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Optimal Vaccine Policies : Spillovers and Incentives, Working Paper 21-06

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Optimal Vaccine Policies : Spillovers and Incentives, Working Paper 21-06

DATE: March 24, 2021

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ABSTRACT: We offer a novel theoretical framework to study optimal vaccination policies. The key features of the model are that agents: 1) differ both in their potential exposure (x) to others and vulnerability (y​) to severe illness, 2) exert negative externalities through interaction, and 3) can take voluntary preventative measures, for instance self-isolation. Our main result is a complete characterization of the second-best policy. Three striking features emerge. First, it is non-monotone – people with intermediate y are vaccinated more than those with either low or high y. Second, it exhibits an exposure premium among those who do not self-isolate – people with higher x require lower overall risk, xy, to be vaccinated. Third, for those who voluntarily self-isolate, it is invariant to y, depending only upon x. Numerical results demonstrate that policies vaccinating only the most vulnerable perform significantly worse than other simple heuristics, especially when supplies are limited.


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Vellodi, Nikhil and Weiss, Joshua. "Optimal Vaccine Policies : Spillovers and Incentives, Working Paper 21-06," Working Papers (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond) (March 24, 2021). https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/3942/item/601662, accessed on November 29, 2023.

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