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For release on delivery
9:00 a.m. EDT
March 20, 2010

Preserving a Central Role for Community Banking

Remarks by
Ben S. Bernanke
Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
Independent Community Bankers of America
Orlando, Florida

March 20, 2010

I’m glad once again to be able to meet with and speak to the Independent
Community Bankers of America. I greatly value the chance to hear directly from you
about the challenges you are facing today. As everyone in this audience knows, those
challenges are daunting indeed, and they go far beyond parochial concerns. Communities
all over America are trying to cope with the economic consequences of the most severe
financial crisis since the Great Depression--high unemployment, lost incomes and wealth,
home foreclosures, strained fiscal budgets, and uncertainty about the future. Because
community banks are integral to local economies, you have been on the front line, so to
speak, deeply engaged in confronting those problems and uncertainties. Your
commitment to your communities, including your willingness to provide credit and
services supporting small businesses, home purchases, and commercial development, is
reason to be optimistic about our nation’s ability to meet the current challenges and return
to economic health.
One of America’s economic strengths is its relatively greater reliance on bottomup rather than top-down growth and development, in which individual creativity, local
knowledge, and the trust born of longstanding relationships help foster economic
creativity and progress. Of course, it is precisely the ability to foster bottom-up growth,
building on local knowledge and relationships, that sets community banks apart from
other financial institutions. It is important for our economic health to maintain a diverse
and resilient financial system in which community banks play an important role.
As the crisis has shown, one of the greatest threats to the diversity and efficiency
of our financial system is the pernicious problem of financial institutions that are deemed
“too big to fail.” I will spend some time today discussing the efforts the Federal Reserve

-2and other policymakers are making to put an end to the too-big-to-fail problem and thus
help foster effective competition in financial services. I also want to speak today about
the links between your institutions and mine. The Federal Reserve has always had a
special relationship with community banks. As we turn from crisis management to
supporting the economic recovery, that relationship will become more important than
ever.
Toward a More Competitive, Efficient, and Innovative Financial System
The United States has a financial system that is remarkably multifaceted and
diverse. Some countries rely heavily on a few large banks to provide credit and financial
services; our system, in contrast, includes financial institutions of all sizes, with a wide
range of charters and missions. We also rely more than any other country on an array of
specialized financial markets to allocate credit and help diversify risks. Our system is
complex, but I think that for the most part its variety is an important strength. We have
many, many ways to connect borrowers and savers in the United States, and directing
saving to the most productive channels is an essential prerequisite to a successful
economy.
That said, for the financial system to do its job well, it must be an impartial and
efficient arbiter of credit flows. In a market economy, that result is best achieved through
open competition on a level playing field, a framework that provides choices to
consumers and borrowers and gives the most innovative and efficient firms the chance to
succeed and grow. Unfortunately, our financial system today falls substantially short of
that competitive ideal.

-3Among the most serious and most insidious barriers to competition in financial
services is the too-big-to-fail problem. Like all of you, I remember well the frightening
weeks in the fall of 2008, when the failure or near-failure of several large, complex, and
interconnected firms shook the financial markets and our economy to their foundations.
Extraordinary efforts by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and other agencies, together with similar actions by our counterparts
in other countries, narrowly averted a global financial collapse. Even with those
extraordinary actions, the economic costs of the crisis have been very severe; but I have
little doubt that, had the global financial system disintegrated, the effects on asset values,
credit availability, and confidence would have resulted in a far deeper and longer-lasting
economic contraction. It is unconscionable that the fate of the world economy should be
so closely tied to the fortunes of a relatively small number of giant financial firms. If we
achieve nothing else in the wake of the crisis, we must ensure that we never again face
such a situation.
The costs to all of us of having firms deemed too big to fail were stunningly
evident during the days in which the financial system teetered near collapse. But the
existence of too-big-to-fail firms also imposes heavy costs on our financial system even
in more placid times. Perhaps most important, if a firm is publicly perceived as too big,
or interconnected, or systemically critical for the authorities to permit its failure, its
creditors and counterparties have less incentive to evaluate the quality of the firm’s
business model, its management, and its risk-taking behavior. As a result, such firms
face limited market discipline, allowing them to obtain funding on better terms than the

-4quality or riskiness of their business would merit and giving them incentives to take on
excessive risks.
Having institutions that are too big to fail also creates competitive inequities that
may prevent our most productive and innovative firms from prospering. In an
environment of fair competition, smaller firms should have a chance to outperform larger
companies. By the same token, firms that do not make the grade should exit, freeing up
resources for other uses. Our economy is not static, and our banking system should not
be static either.
In short, to have a competitive, vital, and innovative financial system in which
market discipline encourages efficiency and controls risk, including risks to the system as
a whole, we have to end the too-big-to-fail problem once and for all. But how can that be
done? Some proposals have been made to limit the scope and activities of financial
institutions, and I think a number of those ideas are worth careful consideration.
Certainly, supervisors should be empowered to limit the involvement of firms in
inappropriately risky activities. But even if such proposals are implemented, our
technologically sophisticated and globalized economy will still need large, complex, and
internationally active financial firms to meet the needs of multinational firms, to facilitate
international flows of goods and capital, and to take advantage of economies of scale and
scope. The unavoidable challenge is to make sure that size, complexity, and
interconnectedness do not insulate such firms from market discipline, potentially making
them ticking time bombs inside our financial system.
To address the too-big-to-fail problem, the Federal Reserve favors a three-part
approach. First, we and our colleagues at other supervisory agencies must continue to

-5develop and implement significantly tougher rules and oversight that serve to reduce the
risks that large, complex firms present to the financial system. Events of the past several
years clearly demonstrate that all large, complex financial institutions, not just bank
holding companies, must be subject to strong regulation and consolidated supervision.
Moreover, the crisis has shown that supervisors must take account of potential risks to the
financial system as a whole, and not just those to individual firms in isolation.
Implementing supervision in a way that seeks to identify systemic risks as well as risks to
individual institutions is a difficult challenge, but the fact is that the traditional approach
of focusing narrowly on individual firms did not succeed in preventing this crisis and
likely would not succeed in the future. Consequently, we at the Federal Reserve have
been working with international colleagues to require that the most systemically critical
firms increase their holdings of capital and liquidity and improve their risk management;
and we are overhauling our supervisory framework for the largest institutions, both to
improve the effectiveness of consolidated supervision and to incorporate in our oversight
a more comprehensive, systemic perspective.
The second component of the strategy to end too-big-to-fail is to increase the
resilience of the financial system itself, to reduce the potential damage from a systemic
event like the failure of a major firm. For example, the Federal Reserve has been leading
collaborative efforts to improve the clearing and settlement of credit default swaps and
other derivatives and to enhance the stability of markets for repurchase agreements.
Limiting the fallout from the failure of a major firm is not only directly beneficial in a
crisis, it also helps to reduce the too-big-to-fail problem, because the government has

-6much less reason to intervene if it believes that the financial system is resilient enough to
handle a significant failure without excessive disruption.
Third, because government oversight alone will never be sufficient to anticipate
all risks, increasing market discipline is an essential piece of any strategy for combating
too-big-to-fail. To create real market discipline for the largest firms, market participants
must be convinced that if one of these firms is unable to meet its obligations, its
shareholders, creditors, and counterparties will not be protected from losses by
government action. To make such a threat credible, we need a new legal framework that
will allow the government to wind down a failing, systemically critical firm without
doing serious damage to the broader financial system. In other words, we need an
alternative for resolving failing firms that is neither a disorderly bankruptcy nor a bailout.
A prototype for such a framework already exists--namely, the rules set forth in the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 for dealing with a
failing bank. As the FDIC is now able to do with a failing bank, the government should,
under appropriate circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, be able to seize and
wind down a failing, systemically critical firm. Institutions should not be permitted to
receive assistance while open, but authorities must be empowered to sell, merge, or break
up an institution as necessary to avoid a disorderly unraveling that threatens the financial
system as a whole. The resolution agency should not be allowed to protect shareholders
and other capital providers and it should have clear authority to impose losses on debt
holders, override contracts, and replace managers and directors as appropriate. If, in the
end, funds must be injected to resolve a systemically critical institution safely, the

-7ultimate cost must not fall on taxpayers or small financial institutions, but on those
institutions that are the source of the too-big-to-fail problem.
I don’t want to understate the difficulties of creating an effective resolution
framework for large, interconnected firms. Such firms can be extraordinarily complex,
both in terms of their legal structure and in the range and sophistication of their activities.
The resolution of large institutions whose operations span many countries poses
particular challenges, as legal frameworks vary across countries, and the authorities in
each country naturally seek to protect the interests of depositors and creditors in their
own jurisdictions. We must also recognize that such resolutions might well take place in
the context of a broader crisis, in which the government might be forced to address
problems at multiple firms simultaneously. Careful planning is therefore essential. An
idea worth exploring is to require firms to develop and maintain a so-called living will,
which will help firms and regulators identify ways to simplify and untangle the firm
before a crisis occurs.1
The Federal Reserve and Community Banks
The Federal Reserve and community banks have much in common beyond our
mutual concerns about the too-big-to-fail problem. Our interest in community banks has
its roots in the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913, nearly a century ago. President
Woodrow Wilson and the other founders of the Fed, taking note of two previous failed
attempts to establish a U.S. central bank, intentionally avoided creating a single,
monolithic institution located in Washington or New York. Instead, they established a
system of 12 Reserve Banks located in major cities around the country. (It was a federal
1

See Daniel K. Tarullo (2009), “Supervising and Resolving Large Financial Institutions,” speech delivered
at the Institute of International Bankers Conference on Cross-Border Insolvency Issues, New York, N.Y.,
November 10, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20091110a.htm.

-8system--hence the term, “Federal Reserve.”) Why was America’s central bank given this
unique structure? The reason was to provide legitimacy and a broad geographic presence
across the nation for an institution that often has to make difficult decisions. Over time,
this structure has provided the Federal Reserve with grassroots connections, local
insights, and diverse perspectives that few other federal institutions enjoy.
We are always looking for opportunities to interact with and learn from
community bankers. Events like this one are an important venue for exchanging ideas, as
I’ve mentioned, but there are many others. For example, community bankers sit on our
Federal Advisory Council, which meets with the Board of Governors for three mornings
each year to discuss developments in the economy and in the banking industry. We meet
on a similar schedule with a second official council, the Thrift Institutions Advisory
Council, which brings together thrifts, saving banks, and a variety of other depository
institutions, most of them smaller, from around the country. In addition, community
bankers sit on the boards and the advisory councils of the Fed’s 12 regional Reserve
Banks and 24 Reserve Bank branches. Both the Board and the Reserve Banks organize
regular meetings involving community banks and a range of other participants. For
example, the Reserve Banks are meeting with community bankers, community
development organizations, and other stakeholders to discuss barriers to and
opportunities for extending credit to small businesses.
Of course, many of our regular interactions with community banks arise from our
oversight of bank holding companies and state-chartered banks that choose to join the
Federal Reserve System. This supervision is guided by the Board, but conducted day-today by the Reserve Banks and their examiners, many of whom have lived and worked

-9within the Districts they serve for many years. We believe this approach ensures that
Federal Reserve supervision of community banks is consistent and disciplined but also
reflects a local perspective that can take account of differences in regional economic
conditions. For example, in the Midwest, where many community banks specialize in
agricultural lending, Federal Reserve examiners maintain a special expertise in the
agricultural economy and the associated lending practices. They also draw frequently on
the expertise of regional and agricultural economists in the Districts to maintain an up-todate understanding of local conditions. So while many bankers tell us that Federal
Reserve examiners are analytical and tough, few tell us that they are unfair or uninformed
about what’s going on in the local economy. We believe that this kind of response
speaks to the effectiveness of our supervisory program for community banks, and we take
pride in the professionalism and quality of our community bank examiners.
One particularly valuable aspect of our federal structure is that, over the years, it
has provided policymakers in Washington with a way to keep in close touch with the
continent-spanning, highly varied economy of the United States. When I attend board of
directors meetings at regional Reserve Banks, which I do regularly, one of the most
interesting portions is the go-round, during which each director provides his or her
perspective on local economic developments. Quite often, the directors who are
community bankers provide some of the most valuable contributions. That fact should
not be surprising. By their nature, community banks interact with many parts of the area
economy--consumers, small businesses, large businesses, real estate developers, even
local governments. This breadth of vision, together with a good sense of the underlying
economic forces at work in each locality, gives community bankers a unique perspective

- 10 on the developments in their part of the country. When the Fed analyzes economic
developments, of necessity we rely on official economic data to identify broad national
trends. However, the official data often mask the diversity of the U.S. economy;
moreover, the data are inherently backward-looking, telling us what happened in the past
quarter or year. In contrast, the grass-roots information that we obtain from community
bankers and the other community and business leaders who serve as Reserve Bank
directors provides a forward-looking perspective on economic developments and
concerns, as well as a level of detail and qualitative insight that is often lost in the
aggregate numbers.
Our contacts with community bankers also provide critical insights into the state
of our nation’s banks. Because of the remarkable diversity of the U.S. financial system, a
supervisory agency that focused only on the largest banking institutions, without
knowledge of community banks, would get a limited and potentially distorted picture of
what was happening in our banking system as a whole. Close connections with
community bankers enable the Federal Reserve to better understand the full range of
financial concerns and risks facing the country, such as the current difficult problems in
commercial real estate lending and the impediments to small business lending. For
example, recent patterns in commercial loan growth are very different at large and small
banks, and our links to community bankers help us to better understand these trends. The
community banking perspective is also critical as we try to assess the burden and
effectiveness of financial regulation.
As a group, community banks are also important to the nation’s financial stability,
a particular focus and responsibility of the Federal Reserve. Although it was not the case

- 11 in the current crisis, instability can be generated by small institutions as well as by large
ones--as occurred in the Great Depression or in the thrift crisis, to cite two particularly
dramatic examples. Additionally, as a lender through our discount window to community
banks and other depository institutions, we rely on information and expertise obtained
from our supervisory responsibilities to lend safely, particularly in times of stress.
For all these reasons, our supervisory relationships with the state-chartered banks
that have joined the Federal Reserve System are immensely valuable, as is the range of
contacts we have with community banks.
Conclusion
I know that community banks, with their special strengths, can flourish in a
system that provides fair competition; indeed, many of you have stepped up during a
difficult time to provide credit to support the economic recovery. To create a more
competitive system, as well as a safer one, we need to end the too-big-to-fail problem
once and for all. We will continue to focus on this issue, and we welcome constructive
ideas from all quarters.
We at the Federal Reserve look forward to maintaining our long-standing
relationships with community bankers. You bring us insights into the banking industry
and the economy that we can obtain nowhere else. And as the recovery progresses, we
expect that you will continue to aid the nation’s return to prosperity by making good
loans to creditworthy borrowers in your communities. We want to continue to work with
you to help you play this important role. In doing so, together we will help ensure a
bright future both for our economy and for community banking.