Multiple Ratings and Credit Standards : Differences of Opinion in the Credit Rating Industry, Research Paper 9527

Multiple Ratings and Credit Standards : Differences of Opinion in the Credit Rating Industry, Research Paper 9527

DATE: December 1995

• Research Papers (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

• Cantor, Richard
• Packer, Fred

ABSTRACT: This paper tests whether the tendency of third rating agencies to assign higher ratings than Moody's and Standard & Poor's results from more lenient standards or sample selection bias. More lenient standards might result from incentives to satisfy issuers who are, in fact, the purchasers of the ratings. Selection bias might be important because issuers that expect a low rating from a third agency are unlikely to request one. Our analysis of a broad sample of corporate bond ratings at year-end 1993 reveals that, although sample selection bias appears important, it explains less than half the observed difference in average ratings. The paper also investigates why bond issuers seek ratings in addition to those of Moody's and Standard & Poor's. Contrary to expectations, the probability of obtaining a third rating is not found to be related to levels of ex ante uncertainty over firm default probabilities. In particular, a firm's decision to obtain a third rating appears unrelated to its Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings or the amount of disagreement between them. Instead, the most important determinants of the decision are a firm's age and size. The results should be of interest to investors and financial market regulators who generally use the ratings of different agencies as if they correspond to similar levels of default risk. In addition, our findings raise a number of questions about the certification role of rating agencies and about the strength of the rating agencies' incentives to maintain a reputation for high quality (accurate) ratings.

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