Monetary Policy, Transparency, and Credibility, March 23-24, 2007
The conference on “Monetary Policy, Transparency, and Credibility” was held at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March 23 and 24, 2007. At this conference, academic researchers and policymakers gathered to discuss six research papers that focused on transparency and credibility and how central banks can achieve their goals by effectively communicating their views on monetary policy as well as their views on the economy, which inherently involve some degree of uncertainty.
- 2000s
- Monetary Policy, Transparency, and Credibility - Agenda
- The Limits of Transparency
- Banking and Interest Rates in Monetary Policy Analysis: A Quantitative Exploration
- Monetary Policy and its Informative Value
- Three Great American Disinflations
- Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization
- Welfare-Maximizing Monetary Policy Under Parameter Uncertainty
In order to aid in the retrieval of information from this publication, significant tables, charts, and/or articles have been extracted and can be viewed individually or across a span of issues.
- Economic Research Conferences
- Economic Letter No. 2007-12: Monetary Policy, Transparency, and Credibility: Conference Summary
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
