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Working Paper Series

Optimal Disinflationary Paths

WP 95-01

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/

Peter N. Ireland
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

WORKING
PAPER95-1

OPTIMALDISINFLATIONARY
PATHS
Peter N. Ireland*

Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
January 1995

*I would like to thank John Cochrane, Thomas Cooley, Jeffrey Lacker, Kevin
Reffett, Stacey Schreft, Alan Stockman, John Weinberg, and seminar
participants at Florida State, Iowa, and the Minneapolis Fed for helpful
comments and suggestions. The opinions expressed herein are my own and do not
necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the
Federal Reserve System.

Abstract
This

paper

general

characterizes

equilibrium
Starting

setting.
disinflation
fully

optimizing

from a steady

state

of disinflation

using

other

in the context

agents

and staggered

with

policy

when the monetary

to be welfare-improving,

be replaced

policy

positive

when announcements

Disinflationary

and employment

fails

monetary

model with

is desirable

credible.

the benefits

optimal

yields

authority

still

exceed

however,

distortionary

of

credibility;

the costs.

when lost
taxes.

a rapid

monetary

substantial

losses

policy

are

in output

nevertheless,

Disinflation

seignorage

a

price

inflation,

future

lacks

of

often

revenues

must

1.

Introduction
The inflation

peak of

over

stabilized

should

at an average

annual

the average

inflation

rate

1983,

of price

monetary

model to suggest

in fact,

still

stabil1ty.l

reaching

inflation

further,
n

after

however,

This

how the final

paper
stage

a

has

The Federal

of 4 percent.’

rate

goal

States

Reserve
if

uses

it

is

to

a general

of disinflation

proceed.

simple

work with

answer
like.

agents’

to the question

and Hansen

variables

general

to the extent

decisions

as they

balances.

Optimal

the Friedman

the nominal

interest

wages and prices
is

either

short-run

costs

Friedman

rule

monetary

that

inflation

acts

of

zero.

Moreover,

the

these

Hence,

be adopted

the models

an immediate

completely

offset

the gains

and Taylor

(1983)

analyze

is,

(1987)
real

distorting
on their

cash

tax by
to make

assume that
that

nominal

the Phillips

they

indicate

identify
that

no

the

immediately.

or wages are not perfectly
of

imply

that

or positively-sloped;

affects

inflation

models

a

path

the money supply

so they

flexible,

policy

as a tax,

contracting

provides

and Huffman

to economize

eliminates

disinflation.

should

costs

in efforts

rule,

are perfectly

When prices
be short-run

rate

of Greenwood

instance,

policy

models

disinflationary

for

(1969)

vertical

models

engage

monetary

monetary

of what the optimal

(19891,

only

following

equilibrium

In the cash-in-advance

and Cooley

curve

in the United

Since

long-run

Previous

looks

sharply

in 1980.

its

equilibrium

fell

13 percent

must reduce
achieve

rate

flexible,

disinflation

from removing
the problem

the

that
inflation

of disinflation

1

however,
partially
tax.
with

there

may

or
Phelps

models

(1979)

featuring

overlapping

labor

contracts

Both Phelps

periods.

disinflationary
employment
the rate

path

along

of money growth
price

setting

can actually

money supply

is

the

chosen

and Taylor’s,

on output

suggest,

however,

wages are

output,

of

path

the striking

of

(19941

result

that

provided

that

and
a reduction

uses

a model of

the path

called
output

in

a quick

in Ball’s

disinflation

several

a

output

Ball

decreases

for

involves

Nevertheless,

This

paper

flexible

current

adds to the

goods

that

economizing
Here,

that

is

for

for

the

model as in
by the

and employment

in

by Danzlger

prices.

setting
none of
on their

the presence

than on welfare.

differs

from

Danzlger

(1988)

to be welfare-improving
similar
of

research

or

the optimal

shows that

an

in a model of

initiated

of past

are

2

used

provides

in the face

a cash-in-advance

inflation

between

and those

models

cash balances

and

the consequences

difference

here

by Phelps

by considering

the effects

the earlier

results

to Ball’s.

and Ball

developed

Their

path when prices

significantly

Indeed,

The major

of

of disinflationary

disinflationary

line

in a model where

price
is

may fall

the effects

rather

case.

setting

and continued

disinflation

consider

the optimal

not perfectly

price

tax.

this

gradual.

models

and Ball

that

staggered

for

only

and employment

disinflation

however,

initial

the instantaneous

immediate

staggered

levels

increase

in the flexible-price

Taylor

the

show that

is

in advance

the existence

appropriately.

Taylor,

policies

into

that

wages

run.

Phelps,

of

both

cash-in-advance

short

path

which

nominal

demonstrate

to derive

disinflation

flexible-price

fix

and Taylor

are maintained;

staggered

Phelps

that

the model of

in previous
agents

of

constraint

built

with

a positive
implies

work,
a motive
inflation
that

the

inflation

tax has the

traditional

The model can therefore

be used

disinflation
removing

due to nominal
the

inflation

from conventional
permits
of

policy

with

section

Section

3 then defines

Section

4 derives

alternatives:

(1986)

prescribed

taxes.
with

from
here

the

for

it

implications

the optimal

called

differs

to which

Thus,

disinflation

section

selgnorage

staggered

switch

of price

policy

to zero
stability,

money growth,
and the

monetary

by the

emphasize

the effects

and Hansen

(1991)

an immediate
revenues

setting.

only

must be replaced
their

of

result

Finally,

section

3

the

to the

of

model.

the monetary

disinflationary

of disinflation

when

to an announced

change

cash-in-advance

to be welfare-improving

using

carries

with

models.

use a flexible-price
falls

switch

to the basic

gradually

disinflation

to two

consistent

the role

5 investigates

equilibrium.
it

cash-in-advance

the outcome

respond

setting.

immediate

two modifications

(19931

price

and compares

in determining

6 asks whether
price

staggered

the model economy's

by flexible-price

expectations

Cooley

Section

monetary

and Goodfriend

to show that

when lost

of

benefits

in the extent

by comparing

the model of

on to consider

credibility

agents'

in policy.
model

goes

Thus,

private

only

and characterizes

goal

The paper

policies.

outlines

an immediate

rule

authority's

long-run

dlsturbances.3

immediate

the optimal

Reserve's

Sargent

the

costs

the model presented

models

isolated

on money demand.

the short-run
the

In addition,

are

effects

models.

The next

Friedman

with

to monetary

setting

here

flexible-price

Federal

rigidity

tax.

to adjust
price

found

to compare

cash-in-advance

prices

staggered

dlstortlonary

other
over

dlstortlonary
to the environment

7 concludes.

2.

A Model of Staggered Price Setting
As indicated

monetary

model

above,

that

this

borrows

most of

cash-in-advance

models

Hansen

The model departs

( 1989 I.

introducing
(19831,
is

an element

a staggered

not derived

as a tractable
continuously
their

provide

nominal

goods

(see,
Cooley
nominal
appear

consider
rigidities

do not all

a list

price

price

as in Blanchard

rigidity.

Here,

structure

of

and second,

is

simply

that

firms

do so simultaneously.

Ohanlan

that

document

by

and
serves

cannot

when firms

studies

imposed

The framework

that

empirical

however,

do change
and Stockman

rigidity

in

prices.
most of

market

find

rather

that

the nature
as well

(19941,
than

nominal

the focus

in the

nominal

models
While

for

of

optimal

as price

1990).

research.

4

of

left

thought
real

hand,
job

correlations
it

would

in economies
is

of

do a better

that

policy

are widely

behavior

models

rigidity

emphasis

On the other

a variety

this

on nominal

models

work indicates

rigidities,

the contributions

This

the cyclical

wage setting

monetary

is

market.

wage contracting

at matching

their

here

labor

Manklw 1987 and King
that

including

literature,

implications

setting

in the data.

the recent

and Ball

instance,

(1992)

prices

and

ones,

first,

their

and Cooley

from more conventional

two ideas:

counterfactual

for

(1987)

way of

the fact

to have

and Huffman

setting

capturing

equilibrium

from the flexible-price

frictions.

(19881

in the goods

structure

underlying

Following
by Danzlger

price

a general

from more basic,

they

(1994)

of nominal

develops

its

Greenwood

nominal

adjust

prices,

reflects

of

section

Cho and
than
that

be useful

with

as a task

wages

wage
for

future

to

2.1.

The Economic Environment
The economy consists

government

(or monetary

by le{l,2,3,4);

there

different

produce

there

types

are four

of

infinitely-lived

are N identical

types

different

of goods

by firms

of

Each consists

of

members:

three

At the beginning
sequence
each

of

{Ht)rzo

household's

supply

a worker,

bond trader

t=O,

at each

according

four

indexed

each

Firms of

consumption
also

types,

type.

Hence,

goods.

indexed

by 1, where good

are all

a shopper,

the monetary
transfers
date

identical.

and a bond trader.

authority

that

it

announces

plans

t=O,l,Z,....

M;+Hr'

where MS
t+l denotes

the per-household

and the beginning

of

the government's

are of

the

to make to

The nominal

money

to

Mt+l=

now,

and a

by t=0,1,2,....

of period

period

households,

The N households

i.

lump-sum monetary

then evolves

of

perishable

type

and indexed

firms

in the economy,

1 is produced

Time ls'dlscrete

The firms

authority).

firms,

t+l.

activity

t=0,1,2,...,
money supply

By choice
is

limited

of

at the end of

nominal

units,

to making these

period
Mi=l.

t
For

monetary

transfers.
Firms
of

its

monetary

households
behavior

2.2.

and households

act
of

policy
as if

each,

perceive

{M:+r}to
they

given

the government's

as fully

have perfect

the announced

time

credible.
foresight

policy

Hence,
from

{M~+l)~zo,

t=O announcement
firms

and

t=O forward.
is described

The
next.

Firm Behavior
Each firm

technology

for

of

type

producing

1 has access
good

1.

If

to a constant

returns

the representative

to scale

type

1 firm

hires

n it units

of

then

labor,

Firms are

Specifically,

output

is fixed

interval,

the firm

setting

is

setting

new prices

to sell

at prices

dates

its

while

all

set

new prices

each

date

this

at which

t.

its

four-period

one type

types

are

set

Price
are

constrained

new prices

at

at dates

at dates

firm

for

price.

teT3={3,7,11,...},

teT4={4,8,12,...).

conditions;

the first

of

Type 1 firms

new prices

price

fixed

three

new prices

at dates

its

at time

setting

a nominal

firms

the other

set

output

During

all

period.

2 firms

3 firms

until

to set

on demand at

of

of

and price

interval.

output

firms

as initial

price

required

in a previous

1, type

taken

production

in each period,

1, type

set

is

units

ylt=nit

a four-period

so that

set

4 firms

initial

each

must supply

staggered

teT2={2,6,10,...

at t=O are

in their

over

teT’={l,5,9,...

and type

can produce

constrained

decisions.
that

it

is
it

Goods prices

constrained

is

to sell

permitted

to set

at
a

new price.
An individual

type

other

firms

as given.

price

p and all

individual
je{O,

prices

firm

1,2,3),

other

1 firm

type

sets
If

and time
other
sets

choose

type

to set
units

time teT’
i firm

price

of

p,,

output

taking
chooses

then

the
to set

the

at each

date

t+j,

where

is

t+j.4

firms’

at

individual

c I,+,(p,p,)

C ,,+,(P,P,)

and c it+,(p)

the

1 firms

must produce

a new price

=

the representative
That is,

price,

the same price

it

if

the

if

P<P,

cit+,(pI
0

lf

P’P,

if

P’P,

household’s
individual

must satisfy

as the other

NCit+,(Pl

demand for
firm

sets

the demand of
firms,

6

it

(1)

all

must satisfy

its

good
price

1 at price
below

N households.

p

the
If

it

the same demand as

the other

If

firms.

attracts

it

the gross

individual
its

its

price

above

the other

firms

price,

it

no demand.
let

For t=0,1,2,...,
denote

sets

type

price

is

nominal

interest

1 firm's

fixed

wt denote

the nominal

rate

discounted

between

profits

at p and the other

type

wage at time
periods

over

the

1 firms

t and Rt
The

t and t+l.
interval

price

during

is

fixed

which
at p,

are
X(P.P,l

(p-wt)Clt(P’Pt)+ (P-Wt+1 )Clt+&P’Ptmt

=

(21
+ (p-w
since

the

t+2

1c it+2(P,pt)/(R
R

t t+1

individual

firm

p to maximize

interest
setting

rates

p,

This

are

0

all

type

=

i firms

and all

competed

zero-profit

to determine

type

of

labor

the representative

type

demands ~~~+,(p,p~),

1 firms'

price

p,,

to meet
1 firm

wages w

t+J'

and the price

as given.

in equilibrium

profits

teT',

taking

Rt+J, the other

rules
Since

x(p,pt),

units

c It+,(p,pt)

must hire

At each date

demand at time t+j.
chooses

1 + (P-w~*,)c~~+~(P,P~)/IR
R R
1,
t t+1 t+2

are

will

earn

profits

away in equilibrium,

condition,

along

the equilibrium

with

price

of

will

choose

the same price
Positive

rt=n(pt,pt).

so that
equations

rrt=O for
(1)

p, as the solution

+ (Pt-wt+1 )c&p,VR

(Pt-wt)cJPt)

all

identical,

all

and (21,

t=0,1,2,....
is

sufficient

to

t

(3)
+ (Pt-W,+2)Clt+2(Pt)/(RtRt+l)
With p, given
C It+,(p1

below,
Thus,

by the solution

consistent
the

with

individual

the nominal

price

+ (P,-~~+~)c~~+~(P,)/(R~R~+~R~+~).
to

the optimizing

type
p,,

1 firm
of

good

(3)

and the demand functions

behavior

maximizes

of

r(p,pt)

1 at time t is
7

households
by choosing
given

by

described
p=p,.

P 1t

Pt

=

for

teT'

for

MT'

(4)

p,,-,
t

for

and by initial

t=l,2,3,...
Although

the course
firm

competition

of

each

rt=n(p,,p,)

eliminates

interval

may make a nonzero

conditions

during

profit

must be zero

for

is nonzero
firms,

nit

covering

t,

then

this

price

any single
it

If

is

profits

fixed,

period.

over

an individual

That is,

may be that

nit,

while
given

by

(Plt-wt)cJPJ'

type

t=0,1,2,....

its

discounted

and 1~{1,2,3,4).

to the representative

period

in period

2.3.

any t=0,1,2,...

so the representative

profits
each

for

which

t=0,1,2,...,
=

It
it

t=O.

each firm's

during
all

for

1 firm

The households

delivers

household's

nltCO,

so that

the representative

its

current-period

bond trader
the type

own the

at the end of

1 firm

incurs

bond trader

is

responsible

preferences

are described

a loss

for

loss.

Household Behavior
The representative

utility

household's

by the

function

(5)

where
time
work,

c It is
t.

the household's

During

shop,

each

and trade

period
bonds

The representative
supply

to firms

of

each

consumption

1 and xt is

t=0,1,2,...,

the three

in spatially

distinct

household's
type

of good

worker

1~{1,2,3,4)

8

members of

leisure

at

the household

markets.

decides

during

its

each

how much labor
period

nit

t=0,1,2,...

to

subject

to the constraints
4
1

E:

xt +

t=0,1,2,....

1 nit,

(61

I=1

The time endowment in equation
The representative
consumption
Since

he shops

worker
his

goods

is

shopper,

of each

in different

meanwhile,

from those

required

to unity.

type during

markets

he is

beginning-of-period

advance

is normalized

household's

from firms

employed,

(6)

to pay for

money holdings

each

period

in which
all

of

That is,

Mt.

purchases
t=0,1,2,....

his

his

household's

purchases

he faces

out of

the cash-ln-

constraints
4

Mt

=

t=0,1,2,....

CPAs

(7)

i=l

At the end of period
trader

receives

the shopper,
from

the wage earnings

and current-period

the government.

accumulate

profits

the cash Mt+i that

traders

from other

bonds.

Bonds paying

dollars

at the end of

Bt+Mt+H

his

4

4

n

i=l

It.

+

will

c

any unspent

carry

the bond trader

of

bond
from

transfer

funds

into

to

the following

from or lends

or purchasing
time

cash

and the

sources

borrows

at the end of
Thus,

t c

these

also

by issuing

time t.

+w

uses

household

Bt+I dollars

household's

from the firms,

bond trader

households

t

from the worker,

The bond trader

The representative

period.

the representative

t=O,l,Z,...,

to

one-period

discount

trade

Bt+I/Rt

t+l

faces

for

the constraints

4

a

2

It.

c

PC
+M
+B
m9
it 1t
t+i
t+1
t

(8)

IS1

I=1

t=0,1,2,....
The representative
M

t+1'

and Bt+l to maximize

household
the utility

chooses

sequences

function
9

for

(51 subject

tit,

nit,

to the

xt,

constraints

(6)-(81,

taking

the

initial

conditions

3.

Equilibrium Defined and Characterized

such

discounted

profits

(ill)

households

labor

markets

is defined

that:

(1)

bonds

over

each

behave

clear.

optimally;

=

and labor

markets
=c

It

conditions

for

household's

it'

n

and writ and

for

prices

each

firm

earns

its

price

is

the money,

bond,

goods,

which

M

it'

problem.

clear

in its
t+1’

These

supply,

and
zero

fixed;
and

when
)....
the bond market

clears

when

t=0,1,2,....

0,

=

(ii)

t=0,1,2

net

when
t=0,1,2,...,

household's

linear,
c

during

Mt+l'

It’

The representative
are

p,,,

sequences

optimally;

and (iv)

in zero
t+1

constraints

of

The money market clears

are available

n

behave

interval

B
The goods

Ht, wt. Rt,

as a collection

firms

M:+l
Since

for

MO=1 and Bo=O as given:

An equilibrium
quantities

the sequences

objective

choice

function

variables.

and B

first

lo{l.2,3.4).

t+1

order

is

Thus,

characterize
conditions

concave,

the first

the solution
imply

that

and its
order

to the
in

equilibrium,
n

It

=c

=

1t
W

M;/(4pJ,

t =

orM;+1/(4PL

t=0,1,2,..., 1~{1,2,3,4),
t=0,1,2,...,

(9)
(101

and
Rt
Equations

(3)

=

M,S+2/(PM;+1I,

and (4)

summarize

t=0,1,2,....
the implications

(11)
of

firm

optimization

and the zero-profit

In light

condition.

function

in equation

(91-(11)

imply

(3)

that

is given

equation

(3)

of

equation

(91,

by c it+J(p1=MI+J/(4p).
can be rewritten

the demand
Thus,

equations

as

MI + @M;+l + 8G;+2 + s":+,
P,

(12)

#

=
+ @MS /MS

t+2 + s":+2m:+3

t+1

+ 133Mi+3/M:+4

I

t=1,2,3,....
Equations
in terms of
supply

(4)

the

initial

sequence

its

they

prices

and quantities
and the money

show how equilibrium

monetary

equilibrium

money growth

equilibrium

M:=l and {p,,,p2,,p3,,p4,~

Thus,

varies

on the economy's

the moment that

express

conditions

{M:+l)Fzo.

as the government
policy

and (9)-(12)

policy.

Two key effects

are best

;r,=M:+r/MI is

outcomes

illustrated

constant,

of

change

monetary

by assuming

with

r,=r

for

for

all

t=0,1,2,....
Equation
the nominal

Greenwood

positive

nominal

teT1.

(10)

wage wt also

During

type

under

also

the constant

constant,

and Cooley

rate

provides

on their

cash

The government

the Friedman

representative

is

(1987)

interest

economize

Equation

that

with

money growth

Rt=R=~/p

model as in the flexible-price

and Huffman

consumption.

following

rate

In this

nominal

inefficiently
less

indicates

interest

t=o, 1,2 ) . . . .
of

(11)

(1969)

grows

three

sets

its

periods,

price

with

a strictly
to

more leisure

and

inefficiency

by

of

7=/3.

rate
above

money growth
r.

When r>l,

the nominal

the wage rises

11

models

an incentive

source

the constant

at the constant

1 firm

the next

under

with

(19891,

by enjoying

can remove this

rule,

shows that

households

r,

all

cash-in-advance

and Hansen

balances

for

rate

while

rate

r,

the

the
wage at date

the price

remains
zero

fixed;

eventually

discounted

profits

profits

early

firm

sets

fall

during

relative
that

its

price

below

the next
r=l,

efficiency
This

periods

condition

model,

only

therefore,

contracting

the money supply,

the optimal

monetary

utility-maximizing

4.

that

smaller

cost

sees

however,

a tension

policy

The next

is

is

the

tension

period
consistent

inflation

tax by

efficiency

which
is

with

the monetary

productive

section,

manner

constant.

between

can remove

the wage

requires

wt in every

monetary

the

than the fixed

efficiency,

shows how this

then

moves in a saw-tooth

but can guarantee

policy,

teT1,

when the money supply

fixed.

when r<l,

only

characterizes

resolved

in a

way.

Optimal Disinflation
Let

inflation:

initial

goods

prices

to continue

At t=O, however,

the monetary

follow

believe

come from an equilibrium

p4,=gp30=g2p2,=g3pIo,

the money supply

will

price

The government

the money supply

is

marginal

features

objectives.

by holding

its

implies

authority's

it

Productive

equal

(10)

until

earns

by making positive

Conversely,

wage at date

The firm

price.

interval

later.

nominal

wage.

p,,

Equation

t=0,1,2,....

losses

the firm's

price

the fixed

the four-period

the nominal

three

to the nominal

the firm's

this

over

on and incurring

Unless

price.

the wage exceeds

this

an alternative
announcement

where g>l.
expanding

at the

authority

path

Prior

{M~+l}~=o instead.

and act

from t=O forward

12

to t=O,

inflation

announces

with

that

positive

agents
rate

g>l

expect
forever.

the money supply

Firms and households
with

perfect

foresight,

taking

prices

perfectly

set

optimal

utility

disinflationary
To compute

set

quarter

equal

fixed

preference

wages,

neither

any of

monetary
Rt-1,

rate

of

policy.

by Ball

by equations

(4)

the representative
the economy's

the preference

in the model
(19941,

(9)-(12)

the equilibrium
levels

these

variables

Thus,

a is

goods

indicate

levels

of

equal

xtrO and nit20

do not bind

prices
that

the

a affects

rate

to 10, which

one

consumption,

are determined,

nor the growth

set

parameter

represents

individual

Equations

only

constraints

the other

of

money

guarantees
without

results.

It

on the the

and output.

is

constitutes

path,

period

Once their

inflation.

policy

each

intervals.

1 shows the optimal

annual

maximizes

disinflationary

CLaffects

the nonnegativity

percent

constraints

and prices.

the optimal

Figure

to these

so that

one-year

the growth

affecting

that

as suggested

parameter

leisure,

'M~+ll~zo

the optimal

to 0.99,

for

are determined

announcement

path.

Thus,

year.

remain

that

subject

the policy

as given;

and quantities

The sequence

household's

under

Prices

credible.

and (9)-(121.

#3 is

at t=O and earlier

disinflationary

traces

out

inflation

Aggregate

output

path

the effects

rate,

the net

is measured

starting
of

from a 4

the optimal

nominal

interest

rate

as

4

yt = c%t
I=1

and is normalized

so that

and labor

implies

that

Inflation

is

by dividing

calculated
nominal

Yo=l.

Yt also

The market clearing
serves

as an index

as the growth

expenditure

rate

by real

13

of

output:

condition
of

total

the price

for

goods

employment.

level

Pt,

obtained

4

=

pt

Y;' 1 P,&,.
I=1

1, money and prices

In figure
which

period,
rate

corresponds

and aggregate

steady
rate

state
of

prices

prior

the slower

maintaining

requires

a similar

determined
initial

their

increase

per year,

are

when the economy

constant

The optimal

at t=O, which

policy

that

and employment

money holdings

calls

does

later.

in his

model of

Since

not

percent

interest

in its

initial

on real

Phelps

in the

goods

(1979)

finds

disinflation

households

translate

per

an increase

the effect

MOwhen the new policy

in money growth

is

for

occurs

jump in money growth.

0.985

and the nominal

counteracts

money growth

output

of

to 4 percent

to t=O.

money growth
of

that

output

grow at the rate

have already

is

into

announced,

the

a distortlonary

tax.
Real
response
lower

output

to the unexpected

inflation

addition,

following
starts

balances
tax,

reduces

t=O,
between

t=O and t=l,
at t=O,

and increases

household's
of

consumption

demand for

slower

immediately,

even

though

partly

but also

real

money growth

at t=l.

during

money growth

in

because

balances

and money demand increasing,

In

increases
the

the
does

a

inflation
not begin

to

t=l.
money growth
r=g and r=l.

converges
Thus,

the benefits

of

the Friedman

and the benefits

of

zero

efficiency.

between

of money growth

leisure

With output

to fall
until

After
lies

burst

t=O in anticipation

period.

decelerate

that

tax

by 2 percent

the representative

at the end of

rate

increases

Disinflation

is

quickly
in the

to a new steady

long

run,

the optimal

rule,

which

eliminates

money growth,

which

ensures

largely

complete
14

after

state

the

value

policy
inflation

productive

one year.

Since

the

inflation

tax

exactly

is permanently

as in flexible-price
Figure

growth

2 displays

policy,

percent

annual

initial

burst

falls

the effects

As before,

slightly

inflation

with

Table

take

but

eliminating

percentage

of

percent

annual

welfare

gains

adopting

smaller.
policy

consumption.

rule

partially
1 also

setting,

These
monetary

Here,

come close

results

policy

with

4

without

the

policy.

as the effects

2 nor

off

of

Output

reducing

that

the

the

percent

those

under

while

of

the

obtained

benefits;

are optimal

announcements

that

it

is desirable

are perfectly
15

that

inflation

the gain
path

is

from

0.0223

eliminating

a 10
These

from immediately

adjustment

flexible-price

costs

of

hence,
the zero

switch

goods

continuing

(19891

neither

measured

four

consumption.

the net

under

gain

is

money growth

to the Friedman

to the optimum in welfare

suggest

all

the optimal

and Hansen's

immediate

models

of

from optimally

long-run

that

of disinflation,

It shows that

using

the short-run

reveals

by flexible-price
both

0.0874

in Cooley

offset

shown in figure

prescribed

state

sharply

in consumption

inflation

equals

model.

Table

money

stability

the optimal

consequences

The gain

are much smaller

the Friedman

disinflation

steady

under

a zero

price

falls

policies.

annual

inflation

cash-in-advance

rate

as well

the disinflationary

total

in its

later

increase

household

a 4 percent

percent

increases

adopting

Reserve's

occurs

on the welfare

makes the representative
is under

that

higher,

over.

1 reports

as the permanent

as it

the Federal

money growth

permanently

models.

immediately

The inflation

at first,

tax

of

the economy begins

inflation.
of

remains

cash-in-advance

consistent

objective.

output

reduced,

staggered

rule

price

terms.
to disinflate

credible.

Sargent

quickly
(1986)

when
and

Goodfriend

(19931,

credibility
practice.
respond

however,

can be a major

stumbling

Under the optimal

policy

to promises

initially

of

different

they

instead

observe

the next

changes

if
of

section

agents

this

even
this

to the faster
that

how the optimal
announcements

of

policy

1, households

of

money growth

authority's

as fully

perfect

Fischer

in

and firms

as money growth

policy

might

money growth
they

be
that

are promised.

disinflationary

path

are no longer

perceived

credible.

money growth

policy.

As before,

money growth
policy

rate

'M;+l';zo

and households

(19861,

foresight

future

on their

and their

respond

g>l.
that

only

it

plans

agents'

incorporated

the monetary

into

expectations

to an announced

in a steady

to implement

each
of

that

t forward.

is

state

of

change
under

authority

in

a constant

announces

at the beginning

of

a new

t=O.

Firms

as follows.

of

knowledge

that

gradually

As before,

then react

have observed

credibility

the economy begins

expectation

g-t i from time

partial

model by assuming

At the beginning

they

consequence

investigates

lack

disinflationary

in the future

respond

the slower

for

shown in figure

inflation

agents

the money authority's

Optimal Disinflation With Partial Credibility
Following

based

that
block

The welfare

when the monetary

by private

5.

lower

accelerates.

considerably

Thus,

emphasize

period

teT',

the actual

the magnitude

of

i firms

set

beginning-of-period

the money supply
Households

type

will

make their

grow at

money supply
the constant

time t decisions

the time t transfer

16

new prices

Ht.

Thus,

M:
rate

after
they

make their

decisions

based

money supply

MI+i and their

the constant

rate

=

rate

of

g,-,

If

constant

7,

also

then

(13)

converge

from those
prices
their

(131

the expected

by the fraction

(p of

of money growth

during

more rapidly

to observed

can be characterized

is defined

in section

that

of

eventually
rate

as more
converges

of

to some

money growth

as a collection

and households
of firms

3, however.

time

teT'

on their

will

of

behave

gt

expand

type

sequences

optimally

and households

Since

based

the money supply

replaced

=

Thus,

rates

the expected

decisions

is

P,

that

The optimal

described

(12)

money growth

that.firms

at the beginning

equation

rate

to

t=0,1,2,...,

g.

adjust

policy

such

expectation

rate

so that

an equilibrium

clear.

grow at

to 7.

and quantities

markets

expectations

implies

will

according

(pe(O,l),

and expected

of

end-of-period

the money supply

downward in each period

the actual

the actual

As before,
prices

inflation

between

the actual

gt evolves

by the initial
adjusts

of

forward.

)-gtml 1 s

in money growth,

credible.

that

of money growth

I As (p increases,

the period.
changes

expectation

+ (P[ (M;+/$

money growth

the difference

will

rate

is given

where g-,

knowledge

gt from time t+l

The expected
gt

on their

and

now differ

i firms

knowledge
forever

for

set

new

of M: and
at rate

gt 1,

by

wztml (l+Pg t-1+P'g: - 1+P3gf-1 MSt

t=1,2,3,....

,

(14)

413( 1+P+P2+B3I
Note that
which
lack
for

p, now depends

may differ
credibility.

t=1,2,3,...

on firms'

from the actual
Individual
and by initial

expected
rate

goods

rate

of money growth

of money growth

prices

conditions
17

when announcements

are determined
for

t=O.

gtei,

by equation

(4)

Households
MI+l

and their

rate

gt.

make their

expectation

Thus,

continue

decisions

while

that

t based

the money supply

equilibrium

to be described

at time

labor

will

supplies,

by equations

(9)

on their
expand

knowledge

forever

consumptions,

and (IO),

nominal

of

at

and wages

interest

rates

are now
=

Rt
Since

the current

future
which

interest

money growth,
may differ

(15)

are not

fully

initial

path

when the

sequence

is defined

prices

of

during

by gt,

time t.

equilibrium

prices

M:=l and

{Mr+l}F=o when policy

As in the case

household's

initial

express

conditions

expectations

Rt is determined

of money growth

credible.

the representative

that

and (131-(15)

the

(15)

on households'

indicates
rate

(IO),

disinflationary

constraints

depends

and the money supply

announcements

maximizes

(91,

in terms of

{p,,.p,o,p,,,p,o~

the optimal

equation

(41,

and quantities

rate

from the actual

Equations

t=0,1,2,....

g/is,

of

full

as the sequence

utility

subject

come from a steady

credibility,
{M:+llT-o

that

to these
state

with

positive

inflation.
Figure
Fischer
occurs

(19861,

calls

it

is

unanticipated

of

credible,

a sharp

expectations

back,

but

negative.
monetary

is

Output

falls

contraction

burst

the optimal

begin

still

path when,

the initial

contraction

can be read directly

bounces

remains

disinflationary

Instead

fully

for

inflationary

expectations
growth

(p=O.125.

when policy

credibility
Thus,

3 shows the optimal

off

of

slower

the

policy

at once;
interest

with

since
rate

than expected,

by almost
and remains
18

of money growth

below

its

that

at t=O.
Rt=gt/P,

series.

at t=l;

1.4 percent

by

partial

the money supply

to ease
of

as suggested

these
Money

thereafter,

in response
initial

level

to the
for

Eventually,

two full

years.

inflation

tax

that

between

lies

While

the Friedman

a comparison

a big

difference

for

table

2 indicates

those

from the full

percent

consumption

these

percent

gain

alternative

inflation

using

figures,
under

full

rule

Thus,

of

continue

yields
authority

lacks

that

long-run

benefits

run costs.
practice,

Cooley

in magnitude

revenues.

Cooley

cash-in-advance
of

to disinflationary

other

other

money growth

however;

19

when the
here

exceed

reason

taxes
their

show

the short-

why,

in

taxes

to replace

analysis

the next

section

presents

in the model with

setting.

terms.

to be welfare-improving:

distortionary

distortionary

or the

(19931,

still

and Hansen conduct
model,

the

the results

another

might fail

policy

to the 0.0223

and employment

disinflation

of

when q=O.750.

and Goodfriend

suggest

percent

Moreover,

to zero

Nevertheless,

(19911

seignorage

1.

a 4

0.0184

consumption

in output

resemble

when policy

to the optimum in welfare

a quick

to increase

challenge

similar

credibility.

policies

and employment,

easier

equals

switching

may have

the presence

policy

immediately

of

is

of

losses

makes

credibility

percent

(1986)

state

credibility

from eliminating

shown in table

government

whether

the gain

credibility

and Hansen

disinflationary

flexible-price

instance,

significant

that

partial

Disinflation

are

as the

to a new steady

on output

under

the optimal

levels

money growth.

case.

by Sargent

monetary
the

gains

to come close

as suggested

converges

of disinflation

however,

higher

1 and 3 reveals

the welfare

for

reaches

and zero

figures

credibility

policies

disinflation

rule

the effects

that

again

when (p=O.125 and 0.0214

Both of

Friedman

of

so that,

annual

output

Money growth

recedes.

is more credible

however,

lost

in a
considers

a serious

staggered

the

price

6.

Disinflation With Other Distortionary Taxes
Suppose

government

now that,

levies

the proceeds
each

period

in addition

a flat-rate

to households

to controlling

tax tt on workers'
in the form of

labor

income,

household's

the

returning

a lump-sum transfer

The representative

t=0,1,2,....

the money supply,

at

budget

the end of
constraints

become
4

4
Bt + Mt + Tt + (l-tt)wt~nIt

+ 1 nit

I=1

4
L cP&t+Mt+l
+Bt+l/Rtp

l=l

(16)

1=1

t=0,1,2
In equation
revenues

(161,

as well

{T Ia0 is
t t=o

taken

in equilibrium

the total

lump-sum transfer

as the newly
as given

created

Tt includes

money Ht; that

by the representative

by the government's

budget

is,

income
while

household,

it

)....
tax

the sequence
is determined

constraints

4
=

Tt

t=0,1,2,....

Ht + ttwt c nit,

(17)

i=l
Cooley
to establish
for

all

and Hansen
two results.

t=0,1,2

exceed

(1991)

those

First,

, - * * , they

when z=O.

Thus,
cost

the welfare

transfers

Tt/Pt

improving

when ~~ must adjust

constant,

They conclude

that

holding

show that

increases

(17).

use a flexible-price

of
they

the tax

the benefits

the presence
inflation.
show that
to satisfy

disinflation

cash-in-advance

of

rate
of

20

holding

the real

ceases

the government

tax
value

to be welfare-

budget

desirable

tt=~

when 00

distortionary

disinflation

is no longer

with

disinflation

another

Second,

constant,

model

constraints
when the

of

.

government

must use other

distortionary

taxes

to replace

lost

seignorage

revenues.
Following
the

income

Cooley

tax rate

economy begins
policy

is

announcements

money growth

When t0=0.23,

policy

benefits

of

to zero

0.448

of

government
beginning

of

hold

transfers

money growth
both

to zero

t=O, but

policy

of

table

both

rule

and monetary

When t"=O,

are

that

The

from immediately

there

is no

adopting

the

the same as in table

policies

increase

annual

inflation,

a welfare

gain

the Friedman

rule

switching
of

0.231

yields

percent

a gain

of

equal

the economy begins

money growth

increases

Tt/Pt

3,

to yield

annual

inflations.

disinflationary

income

The table

continues

inflation

or the Friedman

the labor

fixed.

in a steady

rule

g>l.

when t'=O,

welfare

gain

The Friedman

rule,

starting

from a 4 percent

policies

yield

sizable

The

at the

tax tt as necessary

shows that

a small

rate

state

to

the zero

starting

from

however,

inflation.

losses

in welfare

when t0=0.23.
Thus,
findings

1.

and Hansen to match the US data,

to and a constant

to be welfare-improving

Moreover,

3 assumes

t=0,1,2,....

inflation,

gains

yields

adopting

all

table

credible.

disinflationary

tax rate

4 and 10 percent

ceases

both

part

labor

switches

real

fully

for

of

consumption.

In the second
a constant

positive

by Cooley

money growth

Immediately

with

with

from a 4 percent

consumption.
percent

rt=~'

again

chosen

part

with

and the Friedman

Starting

immediately

the first

tax and the welfare

the value

dramatically.

state

are once

labor

the welfare

constant,

in a steady

distortionary
zero

and Hansen,

the results

by showing

that

displayed

in table

the welfare

3 confirm

consequences
21

Cooley

and Hansen's

of disinflation

depend

to

critically

on how the government

revenues.

On the one hand,

the government
On the other

cuts
hand,

spending

be replaced

through

7.

so that

higher

the income
ceases

so that

income

loss

becomes

often
fixed,

the

of

its

seignorage

much more attractive
tax does

not have

when

to rise.

to be welfare-improving
all

of

the

lost

when

seignorage

must

taxes.

Conclusion

Inflation
the past

has averaged

decade.

principal

the best

flexible-price
Cooley

Since

long-run

What is

that

(1989)

Danziger

(19881,

rate

there
run?

equal

rate

price
for
of

answer
should

to zero,

are nominal

(1994)

lists

of Greenwood

a simple

Previous

and Ball

may then differ

models

in the United

question

of money growth

interest

in the short

Reserve

the average

provide

the rate

annually

a central

way to reduce

But what if

costly

the Federal

cash-in-advance

make the nominal
(1969).

4 percent

objectives,

and Hansen

indicating

path

spending

is held

with

disinflation

disinflation

government

copes

considerably

monetary

that

policy
The

and Huffman

(1987)

question

as called

and

by
to

by Friedman

make disinflation

(19791,

Taylor

the optimal

from an immediate

is:

immediately

for

that

during

among its

inflation?

be reduced

work by Phelps
suggests

stability

to this

rigidities

States

(1983).

disinflationary

switch

to the Friedman

rule.
None of
with

these

an incentive

positive

inflation

earlier

models

to economize
tax,

however.

with

on their

nominal
cash

balances

The model of

22

rigidities

provides

in the face

staggered

price

agents
of

setting

a

developed

here

shows that

inflation

on money demand is
disinflation.

optimal

disinflationary
in output

zero

path

models,

yields

following

the optimal

in output

announcements
determinant
Sargent's

are not fully
the effects

(1986)

studies

analysis

of

disinflation

long-run

benefits

consequences

of

reducing

tax

of

the results

increases

as that

price

obtained

from

Thatcher

exceed

money growth

as a chief

corroborate

hyperinflations

1979.

policy

credibility

the results

as well

still

in significant

authority's

By isolating

the European

support

Cooley

distortionary

taxes

inflation.

of

the

as Goodfriend's

1920's

and

(1993)

In the model,
the short-run

however,
costs.

and the Friedman

by increasing

that

reducing

and Hansen's

the
Even

rule

has major

(1991)

effects

The model shows that

to be welfare-improving

indicate

to

continue

policies.

other

that

credible.

zero

of

results

of

no

by flexible-price

results

when the monetary

of disinflation

revenues

as large

disinflation

in the US since

the presence

seignorage

that

under

to be welfare-improving

fails

is almost

with

switching
goal

for

involve
the

one year

Reserve's

as called

of disinflation,

credibility,

Finally,

rule,

within

of

does

inflation,

immediately

the Federal

that

and employment

experience

often

gain

of

partial

with

indicates

the British

with

In addition,

policy

annual

inflation

effect

path.

The model also
losses

from a 4 percent

the Friedman

a welfare

distortionary

the optimal

for,

eliminates

consistent

or adopting

traditional

accounted

and employment.

money growth,

stability,

this

Starting

a rapid

losses

once

when the government
the tax on labor

the government's

are not necessary

is
23

crucial

that

on the welfare
disinflation

must replace

income.

revenue

finding

Thus,

the

requirements

to the success

of

lost

any

so

disinflationary

policy.

Aiyagari
price

stability

Aiyagari's
leather
other

hand,

that
tax

requires

increases

discussed
income

variability

with

the US currency

consideration

of

losses

authority

required

the model does
by Aiyagari,

the

level

supply
these

of

lacks

issues

addresses

inflation,

of

future

24

seignorage

of

the other

of

overseas.

provided

lost

greater

research.

On the

The model

the costs,

and the fact

to be held

constraint.

several
lack

some of

and employment,

to make up for

the

Reserve's

the shoe

credibility.

not capture

awaits

the Federal

reduces

exceed

association

appears

here

in output

including

the possible

of

cash-in-advance

of disinflation

are not

tax,

critique

disinflation

a binding

short-run

the benefits

However,

revenues.

capital

with

when the monetary

indicates

elements

On the one hand,

associated
it

a detailed

The model developed

objective.

costs

income

provides

concerns.

particularly

of

(19901

indexation

that

in the US

inflation
that

a large

A full

fraction

Notes
'These
for

figures

all

refer

urban

consumers,

President (1994,
2Black

(1990)

Reserve's

Lucas

good

focus

i.

list

and the prices

will

of

of

the consumer

price

index

in the Economic Report of the

is

closest
(19921,

be accounted

stability

in spirit

as the Federal

of

the other

three

price

however,

conditions.

25

developed

and Stockman

demand for

suppresses

i firms'
for,

to those

and Ohanian

household's

used here
type

price

objective.

the representative

on the effects

dependence

long-run

The notation

rate

as reported

(1991)

Cho and Cooley

income

growth

B-59).

the model

respect,

41n general,

of

CPI-U,

and Hoskins

(19881,

on its

Table

principal

31n this

to the annual

goods

good

(1994).

i will

as well

by

depend

as the price

this

dependence

in order

setting

decisions.

The

in deriving

equilibrium

to

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Ball,

1990,

S.R.,

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84,

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with

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inflation,

Federal

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staggered

price

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price-setting,

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Inflation,

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Deflating

1989,

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79,

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adjustment

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Economic

26

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l-24.

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1987,

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R.G.,

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Cambridge,

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and G.W. Huffman,

W.L.,

States

and disinflation,

(MIT Press,

(Aldine

and unemployment,

Hoskins,

King,

policy

essays

1993,

M.,

credibility,

The optimum quantity

of money and other

Goodfriend,

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1994,

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induced

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S. Fischer,

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MA).

1994,

Short-run

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E.S.,
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Studies

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American

Table

1 .--Welfare

Gain from Monetary

Policy
Initial
Annual
Inflation
Rate

Monetary

Policy

Optimal Path
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule

4
Percent

10
Percent

0.0223
0.0196

0.0874
0.0831

0.0174

0.0803

Figures
refer
to the permanent percentage
increase
in
consumption
that makes the representative
household
as well off
under continuing
inflation
at the initial
rate as it is under
the optimal policy,
zero money growth, or the Friedman rule.

Notes:

Table

2. --Welfare

Gain from Monetary
Credibility

Policy

With Partial

Initial
Annual
Inflation
Rate

Monetary

Policy

4
Percent

10
Percent

0.0184
0.0171
0.0136

0.0749
0.0739
0.0694

0.0202
0.0185
0.0159

0.0809
0.0793
0.0759

0.0211
0.0192
0.0170

0.0839
0.0820
0.0791

0.0214
0.0195
0.0173

0.0849
0.0828
0.0800

Q=O.l25
Optimal Path
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule
Q=O.250
Optimal Path
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule

Q=O.500
Optimal Path
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule
Q=O.750
Optimal Path
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule

Notes:

See notes

to table

1.

Table

3. --Welfare

Gain from Monetary Policy
Labor Taxation

With Distortionary

Labor Tax Rate Constant
Initial
Annual
Inflation
Rate
Monetary

Policy

4
Percent

10
Percent

0.0196
0.0174

0.0831
0.0803

0.231
0.448

0.595
0.812

TOSO.
00
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule

t0=0.23
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule
Government

Spending

Constant
Initial
Annual
Inflation
Rate

Monetary

4
Percent

Policy

10
Percent

2O=o. 00
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule

0.00520
-0.00212

0.0307
0.0220

r0=0.23
Zero Money Growth
Friedman Rule

Notes:

See notes

-0.112
-0.243
to table

1.

-0.298
-0.456

(Money Growth 1

0’11”1”‘11”1’111111”“111”1’11’1’~11’
’
-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

20

24

28

32

36

t

j Inflation 1
1.025

1.5

1.02

1
E8
G
9.

1.015

0.5

1.01

0

1.005

-0.5

1
0.995

-1
-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

L

-4

0

4

8

12

16
t

t

Fig. 1. Optimal Monetary Policy

-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

O.B"~~~~'~~~.~~.,~~"~."'~~~,.~'~"~'~~'~'~
-4
0
4
8
12 16 20 24 28 32

t

t

1Inflation 1

'
36
I

) output

1

1.5
1
2
8
G
a

0.5
0
-0.5
-1
-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

-4

0

4

8

12

16
t

t

Fig. 2. Zero Money Growth Policy

20

24

28

32

36

1Interest Rate 1

-1.5'
-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

32

36

32

36

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~~~~~~'~~'~~~'~~~~~~
-4
0
4
8
12
16 20 24 28 32

36

-4

0

4

8

12

16

20

24

28

t

t

1.02

’
-4

0

4

8

12

16
t

20

24

28

32

36

0.98

t

Fig. 3. Optimal Monetary Policy With Partial Credibility, phi=0.125