Full text of Working Papers (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) : Will Writing and Bequest Motives : Early 20th Century Irish Evidence, Working Paper 2006-18

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Will Writing and Bequest Motives:
Early 20th Century Irish Evidence
Leslie McGranahan

WP 2006-18

Will Writing and Bequest Motives:
Early 20th Century Irish Evidence
November 13, 2006

Leslie McGranahan
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Leslie.McGranahan@chi.frb.org

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the
opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or of the Federal Reserve System. I
wish to thank Joel Mokyr for inspiring this work and seminar participants at IUPUI,
Northwestern, the University of Chicago, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and
attendees at the Cliometrics sessions at the ASSA meetings for thoughtful comments.
I also received helpful comments from Lisa Barrow, Cristina DeNardi, Anna Paulson,
Lou Cain and Joe Ferrie.

1

“Why spend years attempting to create wealth and then take so little care to provide for
loved ones, friends, or charity. The present rules governing your estate if you die without
a will have scant regard for your wishes… There are no excuses for not making or
reviewing your will. Act now before it’s too late.” Ian Burman, Probate lawyer, “When
to Write a Will” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4332463.htm. March 10, 2005
“Every adult – whether they are wealthy or not – should have a valid will. Yet, over half
of all Americans die without one. In fact, national estimates project that 70% of
American adults currently don’t have a will. The reasons for this are common. Many
people think they don’t have enough property to worry about or that writing a will might
be too expensive. Others simply prefer not to think about the subject at all…If your
state’s distribution laws work fine for you does that mean you shouldn’t write a will?
Well, not exactly. After all, having a will takes the guesswork out of who will receive
what. And why not help avoid potential family feuds over where your property will go?
… Having a will not only provides clear guidance for your loved ones after your death,
but it also allows you to rest easy, knowing your wishes will be carried out. The peace of
mind you gain will be well worth any expense or effort involved in drafting a will. After
all, we all want to take care of our loved ones. Writing a will is one way to make sure
they’re cared for even after you’re gone.” Legalzoom.com advertising $69 Wills.
“Unless you make a Will, you cannot guarantee that your belongings will be distributed
as you want when you die.” Clickdocs.co.uk
“Why let someone else decide how to dispose of assets you worked hard to acquire.”
Elderhostel.com – a non-for-profit encouraging wills that include bequests to Elderhostel.
“If you die without a will, California law will determine the beneficiaries of you estate.
Contrary to popular myth, everything does not automatically go to the state… Friends, a
non-registered domestic partner or your favorite charities will receive nothing if you die
without a will.” The State Bar of California, “Wills” Calbar.ca.gov

2

I. Motivation
Will writing is a crucial part of the bequest process. In writing a will, an
individual can choose who receives what portion of his assets, can give specific
belongings to particular beneficiaries, and can provide for charities. By contrast, the
assets of an individual who dies with out a will, or intestate, are divided among
beneficiaries in a manner specified by the state or country in which he lived. Estimates
of the percent of Americans who write wills before they die range from 30% to 50%.
The existence of wills gives some indication concerning bequest motives. In particular,
will writers anticipate that they are going to die with some positive estate value, care
about who receives their assets, and are willing to occur a financial cost to pay for the
drafting of a will. The goal of this paper is to investigate the decision to write a will in
hopes that the motivations behind this decision will shed some light on bequest motives
more generally.
Bequest motives are poorly understood despite a substantial body of research
seeking to understand the impetus for the posthumous distribution of assets. The two
principal economic theories of bequests – altruism and strategic bequests or exchange–
fail to explain significant features of observed bequest behavior. One finding that is
particular challenging to these two theories is the prevalence of equal bequests to
children. However, few alternative explanations have been offered in place of these two
theories. The frequency of equal bequests to children also draw into question why
individuals write wills, given that estates are divided equally among children in the
absence of wills.
Gaining a better grasp of bequest motives and the pattern of bequests can lead to a
better understanding of key macroeconomic phenomenon. For example, further insight
into bequest motives can help explain the rationale for the patterns of observed saving
behavior and can lead to a better understanding of the sources of wealth inequality. In
addition, understanding bequest motives can clarify likely responses to policy changes
such as an abolition of the estate tax or changes in social security policy parameters.
I investigate bequest motives by looking at the will writing decision of a set of
individuals who died in Ireland between 1901 and 1905. I link the estate records of these
individuals to their household record in the 1901 Irish Census. The Census provides

3

similar information on individuals who write wills -- testators, and the intestate. The
advantage of looking at this particular time period derives from the fact that it predates
government provided old age support in Ireland. As a result, the linkages between
parents and their children are less nuanced and more explicit than in the time periods and
locations analyzed in most studies of bequest motives. I would anticipate strategic
bequest motives to be far more pronounced because parents were more heavily dependent
on their children in old age. In addition, in the turn of the century Irish context, estate
taxes were low relative to current levels so I am able to abstract away from the tax
avoidance component of modern estate planning.
I find some evidence that will-writing is motivated by the desire to repay
individuals who provided care after the end of a dying person’s productive years,
especially among women. By contrast I find no evidence that the characteristics of
potential beneficiaries influence the decision to write a will. I do find that the age,
wealth, and landholding status of the deceased are correlated with will writing. These
additional findings are consistent with the strategic bequest model and also with a simple
model of bequests where individuals write wills because they have assets and think they
are about to die.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I introduce the principal theories of
bequests and how these theories have been tested in previous research. I then present a
simple model of the decision to write a will and discuss the implications of the model.
Next I introduce the Irish context and the data set. Subsequently, I investigate which
features of potential testators influence their decision to write a will and explore the
extent to which the various theories can explain the patterns found in the data. I then
conclude.
II. Understanding Bequest Motives
According to the basic life-cycle model, individuals save in order to support
consumption above their income levels in the later years of life. With perfect foresight
concerning the timing of death, individuals would run out of assets at the moment of
death leaving no bequests to their heirs. The presence of substantial bequests has been
explained in the literature primarily by three different theories; accidental bequests,

4

strategic bequests, and altruism. When the life-cycle model is extended to include
uncertainty over the time of death, the prediction of accidental bequests arises.
According to this theory, bequests are insurance for living too long. The accidental
theory is inconsistent with the existence of wills. While bequests themselves may be
accidental, the distribution decisions made by will are not accidental, but deliberate
actions by individuals to distribute their assets under the assumption that there is
something left to distribute. In addition, wills are not costless to draw up indicating that
testators are willing to sacrifice some consumption in order to have a will.
The strategic bequest or exchange theory postulates that bequests are used to
procure services from heirs that are not available in the market-place. For instance, a
child who takes care of an elderly parent receives a disproportionate bequest in exchange
for those care-giving services. Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers (1985) finds some
support for this theory in that they find that parents who hold more bequeathable wealth
receive more attention from their children. Perozek (1999) further investigates the link
between estate size and attention from children and does not find more interaction
between parents and adult children when parents hold more bequeathable wealth. Her
work also challenges the exchange theory in that she finds that only children, who have
no competition for their parents’ resources, spend as much time with their parents as
children in multi-child families.
Another theory that has been investigated as an explanation for bequest behavior
is that bequests are motivated by altruism. (Wilhelm 1996) According to this theory,
individuals care about the well-being of their heirs, and distribute their assets to
maximize the utility of heirs. The assumption that the well-being of other individuals
enters into the deceased’s utility function equally, leads to the prediction that bequests to
these individuals should compensate for pre-existing differences in wealth or earning
potential. Because the lower wealth individual has a higher marginal utility of income
under the standard assumption of declining marginal utility of income, he should receive
a larger bequest. Research on the division of bequests does not support the prediction
that bequests compensate for differential endowments.
In contrast to the predictions of both the exchange and altruism models, data on
bequests finds that bequests to children are in most cases equal. Equal division has been

5

found to be the norm in a number of different data sets. In the Estate-Income Tax Match
data, Wilhelm (1996) found that 68.6% of estates were divided exactly equally, and
76.6% were divided within 2% of equality. Light and McGarry (2003) report that 92.1%
of mothers in their sample from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) respond that
they plan to divide their estate equally among their children. Using North Carolina estate
records, Norton and Taylor (2005) find that between 70% and 83% of estates were
divided equally.
Some research has also advanced other theories of bequests. In particular,
Andreoni (1990) postulates that giving is motivated by the “warm glow” received by the
giver and McGranahan (2000) finds evidence that bequests to charity are motivated by
the desire to be remembered in a favorable manner.
More recent articles on bequests have sought to understand bequest motives in the
context of the stylized fact of predominant equal division. As Bernheim and Severinov
(2003) point out, equal division is a “knife edge” outcome; it is difficult to reconcile with
standard marginal utility based theories. Bernheim and Severinov (2003) develop a
theoretical model where children care about parental affection and see bequests as a
signal of parental preference relative to their siblings. Altruistic parents care about their
children and as a result care about their children’s perception of how much they are
loved. The model suggests that an equilibrium exists where a large subset of parents will
divide equally so that children will not believe that their parents are more partial to one
child than they actually are.
Empirical research has investigated the prevalence of equal division by looking at
the determinants of dividing an estate equally. These studies infer bequest motives from
differences in the characteristics of parents who chose unequal division as compared to
those who chose equal division. Norton and Taylor (2005) link survey responses
concerning elderly living arrangements and care needs to estate records to investigate
whether parents who divide unequally are more likely to have living arrangements and
other characteristics consistent with exchange. They find little evidence of strategic
bequests in that living with a child prior to death and elderly care demands do not lead to
unequal division. They do find that some factors that could support either altruism or
exchange do influence unequal division; namely having four or more children and writing

6

a will close to death. Light and McGarry (2003) find that unequal divisions can be
explained by some characteristics of mothers consistent with exchange and altruism and
that mothers’ responses to survey questions concerning why they are not planning on
dividing their assets equally are evenly divided between altruism and exchange.
This paper also takes the prevalence of equal division as a point of depart and
asks why individuals write wills given that estates are divided equally among children in
the absence of wills. Currently, in all 50 U.S. states, the intestate succession laws give
surviving children equal parts of their parents’ estates.1 Equal division among children is
also the law under intestacy in many other nations, and was the law in Ireland at the time
investigated in this paper. Unequal division among children requires a will, but most will
writers choose to divide equally in their will.
III. A Simple Model of the Decision to Write a Will
In this section, we present a simple model of will writing. We assume that the
sole goal of a will is to change the distribution of assets from the distribution that would
occur under intestacy. As noted in the previous section, many individuals mimic the
intestacy distribution in their wills as far as the treatment of children is concerned: this
issue along with other potential rationales for will writing will be discussed later.
We assume that a potential testator, i, chooses to write a will if his utility from
doing so exceeds his utility from dying intestate. In particular, we assume that an
individual compares his optimal estate distribution to the distribution that occurs if he
dies intestate (the laws governing this process are referred to as the laws of intestate
succession) and writes a will if the utility gain justifies the expense of writing a will.
Assume an individual has a set of family members or other beneficiaries who
affect his will writing decision, or who would receive a bequest under intestate
succession n=1,…N. Further assume that his entire estate is distributed to these
individuals and no one else. We label these bequests bn .

1

The intestate succession statutes do differ in the treatment of children of deceased children and in the
portion given to surviving spouses.

7

He has a fixed amount of wealth to distribute at death: Wi . In other words, he
does not determine the size of his bequest by weighing it against consumption uses of
wealth. He derives some utility from the bequests given to beneficiaries: U (b1 ,..., bn ) .
This utility may arise because he directly benefits from the utility of other (altruism),
from services received from heirs as a result of the bequest (exchange), or from the mere
act of making the bequests (warm glow).
He incurs a cost of writing a will when he dies. Assume that this cost has both a
psychic and financial component. The psychic cost derives from the need of the
individual to contemplate his own demise. The financial cost comes from the need to
find, hire, and pay a lawyer. Assume that both the psychic cost, pi , and financial cost,
li are individual specific. The financial cost reduces the amount of assets he is able to
distribute to his heirs – the resulting estate size is Wi − li .

Intestacy
If an individual dies intestate, his entire estate is divided amongst his family members
according to the laws of intestate succession. The series of bequests dictated by the state
N

are: b1,is ,..., bN ,is s.t.

∑b
n =1

n ,is

= Wi . His utility under intestate succession is:

U i ,is = U ( b1,is ,..., bN ,is | Wi , X i ) .
The vector X i includes other state variables such as the endowments of beneficiaries
prior to bequest, and attributes of the potential testator.

Testacy
If an individual writes a will, he chooses bequests to family members to maximize his
utility subject to the constraint that the total bequests plus the lawyer’s fee for writing the
will must equal the total bequest. All bequests are constrained to be positive because an
individual cannot take assets from one heir at death and transfer it to another. His

8

N

optimization problem is: Max

b1,T ,...,bN ,T U ( b1,T ,..., bN ,T pi , X i ) s.t .∑ bn ,T + li = Wi and
n =1

b1,T , b2,T ,..., bn ,T > 0 .
If we label the optimal bequests that result from solving the optimization problem:
bˆ1 ,...bˆN , then the utility of writing a will is:

(

)

U i ,T = U bˆ1 ,..., bˆN | Wi , li , pi , X i .
If we further assume that the utility function is separable in the psychic costs, we can
rewrite the utility of writing a will as:

(

)

U i ,T = U bˆ1 ,..., bˆN | Wi , li , X i − U ( pi )

Will Writing
An individual will choose to write a will if the utility from having a will exceeds the
utility from dying intestate. Or, if:

(

)

U bˆ1 ,..., bˆN | Wi , li , X i − U ( pi ) > U ( b1,is ,..., bN ,is | Wi , X i )

(Equation 1)

this can be rearranged to

(

)

U bˆ1 ,..., bˆN | Wi , li , X i − U ( b1,is ,..., bN ,is | Wi , X i ) > U ( pi )

(Equation 2)

Lemma 1: If there are no costs to will writing, and if individuals indifferent between
writing a will and not writing a will do write a will, everyone will write a will.
Proof: In the absence of costs, the exact distribution under intestate succession is
possible by will. If the intestate succession outcome is preferred to the testate outcome,
then the testate outcome could not have been the optimal distribution.
Lemma 2: If bequests did not enter into the utility function i.e., individuals did not care
about the distribution of their assets, and there were positive psychic costs, no one would
write a will.

9

Proof: The utilities of the bequests are both equal to zero, so the left hand side of
Equation 2 equals zero. This implies that an individual will write a will is the utility of
the psychic costs is negative, but we’ve constrained the psychic costs to be positive.
The combination of the two Lemmas indicates that the observation that some individuals
write wills and others do not demonstrates that there are both costs and benefits to will
writing.
Even without specifying anything concerning the form of the utility function, we
can generate a couple of predictions from Equation 2. Anything that increases the left
hand side of the equation will increase the likelihood of observing a will as will anything
that decreases the right hand side. First, other things equal, individuals with lower
psychic costs will be more likely to write a will. Individuals facing lower financial costs
will also be less likely to write a will because the lower financial costs increase the utility
of the optimal distribution while leaving the utility of the intestate succession distribution
unchanged.2 Second, individuals whose optimal distribution differs most dramatically
from the intestate succession baseline should be more likely to write wills. These
individuals have the most to gain from changing the distribution. Which individuals are
most likely to want to change the baseline distribution will depend on the specifics of the
intestate succession distribution and the utility function determining the optimal
distribution.
The effect of wealth on will writing is indeterminate. For some individuals the
cost of hiring a lawyer will be prohibitive; as a result, increases in wealth will make will
writing possible. Further predictions based on wealth depend on the utility function. For
example, if we assume that testators are motivated by altruism, we find that for a broad
class of individuals, increases in wealth make will-writing less attractive and lead to
intestacy. This is the case because as wealth increases, the pre-existing endowments of
beneficiaries shrink relative to the size of the estate and the distribution under intestate
succession of dividing wealth equally converges to the altruism distribution of dividing
the combined assets of all family members equally. The predictions of the effects of
wealth according to a specific manifestation of the altruism model are investigated further
2

This holds so long as bequest amounts enter the utility function positively, a very reasonable assumption.

10

in Appendix A. The strategic bequest theory could lead to a prediction of higher wealth
leading to a higher probability of writing a will if there are economies of scale in the
receipt of care services. An individual would like to give his entire estate to which ever
child is a better service provider. The marginal benefit of each dollar given to the
preferred child and taken away from other children is increasing as wealth increases.
This discussion is based on the assumption that individuals write wills in order to
change the distribution of assets. Other possible motivations for will writing also exist.
An individual may write a will in order to choose guardians for their minor children, to
name an executor different from the one appointed by the state, to give bequests to
charities, to speed the distribution of assets, or to give specific assets to specific
beneficiaries. These will be discussed further in light of the findings and once the
specific legal context of the data is elucidated.
IV. The Context
While the decision to write a will could be investigated using data from a variety
of nations and time periods, I choose to look at data from turn of the century County
Fermanagh, Ireland. At this time all of Ireland was still subject to English law. This
data selection has numerous motivations and advantages.
First, there was no state old age support system in place in Ireland at this time.
The first government pension act was passed in 1908. As a result, older individuals were
more dependent on younger individuals in their waning years. Modern research on
strategic bequests assumes that young individuals provide their elders with phone calls
and visits. In the turn of the century Irish context, older individuals relied on the young
for more basic needs. As a result, the incentives for strategic interaction were more
pronounced. Strategic interactions may be evident in the Irish data, even though they are
not consistently present in data collected after the advent of government provided old age
support.
Second, estate taxes were fairly low so the tax regime in place would have been
less distortionary than the current tax regime. Estate taxes were applied in the same
manner whether a deceased individual wrote a will or died intestate. Estates below £100
paid no duty (40% of my sample), estates between £100 and £500 paid 1% of the estate

11

value (45% of the sample). Estates valued above £500 had gradually increasing rates.
The largest estate in my data, £57148, would have paid 5%. In addition to estate duties,
beneficiaries needed to pay Legacy and Succession duties for estates above £1000 (5% of
the sample), these rates were decreasing in consanguinity. These rates were also low by
current standards – 1% for direct lineal relatives.
Third, Irish testators, like their English and American counterparts, had a great
deal of freedom over distribution rendering will writing more attractive than in societies
with less testamentary freedom (such as Italy, France, and Modern Ireland)3. While the
laws of intestate succession provided a default distribution of property upon death, by
writing a will, testators could choose any alternative distribution of their choosing.
Testators could be capricious or even cruel if they chose. The one exception to total
testamentary freedom was that surviving spouses were entitled to some portion of the
estate. In this environment, the will writing decision is more important than in societies
where only a small portion of the estate can be transferred at the deceased’s discretion.
Finally, I was able to create a rich data set that contained information on whether
a set of individuals was testate or intestate as well as information about their family
circumstances. For this purpose, I create a data set that combines information on the
estate of an individual from estate records, matched with information on their living
arrangements and family status from the Census preceding their death. I use estate
records for individuals who died in County Fermanagh, Ireland (now part of Northern
Ireland) between April 1901 and December 1905 matched with their record in the 1901
Census, enumerated on March 31, 1901.
The Irish Census provides a rich array of information on family structure that is
not available from many other sources. Other Censuses could presumably be used, but
in order to match individuals to the Census, we would need access to actual Census
manuscripts records which are only available for older Censuses.4 Irish living
arrangements were complex and diverse during this period providing a good deal of
variation in the data. Relatedly, in this period many individuals died without ever having
married. I believe that individuals without direct descendents may be the most likely to
3

Many other societies do not allow children to be disinherited by will.
For instance, US census data is only available through 1930. U.S. Census data is confidential for 72
years.
4

12

write a will because they are more likely to find the laws of intestate succession arbitrary
and desire to change the default distribution.5 The small size of the Census geographical
unit, townland, makes it easy to find individuals in the Census, once their townland is
known from the estate records. The median townland in the sample has 36 people and
8.5 families.
I restrict the analysis to individuals who died in Co. Fermanagh. I could only
chose among the counties that are currently part of Northern Ireland because many
records from the counties in the Republic of Ireland were destroyed by fire. Among the
Ulster counties I chose Co. Fermanagh because it is the least populous of the Ulster
counties which promotes matching, because the county’s Census had been Indexed
making it possible to find individuals who had changed townland, and because it is a
fairly average county. The population in Co. Fermanagh in 1901 was approximately
evenly split between Catholics and Protestants. It was wealthier than most of the nonUlster counties, but poorer than most of the rest of Ulster. In Appendix B, I compare my
Co. Fermanagh sample to the entire enumerated Irish population.
In order to further understand the incentives to write a will, we need additional
information about the inheritance practices in Ireland at this time. Farms in Ireland had
historically been subdivided and by the dawn of the 20th Century were relatively small
and most could only realistically support one family.6 As a result, inheritance practices in
Ireland in the early 20th Century were generally characterized by giving the farm to one
son and expecting the remaining children to live either unmarried with the inheriting son
or to find a life elsewhere –in the cities of Ireland or abroad. Daughters could also marry
the inheriting sons of other families. Research looking at farm inheritance has not found
that primogeniture dominated, but rather that the inheriting son would come from across
the birth order distribution (Kennedy 1991). Kennedy (1991) hypothesizes that this
departure from primogeniture arose from the unattractiveness of farm inheritance for

5

Guinnane 1997 contains a lengthy analysis of the reasons for the high level of permanent celibacy. He
concludes that changes in the costs and benefits of having a family (for both men and women) can explain
the high rates of non-marriage. In particular, expanding life options other than child-rearing and marriage
allowed individuals to survive without marriage. He does a good job explaining why simpler explanations
cannot explain the data. Other things substituted for the security of marriage and family.
6
One of the Penal Laws (enacted in 1703) mandated that the land of a Catholic farmer descend in equal
shares to all his sons. This restriction lasted until the end of the 18th Century.

13

some eldest sons who would have to wait too long for their parents to retire or die and
could find better opportunities outside the family farm.
The laws of intestate succession in Ireland also were not characterized by
primogeniture. At this time, Ireland was subject to English succession law.7 English law
stipulated that in the case of intestacy, real property pass via primogeniture and personal
property (chattels) pass by more complicated intestate succession arrangements that
treated all children equally. In England, some land was freehold and was considered real
property while other land was leasehold and considered personal property. By contrast,
in Ireland by 1901, all landholding whether held as real property or as personal property
descended to heirs in the manner of personal property i.e. via the intestate succession
arrangements for chattels.
The Irish Land Acts had allowed tenant farmers to purchase the land they worked
using money borrowed at a low interest rate from the state. Most of this purchasing had
occurred between 1885 and 1909, with some of it prior to 1901. The Registration of Title
Act of 1891 mandated that all land purchased under the Land Acts where money was
borrowed from the state be registered. It further stipulated that all compulsorily
registered land pass to heirs as personal property. The justification given for this
departure from the English treatment of real property was that Irish tenant farmers had
long been leaseholders and were more familiar and comfortable with equal division of
land under intestacy and had no experience with issues related to real property
transmission.8
Most of the land holders in my sample were leaseholders or tenant farmers. Any
real property held would have been purchased under the Land Acts. As a result, we can
7

Irish succession law and English succession law were identical with one exception. In England, bequests
for the purposes of saying mass for the repose of the soul of the deceased were not permissible because
they were deemed superstitions, but such bequests were allowed in Ireland.
8
This justification was pointed out in a debate in the Irish Senate (Seanad Eireann, 1965). Other possible
justifications exist. Primogeniture was beginning to be viewed as an antiquated and unenlightened
tradition, even in England where it would be abolished in 1925. Additionally primogeniture was
particularly problematic in a society with high migration where it could be difficult to find and contact an
heir. Alternatively, the state may have been motivated by a desire to enhance its ability to collect the
substantial debts that accompanied land purchased under the Land Acts. It is easier to collect debts against
property that devolves as personal property than against real property. It is unlikely that this was
motivated by an English desire to keep farms small as had occurred under the penal laws because these
arrangements could still be changed by will and because the Land Acts were not punitive, but a
fundamentally generous solution to the Irish land problem.

14

assume that all assets were divided according to the laws of intestate succession that
treated all children equally.
Table 1 details the rules of intestate succession based on who survived the
deceased. There are four principal scenarios depending on whether a spouse and/or
children survived the deceased. These rules are not random. They appear to conform to
some notion of fairness and may attempt to approximate the choices that the deceased
would have made had he written a will.
V. Data
The data I gather on estates comes from The Calendar of Probates (essentially an
index). Each year has a separate Calendar arranged alphabetically by the last name of the
deceased. The Calendar provides information on all estates in Ireland where someone
was given a grant of Probate or Administration. When an individual had a will, probate
was granted to the executor. Administration was granted to an administrator when an
individual was intestate or failed to appoint an executor. The grant of administration or
probate allowed the grantee to initiate the distribution of assets. The calendars tells us
whether an individual was testate or intestate, the total value of his personal property, his
place of residence, date and place of death, date and place of probate, occupation, and to
whom probate (for testators) or administration (for the intestate) was granted. Figure 1A
provides an example of a record from the Calendar.
From the Calendars, I collected information on all individuals from Fermanagh
who died between April 1901 and November 1905 and whose estates received a grant of
administration or probate between May 1901 and December 1905. There are 531
individuals in this data set. While this does not include all individuals who died, it does
include all individuals who had estates to pass on after their death and therefore had to
use legal distribution channels. A deceased individual would be excluded from the
sample if he was poor or young (under 18) and did not have any assets or because the

15

deceased was married and female and all her assets automatically transferred to her
husband.9 Issues related to sample selection are discussed in greater detail in Section VII.
Based on the information provided in the Calendars, most importantly the
deceased’s name and place of residence, I look for the deceased individual and his or her
family in the 1901 Irish Census for County Fermanagh. Remarkably, I am able to match
494 of the 531 individuals to their 1901 Census record, representing a 93% matching rate.
Three types of data are available from the Census. First, we know information about the
individuals in the deceased's household. In particular, we know how family members are
related to the household head, and their religion, martial status, literacy, age, occupation,
and place of birth.10 An example of a household record is presented in Figure 1B, part b.
Second, the census provides detailed information on the condition of the family's housing
including whether the household head is also the landholder. An example of a building
record is presented in Figure 1B, part c. Various housing attributes are reported and
given points. The sum of the points, called housepoints¸ is then tabulated. Housing is
rated as being first (the best) through fourth class depending on the number of
housepoints. We also know whether anyone was seriously ill in the household on the day
of the census but if so we don’t know who was ill. Third, we have information on the
location where the household lived including whether it was a town or a street in a city,
the town or street population, and the religious distribution of the town or street members.
Figure 1B, part a, provides an example of the townland information.
Our analysis is based on these two sets of records only. We do not use
information from the wills and administrations themselves, although all of the wills,
administrations and some additional estate documents are available in the Public Record
Office of Northern Ireland.11 The wills do not provide the same information as the
administrations making it difficult to generate a common set of variables from the two
9

The Married Woman’s Property Act of 1882 allowed woman married after 1882 to control and dispose of
the property held at the time of marriage. Most married women who would have been dying in 1901-1905
were probably married before 1882.
10
The 1911 Census asks three additional questions of married women -- the number of years the marriage
has lasted, the number of children born in the marriage and the number still living. This would provide
information on family members outside the household. However, it is less valuable than it first appears
because the questions are not asked of widows or widowers. Because the Old Age Pensions Act was
passed in 1908, 1911 data would not be as useful for this analysis.
11
In some circumstances, I looked at the estate records to make sure the correct match was being made
between the estate calendars and Census.

16

sets of records. In the case of wills, these records contain the wishes of the deceased.
For administrations they give the information necessary to apply the laws of intestate
succession.
I code information from these different sources to create a set of variables that
allows me to investigate the will writing decision. Means of the variables coded for the
entire sample as well as breakdowns based on whether an individual had a will, and the
legal distribution channel if he had a will, are presented in Table 2. The sample is
divided into the entire sample (in columns 2&3), the intestate (in columns 4 & 5), those
with probated wills (in columns 6 & 7), and those with administrated wills (in columns 8
& 9). Individuals with administrated wills are labeled in the Calendars as having “Letters
of Administration with the Will Annexed.” In most cases, this indicates that a will was
written, but that either no executor was appointed or that the appointed executor was
unable or unwilling to act. The estate would still go to the beneficiaries named in the
will and the wife, if living, or next of kin, if the testator was unmarried, would act as the
administrator. The majority of the sample had a probated will, while approximately onethird was intestate. A small number, seven percent, had administrated wills.12 The table
shows that the average time between death and the grant of administration or probate was
similar for those with probated wills and the intestate indicating that writing a will does
not appear to speed up the distribution of assets.
The table presents means of eight sets of variables – estate variables, demographic
variables, information about potential beneficiaries, measures of literacy, culture, and
religion, one community measure, wealth variables, occupational indicators, and
indicators for individuals likely to be influenced by exchange motives. The format of the
variable names indicates whether the variable means for the three testation status groups
are statistically significantly different from one another at the 95% level.
The theory suggested the need for variables measuring the gap between the
optimal distribution and the intestate succession distribution, psychic costs of a will,
financial costs of a will, and wealth. I describe below how I proxy for each of these
12

We can compare these numbers to some official statistics for Ireland as a whole. In the District Probate
courts in 1902, 48% of estates had Probated wills, 10% had administrated wills, and 42% were intestate.
The percentages in 1903 were nearly identical. (Judicial Statistics of Ireland, for 1902, 1903; Judicial
Statistics of Ireland for 1903, 1904)

17

variables. I also include variables measuring additional attributes of the deceased, his
estate and his potential beneficiaries to capture other features of the utility function or
other possible rationales for will-writing.
Measures of family composition serve to proxy for the gap between the optimal
distribution and the distribution under intestate succession based on the assumption that
the intestate succession default less accurately reflects the preferences of individuals in
certain family types. I break the deceased into categories based on who will inherit the
estate under intestacy.13 This categorization is based on the individuals enumerated in
the household at the time of the census.14 In 33% of cases, relatives other than a wife and
children will inherit, indicating that the deceased was unmarried and childless. In 14% of
cases a wife would share the estate with other relatives because the married couple was
childless. In an additional 33% of cases, a spouse and children inherit indicating that the
deceased was married with children. Finally, in 20% of cases, children inherit alone
because the deceased was widowed and had children. I anticipate that individuals whose
beneficiaries include relatives outside their immediate family should be the most likely to
write a will because they are more likely to have preferences different from the intestate
succession default. For example, the estate of an unmarried childless man without
parents would be divided equally among his siblings according to the intestate succession
laws. I hypothesize that he is likely to desire to write a will to bring about an unequal
partition among his siblings or to give his estate to other individuals. By contrast, I
anticipate that widowers with children will be less likely to write wills, other things
equal, because the equal division dictated under intestate succession conforms to their
preferences.
I include additional measures of the children in the household including an
indicator as to whether there are any children in the household, the age of the oldest and
youngest child, the number of children and whether all children or any children are
minors. Having minor children may influence the will writing decision because an
individual may want to appoint a guardian for his children different from the one
13

These categories are based on the rules for men. The entire estate of a deceased married woman would
go to her husband. There are 21 married women in the sample.
14
Some of the children of older potential testators likely lived outside the household and would not have
been enumerated in the Census. However, these categorizations are probably still correct in nearly every
case because households with children usually had at least one child living within the household.

18

appointed by the state and can do so by will.15 In modern discussions of will writing,
guardianship of minor children is frequently advanced as a reason for writing a will.
Alternatively, there are fewer opportunities for exchange with minor children and the
earning potential of minor children has not been revealed. As a result, potential testators
with minor children have less of an incentive to write a will based on the altruism or
strategic bequest theories.
I use indicators of whether the deceased was able to read and write, or able to read
but unable to write, and measures of religious confessional group to proxy for the psychic
costs of will writing. The majority of the deceased, over 80%, reported to the census
enumerator that they could read and write. An additional 9% could read but could not
write. The sample is about 40% Catholic and 60% Protestant. There is little religious or
educational difference amongst the three testation groups. I incorporate these measures
because individuals of different religions or educational attainment may have different
perspectives, superstitions, or teachings on temporal preparation for death. In addition,
religious divisions in Ireland represented cultural divides. Protestants and Catholics
attended separate schools and lived in different towns or different areas within cities. In
my sample, the average deceased Catholic lived in a town that was nearly three quarters
Catholic while the average Protestant lived in a town that was sixty percent Protestant.
To measure the financial costs of writing a will, I include a variable indicating
whether the deceased lived in a city. I use this as a proxy for the costs of will writing
based on the assumption that city dwellers had more access to lawyers who could draft
wills. Only 17% of the sample lived in a city; half of the city dwellers lived in
Enniskillen and half lived in smaller cities. The remainder of the sample dwelled in the
small rural townlands throughout Fermanagh. Contrary to my prediction that citydwellers should be more likely to write wills, I find that a higher percent of the intestate
lived in cities. Literacy may also be correlated with the financial cost of writing a will as
illiterate individuals may need more assistance from lawyers.
I include a number of measures of wealth. First, I include the measure of estate
value provided in the Calendars. Average log estate value in the sample was ₤4.959
15

More specifically, in a will a married man could appoint a guardian to act jointly with his wife following
his death. A married woman could not appoint a guardian for her children as the father would be their sole
guardian. A widow could appoint a guardian by will.

19

(£142 -- average estate value was £486). This is actual reported wealth at death – a far
more exact measure than is available in other (non-administrative) data sources. It
measures the value of all personal property including the value of leasehold properties net
of rental obligations, but does not include the value of real property and is not net of
debts or funeral expenses. Based on richer asset data for a subset of the population, the
correlation between the reported wealth measure and wealth including real property and
net of debts and funeral expenses is .6. Figure 2 displays the wealth distribution
separately for each sub-sample. From the graph and table we see that those with
probated wills were wealthier than individuals in the other groups. Figure 3 displays the
wealth distribution separately for the Protestants and Catholics in the sample. It is well
known that Protestants throughout Ireland were wealthier than Catholics. Matching
religion data from the Census with wealth data from estate records allows me to quantify
this disparity for a specific population.
I also measure wealth by include an indicator as to whether there were servants
enumerated in the household. In addition, I code a dummy variable based on whether the
deceased was reported as the landholder in the Census building return. I also include an
indictor for when the name of the landholder was left blank. Most frequently, the
landholder information is left blank when there was no landholder because the family
lived in an urban area. For instance, none of the 39 individuals who lived in Enniskillen
report a landholder. I find that individuals with probated wills were more likely than the
intestate to have servants and hold land.
I also include a number of occupation measures to proxy for wealth. My first
measure places individuals in occupational groups according to the classifications used in
the published Census Report; professional or commercial, agricultural, domestic or
industrial, unclear. I label individuals who were retired or have no reported occupation as
“unclear.” Higher fractions of those with probated wills report agricultural and domestic
or industrial occupations than the intestate. My second occupational grouping uses more
standard social class definitions. I place retired individuals in the category corresponding
to their former occupations and individuals with no reported occupation in the category
corresponding to the occupation of the head of household (if related). While most of the

20

sample in all three testation groups worked as farmers, we also observe that individuals
with probated wills were more likely to be farmers than the intestate.
In addition to categorizing occupations, I also map the occupation reported in the
Census to three different continuous measures of occupation – Haines income score,
IPUMS status score, and IPUMS income score. The Haines income score corresponding
to an occupation is a measure of income imputed from data from the 1901 U.S. Cost of
Living Survey and compiled in Preston and Haines (1991). The IPUMS status and
income scores are measures of the social status and income of an occupations based on
data in the 1950 Census. The intestate have higher scores than will writers. In
conjunction with these scores, I include separate dummies for those individuals who do
not report a market occupation (i.e. wife) and for those individuals who report that they
are independently wealthy and therefore do not need to work.
I also include a standard set of demographic variables – age, sex, and marital
status. From the demographic variables we observe that the average age at death was
65.16 Those with wills, either probated or administrated, were older than the intestate.
Figure 4 graphs the distribution of age at death for the three testation groups. Figure 5
displays the frequency of different ages reported in the census for the entire deceased
population. We see obvious signs of the age-heaping common in the self-reported age
data from less advanced societies.17 While age was not incorporated directly into the
model, we may anticipate that age would influence will writing for a couple reasons.
First, wills are valid unless subsequently revoked, usually by a newer will, so an
individual will have a will if one was ever written. Older individuals have had more
time to write a will. Second, a will is not needed until a person dies, so individuals may
become more likely to write a will as they age and anticipate that they will die soon.
Over three-quarters of the sample are male. This is partly due to the near
exclusion of married women from the sample. However, even among the never married,
men outnumber women 3 to 1. Most never married women probably had few assets and
16

Age at death is age reported in the Census plus the amount of time between the date of death as reported
in the Calendars and the Census date of March 31, 1901.
17
Most tests for age heaping find that heaping is more common at older ages. Given that so many of the
individuals in the deceased sample were old at the time of the census, the high degree of age heaping in the
data is not surprising. Within the sample, I find reporting of an age ending in a 0 or 5 to increase in age,
decreasing in wealth, and higher for the illiterate.

21

were dependent on parents or siblings. The intestate were more likely to be never
married and less likely to be widowed than those with probated wills; this may be an age
effect. In keeping with the famous Irish low marriage rates, we see that 28.5% of the
deceased were never married. By comparison, according to recent U.S. statistics, 10.4%
of individuals who died in 2003 and were over 15 were never married. (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services 2006) Individuals with administrated wills more likely to
be married than those with probated wills and the intestate (the difference with the
intestate is statistically significant at the 10% level).
Finally, I include three family structure variables that will help with an
assessment of the exchange model. With these, I hope to label individuals who were
dependent on others during old age and would potentially need to pay for this care in the
form of a disproportionate bequest. In order to single out the relative who provided care,
a will is needed. As was the case with the earlier beneficiary indicators, I hypothesize
these individuals have the most to gain from changing the default distribution. First, I
include an indicator as to whether the deceased appeared to live as a dependent on a
grown child. This includes individuals who are labeled in the Census as the mother or
father of the head, and those who live with one son or daughter who is 30 or above. I
view this as an indicator of exchange because individuals living with one prime age child
are likely to be getting care-giving services from that child. I find that this type of living
arrangement is most common among those with probated wills. Second, I include a
variable measuring whether an individual is not related to the head in a direct lineal
manner. This includes individuals who are brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts or uncles of
the family head. I assume that these individuals were supported by the household head
and are more indebted to him than to other similarly related individuals. Third, I include
an indicator for whether an individual is reported as being retired either in the Census or
in the estate record or reported an occupation that provides no income -- such as
housekeeper or wife. I believe that individuals without a source of income are more
likely to be dependent on their children or others in old age and therefore need to
compensate those who provided support.18

18

I exclude individuals retired from the armed forces or police in this definition of the retired because they
would have received pensions.

22

From Table 2 we get a picture of individuals with Administrated wills as being
older, married, relatively poor landowners. This pattern leads to the conjecture that for
such estates the appointed executor may believe that the widow will do an adequate job
administering a small farming estate and may step aside as a result. Alternately, the
deceased may not have appointed an executor at all deeming his wife equal to the task.
In either case, the motivations of the deceased in writing a will are not different from the
motivations of those with a probated will. As a result, for the remainder of the paper, I
am going to group individuals with administrated wills and individuals with probated
wills together. All of these individuals went to the expense and trouble of writing a will.
VI. Estimation and Findings
To investigate the determinants of having a will, I estimate a probit model where
the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has a will (either probated or
administrated) and equal to zero if the individual died intestate. I report marginal effects
in the Tables below. The coefficients can be interpreted as telling us how a marginal
change in the underlying independent variable influences the probability of having a will.
Because of the numerous different variables available in the data set, I am going
to begin with the demographic variables and progressively add other variable groups. In
column 1 of Table 3, I report the determinants of will writing based on age, sex, and
marital status. I find that among these variables only age has a statistically significant
effect on the probability of writing a will. A one year change in age changes the
probability of having a will by one percent. Calculated differently, a one standard
deviation change in age, 15 years, changes the probability of having a will by about 15%.
This relationship between will writing and age is consistent with the fact that older
individuals are more likely to die and a will is unnecessary prior to death. Younger
individuals may have put off will writing because they were not expecting to die. If we
were able to obtain individual cause of death data we could further investigate whether
individuals without wills were more likely to die from accidents and fast moving illnesses
and were not anticipating their deaths. Unfortunately, this data is unobtainable.19

19

The registrar of deaths in Belfast does have the data available, but it is expensive to procure and would
need to be done by a civil servant separately for each individual.

23

Interestingly, overall data on cause of death show that illness far exceeds accidents and
other unexpected events as the major cause of death. If we look at the readily available
U.S. mortality statistics for this period, we find approximately 5% of deaths caused by
accidents. Comparable statistics for England and Wales yield a lower number – close to
1%. At this time the leading causes of death in England and Wales and the U.S. were
Tuberculosis and Influenza/Pneumonia -- illnesses that don’t kill or total incapacitate an
individual instantaneously presumably leaving an ill person time to write a will if desired.
In column 2, I replace the marital status variable with the beneficiary variables
that indicate who will inherit the estate if the individual dies intestate. As mentioned
earlier, I expect that individuals will be more likely to write a will if other relatives
inherit either exclusively or in conjunction with the deceased’s wife because in these
cases, potential testators are more likely to find the division dictated by intestate
succession arbitrary. This prediction is not supported in the data. The marginal effects
on these two types of families relative to those where a wife and children inherit are
negative and statistically insignificant; if anything individuals with estates divided
outside their immediate families are more likely to be intestate.20 This result could arise if
individuals in these types of families are less concerned about what happens to their
assets because they care less about those they leave behind.
In column 3, I incorporate measures of literacy and religion. None of these
variables is statistically significant indicating that these proxies for psychic costs do not
appear to affect will writing. Alternatively religion and literacy may be poor proxies for
psychic costs. One issue with this regression is that we are omitting wealth which is
highly correlated with religion.
In column 4, I add a dummy indicating whether the deceased lived in a city. I
find that city dwellers are 15% less likely to write wills, contrary to my predictions. This
is not a wealth effect because city dwellers were on average wealthier than non-city
residents. However, it may be a result of the low landholding by individuals in cities.
Only 5% of city dwellers report that they are the landholder on their Census forms as

20

These results are unchanged if we create a separate category for married women whose entire estate
would go to her husband under intestate succession.

24

opposed to 72% of individuals outside of cities. This will be revisited in greater detail
below.
The final column of Table 3 adds a variable measuring the natural log of the
estate value to the regression. I find that a one percent increase in wealth increased the
probability of having a will by seven percent. While the effect of wealth on will writing
was indeterminate based on the theory, intuitively individuals with more to distribute
may be expected to go to more trouble to distribute. This result does not appear to be
driven by their being a threshold below which no one writes a will. Fifty percent of
individuals in the bottom wealth decile have a will and the probability of having a will is
increasing in wealth for individuals above the bottom decline. In this final column, the
effect of living in a city becomes larger. This indicates that the earlier result was muted
by the absence of wealth.
I further investigate these results by maintaining a subset of variables and adding
alternative measures of family structure in Table 4. I look at whether having children,
their ages, or whether any or all are minors affects will writing. None of these measures
of family structure is statistically significant. Similar to the measures of beneficiaries,
characteristics of children do not influence will writing.
In Table 5, we incorporate an additional set of wealth and income measures. In
column 2, we add in two measures of wealth traditionally used in the economic history
literature – whether the household contains servants and the number of housepoints
(similar to the common measure of the number of windows). Neither is statistically
significant, although the coefficient on servants is positive and large. Both of these are
highly correlated with wealth, which is already controlled in the regression. In column 4
we add information about landholding in the form of indicators for whether the deceased
is the holder of the land where he lives, and an indicator for whether the landholder
information is blank. Relative to individuals who live on the holdings of others,
landholders are 9% more likely to write wills. Because the value of most land (the value
of real property is excluded) is incorporated into the measure of wealth, this result
indicates that the type of wealth influences will-writing. We may find this higher
propensity to write a will among landholders because the assets of non-landowners may
have been more liquid and easier to split among beneficiaries. Landholders may have

25

had more concern with giving a single beneficiary a sizeable enough farm to support a
family and may have been concerned with which child inherited the holding.
In columns (5)-(9) we add the various measures related to the occupation of the
deceased as detailed in the previous section. None of the occupational grouping or scores
has any predictive power of the probability of writing a will controlling for wealth.
In Table 6, I incorporate the indicators for households where I expect individuals
to be influenced by exchange. In column 2, I add the dummy indicating whether an
individual lived with one prime aged child prior to death. In column 3, I add the
indicator for individuals who were enumerated outside their family of origin. In column
4, I incorporate the indicator for individuals with no obvious income source based on the
occupation reported to the Census or in the Calendars. For the first and the last
indicators of exchange, the point estimates are large and positive and the effect on will
writing of having no obvious source of income is statistically significant. This finding is
consistent with those more dependent on others in their last years being motivated by
exchange in deciding to distribute their assets after death. I do not find that living outside
ones family of origin influences the probability of having a will. The point estimate here
is negative in keeping with the finding that individuals whose estates devolve to
individuals outside their immediate family appear to be less likely to write wills.
To investigate these results further, I look at the determinants of will writing for
six separate sub-population groups: men and women, Protestants and Catholics, and land
holders and non-land owners. I do this separately for each measure of exchange and
present the results of separate regressions for each group in Tables 7-9.
A number of noteworthy patterns emerge from these tables. First, we observe in
Table 8 that the point estimate of the effect of living outside of ones family of origin on
will writing is negative for all groups and statistically insignificant. Most of these
individuals live with siblings. We find no evidence that these individuals write a will to
compensate their sibling for giving them a place to live. The negative relationship we
find could be consistent with altruism if these individual place a low weight on the utility
of others generally and as a result do not care about who receives their assets. When we
look at the other two measures of exchange, we find that these exchange motivations are
stronger for women and non-land owners than their counterparts. Women living with a

26

prime age child are 28% more likely to write a will than other women while women with
no obvious income sources are (statistically insignificantly) 15% more likely to write a
will. Among non-landholders and those where the name of the landholder is not given,
those living with a prime aged child are 31% more likely to write a will and those with no
income source are 21% more likely to write a will.
Women and non-landholders were disadvantaged relative to others (as were
Catholics) and as a result more likely to be dependent on others for support during old
age, so it is reassuring that they appear to be more motivated by exchange. Landholders
were unlikely to be dependent in old age because their holding provided enough food and
income to support them. Even if a landholder was too old to work the land, he could
guarantee some minimum level of sustenance.
I also find that the role of landholding in leading to will writing was concentrated
among Protestants and men. The value of the land owned by these two advantaged
population groups, even controlling for wealth, was probably higher. These groups may
also have owned real property not counted in our wealth measure. Finally, the influence
of age on will writing was positive and statistically significant for all of the groups. I find
a curious result that women who could read, but could not write were much more likely
to have wills. 21

One potential explanation for the differences between men and women is that they
were differentially selected into the sample. In the next section, we investigate sample
selection and its potential influence on these findings.
VII. Sample Selection
Our sample consists of all individuals who died between April 1901 and
November 1905 in County Fermanagh and whose estates received a grant of
administration or probate between May 1901 and December 1905 and who we were able
to find in the 1901 Census.

21

I looked at the determinants of literacy and found that wealthier individuals, younger individuals, and
Protestants were more likely to be literate. This indicates that this variable is correctly specified.

27

As a result, the sample is selected from the population of individuals who died in
Fermanagh between March 1901 and 1905 in two manners. First, there are individuals
who we are unable to find in the 1901 Census and second there are those who died
between the target dates who did not have their estates go through administration or
probate prior to December 31, 1905 either because their estates did not go through
administration or probate at all or because the legal process occurred after the end of
1905. We discuss each of these sources of selection in turn.
Our first issue is that we are unable to find some individuals in the 1901 Census.
As mentioned earlier, I am able to match over 90% of those individuals in the Calendars.
This is an impressive match rate. The principal way that we are able to match
individuals is through townland and name. Townlands are very small. The median
townland of the deceased had only 9 families. In some cases there is not an exact and
unique match between the townland and name in the Calendar and the same information
in the Census. I address this problem in a myriad of ways.
In a number of cases there is more than one individual in the townland with the
same name as the deceased. Often most individuals in a townland have the same
surname – probably the result of farm division by common ancestors. First names are
also fairly well concentrated – among the deceased in my sample nearly 30% were named
James, John, Patrick, Thomas, or William. In many of the cases where more than one
person has the same name, I am able to find the deceased based on ancillary information
provided in the calendars – such as occupation or the name of and relationship to the
person who was granted probate or administration. Also, sometimes I am unable to find
the deceased in the Census, but can clearly find the deceased’s family in the Census. In
these cases, I use the information on the remainder of the family members – these
individuals are included among the matched. 22 If I cannot find the deceased or his
family in the given townland, the availability of an index allows me to look for
individuals with that name in other townlands. I occasionally will find the deceased in a
townland adjacent to the one reported in the Calendar. Given the small and rural nature
of most townlands, the boundaries were probably pretty uncertain.

22

In 51 cases there is more than one individual with the same name in the townland. In seven cases, I can
find the deceased’s family, but the deceased is absent.

28

Of the 531 individuals from the calendars, 38 cannot be found in the 1901 Census
Microfilm using any of these techniques. Among those that we are unable to match, we
can think of a couple possible reasons why we cannot find them in the census. We would
be unable to match someone if they had changed their name or recorded it drastically
differently in the two records, if they had been absent on the Census date, or if they
moved between the Census and their death, especially if they had previously lived outside
Fermanagh.
Looking more closely at the unmatched sample, the principal phenomenon that
seems to be at work is that some people must have moved to the location reported in the
index after the Census, or been otherwise absent on the Census date. We are often able to
find the townland listed by an individual, but not find a record of them or their family
within the townland. This may be due to occupation such as an itinerant priest or a
roving reporter (occupations among the unmatched) or to a family move. The fact that we
are able to match such a high percentage speaks to the generally low mobility of the
population within Ireland – according to the Census 86 percent of individuals enumerated
in the whole of Ireland lived in the county where they were born on the Census date.23
The lack of a perfect match brings up the question of potential selection bias. We
need to be concerned if those individuals that we are not able to match are somehow
systematically different in a manner relevant to their estate distribution decisions. Given
the high match rate, selection is unlikely to be a major issue, nonetheless it is a concern.
To look more systematically at sample selection, I predict the probability of being
matched in the Census based on the information available in the Calendars. Fortunately,
the Calendars are a rich data source. I include information on gender, occupation, estate
value, whether the deceased was intestate or not, whether estate administration occurred
in Dublin or Armagh, whether the individual lived in the city of Enniskillen, and the
amount of time between the Census and the individual’s death. Nearly all women
included in the sample are labeled as Widows or Spinsters in the Calendars. While
according to the Census definitions, spinsters are involved in an industrial occupation, in
the context of the Calendars this appears to designate a never married woman. As a

23

Ireland is know for its high out migration rates, but these individuals would have died outside of Ireland
as well.

29

result, we include a spinster indicator in the regression and do not include spinster as an
industrial occupation.
Marginal effects from a Probit model predicting matching are presented in Table
10. We present the results for the total population in Column 1 and then separately for
males and females in Columns 2 and 3. The occupational categories are based on the
Census occupational definitions; results using occupations based on social status yield a
consistent result. For the entire population, the only attribute that predicts matching is
occupation. Farmers are 15 percent more likely to be matched than managers and
professionals (the omitted category). Given that farmers are tied to the land, and that the
Census date of March 31 is at the start of the planting season, it is not surprising that they
are easy to find. I also find that those with industrial occupations are easier to match.
This may demonstrate increased geographic mobility among managers and professionals
(the omitted occupational category).
When we look separately by sex, we find that no attributes predict matching
among women while occupation, residence in Enniskillen, and having a will probated in
Dublin predict matching among men. The marginal effect for farmers is far larger than
the other estimates. Residence in Enniskillen may influence the results because Census
enumeration had better coverage in an urban area or because individuals in Enniskillen
were more likely to reside in the same town according to the Calendars and the Census.
We are 4% more likely to match individuals with estates probated or administrated in
Dublin than individuals probated or administrated in Armagh. The registry in Dublin was
the principal registry while the Armagh registry was the district registry covering
Fermanagh and nearby counties. There was no administrative or geographic reason to
prefer one registry over another, but the Dublin registry may have been more prestigious
and may have attracted more established families who would also have been easier to
find in the Census.
The variable measuring having a will is not significantly different from zero and
the point estimate is small. We also estimate the probability of having a will based on the
variables observed in the Calendars including an indicator of whether the individual was
matched to the Census. Being matched to the Census has a small and statistically
insignificant effect on will writing. Combined, these results indicate that selection into

30

the matched sample is unlikely to influence the results. As a result, we do not adjust the
sample for selection.
While we have a great deal of information concerning those individuals who we
are unable to match to the Census, we have very little information concerning individuals
whose died, but who did not have estates go through administration or probate. The
principal reason to be excluded from these legal channels would be the absence of any
possessions of value upon death. In general, in order for administration or probate to
occur someone would need to initiate the process for the transmission of assets and desire
the assets of the deceased. Individuals who possessed nothing of value would not have
their death lead to estate distribution. Some of these individuals would have passed their
possessions to their heirs via intervivos transmission, and others would have had nothing
to begin with. Therefore, our results characterize the will writing decision among
individuals with assets at death. Presumably individuals without assets would not have
wills because they have nothing to gain from changing the distribution of their minimal
estates. Moreover, the cost of writing a will may exceed their assets.
The total lack of assets would particularly characterize two groups among the
deceased -- dependent children and married women. Dependent children would not have
accumulated any possessions – the property of children under 21 was in practice the
property of their parents. The property rights and holdings of married women were also
very limited. The personal property held by women who were married in1882 or earlier
was the “absolute property of the husband” with some minor exceptions. (British
Almanac, 1901) Women married after 1883 could more easily own property independent
of their husbands, but this was limited in practice except for among women in the upper
reaches of society.
In order to get a better picture of the potential nature of selection into the Probate
and Administration processes from the overall deceased population, we perform some
simple calculations based on vital statistics data. (Mitchell 1962) We use death rates by
age group and gender for all of Ireland, to generate approximations of deaths by age
group and year in Femanagh. We then compare these numbers to our sample.
The county of Fermanagh contained 65,430 people according to the 1901 census.
If we assume that the population was divided by age group and gender in the same

31

manner as was Ireland as a whole, we arrive at the population by gender by age category
estimates presented in the first column of Table 11 for men and Table 12 for women. If
we further assume that the annual death rate, by age group and gender were the same at
those prevailing in Ireland in 1900-1902, we can generate estimates of the number of
people who would have died, by age group and gender, per year. Those estimates are
presented in the third column of Table 11 and Table 12.
Our sample covers people who died between April 5, 1901 and Nov 13, 1905.
Because of the timing of the census, we do not have people for all of 1901. Because
some people have their estates probated quite a while after their deaths, and we only look
at the calendars through the end of 1905, we do not have many people who died in 1905.
As a result, we have three full years of data 1902-1904. We probably have a nearly
complete sample of individuals who died between 1902 and 1904 because approximately
85% of estates are probated within a year of death indicating we would have observed in
the calendars through the end of 1905 nearly everyone who died through the end of
1904.24 Assuming that we have three years of data, the total deaths would be about three
times the annual death rates, again presented in Tables 11 and 12, column 4. Across both
genders, this leads to a countywide three year death total of 3582 people
For deaths between 1902 and 1904, we have a matched deceased sample of 372
individuals. This indicates that we are capturing about 10% of individuals who died.
This 10% is not evenly split across age and gender groupings. We present the percent of
deceased people captured in our sample by age and gender in column 5 of the two tables.
These representation rates are graphed by age group and gender in Figure 6. This
indicates that we are capturing 6% of women aged 25 and over and 24% of men. The
pattern of these rates is consistent with the earlier discussion with no children represented
and low representation of women. The representation of men is also fairly low indicating
that property ownership at death was far from universal, even among prime aged males.
We could potentially adjust for selection by weighting individuals in a manner
inversely proportional to their representation in our sample. In that way, we could
generate a sample that represented the entire deceased population. However, doing so

24

According to the Almanac, executors were liable for penalties if probate was not taken out within six
months of the testator’s death.

32

would not be accurate because individuals are not randomly selected from their age and
sex categories, but rather are selected based on their asset value and we have no
information on the asset value of individuals who died but did not have estates (aside
from a general assumption that it is low). Rather than trying to correct for this issue, we
conclude that our sample represents all deceased individuals with assets rather than all
deceased individuals.
The third source of selection involves the absence of individuals who died prior to
December 1905, who had their estates go through probate or administration, but after
December 1905. In other words, we are missing some individuals who have a lengthy
delay between death and probate. The date of probate or administration would depend on
the executors or administrators submitting the necessary paperwork to the probate
registry and the registry being satisfied enough with the information provided to grant
probate or administration. We can get some idea of why some individuals might be
excluded from the sample by looking at the determinants of the timing between death and
probate within our sample.
In Table 13 we present results from regressions predicting the number of days
between probate and death. In the first column, we include basic information about the
deceased, in the second column we add information about beneficiaries, and in the third
column we add more detailed information about the number of sons of the deceased. Our
discussion of the results focuses on the final column of the table. We find that probate is
faster for wealthier individuals. This result is consistent with the time value of money,
with beneficiaries more eager to get their hands on larger estates. We also find that
controlling for wealth, land ownership delays the issuing of a grant. Land transmission
likely required more extensive paperwork and valuation. Finally, we find that the
number of sons increases the time until probate. In particular, families with two sons
received a grant over two months later than families with only one son (the omitted
category). If we look further, we find that this effect is strongest for estates without
wills. The results indicate that estates with multiple sons may be more contentious and it
may take the sons, who both lived with their parent on the Census date, more time to
generate the consensus needed to apply for probate. Alternately, households with sons at

33

home may be less eager to divide the assets and may be more able to continue to function
without estate division.
We can partly compensate for the lack of observations with lengthy delays
between death and probate, by re-weighting the sample, and giving more weight to those
with longer days between death and grant issuance. Doing so does not change any of the
substantive results.
VII. Implications
We find that the main determinants of having a will at death are age at death and
wealth. The result that age influences will writing corresponds to the notion that an
individual does not need a will until after he is dead. As a result, individuals who think
that they are going to die in the near future, such as the old, are more likely to have a will.
The effect of wealth on will writing is indeterminate (or negative under reasonable
assumptions) according to the altruism model, but the strong positive effects we find
correspond to other theories. For example, we would generate this result if individuals
get no utility from assets distributed by intestate succession, but some benefit from assets
distributed deliberately by will. Wealthier individuals may also have more specific items
that they would like to distribute to certain beneficiaries (e.g. I give my daughter Molly
my china). We also see some indication that the type of assets held by an individual
influences will writing. In particular, landholding increases the probability of writing a
will for men and Protestants.
We also find some evidence of exchange motives for women and non-land
owners. In particular, we find that women and non-land owners who live with a prime
aged child or who do not report an income generating occupation are more likely to write
a will. This supports exchange because these individuals would have been dependent on
others for financial support during their waning years and would need a will to
compensate these others for the support given and services provided.
We find little support for a more sophisticated model where an individual
compares his utility under testacy and intestate succession and optimizes. This model
leads to the prediction than beneficiaries and living arrangement should matter. This
prediction is not supported in the data. The beneficiary characteristics that we are able to

34

glean from the Census manuscripts have no effect on will writing. Instead it is the
characteristics of the dying himself and his assets that influence the decision to write a
will.

35

Bibliography
Andreioni, James “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of WarmGlow Giving.” Economic Journal, v. 100, June 1990, 464-477.
Bernheim, B. Douglas; Andrei Shleifer; Lawrence H. Summers “The Strategic Bequest
Motive,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6, (Dec.., 1985).
Bernheim, B. Douglas and Sergei Severinov, “Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for
the Equal Division Puzzle,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111 (2003)
“The British Almanac of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge: 1901”
Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, London: Published for the Stationers’
Co. by Cassell, 1901.
Criminal and Judicial Statistics, Ireland, 1894, Dublin: Printed for Her Majesty’s
Stationery Office, By Alexander Thom. & Co, (Limited), 1895.
Guinnane, Timothy, The Vanishing Irish: Households, Migration, and the Rural
Economy in Ireland, 1850-1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Judicial Statistics for Ireland, for 1902, British Parliamentary Sessional Papers, 1903.
Judicial Statistics for Ireland, for 1903, British Parliamentary Sessional Papers, 1904.
Kennedy, Liam, “Farm Succession in Modern Ireland: Elements of a Theory of
Inheritance” Economic History Review, XLIV, 3(1991), pp. 477-499.
McGranahan, Leslie "Charity and the Bequest Motive: Evidence from SeventeenthCentury Wills," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6),
pages 1270-1291, December, 2000.
Mitchell, B.R. with Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1962.
Norton, Edward and Donald Taylor, “Equal Division of Estates and the Exchange
Motive,” Journal of Aging and Social Policy, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2005.
Preston, Samuel H. and Michael Haines, Fatal Years – Child Mortality in Late
Nineteenth Century America, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
Seanad Eirann, 1965, Seanad Eireann- Volume 59 – 14 July 1965 Private Business. –
Succession Bill, 1965: Second Stage. Available on the WWW at http://www.oireachtasdebates.gov.ie/S/0059/S.0059.196507140007.html.

36

U.S. Census Bureau, 2003, “Table AVG1. Average Number of People per Household, by
Race and Hispanic Origin, Marital Status, Age, and Education of Householder: March
2002.” Internet release date: June 12, 2003.
U.S. Census Bureau, 2005, “Wealth and Asset Ownership,” available on the Internet at
www.census.gov/hhes/www/wwealth/wealth.html. Last revised: January 28, 2005.
Accessed August 28, 2006.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2006, “Deaths: Final Data for 2003,”
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 54, No. 13, April 19, 2006. Available on the
Internet at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54_13.pdf.
Wilhelm, Mark O, 1996. "Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings: Testing
the Altruistic Model of Bequests," American Economic Review, American Economic
Association, vol. 86(4), pages 874-92, September.

37

Table 1: Intestate Succession Laws, Ireland 1901
Personal Property (Chattels)
• Married Woman: All to husband
• Widow and Kids: First £500 and ½ of remainder to wife, ½ of remainder split
among kids
• Kids Only: Evenly distributed among them
• Widow No Kids: First £500 and half of remainder to wife, ½ as under no widow
or kids
• No Widow or Kids: All to father; no Father to mother and siblings evenly
• No Next of Kin: To state

38

Table 2: Variable Means by Testation Status
Whole Sample
Mean
Std. Dev.
Estate Variables
Testate
Intestate
Administration With Will
Days Death to Probate/Administration

Mean

Intestate
Std. Dev.

Probated Will
Mean
Std. Dev.

Administrated Will
Mean
Std. Dev.

0.587
0.340
0.073
181.488

0.493
0.474
0.260
207.309

174.417

227.919

179.824

198.463

227.889

172.610

0.334
0.136
0.332
0.198
22.633
28.251
0.522
0.077
0.170
1.322

0.472
0.343
0.471
0.399
12.613
11.330
0.500
0.267
0.376
1.743

0.387
0.167
0.298
0.149
17.891
23.981
0.440
0.089
0.202
1.190

0.488
0.374
0.459
0.357
11.542
10.606
0.498
0.286
0.403
1.699

0.317
0.114
0.334
0.234
24.849
30.210
0.559
0.069
0.155
1.383

0.466
0.318
0.473
0.424
12.734
11.200
0.497
0.254
0.363
1.804

0.194
0.167
0.472
0.167
23.261
28.913
0.639
0.083
0.139
1.472

0.401
0.378
0.506
0.378
11.845
11.441
0.487
0.280
0.351
1.404

Literacy/Culture/Religion
Roman Catholic
Protestant Episcopalian
Other Protestant
Can Read and Write
Can Read but Cannot Write

0.423
0.415
0.162
0.818
0.093

0.495
0.493
0.369
0.386
0.291

0.452
0.393
0.155
0.857
0.071

0.499
0.490
0.363
0.351
0.258

0.403
0.431
0.166
0.803
0.103

0.491
0.496
0.372
0.398
0.305

0.444
0.389
0.167
0.750
0.111

0.504
0.494
0.378
0.439
0.319

Community
Deceased Lived in a City

0.168

0.374

0.238

0.427

0.131

0.338

0.139

0.351

Wealth
Natural Log of Estate Value
Household Contains Servants
Census Housepoints
Lives on Own Holding
Landholder Blank
Does Not Live on Own Holding

4.959
0.348
7.831
0.609
0.162
0.229

1.304
0.477
4.497
0.489
0.369
0.421

4.700
0.292
7.527
0.485
0.216
0.299

1.283
0.456
3.363
0.501
0.412
0.459

5.153
0.397
8.024
0.666
0.128
0.207

1.268
0.490
5.148
0.473
0.334
0.406

4.599
0.222
7.667
0.722
0.194
0.083

1.432
0.422
3.260
0.454
0.401
0.280

Beneficiary Info
Other Relatives Inherit
Wife and Other Relatives Inherit
Wife and Children Inherit
Children Inherit
Age of Youngest Child
Age of Oldest Child
Has Any Children
All Children 16 or Under
Has a Child 16 or Under
Number of Children

Variable name in italics if those with probated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name in bold if those with administrated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name double underlined if probated will significantly different from administrated will at 95% level

39

Table 2: Variable Means by Testation Status, Continued
Whole Sample
Mean
Std. Dev.

Mean

Intestate
Std. Dev.

Probated Will
Mean
Std. Dev.

Administrated Will
Mean
Std. Dev.

Occupation and Occupation Scores
Census Professional or Commercial Worker
Census Agricultural Worker
Census Domestic or Industrial Worker
Census Class of Worker Unclear

0.047
0.650
0.107
0.196

0.211
0.478
0.310
0.398

0.054
0.577
0.173
0.196

0.226
0.495
0.379
0.398

0.041
0.693
0.066
0.200

0.200
0.462
0.248
0.401

0.056
0.639
0.139
0.167

0.232
0.487
0.351
0.378

Class Professional / Shopkeeper
Class Farmer
Class Skilled Craft
Class Unskilled
Class Unknown

0.162
0.717
0.057
0.030
0.034

0.369
0.451
0.231
0.172
0.182

0.196
0.655
0.071
0.048
0.030

0.398
0.477
0.258
0.214
0.170

0.155
0.752
0.041
0.024
0.028

0.363
0.433
0.200
0.154
0.164

0.083
0.722
0.111
0.000
0.083

0.280
0.454
0.319
0.000
0.280

Haines Income Score /100
IPUMS Occupation Status Score
IPUMS Occupation Income Score
No Market Occupation Given for Scores
Indepenent Wealth for Scores

3.674
21.772
14.667
0.099
0.024

2.419
54.147
9.364
0.299
0.154

3.988
28.781
15.560
0.090
0.030

2.827
78.740
10.596
0.287
0.171

3.506
18.557
14.219
0.100
0.024

2.186
37.061
8.805
0.301
0.154

3.578
15.153
14.139
0.139
0.000

2.052
10.102
7.353
0.351
0.000

Demographics
Age at Death
Male
Never Married
Married
Widowed

64.714
0.777
0.283
0.468
0.249

15.170
0.416
0.451
0.499
0.433

58.276
0.768
0.351
0.464
0.185

15.128
0.423
0.479
0.500
0.389

68.219
0.783
0.255
0.448
0.297

14.239
0.413
0.437
0.498
0.458

66.516
0.778
0.194
0.639
0.167

13.090
0.422
0.401
0.487
0.378

0.097
0.063
0.156

0.296
0.243
0.363

0.042
0.095
0.131

0.200
0.294
0.338

0.134
0.052
0.166

0.342
0.222
0.372

0.056
0.000
0.194

0.232
0.000
0.401

Exchange Indicators
Deceased is Parent of Head or Head/Wife
with Prime Aged Child
Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin
No Obvious Income Source
Sample Size

494

168

290

36

Variable name in italics if those with probated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name in bold if those with administrated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name double underlined if probated will significantly different from administrated will at 95% level

40

Table 3: Determinants of Will Writing

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Male
Dummy=1 if Married
Dummy=1 if Never Married

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Demographics
0.010***
(0.002)
0.032
(0.056)
-0.026
(0.060)
-0.047
(0.066)

Beneficiaries
0.010***
(0.002)
0.019
(0.055)

Literacy / Culture /
Religion
0.009***
(0.002)
0.025
(0.056)

Environment
0.009***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.056)

Wealth
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.024
(0.056)

-0.020
(0.069)
-0.052
(0.058)
-0.086
(0.074)
0.011
(0.067)
-0.010
(0.050)
-0.095
(0.076)
0.052
(0.101)
-0.211***
(0.066)
0.074***
(0.019)
493

Children Inherit
Other Relatives Inherit
Wife and Other Relatives Inherit

-0.015
(0.068)
-0.046
(0.056)
-0.106
(0.074)

-0.015
(0.068)
-0.050
(0.057)
-0.105
(0.074)
0.040
(0.064)
0.027
(0.049)
-0.067
(0.077)
0.049
(0.101)

-0.016
(0.068)
-0.053
(0.057)
-0.093
(0.074)
0.047
(0.063)
0.026
(0.049)
-0.055
(0.078)
0.053
(0.101)
-0.148**
(0.063)

494

494

494

Other Protestant
Protestant Episcopalian
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Observations
494
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

41

Table 4: Characteristics of Children

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Age of Youngest Child
Age of Oldest Child

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Basic
Regression
0.009***
(0.001)
-0.092
(0.075)
0.055
(0.100)
-0.210***
(0.064)
0.073***
(0.019)

Age of
Children
0.010***
(0.003)
-0.122
(0.093)
-0.050
(0.160)
-0.235**
(0.093)
0.080***
(0.026)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.006)

Number of
Children
0.009***
(0.001)
-0.095
(0.075)
0.053
(0.100)
-0.208***
(0.064)
0.071***
(0.019)

Any Minor
Children
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.092
(0.075)
0.054
(0.100)
-0.210***
(0.064)
0.073***
(0.019)

All Minor
Children
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.100
(0.074)
0.053
(0.101)
-0.209***
(0.063)
0.072***
(0.019)

Any Children
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.095
(0.075)
0.054
(0.100)
-0.207***
(0.064)
0.072***
(0.019)

Has Any Children

0.052
(0.045)

All Children 16 and Under

0.107
(0.072)

Has a Child 16 or Under
Number of Children
Observations
493
259
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

-0.001
(0.059)
0.010
(0.013)
493

493

493

493

42

Table 5: Indicators of Wealth and Income
(1)

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Dummy=1 if Household contains Servants
Census Housepoints
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank
No Market Occupation Given
Occupation -- Independent Wealth

Basic
Regression
0.009***
(0.001)
-0.092
(0.075)
0.055
(0.100)
-0.210***
(0.064)
0.073***
(0.019)

(2)
Servants /
Housing
Characteristics
0.010***
(0.001)
-0.098
(0.074)
0.060
(0.099)
-0.217***
(0.067)
0.063***
(0.020)
0.065
(0.050)
0.004
(0.008)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Land
Holding
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.100
(0.074)
0.054
(0.100)
-0.192*
(0.112)
0.056***
(0.021)
0.068
(0.050)
0.005
(0.008)
0.092
(0.056)
0.047
(0.099)

Census
Class of
Worker
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.106
(0.074)
0.047
(0.102)
-0.185
(0.119)
0.055***
(0.021)
0.067
(0.050)
0.004
(0.008)
0.101
(0.065)
0.066
(0.099)

Social
Class of
Worker
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.101
(0.074)
0.054
(0.100)
-0.210*
(0.123)
0.056***
(0.021)
0.074
(0.051)
0.002
(0.008)
0.108*
(0.061)
0.034
(0.103)

IPUMS
Income
Score
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.102
(0.074)
0.048
(0.101)
-0.197
(0.122)
0.058***
(0.021)
0.064
(0.051)
0.004
(0.008)
0.117**
(0.060)
0.059
(0.099)
0.115
(0.087)
-0.051
(0.179)

IPUMS
Status
Score
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.098
(0.074)
0.050
(0.101)
-0.166
(0.113)
0.060***
(0.021)
0.064
(0.051)
0.006
(0.008)
0.107*
(0.060)
0.056
(0.099)
0.071
(0.075)
-0.127
(0.163)

Haines
Income
Score
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.098
(0.074)
0.050
(0.101)
-0.168
(0.120)
0.058***
(0.021)
0.065
(0.051)
0.005
(0.008)
0.112*
(0.060)
0.059
(0.098)
0.073
(0.097)
-0.120
(0.189)
-0.005
(0.014)

Haines Income Score/100
Occupation Status Score
Occupation Income Score

-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.004)

43

Table 5: Indicators of Wealth and Income, Continued

(1)

(2)

Servants /
Housing
Basic
Regression Characteristics

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Land
Holding

Census
Class of
Worker

Social
Class of
Worker
-0.106
(0.123)
-0.022
(0.132)
-0.090
(0.167)
-0.096
(0.100)
-0.013
(0.146)

IPUMS
Income
Score

IPUMS
Status
Score

Haines
Income
Score

489

-0.031
(0.121)
0.010
(0.118)
-0.120
(0.134)
489

489

488

488

488

Lower Professional / Shopkeeper
Skilled Craft
Unskilled
Farmer
No Occupational Info.
Agricultural Worker
Class Worker Unclear (e.g. Wife)
Domestic or Industrial Worker
Observations
493
489
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

44

Table 6: Indicators of Exchange
(1)

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank

Basic
Regression
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.090
(0.075)
0.049
(0.101)
-0.184*
(0.105)
0.066***
(0.019)
0.085
(0.056)
0.042
(0.095)

Deceased is Parent of Head, or Head/Wife with Prime Aged Child

(2)
Exchange -Lives With
Prime Aged
Child
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.087
(0.076)
0.047
(0.102)
-0.187*
(0.106)
0.067***
(0.019)
0.090
(0.056)
0.047
(0.095)
0.111
(0.074)

(3)

(4)

Exchange -Not Lineal to
Head
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.085
(0.076)
0.053
(0.100)
-0.188*
(0.106)
0.066***
(0.019)
0.065
(0.060)
0.030
(0.098)

Exchange -No Income
Source
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.102
(0.075)
0.036
(0.104)
-0.195*
(0.106)
0.071***
(0.019)
0.146**
(0.063)
0.081
(0.093)

No Obvious Income Source

0.143**
(0.058)

Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

492

492

-0.083
(0.099)
492

492

45

Table 7: Determinants of Will Writing by Group, Deceased is Parent of Head

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank
Deceased is Parent of Head, or Head/Wife with Prime Aged Child
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

(1)

(2)

(3)

Whole
Population
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.187*
(0.106)
0.067***
(0.019)
-0.087
(0.076)
0.047
(0.102)
0.090
(0.056)
0.047
(0.095)
0.111
(0.074)
492

Women
Men Only Only
0.009*** 0.007**
(0.002)
(0.004)
-0.267** -0.165
(0.132)
(0.190)
0.080*** 0.055
(0.022)
(0.042)
-0.112
0.001
(0.084)
(0.175)
-0.117
0.347***
(0.139)
(0.090)
0.138**
-0.097
(0.069)
(0.121)
0.066
0.067
(0.113)
(0.171)
0.044
0.279***
(0.094)
(0.101)
382
110

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

NonLandholders/
Protestants Catholics Landholders Blank
0.009***
0.009*** 0.010***
0.007***
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.149
-0.242
-0.077
-0.187
(0.154)
(0.152)
(0.244)
(0.116)
0.050**
0.103*** 0.082***
0.048
(0.023)
(0.034)
(0.024)
(0.030)
-0.089
-0.124
-0.097
-0.069
(0.131)
(0.097)
(0.081)
(0.141)
-0.180
0.135
0.000
0.110
(0.224)
(0.117)
(0.123)
(0.177)
0.167**
0.002
(0.072)
(0.090)
0.013
0.137
0.079
(0.138)
(0.130)
(0.114)
0.133
0.057
-0.020
0.314***
(0.093)
(0.124)
(0.103)
(0.105)
283
209
299
193

46

Table 8: Determinants of Will Writing by Group, Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank
Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin

(1)

(2)

Whole
Population
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.188*
(0.106)
0.066***
(0.019)
-0.085
(0.076)
0.053
(0.100)
0.065
(0.060)
0.030
(0.098)
-0.083
(0.099)
492

Women
Men Only Only
0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002)
(0.003)
-0.267** -0.141
(0.133)
(0.195)
0.080*** 0.039
(0.022)
(0.043)
-0.113
0.040
(0.083)
(0.176)
-0.117
0.365***
(0.139)
(0.085)
0.135*
-0.132
(0.078)
(0.124)
0.065
0.040
(0.116)
(0.180)
-0.001
-0.264
(0.123)
(0.166)
382
110

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

(3)

(4)

Protestants
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.147
(0.153)
0.051**
(0.024)
-0.094
(0.130)
-0.196
(0.222)
0.151*
(0.079)
-0.003
(0.141)
-0.039
(0.114)
283

(5)

Catholics
0.009***
(0.003)
-0.249
(0.154)
0.104***
(0.034)
-0.124
(0.097)
0.146
(0.115)
-0.024
(0.094)
0.119
(0.136)
-0.160
(0.188)
209

(6)

(7)

Landholders
0.010***
(0.002)
-0.074
(0.258)
0.082***
(0.024)
-0.097
(0.082)
0.000
(0.124)

NonLandholders/
Blank
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.189
(0.116)
0.049*
(0.030)
-0.063
(0.140)
0.131
(0.171)

-0.010
(0.337)
299

0.051
(0.115)
-0.100
(0.107)
193

47

Table 9: Determinants of Will Writing by Group, Deceased Has No Income Source

Age at Death
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City
Log of Estate Value
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank
No Obvious Income Source

(1)

(2)

Whole
Population
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.195*
(0.106)
0.071***
(0.019)
-0.102
(0.075)
0.036
(0.104)
0.146**
(0.063)
0.081
(0.093)
0.143**
(0.058)
492

Women
Men Only Only
0.009*** 0.009**
(0.002)
(0.003)
-0.264** -0.125
(0.132)
(0.188)
0.082*** 0.045
(0.022)
(0.043)
-0.114
-0.051
(0.083)
(0.167)
-0.111
0.321***
(0.139)
(0.109)
0.161**
-0.012
(0.076)
(0.132)
0.079
0.063
(0.112)
(0.176)
0.087
0.145
(0.094)
(0.106)
382
110

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Protestants
0.009***
(0.002)
-0.167
(0.156)
0.053**
(0.024)
-0.111
(0.126)
-0.215
(0.224)
0.211**
(0.083)
0.050
(0.138)
0.093
(0.077)
283

NonLandholders/
Catholics Landholders Blank
0.008*** 0.010***
0.007***
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.244
-0.089
-0.185
(0.153)
(0.248)
(0.117)
0.115*** 0.082***
0.058*
(0.035)
(0.024)
(0.031)
-0.135
-0.098
-0.122
(0.097)
(0.081)
(0.137)
0.127
-0.004
0.095
(0.120)
(0.125)
(0.181)
0.072
(0.097)
0.160
0.113
(0.126)
(0.116)
0.252*** 0.048
0.207**
(0.081)
(0.129)
(0.080)
209
299
193

48

Table 10: Determinants of a Match to the Census

Agricultural Occupation
No Occupation or Occupation Uncertain (e.g. Widow)
Commercial or Industrial Occupation
Spinster
Natural Log of Estate Value
Deceased is Female
Resided in Enniskillen
Probate / Administration in Dublin
Wrote Will
Years Between Census Date and Probate Date

(1)

(2)

(3)

Whole Sample
0.153***
(0.054)
0.036
(0.037)
0.048***
(0.018)
-0.017
(0.039)
0.008
(0.008)
0.006
(0.036)
0.006
(0.031)
0.028
(0.020)
0.005
(0.020)
0.002
(0.008)
530

Males Only
0.169**
(0.073)
0.023
(0.020)
0.033**
(0.015)

Females Only

0.004
(0.007)

-0.030
(0.064)
0.019
(0.022)

0.029*
(0.018)
0.040**
(0.017)
-0.007
(0.018)
0.004
(0.007)
404

-0.042
(0.090)
-0.012
(0.067)
0.063
(0.065)
-0.003
(0.025)
126

Observations
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Omitted Categories: Professional Occupation, Male, Residence Outside of Enniskillen, Probate in Armagh, Intestate

49

Table 11: Vital Statistics for Males, By Age

Age Group
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75-84
85+
Total
Total 25 and up

Number in
Death Rate per Deaths Per Deaths in 3 Sample, 19021000
Year
Years
1904

Males
3299
3352
3437
3449
3189
4709
3431
2854
2483
1413
559
110
32285
15559

39.4
3.9
2.9
4.8
7.1
9.0
10.6
15.6
29.5
63.1
140.0
317.1

130
13
10
17
23
42
36
45
73
89
78
35
591
398

390
39
30
51
69
126
108
135
219
267
234
105
1773
1194

Representation
0
0
0
1
1
11
19
41
69
67
58
24
291
289

0%
0%
0%
2%
1%
9%
18%
30%
32%
25%
25%
23%
16%
24%

Table 12: Vital Statistics for Females, By Age

Age Group
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65-74
75-84
85+
Total
Total 25-

Females
3198
3265
3308
3490
3330
4926
3654
3214
2671
1388
583
120
33147
16556

Death Rate per Deaths Per Deaths in 3
1000
Year
Years
35.0
4.8
3.9
6.0
6.6
8.6
10.8
14.9
29.6
67.2
142.2
292.6

112
16
13
21
22
42
39
48
79
93
83
35
603
419

336
48
39
63
66
126
117
144
237
279
249
105
1809
1257

Number in
Sample, 19021904

Representation
0
0
0
0
1
0
7
11
25
16
16
5
81
80

0%
0%
0%
0%
2%
0%
6%
8%
11%
6%
6%
5%
4%
6%

50

Table 13: Determinants of the Days Between Death and Grant of Probate or Administration

Log of Estate Value
Age at Death
Probated Will
Administrated Will
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Male
Dummy=1 if Household contains Servants
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City

(1)

(2)

Determinants of
Days Until Grant
-12.642
(7.825)
0.428
(0.630)
-12.104
(21.052)
20.088
(37.397)
-40.093*
(22.788)
-28.035
(20.341)
32.510
(32.356)
-18.268
(42.259)
104.355***
(23.695)
13.858
(42.729)
-58.039
(41.441)

Adding
Beneficiary Info
-15.550**
(7.760)
0.091
(0.654)
-17.280
(20.625)
20.872
(36.722)
-44.410*
(23.104)
-13.911
(20.234)
27.497
(31.728)
-26.252
(41.511)
82.971***
(23.947)
-9.687
(42.487)
-42.426
(40.819)
51.835*
(31.298)
41.374
(31.764)
-21.341
(29.249)
34.035***
(12.106)
-14.863
(10.953)

Children Inherit
Wife and Children Inherit
Wife and Other Relatives Inherit
Number of Sons
Number of Daughters
No Sons
2 Sons
3 or More Sons
Constant

182.539***
(59.952)
492
0.100

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

203.530***
(58.890)
492
0.150

(3)

Number of Sons
-15.182*
(7.759)
0.079
(0.654)
-15.118
(20.624)
26.051
(36.782)
-45.409*
(23.135)
-11.720
(20.293)
27.537
(31.932)
-30.600
(41.708)
81.881***
(23.939)
-15.932
(42.589)
-37.421
(40.890)
42.302
(38.249)
29.987
(38.438)
-21.803
(29.226)

-13.239
(11.151)
-37.481
(33.040)
79.637**
(31.894)
46.461
(42.200)
239.537***
(66.699)
492
0.160

51

Figure 1: Raw Data Example

A. Record from Calendar of Probates
a. 12 September 1902 Probate of the Will of Christopher Armstrong late of Ballylucas Co. Fermanagh Farmer who died
17 May 1901 granted at Dublin to Mary Armstrong the Widow Effects £20.
B. Information from the Census
a. Form N: Enumerator’s Abstract for a Townland or Street
Ballylucas – A town or village, not a city or urban district: 14 Families, 59 Residents (34 Males, 25 Women), 42
are Roman Catholic, 17 are Protestant Episcopal, None have other Religious Professions (also includes
information on location within Fermanagh such as the Poor Law Union)
b. Form A: Return of Household Members
First Name

Surname

Christopher
Mary
John C.
Archibald
Patrick

Armstrong
Armstrong
Armstrong
Armstrong
McCahery

Relation to
Head
Head
Wife
Son
Brother
Servant

Religious
Profession
CI
CI
CI
CI
RC

Education
Age
RW
50
RW
40
RW
8
RW
30
RW
27

Sex
M
F
M
M
M

Profession or
Occupation
Farmer
None
Scholar
Farmer
Farm Servant

Marriage
Married
Married
Not Married
Not Married
Not Married

Birth
Place
Fermanagh
Fermanagh
Fermanagh
Fermanagh
Fermanagh

c. Form B.1. Household and Building Return
1 S ta te w h e th e r P riv a te D w e llin g , P u b lic -h o u s e e tc :
2 N u m b e r o f O u t-O ffic e s a n d F a rm s te a d in g s (e .g . P ig g e ry ):
3 W A L L S : If W a lls a re o f S to n e , B ric k , o r C o n c re te e n te r 1 ; if th e y a re M u d , W o o d , o r
o th e r p e ris h a b le m a te ria l e n te r 0

P riv a te D w e llin g
7
1

4 R O O F : If R o o f is o f S la te , Iro n o r T ile s , e n te r 1 ; if it is T h a tc h , W o o d o r o th e r
p e ris h a b le m a te ria l e n te r 0

0

5 R O O M S : F o r e a c h H o u s e w ith 1 R o o m o n ly e n te r 1 , F o r H o u s e s w ith 2 ,3 ,o r 4
R o o m s e n te r 2 , 5 o r 6 R o o m s e n te r 3 , e tc …

3

6 W in d o w s in F ro n t: S ta te th e e x a c t N u m b e r o f W in d o w s in F ro n t o f H o u s e :
7 T o ta l th e F ig u re s in 3 -6 (h o u s e p o in ts ) :
8 C L A S S O F H O U S E : If T o ta l is 1 o r 2 e n te r "4 th "; 3 , 4 , o r 5 , e n te r "3 rd ", 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
1 0 , o r 1 1 e n te r "2 n d ", 1 2 o r o v e r e n te r "1 s t":

5
9
2nd

9 N a m e o f th e H e a d o f F a m ily
1 0 N u m b e r o f P e rs o n s w h o w e re s ic k o n 3 1 s t M a rc h 1 9 0 1 :
1 1 N a m e o f th e L a n d h o ld e r (if a n y ) o n w h o s e H o ld in g th e H o u s e is s itu a te d

C h ris ty A rm s tro n g
0
C h ris ty A rm s tro n g

52

0

Wealth Distribution by Testacy Status
.1
.2
.3
.4

Figure 2: Wealth Distribution by Testacy Status

0

5
Log of Estate Value
Distribution for Probated Will
Distribtion for Administrated Will

10
Distribution for Intestate

53

0

Wealth Distribution by Religion
.1
.2
.3

.4

Figure 3: Wealth Distribution by Confessional Group

0

5
Log of Estate Value
Roman Catholics
Other Protestants

10

Protestant Episopalians

54

0

Age Distribution by Testacy Status
.01
.02
.03

Figure 4: Age Distribution by Testacy and Probate Status

20

40
Distribution for Probated Will

60
Age at Death

80

100

Distribution for Administrated Will

Distribution for Intestate

55

Figure 5: Age Frequencies

56

Figure 6: Sample Representation by Age Group and Sex

Representation in Sample

Percent In Sample

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%

Males
Females

10%
5%
0%
0-4 5-9 10- 15- 20- 25- 35- 45- 55- 65- 75- 85+
14 19 24 34 44 54 64 74 84

Age Group

57

Appendix A:
The goal of this Appendix is to investigate the effect of wealth on the benefit of
writing a will according to the altruism model.
Assume two children 1 and 2, with endowments E1 and E2 .
The potential testator, i, has a wealth of amount Wi to divide between these two children
by giving bequests of amount b1 and b2 . Writing a will requires a lawyers fee of amount
li , and a psychic cost of pi . There is no psychic cost in the absence of a will.
Assume his utility is measured by the equation U ( • ) = log ( E1 + b1 ) + log ( E2 + b2 ) − pi .
In other words he is an altruist who values the utility of his two children equally and is
subject to a psychic cost that enters the utility function linearly.
Under intestacy his bequests are determined by the state as b1 =

Wi
W
and b2 = i
2
2

W ⎞
W ⎞
⎛
⎛
Utility under intestacy is U ( • ) = log ⎜ E1 + i ⎟ + log ⎜ E2 + i ⎟
2 ⎠
2 ⎠
⎝
⎝
Is he writes a will, he chooses b1 and b2 to solve the optimization problem:
Maxb1 ,b2 log ( E1 + b1 ) + log ( E2 + b2 ) − pi

s.t. b1 + b2 + li = Wi , b1 , b2 > 0

Substituting in the constraint gives us:
Maxb1 log ( E1 + b1 ) + log ( E2 + Wi − li − b1 ) − pi
Interior Solution
First order condition:
1
1
−
=0
E1 + b1 E2 + Wi − li − b1
solving for b1
E2 − E1 + Wi − li
E − E2 + Wi − li
similarly b2 = 1
2
2
We can see from this that a child’s bequest is decreasing in his own endowment and
increasing in the endowment of his sibling.
b1 =

58

E1 + E2 + Wi − li
2
This is the standard implication of the altruism model. Namely, that the altruist divides
the entire set of resources evenly across the children.

After the transfer, each child’s resources equal:

Substituting this into the utility function, we find that

⎛ E + E2 + Wi − li ⎞
Utility under testacy is: U ( • ) = 2 log ⎜ 1
⎟ − pi
2
⎝
⎠
Note that this is only defined so long as E1 + E2 + Wi − li > 0 . This implies that if
lawyer’s fees are larger than the endowments of parents and children the decision is
meaningless. We can assume that if li > Wi the individual cannot write a will and will
die intestate with certainty.
Corner Solution Case
If we assume that E2 > E1 , we have an interior solution so long as the bequest to the
wealthier child, 2, is positive. This is the case if
E1 − E2 + Wi − li
> 0 or so long as Wi − li > E2 − E1 . In words, as long as the
2
bequeathable amount is greater than the difference in the endowments.
If Wi − li < E2 − E1 , a testator will maximize his utility by giving the entire bequest to
the poorer child.
With a corner solution, after the transfer child 1’s resources will be: E1 + Wi − li , child 2’s
resources will be E2 .
Utility under testacy is: U ( • ) = log ( E1 + Wi − l ) + log ( E2 ) − pi

The will writing decision:
If Wi − li

> E2 − E1 :

The potential testator will write a will if:
Wi ⎞
Wi ⎞
⎛ E + E2 + Wi − li ⎞
⎛
⎛
2 log ⎜ 1
⎟ − pi > log ⎜ E1 + ⎟ + log ⎜ E2 + ⎟
2
2 ⎠
2 ⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎝
If Wi − li

< E2 − E1 :

The potential testator will write a will if:
W
⎛
log ( E1 + Wi − l ) + log ( E2 ) − pi > log ⎜ E1 + i
2
⎝

Wi ⎞
⎞
⎛
⎟ + log ⎜ E2 + ⎟
2 ⎠
⎠
⎝
59

Because of the complicated role of W, it is difficult to take and sign derivatives. Instead,
I perform a series of simulations that look at how the net benefit of writing a will changes
as wealth changes. For these simulations, I drop the psychic cost, pi , as it only serves to
shift the net benefits down and has no impact on the dynamics.
Case 1: Low cost relative to endowments, endowments close together (always an interior
solution).
Net Benefit of Will
Cost of Will=$1 Endowment 1=$50 Endowment 2=$55

$2,500.00

$2,250.00

$2,000.00

$1,750.00

$1,500.00

$1,250.00

$1,000.00

$750.00

$500.00

$250.00

Wealth

0.0000
-0.0020
-0.0040
-0.0060
-0.0080
-0.0100
-0.0120
-0.0140
-0.0160
-0.0180

The high utility value of the cost dominates when wealth is low, making will writing
unattractive. As wealth increases, the cost becomes small relative to wealth, and will
writing grows more attractive but the distribution under intestacy and the distribution
under testacy converge making will writing pointless. With these costs and endowments,
no level of wealth will lead to a will.

60

Case 2: Low cost relative to endowments. Endowments are not too far apart.
Net Benefit of Will
Cost of Will=$1 Endowment 1=$50 Endowment 2=$70

$2,500.00

$2,250.00

$2,000.00

$1,750.00

$1,500.00

$1,250.00

$1,000.00

$750.00

$500.00

$250.00

Wealth

0.0080
0.0060
0.0040
0.0020
0.0000
-0.0020
-0.0040

This individual begins as a will writer giving all to one child. As wealth increases, he
moves to an interior solution. When wealth increases further he becomes intestate. He
switches to intestacy because the utility cost of the financial cost exceeds the utility gain
from distributing optimally.
Case 3: Low cost relative to endowments, endowments far apart.
Net Benefit of Will
Cost of Will=$1 Endowment 1=$50 Endowment 2=$600

$2,500.00

$2,250.00

$2,000.00

$1,750.00

$1,500.00

$1,250.00

$1,000.00

$750.00

$500.00

$250.00

Wealth

0.4000
0.3500
0.3000
0.2500
0.2000
0.1500
0.1000
0.0500
0.0000

As wealth increases, will writing grows more attractive for low levels of wealth. In this
part of the graph, we have a corner solution where all assets go to one child. Will writing
61

is increasingly attractive because giving all of the added wealth to a poorer child with a
higher marginal utility of wealth adds more value than giving half to the poorer child and
half to the richer child. Subsequently, the value of a will falls over time because as
wealth increases the intestate succession distribution converges to the will distribution.
In the limit, this individual will be intestate because the cost cannot be justified for
distributions that are practically identical.
Case 4: High cost of will writing relative to endowments. Endowments are far apart.
Net Benefit of Will
Cost of Will=$50, Endowment 1=$200 Endowment 2=$600

$2,380.00

$2,120.00

$1,860.00

$1,600.00

$1,340.00

$1,080.00

$820.00

$560.00

$300.00

Wealth

0.0500
0.0000
-0.0500
-0.1000
-0.1500
-0.2000

In this case, for low levels of wealth, increasing wealth makes will writing more
attractive. This individual is initially intestate, but switches to writing a will. The switch
occurs because the utility cost of the cost of a will is prohibitively high at low levels of
wealth, but declines as wealth increases. A similar pattern would emerge if the cost of
will writing was greater than the wealth of the potential testator.
Combining these cases, we find that the effect of wealth is indeterminate. We can find
circumstances where growing wealth leads an intestate individual to write a will, and we
can find circumstances where growing wealth leads a testator to die intestate. All cases
share the dynamic that in the limit, when wealth gets extremely large relative to costs and
endowments, individuals will be intestate. This is the case because the distribution under
intestacy converges to the distribution under a will and therefore the cost cannot be
justified. This result would be even more pronounced if psychic costs were incorporated
into the model.
The only case where increasing wealth leads an intestate individual to write a will relies
on very specific assumptions about costs and only holds for low levels of wealth. For
most individuals, costs are likely to be small relative to wealth. As a result, we can
conclude that for a wide class of individuals, the altruism model leads to the prediction
that the effect of wealth on will writing should be negative.

62

Appendix B
In this appendix, I compare the values of variables coded from the Census to data
from the Census report to put the sample in context. This comparison is presented in
Table B1. The Table compares Census data on all of Ireland (column 1), to Census Data
on the Provence of Ulster (column 2 – the six counties of Northern Ireland plus three
adjacent Counties), Census data on Co. Fermanagh (column 3), the entire population of
towns where someone in the deceased sample lived (column 4), the families the deceased
lived in (column 5), and the deceased themselves (column 6). The data in Columns 1-3
come from the official Census Report (Census of Ireland 1901, 1902), while the data in
Columns 4-6 are tabulated from the matched sample.
A number of patterns are evident in the Table. As mentioned earlier,
Fermanagh’s religious split is more Catholic than the rest of Ulster, but more Protestant
than Ireland as a whole. The Protestant denominational split is quite different from the
remainder of Ireland. Fermanagh has more Methodists and Episcopalians than the rest of
Ulster, and fewer Presbyterians. The quality of the housing stock and literacy of the
population are broadly similar to the remainder of the country with the exception that
Fermanagh has a lower proportion of first class houses than the Country or Provence.
This is probably due to the predominantly rural nature of the County – First Class houses
tended to be in cities. When we compare data from the Census Report to data from the
families of the deceased sample, we observe that the matched sample is more Protestant
and less Catholic than Fermangh overall and lives in higher class houses. This is
consistent with individuals who leave estates coming from richer families. When we look
at the occupational breakdowns of the population, we see that the deceased individuals
were more likely to be from agricultural families and families where the individuals are
older. In the final column, we show attributes of the deceased themselves. This is a
much older sample than the individuals represented in the earlier columns. Seventy-two
percent of the deceased are 55 and over. About 78% of the sample is male largely as a
result of the near exclusion of married women from estate distribution. The famous Irish
marriage patterns are also evident in the sample. At death 29% are never married while
48% are married and 23% are widowed.

63

Table B1: Comparisons Between Census and Matched Samples
Population
Families
Houses

W hole of Ireland
Ulster
Ferm anagh
Town Sample
Family Sam ple
Deceased Sample
(Census Report)
(Census Report)
(Census Report)
(Matched Data)
(Matched Data)
(Matched Data)
4,458,775
1,582,826
65,430
23,683
2165
494
910,256
NA
NA
5,364
482
482
858,158
NA
NA
5,033
482
482

Read and W rite
Read Only
Neither Read Nor W rite

79%
7%
14%

79%
9%
13%

78%
9%
13%

NA
NA
NA

82%
6%
12%

81%
9%
9%

Rom an Catholic
Protestant Episcopalians
Presbyterians
Methodists
All Other Denom inations

74%
13%
10%
1%
1%

44%
23%
27%
3%
3%

55%
35%
2%
7%
0%

55%
35%
3%
7%
0%

44%
41%
3%
11%
0%

42%
41%
4%
13%
0%

1st Class
2nd Class
3rd Class
4th Class

9%
61%
29%
1%

8%
65%
27%
1%

4%
63%
31%
1%

NA
NA
NA
NA

15%
71%
14%
0%

11%
71%
18%
0%

33.4
0.3%

35.4
0.4%

47.1
0.5%

NA

111
1.1%

365
3.7%

Marital Status of Population Over 15
Married
W idowed
Never Married

38%
10%
53%

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

32%
10%
58%

47%
24%
29%

Born in Same County
Irish Born from Different County
Born in England
Born in Scotland
Born in Rest of W orld

86%
11%
2%
1%
1%

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

86%
13%
1%
0%
1%

87%
12%
1%
1%
0%

Professional Class
Dom estic Class
Com mercial Class
Agricultural Class
Industrial Class
Indefinite or Unproductive Class

3%
5%
2%
20%
14%
56%

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

2%
7%
1%
35%
9%
46%

3%
0%
1%
65%
10%
20%

Under 20
20-55 Years Old
55 Years and Up

41%
45%
14%

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
NA

26%
47%
27%

0%
28%
72%

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA
NA

51%
49%

50%
50%

78%
22%

Sick at their Own Homes per 10K

Male
Female

64

Working Paper Series
A series of research studies on regional economic issues relating to the Seventh Federal
Reserve District, and on financial and economic topics.
A Proposal for Efficiently Resolving Out-of-the-Money Swap Positions
at Large Insolvent Banks
George G. Kaufman

WP-03-01

Depositor Liquidity and Loss-Sharing in Bank Failure Resolutions
George G. Kaufman

WP-03-02

Subordinated Debt and Prompt Corrective Regulatory Action
Douglas D. Evanoff and Larry D. Wall

WP-03-03

When is Inter-Transaction Time Informative?
Craig Furfine

WP-03-04

Tenure Choice with Location Selection: The Case of Hispanic Neighborhoods
in Chicago
Maude Toussaint-Comeau and Sherrie L.W. Rhine

WP-03-05

Distinguishing Limited Commitment from Moral Hazard in Models of
Growth with Inequality*
Anna L. Paulson and Robert Townsend

WP-03-06

Resolving Large Complex Financial Organizations
Robert R. Bliss

WP-03-07

The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth:
Or, Does information technology explain why productivity accelerated in the United States
but not the United Kingdom?
Susanto Basu, John G. Fernald, Nicholas Oulton and Sylaja Srinivasan

WP-03-08

Inside-Outside Money Competition
Ramon Marimon, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles

WP-03-09

The Importance of Check-Cashing Businesses to the Unbanked: Racial/Ethnic Differences
William H. Greene, Sherrie L.W. Rhine and Maude Toussaint-Comeau

WP-03-10

A Firm’s First Year
Jaap H. Abbring and Jeffrey R. Campbell

WP-03-11

Market Size Matters
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Hugo A. Hopenhayn

WP-03-12

The Cost of Business Cycles under Endogenous Growth
Gadi Barlevy

WP-03-13

The Past, Present, and Probable Future for Community Banks
Robert DeYoung, William C. Hunter and Gregory F. Udell

WP-03-14

1

Working Paper Series (continued)
Measuring Productivity Growth in Asia: Do Market Imperfections Matter?
John Fernald and Brent Neiman

WP-03-15

Revised Estimates of Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States
Bhashkar Mazumder

WP-03-16

Product Market Evidence on the Employment Effects of the Minimum Wage
Daniel Aaronson and Eric French

WP-03-17

Estimating Models of On-the-Job Search using Record Statistics
Gadi Barlevy

WP-03-18

Banking Market Conditions and Deposit Interest Rates
Richard J. Rosen

WP-03-19

Creating a National State Rainy Day Fund: A Modest Proposal to Improve Future
State Fiscal Performance
Richard Mattoon

WP-03-20

Managerial Incentive and Financial Contagion
Sujit Chakravorti and Subir Lall

WP-03-21

Women and the Phillips Curve: Do Women’s and Men’s Labor Market Outcomes
Differentially Affect Real Wage Growth and Inflation?
Katharine Anderson, Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher

WP-03-22

Evaluating the Calvo Model of Sticky Prices
Martin Eichenbaum and Jonas D.M. Fisher

WP-03-23

The Growing Importance of Family and Community: An Analysis of Changes in the
Sibling Correlation in Earnings
Bhashkar Mazumder and David I. Levine

WP-03-24

Should We Teach Old Dogs New Tricks? The Impact of Community College Retraining
on Older Displaced Workers
Louis Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde and Daniel Sullivan

WP-03-25

Trade Deflection and Trade Depression
Chad P. Brown and Meredith A. Crowley

WP-03-26

China and Emerging Asia: Comrades or Competitors?
Alan G. Ahearne, John G. Fernald, Prakash Loungani and John W. Schindler

WP-03-27

International Business Cycles Under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes
Michael A. Kouparitsas

WP-03-28

Firing Costs and Business Cycle Fluctuations
Marcelo Veracierto

WP-03-29

Spatial Organization of Firms
Yukako Ono

WP-03-30

Government Equity and Money: John Law’s System in 1720 France
François R. Velde

WP-03-31

2

Working Paper Series (continued)
Deregulation and the Relationship Between Bank CEO
Compensation and Risk-Taking
Elijah Brewer III, William Curt Hunter and William E. Jackson III

WP-03-32

Compatibility and Pricing with Indirect Network Effects: Evidence from ATMs
Christopher R. Knittel and Victor Stango

WP-03-33

Self-Employment as an Alternative to Unemployment
Ellen R. Rissman

WP-03-34

Where the Headquarters are – Evidence from Large Public Companies 1990-2000
Tyler Diacon and Thomas H. Klier

WP-03-35

Standing Facilities and Interbank Borrowing: Evidence from the Federal Reserve’s
New Discount Window
Craig Furfine

WP-04-01

Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications
William J. Bergman, Robert R. Bliss, Christian A. Johnson and George G. Kaufman

WP-04-02

Real Effects of Bank Competition
Nicola Cetorelli

WP-04-03

Finance as a Barrier To Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in
Local U.S. Markets?
Nicola Cetorelli and Philip E. Strahan

WP-04-04

The Dynamics of Work and Debt
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz

WP-04-05

Fiscal Policy in the Aftermath of 9/11
Jonas Fisher and Martin Eichenbaum

WP-04-06

Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment: The Stock Market Reaction
To Merger Announcements
Richard J. Rosen

WP-04-07

Earnings Inequality and the Business Cycle
Gadi Barlevy and Daniel Tsiddon

WP-04-08

Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Payment Networks
Sujit Chakravorti and Roberto Roson

WP-04-09

Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy
Javier Díaz-Giménez, Giorgia Giovannetti, Ramon Marimon, and Pedro Teles

WP-04-10

On the Timing of Innovation in Stochastic Schumpeterian Growth Models
Gadi Barlevy

WP-04-11

Policy Externalities: How US Antidumping Affects Japanese Exports to the EU
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley

WP-04-12

Sibling Similarities, Differences and Economic Inequality
Bhashkar Mazumder

WP-04-13

3

Working Paper Series (continued)
Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: A Robust Analysis
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas

WP-04-14

The Occupational Assimilation of Hispanics in the U.S.: Evidence from Panel Data
Maude Toussaint-Comeau

WP-04-15

Reading, Writing, and Raisinets1: Are School Finances Contributing to Children’s Obesity?
Patricia M. Anderson and Kristin F. Butcher

WP-04-16

Learning by Observing: Information Spillovers in the Execution and Valuation
of Commercial Bank M&As
Gayle DeLong and Robert DeYoung

WP-04-17

Prospects for Immigrant-Native Wealth Assimilation:
Evidence from Financial Market Participation
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson

WP-04-18

Individuals and Institutions: Evidence from International Migrants in the U.S.
Una Okonkwo Osili and Anna Paulson

WP-04-19

Are Technology Improvements Contractionary?
Susanto Basu, John Fernald and Miles Kimball

WP-04-20

The Minimum Wage, Restaurant Prices and Labor Market Structure
Daniel Aaronson, Eric French and James MacDonald

WP-04-21

Betcha can’t acquire just one: merger programs and compensation
Richard J. Rosen

WP-04-22

Not Working: Demographic Changes, Policy Changes,
and the Distribution of Weeks (Not) Worked
Lisa Barrow and Kristin F. Butcher

WP-04-23

The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz

WP-04-24

Advertising and Pricing at Multiple-Output Firms: Evidence from U.S. Thrift Institutions
Robert DeYoung and Evren Örs

WP-04-25

Monetary Policy with State Contingent Interest Rates
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles

WP-04-26

Comparing location decisions of domestic and foreign auto supplier plants
Thomas Klier, Paul Ma and Daniel P. McMillen

WP-04-27

China’s export growth and US trade policy
Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley

WP-04-28

Where do manufacturing firms locate their Headquarters?
J. Vernon Henderson and Yukako Ono

WP-04-29

Monetary Policy with Single Instrument Feedback Rules
Bernardino Adão, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles

WP-04-30

4

Working Paper Series (continued)
Firm-Specific Capital, Nominal Rigidities and the Business Cycle
David Altig, Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Jesper Linde

WP-05-01

Do Returns to Schooling Differ by Race and Ethnicity?
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse

WP-05-02

Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman

WP-05-03

Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions
Robert DeYoung, Anne Gron and Andrew Winton

WP-05-04

Characterizations in a random record model with a non-identically distributed initial record
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja

WP-05-05

Price discovery in a market under stress: the U.S. Treasury market in fall 1998
Craig H. Furfine and Eli M. Remolona

WP-05-06

Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets
Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent

WP-05-07

Rigid Prices: Evidence from U.S. Scanner Data
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Benjamin Eden

WP-05-08

Entrepreneurship, Frictions, and Wealth
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi

WP-05-09

Wealth inequality: data and models
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi

WP-05-10

What Determines Bilateral Trade Flows?
Marianne Baxter and Michael A. Kouparitsas

WP-05-11

Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the U.S., 1940 to 2000
Daniel Aaronson and Bhashkar Mazumder

WP-05-12

Differential Mortality, Uncertain Medical Expenses, and the Saving of Elderly Singles
Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, and John Bailey Jones

WP-05-13

Fixed Term Employment Contracts in an Equilibrium Search Model
Fernando Alvarez and Marcelo Veracierto

WP-05-14

Causality, Causality, Causality: The View of Education Inputs and Outputs from Economics
Lisa Barrow and Cecilia Elena Rouse

WP-05-15

5

Working Paper Series (continued)
Competition in Large Markets
Jeffrey R. Campbell

WP-05-16

Why Do Firms Go Public? Evidence from the Banking Industry
Richard J. Rosen, Scott B. Smart and Chad J. Zutter

WP-05-17

Clustering of Auto Supplier Plants in the U.S.: GMM Spatial Logit for Large Samples
Thomas Klier and Daniel P. McMillen

WP-05-18

Why are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low?
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation
Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl

WP-05-19

Constructing the Chicago Fed Income Based Economic Index – Consumer Price Index:
Inflation Experiences by Demographic Group: 1983-2005
Leslie McGranahan and Anna Paulson

WP-05-20

Universal Access, Cost Recovery, and Payment Services
Sujit Chakravorti, Jeffery W. Gunther, and Robert R. Moore

WP-05-21

Supplier Switching and Outsourcing
Yukako Ono and Victor Stango

WP-05-22

Do Enclaves Matter in Immigrants’ Self-Employment Decision?
Maude Toussaint-Comeau

WP-05-23

The Changing Pattern of Wage Growth for Low Skilled Workers
Eric French, Bhashkar Mazumder and Christopher Taber

WP-05-24

U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation
Robert R. Bliss and George G. Kaufman

WP-06-01

Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter
Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib

WP-06-02

Identification of Search Models with Initial Condition Problems
Gadi Barlevy and H. N. Nagaraja

WP-06-03

Tax Riots
Marco Bassetto and Christopher Phelan

WP-06-04

The Tradeoff between Mortgage Prepayments and Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings
Gene Amromin, Jennifer Huang,and Clemens Sialm

WP-06-05

Why are safeguards needed in a trade agreement?
Meredith A. Crowley

WP-06-06

6

Working Paper Series (continued)
Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth
Marco Cagetti and Mariacristina De Nardi

WP-06-07

A New Social Compact: How University Engagement Can Fuel Innovation
Laura Melle, Larry Isaak, and Richard Mattoon

WP-06-08

Mergers and Risk
Craig H. Furfine and Richard J. Rosen

WP-06-09

Two Flaws in Business Cycle Accounting
Lawrence J. Christiano and Joshua M. Davis

WP-06-10

Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?
Sumit Agarwal, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles

WP-06-11

Chronicles of a Deflation Unforetold
François R. Velde

WP-06-12

Female Offenders Use of Social Welfare Programs Before and After Jail and Prison:
Does Prison Cause Welfare Dependency?
Kristin F. Butcher and Robert J. LaLonde
Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size
Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl, and Richard Rosen
Do Bonds Span Volatility Risk in the U.S. Treasury Market?
A Specification Test for Affine Term Structure Models
Torben G. Andersen and Luca Benzoni

WP-06-13

WP-06-14

WP-06-15

Transforming Payment Choices by Doubling Fees on the Illinois Tollway
Gene Amromin, Carrie Jankowski, and Richard D. Porter

WP-06-16

How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?
Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison, and Steven Sharpe

WP-06-17

Will Writing and Bequest Motives: Early 20th Century Irish Evidence
Leslie McGranahan

WP-06-18

7