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A Series of Occasional Papers in Draft Form Prepared by Members 'o

V A R IA B L E -R A T E L O A N C O M M IT M E N T S , D E P O S IT
W IT H D R A W A L RISK, A N D A N T IC IP A T O R Y H E D G IN G
G. D. Koppenhaver

SM-85-6

Variable-Rate Loan Commitments, Deposit
Withdrawal Risk, and Anticipatory Hedging*

by

G.D. Koppenhaver
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60690
(312) 322-5858

October 1983
Revised January, August 1984

*The author is grateful to Herb Baer and Larry Mote, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, and George Kanatas, Northwestern University, for helpful
discussions and suggestions. Any errors are the author's responsibility
alone. All views expressed here are those of the author and are not
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve System.




Variable-Rate Loan Commitments, Deposit Withdrawal
Risk, and Anticipatory Hedging

Abstract
Currently, variable-rate loan commitments enjoy widespread use at large
banks for commercial and Industrial loans.

This paper shows that financial

futures contracts can be used to hedge the risk of uncertain loan revenues
from variable-rate loan commitments and simultaneously, the risk of deposit
withdrawals.

The theoretical model predicts that a long futures market hedge

will be greater and a short futures market hedge smaller:

1) the greater the

expected fall 1n Interest rates, 11) the more Inelastic the demand for credit
by borrowers, and 111) the smaller the problem of disintermediation.

For

1976-82, a T-b111 futures market hedge of 90% of the bank's risk exposure
decreases the variability of unhedged profits by 10% for a stylized large bank
1n the Seventh Federal Reserve District.




Variable-Rate Loan Commitments, Deposit Withdrawal
Risk, and Anticipatory Hedging

The obvious elements 1n a bank's balance sheet that can benefit from the
risk shifting possibilities of financial futures trading are nonloan assets
such as government securities, or variable-rate deposits such as money market
accounts (see C1ccehett1 et al (1981), Ederlngton (1979), Franckle (1980), and
Parker and Dalgler (1981)).

Less research exists on the usefulness of

financial futures contracts 1n commercial lending operations (for exceptions,
see BatUn (1983), Dew and Martell (1981), and Koppenhaver (1983)).

In the

only other published theory on loan commitments and financial futures, Ho and
Saunders (1983) develop a model to determine a hedge of fixed-rate commitment
takedowns when funding costs are subject to Interest rate risk.

In contrast,

this paper shows that financial futures contracts can help manage the Interest
rate and takedown uncertainty associated with making variable-rate loan
commitments when deposits are subject to withdrawal risk.

The results of this

Investigation are that the anticipatory hedge of Interest rate and quantity
risks will be greater, 1) the greater the expected fall 1n Interest rates, 11)
the more Inelastic the demand for credit by borrowers, and 111) the smaller
the problem of disintermediation.

Using alternative assumptions about the

formation of expectations and the risk aversion of bank management, a
simulation of the optimal futures trading strategy using bank data from the
Seventh Federal Reserve District Indicates that up to 10% of the variability
of unhedged profits could be eliminated by T—b111 futures hedging.
There are two general types of loan commitments used 1n practice:
fixed-rate and variable-rate.



In a fixed-rate loan commitment the lender

2

provides credit on demand up to some previously determined quantity at a
constant, known Interest rate.

In a variable-rate loan commitment the lender

provides future credit on demand up to some maximum quantity at a price
determined by a previously specified formula calculated after the realization
of a random variable.

Borrowers desire loan commitments either because their

cash needs are random or because their future credit worthiness 1s uncertain.
A fixed-rate agreement provides the borrower with Insurance against random
changes 1n the cost of credit; a variable-rate agreement assures the
availability of credit at a favorable rate 1f the borrower's credit rating
changes unfavorably.

In general, lenders make loan commitments because they

seek to strengthen borrower-lender relationships, gain deposits through
compensating balances, or gain fee Income.
The Importance and Implications of both kinds of loan commitments have
largely been Ignored 1n models of bank behavior.

The usual treatment

emphasizes spot market loan decisions (see Baltensperger (1980), O'Hara
(1983), and Sealey (1980)).

Loan commitments are like forward contracts where

the terms of the exchange specify a future delivery of credit.

Two articles

(Campbell (1977) and Deshmukh et al (1982)) have extended the theory of the
banking firm by focusing on the optimal quantity of loan commitments when
commitment takedowns are uncertain and the bank faces a funding risk.

This

extension of the literature seems warranted given the estimate by Boltz and
Campbell (1979) that over 55% of the business loans at large money center and
regional banks 1n 1977 were made under loan commitment agreements.

Using

their estimates, roughly one third of the business loans stipulated
variable-rate loan commitment terms.1

The subject of this study 1s the

management of the risks associated with this element of the bank's balance
sheet when combined with deposit withdrawal risk and hence, uncertain funding
costs.



3

Section one models the bank's operating environment.

Bank management is

assumed to maximize the expected utility of profit (see Edwards (1977), and
Ratti (1980)) given uncertainty about the low cost-high cost mix of fixed-rate
deposits.

Bank loans are made entirely through variable-rate loan

commitments; hence, bank management is also uncertain about the return on its
assets.

By assumption, the bank's balance sheet exhibits a gap between

rate-sensitive assets (loan commitments) and rate-sensitive liabilities
(deposits).

Compounding this decision problem are random loan takedowns on

the loan commitments.
The optimal futures position is calculated in section two.

The

relationships between the futures position and the other elements of the
decision problem are then discussed.

In section three, the performance of the

model and the T-bill futures market are evaluated relative to their
effectiveness in reducing combined price and quantity risks.

Section five

concludes the paper by examining the critical assumptions and by commenting on
the results.
I.

The Model

The framework used here is related to the model developed by Sealey
(1980).

Similar to Sealey's model, deposit flows are uncertain— possibly

because depositors' tastes and preferences for holding money balances
fluctuate randomly, i.e., the velocity of circulation is unstable.

Another

similarity is the presence of an uncertain return to bank loans determined by
market forces.

2

In the model below, however, loan returns are uncertain

because both the interest rate and commitment takedowns are unknown.

No

distinction between variable-rate forward and spot lending exists, assuming
10054 takedowns.




Rather than consider spot loans a choice variable, the volume

4

of loan commitments is assumed predetermined prior to the futures trading
decision period.

This assumption is made so that the theory is consistent

with the empirical application below.
A T-bill futures decision is introduced as a bank decision with an
uncertain return depending on the price of the futures contract at the end of
the planning period.

3

Deposit interest rates are always known with

certainty and are given to the bank by Regulation Q restrictions and market
forces.

It is assumed the bank has access to two different deposit markets:

a Regulation Q deposit market and a certificate of deposit market.

The rate

on the latter is assumed higher than the rate on the former; thus, random
changes in deposit mix are the only source of funding risk for the bank.

If

disintermediation is a problem, the interest rate sensitivity of bank assets
is matched to a limited extent by interest rate sensitivity in bank
liabilities.

In this case, higher interest rates imply greater asset returns

and a shift in deposit mix toward relatively expensive certificates of deposit.
The sequence of decision-making is assumed as follows.
management has a one period planning horizon.

Suppose bank

At the beginning of the

planning horizon when deposit interest rates are known but before deposit
flows are revealed, management must decide on the size of the T-bill futures
position given a predetermined level of variable-rate loan commitments.

This

futures position is an anticipatory hedge; loans have not been made but are
expected to be made after one period through loan commitment takedowns.

Loan

commitment takedowns are uncertain because the credit worthiness of the
borrowers can change before the commitments must be exercised, or the quantity
of credit demanded is sensitive to the loan rate.

An anticipatory hedge of an

asset implies bank management should take a long position in the futures
market.




4

5

The net futures position, however, also considers an anticipatory hedge of
deposits.

In the presence of disintermediation, deposit outflows are hedged

by a short (sell) futures position.

In the absence of disintermediation,

deposit outflows are hedged by a long (buy) futures position.

With uncertain

deposits, the futures position acts, in effect, as an alternate source of
funds.

Deposit inflows imply a positive gap in the bank's balance sheet;

deposit outflows greater than loan commitment takedowns imply a negative gap.
Given a positive gap, the bank is exposed to the risk that a fall in interest
rates on exercised loan commitments are not offset by a fall in deposit rates
because the latter are assumed known ex ante.

Given a negative gap, the bank

is exposed to the risk that deposit withdrawals force it to fund exercised
loan commitments from the expensive certificate of deposit market, narrowing
the bank's profit margin.

Overall, the net futures hedge could be long or

short depending on the relative magnitude of effects in the commitment and
deposit markets.
After the futures decision is made, the size of deposit inflows or
outflows is revealed along with the loan commitment interest rate and
takedown.

Funcs are then purchased or sold in the one period certificate of

deposit market to equate assets and liabilities.

At this time, the T-bill

futures position is offset returning any futures trading profits.

The

decision process repeats itself at the beginning of the next planning horizon.
Currently, the regulations set out in a joint policy statement issued by
the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Comptroller of
the Currency require that financial futures positions be a bona fide hedge of
overall balance sheet interest rate exposure, leaving the specifics of the
hedging program up to the individual bank.5

To capture this governmental

restriction in the model, the size of the futures market position is limited




6

1n absolute value to a position less than or equal to the absolute value of
the maximum loan volume realized through commitments plus deposit changes.
This does not preclude the possibility of a partial hedge of the bank's
exposure, however.
The principal relationships 1n the model are as follows.

Let h be the per

dollar requirement for Initial margin needed to establish a futures position.^
Therefore, hX 1s the margin deposit for a long futures position of size X, -hX
for short futures position.

The bank's balance sheet can be expressed as

L + I(X)hX = B + 0
where L

=

(1)

predetermined loan commitments, with the underlying loans
maturing 1n two periods, L > 0,

I(X) =

+1 for a long futures position and -1 for a short futures
position,

B

=

purchases (B < 0) or sale (B > 0) of one period certificates of
deposit, and

D

=

demand and savings deposits.

Bank profits are the sum of revenues from exercised loan commitments and
T—b111 futures trading minus (plus) the cost (return) of purchasing (selling)
funds minus the cost of Regulation Q deposits.

For simplicity, assume no fees

are earned on unused loan commitments and assume no variation margin calls on
the futures position.

Bank profits, *, at the start of the planning horizon

are given by (tildes Indicate future values and random variables)

Z
where




= RLeL + [(1-RX) - (1-RX)]X + I(X)RyhX - RgB - RpD

R^=

the Interest rate earned on used loan commitments

e = the loan commitment takedown rate, 0 < e < 1,

(2)

7

Rx = the Interest rate on a futures contract at the end of the period,
Rx = the Interest rate on a T-b11l futures contract at the beginning of
the period,
Rj = the Interest rate on one period Treasury securities posted as
Initial margin,
Rd = the Interest rate on one period certificates of deposit, and
D

Rp * the Interest rate payable on demand and savings deposits, set by
Regulation Q.
If the borrower's credit worthiness Improves between the time the loan
commitment 1s made and the time the commitment 1s exercised, he may obtain
credit 1n the spot loan market.
bank profits.

If so, the realized e will fall along with

If Interest rates rise, movement along the borrower's demand

curve for credit causes the realized e to fall, given unchanged credit
worthiness.

In this case, the Impact on bank revenues depends on the Interest

elasticity of loan demand.
The objective of bank management 1s to choose X and B to maximize the
expected utility of profit, EU(iir), subject to the balance sheet constraint
1n equation (1) and expectations about the future.

Let these subjective

expectations be described by the joint cumulative density F(RL ,Rx ,e,D).
It 1s assumed this joint distribution does not change over the planning
horizon.

The maximization problem can be stated as

Maximize E[Max U U ) | F(R. X . e . D ) ]
|X|<|L+AD| B

(3)

subject to equation (1), where AO 1s the change 1n Regulation Q deposits,
E 1s the expectations operator, and

v

1s given by equation (2).

The model

1s closed by assuming that bank management 1s risk averse, such that
U'U) > 0 and U"U) < 0.




8

II.

The Optimal Futures Position

If the random variables are joint normally distributed and bank management
exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, then it can be shown (see the
*

appendix below) that the optimal anticipatory hedge, X, is
X* = E[(Rx-Rx)+I(X)(RT-RB)h]

-LCo v [(Rl 6-Rb ),(Rx -Rx)]

TVar[(Rx-Rx)]

Var[(Rx-Rx)]

-(Rb -Rd )Co v [AD,(Rx -Rx)],

(4)

Var[(Rx-Rx)]
where

y

is the constant absolute risk aversion index, Var represents

variance, and Cov represents covariance.^

Equation (4) shows that the

optimal T-bill futures position is the sum of three distinct terms:
expectations term, a loan commitment term; and a deposit term.

an

Q

The first term on the right hand side of (4) captures the influence of
interest rate expectations and risk aversion on futures trading.

The lower

the expected futures contract interest rate at maturity, the more profitable a
*

long futures position; hence, the greater is X.

Similarly, the greater the

current futures interest rate Rx , the greater the futures position given
unaltered expected interest rates.

An increase in the initial margin

requirement, h, makes the futures position less profitable by increasing the
opportunity cost of the funds needed to establish the futures position; hence
*
X falls. What is more, bank management's aversion to interest rate risk
determines the magnitude of the expectations term in deriving the optimal
futures position.

Greater aversion to risk is indicated as the index y

rises and as y approaches infinity the role of expectations in the trading
strategy diminishes to zero.




Conservative bank management would base its

9

futures position only on the cash market sources of risk:

variable rate loan

commitments and random deposits.
The loan commitment term in equation (4) is interesting in two respects.
First, the greater the loan commitments made prior to the futures decision,
the greater the risk exposure of the bank.

Therefore, the optimal response is

to take a greater long position in the futures market to manage this risk.
Second, the sign of Cov[(RLe-Rg).(R^-R^T] = -Cov(RLe,RxT merits
attention.

It seems likely that R^ and Rx are positively correlated.

Given

this, the interest elasticity of loan demand must then be specified to sign
Cov(RLe,Rx).

If borrower credit worthiness is unchanged and loan demand is

interest inelastic, high Rx and RL are associated with an insignificant
decrease in e so Cov(RLe,Rx) > 0.

If the borrower's credit rating changes

unfavorably, the change in loan demand makes demand more inelastic at all
interest rates and again Cov(RLe,Rx)>0.

Only when loan demand is interest

elastic or the borrower's credit rating improves will Cov(RLe,Rx)<0, all
other things equal.
Since one cannot rule out that Cov(R^e,Rx) is negative, the loan commitment
term in equation (4) could also be negative.

*

The optimal futures position, X,

would be depressed by a magnitude of LCov[(RLe-RB),(RX~RX)]/Var[(Rx~Rx)];
there is less interest rate exposure to be managed by futures trading.

Higher

interest rates result in significantly smaller takedowns, and thus, the gap
between rate sensitive assets and liabilities is smaller and possibly negative.
If loan demand

is interest inelastic and the borrower's credit ratingis

unchanged over the period, then an increase in the variability of R^e causes
an

increase in

X, provided the correlation coefficient between RLe and Rx

is unchanged. That is, as the marginal revenue earned on totalloan
commitments, RLe, becomes more uncertain the T-bill futures position
increases to cover more of the risk exposure.



10

The deposit term 1n the right hand side of equation (4) Indicates the
Influence of withdrawal risk on the optimal futures decision.

Since (Rg-R0)>0

by assumption, the sign of this term depends on the sign of Cov[(AD,(Rx-Rx)]
Binding Regulation Q ceilings on deposit Interest rates could yield
Cov[AD, (Rx-Rx)]>0 or Cov(AD,Rx)<0 through disintermediation effects.

As

Interest rates rise, deposit withdrawals cause the bank to borrow
more expensive funds 1n the certificate of deposit market.

Interest rate

sensitive loan commitments are now partially matched with Interest rate
sensitive deposit costs.

•k

The futures position, X, should be reduced to

reflect the bank's smaller exposure.

Alternatively, Regulation Q deposits

might be uncertain because the velocity of circulation and money demand 1s
unstable.

Changing tastes and preferences for holding money as a source of

deposit uncertainty Imply Cov(AD,Rx) could be positive, negative, or zero.
Cov(AD,Rx)>0 Implies the bank's funding costs decline as Interest rates
rise.

In this case, bank liabilities are again sensitive to Interest rates:

their cost moves the opposite of the Interest rate on assets.

The gap between
★

rate sensitive assets and liabilities widens as Interest rates rise, and X
Increases to cover the greater Interest rate exposure.

Equation (4) also has

Implications for the removal of Regulation Q Interest rate ceilings.

As R^

Increases with the deregulation of deposit markets, (Rg-Rp) gets smaller.
Therefore, the deposit term 1n equation (4) becomes less Important 1n the
optimal futures position.

Even with uncertain deposit flows, the bank's

funding risk 1s reduced as Rp approaches Rp because the mix of liabilities
becomes less Important for bank decision-making.




11

III.

A Hedging Evaluation

Unfortunately, an empirical test of the model presented in the last two
sections is extremely difficult given the lack of data on actual bank
hedging.

Indeed, several surveys of bank futures trading indicate that

perhaps 10% of all banks currently participate in the financial futures
markets (see Drabenstott and McDonley (1982); Koch, et al (1982); Veit and
Reiff (1983)).

An alternative empirical application of the model is to test

the effectiveness of the T-bill futures market in reducing the interest rate
and quantity risks discussed above.

Such an application is simultaneously a

test of the T-bill futures market efficiency and the firm-theoretic model
itself.

Although not attempted here, the performance of the futures strategy

in equation (4) can be compared with the performance of alternative
strategies, such as always hedging 100% of the bank's exposure.

This section

of the paper estimates the performance of the firm-theoretic strategy, using
the T-bill futures contract, relative to a nonhedging strategy.

If its

performance is unacceptable relative to nonhedging, comparisons with other
strategies using the same futures market are not needed.
To assess the model's performance, observations for each of the elements
in the right hand side of equation (4) must be collected.

This requires bank

specific data for L, Cov[(RLe-Rg).(R^-R^)], RQ , and Cov[AD,(R^-R^)].
It is unlikely that any real world bank faces a situation exactly satisfying
the assumptions of the model, but equation (4) can be simulated using survey
and Report of Condition data compiled by the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

In the Seventh Federal Reserve District,

fifteen banks have consistently reported their loan commitment positions since
July 1973.

All reporting banks have assets greater than $1 billion.

Average

unused commercial and industrial loan commitments are calculated for the




12

reporting banks and this value is taken as an approximation for L.

q

The

ratio of outstanding commitments to the total of unused and used commitments
is taken as a proxy for e, the commitment takedown rate.

RLe is

determined as the product of e and the monthly average prime rate for
business loans.

AD is taken to be the average change in demand and savings

deposits for reporting banks.
The hedging simulation covers the time period from March 1977 to June
1982.

Currently, T-bill contracts mature in the following four months:

March, June, September, and December.

Assuming a three month planning horizon

and futures contract maturity at the end of the planning period, T-bill
futures interest rates are collected on the first day of contract maturity and
on the first day of the month 90 days prior to maturity.

The time period

contains 22 non-overlapping opportunities for hedging.
To capture the effects of changing interest rate volatility, all variances
and covariances are recalculated for each new hedging period using ex post
values.

This procedure creates a time series measuring interest rate and

quantity volatility over the simulation period.1®

The rate at which banks

are assumed to sell or purchase funds is the monthly average rate in the
secondary market for six month certificates of deposit.

The cost of deposits,

RQ , is the average interest rate on savings and demand deposits established
by Regulation Q, weighted by the size of each deposit category.

Margin

requirements are set at .3 percent of position face value, approximately the
exchange minimum.
Two elements of equation (4) remain to be specified.
index of constant absolute risk aversion,

y.

The first is the

Little if any empirical

research has been done on the appropriateness of any particular index value in
the banking industry.

Rather than make an ad hoc assumption about any

particular index value, the simulation results are reported for a range of



13

index values.

It is assumed that the index of constant absolute risk aversion

exhibited by bank management ranges between 1x10

-5

and 1x10

-7

. Parameter

values within this range are reported below to indicate changes in the hedging
strategy when risk aversion changes.
The second variable to be specified is ERX, the three month forecast
of the 13-week T-bill futures rate.
in the simulation results.

Three alternative forecasts are reported

The first assumes that bank decision-makers make

no interest rate forecast other than the rate expected by the T-bill futures
market.

Banks without economic research or forecasting units may be able to

use the T-bill futures market as an expectations generating mechanism;
therefore, T-bill futures interest rates merit consideration as forecasts in a
futures hedging strategy.
The second kind of forecast used is the forward rate imbedded in the
short-term segment of the yield curve.11

Because the purpose is to forecast

90-day T-bill futures rates 90-days in the future, the forward interest rate
is calculated as:
l + Rfy j

= (l + RTf2)2/ 0

+ Rt>1)

(5)

where
Ry ^

=

the forward interest rate on a 90-day T-bill beginning 90-day
in the future,

Ry
R

2

** *

=

the current interest rate on a 180-day T-bill and

=

the current interest rate on a 90-day T-bill.

From the pure expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, the
implied forward rate in the yield curve is an unbiased expectation of the
actual future interest rate when markets are in equilibrium.
The third type of forecast used was the actual T-bill futures interest
rate existing at the end of the planning period.

The hedging simulation

results using a perfect interest rate forecast serve as a performance standard



14

for evaluating the other forecasts.

Furthermore, using a perfect forecast 1n

the simulation serves as a proxy for all other possible regression and time
series models capable of predicting three-month T-b111 Interest rates.
Table 1 shows the simulation results with five alternative values of the
risk aversion Index.

Sample means and their standard deviations are

calculated depending upon the type of T-b1ll futures forecast used and the
*

number of hedging periods 1n which the optimal position satisfied |X |<
*

|L+-AD|. The hedging ratio 1n column two 1s defined as X /(L+AD) and
Indicates the percent of bank risk exposure hedged 1n the T-b111 futures
market.

In the third column, hedging effectiveness 1s calculated as the

percent change 1n the variance of unhedged profits due to T-b1ll futures
hedging.

12

It takes a value of zero 1f no futures trading occurs (X*=0).

Hedging effectiveness greater than zero Indicates that financial futures
hedging Increases the variability of bank profits relative to non-hedging.
From the results 1n Table 1, 1t seems likely that a bank's Interest rate
and quantity risks can be hedged successfully using the T-b1ll futures market
and the firm theoretic model developed above.

Hedging 90% of Its risk

exposure reduces the variability of unhedged profits by 7-10% at all levels of
constant absolute risk aversion.

Although the effectiveness of the T—b111

futures hedge 1s small quantitatively, 1t 1s statistically significant at all
but the lowest values of the risk aversion Index using forward and perfect
forecasts.

In similar Instances, the hedging ratios are significantly less

than 100% of the bank's net risk exposure.

By comparison, the hedging ratios

are consistent with those reported 1n Ederlngton (1979) and Franckle (1980),
while the hedging effectiveness results are much lower.

Hedging effectiveness

1s lower here because the role of expectations are explicitly Incorporated,
the hedge 1s a cross-hedge, and quantity risks are Involved.




15

Table 1
Firm-theoretic Simulation Results
1976-82
(22 possible hedge positions)
Risk Aversion
Index and
T-bill Forecast
1. t = lxlO-5*2
a. Futures Forecast
b. Forward Forecast
c. Perfect Forecast
2. y = lxl0"5 *6
a. Futures Forecast
b. Forward Forecast
c. Perfect Forecast
3. y - lxlO-6 *0
a. Futures Forecast
b. Forward Forecast
c. Perfect Forecast
4

= lxlO"6 *4
a. Futures Forecast

Hedging
Ratio

Hedging
Effectiveness

.8976
(.040)
.878
(.049)
.885
(.043)

-.098
(.036)
-.097
(.036)
-.098
(.036)

-916.144*
(786.647)
-767.914*
(735.299)
-775.519*
(736.004)

359.439
(49.392)
342.131
(47.068)
347.646
(46.940)

.897
(.040)
.799
(.067)
.863
(.050)

-.098
(.036)
-.097
(.035)
-.097
(.036)

-915.761*
(786.504)
-573.059*
(710.677)
-561.154*
(675.897)

359.396
(49.380)
306.060
(50.763)
327.995
(44.743)

21

.897
(.040)
.900
(.042)
.848
(.052)

-.098
(.036)
-.074
(.020)
-.099
(.037)

-914.801*
(786.144)
-333.254*
(757.654)
-250.991*
(637.607)

959.289
(49.351)
333.617
(50.003)
304.301
(42.021)

21

.897
(.040)
.896**
(.056)
.753
(.070)

-.098
(.036)
-.076*
(.037)
-.071
(.022)

-912.387*
(785.241)
-579.286*
(884.355)
-555.075*
(1,032.482)

359.020
(49.280)
369.336
(62.463)
289.829
(60.712)

21

.896
(.041)
.987**
(.012)
.864**
(.075)

-.098
(.036)
-.080*
(.039)
-.078*
(.043)

-905.962*
(782.996)
-1,015.900*
(1,019.201)
-662.419*
(1,113.768)

357.909
(49.080)
406.243
(64.954)
334.285
(71.770)

21

Futures
Return
(in 000s)

Initial
Harqin
(in 000s)

Na

21
21
21

20
21

17
20

y

b. Forward Forecast
c. Perfect Forecast
5. y - lxlO-6 *8
a. Futures Forecast
b. Forward Forecast
c. Perfect Forecast




aNumber of hedge positions satisfying |X*|<|L+AD|.
^Sample mean with standard deviation in parenthesis.
* Not significantly different than zero at the 5% level.
**Not significantly different than one at the 5% level.

21

18

20

18

16

Different expectations and levels of risk aversion lead to different
results 1n the hedging strategy solely through the expectations term 1n
equation (4).

As argued 1n section II, the higher the degree of risk

aversion, the less Important the expectations term 1n the'hedging strategy.
e o

This result 1s also seen 1n Table 1.

For y * 1x10

, lines 5b and 5c,
*

the number of hedge positions satisfying the regulatory constraint, |X |
<|L+AD|, are fewer than for y = 1x10

-5 2

’ , lines lb and lc, and the

regulatory constraint 1s binding more often for the former than the latter.
At low levels of risk aversion there Is an Incentive to speculate 1n the
futures market and to Increase the bank's risk exposure.

The regulatory

constraint prohibits this; hence, Table 1 reports hedging ratios not
significantly different than one and hedging effectiveness not significantly
different than zero at the lowest level of risk aversion.

Because using a

futures market forecast greatly diminishes the role of expectations and risk
aversion 1n the hedging strategy, the results for this forecast approximate
the most conservative use of the model and market.
A striking result 1n Table 1 1s that changes 1n expectations and risk
aversion make Insignificant differences 1n hedging performance.

This suggests

the expectations term 1n equation (4) 1s dominated by the loan commitment and
deposit terms, at least with respect to determining the hedging ratio and
hedging effectiveness.

However, the costs of using the T-bl11 futures market

to hedge Interest rate and quantity risks do depend on the expectations term.
A partial assessment of the costs of each T-b1ll futures hedging strategy 1s
given 1n columns four and five of Table 1.

Column four computes the gross

T-b1ll futures return on average excluding the repayment of Initial margin at
the end of the period and excluding any Interest earned on margin.

Column

five calculates the average Initial margin required to Initiate the hedging
strategy.




These figures represent partial costs because the model Ignores

17

roundturn brokerage commissions, Interest on Initial margin, and most
Important, profits on losses from the dally marking to market of the position.
The average T-b111 futures returns are negative, although not
significantly so, for all hedging strategies 1n Table 1.

The losses tend to

be greatest when hedging with a futures market forecast and smallest when
hedging with a perfect forecast.

The returns from hedging with a forward

forecast are similar to the perfect forecast returns.

Of the two ex ante

forecasts, futures and forward, the latter results 1n a more selective
anticipatory hedge and therefore, 1s less costly.

Initial margin requirements

range from $300-400 thousand per hedge, Indicating the futures positions are
quite large.

In sum, part of the costs of attaining a 10% reduction 1n

unhedged profits 1s an Insignificant reduction 1n overall bank profitability
and the opportunity cost of the $300-400 thousand required as Initial margin.
IV.

Conclusion

The applicability of these results depends on the assumptions of the
underlying theory of bank behavior.

Bank assets typically Include spot market

loans and a securities portfolio; for simplicity they have been excluded.
Including these assets 1n the model would create an opportunity for hedging 1n
the T-b1ll, T-bond, and GNMA futures markets and the Implementation of an
Integrated strategy.

13

The resulting optimal futures position may be long

or short or a spread depending on expectations and the bank's exposure.

The

volume of loan commitments acquired by the bank need not be predetermined at
the time of the futures decision.

Similarly, variable-rate liabilities could

have been added to the model with perhaps a deposit Interest rate as a choice
variable.

Generalizing the model 1n these ways would make the futures

decision dependent on the cash market decisions and vice versa.
Unfortunately, this would obscure the purpose of this paper:




to describe the

18

role of anticipatory hedging 1n a bank's forward lending operations when Its
deposit flows are uncertain.

Outside of these matters, the model could have

Incorporated Initial fees on making loan commitments, compensating balances,
or fees on unused commitment balances without substantially changing the
conclusions.
As for the simulation results, 1t 1s unlikely that the estimated costs and
benefits of using the firm-theoretic hedging strategy with the T-b1ll futures
market are directly applicable to any existing bank.

The simulation's purpose

1s to Illustrate the types of bank specific data required to Implement the
strategy and to assess the outcome quantitatively.

The model has the

flexibility to Incorporate different expectations and risk bearing
preferences; the outcomes from a variety of each are estimated.

The results

suggest that Interest rate and quantity risks can be reduced using the T-b1ll
futures market and the f1rm-theoret1c model, although the prospects for
decreasing the variability of unhedged profits are less than 1n pure Interest
rate risk situations.

14

Dissemination of the mechanics and possible

performance of hedging Interest rate and quantity risks Is therefore valuable
because 1t helps current and potential hedging Institutions determine when
futures trading decreases rather than Increases overall bank risk.

Given the

simulation results, hedging Interest rate and quantity risks has a high
probability of Increasing bank risk unless the hedging strategy Incorporates
the elements discussed above.
To date, little theoretical or empirical work addresses the type of
financial futures hedge studied here.

The bank's futures position 1s a

cross-hedge of an expected loan asset with an uncertain rate of return, funded
at an uncertain cost.

Unlike the banks discussed by BatUn (1983) and Dew and

Martell (1981), the bank described above 1s a direct rather than an Indirect
participant 1n the financial futures market.




It 1s the bank rather than the

19

borrower that is better able to transfer interest rate risk to the futures
market because it has the ability to pool small balances and risks.

The

futures position is also different because it is an anticipatory hedge of
interest rate and quantity risks.

Because any futures hedge of an existing

cash market position can be duplicated by the purchase and sale of cash market
instruments with different maturities, Franckle and Senchak (1981) argue that
the most effective use of financial futures markets is to hedge an anticipated
cash position.
purpose in mind.

The theoretical model in section one was developed with such a
In reality, bank applications of anticipatory hedging

commonly involve a quantity risk such as commitment takedowns, loan
prepayments or deposit withdrawals.

Financial futures contracts are best

suited for managing interest rate risks, and this helps explain why the bank's
T-bill futures market hedge results in only a 10% reduction in the variability
of unhedged profits.

Although this reduction is significant, further research

into the usefulness of other anticipatory hedging applications is needed
before it can be labeled the most effective type of bank hedging.




20

V.

Appendix

Since the balance sheet constraint, equation (1), can be solved for B 1n
terms of X, the maximization problem 1n (3) can be expressed as
Maximize EU((R.e-R„)L + [(Rv-Ry)+I(X)(RT-Rn)h]X + (R„-Rn)D}.
|X|<|UAD
L
8
X X
T 8
8 0

(Al)

Differentiating expression (Al) with respect to the futures decision, X = 0
glves^S

EU'[^][(RX-RX)+ I(X)(RT-RB)h]

= 0, or

(A2)

EU'[?]E[(Rx-Rx+I(X)(RT-RB)h] + Cov[U'(?),(RX-RX)1= 0,
where Cov represents covariance.
normally distributed.

(A3)

Next, assume the random variables are joint

Using Rubinstein's (1976) result, equation (A3) can be

rewritten as
E U ' M E [ ( R X-RX) + I(X)(RT-RB)h] + EUMMCov|>?,(Rx-Rx) ] = 0.

(A4)

The final assumption needed for a closed form solution 1s that bank management
exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
-y, equals -U"[tr]/U'[*] > 0.

The fixed Index of risk aversion,

Rewriting this relationship and taking

expectations yields EU"[ir] = -y EU'[w ].

Since Cov[w,(Rx-Rx)] = L»

Cov[(RL6-RB),(Rx-Rx)] + XVar[(Rx-Rx)] * (Rg-RpJCov [AD,(RX-RX)]
where Var represents variance and D=D+AD, equation (A4) can be solved for
★

the optimal anticipatory hedge, X, given by equation (4) 1n the text.




21

VI. Footnotes
^Given that 55-61% of the business loans made were under commitment
agreements and that 55-66% of the business loans had floating interest rates,
a rough approximation of 30-40% of the business loans made had variable-rate
loan commitment terms.
2

This model abstracts from the explicit problem of default risk on bank

loans.
3
In this theory, no special significance should be attached to the
T-bill futures contract.

Any money market futures contract could be used by

the bank and the particular choice of contract depends on the covariance
between futures prices and the exposure that is being hedged.
4

The current futures trading guidelines set out by the three federal

banking agencies (see 45 Federal Register 1812D-18122 and 18116-18118 (March
20, 1980)) do not proscribe long anticipatory heging by banks.

Long futures

positions can be used when funding interest-sensitive assets with fixed rate
sources of funds provided this is the net exposure in the bank's overall
balance sheet.

The anticipated transaction must be probable to occur because

the institutions has little discretion to do otherwise.
5
These guidelines were issued simultaneously by all three regulatory
agencies in November 1979 and revised in March 1980.

For national banks, see

Banking Circulars No. 79 issued by the Comptroller of the Currency.

For

insured state nonmember banks, see Banking Letter No. 17-80 issued by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
^This model considers only initial margin; margin calls are ignored.
Also, any excess margin monies beyond maintenance margin on the open futures
position is usually invested in interest earning accounts by the brokerage
house.




It seems likely that ignoring margin calls biases the estimated costs

22

of futures trading downward.
are also Ignored.

Finally, fixed roundturn brokerage commissions

These commissions are approximately $100 per contract.

^Constant absolute risk aversion Implies that favorable odds are
required before accepting a risky gamble of fixed absolute size and that those
favorable odds do not change as profits change.
®If the model has been developed without the quantity risk of
uncertain deposit flows, Cov[A0,(Rx-Rx)] = 0.

In addition, assuming the

expected T-b111 futures rate equals the current T-b111 futures rate (the
futures market 1s martingale efficient), margin requirements are zero, and
loan commitment takedowns are 100%, equation (8) becomes
X*/L . -Cov[(RL-RB),(Rx-Rx)]/Var[(Rx-Rx)].

(4')
*

The optimal ratio of T-b111 futures to risk exposure, X /L, 1s given by -B
1n the regression (RL~Rg) = <* + B(RX~RX).

This 1s the portfolio-choice

method developed for financial futures hedging by Ederlngton (1979) but applied
here to a cross-hedge between the bank's profit margin and the change 1n T-b111
futures rates.

The advantage of the f1rm-theoret1c solution, equation (4), 1s

that the role of expectations, margins, and quantity risks can be considered
1n the bank's risk-bearing decisions.
9

A better approximation may be Boltz and Campbell's (1979) estimate that

55-66% of the business loans made at money center and regional banks had
variable rate terms.

The simulation tends to overstate the stylized bank's

risk exposure, therefore.
^Some of the bank-specific Items used 1n the simulation are as follows
(means over the simulation period with standard deviations 1n parentheses).




L
($000s)

Cov[(R.6-Rr ),(Ry-Rv)]
L
B
* *

134,190
(12,117)

-.0000235
(.0000115)

Cov[AD,(Ry-Ry)]
_________* *
-245,896
(61,157)

23

^Fo r further discussion on a comparison between forward and futures
Interest rates as expectations see Lang and Rasche (1978) and Poole (1978).
12

Therefore, hedging effectiveness was taken as:

[Var(ir)-Var(wu) ]/Var(tru) = ((X*)2Var[(Rx-Rx) ] + 2LX*Cov[(RLe-RB) ,(RX-RX)]
* 2X*(RB-RD)Cov[AD,(Rx-Rx)]}/Var(^u)
where Var(iru) = the variance of bank profits without futures hedging.
13

Including a variety of assets 1n the bank's portfolio also complicates

the calculation of net risk exposure.

An Important factor Inhibiting the use

of financial futures by banks may very well be their Inability to calculate
the gap between rate sensitive assets and liabilities at different maturities.
14

Another possible explanation for the low estimates of hedging

effectiveness 1s that the simulation used monthly average prime rates 1n
calculating Rl ©.

It 1s well known that the prime rate 1s a poor

reflection of the terms of bank lending, especially at larger Institutions.
Unfortunately, other proxies for R^ are not easily obtained.
15

A sufficient condition for a maximum 1n expression (4) requires that

the utility function demonstrate risk aversion.




24

VI.

References

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Firm."

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BatUn, C.A. (1983): "Interest Rate Risk, Prepayment Risk, and the Futures
Market Hedging Strategies of Financial Intermediaries,"

Journal of

Futures Markets. 3:177-184Boltz, P. and Campbell, T.S. (1979): "Innovations 1n Bank Loan Contracting:
Recent Evidence."

Staff Studies. Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System, 104.
Campbell, T.S. (1978): "A Model of the Market for Lines of Credit,"

Journal of

Finance. 33:231-244.
C1ccehett1, P., Dale, C., and Vignola, A. (1981): "Usefulness of Treasury Bill
Futures as Hedging Instruments,"

Journal of Futures Markets. 1:379-387.

Deshmukh, S.D., Greenbaum, S.I. and Kanatas, G. (1982): "Bank Forward Lending
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Dew, J.K. and Martell, T.F. (1982): "Treasury Bill Futures, Commercial Lending,
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City, 67:19-30.
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"The Hedging Performance of the New Futures Markets,"

Journal of Finance. 34:154-170.
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25

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(1980): "The Hedging Performance of the New Futures Markets:

Comment,"

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Franckle, C. and Senchak, Jr, A., (1981): "Economic Considerations In the Use
of Interest Rate Futures."
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Journal of Futures Markets. 2:107-116.

(1983): "Fixed Rate Loan Commitments, Take-Down

Risk, and the Dynamics of Hedging with Futures."

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Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank of

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Bill Futures."

(1981): "Hedging Money Market CDs with Treasury

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Bell Journal of Economics. 7:407-425.

26

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