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Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life?
The Relationship Between Regulators
and the Regulated in Banking

By: Richard J. Rosen

WP 20001-05

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life?
The Relationship Between Regulators
and the Regulated in Banking
Richard J. Rosen
Finance Department
Kelley School of Business
Indiana University
rrosen@indiana.edu
June 2001

Abstract: In some industries, firms are able to choose who regulates them. There is a long debate
over whether regulatory competition is beneficial or whether it leads to a “race for the bottom.”
We introduce another possible issue with regulation. Regulators may take actions intended to
minimize the effort they spend on work. Using banking as an example, we test this “quiet life”
hypothesis against other explanations of regulatory behavior. Banks are able to switch among
three options for a primary federal regulator: the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. We
examine why they switch and what the results of switches are. We find support for the
hypothesis that competition among regulators has beneficial aspects. Regulators seem to
specialize, offering banks that are changing strategy the ability to improve performance by
switching regulators. There is also evidence that the ability to switch regulators allows banks to
get away from an examiner that desires a quiet life.
I would like to thank Susan Monaco, Terry Nixon, Greg Udell, and participants in workshops at
Indiana University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago for comments on the paper. Some
of this work was completed while the author was visiting the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? The Relationship Between Regulators and the
Regulated in Banking
Should firms be able to choose who regulates them? This question arises in many different
contexts. In securities law, antitrust enforcement, and environmental policy, there are arguments
over whether the main regulatory authority should be at the state or federal level. To the extent
that firms select where to incorporate and locate factories, state chartering regulation allows them
to pick their regulator. The formation of the European Union opened up the question of whether
to harmonize policy across nations. Without harmonization, firms can migrate to the country
with the laxest regulation. This paper studies banking, where there have been debates over the
optimal regulatory structure since at least the National Banking Act of 1863.
The answer to how many regulators there should be depends on the extent to which regulators
attempt to serve the broad public interest versus acting in their private or parochial interest. For
example, the 1980s saw the worst crisis in banking since the Great Depression. Some critics
blame the crisis partially on regulators, saying they let banks take excessive risk. Did
competition among regulators exacerbate or mitigate the banking crisis? This paper examines the
impact of regulatory structure using banking as an example. We offer some evidence on whether
bank regulators act in their own interest, and if so, how. Our sample includes both the crisis
period of the 1980s and the healthier banking industry of the 1990s.
The banking industry offers an excellent opportunity to study regulatory behavior because
commercial banks can choose among three primary federal regulators. The primary regulator
depends on a bank’s chartering agency and on whether it is a Federal Reserve System (“Fed”)
member. A nationally-chartered bank is regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (the "OCC"). A state-chartered bank has the Fed as its primary federal regulator if it is
a Fed member and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (the "FDIC") otherwise.1 To examine
how the regulatory structure interacts with the risk and return choices of banks, we focus on
banks that switch primary regulators, asking why banks switch and, after they do, what the effect
on performance is.
The existing literature on regulatory structure focuses on whether there is a “race for the
bottom” among regulatory agencies. Since the budget of an agency depends in part on the
number and size of the firms it regulates, regulators might compete against each other by offering
lenient treatment in order to attract firms. When Chase Manhattan Bank elected to have a state
charter rather than a national one after its merger with Chemical Bank in 1995, the OCC lost fees
equal to 2% of its budget. If the OCC was concerned with maximizing its budget, it would have

1

Regulatory authority for state-chartered banks is shared with the appropriate state chartering agencies.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 2
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an incentive to remove burdens on Chase Manhattan (or its managers) to get them back to the
OCC.
Another potential drawback of having multiple regulatory agencies from which to choose is
that the agencies may respond to their constituencies but ignore externalities. When externalities
are important, control by local agencies may lead to too little regulation (Baumol and Oates,
1988; Stewart, 1992). As an example, for many years Britain did not control sulfur emissions
from its power plants because prevailing winds blew them offshore, with most of the damage
being felt in continental Europe (Lomas, 1988). We do not examine this here, since this sort of
externality is not a big problem in banking.
Regulatory competition also may be a good thing. Tiebout (1956) presents a model of public
good provision by local communities that has often been adapted to other issues of regulation.
He shows that under certain conditions (including no externalities and costless mobility),
regulatory competition leads to optimal standard setting. Different localities can offer a menu of
public goods, with each individual choosing the menu that is best for her or him. The Tiebout
model underlies the arguments for local control of securities regulation (Romano, 1998), antitrust
(Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991), and environmental policy (Revesz, 2000). These papers also
claim that the benefits of competition among local agencies mean that there is (or should be) no
race for the bottom.
The evidence on competition among regulators is limited and often anecdotal. For example,
local control of environmental regulation is deemed to be good because under this system we
have seen environmental standards rising recently. There are, however, several more rigorous
studies of differences of competition among regulators that focus on state corporate governance
rules. When firms switch the state in which they are incorporated, stock prices show no
significant reaction or increase slightly suggesting that the ability to switch regulators may have
benefited firms (Bradley and Schipani, 1989; Romano, 1985). On the other hand, when states
passed laws making it easier for firms to avoid hostile takeovers, stock prices fell suggesting a
race for the bottom (Alexander et. al., 1997; Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989). The common factor
in these studies is that states seem to be acting to benefit those who are likely to decide where
firms are chartered, that is, the firms’ managers. Whether this is good or bad for the public
depends on the degree of manager-shareholder agency problems. One contribution of this study
is that we are able to test for both regulatory behavior and manager-shareholder agency problems
at the same time.
An additional complication in banking is that a bank regulatory agency is essentially a
collection of examiners. Unlike regulators in many other areas, examiners in banking frequently

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make subjective decisions about the banks they visit.2 Berger, et. al. (2000) reviews the
discretion that examiners and regulatory agencies have when deciding how much risk to allow a
bank. Examiners go in a bank to evaluate its risk. Based on this assessment, the examiners
decide whether the bank’s reserve for loan losses is sufficient and they assign a strength rating to
the bank (the CAMELS rating). If a bank wants to change its portfolio, its examiner must decide
how to react. The examiner can accede or make the change costly for the bank by requesting a
higher loan loss reserve (resulting in a charge against income) or by giving the bank a lower
CAMELS rating (resulting in more regulatory costs for the bank). 3
Examiners can exploit the discretion they have when examining a bank to maximize their
own utilities. One interest of some examiners may be to lead a “quiet life.”4 That is, they may
want to get by with as little work, and as little career risk, as possible. If a quiet life were the
goal, then examiners would want banks to avoid changing. The more a bank changes its
portfolio, the more work an examiner would have to do. This study is the first to test whether
there is evidence that examiners act so as to lead a quiet life.
There is another reason why examiners may put up roadblocks to change by banks.
Regulatory behavior also may be influenced by a desire to avoid criticism from groups other than
the firms they regulate.5 Importantly, Congress and public interest groups may criticize ex post
even actions that were proper ex ante (as Kane, 1989, argues was done early in the savings and
loan crisis in the 1980s). This gives regulatory agencies, and by extension examiners, an
incentive to avoid actions that the regulator thinks could increase the risk of bank failure. Fear of
criticism may induce risk aversion on the part of regulators.
One goal of this paper is to test whether there is evidence in regulatory decisions of Tiebout
sorting, a race for the bottom, a desire for the quiet life, or risk aversion. As a secondary goal, we
attempt to shed light on other possible motivations for regulatory and bank actions, including
manager-shareholder conflicts. The evidence here is consistent with both Tiebout sorting and the
quiet life hypothesis, and there is evidence against all the alternative explanations of regulatory
behavior. We find that banks that switch regulators do better after the switch. There is some

2

In other industries, interpretation of regulations most frequently comes at the agency level. There is a
literature that looks at whether regulatory agencies act as Congress wants them to. Libecap (1996) contains
a number of articles addressing this question.
3
Evidence of the power examiners hold over banks is mostly indirect. For example, in 1991 Alan
Greenspan was worried that examiners were contributing to a “credit crunch” by requiring banks to hold to
much capital against loans. He felt that examiners were using their discretion to be too tough on banks.
4
Berger and Hannan (1998) talk about the desire by bankers for a quiet life.
5
Stigler (1971) points out that regulators can be captured by the industries they regulate because firms in
the industry care a lot more about the regulators decisions than outsiders. Peltzman (1976) and others
extend Stigler’s argument by pointing out that any organized interest group can have an influence on
policy.

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evidence that the regulator they switch to is based on the types of changes they are making in
their portfolio. Also, holding everything else constant, banks are more likely to switch regulators
when the banks are changing their portfolios – thus generating more work for examiners.
The paper consists of six sections. The first section sets out the major hypotheses and data
sources. In the next section, we look at the probability that a bank changes its primary regulator
as a function of bank characteristics. The third section examines the performance of banks that
switch regulators. The next section focuses on the individual regulatory agencies (that is, the
OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC). We examine whether any of the findings in the previous sections
are specific to a single regulator. The fifth section discusses robustness. Finally, the last section
offers concluding comments.

1. Hypotheses and data
To provide the underpinnings for the empirical work in later sections, this section reviews the
reasons why a bank might switch regulators. When bank managers are asked why they change
primary regulators, they generally respond in one of two ways. They claim that the switch either
saves them money (as Chase Manhattan Bank did after its merger with Chemical Bank in 1995)
or allows them additional powers (as Chase did when it changed the primary regulator of its
Delaware bank in 1990).
If regulatory switches are primarily designed to save money, then banks should have no
(expected) change in their risk profile surrounding a switch. Looking at performance, the only
impact of the move should be an increase in return. The direct cost of regulation is small,
generally less than $4 per $10,000 of assets. However, it is difficult to pin down how big the
savings could be, since estimates of the total cost of regulation, including indirect costs, vary
widely. Elliehausen (1998) gives estimates of the cost of regulation that range between 5 and 15
percent of noninterest expense, or between 2 and 6 percentage points of return on equity. So, if
the differences across regulators are large, it can have a measurable effect on a bank’s bottom
line. If banks are motivated primarily by cost savings, then there should be little other change in
their portfolios:
H0 (cost savings): Banks increase return when they switch primary federal
regulators (so that return rises or risk falls). The switch is not associated with a
change in loan portfolios or in measures of risk.
We use this as the null hypothesis in this study. The implications of this and the alternative
hypotheses described below are summarized in Table 1.

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Public interest – Tiebout sorting
Banks may choose regulators based on the basket of services provided by each regulatory
agency and its examiners. Consistent with the Tiebout hypothesis, a bank may change regulators
when its desires a different set of services, such as when it is otherwise changing its business
strategy.
Some regulations differ across agencies, although these differences generally are minor.6 But
for some banks, and some issues, the differences might be important enough to induce a switch.
During the sample period, for example, the insurance powers allowed to banks differed across
regulators. If banks shift to a new regulator to take advantage of a new, profitable activity, then
return should increase (or, more exactly, the bank should shift to a better risk-return tradeoff).
Switching to a new regulatory agency may be part of a general shift in a bank’s portfolio.
According to the Tiebout model, regulators choose a package of regulations and examination
policy to offer banks. Banks choose the package that most closely fits their objectives. If
regulators specialize, then there may be a pattern in the switching data reflecting the policies of
the regulatory agencies. For example, banks that focus on a particular kind of loan may prefer
one regulator while banks that want low examination costs may prefer another. If banks, in an
attempt to provide shareholder value, sort themselves this way, then the following hypothesis
should hold:
H1 (Tiebout sorting): Banks shift to a more favorable risk-return tradeoff when
they switch primary federal regulators (so that return rises or risk falls). The
changes in risk, return, and other portfolio characteristics may differ depending
on the regulatory agencies involved in the switch.
We expect other changes in a bank’s portfolio to occur around the time of the switch of
regulators.
Race for the bottom
If regulatory agencies want to maximize their budgets or their domain, then they will compete
for firms. A race for the bottom occurs when this competition is at the expense of the public
interest. One job of the bank regulatory agencies is to protect the safety and soundness of the
banking system by preventing banks from taking excessive risk. Given this, one way the
agencies can compete for banks by being less stringent about safety and soundness. This is the
“competition for laxity” that Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns spoke about in 1974.7 His
worry was that agencies would try to attract banks by letting the banks take more risk without a
6

Butler and Macey (1988) point out that one reason for the small differences across regulators in our
sample is the use of federal supremacy laws. In essence, federal regulators impose their rules on statechartered banks through direct regulation or by making federal deposit insurance conditional on accepting
certain rules.
7
Scott (1977) reviews of the statements of Chairman Burns and others on this topic.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 6
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compensating increase in return. This is not in the public interest because it increases the risk of
bank failures, and hence the expected payments to insured depositors by the FDIC. We capture
this in the data by looking for banks that increase risk without increasing return after switching
regulators:
H2 (race for the bottom): Banks switch regulatory agencies to increase risk.
Return does not increase after the switch.
H2 implicitly assumes that all regulatory agencies are competing for laxity. If the competition is
limited to one or two agencies, then it might not show up in the aggregate data. In Section 4, we
examine whether individual agencies are allowing risk taking to increase the number of banks
they regulate.
Quiet life
Another alternative hypothesis is that bank examiners want a quiet life. Examiners have a
quiet life when the banks they regulate change as little as possible. Since we want to distinguish
an examiner acting in her own private interest from one acting in the public interest, we look for
examples where banks are impeded in their attempts to make value-adding changes. So, as an
alternative hypothesis we have8:
H3 (quiet life): A bank is more likely to switch regulatory agencies when it is
changing its portfolio. These changes may involve increasing or decreasing risk.
After changing agencies, the bank has higher return (or lower risk with the same
return).
The changes in portfolio we examine include changes in leverage and other measures of
risk, as well as changes in the loan portfolio without regard to whether they change risk.
The less a bank changes, the happier the examiner is, and the less pressure she puts on the
bank. Thus, ‘quiet’ banks – those that have little change their loan portfolios and risk –
should be less likely to switch regulators than their more active counterparts. If risk is
increasing concurrent with a switch, then this supports both the race for the bottom and
the quiet life. To support the quiet life against a race for the bottom, we look for switches
based on decreases in risk such as leverage or based on changes in the loan portfolio once
risk is controlled for. Both the quiet life and Tiebout sorting imply that banks shift to a
better risk-return tradeoff and change their portfolios when switching regulators. To
distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the portfolio changes of banks as a
function of the agency they switch to.

8

We do not have data on whether banks are granted changes of examiners within an agency. Thus, we may
not be able to pick up some instances when an examiner is changed because she impedes changes in a
bank’s portfolio.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 7
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Risk aversion
The final hypothesis about regulatory behavior that we test is risk aversion. If agencies or
examiners are risk averse, then they will prevent banks from making value-adding increases in
risk:
H4 (risk aversion): A bank is more likely to switch regulatory agencies when it
is increasing (failure) risk. After changing agencies, the bank has higher return.
The distinguishing characteristic between risk aversion and a race for the bottom is the return
after the switch. If agency or examiner risk aversion is the driving force behind a switch then
return should increase, while if a race for the bottom exists then return should decrease.
Managerial explanations
There is another agency conflict in banking – the one between bank managers and
shareholders. If bank managers are acting in shareholders’ interests, then any increase in a bank’s
risk should be accompanied by an increase in return. On the other hand, the increase in risk could
reflect a bank manager’s reaction to changes in the bank’s market. Gorton and Rosen (1995)
show that during the 1980s, banking was in a period of decline. They also note that if the bank
managers most affected by the decline continued their existing approach, return at their banks
would fall increasing the chance that the managers would be fired. On the other hand, the
managers knew more about the risks they were taking than outsiders, including outside
shareholders. If the managers increased risk, even at the expense of expected return, they might
get high enough realized returns to keep their jobs.9 The key was that outsiders did not realize
that the bank was moving to a worse risk-return tradeoff. Since the same examiners visit a bank
repeatedly, the current examiner of a bank may know more about the bank’s risk than either an
outsider or a new examiner. Thus, switching regulatory agencies gives the bank a new examiner
who may have difficulty determining both the level of risk at the bank and whether the risk is
compensated by a higher expected return. So, a finding that banks increased risk but not return
may reflect the manager-shareholder conflict rather than any problems with regulators10:
H5 (managerial risk taking): Banks switch regulators concurrent with adding
risk. Performance does not improve after the change.
It is difficult to distinguish managerial risk taking from a race to the bottom if we find an increase
in risk at the same time as a switch. However, if we assume that banking was in decline in the
early part of our sample but not the later part of the sample, we can look at whether H5 holds
9

Because banking was in decline, the normal incentive for managers to reduce risk (Amihud and Lev,
1981) was reversed.
10
Bank managers also might increase risk to “gamble for resurrection.” That is, they may take risks that
reduce the expected return on their asset portfolio but increase the expected return to shareholders by taking
advantage of fixed-rate deposit insurance. Regulators should prevent this. If they do not, we should pick it
up as a race for the bottom.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 8
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early but not late. This could either reflect a race to the bottom in only one part of the sample or
managerial risk taking.
The manager-shareholder conflict may also manifest itself in scapegoating. When a bank
manager does poorly, he may want to shift blame from his performance to external
circumstances. One way to do this is to blame the examiner. Thus, we might see banks
switching agencies after poor performance. This need not be accompanied by a change in the
bank’s portfolio. If the regulator really is at fault, then performance should increase after a switch
while if it is scapegoating, then there should be no improvement:
H6 (scapegoating): Banks are more likely to switch regulators after poor
performance. Performance does not improve after the change.
Data
To test these hypotheses, we focus on banks that changed primary regulatory agencies
between 1983 and 1999. Banks have been switching agencies for many years (Scott, 1977,
documents switches from 1950 to 1974). However, our sample starts after the passage of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) in 1980. Prior to
DIDMCA, there were important differences across regulators. For example, reserve requirements
depended on whether a bank was a member of the Federal Reserve System. DIDMCA leveled
the playing field for banks that were and were not members of the Federal Reserve System. It is
possible that many of the regulatory switches that occurred prior to and immediately after passage
of DIDMCA were related to major differences in regulations rather than the implementation of
the regulations.
Table 2 gives an overview of the banks that switched primary regulators. As the second
column of Panel A shows, there were 1,522 changes during the sample period, an average of 90
per year. Over the sample period, 9.4% of banks left their regulator at least once (0.7% of banks
switched more than once). Both the number of banks and the proportion of banks that switched
regulators increased in the 1990s. Panel A also gives a breakdown of switches by the size of the
bank. The smallest banks were the least likely to switch.
Panel B in Table 2 looks at the direction of regulatory changes. Most regulatory switchers
were either moving to or away from primary federal regulation by the FDIC (state nonmember
status). This is not surprising, since the FDIC regulates sixty percent of banks. Relative to a
situation where switches had been in proportion to the share of banks regulated by each agency,
the Fed was the biggest gainer and the OCC the biggest loser. There were a net of 303 switches
to the Fed and 300 away from the OCC compared to proportional changes.
Balance sheet and income data for banks comes from the year-end Call Reports of Income
and Condition (Call Reports) that banks are required to file. Table 3 gives data on the variables

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 9
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used in the paper.11 We measure return using return on equity (ROE) and risk using three
measures: the equity-to-assets ratio, the loan-to assets ratio, and the ratio of nonperforming loans
to total loans. The equity-to-asset ratio is a measure of leverage, with higher values indicating
lower risk. Loans are riskier than most other (on-balance sheet) bank assets, so we interpret an
increase in the loan-to-asset ratio as an indicator of higher risk. The nonperforming loans-toloans ratio reflects expected losses on loans made in the past. A riskier loan portfolio, all else
equal, has higher nonperforming loans. Since nonperforming loans can also reflect bad luck or
bad management, results based on an analysis of nonperforming loans should be viewed with
caution.
We can also view the loan-to-assets ratio and the nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio as
proxies for the workload of bank examiners. Examiners have to spend more effort reviewing
loans than other assets and nonperforming loans than other loans. If examiners desire a quiet life,
then they would prefer banks to have nonloan assets such as cash and government securities and
they would like the banks not to issue loans with a high probability of becoming nonperforming.

2. Why banks change regulators
This section examines the characteristics that predict whether banks switch primary
regulators. To do this, we must control for other reasons that banks might switch primary
regulators. For example, we expect that banks are more likely to switch regulators after a major
corporate change such as a merger or when they belong to a holding company that has banks with
different primary regulators.
The model used to predict switches is:
(1)

Regulator Change = f(Bank Risk Change, Bank Portfolio Change, Control Variables),

where Regulator Change is one if the bank changes regulator in year t and zero otherwise. The
independent variables are described below and summarized in Table 3.
Bank risk change
We measure the change in risk two ways. First, we include the difference in the primary risk
ratios at the end of year t from their value at the end of year t - 2. Notice that we include changes
in year t, the year of any potential regulatory shift. We do this for two reasons: First, we do not
have an exact date for a switch. Also, we are much more concerned with changes in the policy of
a bank that the bank examiner can see. It takes time to implement such changes, but it is likely
11

We drop all banks that switch regulators more than once in the sample period. We also eliminate outliers
from the sample by dropping any observation where the ROE, ROA, or equity-to-assets ratio is either in the
top 1% or bottom 1% of values. These do not affect the qualitative results.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 10
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that a bank (and its examiners) know months in advance that the bank is adding risk that might be
reflected in these ratios. Thus, while some of the change may occur after any switch, most of the
planning for the change takes place prior to the switch.
Estimating changes in risk ratios using continuous variables may be misleading. Banks may
run in to resistance from a regulatory agency or an examiner not as a function of how big a
change in risk they make but if the change in risk exceeds some threshold level. To capture the
possibility of a discrete change in regulatory behavior when risk at a bank increases beyond a
threshold, we include dummy variables that have the value one if a bank’s risk increase is in the
top quartile of changes at all banks and dummy variables that have the value one if a bank’s risk
increase is in the bottom quartile of changes at all banks.
Bank portfolio change
We look at bank portfolio change by looking at shifts within a loan portfolio. We split the
loan portfolio into seven categories: real estate construction loans, commercial real estate loans,
home mortgage loans, other real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans, consumer loans,
and other loans. For each of these, we measure the percentage change in that category of loan as
a fraction of total loans between the ends of year t – 2 and year t.
We measure loan portfolio change as the sum of the absolute values of the percentage
changes in each type of loan:
Loan portfolio change = Σ | change in loan type i between years t-2 and t |,
where the sum is taken over all seven different types of loans. Higher values of loan portfolio
change should make it more difficult for a bank examiner to have a quiet life. We include both
the continuous version of loan portfolio change as well as dummy variables for whether the
change is in the top quartile or the bottom quartile.
Control variables
The primary hypothesis that we are testing in this section is that banks change regulators
when they are adding risk or otherwise changing their portfolio. To control for a bank’s existing
levels of risk and return, we include the equity-to-assets ratio, the loan-to-assets ratio, the
nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio, and ROE (adding additional risk and return variables as
controls does not change the qualitative results). We use the log of total assets as a control, since
larger banks are more diversified, all else equal. We also include the log of total assets squared,
since Table 2 suggests a quadratic relationship between assets and switches. All these variables
are as of the end of year t – 1 except ROE, which is for the entire year t – 1.
We also want to control for other reasons unrelated to risk, return, and portfolio change that

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may lead a bank to shift its primary regulator. Additional controls include a dummy for merger
activity. The dummy has a value of one if the bank or its holding company has been involved in
a merger with a banking organization in year t or year t-1. Breaking down mergers by type, such
as mergers between banks within a holding company versus acquisitions of outside banks, does
not change the qualitative results. We also control for holding company status using dummies for
whether the bank is the lead bank in a holding company, or whether it is a non-lead bank within a
holding company that has the same or a different charter than the lead bank (banks not in a
holding company are the excluded category). This allows us to test for switches to unify the
regulators a holding company reports to. The holding company status variables are all as of the
end of year t - 1.
There may also be other differences across primary regulators. To control for this, we
include dummies for whether a bank is regulated by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC at the end of
year t - 1 (the OCC is the omitted category). In Section 4, we examine in more detail the extent
to which the pattern of changes depends on the regulators.
Finally, year dummies are included to control for systemic changes such as changes in the
banking economy.
Results
Table 4 presents the results of a logistic regression of (1).12 The first column shows that the
control variables are important predictors of regulatory switches. Banks are more likely to switch
if they have merged, are within a holding company (especially if they are not the lead bank), are
performing poorly, or are larger. These results are consistent with banks changing agencies as the
result of corporate reorganization or to simplify their regulation. One slightly puzzling result is
that a bank is more likely to switch when it is not the lead bank in a holding company if it has the
same charter as the lead bank. This may reflect the use of special purpose non-lead banks to
exploit the differences in regulation. There is also a pattern across the regulators with banks at
the Fed and FDIC more likely to switch than those at the OCC. We explore this further in
Section 4.
The second column of Table 4 includes the continuous measures of changes in risk, return,
and loan portfolios. Under the null hypothesis, the coefficients on these variables should all be
insignificantly different from zero. As shown in the table, the only change variable with a
significant coefficient is the loan portfolio change. The coefficient on the loan portfolio change
variable is significantly positive. This suggests that once risk is controlled for, changes in the
12

As a robustness check, we rerun all the logistic regressions using a fixed effect OLS model. The results
are qualitatively similar.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 12
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loan portfolio make a switch of regulators more likely. As shown in Table 1, this is consistent
with the quiet life hypothesis.
The third column of Table 4 introduces the quartile dummies for the main risk, return, and
portfolio change measures. The dummies do a better job of explaining regulatory switches than
the continuous variables do.13 For this reason, we focus on the model without the continuous risk
and portfolio change variables. Changing the risk ratios either up or down increases the chances
of switching regulators. This provides support for the quiet life hypothesis since it is the fact that
a bank is changing and not the direction that is important. Further support is provided by the loan
portfolio change variables. ‘Quiet’ banks – those in the bottom quartile in loan changes – are less
likely than average to switch regulatory agencies while ‘active’ banks – those in the top quartile
in loan changes – are more likely to switch. None of the coefficients on the quartile dummies for
the individual loan shares is significant, suggesting that again it is the act of changing rather than
the types of changes made that is key.
We also include changes in return in the regressions in Table 4. The results imply that after
controlling for other factors, banks are more likely to switch regulators when their return is
increasing and not when it is decreasing. This is evidence against the scapegoating hypothesis.
In the fourth column, we add dummies for the growth in individual loan shares. We include
dummies that are one if a bank’s increase in the proportion of loans of a given type was in the top
25 percent. None of the coefficients on the loan share dummies is statistically significant. We
return to this in Section 4, when we examine the individual regulatory agencies.
Much of the explanatory power in the regressions comes from the merger variable and the
holding company structure variables. This is consistent with many switches being motivated by
organizational issues within banks. For example, multibank holding companies may want to
simplify regulation under a single agency or the acquiring bank in a merger may want to take the
charter of its target. We would like to eliminate switches motivated by changes in corporate
structure to see if other banks that switch appear to be reacting to regulatory actions. To do this,
we rerun the predictive model (1) for non-holding companies banks and one-bank holding
companies excluding those banks that had recently merged. The results, presented in the fifth
column of Table 4, are qualitatively similar to those for the full sample. The biggest difference is
that the coefficients on the equity-to-asset ratio change variables, although positive, are
insignificant in the smaller sample.

13

When both the discrete and continuous versions of the risk and portfolio change variables are included,
only the discrete versions are statistically significant.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 13
08/21/01

Overall, the results provide support for the quiet life hypothesis against the null hypothesis
that bank switch only to save on costs. Since banks are more likely to switch when they increase
risk, can we also interpret the results as supporting risk aversion on the part of regulators? While
we cannot reject risk aversion playing a role, if risk aversion is the driving factor in regulatory
decisions, then a large reduction in the risk ratios should reduce the probability of a switch
instead of increase it as the data suggest.

3. The performance of banks that switch primary regulators
This section looks at the pre- and post-switch performance of banks. In the previous section,
we show that a bank is more likely to change its primary regulatory agency when it is changing
its portfolio. This is consistent with the first part of the quiet life hypothesis. However, we have
not yet examined the second part of the hypothesis, which says that regulators impede valueadding portfolio changes. For this, we need to look at whether banks performance improves after
a switch of regulators. Looking at performance around a switch also sheds light on Tiebout
sorting, the race for the bottom, and the risk aversion hypotheses.
Return is higher in the year following a change of regulators than in the year prior to a change
of regulators. Return on equity rises from 9.98% to 11.43%, an increase of 14.5%. This is both
statistically and economically significant. The risk measures are mixed, with the equity-to-assets
and loan-to-assets ratios rising by less than 3% each but the nonperforming-loans-to-loans ratio
falling. A large increase in return with at most a small change in risk is evidence that bank
performance improves after a regulatory switch. But these performance changes may not be the
result of the switch. To control for other factors that can explain return and risk, we use the
following model:
(2)

Performance = f(Pre-change indicators, Post-change indicators, Control Variables),

where the model is estimated for the two return and three risk variables over the entire sample.
We use the same control variables as we did in the regressions to predict regulatory switches,
except we omit return variables for the return regressions and some risk variables for the risk
regressions. We also add one variable, the absolute value of the loan portfolio change. The
results are robust to the omission of this variable, but we believe it might be a proxy for costs
involved in altering bank policy.
The results in the previous section were consistent with the quiet life hypothesis. If return is
increasing and risk changing (either up or down), then this would provide further support for the
hypothesis. As shown in Table 1, Tiebout sorting is also consistent with a move to a better risk-

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 14
08/21/01

return tradeoff. However, a race for the bottom, risk aversion, and managerial risk-taking all
predict an increase in risk after the switch. If either the race for the bottom and managerial risktaking, but not risk aversion, hold, return should fall after a switch.
A priori, we have no reason to believe that the changes induced by a switch of regulators
should be immediately reflected in performance. For this reason, we look over a variety of time
horizons surrounding a regulatory change. In Table 5, we present results that focus on two and
five year periods before and after a switch. This allows a long enough time before a switch to see
whether there was some change in a bank’s performance that might prompt a switch. It also
allows a long enough time after a switch to ensure that all the changes that result from it are
reflected in the accounting data we examine. For banks that switch regulators, we use dummy
variables for pre- and post-switch periods and well as a trend variable for the longer horizon
(specific definitions are given in the table). As seen in the table, return increases after a switch.
Although trend in return is positive going into a switch, it increases significantly following a
switch. Most of the change in return occurs at least two years after the switch. The results also
indicate that the equity-to-assets ratio weakly falls following a switch, the loan-to-asset ratio
increases, and the nonperforming-loans-to-loans ratio decreases. These results are robust to
changes in the five-year horizon, but the two years before and after a switch seem to be different
than other years. The generally flat performance in the two years after a switch may reflect the
time necessary for changes initiated after the switch to show up in the accounting data.
The increase in return post-switch is consistent with Tiebout sorting and the quiet life
hypothesis. It is inconsistent with a race for the bottom, managerial risk taking, or scapegoating.
The decline in the nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio with a roughly steady equity-to-assets ratio
implies that the expected failure rate of banks that switch is no higher, and probably lower, after a
switch compared with before. This is inconsistent with the new regulatory agency allowing a
bank that has switched to take socially excessive risk, and thus inconsistent with agencies being
engaged in a race for the bottom. To the extent examiners are risk averse, we assume that they
want to avoid the failure of banks they regulate. Thus, although banks weakly increase risky
assets after they switch, since the risk of failure appears to fall, the results are also inconsistent
with examiners being risk averse.
Overall, the results are consistent with the quiet life hypothesis since changes in risk – in
either direction – or changes in the loan portfolio are associated with a higher probability of
switching regulators and since return is increasing after a switch. The increase in return also is
consistent with Tiebout sorting, which implies that firms switch as part of a process that improves
performance. We attempt to distinguish the quiet life from Tiebout in the next section.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 15
08/21/01

The results are not inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis explaining some switches,
since an increase in risk leads to more switches and return increases after a switch. However,
switches are also more likely when risk is decreasing a lot, and that should not happen if risk
aversion is the only reason to switch. A race for the bottom implies that banks are no better off
after a switch, but we find that return is increasing after a switch at the same time as failure risk is
not increasing. Increasing return and weakly decreasing risk also rules out the two managerial
explanations for switches since managerial risk-taking should lead to an increase in risk and
scapegoating is not associated with higher return.

4. Individual regulatory agencies
The purpose of this section is to provide tests of Tiebout sorting and to determine if some of
the other hypotheses hold at one or two, but not all, the regulatory agencies. Tiebout sorting
implies that the three bank regulatory agencies specialize in their manner of regulation. Banks
can choose the agency that best met their needs. Prompting for specialization may derive from
the fact that the three bank regulatory agencies have very different responsibilities and positions
within the government. These responsibilities and relationships may affect the way the agencies
regulate banks. The OCC is part of the Treasury Department, and thus is under the President.
The Fed is an independent agency that also has the responsibility for monetary policy. Its attitude
toward regulation might be colored by the importance of controlling inflation. The FDIC is also
an independent agency. It supervises the deposit insurance fund, and that may influence its
attitude toward bank failures.
The Tiebout sorting hypothesis implies that there should be clear differences in the types of
banks that switch to each regulator. To test this, we examine a predictive model focusing on the
regulator that is being switched to. That is, for each regulatory, we use the predictive model (1)
to examine the probability that a bank not regulated by that agency at the end of year t – 1
switches to the agency during year t.14
Table 6 presents evidence on the probability that a bank switches to a particular regulator.
The coefficients are generally consistent with the full sample results for all three regulators, with
the exception of the loan share variables. The loan share variables indicate that regulators seem
to specialize in different loan categories. Banks that are increasing consumer loans are more

14

For robustness, we ran a multinomial logistic model asking which regulator a bank would have in year t
given its regulator in year t – 1. The results are consistent with the results here, although fewer variables
are statistically significant because the multinomial logit in effect splits the sample into smaller subsamples.
Moreover, it is more difficult to look at the regulator that is being switched to since you have to combine
the results of two multinomial regressions (for banks switching from each of the other two regulators).

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 16
08/21/01

likely to shift to the OCC, banks that are increasing commercial loans (including commercial real
estate loans) are more likely to shift to the Federal Reserve, and banks that are increasing real
estate construction loans are more likely to shift to the FDIC. This is consistent with the loan
shares held by all banks (not shown). Controlling for size and holding company structure, banks
at the OCC hold more consumer loans, banks at the Federal Reserve more commercial loans
(overall, but not more commercial real estate loans), and banks at the FDIC more real estate
construction loans. This provides support for Tiebout sorting.
The results of the predictive model do not support a conclusion that one regulator is attracting
primarily weak banks. The coefficient on the dummy indicating an increase in return is positive
at all three agencies, although only statistically significant for banks switching to the FDIC.
However, the other two agencies attract banks that have a statistically significantly higher
probability of being banks with declining nonperforming loans.
The evidence implies that regulators are specializing, but that does not show that
specialization is in the public interest. To test that, we need to examine the change in
performance after a switch. As in the previous section, we look at the pre- and post-switch
performance of banks that switch regulators controlling for other factors that could influence
performance. We start with (2), the same model as in Section 3, but we include interaction
variables between the pre- and post-switch variables and the regulator at the end of year t – 1 (the
conclusions are the same when we interact the variables with the regulator at the end of year t).
Table 7 presents the results for the interaction variables. As an example of how to interpret the
table, the variable for the trend prior to the switch for banks from the OCC is the pre-switch trend
variable multiplied by a dummy that is one for banks that switch from the OCC in year t. The
positive coefficient on that variable indicates that – controlling for mergers, holding company
status, size, and risk – banks that left the OCC in year t were increasing ROE prior to switching.
Overall, the results in Table 7 show that for banks that switch from all three agencies, return rises
or risk falls. This suggests that banks are shifting to a better risk-return tradeoff when they
switch. This provides further support for Tiebout sorting.
We can also use the results in Table 7 to shed light on some of the other hypothesis. The race
for the bottom, managerial risk-taking, and scapegoating require a worse risk-return tradeoff after
a switch while the race for the bottom, risk aversion, and managerial risk-taking all imply an
increase in post-switch risk. Banks leaving the OCC are increasing return without increasing risk,
providing no support to any of the hypotheses. Banks leaving the Fed have higher leverage (a
lower equity-to-assets ratio) but lower nonperforming loans. Since banks that leave the Fed also
increase return, it is unlikely that they significantly increase failure risk. The return at banks
leaving the FDIC is economically and statistically no different after they switch than before.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 17
08/21/01

These banks increase their loans-to-assets ratio, but experience a decline in their nonperforming
loans-to-loans ratio after they switch. On average, the ratio of nonperforming loans to assets (not
shown) declines slightly after a switch (the increase in loans is slower than the decrease in bad
loans). This means that it is unlikely failure risk rises. Thus, overall, the performance evidence
does not support a race for the bottom, risk aversion, managerial risk-taking, or scapegoating
being the major reason why banks switch agencies.
To examine whether examiners at only one or two regulatory agencies desire a quiet life and
whether only one or two agencies are risk averse, we look at the probability that banks regulated
by a particular agency at the end of year t – 1 switch to a new agency in year t. These results are
presented in Table 8. For the OCC and the FDIC, the coefficients on the loan portfolio change
dummies have the same sign as in the full sample. This supports the quiet life hypothesis at these
two agencies. Quiet banks regulated by the Federal Reserve are less likely to switch, as in the full
sample, but active banks are no more likely to switch than banks in the middle. The difference
between quiet banks and all others is consistent with the quiet life hypothesis, while the result on
active banks does not contradict it.
As in the aggregate data, there is evidence that increases in risk might be associated with
switching from the FDIC and the Fed, but there is also evidence that there are other factors,
including reductions in risk, that increase the probability that a bank switches from each agency.
For example, banks with increasing leverage or nonperforming loans are more likely to switch
from the FDIC, but so are banks with decreasing leverage or nonperforming loans. This suggests
that risk aversion is not the major reason that banks switch regulators.
To summarize, there is evidence of specialization among agencies prompting some switches,
supporting Tiebout sorting. It also appears that examiners at all the agencies seem to desire a
quiet life. At least some evidence against all of the other hypotheses exists at each agency since
the risk-return tradeoff is improving while failure risk is not rising at any agency. This suggests
that the dominant reasons for banks to switch regulators are to take advantage of Tiebout sorting,
to avoid an examiner who wants a quiet life, or for reasons unrelated to regulation (such as to
consolidate after a merger).

5. Robustness
In this section, we present the results of several robustness checks. They support the results
in the previous sections. To save space, only the qualitative results for the robustness tests are
given.
Since some switches are motivated reasons other than the actions of regulators, in Section 2

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 18
08/21/01

we looked at the subsample of banks that have not merged and either are not in a holding
company or are the only bank in a holding company. However, this may not eliminate all the
switches done for structural reasons. To drop those most likely to switch for structural reasons,
we use the first regression in Table 4 to predict how likely a bank is to switch regulators. This
model does not include any performance or loan variables meaning that it isolates structural
reasons for switching. We drop from the sample banks in the top ten percent of probability of
switching regulators based on these predicted values (recall that about one percent of banks
switch regulators every year). We rerun our tests on the remaining 90 percent of banks. The
qualitative results are as in the previous sections. This is more evidence that while organizational
issues may be important, they are not driving the overall results.
If prior performance affects the probability of switching, as the results suggest, then it may
also affect the post-switching performance. For example, the scapegoating hypothesis implies
that banks blame declines in performance on regulators. One reason that we might not see this in
aggregate data is that most banks had strong performance leading into a switch. We divide banks
by whether return increased from year t-2 to year t and by whether nonperforming loans fell from
year t-2 to year t. We then examine whether performance improves post-switch. These results
must be interpreted with extreme caution, since we are in some sense conditioning on what we
are looking to find. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with the effect of a switch being
independent of prior performance. In no case are the signs of the coefficients significantly
different between the banks with strong and weak prior performance.
The bank failure rate rose throughout the 1980s and remained high in the early 1990s. On the
other hand, banks made record profits in the late 1990s. This suggests that banking may have
gone through two regimes in the sample period. First, a period of decline as identified by Gorton
and Rosen (1995) and then a period of strength. To examine whether behavior changed, we split
the sample into two subperiods: 1983-1990 and 1991-1999. The break in the sample is between
1990 and 1991 because the number of bank failures started falling in 1991. The results of the
predictive model (1) are similar for the two subperiods. But there is evidence that in the early
part of the sample, return and leverage both declined in the two years following a change of
regulators. The decline in return is consistent with managerial risk taking as a reason for
switching regulators, but the decline in leverage is not.
This paper focuses on changes of primary federal regulators. There are two potential
objections to this. First, it may be the choice of a national versus a state charter that matters, and
not the further choice of whether to be a Federal Reserve System member. Using a switch of
charters rather than a switch of primary federal regulators in our analysis does not change the
qualitative results. A second issue is that for state-chartered banks, regulation is shared between

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 19
08/21/01

federal regulators and state regulators. To control for the effect of state regulators, we add state
dummies for banks with a state charter. The qualitative results in the predictive regression are
unchanged. We also examined results on a state-by-state basis, but even for the largest states,
there were not enough switches to get meaningful results.

6. Concluding comments
This paper attempts to shed some light on the motivations of regulators. This is important
both for its implications in banking and for its contributions to the debate on the optimal
regulatory structure. The debate over whether regulatory authority should be centralized or
divided among different agencies has been long and heated, but there has been little direct
empirical evidence brought to bear. By examining switches of primary federal regulators by
banks, we are able to test the importance of different theories of regulation. We test whether
there is beneficial specialization by agencies, whether the agencies race for the bottom or are risk
averse, and whether examiners want a quiet life. Our results strongly support a combination of
beneficial specialization, that is, Tiebout sorting, and the quiet life hypothesis against the other
two. Banks are more likely to switch regulators when they are changing risk and loan portfolios,
whether or not these changes increase risk. Moreover, these changes appear to improve
performance. When we look at individual bank regulators, there is support for Tiebout sorting
and the quiet life hypothesis at all three regulators – the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC.
Periodically, questions are raised about whether bank regulatory authority should be
consolidated into one agency. For example, the following is from an article in Business Week on
April 21, 1975:
Take a banking system governed by three federal and 50 state regulatory agencies that
compete more often than they cooperate. Mix in three massive bank failures in less than
18 months, and add a charged-up liberal Congress that includes militant, new chairmen
for both the House and Senate banking committees. The result is more turmoil in the
field of bank supervision than at any time since the 1930s, with the regulatory agencies
jockeying for top position and with Congress threatening to write new rules of its own.
This paper suggests two possible benefits of the regulatory structure we now have. Bank
regulators seem to specialize, allowing banks to pick the regulator that best matches their
strategy. This regulatory specialization allows banks to move to a better risk-return tradeoff by
switching regulators when they are switching business strategy. Another benefit is that if bank
examiners are making it difficult for banks to make value-adding changes, then banks can
improve performance by switching to a new examiner at a different agency. This last benefit is
above and beyond any from the competition among regulators discussed in the previous literature
in this area.

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 20
08/21/01

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Table 1: Predictions of the main hypotheses.

Prior to the switch

Concurrent with switch

As a result of the switch

Return

Risk

Loan portfolio
(controlling
for risk)

H0: Cost savings

NP

0

0

Increasing

NP

H1: Tiebout sorting

NP

NP

NP

Increasing

NP

H2: Race for the bottom

NP

Increasing

NP

Constant or
decreasing

Increasing

H3: Quiet life

NP

Not constant
(increasing or
decreasing)

Changing

Increasing

NP

H4: Risk aversion

NP

Increasing

NP

Increasing

Increasing

H5: Managerial risk-taking

NP

Increasing

NP

Decreasing

Increasing

Decreasing

Constant or
increasing

NP

Constant or
decreasing

NP

H6: Scapegoating

NP – No prediction.

Risk-return
tradeoff

Risk

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 23
08/21/01

Table 2: Summary statistics for banks that switch primary federal regulators, 1983-1999.

Panel A. Regulatory switches by year and size of bank.
Total assets less than $100
million

Total assets between
$100 million and $1 billion

Total assets between
$1 billion and $10 billion

Total assets over $10 billion

Year

Number of
banks that
change
regulators

Percentage of
banks that
change
regulators

Number of
banks that
change
regulators

Percentage of
banks that
change
regulators

Number of
banks that
change
regulators

Percentage of
banks that
change
regulators

Number of
banks that
change
regulators

Percentage of
banks that
change
regulators

Number of
banks that
change
regulators

Percentage of
banks that
change
regulators

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
total

63
70
78
78
78
78
64
64
72
105
124
101
154
83
111
119
80
1522

0.44
0.49
0.55
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.51
0.53
0.62
0.93
1.14
0.99
1.58
0.89
1.25
1.39
0.96
0.77

41
41
48
52
45
43
34
39
50
51
72
44
78
44
50
66
43
841

0.38
0.38
0.45
0.51
0.45
0.46
0.38
0.45
0.61
0.65
0.97
0.63
1.21
0.73
0.87
1.23
0.83
0.61

16
25
29
20
31
33
26
22
18
38
39
49
62
34
51
49
33
575

0.51
0.77
0.89
0.60
0.97
1.06
0.84
0.72
0.59
1.23
1.29
1.70
2.15
1.18
1.81
1.73
1.16
1.11

6
4
1
6
2
2
4
2
4
14
11
7
12
3
10
4
4
96

1.92
1.27
0.28
1.64
0.54
0.55
1.21
0.61
1.26
4.18
3.19
2.25
3.75
1.03
3.79
1.46
1.50
1.76

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
2
1
2
2
0
0
0
10

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.61
0.00
3.28
3.23
1.59
2.78
2.94
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.03

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 24
08/21/01

Panel B. By initial and final regulator.
Final regulator ->

OCC

Fed

FDIC

Initial regulator

Memo: percent
regulated by the
initial regulator

162
10.64%

OCC
Fed

78
5.12%

FDIC

391
25.69%

449
29.50%

336
22.08%

31.87%

106
6.96%

8.73%
59.40%

The first number in each cell is the number of banks and the second number is the fraction of all banks that switched regulators.

Table 3. Summary statistics for the sample.
Total sample includes all banks (excluding outliers and banks that switch regulators more than once), 19831999. Regulatory switchers is a subset of the total sample that includes year t-1 data for all banks that
switch regulators in year t.
Total sample

Regulatory switchers

Mean

25th percentile

Median

75th percentile

Mean

Median

Return on equity (ROE)

9.53

7.33

11.51

15.26

10.51

12.73

Equity-to-assets ratio

9.14

7.20

8.47

10.32

8.49

8.00

Loans-to-assets ratio

53.90

44.49

55.33

64.47

56.86

58.18

Nonperforming loans-to-loans
ratio

1.88

0.38

1.09

2.44

1.71

0.98

Change in ROE

-0.15

-3.49

-0.12

3.26

0.11

-0.03

Change in equity-to-assets ratio

-0.30

-0.70

0.10

0.80

-0.15

0.08

Change in loans-to-assets ratio

1.36

-3.67

1.12

5.98

0.95

1.23

Change in nonperforming loansto-loans ratio

-0.07

-0.85

-0.04

0.62

-0.09

-0.03

Real total assets ($ millions)

344.49

29.23

56.77

117.72

351.86

82.42

Merger dummy

10.10

0.00

21.30

0.00

Holding company member

70.30

100.00

83.90

100.00

Lead bank in a holding
company

48.00

0.00

34.70

0.00

Nonlead bank with the same
regulator as its lead bank

12.70

0.00

13.10

0.00

Nonlead bank with a different
regulator than its lead bank

36.10

0.00

Loan portfolio change
Real estate construction
loans / total loans
Commercial real estate
loans / total loans
Real estate home loans /
total loans
Other real estate loans /
total loans

26.35

9.60
14.41

21.66

0.00
32.89

27.74

22.94

3.29

0.00

1.23

4.04

4.28

2.19

12.20

4.25

9.79

17.46

15.28

13.42

25.09

12.95

23.04

34.80

27.33

26.19

5.97

0.93

3.34

8.62

4.89

2.62

Commercial loans / total loans

20.12

10.61

17.22

26.66

20.56

18.14

Consumer loans / total loans
Other loans / total loans

19.70
13.62

10.14
0.99

16.67
6.13

25.91
20.36

18.81
8.85

15.78
3.71

Table 4. Probability that a bank will switch regulator.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether a bank changes its primary federal regulator in year t. The dummy equals one if the bank changes
regulators and equals zero otherwise. The sample period is 1983-1999. Year dummies are not shown.
Parameter
Merger dummy
Lead bank in holding company
Nonlead bank with the same regulator
as its lead bank

Pr > ChiSq

0.005

Estimate
0.624
0.327

1.923

<.001

1.935

<.001

1.933

<.001

<.001

0.755

<.001

0.766

<.001

0.766

<.001

<.001

0.422
0.360
5.533
-0.314
-0.375
0.003
0.027
-0.001
0.010

<.001

0.437
0.376
5.849
-0.331
-0.035
0.003
0.019
-0.001

<.001

<.001

0.325

0.438
0.377
5.684
-0.322
-0.034
0.003
0.021
-0.001

0.332

-0.031
-0.464
1.846
-0.092
-0.062
0.014
-0.035
0.003

-0.341

<.001

-0.300

0.001

-0.283

0.046

0.265

<.001

0.239

0.001

0.410

0.002

Change in equity-to-assets ratio –
bottom quartile

0.135

0.072

0.130

0.083

0.150

0.273

Change in equity-to-assets ratio – top
quartile

0.197

0.007

0.197

0.008

0.127

0.337

Change in loan-to-asset ratio – bottom
quartile

0.193

0.014

0.193

0.014

0.306

0.038

Change in loan-to-asset ratio – top
quartile

0.139

0.050

0.135

0.057

0.504

<.001

Nonlead bank with a different
regulator than its lead bank
Federal Reserve dummy
FDIC dummy
Log(real total assets)
Log(real total assets) squared
Equity-to-assets ratio
Loans-to-assets ratio
Nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Return on equity
Loan portfolio change
Loan portfolio change – bottom
quartile

Estimate
0.670
0.339

Pr > ChiSq

Pr > ChiSq

0.001

Estimate
0.651
0.304

1.991

<.001

0.769
0.503
0.424
5.278
-0.295

<.001

<.001
<.001
<.001

<.001

<.001
<.001
<.001
0.005
0.138
0.018
0.100

Change in loan-to-asset ratio

0.012

0.000

0.003

<.001
<.001
<.001
0.009
0.137
0.130

Estimate Pr > ChiSq Estimate Pr > ChiSq
<.001
0.628
0.002
0.601
0.331
0.061

<.001
<.001
<.001
0.010
0.153
0.107

0.864
<.001
0.438
0.536
0.006
0.002
0.229
0.339

<.001

Loan portfolio change – top quartile
Change in equity-to-assets ratio

<.001

0.252

0.932

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 27
08/21/01

Change in nonperforming loans-toloans ratio

-0.005

0.671

Change in nonperforming loans-toloans ratio – bottom quartile

0.190

0.014

0.193

0.013

0.293

0.034

Change in nonperforming loans-toloans ratio – top quartile

0.172

0.032

0.174

0.031

0.012

0.937

Change in return on equity – bottom
quartile

-0.034

0.672

-0.035

0.667

-0.014

0.927

Change in return on equity – top
quartile

0.144

0.047

0.140

0.052

0.229

0.078

Change in real estate construction
loans – top quartile

0.092

0.159

Change in commercial real estate loans
– top quartile

0.076

0.273

Change in home mortgage loans – top
quartile

0.025

0.731

Change in other real estate loans – top
quartile

-0.069

0.337

Change in commercial loans – top
quartile

0.059

0.439

Change in consumer loans – top
quartile

0.082

0.251

Change in return on equity

Observations
Regulatory switches
Pseudo-R2

0.001

187485
1226
0.093

0.604

169281
1162
0.097

169281
1162
0.101

169281
1162
0.101

124407
352
0.053

Table 5. Change in performance surrounding a switch of regulators.
Pre- and post-switch performance for banks that switch primary federal regulators. The data
include the five years prior to a switch and the five years following a switch (but not the year of
the switch). The dummy for years t-5 to t-1 equals one if a bank switches regulators in the next
five years and zero otherwise. The other dummies are defined similarly. The trend variable for
prior to the switch equals τ in year t if the bank switches regulators in year t – τ where t - τ is
between one and five, and zero otherwise. The trend variable for after the switch is defined
similarly. The data is from 1983-1999, with year dummies not shown. Each regression has
177,445 observations. In the bottom panel, p values for the tests are reported.
Parameter
Dummy for years t-5 to t-1
Dummy for years t-2 to t-1
Trend prior to switch (t-5 to t-1)
Dummy for years t+1 to t+5
Dummy for years t+1 to t+2
Trend after switch (t+1 to t+5)
Merger dummy
Lead bank in a holding company
Nonlead bank with the same regulator
as its lead bank
Nonlead bank with a different
regulator than its lead bank
Federal Reserve dummy
FDIC dummy
Log(real total assets)
Log(real total assets) squared
Equity-to-assets ratio
Loans-to-assets ratio
Nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Return on equity
Loan portfolio change
Adjusted R2
Tests for differences in:
5-year change dummies
2-year change dummies
Trend variables

Estimate

ROE
Estimate

Pr > ChiSq

Pr > ChiSq

0.010
-0.163
0.031
-0.383

Equity-to-asset ratio
Estimate

Pr > ChiSq

0.927
0.467

0.022
0.255

Estimate

0.940
-0.834

<.001

Pr > ChiSq

0.076
-0.142

<.001

-0.090
0.036

0.022

<.001

-0.009
-0.033

<.001

0.452
<.001

-0.063
-0.032

<.001

<.001

0.560

0.008

0.490

0.341
0.080
-0.469

<.001

0.077
-0.471

<.001

-0.015
-0.064
-0.032

-0.343

<.001

-0.342

<.001

0.052

<.001

0.052

<.001

-0.583
0.217
-0.091
2.800
-0.157
-0.255
-0.033
-1.083

<.001

-0.584
0.214
-0.093
2.769
-0.155
-0.255
-0.033
-1.083

<.001

0.165
-0.074
0.041
-2.685
0.161

<.001

0.167
-0.073
0.042
-2.683
0.161

<.001

-0.039
0.006
-0.004

<.001

-0.039
0.006
-0.004

<.001

0.003
0.330

0.015
0.073
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

-0.004

0.001

0.114

0.352

0.017
0.068
<.001
<.001

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

<.001
<.001
<.001

-0.004

0.001

0.114

<.001
<.001

0.088

<.001
0.375
0.008

<.001

<.001
<.001

0.088
<.001
0.803

0.762

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 29
08/21/01

Table 5 continued.

Parameter

Loan-to-asset ratio
Estimate Pr > ChiSq

Dummy for years t-5 to t-1
Dummy for years t-2 to t-1
Trend prior to switch (t-5 to t-1)
Dummy for years t+1 to t+5
Dummy for years t+1 to t+2
Trend after switch (t+1 to t+5)
Federal Reserve dummy
Lead bank in a holding company

-0.086
-0.009
0.845

Nonlead bank with the same regulator
as its lead bank
Nonlead bank with a different
regulator than its lead bank
FDIC dummy
Merger dummy
Log(real total assets)
Log(real total assets) squared
Equity-to-assets ratio
Loans-to-assets ratio
Nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Return on equity
Loan portfolio change
Adjusted R2
Tests for differences in:
5-year change dummies
2-year change dummies
Trend variables

Loan-to-asset ratio
Estimate Pr > ChiSq
-0.282
0.300

0.065
0.661

0.002
0.107

<.001
0.018

Nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Estimate Pr > ChiSq Estimate Pr > ChiSq

0.358
0.167

0.066

-0.009
-0.083

<.001

0.496

0.523

<.001

-0.011
0.842

<.001

-0.016
-0.017
-0.058

2.001

<.001

2.002

<.001

2.222
0.005
-0.696
1.242
-0.041

<.001

2.218
0.002
-0.698
1.209
-0.039

<.001

0.371
0.899

0.911
<.001
0.021
0.210

-0.343
0.003
0.017

<.001
0.002
<.001

0.128

0.216

0.883

0.953
<.001
0.025
0.231

-0.343
0.003
0.017

0.163

-0.138
0.028

0.003

0.798

0.653

<.001

-0.017
-0.058

<.001

-0.246

<.001

-0.246

<.001

-0.219
-0.026
-0.014
-0.015
0.000
0.001
-0.015

<.001

-0.220
-0.026
-0.013
-0.011
-0.001
0.001
0.009

<.001

0.009
-0.004

<.001

-0.015
-0.004

<.001

0.335

0.010
0.401
0.907
0.967
0.611
<.001

0.344

0.011
0.417
0.934
0.940
0.607
<.001

<.001
0.002
<.001

0.128

<.001

0.105

0.037
0.003
0.119

0.031
0.011

<.001

0.105
<.001
0.009

0.778

Table 6. Probability that a bank switches to a particular regulatory agency.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether a bank changes its primary federal regulator in
year t. The dummy equals one if the bank changes regulators in year t and equals zero otherwise. For each
regression, the sample includes all banks regulated by the named agency at the end of year t. The sample
period is 1983-1999. Year dummies are not shown.

Parameter

To the OCC
Estimate Pr > ChiSq

To the Fed
To the FDIC
Estimate Pr > ChiSq Estimate Pr > ChiSq

Merger dummy
Lead bank in a holding company

0.804
-0.229

<.001
0.307

0.709
0.453

<.001
0.007

0.305
0.515

0.042
0.007

Nonlead bank with the same regulator as its
lead bank

2.736

<.001

1.567

<.001

1.459

<.001

Nonlead bank with a different regulator than
its lead bank
Log(real total assets)
Log(real total assets) squared
Equity-to-assets ratio
Loans-to-assets ratio
Nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Return on equity
Loan portfolio change – bottom quartile
Loan portfolio change – top quartile

-0.683
9.732
-0.523
-0.117
-0.003
-0.013
-0.002
-0.256
0.287

0.034
<.001
<.001
<.001
0.421
0.592
0.016
0.140
0.026

0.954
4.689
-0.259
-0.005
0.006
-0.053
0.000
-0.222
0.098

<.001
0.001
0.002
0.768
0.078
0.143
0.976
0.084
0.416

1.509
0.984
-0.089
-0.019
0.005
0.045
0.002
-0.549
0.325

<.001
0.616
0.454
0.389
0.267
0.001
0.154
0.005
0.015

Change in equity-to-assets ratio – bottom
quartile
Change in equity-to-assets ratio – top quartile

0.189
0.326

0.164
0.018

0.049
0.106

0.679
0.340

0.093
0.165

0.515
0.243

Change in loan-to-asset ratio – bottom quartile

0.404

0.003

-0.057

0.668

0.277

0.055

Change in loan-to-asset ratio – top quartile

0.116

0.390

0.092

0.375

0.223

0.107

Change in nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
– bottom quartile

0.396

0.007

0.217

0.072

0.104

0.462

Change in nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
– top quartile

0.560

<.001

-0.002

0.986

0.015

0.921

Change in return on equity – bottom quartile

0.302

0.031

-0.316

0.019

-0.054

0.733

Change in return on equity – top quartile

0.170

0.226

0.037

0.735

0.271

0.046

Change in real estate construction loans – top
quartile

-0.123

0.322

0.089

0.364

0.250

0.040

Change in commercial real estate loans – top
quartile
Change in home mortgage loans – top quartile
Change in other real estate loans – top quartile
Change in commercial loans – top quartile
Change in consumer loans – top quartile

-0.089
0.095
-0.165
-0.119
0.379

0.493
0.466
0.225
0.407
0.002

0.254
0.060
-0.017
0.273
-0.052

0.018
0.609
0.880
0.016
0.654

0.003
-0.082
-0.023
-0.037
0.001

0.982
0.538
0.862
0.803
0.992

Observations
Regulatory switches
Pseudo-R2

116224
350
0.240

154579
494
0.126

66597
318
0.063

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 31
08/21/01

Table 7. Change in performance surrounding a switch of regulators, by initial and final
regulator.
Pre- and post-switch performance for banks that switch primary federal regulators. The data
include the five years prior to a switch and the five years following a switch (but not the year of
the switch). Data for 1983-1999. The following independent variable are not shown: merger
dummy, lead bank dummy, nonlead bank dummies, log(real assets) terms, equity-to-assets ratio
(for return and nonperforming ratio only), loans-to-assets ratio (for return and nonperforming
ratio only), nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio (except when it is the dependent variable), return
on equity (for risk variables), loan portfolio change, and year dummies. All the regressions have
177,445 observations.

Parameter
Dependent variable: return on equity (ROE)
Trend prior to switch (t-5 to t-1)
Trend after switch (t+1 to t+5)

From OCC
Estimate
Pr > ChiSq

0.075
0.413

Test trend prior to switch = trend after switch
(p value)
Adjusted R2
Dependent variable: equity-to-assets ratio
Trend prior to switch (t-5 to t-1)
Trend after switch (t+1 to t+5)

-0.002
-0.019

0.004
-0.046

0.003

0.653
0.213

-0.014
-0.073

0.286

0.812
0.573
0.548

0.100
0.004

-0.010
-0.008

0.029

<.001
0.551
0.899

0.088
0.010
0.021

0.644
0.783

0.018
-0.011

0.895

Adjusted R2
Dependent variable: nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Trend prior to switch (t-5 to t-1)
0.001
Trend after switch (t+1 to t+5)
-0.022

Adjusted R2

0.426
<.001

From FDIC
Estimate
Pr > ChiSq

0.114

Test of trend prior to switch = trend after switch
(p value)

Test of trend prior to switch = trend after switch
(p value)

0.041
0.519

<.001

Test of trend prior to switch = trend after switch
(p value)
Adjusted R2
Dependent variable: loans-to-assets ratio
Trend prior to switch (t-5 to t-1)
Trend after switch (t+1 to t+5)

0.005
0.005

From Fed
Estimate
Pr > ChiSq

0.671
0.932

0.106
0.263

0.956

<.001
<.001
0.023

0.128
0.807
0.219
0.212

0.003
-0.088

0.758
0.004
0.005

0.105

-0.014
-0.043

<.001
0.008
0.075

Do Regulators Search for the Quiet Life? -- 32
08/21/01

Table 8. Probability that a bank switches from a particular regulatory agency.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether a bank changes its primary federal regulator in
year t. The dummy equals one if the bank changes regulators in year t and equals zero otherwise. For each
regression, the sample includes all banks regulated by the named agency at the end of year t – 1. The
sample period is 1983-1999. Year dummies are not shown.
Parameter

From the OCC
Estimate Pr > ChiSq

From the Fed
From the FDIC
Estimate Estimate Pr > ChiSq Estimate

Merger dummy
Lead bank in a holding company

0.543
0.486

<.001
0.006

0.623
-0.317

0.543
0.486

<.001
0.006

0.623
-0.317

Nonlead bank with the same regulator as its
lead bank

1.166

<.001

1.901

1.166

<.001

1.901

Nonlead bank with a different regulator than
its lead bank
Log(real total assets)
Log(real total assets) squared
Equity-to-assets ratio
Loans-to-assets ratio
Nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
Return on equity
Loan portfolio change – bottom quartile
Loan portfolio change – top quartile

1.309
0.266
-0.036
-0.013
0.004
0.009
0.001
-0.260
0.363

<.001
0.866
0.705
0.541
0.321
0.692
0.386
0.103
0.004

0.239
1.518
-0.080
-0.048
-0.008
0.050
0.001
-1.028
-0.035

1.309
0.266
-0.036
-0.013
0.004
0.009
0.001
-0.260
0.363

<.001
0.866
0.705
0.541
0.321
0.692
0.386
0.103
0.004

0.239
1.518
-0.080
-0.048
-0.008
0.050
0.001
-1.028
-0.035

Change in equity-to-assets ratio – bottom
quartile
Change in equity-to-assets ratio – top quartile

-0.161
0.105

0.247
0.402

0.548
0.006

-0.161
0.105

0.247
0.402

0.548
0.006

Change in loan-to-asset ratio – bottom quartile

0.311

0.021

0.148

0.311

0.021

0.148

Change in loan-to-asset ratio – top quartile

0.105

0.411

0.147

0.105

0.411

0.147

Change in nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
– bottom quartile

0.275

0.031

-0.071

0.275

0.031

-0.071

Change in nonperforming loans-to-loans ratio
– top quartile

-0.004

0.976

0.319

-0.004

0.976

0.319

Change in return on equity – bottom quartile

0.005

0.974

0.195

0.005

0.974

0.195

Change in return on equity – top quartile

0.310

0.014

0.365

0.310

0.014

0.365

Change in real estate construction loans – top
quartile

0.270

0.016

0.210

0.270

0.016

0.210

Change in commercial real estate loans – top
quartile
Change in home mortgage loans – top quartile
Change in other real estate loans – top quartile
Change in commercial loans – top quartile
Change in consumer loans – top quartile

-0.049
-0.106
0.060
-0.005
-0.126

0.689
0.408
0.618
0.971
0.320

0.168
-0.111
-0.471
-0.245
0.129

-0.049
-0.106
0.060
-0.005
-0.126

0.689
0.408
0.618
0.971
0.320

0.168
-0.111
-0.471
-0.245
0.129

Observations
Regulatory switches
Pseudo-R2

52621
376
0.072

14163
129
0.152

102497
657
0.180