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Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Liquidity Traps and Monetary Policy:
Managing a Credit Crunch
Francisco Buera and Juan Pablo Nicolini
May 2014
WP 2014-14
Liquidity Traps and Monetary Policy: Managing a
Credit Crunch
Francisco Buera
∗
Juan Pablo Nicolini
†‡
May 14, 2014
Abstract
We study a model with heterogeneous producers that face collateral and cash
in advance constraints. These two frictions give rise to a non-trivial financial
market in a monetary economy. A tightening of the collateral constraint results
in a credit-crunch generated recession. The model can suitable be used to study
the effects on the main macroeconomic variables - and on welfare of each individual - of alternative monetary - and fiscal - policies following the credit crunch.
The model reproduces several features of the recent financial crisis, like the persistent negative real interest rates, the prolonged period at the zero bound for
the nominal interest rate, the collapse in investment and low inflation, in spite
of the very large increases of liquidity adopted by the government. The policy
implications are in sharp contrast with the prevalent view in most Central Banks,
based on the New Keynesian explanation of the liquidity trap.
∗
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and NBER; fjbuera@econ.ucla.edu.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Universidad Di Tella; juanpa@minneapolisfed.org.
‡
We want to thank Marco Basetto, Gauti Eggertsson, Jordi Gali, Simon Gilchrist, Hugo Hopenhayn, Oleg Itskhoki, Keichiro Kobayashi, Pedro Teles. The views expressed in this paper do not
represent the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Minneapolis, or the Federal Reserve System.
†
1
1
Introduction
The year 2008 will be remembered in the macroeconomics literature for long. This is
so, not only because of the massive shock that hit global financial markets, particularly since the bankruptcy of Lehman and the collapse of the interbank market that
immediately followed, but also because of the unusual and extraordinary response to
it, emanated from all major Central Banks. The reaction of the Fed is a clear example:
it doubled its balance sheet in just three months - from 800 billion on September 1st,
to 1,6 trillion by December 1st. Then, it kept on increasing it to reach around 3 trillion by the end of 2012. Very similar measures where taken by the European Central
Bank and other Central Banks of developed economies. Most macroeconomists would
probably agree with the notion that the 2008-2013 period is, from the point of view
of US macroeconomic theory and policy, among the most dramatic ones in the past
hundred year’s history, perhaps second only to the Great Depression period.
Paradoxically, however, none of the models used by Central Banks at the time
in developed economies was of any use to study neither the financial shock, nor the
reaction of monetary policy. Those models ignore financial markets on one hand,
and monetary aggregates on the other. There were good reasons for this: by and
large, big financial shocks seemed to belong exclusively to emerging economies since
the turbulent 1930’s. We are not sure how to define emerging economies, but always
suspected that it meant highly volatile financial markets. According to this narrow
definition, it seems that 2008 taught us, among other things, that we live in an emerging
world.1 In addition, monetary economics developed, in the last two decades, around the
Central Bank rhetoric of emphasizing exclusively the short term nominal interest rate.
Measures of liquidity or money, were completely ignored as a stance of monetary policy;
one of the reasons being that empirical relationships between monetary aggregates,
interest rates and prices, that stood well for most of the twentieth century, broke down
in the midst of the banking deregulation that started in the 1980’s.2 Consequently,
there is a need of general equilibrium models that can be used to study the effects of
policies like those adopted in the U.S. since 2008, during times of financial distress.
The purpose of this paper is to provide one such model and analyze the macroeconomic effects of alternative policies. We study a model with heterogenous entrepreneurs
1
See Diaz-Alejandro (1985) for a very interesting view on the subject.
For a detailed discussion of this, and a reinterpretation of the evidence that strongly favors the
view of a stable ”money demand” relationship, see Lucas and Nicolini (2013).
2
2
that face cash-in-advance constraints on purchases and collateral constraints on borrowing. The collateral constraints give rise to a non-trivial financial market. The
cash-in-advance constraints give raise to a money market. We use this model to evaluate the effect of monetary and fiscal policies in the equilibrium allocation following
a shock to financial intermediation. As we will show below, the collateral constraints
imply that Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Thus, taxes and transfers will have
allocative effects even if they are lump sum, so monetary policy cannot be studied in
isolation as in representative agent models.
An essential role of financial markets is to reallocate capital from wealthy individuals
with no profitable investment project - savers - to individuals with profitable projects
and no wealth - investors. The efficiency of these markets determines the equilibrium
allocation of physical capital across projects and therefore equilibrium intermediation
and total output. A recent macroeconomic literature has study models of the financial
sector with these properties, the key friction being an exogenous collateral constraint
on investors. We borrow the model of financial markets from that literature.3 The
equilibrium allocation critically depends on the nature of the collateral constraints;
the tighter the constraints, the less efficient the allocation of capital and the lower are
total factor productivity and output. A tightening of the collateral constraint creates
disintermediation and a recession. This reduction in the ability of financial markets to
properly perform the allocation of capital across projects, we interpret as a negative
financial shock.
The single modification we introduce to this basic model is a cash-in-advance constraint on households. While we consider as an extension the case with nominal wage
rigidity, in the benchmark model we assume prices and wages to be fully flexible, mostly
to highlight the effects that are novel in the model. Monetary policy determines equilibrium inflation and nominal interest rates and it has real effects. This is not only
because of the usual well understood distortionary effects of inflation in a cash-credit
world, but, more importantly, because of the zero bound on nominal interest rates
restriction that arises from optimizing behavior of individuals in the model, and the
non-Ricardian nature of our model with financial frictions. The analysis of the effect
of monetary policy at the zero bound is the contribution of this paper.
One attractive feature of the financial sector model we use is that, if the shock to
3
We follow closely the work by Buera and Moll (2012), who apply to the study of business cycles
the model originally developed by Moll (forthcoming) to analyze the role of credit markets in economic
development. See Kiyotaki (1998) for an earlier version of a related framework.
3
the collateral constraint that causes the recession is sufficiently large, the equilibrium
real interest rate becomes negative for several periods.4 The reason is that savings
must be reallocated to lower productivity entrepreneurs, but they will only be willing
to do it for a lower interest rate. To put it differently, the ”demand” for loans falls,
and this pushes down the real interest rate in this non-Ricardian economy. Depending
on what monetary and fiscal policy do, the bound on the nominal interest rate may
become a bound on the real interest rate. As an example, imagine a policy that targets,
successfully, a constant price level: If inflation is zero, the Fisher equation, which is
an equilibrium condition of the model, implies a zero lower bound on the real interest
rate. The way the negative real interest rate interacts with the zero bound on nominal
interest rates that arises in a monetary economy, under alternative policies, is at the
hearth of the mechanism discussed in the paper.
The qualitative properties of the recession generated by a tightening of the collateral
constraint in the model are in line with some of the events that unfolded since 2008, like
the persistent negative real interest rate, the sustained periods with the effective zero
bound on nominal interest rates and the substantial drop in investment. In addition,
the model is consistent with the very large increases in liquidity while the zero bound
binds. Thus, we argue, the model in the paper is a good candidate to interpret the way
monetary policy is affecting the economy nowadays. In addition, some - but not all! features of this great contraction make it a - distant - cousin of the great depression
of the 30’s. The great depression evolved in parallel to a major banking crisis and the
severity of the depression was unique in US history. The role of monetary policy has
also been at the center of the debate: For many, the unresponsive Fed played a key role
in the unfolding of events during the great depression.5 A strongly held view attributes
the reaction of the Fed in September 2008 to the lessons that Friedman and Schwartz
draw from the great depression and attributes to the policy reaction the avoidance of
an even major recession, an interpretation that is consistent with results in our paper.6
We first study the case in which the monetary authority is unresponsive to the
credit crunch. The model implies that the nominal interest rate will be at its zero
lower bound for a finite number of periods and there will be a deflation on impact, and
higher inflation thereafter so that there is no arbitrage between money and bonds. If
4
This feature is special of the credit crunch. If the recession is driven by an equivalent, but
exogenous, negative productivity shock, the real interest rate remains positive, as we will show.
5
See Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
6
Chairman Bernanke was named Time’s magazine “Person of the Year” on December 2009, arguing
he “prevented an economic catastrophe”.
4
private bonds are indexed to the price level, the real effects are minor. On the contrary,
if debt obligations are in nominal terms, the deflation strongly accentuates the recession
well beyond the one generated by the credit crunch, due to a debt deflation problem.
We then study active inflation targeting policies, for low values of the inflation target.
In these cases, the deflation and the associated debt deflation problem are avoided by a
very large increase in the supply of government liabilities that must accommodate the
credit crunch. Was the different monetary policy recently adopted, the reason why the
great contraction was much less severe than the great depression? Our model suggests
this may well be the case.7
The number of periods that the economy will be a the zero bound and the amount
of liquidity that must be injected depends on the target for the rate of inflation. The
evolution of output critically depends on this too. As we mentioned above, the interaction between the inflation target and the zero bound on nominal interest rates is the
key to understand the mechanism. Imagine, as before, that the target for inflation is
zero. Thus, the Fisher equation plus the zero bound constraint imply that the real
interest rate cannot be negative. This imposes a floor on how low can the real interest
rate be. But for this to be an equilibrium, private savings must end up somewhere else:
This is the role of government liabilities. In this heterogeneous credit-constraint agents
model, debt policy does have effects on equilibrium interest rates, even if taxes are
lump-sum. Thus, the issuance of government liabilities crowds out private investment.
The reason why policy can affect the real interest rate is that Ricardian equivalence
does not hold in models in which agents discount future flows with different rates, like
the one we explore. Thus, total government liabilities matter. At the zero bound,
money and bonds are perfect substitutes, so monetary policy (increases in the total
quantity of money) acts as debt policy.
But there is an additional effect of policy. In the model, a credit crunch generates
a recession because total factor productivity falls. The reason, as we mentioned above,
is that capital needs to be reallocated from high productivity entrepreneurs for which
the collateral constraint binds, and therefore must de-leverage, to low productivity entrepreneurs for which the collateral constraint does not bind. As a result of the drop in
7
Friedman and Schwartz argued that the Fed should have increased substantially its balance sheet
in order to avoid the deflation during the great depression. In 2002, Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve
Board governor, said in a speech in a conference to celebrate Friedman’s 90th birthday, “I would like
to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You’re right, we did it. We’re very
sorry. But thanks to you, we won’t do it again.” Bernanke’s speech has been published in The Great
Contraction, 1929-1933: (New Edition) (Princeton Classic Editions), 2008.
5
productivity, output and investment fall, at the same time that financial intermediation shrinks. Therefore, by keeping real interest rates high, an inflation targeting policy
leaves the most unproductive entrepreneurs out of production, increasing average productivity. Thus, a target for inflation, if low, implies that the drop in productivity
will be lower than in the real economy benchmark - there will be less reallocation of
capital to low productivity workers - but the recession will be more prolonged - capital accumulation falls because of the crowding out effect. If the target for inflation is
higher, say 1%, then the effective lower bound on the real interest rate is -1%, lower
than before. Thus, the amount of government liabilities that must be issued will be
smaller, the crowding out will be smaller, but the drop in average productivity will be
higher.
The model provides an interpretation of the after 2009 events that is different from
the one provided by a branch of the literature that, using New Keynesian models,
places a strong emphasis on the interaction between the zero bound constraint on
nominal interest rates and price rigidities.8 This is also the dominant view of monetary
policy at major central banks, including the Fed. According to this view, a shock often associated to a shock in the efficiency of intermediation 9 - drove the natural real
interest rate to negative values. The optimal monetary policy in those models is to
set the nominal interest rate equal to the natural real interest rate. However, due to
the zero bound, that is not possible. But it is optimal, unambiguously, to keep the
nominal interest rate at the zero bound, as the Fed has been doing for over 4 years
now. Furthermore, these models imply that it is unambiguously optimal to maintain
the nominal interest rates at zero even after the negative shock reverts. This policy
implication, called “forward guidance” has dominated the policy decisions in the US
since 2008, and still is the conceptual framework that justifies the “exit strategy”.
On the contrary, the model we study stresses a different and novel trade-off between
ameliorating the initial recession and delaying the recovery. When the central bank
chooses a lower inflation target, the liquidity trap last longer, the real interest rate is
constrained to be higher, and therefore, there is less reallocation of capital toward less
productive, and previously inactive, entrepreneurs. The counterpart of the milder drop
in TFP is a drop in investment due to the crowding out, leading to a substantial and
8
See Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Christiano et al. (2011), Correia et al.
(2013) and Werning (2011).
9
See for example Curdia and Eggertsson (2009), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), and Galı́ et al.
(2011).
6
persistence decline in the stock of capital and a slower recovery.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and characterize
the individual’s problems. In Section 3, define an equilibrium and characterize the
equilibrium dynamics for simple examples. In Section 4, we solve numerically the
model under alternative monetary policies and discuss the results. We discuss the
distribution of welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies in Section 5
Related Literature We consider a monetary version of the model in Buera and Moll
(2012), who apply to the study of business cycles the framework originally developed
by Moll (forthcoming) to analyze the role of credit markets in economic development.
Kiyotaki (1998) is an earlier example focusing on a two point distribution of shocks
to the entrepreneurial productivity. This frameworks is related to a long tradition
studying the role of firms’ balance sheet in business cycles and financial crisis, including
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999),
Cooley et al. (2004), Jermann and Quadrini (2012). 10
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) study a monetary economy where entrepreneurs face
stochastic investment opportunities and friction to issue and resale equity on real assets,
and consider the aggregate effects of a shock to the ability to resale equity. In their
environment, money is valuable provided frictions to issue and resale equity are tight
enough. They use their model to study the effect of open market operations consisting
on the exchange of money for equity. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) also study a
monetary economy with financial frictions, emphasizing the endogenous determination
of aggregate risk and the role of macro-prudential policy. Like in our model, a negative
aggregate financial shock results on a deflation, although both of these papers consider
environments where, for the relevant cases, the zero lower on nominal interest rate is
binding in every period.
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) also study a model where workers face idiosyncratic
labor shocks. In their model a credit crunch leads to an increase in the demand of
bonds, and therefore, results in negative real rates. While our model also generates
a large drop in the real interest rate, the forces underlying this result are different.
In our framework the drop in the real interest rate is the consequence of a collapse
in the ability of productive entrepreneurs to supply bonds, i.e., to borrow from the
unproductive entrepreneurs and workers, as oppose to an increase in the demand for
10
See Buera and Moll (2012) for a detailed discussion of the connection of the real version of our
framework with related approaches in the literature.
7
bonds by these agents. In our model a credit crunch has an opposite, negative effect
on investment.
2
The Model
In this section we describe the model, that follows closely the framework in Moll (forthcoming). The model’s attractive feature for our purposes is that it explicitly deals with
heterogeneous agents that are subject to exogenous collateral constraints in a relatively
tractable fashion. Tractability is obtained by restricting the analysis to specific function forms - log utility and Cobb-Douglas technologies - so the solution to the optimal
problem of the consumers can be obtained in closed form and aggregates behave similar
to Solow’s growth model. This allows us to better understand the economics behind
the simulations that we present.
We modify the original model by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint on consumer’s decision problem, so we can determine the aggregate price level and the nominal interest rate. The analysis will be restricted to a perfect foresight economy that
starting at the steady state, all agents learn at time zero that, starting next period,
the collateral constraint will be tightened for a finite number of periods.
2.1
Households
All agents have identical preferences, given by
∞
X
β t ν log cj1t + (1 − ν) log cj2t
(1)
t=0
where cj1t and cj2t are consumption of the cash good and of the credit good, for agent j
at time t, and β < 1. Each agent also faces a cash-in-advance constraint
cj1t
mjt
.
≤
pt
(2)
where mjt is the beginning of period money holdings and pt is the money price of
consumption at time t.
The economy is inhabited by two classes of agents, a mass L of workers and a mass
1 of entrepreneurs, which are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity z ∈ Z.
8
We assume that the productivity is constant through their lifetime. We let Ψ(z) be
the measure of entrepreneurs of type z. Every period, each entrepreneur must choose
whether to be an active entrepreneur in the following period (to operate a firm as a
manager) or to be a passive one (and offer his wealth in the credit market). We proceed
now to study the optimal decision problems of agents.
Entrepreneurs There are four state variables for each entrepreneur: her financial
wealth - capital plus bonds -, money holdings, the occupational choice (active or passive) made last period and her productivity. She must decide the labor demand if active,
how much to consume of each good, whether to be active in the following period, and
if so, how much capital to invest in her own firm. An entrepreneur’s investment is
constraint by her financial wealth at the end of the period a and the amount of bonds
she can sell −b, k ≤ −b + a, where we assume that the amount of bonds that can be
sold are limited by a simple collateral constraint of the form
−bj ≤ θk j ,
(3)
for some exogenously given θ ∈ [0, 1].
If the entrepreneur decides not to be active (to allocate zero capital to her own
firm), then she invest all her non-monetary wealth to purchase bonds.
We assume that the technology available to entrepreneurs of type z is a function of
capital and labor
y = (zk)1−α lα .
This technology implies that revenues of an entrepreneur net of labor payments is a
linear function of the capital stock, %zk, where % = α ((1 − α)/w)(1−α)/α is the return to
the effective units of capital zk, and w denotes the real wage. Thus, the end of period
investment and leverage choice of entrepreneurs with ability z solves the following linear
program
9
%zk + (1 − δ)k + (1 + r)b
max
k,d
k ≤ a − b,
−b ≤ θk,
where r is the real interest rate. Denoting the maximum leverage by λ = 1/(1 − θ),
it is straightforward to show that the optimal capital and leverage choice are given by
the following policy rules, with a simple threshold property11
k(z, a) =
λa,
z ≥ ẑ
0,
z < ẑ
, b(z, a) =
−(λ − 1)a,
z ≥ ẑ
a,
z < ẑ
where ẑ solves
%ẑ = r + δ.
(4)
Given entrepreneurs’ optimal investment and leverage decisions, they would face a linear return to their non-monetary wealth that is a simple function of their productivity
R(z) =
1 + r,
z < ẑ
λ (%z − r − δ) + 1 + r,
z ≥ ẑ
(5)
Given these definitions, the budget constraint of entrepreneur j, with net-worth ajt and
productivity z j , will be given by
cj1t
+
cj2t
+
ait+1
mjt+1
mj
+
= Rt (z j )ajt + t − Tt (z j ),
pt
pt
(6)
where we allow lump-sum taxes (transfers if negative) to be a function of the – exogenous – productivity of entrepreneurs.
Note that these budget constraints imply that agents choose, at t, money balances
i
mt+1 for next period, as the cash-in-advance constraints (2) make clear. Thus, we are
adopting the timing convention of Svensson (1985), in which goods markets open in
the morning and asset markets open in the afternoon. Thus, agents buy cash goods
11
See Buera and Moll (2012) for the details of these derivations.
10
at time t with the money holdings they acquired at the end of period t − 1. Similarly,
production by entrepreneurs at time t is done with capital goods accumulated at the
end of period t − 1. An advantage of this timing for our purposes is that it treats
all asset accumulation decisions symmetrically, using the standard timing from capital
theory.12
Workers Workers are all identical and are endowed with a unit of time that they
inelastically supply to the labor market. Thus their budget constraints are given by
W
W
cW
1t + c2t + at+1 +
mW
mW
t+1
t
= (1 + rt )aW
+
w
+
− TtW
t
t
pt
pt
(7)
W
where aW
t+1 and mt+1 are real financial assets and nominal money holdings chosen at
time t, and TtW are lump-sum taxes paid to the government. If TtW < 0, these represent
transfers from the government to workers. We impose on workers a non-borrowing
13
constraint, so aW
t ≥ 0 for all t.
2.2
Demographics
The decision rules of entrepreneurs imply that the wealth of active entrepreneurs increases over time, while that of inactive entrepreneurs converges to zero. Thus, each
active entrepreneur saves away from the collateral constraint asymptotically. In order
for the model to have a non-degenerate asymptotic distribution of wealth across productivity types, we assume that a fraction 1 − γ of entrepreneurs depart for Nirvana
and are replaced by equal number of new entrepreneurs. The productivity z of the
new entrepreneurs is drawn from the same distribution Ψ(z), i.i.d across entrepreneurs
and over time. We assume that there are no annuity markets and that each new entrepreneur inherits the assets of a randomly drawn departed entrepreneur. Agents do
not care about future generations, so if we let β̂ be the pure discounting factor, they
discount the future with the compound factor β = β̂γ, which is the one we used above.
12
This assumption implies that unexpected changes in the price level have welfare effects, since
agents cannot replenish cash balances until the end of the period.
13
This is a natural constraint to impose. It is equivalent to impose on workers the same collateral
constraints entrepreneurs face; since workers will never decide to hold capital in equilibrium.
11
2.3
The Government
In every period the government chooses the money supply Mt+1 , issues one-period
bonds Bt+1 , and uses type specific lump-sum taxes (subsidies) Tt (z) and TtW . Government policies are constrained by a sequence of period by period budget constraints
Mt+1 Mt
Bt+1 − (1 + rt )Bt +
−
+
pt
pt
Z
Tt (z)Ψ(dz) + TtW = 0,
t ≥ 0.
(8)
We denote by Tt the total taxes receipts of the government,
Z
Tt =
Tt (z)Ψ(dz) + TtW .
In representative agent models, monetary policy can be executed via lump-sum
taxes and transfers that, because those models satisfy Ricardian equivalence, are neutral. However, in this model, Ricardian equivalence will not hold for two related reasons. First, agents face different rates of return to their wealth. Thus, the present
value of a given sequence of taxes and transfers differs across agents. Second, lumpsum taxes and transfers will redistribute wealth in general, and these redistributions
do affect aggregate allocations, due to the presence of the collateral constraints. In the
numerical sections, we will be explicit regarding the type of transfers we consider and
the effect they have on the equilibrium allocation.
2.4
Optimality conditions
The optimal problem of agents is to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (6) for entrepreneurs or (7) for workers. Note that the only difference between the two budget
constraints is that entrepreneurs have no labor income. For workers, as for inactive
entrepreneurs, the real return to their non-monetary wealth equals 1 + rt . In what
follows, to save on notation, we drop the index for individual entrepreneurs j unless
strictly necessary. Since this is a key aspect of the model, we first briefly explain the
zero bound equilibrium restriction on the nominal interest rate that arises from the
agent’s optimization problem.14 Then, we discuss the other first order conditions.
In this economy, gross savings (demand for bonds) come from inactive entrepreneurs
and, potentially, from workers. Note that the return of holding financial assets for these
agents is Rt (z) = (1 + rt ) , while the return of holding money - ignoring the liquidity
14
Formal details are available from the authors upon request.
12
services - is given by pt /pt+1 . Thus, if there is intermediation in equilibrium, the return
of holding money cannot be higher than the return of holding financial assets. If we
pt
, then for intermediation to be non-zero in
define the nominal return as (1 + rt ) pt−1
equilibrium, the zero bound constraint
(1 + rt )
pt
−1≥0
pt−1
(9)
must hold for all t.
The first order conditions of household’s problem imply the standard Euler equation
and intra-temporal optimality condition between cash and credit goods
1 c2t+1
= Rt+1 (z), t ≥ 0,
β c2t
pt+1
ν c2t+1
= Rt+1 (z)
, t ≥ 1.
1 − ν c1t+1
pt
(10)
(11)
Solving forward the period budget constraint (6), using the optimal conditions
(10) and (11) for all periods, and assuming that the cash-in-advance is binding at the
beginning of period t = 0, we obtain the solutions for consumption of the credit good
and financial assets for agents that face a strictly positive opportunity cost of money
in period t + 1,15
#
"
∞
X
(1 − ν) (1 − β)
Tt+j (z)
c2t =
Rt (z)at −
Qj
1 − ν (1 − β)
s=1 Rt+s (z)
j=0
"
#
∞
∞
X
X
Tt+j (z)
Tt+j (z)
at+1 = β Rt (z)at −
+
.
Qj
Qj
s=1 Rt+s (z)
s=1 Rt+s (z)
j=0
j=1
These equations always characterize the solution for active entrepreneurs even when
15
Note that it could be possible that initial money holdings are so large for an active entrepreneur,
that the cash-in-advance constraint will not be binding in the first period. This case will not be
relevant provided initial real cash balances are small enough, i.e.,
∞
X
m0
ν (1 − β)
Tj (z)
≤
R0 (z)a0 −
.
Qj
p0
1 − ν (1 − β)
s=1 Rs (z)
j=0
If this condition is not satisfied, then the optimal policy for period t = 0 is to consume a fraction
ν(1 − β) and (1 − ν)(1 − β) of the present value of the wealth, inclusive of the initial real money
balances, in cash and credit goods. Similarly, the non-monetary wealth and real money holding at
the end of the first period are functions of the present value of the wealth, inclusive of the initial real
money balances.
13
nominal interest rates are zero. The reason is that for them, the opportunity cost of
holding money is given by Rt (z)pt+1 /pt > (1 + rt ) pt+1 /pt ≥ 1, where the last inequality follows form (9) . The solution also characterizes the optimal behavior of inactive
entrepreneurs, as long as (1 + rt ) pt+1 /pt − 1 > 0.
The solution for inactive entrepreneurs in periods in which the nominal interest
rate is zero, (1 + rt ) pt+1 /pt − 1 = 0, is
"
#
∞
∞
X
X
Tt+j (z)
mt+1 mTt+1
Tt+j (z)
−
= β Rt (z)at −
at+1 +
+
.
Qj
Qj
pt
pt
R
(z)
R
(z)
t+s
t+s
s=1
s=1
j=0
j=1
where
"
#
∞
X
mTt+1
Tt+j (z)
ν(1 − β)β
Rt (z)at −
=
Qj
pt
1 − ν(1 − β)
s=1 Rt+s (z)
j=0
(12)
are the real money balances that will be used for transaction purposes in period t +
1.Thus, mt+1 /pt −mTt+1 /pt ≥ 0 are the excess real money balances, hoarded from period
t to t + 1.
The optimal plan for workers is slightly more involved, as their income is nonhomogeneous in their net-worth and they will tend to face binding borrowing constraints in finite time. In particular, as long as the (1 + r∞ )β < 1, as it will be the case
in the equilibria we will discuss, where r∞ is the real interest rate in the steady state,
workers drive their wealth to zero in finite time, and are effectively hand-to-mouth
consumers in the long run. That is, for sufficiently large t,
cW
2,t =
mW
(1 − ν) (wt − TtW )
ν(wt − TtW ) βpt
t+1
and cW
=
=
.
1,t+1
1 − ν(1 − β)
pt+1
1 − ν(1 − β) pt+1
Along a transition, workers may accumulate assets for a finite number of periods. This
would typically be the case if they expect a future drop in their wages - as in the credit
crunch we consider - or they receive a temporarily large transfer, TtW < 0.
3
Equilibrium
Given sequences of government policies {Mt , Bt , Tt (z), TtW }∞
t=0 and collateral constraints
∞
{θt }∞
t=0 , an equilibrium is given by sequences of prices {rt , wt , pt }t=0 , and corresponding
14
quantities such that:
• Entrepreneurs and workers maximize taking as given prices and policies,
• The government budget constraint is satisfied, and
• Bond, labor, and money markets clear
Z
bjt+1 dj
+ bW
t
Z
+ Bt+1 = 0,
ltj dj
Z
= 1,
mjt dj + mW
t = Mt ,
for all t.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we first provide a partial characterization
of the equilibrium dynamics of the economy for the case in which the zero lower bound
is never binding, 1 + rt+1 > pt /pt+1 for all t, workers are hand-to-mouth, aW
t = 0 for
all t, and the share of cash goods is arbitrarily small, ν ≈ 0. Second, we discuss some
properties of the model when the zero bound constraint binds. Finally, we study a very - special case for which we can obtain closed form solutions.
3.1
Equilibrium away from the zero bound.
Let Φt (z) be the measure of wealth held by entrepreneurs of productivity z at time
t. Integrating the production function of all active entrepreneurs, equilibrium output
is given by a Cobb-Douglas function of aggregate capital Kt , aggregate labor L, and
aggregate productivity Zt ,
Yt = Zt Ktα L1−α
(13)
where aggregate productivity is given by the wealth weighted average of the productivity of active entrepreneurs, z ≥ ẑt ,
R∞
Zt =
zΦt (dz)
Rẑt∞
ẑt
Φt (dz)
!α
.
(14)
Note that Zt is an increasing function the cutoff ẑt and a function of the wealth measure
Φt (z). In turn, given the capital stock at t + 1, that we discuss below, the evolution of
15
the wealth measure is given by
" "
#
#
∞
∞
X
X
Tt+j (z) Ψ (z)
Tt+j (z) Ψ (z)
Φt+1 (z) = γ β Rt (z) Φt (z) −
+
Qj
Qj
R
(z)
t+s
s=1
s=1 Rt+s (z)
j=0
j=1
+ (1 − γ) Ψ (z) (Kt+1 + Bt+1 )
(15)
where the first term on the right hand side reflects the decision rules of the γ fraction
of entrepreneurs that remain alive, and the second reflects the exogenous allocation of
assets of departed entrepreneurs among the new generation.
Then, given the - exogenous - value for λt+1 and the wealth measure Φt+1 (z) the
cutoff for next period is determined by the bond market clearing condition
Z
ẑt+1
Z
∞
Φt+1 (dz) = (λt+1 − 1)
0
Φt+1 (dz) + Bt+1 .
(16)
ẑt+1
To obtain the evolution of aggregate capital, we integrate over the individual decisions
and use the market clearing conditions. It results in a linear function of aggregate
output, the initial capital stock, and the aggregate of the (individual specific) present
value of taxes,
Z
Kt+1 + Bt+1 = β [αYt + (1 − δ)Kt + (1 + rt )Bt ] − β
0
∞
∞X
Z
+
0
j=1
∞
∞X
Tt+j (z)
Ψ (dz)
s=1 Rt+s (z)
Qj
j=0
Tt+j (dz)
.
Qj
s=1 Rt+s (z)
(17)
Solving forward the government budget constraint (8), using that ν ≈ 0, and substituting into (17)
Z
Kt+1 = β [αYt + (1 − δ)Kt ] + (1 − β)
∞
∞X
0
Z
−(1 − β)
0
+βLTtW
∞
∞X
j=1
Tt+j (z)
Ψ(dz)
s=1 Rt+s (z)
Qj
j=1
Tt+j (z)Ψ(dz)
Qj
s=1 (1 + rt+s )
− (1 − β)L
∞
X
W
Tt+j
Qj
j=1
s=1 (1
+ rt+s )
(18)
The first term gives the evolution of aggregate capital in an economy without taxes. In
16
this case, aggregate capital in period t + 1 is a linear function of aggregate output and
the initial level of aggregate capital. The evolution of aggregate capital in this case is
equal to the accumulation decision of a representative entrepreneur (Moll, forthcoming;
Buera and Moll, 2012). The second term captures the effect of alternative paths for
taxes, discounted using the type-specific return to their non-monetary wealth, while
the last terms is the present value of taxes from the perspective of the government.
For instance, consider the case in which the government increases lump-sum transfers
to entrepreneurs in period t, financing them with an increase in government debt, and
therefore, with an increase in the present value of future lump-sum taxes. In this case,
future taxes will be discounted more heavily by active entrepreneurs, implying that
the last term is bigger than the second. Thus, this policy results in a lower aggregate
capital in period t + 1.
Finally, we describe the determination of the price level. In the previous derivations,
in particular, to obtain (18), we have used that ν ≈ 0, and therefore, the money market
clearing condition is not necessarily well defined.16 More generally, given monetary and
fiscal policy, the price level is given by the equilibrium condition in the money market
"
ν(1 − β)β
Mt+1
=
αYt + (1 − δ)Kt + (1 + rt )Bt
pt
1 − ν(1 − β)
#
Z ∞X
∞
Tt+j (z)
Ψ(dz) .
(19)
−
Qj
R
(z)
0
t+s
s=1
j=0
The nominal interest rate is obtained from the inter-temporal condition of inactive
entrepreneurs
1 + it+1
1 c2t+1
= pt+1 = 1 + rt+1 .
β c2t
pt
(20)
Note that, except for the well known Sargent-Wallace initial price level indeterminacy
result, we can think of monetary policy as sequences of money supplies {Mt }∞
t=0 , or
sequences of nominal interest rates, {it }∞
t=0 . We will think of policy as one of the two
sequences and therefore abstract from the implementability problem.17
There are two important margins in this economy. The first, is the allocation of
16
To determine the price level in the cash-less limit we need to assume that as Mt+1 , ν → 0,
Mt+1 /ν → M̃t+1 > 0. See details in section 3.3.3.
17
Because we use log-utility, there is a unique solution for prices, given the sequence {Mt }∞
t=0 .
17
capital across entrepreneurs, that is dictated by the collateral constraints and determines measured TFP (see (14)).The second, is the evolution of aggregate capital over
time, which, in the absence of taxes, behaves as in Solow’s model (see (18) and set
Tt+j (z) = 0). Clearly, fiscal policy has aggregate implications: the net supply of bonds
affects (16) and taxes affect (18). However, monetary policy does not, since none of
those equations depend on nominal variables. Monetary policy does have effects, since
it distorts the margin between cash and credit goods, but in a fashion that resembles
the effects of monetary policy in a representative agent economy. This is the case only
if, as assumed above, the zero bound does not bind.
3.2
Equilibrium at the zero bound
In periods in which the zero bound binds, successful inflation targeting policies will
affect equilibrium quantities if the target for inflation is tight enough. The reason
is that, by successfully controlling inflation, monetary policy, together with the zero
bound on nominal interest rates, can impose a bound on real interest rates. To see
this, use (20) and the zero bound to write
pt−1 − pt
pt
(1 + rt ) ≥ 1, so rt ≥
=−
1 + it =
pt−1
pt
πt
1 + πt
(21)
where πt is the inflation rate.
Imagine now an economy with zero net supply of bonds that enters a credit crunch,
generated by a drop in maximum leverage, λt . Equation (16) implies that the threshold
ẑt+1 has to go down, to reduce the left hand side and increase the right hand side so as
to restore the equilibrium. This drop in the gross supply of private bonds will reduce
the real interest rate so the marginal entrepreneurs that were lending capital, now start
borrowing till market equilibrium is restored, i.e., the net supply of bonds is zero. If the
credit crunch is large enough, the equilibrium real interest rate may become negative.
If inflation is not high enough, the bound (21) may be binding. Imagine, for instance,
the case of inflation targeting with a target equal to zero. Then, the real interest rate
cannot become negative.
How will an equilibrium look like? In order to support the zero inflation policy the
government needs to inject enough liquidity, so the net supply of money (or bonds,
since they are perfect substitutes at the zero bound) goes up to the point that conditions (16) and (21) are jointly satisfied. This policy will have implications on the
18
equilibrium cutoff ẑt+1 . In addition, as it can be seen in (17), the injection of liquidity
(increases in Bt+1 ) affects capital accumulation. Thus, at the zero bound, the level of
inflation chosen by the central bank, if low enough, can affect the two relevant margins
in the economy. To further explore these implications in this general model, we need to
solve it numerically. But before doing that we present now a particular - very special case that can be analytically solved and analyzed, which we find very useful to isolate
and understand some of the mechanisms of the model.
3.3
A simple case with a closed form solution
An interesting feature of dynamic models with collateral constraints as the one we
analyze is the interaction between the credit constraints and the endogenous savings
decisions. This interaction generates dynamics that imply very different long run effects from the ones obtained on impact, precisely through the endogenous decisions
agents make over time to save away from those constraints. A complication is that
the endogenous wealth distribution becomes a relevant state variable and it becomes
impossible to obtain analytical results.
It is possible, however, to obtain closed form solutions if we shut down that endogenous evolution of the wealth distribution. Some of the effects that the simulations
of the general model exhibit are also present in this simplified version, where they are
easier to understand. We now proceed to discuss that example.
Consider then the case in which γ → 0 (but β̂ → ∞, so as to keep β = β̂γ constant).
So, equation (15) becomes
Φt+1 (z) = Ψ (z) (Kt+1 + Bt+1 ) .
Thus, in the limit agents live for only a period, but the saving decisions are not
modified. In addition, since it simplifies the algebra, we let z be uniform in [0, 1]. Then,
the equilibrium condition for the credit market (16) becomes
ẑt+1 = θt+1 + (1 − θt+1 ) bt+1
where bt =
Bt
,
Kt +Bt
Zt =
and the value of TFP in equation (14) becomes
1 + θt + (1 − θt ) bt
2
α
(22)
19
Finally, we normalize L = 1 so the law of motion for capital in this special case is given
by
α
1 + θt + (1 − θt ) bt
α
(23)
Kt+1 = β α
Kt + (1 − δ)Kt
2
"Z
#
∞
∞X
Tt+j
+(1 − β)
dz − Bt+1 .
Qj
0
s=1 Rt+s (z)
j=1
Note that given sequences of policies and collateral constraints, this equation fully
describes the dynamics of capital.
The economy behaves like in Solow’s growth model, where the collateral constraint
and the fiscal policy matter. The collateral constraint matters because it affects aggregate TFP. Policy matters because the model, as we show in detail below, does not
exhibit Ricardian equivalence. Finally, the real interest rate is given by
δ + rt+1 = α
θt+1 + (1 − θt+1 ) bt+1
1−α
1−α
α
Zt+1
Kt+1
In addition, the constraint (21) must be satisfied.
In order to gain understanding of some of the effects on equilibrium outcomes of
changes in the collateral constraint and on the effects of monetary and fiscal policy,
we now solve several simple exercises. In the first two exercises, we solve for the real
economy, where ν = 0 and focus the discussion on the evolution of real variables. We
first set all transfers to zero and study the effect of a credit crunch: An anticipated
drop in θt , that lasts several periods and it then goes back to its steady state value.
We show that total factor productivity, output and capital accumulation drop, so the
effect of output is persistent. We also show that if the credit crunch is large enough, the
real interest rate becomes negative. We then keep θt constant and study the effect of
debt financed transfers, to show the effect of an increase in the outside supply of bonds
in the equilibrium. We show that debt issuance crowds out private investment but
increases total factor productivity, so the effect on output is ambiguous. In addition,
debt issuance increases the real interest rate. Finally, we consider the cashless limit and
study the behavior of the price level following a credit crunch where the real interest
rate becomes negative and the zero bound on nominal interest rate becomes binding.
We show that if the central bank does not change the nominal quantity of money, a
20
deflation follows.
3.3.1
The effect of a credit crunch
To isolate the effect of a credit crunch, we set bt = 0 and Tt (z) = Ttw = 0. In this case,
ẑt = θt and Zt =
1 + θt
2
α
.
Given the level of capital, the interest rate is given by
δ + rt =
21−α α
θt
(1 + θt )1−α Kt1−α
(24)
which implies that the real interest rate falls with θt . This drop in the real interest rate
is what provides the incentives to the less efficient entrepreneurs to enter till the credit
market clears, reducing TFP.18
The law of motion for capital is given by
Kt+1
α
1 + θt
α
Kt + (1 − δ)Kt .
=β α
2
(25)
We model a temporary credit crunch as
θ0 = θss
θt = θl < θss for t = 1, 2, ...., T
θt = θss for for t > T
and assume all agents have perfect foresight. The effect on capital is identical to a
temporary drop in TFP in Solow’s model: Capital does not change on impact, but
starts going down till T. Then, it starts going up to the steady state. The interest rate
drops on impact, since the ratio (1+θθt+1)1−α is increasing on θt+1 . Note that
t+1
δ + r1 =
21−α α
θl
1−α
(1 + θl )1−α Kss
18
The drop of the real interest rate as the collateral constraint falls enough is a general feature of
the model, which does not depend on the particular simplifying assumptions used in this example.
In general, rt = ẑt /E[z|z ≥ ẑt ]1−α Ktα−1 − δ, which tends to −δ as θt , and therefore, ẑt , converges to
zero.
21
so the real interest rate will be negative if θl is low enough.
Then, between periods 2 and T, where θ remains low, the interest rate goes up, as
capital goes down, approaching what would be the new steady state if the change were
permanent. At time T + 1, the interest rate jumps up because of the direct effect of θt ,
overshooting the steady state value since the capital stock is below the steady state,
and then it goes down as the capital stock recovers. These dynamics are illustrated for
the case of a smoother version of this shock in Figure 2.
3.3.2
The effect of policy
We consider the case in which taxes and transfers are made to all entrepreneurs, independently of their type (so T (z)t = Tt ) and in which there are no taxes or transfers to
workers (so Ttw = 0).19 First, note that (22) trivially implies that total factor productivity is increasing on the ratio of debt to total assets. We assume the economy starts
at the steady state and the policy we study is given by
B0 = 0, B1 = −T0 = B > 0 and (1 + r1 ) T0 + T1 = 0
so Bt = 0 for t ≥ 2. Given this policy, the law of motion for capital (23) becomes
Z
K1 = Kss − (1 − β)B 1 −
0
1
(1 + r1 )
dz
R1 (z)
(26)
When θ = 1, R1 (z) = (1 + r1 ) for all z (and ẑ = 1), then
Z
(1 + r1 )
0
1
1
dz = 1
R1 (z)
and Ricardian equivalence holds. But when θ ∈ (0, 1), from (5) it follows that R1 (z) >
(1 + r1 ) for z > ẑ (and ẑ ∈ (0, 1)), then
Z
0<
0
1
(1 + r1 )
dz < 1
R1 (z)
Thus, the level of capital is lower than the steady state for any positive level of debt.20
19
We solve the case in which workers are also taxed in Appendix B, where, to keep analytical
tractability we also assume that workers are hand to mouth. In our simulations we solve for the
general case in which workers can hold bonds.
20
The opposite is true of the government lends such that B < 0.
22
Thus, starting at B = 0, as debt increases, total factor productivity goes up as seen
from (22), but capital goes down, so the net effect on output is ambiguous.21 Finally,
note that the interest rate on period 1 is given by
δ + r1 =
α21−α
θ + b1 (1 − θ)
(1 + θ + b1 (1 − θ))1−α K11−α
where the first term is increasing on b1 , so the interest rate will be higher than in the
steady state.
To summarize, a credit crunch and an increase in debt have opposite effects on
total factor productivity and on the real interest rate: While the credit crunch reduces
both, the increases in debt increase both. On the contrary both the credit crunch and
the debt increase reinforce each other in that they reduce capital accumulation. As
increases in outside liquidity (Bonds plus Money at the zero bound) dampens the drop
in the real interest rate, they will be effective in achieving a target for inflation when
a credit crunch implies
(1 + rt ) (1 + π ∗ ) < 1
Doing so, also implies a lower drop in TFP (a higher threshold) but a larger drop in
Capital. The net effect on output is in general ambiguous, but it can be shown to be
positive in the neighborhood of B = 0.22
This trade off will be present in our simulations of the general model that allows
for rich dynamics of the wealth distribution and uses alternative functional forms for
the distribution of z.
3.3.3
Deflation follows passive policy
We want to discuss the behavior of the price level following a credit crunch that drives
the real interest rate to negative territory and such that the zero bound constraint
binds at least during one period. The characterization is simpler in the case in which
the zero bound is binding only for one period. As it turns out, if the parameters satisfy
certain properties, this will indeed be the case. Thus, as we explain in the example,
21
The relationship between government debt and aggregate capital is non-monotonic. In particular,
one can show that as B → ∞ aggregate capital converges to the steady state value in an economy
with θ = 1.
22
In the case workers are the only individuals been taxed and subsidized, the net effect on output
is negative. The analysis of the net effect on output is presented in Appendix B.
23
we will make two assumptions parameters must satisfy for the equilibrium to be such
that the zero bound only binds in one period. Under these condition, we then explain
why deflation will be the results of a credit crunch if policy does not respond.
The cashless limit We consider the limiting case of the cashless economy, i.e.,
ν → 0. In this case, the distortions associated with positive nominal interest rate do
not affect the real allocation.23 In taking the limit, though, we also let nominal money
balances shrink at the same rate so we can still meaningfully determine the equilibrium
price level. The details follow.
When the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, the first order condition is
pt c1t =
1
ν 2
ct pt−1
1−ν
Rt (z)
We define mt = mνt , so pt c1t = mt = mt ν. Replacing above and taking the limit when
ν → 0, we obtain
mt = c2t pt−1
1
Rt (z)
Finally, using the optimal rule for the credit good specialized for the limiting case
c2t = (1 − β)Rt (z)kt
and aggregating over all agents we obtain
M t = (1 − β)Kt pt−1
(27)
Because of the cashless limit and since debt and transfers are all zero, the real variables
follow the solution described in (25) and (24) , irrespectively of the evolution of the
price level. However, the price level does depend on the behavior of real variables, so
it is useful to obtain some explicit solutions.
If we let β ≡ (1 + ρ)−1 , ρ > 0, the steady state is given by
Kss =
α
ρ+δ
1
1−α
1 + θss
2
α
1−α
(28)
23
In the general case, non-negligible money balances crowd out capital and ameliorate the drop in
the real interest rate and the drop in total factor productivity.
24
and
2θss
1 + θss
(ρ + δ) = rss + δ
(29)
We assume that
2θss
>β
(1 + θss )
(30)
which implies that real interest rate is positive in the steady state.24 During the credit
crunch, at t = 1 the real interest rate is
2θl
δ + r1 = (ρ + δ)
(1 + θl )
1 + θl
1 + θss
α
which is negative as long as
2θl
(1 + θl )
1 + θl
1 + θss
α
<
δ
.
(ρ + δ)
(31)
Clearly, there exists a value for θl ∈ (0, θss ) such that this constraint is satisfied.
The conditions that determine the price level Let M t+1 = M and assume that
in equilibrium it > 0 for t ≥ 2. Then, using (27) we obtain that for all t ≥ 2
1 + it = (1 + rt )
Kt
pt
= (1 + rt )
.
pt−1
Kt+1
Note that the real interest rate is positive, but there is deflation. It is possible to show,
however, that under assumption (30) the deflation is not enough to make the nominal
interest rate negative.
Lemma 1: Given assumption (30), it > 0 for t ≥ 2.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
2θss
δ
The necessary condition for positive interest rates in the steady state, (1+θ
> ρ+δ
, is weaker.
ss )
The stronger condition we assume will also imply that the zero bound on nominal interest rates binds
at most one period and simplifies the example.
24
25
As all cash-in-advance constraints are binding from t ≥ 2,
pt =
M
for t ≥ 1
(1 − β)Kt+1
We now show that under certain conditions on the parameters, the zero bound is binding at t = 1.
Lemma 2: If δ > ρ, then there exists a θ̃l > 0 such that i1 = 0 for all θl ∈ (0, θ̃l ].
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Finally, we show now that if the economy starts at the steady state, at time zero,
when agents learn there is a credit crunch, the equilibrium price level must be strictly
below its steady state value.
Lemma 3: Under the assumptions of Lemmas 1 and 2, p0 < pss for all θl ∈ (0, θ̃l ).
Proof: See Appendix 3.
The intuition for this results is standard. The credit crunch drives the real interest
rate below zero to the point in which the zero bound is reached. At this point, there is
an excess demand for money as a ”store of value”. That excess demand is, of course,
real rather than nominal. As the nominal quantity is fixed by policy, the demand
pressure results in deflation. The excess demand for money as a store of value will
be positive until future inflation is high enough such that the return on money is the
same as the return on bonds. As the quantity of money is constant, the price level in
the steady state must be the same as the initial price level. The initial deflation allows
for future inflation along the path, required for the arbitrage condition to hold, with
a zero “long run” inflation. The resulting deflation is similar to the one that would
arise away from the zero bound if output expands and the nominal quantity of money
remains fixed,but in this case is caused by a shock affecting the market for bonds.
26
4
Numerical Examples
In this section, we numerically solve the model to illustrate the way monetary policy
interacts with the credit crunch. In these numerical examples we allow for endogenous
dynamics of the distribution of wealth shares across entrepreneurs, more general distributions of productivity levels, forward looking workers, a monetary economy away from
the cash-less limit, nominal debt contracts, and nominal wage frictions. As before, for
all the experiments we consider, we start the economy at the steady state, and assume
that in the first period, agents learn that there will be a deterministic credit crunch. All
other parameters are kept constant. Given this credit crunch, we consider two different
scenarios for monetary policy. In the first one, we illustrate the interactions between
real and nominal variables as a result purely of the credit crunch, in the absence of a
policy response. In the second scenario, we assume that monetary and fiscal policies are
such that inflation is kept low and constant, at targeted values that are consistent with
the typical mandates of Central Banks. To achieve the desire target, monetary policy
must be active, and the equilibrium outcome will depend on the accompanying debt,
tax and transfer policies. Thus, we consider alternative lump-sum tax and subsidy
schemes. We compare, in all cases, the evolution of the equilibrium with a benchmark
case in a real economy with no government, i.e., one in which we set the parameter
υ = 0 and T (z)t = TtW = Mt+1 = 0. In the real economy there is no money so the
zero lower bound is not a relevant consideration. The assumptions that allows us to
obtain relatively simple characterization of individual’s problem and aggregation, e.g.,
log utility and individual Cobb-Douglas technologies make the model less suitable for
a full quantitative analysis. For instance, since the model does not have a well-defined
size distribution of entrepreneurs, we cannot used moments on the size distribution of
establishments or firms to calibrate the distribution of productivities, nor to match the
leverage of the economy. Therefore, the numerical examples that follow should be seen
as theoretical illustrations of the model mechanisms.
The model has very few parameters. We set the time period to a quarter. On
the production side, we set the capital share in output α = 1/3 and the depreciation
rate δ = 1 − (1 − 0.07)1/4 . For preferences and the demographic structure we set the
relative importance of the cash good υ = 0.5, the discount factor β = 0.986 to match a
quarterly interest rate of 0.005. We choose the survival rate (1 − γ) = 0.91/4 to imply
a 10% yearly exit rate of entrepreneurs and set the leverage parameter θ = 0.75 which
is consistent with data on credit to real assets in Buera et al. (2014). The distribution
27
of productivity z is assumed to be lognormal(0, 1).
4.1
Real Benchmark
As a benchmark, we first present the effects of a credit crunch in an real economy and
no policy, so ν = 0, and Bt = Tt = 0. The results in this section follow closely those in
Buera and Moll (2012).
debt to capital ratio, θt
TFP
0.8
1
0.75
0.98
0.7
0.96
0.65
0.6
0
5
10
15
20
0.94
0
capital
5
10
15
20
real interest rate
0.04
1
0.02
0.98
0.96
0.94
0
0
−0.02
credit crunch
TFP shock
5
10
15
quarters
20
−0.04
0
5
10
15
quarters
20
Figure 1: Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch: Real Benchmark
In the upper-right panel of Figure 1, we show the evolution of the exogenous driving
force of the credit crunch, the debt to capital ratio θt . We also show the evolution of
total factor productivity, Zt , the capital stock and the real interest rate during a credit
crunch (solid line), and compare them with the evolution of these variables following
an “equivalent” exogenous TFP shock (dashed line).25
As in the simple example, the immediate effect of the credit crunch is to reduce the
amount of bonds that an active entrepreneurs can issue, so they will manage a lower
amount of capital. But as the capital stock is given, some of it will be reallocated
to previously inactive, less productive entrepreneurs. This immediately lowers total
25
Specifically, we feed to the model an unanticipated exogenous TFP shock that replicates the
evolution of the endogenous TFP during a credit crunch and the solve for the capital stock and the
real interest rate.
28
factor productivity (top right panel) and therefore output (not shown). But for those
entrepreneurs to find optimal to manage capital, the real interest rate has to go down
(bottom right panel). The lower output implies that there are fewer resources for
investment, and therefore, the capital stock drops below its steady state level (bottom
left panel), which further implies a reduction in output. Relative to the simple example
discussed in Section 3.3.1, in this case TFP starts recovering before the drop in the
collateral constraint reverts. This is due to the fact that the fraction of aggregate
wealth owned by productive entrepreneurs increases as their profitability is boost with
the fall in factor prices, the wage and interest rate.
As shown in Buera and Moll (2012), the change in aggregate variables, with the
exception of the interest rate, is the same in response to a credit crunch or to the
corresponding exogenous TFP shock. The drop in the interest rate is substantially
more pronounced following a credit crunch, compared to the case of an exogenous
TFP shock. As the supply of bond by productive entrepreneurs is further constrained
during a credit crunch, the equilibrium interest rate must drop to clear the bond
market. This force is not present in a contraction that is driven by an exogenous
decline in TFP. We would like to stress the effect of the credit crunch on the real
interest rate. The New-Keynesian literature on the zero bound that represents the
dominant view, assumes shocks to the discount factor in order to generate a negative
“natural” rate of interest.26 While our model also generates a large drop in the real
interest rate, the forces underlying this result are different. In our numerical exercises
we choose a credit crunch - the values for θt - such that the equilibrium exhibits
negative real interest rate for two years and such that it averages an annualized value
of −2%, a value that was suggested in the literature mentioned above.
4.2
Non-responsive monetary policy
We now show the equilibrium of the monetary model assuming that policy does not
respond to the shock, so the quantity of money does not change. Note that while we
focus on the case of money rules, in an equilibrium, given a money rule, we obtain a
unique sequence of interest rates. One could therefore think of policies as setting those
same interest rates.27 As there is no change in monetary policy, we do not need to
26
This discount factor shock is meant to be a reduced form of a shock to financial intermediation,
see Curdia and Woodford (2008).
27
If one were to think of policy as setting a sequence of interest rates, the issue of price level
determination should be addressed. The literature has adopted two alternative routes, the Taylor
29
change transfers either. We consider an economy with no public debt, and therefore,
no taxes or transfers, Bt = Tt = 0 all t.
As shown in Figure 1, a credit crunch results in a large decline in the return of
real assets. In a monetary economy, the return of real assets cannot be lower than the
return of money. If they are the same, the economy is at the zero lower bound. If at
the zero bound there is a further tightening of the collateral constraint, there will be
an excess demand for “store of value”, leading in equilibrium to the hoarding of real
money balances by inactive entrepreneurs, in excess to the ones needed for transaction
purposes. As the supply of money is held fixed in this exercise, the price level must drop
initially so that, in equilibrium, the supply of real balances meets the excess demand
of real balances of inactive entrepreneurs and the return on money is the same as the
return on bonds.
The response of the main variables in the nominal economy with a fixed money
supply are illustrated in Figure 2. As discussed above and illustrated in the bottom
right panel, there is a large deflation on impact and positive inflation afterwards as the
supply of bonds by productive entrepreneurs recovers, and the excess demand for real
balances slowly reverts to zero. The initial deflation increases the value of the money
balances at the beginning of the initial period, crowding out investment. The larger
decline in investment, relative to the real benchmark is illustrated in the lower left
panel of Figure 2. The lower value for investment implies that the recession is deeper,
but the overall effect on output is small.28
In the context of the model, this unexpected shock has relatively minor consequences. However, it suggests that a potential problem may arise to the extent that
debt instruments are nominal obligations or if there is downwards wage rigidity as the
New Keynesian models assume.29 We now explore these two extensions.
4.2.1
Nominal Bonds
We now solve the model assuming that entrepreneurs only issue nominal bonds. As
before, the real value of bond issuance are restricted by the collateral constraint in (3).
principle or the fiscal theory of the price level. We abstract form those implementation issues in this
paper.
28
Capital will be a third of a percentage point lower, but only 1/3 of the decline in the capital stock
translates to output.
29
This “debt deflation” problem has been mentioned as one of the possible costs of deflations before,
particularly in reference to the great depression (Fisher, 1933).
30
output
TFP
1
1
0.98
0.98
0.96
0.96
0.94
0
10
20
0.94
0
capital
0
0.98
0.94
0
20
inflation
1
0.96
10
−0.1
bmk real
real debt
10
quarters
−0.2
20
0
10
quarters
20
Figure 2: Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch: Constant Money
The results, which are dramatically different, are depicted in Figure 3, which also
plots both the benchmark (dotted line) and the case of indexed debt (dashed line).
The recession is deeper and more persistent, driven mainly by a sharper decline in
TFP. The intuition for the dramatic effect of the debt deflation is simple: The initial
deflation implies a large redistribution from high productivity, leveraged entrepreneurs
towards bondholders, who are inactive, unproductive entrepreneurs. The ability of
productive entrepreneurs to invest is now hampered by both the tightening of collateral
constraints and the decline of their net-worth. As a consequence, there needs to be a
larger decline in the real interest rate so that in equilibrium more capital is reallocated
from productive to unproductive entrepreneurs (bottom left panel), which results in a
larger deflation and a nominal interest rate that remains at zero for longer (center and
bottom left panels).
This example shows that the initial deflation can be very costly in terms of output,
and could provide a motivation for policy interventions to stabilize the price level and
output. An alternative motivation is given by the existence of nominal price rigidities.
31
output
TFP
1
1
0.95
0.95
0.9
0
10
0.9
0
20
capital
1
0.95
0.9
0
20
0
bmk real
real debt
nominal debt
10
−0.1
−0.2
20
0
real interest rate
0.05
0
0
10
quarters
10
20
nominal interest rate
0.05
−0.05
0
10
inflation
20
−0.05
0
10
quarters
20
Figure 3: Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch: Nominal Debt
4.2.2
Sticky Wages
We consider in this section an extension of the benchmark model with nominal wage
rigidities, a case that can be easily implemented following the New Keynesian tradition.
In particular, we consider workers that are grouped into households with a continuum of
members supplying differentiated labor inputs. Each member of the household behaves
monopolistically competitive and gets to revise the wage in any given period with a
constant probability as in Calvo (1983). To simplify the solution of the model, in this
extension we consider the cashless limit discussed in Section 3.3.3. 30
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the economy following an unanticipated credit
crunch for cases with flexible wages (dashed line) and rigid wages (solid line). In
both examples we assume that bonds are indexed to the price of consumption and the
supply of money remains constant. Thus, the case with flexible wages (dashed line)
corresponds to the case labeled “real debt” in figures 2 and 3, with the caveat that in
this section we consider the cashless limit.
30
A detailed and totally standard description of this extension is provided in Appendix C. The
parametrization and calibration of this version of the model follows closely the one in Correia et al.
(2013).
32
output
TFP
1.02
1
1
0.95
0.98
0.9
0.85
0
0.96
10
20
0.94
0
real wage
1.1
1
1
0
flexible wages
sticky wages
10
quarters
20
labor input
1.1
0.9
10
0.9
20
0
10
quarters
20
Figure 4: Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch: Sticky Wages
With rigid wages, the initial deflation causes an increase in the real wage, and a
sharp decline in the labor input. Furthermore, as TFP drops, while the real wage only
slowly adjusts, the labor input further declines. This results in a substantially more
severe recession. As in the previous examples, the real interest rate becomes negative
and the nominal interest rate is at zero lower bound for various periods.
The discussion in last two examples suggests that the initial deflation can be very
costly in terms of output. An obvious question is, then, what can monetary policy do,
if anything, to stabilize the price level and output. We consider those cases next.
4.3
Inflation targeting
We now consider the case of a government who implements an inflation target, π ∗ ,
that for simplicity we assume constant. As long as the zero bound does not bind,
π∗
31
so rt > − 1+π
However, if
∗ , inflation is determined by standard monetary policy.
given the target, the natural interest rate were inconsistent with the zero bound, the
government needs to increase real money balances Mt+1 /pt and/or government bonds
Bt+1 , to satisfy the excess demand for real assets. In order to do so, it will also need
31
Notice that because of lack of Ricardian Equivalence, the tax policy associated to the monetary
injections will have real effects.
33
to implement a particular scheme of taxes and transfers. As we will show, because
Ricardian equivalence does not hold, the way the taxes and transfers are executed
matters a lot.
It is important to emphasize that once the economy is at the liquidity trap, real
money and bonds are perfect substitutes and the only thing that matters is the sum
of the two, so there is an indeterminacy in the composition of total outside liquidity.
We will further discuss the subtle distinction between monetary and debt policy at the
zero bound, but to focus on the effects of policy (monetary and/or fiscal) and without
loss of generality, we assume that the government sets the quantity of money to be
equal to the money required by individuals to finance their purchases of cash good
in every period, mTt+1 , given by equation (12). Then, public debt accommodates the
excess demand for bonds in periods where the real interest rate equals the constants
return of money rt+1 = −π/(1 + π),
Bt+1
B
t
= R ẑ
t+1
0
π
if rt+1 > − 1+π
Φt+1 (dz) − (λt+1 − 1)
R∞
Φ (dz)
ẑt+1 t+1
π
if rt+1 = − 1+π
.
(32)
Obviously, lump-sum taxes (subsidies) must be adjusted accordingly to satisfy the
government budget constraint in (8).
These conditions fully determined the evolution of the money supply, government
bonds, and the aggregate level of taxes (transfers), but they leave unspecified how
taxes (transfers) are distributed across entrepreneurs and workers. We consider two
simple cases: First, we present results for the case that taxes (transfers) are purely
lump-sum, i.e., Tt (z) = TtW = Tt for all t, z.32 We refer to this as the “lump-sum”
case. The second case that we consider is one where taxes are purely lump-sum for all
period. But in periods when the government increases the supply of bonds, we assume
that the proceeds from the sell bonds, net of interest payments and the adjustment
of the supply of real balances are transferred only to the entrepreneurs according to
Tt (z) = Tt , and TtW = 0 for all t, z . The second case captures an scenario in which
the government responds to a credit crunch by “bailing out” productive entrepreneurs
32
In this section we need to specify the relative number of workers and entrepreneurs in the economy.
We assume that workers are 25% of the population, L/(1 + L) = 1/4. We choose a low share of
workers, who in our model choose to be against their borrowing constraint in a steady state, to limit
the non-Ricardian elements in the model.
34
and bond holders. We refer to this as the “bailout” case.33
output
TFP
1
1
0.98
0.98
0.96
0.96
0.94
0
10
20
0.94
0
capital
1
0.95
0.5
10
0
0
20
real interest rate
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
−0.02
−0.04
0
10
quarters
20
debt to GDP
1
0.9
0
10
real bmk
lump−sum
bailout
10
20
nominal interest rate
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
−0.02
−0.04
20
0
10
quarters
20
Figure 5: Aggregate Implications of a Credit Crunch with an Inflation Target: Alternative Subsidy Schemes, Inflation Target π = 0.02.
The results for the case in which the government implements a constant inflation
of 2%, a value in line with the price stability mandates of major Central Banks, are
depicted in Figure 5. The solid line corresponds to the case of pure lump-sum taxes
(transfer) while the dashed line shows the results for the case in which the government
rebates the proceed of the sell of bonds only to entrepreneurs. For comparison, the
dotted line shows again the results for the real benchmark.
To avoid the deflation induced by the excess demand of mediums to serve as “store
of value”, the government must increase the supply of government bonds plus or money
(center right panel). Furthermore, the increase in the supply of government bonds induces a further increase in the demand of these bonds by unconstrained entrepreneurs,
as these agents save in anticipation of the higher taxes that will be raised to pay the
33
The transfer to bond holders is consistent with the evidence presented by Veronesi and Zingales
(2010) for the bail-out of the financial sector in 2008.
35
interest of this debt.
As the top left panel of Figure 5 shows, with this policy the government accomplishes a slightly less pronounced recession at the cost of significantly more protracted
recovery. The milder recession is explained by the smaller drop in TFP. When the government maintains the inflation low, the real interest rate is constrained to be higher,
and therefore, there is less reallocation of capital toward less productive, and previously
inactive, entrepreneurs. The counterpart of the milder drop in TFP is a collapse in
investment, leading to a substantial and persistence decline in the stock of capital.
In our framework Ricardian equivalence does not hold so increases in government
debt crowds out private investment. This is true for both ways of designing the tax
and transfer scheme. Note however, that the liquidity injections are of very similar
magnitudes, which implies that the steady state values of capital (represented as the
points on the right hand side vertical axes) in the bailout and the lump-sum case are
very similar - though different than in the benchmark, due to the positive value of bonds
in steady state.34 However, the magnitude of the crowding out is much higher when the
government uses pure lump-sum taxes (solid line). In this case, part of the transfers
go to workers, who in equilibrium have a large marginal propensity to consume as
they will be against their borrowing constraint in finite time.35 In this case, aggregate
consumptions increases, and investment decreases, relative to the bailout case. We
present the lump-sum case, in spite of this counterfactual feature, just to illustrate
that the magnitude of the crowding out depends not only on the total debt issued, but
also on the way taxes and transfers are distributed across the population.
In comparison to the lump-sum case, the recovery is faster when the government
rebates the proceeds from the increase in the debt solely to entrepreneurs (dashed
line). Nevertheless, the drop in investment is still more pronounced that in the real
benchmark.36
Can the government mitigate the consequences of a credit crunch by choosing alternative inflation targets? In particular, is it desirable that the government chooses
34
The analysis of the non-zero supply of bonds in the steady state is available from the authors
upon request.
35
In a steady state the interest rate is strictly lower than the rate of time preferences, (1+r∞ )β < 1.
Therefore, workers, who earn a flow of labor income each period, will choose to be against their
borrowing constraint in finite time.
36
See appendix B for analytical comparative static results of the effect of changes in government
debt in the neighborhood of B1 = 0 for the simple example introduced in Section 3.3. There we
consider the case in which all taxes and transfers are to entrepreneurs, and the polar case where
workers are the only agents that are taxed and receive transfers.
36
output
TFP
1
1
0.98
0.98
0.96
0.96
0.94
0
10
20
0.94
0
capital
1
10
π=0.03
4
π=0.01
0.95
2
π=0.02
π=0.00
0.9
0
10
0
0
20
real interest rate
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
−0.02
−0.04
0
20
debt to GDP
10
quarters
10
20
nominal interest rate
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
−0.02
−0.04
20
0
10
quarters
20
Figure 6: Aggregate Implication of a Credit Crunch with an Inflation Target: Alternative Inflation Targets, Bailout Case.
a sufficiently high inflation target in order to avoid the zero lower bound? We explore
this question in Figure 6. There we present the evolution of four economies differing
in the level of the inflation target, π = 0, 0.01, 0.02, and 0.03. In all these cases we
assume that the government rebates the proceeds from the increase in the debt solely
to entrepreneurs (bailout case).
The two main features of the previous example are reinforced for the economies
with a lower inflation target. The lower the inflation target is, the less pronounced
the recession in the short run is. To implement that lower target, the government will
need a larger increase in the supply of bonds. The larger increase in the government
debt will imply a larger crowd-out of investment. Therefore, the recovery is slower.
On the contrary, for a sufficiently large inflation target, π = 0.03 in our example, the
government reproduces closely the equilibrium in the real benchmark economy. In
following this inflation target, the economy is at the liquidity trap for very few periods,
and clearly, for a slightly higher target, the economy will never hit the zero bound. At
37
this point, the allocation is very similar to the real benchmark, with a deeper recession,
but a fast recovery.
The case of a government implementing a low inflation seems attractive to interpret
the Great Recession in the US. Following the 2008 crisis, the economy has been for
several quarters at the zero bound, while the Fed has increased substantially its balance
sheet. The Fed policy has been directed explicitly to provide the US economy with
safe zero nominal interest rate money-like-assets, while inflation has been under total
control. In the same direction, the federal government have substantially increase its
indebtedness (supply of real assets). All these features are reproduced by this example.
Moreover, there is a presumption that these policies avoided a more severe recession,
although the recovery is seen as unusually slow. Again, a feature of the aggregate
economy in this example.
4.3.1
Monetary or Fiscal Policy?
At the zero bound, real money and bonds are perfect substitutes. Thus, standard
open market operations in which the central bank exchanges money for short term
bonds have no impact in the economy. What is needed, is an effective increase in the
supply of government liabilities, which at the zero bound, can be money or bonds.
How can these policies be executed? Clearly, one way to do it is through bonds, taxes
and transfers. But another way to do it is by long-ago described helicopter drops:
increases of money that are directly transferred to agents. Sure enough, to satisfy
the government budget constraint, these helicopter drops need to be compensate with
future “vacuums” (negative helicopter drops).
While the distinction between a Central Bank or the Treasury making direct transfers to agents may be of difference relevance in different countries, due to alternative
legal constraints, there is little conceptual difference in the theory. To fully control
inflation during a severe credit crunch, the sum of real money plus bonds must go up
at the zero bound. Otherwise, there will be an initial deflation, followed by an inflation
rate that will be determined by the negative of the real interest rate. If these policies
are understood as being outside the realm of Central Banks, then Central Banks should
not be given tight inflation target mandates: Inflation is out of their control during a
liquiditry trap.
38
5
Distribution of Welfare Impacts
In the previous section we focused on the impact of policies on aggregate outcomes
and factor prices. The aggregate figures suggest a relatively simple trade-off at the
aggregate level. These dynamics, though, hide very disparate effects of a credit crunch,
and alternative policies, among different agents. While workers are hurt by the drop
in wages, the profitability of active entrepreneurs, and their welfare, can increase as a
result of lower factor prices. Similarly, unproductive entrepreneurs are bondholders in
equilibrium, and therefore, their welfare depends on the behavior of the real interest
rate.
π = 0.01, wgW = −0.044
π = 0.02, wgW = −0.02
0.5
fraction of consumption
W
π = 0.03, wg
= −0.0049
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
−0.1
0.8
0.85
0.9
ability percentile
0.95
1
Figure 7: Distribution of Welfare Gains.
Figure 7 presents the impact on the welfare of entrepreneurs of different ability, and
workers, of a credit crunch under alternative inflation targets for the bailout case. We
measure the welfare impact of a credit crunch in terms of the fraction of consumption
that an individual is willing to permanently forgo to experience a credit crunch.37 If
positive (negative) we refer to this measure as the welfare gains (loses) from a credit
crunch, and alternative policy responses.
The dotted line shows the welfare gains for entrepreneurs from a policy that implements a 3% inflation, as a function of the percentile of their ability distribution. This
case is very similar to the real benchmark, since the zero bound is binding only in a
couple of quarters. Unproductive entrepreneurs are clearly hurt by a credit crunch,
as the return of the bonds they hold becomes negative for over 10 quarters, and only
37
For entrepreneurs, we consider the welfare of individuals that at the time of the shock have wealth
equal to the average wealth of its type. For workers, their welfare is calculated assuming, as is true
in the steady state of the model, that they own no wealth when the credit crunch is announced.
39
gradually returns to the original steady state. Their loses amount to over 5% of permanent consumption. On the contrary, entrepreneurs who become active as the credit
crunch lowers factor prices, and increase their profitability, benefit the most. The same
effect increases welfare for previously active entrepreneurs, but they are hurt by the
tightening of collateral constraints, which limit their ability to leverage their high productivity. The welfare loses for workers are shown by the legend of each curve. Clearly
workers are hurt by experiencing a credit crunch, as the wages drop for a number of
periods. The credit crunch amounts to a permanent drop of over half a percentage
point in their consumption, wg W = −0.005.
The other two curves show the welfare consequences of lower inflation targets. The
lowest the inflation target the highest the real interest rate, both during the credit
crunch, and in the new steady state.38 Unproductive entrepreneurs benefit from the
highest interest rate. Similarly, productive entrepreneurs benefit from the lowest wages
associated with the lowest capital during the transition, and in the new steady state.39
Although individual entrepreneurs do not internalize it, collectively they benefit from
the lower wages associated with a lower aggregate stock of capital. The lower the
inflation target, the lower the capital stock and the lower the wages, so welfare of
workers goes down when the target goes down.
6
Conclusions
A contraction in credit due to a tightening of collateral constraints leads to a recession
and a drop in the return of safe assets. In a monetary economy, the nominal return
of safe assets cannot be negative, so the negative of the rate of inflation is a lower
bound on its real return. We showed that if the contraction in credit is large enough
then this constraint becomes binding and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In this
38
Given the debt policy equation (32), the government debt in the new steady state will be highest
the lowest the inflation target is. In the model, a higher level of government debt implies a lower level
of capital in the new steady state.
39
The non-monotonic nature of the welfare effects is related to the heterogeneous impact due to
the changing nature of the occupational choice of agents during the transition. For example, the
entrepreneur that benefits the most is the most productive inactive entrepreneur in the steady state.
As the real rate goes down, that agent becomes entrepreneur, and starts borrowing to profit from the
difference between his productivity and the now low interest rate and also from the lower equilibrium
wage. On the other hand, the most productive entrepreneur is also benefited by the low input prices,
but is hurt by the reduction is ability to borrow. Thus, while she gets a higher margin per unit of
capital, she can only managed a lower amount of capital.
40
case, a deflation occurs if policy is passive. This deflation may interact with collateral
constraints creating debt deflation and worsening the recession if debt obligations are
in nominal terms. In addition, it creates a large drop in employment if wages are sticky.
We characterize a policy that avoid that costly deflation. That policy resembles the
one followed by the Fed as a reaction of the 2008 crisis, and is in line with Friedman
and Schwartz’s explanation of the severity of the great depression.
The policies that avoid the deflation involve a large increase in money or bonds which are perfect substitutes at the zero bound. These policies do stabilize prices and
output. There is a side effect of these policies though: they generate slow recovery.
We argue that many of the features of the model capture the characteristics of the last
financial crisis that hit the US starting in 2008 and the one that hit Japan in the early
90’s.
The interpretation of the crisis provided by the model in this paper is in contrast
with the dominant view in most central banks, and supported by a literature that
emphasizes price frictions. According to that literature it is unambiguously optimal to
maintain the economy at the zero bound even after the shock that drove real interest
rates to negative values reverts. The model of this paper implies that the avoiding the
zero bound or not implies non-trivial trade-offs: ameliorating the drop in output at
the cost a of a slower recovery. The policy trade-offs are even more subtle when the
heterogeneous effects across agents are taken into account.
Our model rationalizes the notion that the inflation determination mechanisms
differ substantially when the policy authority decides to be at the zero bound. Away
from the zero bound, it depends on standard monetary mechanisms. But at the zero
bound, it is total outside liabilities that matter: inflation can only be controlled by
managing the real interest rate so it does not become too negative.
A
Additional Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Use the solutions for the real interest rate and capital (25) and
(24) to write
"
1+it = αθss
1 + θss
Kt
2
#
α−1
+ (1 − δ)
41
Kt
Kt+1
h
αθss
=
β α
1+θss α−1
Ktα + (1 − δ)Kt
2
1+θss α
Ktα + (1 − δ) Kt
2
i
Assume now, towards a contradiction, that
h
αθss
1 + it =
β α
1+θss α−1
Ktα + (1 − δ)Kt
2
1+θss α
α
K
+
(1
−
δ)
K
t
t
2
i
<1
Then,
αθss
1 + θss
2
α−1
Ktα
α
1 + θss
α
+ (1 − δ)Kt < β α
Kt + (1 − δ) Kt
2
which can be written
α
1 + θss
2θss
α
− β + (1 − δ)Kt (1 − β) < 0.
Kt
α
2
1 + θss
Assumption (30) implies that the first term in the left-hand-side is positive. As δ and
β ∈ (0, 1), this is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2: Assume, towards a contradiction, that i1 > 0. Then
M = (1 − β)K1 p0
so
p1
K1
=
p0
K2
and the solution for the nominal interest rate is given by
α
p1
2θl
1 + θl
K1
1 + i1 = (1 + r1 )
=
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
p0
(1 + θl ) 1 + θss
K2
but
α
K1
=
K2
α
1+θss α
α
Kss
+ (1 − δ) Kss
2
1+θl α
α + (1 − δ) K
Kss
ss
2
=
α
α
42
1+θss α
1−α
+ (1 − δ) Kss
2
1+θl α
1−α
+ (1 − δ) Kss
2
replacing the solution for Kss ,we obtain
1+θss α
1+θss α
α
+ (1 − δ) 1 −1+δ
2
2
β
1+θl α
α
1+θss α
+ (1 − δ) 1 −1+δ
2
2
β
α
K1
=
K2
α
=
1/β
1+θl
1+θss
α
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
Then
1 + i1 =
1
β
1+θl
1+θss
α
1+θl
1+θss
2θl
(1+θl )
α
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
(33)
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
Thus, for the lower bound on the nominal interest rate to be binding we need
1
β
2θl
(1+θl )
1+θl
1+θss
α
1+θl
1+θss
α
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
<1
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
which implies
2θl
(1 + θl )
1 + θl
1 + θss
α
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ) < β
1 + θl
1 + θss
α
(ρ + δ) + β (1 − δ)
or
(1 − δ)(1 − β) <
1 + θl
1 + θss
α
2θl
(ρ + δ) β −
(1 + θl )
We now briefly characterize the function
f (θl ) =
1 + θl
1 + θss
α
(ρ + δ) β −
2θl
(1 + θl )
Equation (30) implies that that f (θss ) = 0. On the other hand,
f (0) =
1
1 + θss
α
(ρ + δ)
1+ρ
As δ > ρ,
δ
ρ
> (1 − β) =
1−δ
1+ρ
43
so
θss < 1 <
δ 1+ρ
1−δ ρ
1 + θss <
δ+ρ
(1 − δ) ρ
and
Thus,
(1 + θss )α < 1 + θss <
δ+ρ
(1 − δ) ρ
and
(1 + θss )α (1 − δ) ρ < δ + ρ
or
ρ
(1 − δ) = (1 − β) (1 − δ) <
1+ρ
1
1 + θss
α
δ+ρ
1+ρ
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a θel ∈ (0, θss ) such that
(1 − δ)(1 − β) =
1 + θel
1 + θss
!α
e
2θl
(ρ + δ) β −
e
1 + θl
As f (θl ) is decreasing, the zero bound will bind for all θl ∈ (0, θel ].
Proof of Lemma 3: the ratio of the price level at t = 0 to the price level in the
steady state pss is given by
p0
p1
=(1 + r1 )
pss
p
ss α
2θl
1+θl
1 (1+θl ) 1+θss (ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
α
=
1+θl
β
(ρ + δ) + (1 − δ)
1+θss
which is equal to the right hand side of (33) and, therefore, it is strictly less than one
44
provided θl ∈ (0, θ̃l ).
B
The Effect of Public Debt Around B = 0
In this appendix we characterize the effect of public debt on GDP for two limiting cases.
First, we consider the example presented in Section 3.3.2, where only entrepreneurs
pay taxes and receive subsidies associated with the temporary, one period increase in
government debt. For this case, we show that GDP tend to be an increasing function of
the level of public debt in the neighborhood of B = 0. Secondly, we consider the polar
case where only workers pay taxes and receive subsidies associated with the temporary,
one period increase in government debt. In this case we show that GDP is a decreasing
function of the level of public debt in the neighborhood of B = 0. This examples
illustrate that the net effect of government debt on aggregate output depends on the
particular implementation of the debt policy, and on the relative size of workers and
entrepreneurs in the population.
B.1
Taxing/Subsidizing Only Entrepreneurs
Differentiating (26) around B1 = 0
∂K1
∂B1
B1 =0
Z
(1 + rss )
= − (1 − β) 1 −
dz .
Rss (z)
(34)
Similarly, differentiating (22) around B1 = 0
∂Z1
∂B1
−1
= αZss Kss
B1 =0
1−θ
.
1+θ
(35)
Thus, the net effect on GDP around B1 = 0
∂Y1
∂B1
=
B1 =0
=
Z
−θ
(1 + rss )
α−1
− αZss Kss (1 − β) 1 −
dz
1+θ
Rss (z)
Z
(1 + rss )
α−1 1 − θ
αZss Kss
− (1 − β) 1 −
dz
1+θ
Rss (z)
α−1 1
αZss Kss
45
Finally, using the expressions for R1 (z) and solving the integral
∂Y1
∂B1
=
α−1
αZss Kss
(1
B1 =0
1 + rss
rss + δ 1
1
− (1 − β) 1 −
θ log
+1
− θ)
1+θ
rss + δ
1 + rss θ
where around B1 = 0 the real interest rate rss = (ρ + δ)2θ/(1 + θ) − δ. It is straightforward to see that this expression is positive for β close to 1 or θ close to 0.
B.2
Taxing/Subsidizing Only Workers
In this case
∂K1
∂B1
= −1
(36)
B1 =0
and the effect on TFP is also given by (35). Thus
∂Y1
∂B1
C
α−1
= −αZss Kss
B1 =0
2θ
< 0.
1+θ
Environment with Sticky Wages
In this appendix we describe the extension with rigid wages that is solved in Section
4.2.2. In order to allow for sticky wages, we now consider the case in which workers
are grouped into households with a continuum of members indexed by h ∈ [0, 1], each
supplying a differentiated labor input lht . Each member is endowed with a unit of time.
Preferences of the household are described by
∞
X
W
β t ζν log cW
1t + ζ (1 − ν) log c2t + (1 − ζ) log (Nt )
t=0
where leisure is
Z
Nt = 1 −
1
lht dh.
(37)
0
46
The differentiated labor varieties aggregate up to the labor input Lt , used in production
by individual entrepreneurs, according to the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
1
Z
lht
Lt =
η−1
η
η
η−1
dh
, η > 1.
(38)
0
Each member of the household, which supplies a differentiated labor variety, behaves
under monopolistic competition. They set wages as in Calvo (1983), with the probability of being able to revise the wage 1 − αw . This lottery is also i.i.d. across workers
and over time. The workers that are not able to set wages in period 0 all share the
same wage w−1 . Other prices are taken as given.
There is a representative firm that produces homogenous labor, to be used in production by the entrepreneurs, using the production function (38). The representative
R1
firm minimizes 0 wht lht dh, where wht is the wage of the h-labor, for a given aggregate
Lt , subject to (38). The demand for nht is
lht =
wht
wt
−η
Lt ,
(39)
where Wt is the aggregate wage level, given by
Z
1
wht
wt =
1−η
1
1−η
dh
.
(40)
0
R1
It follows that 0 wht nht dh = wt Lt . In order to simplify the analysis, we also assume
that workers are hand to mouth. In this case, the representative worker maximizes
E0
∞
X
W
β t ζν log cW
1t + ζ (1 − ν) log c2t + (1 − ζ) log (Nt )
t=0
subject to
cW
1t
+
cW
2t
lht =
mW
1
+ t+1 =
pt
pt
wht
wt
Z
1
wht lht dh +
0
mW
t
− TtW ,
pt
−η
Lt ,
47
and
cW
1t ≤
mW
t
.
pt
Note that while consumption and total labor will not be stochastic, each particular wht
will be a random variable. From the first order conditions of representative worker we
obtain
∞
η X
1 − ζ pt+j cW
2t+j
wht = w̃t =
ξt+j
η − 1 j=0
ζ(1 − ν) Nt+j
where
(βαw )j
ξt+j = P∞
j=0
ζ(1−ν) 1
η
wt+j
Lt+j
p
cW
t+j
2t+j
(αw β)j
ζ(1−ν) 1
wη L
pt+j t+j t+j
cW
2t+j
and
∞
X
ξt+j = 1.
j=0
The evolution of the cost of a composite unit of labor is
1
w
1−θw 1−θw
.
wt = (1 − αw ) w̃t1−θ + αw wt−1
and
"
Lt = αw
wt−1
wt
−θw
+ (1 − αw )
w̃t
wt
−θw #−1
(1 − Nt ) .
solves for the aggregate composite labor input given aggregate leisure.
To implement this extension we follow Correia et al. (2013) and calibrate ζ = 0.3,
η = 3, and αw = 0.85. To simplify the calculations, we consider the cashless limit. The
other parameter values are set as in the other numerical examples.
48
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