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Working Paper 9409
THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION:
A GENERALEQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
by Jang-Ting Guo and Kevin J. Lansing
Jang-Ting Guo is a professor of economics at the University
of California, Riverside, and Kevin J. Lansing is an
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion
and critical comment. The views stated herein are those of
the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
September 1994
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ABSTRACT
This paper employs a dynamic general-equilibrium model to analyze various schemes for
simplifying the U.S. tax system, such as a uniform tax levied on all types of income regardless of
source, and the elimination of specific tax breaks like the depreciation allowance. Under each scheme,
the government selects a balanced-budget fiscal policy (consisting of tax rates and the level of public
expenditures) which maximizes household welfare given the constraints imposed by the particular tax
system. We find that a uniform tax system does almost as well as a system with separate taxes on labor
and capital incomes, provided that a depreciation allowance is maintained. Without the depreciation
allowance, a uniform tax system significantly reduces household welfare, even though marginal tax rates
are lower under this scheme. The welfare differences between the various distortionary tax systems are
much smaller than the potential welfare gains from switching to a system of nondistortionary, lump-sum
taxes. The various tax systems are also shown to display very different behavior for the movement of
tax rates and aggregate economic variables over the business cycle.
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1. Introduction
Every year, Congress passes a bill that tinkers in some way with our tax system. During the
1980s however, two major tax bills were enacted that fundamentally altered the structure of the federal
income tax: the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA).
Although many changes to the tax code have been made since ERTA and TRA, the current U.S.tax
system derives most of its basic structure from these two laws. In this paper, we first review the basic
features of these tax laws and then construct a dynamic general-equilibrium model to analyze an issue
which is closely linked to tax reform, namely, tax simplification. Our primary finding is that a simplified
system which involves a uniform tax levied on all types of income does almost as well as a more
complicated system with separate tax rates on labor and capital income, provided that a depreciation
allowance is maintained.
In 1981, ERTA imposed a dramatic 23 percent, across-the-board cut in all marginal tax rates,
and reduced the top marginal rate for individual income from 70 to 50 percent. Statutory marginal rates
were scaled back to levels similar to those that prevailed in 1965. In addition, ERTA introduced new
incentives for investment and saving, such as an increased investment tax credit, a generous accelerated
depreciation schedule, and an extension to the eligibility rules for Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs).' ERTA also helped to eliminate "bracket creep" by indexing tax brackets, personal exemptions,
and the standard deduction for inflation.
In 1986, TRA brought about the most significant overhaul of the federal tax system since its
inception in 1913. The act lowered marginal tax rates for individuals and corporations, dramatically
reduced the number of tax brackets, broadened the tax base by eliminating or reducing many tax breaks,
and helped to "level the playing field by reducing the dispersion of marginal tax rates across alternative
income-producing activities. Also, the lowering of marginal rates reduced the attractiveness of tax
evasion and tax avoidance activities. Because of these features, TRA was viewed as taking a significant
step toward the goal of achieving a simpler, more efficient federal tax system. An important result of
'some of the investment incentives in ERTA, such as the generous accelerated depreciation schedule, were scaled back
somewhat by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). See Economic Report of the President, 1987 and
1989.
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TRA, and one which we will focus on here, was that average marginal tax rates on labor and capital
income were brought closer together. The figures in table 1, taken from Economic Report of the
President, illustrate this point.'
Table 1: Average Marginal Tax Rates before and after TRA 1986
Source of Income
Before TRA
After TRA
Labor Income
Capital Income
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1987, Table 2-6, page 91.
TRA also reduced the variation in marginal tax rates within each category of income. In the
labor income category, the number of individual income brackets was reduced to only two, set at 15 and
28 p e r ~ e n t . In
~ the capital income category, TRA eliminated the investment tax credit (which, under
ERTA, had applied to equipment but not structures), eliminated the capital gains preference by taxing
gains as ordinary income, decelerated depreciation allowances on real estate, imposed limitations on
passive business and real estate losses, and phased out the deductibility of nonmortgage consumer
interest. Furthermore, the lowering of personal marginal rates and the top corporate tax rate reduced the
attractiveness of tax shelters.
By imposing a more uniform tax on alternative sources of income, TRA attempted to eliminate
incentives in the tax code that had directed resources to less productive activities offering high after-tax
returns. These perverse incentives result in a loss of output and a reduction in economic welfare. In
addition, a simpler, more efficient tax system could be expected to contribute to increased compliance
and lower administration costs.
In this paper, we examine the issue of tax simplification using a dynamic general-equilibrium
model which is calibrated to the U.S. economy. Based on the results of TRA, tax simplification is
%or additional description and analysis of TRA 1986, see Slemrod (1991) and the two symposia in The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Summer 1987 and Winter 1992.
3 ~ ohigh-income
r
individuals, the 15 percent tax bracket and the personal exemption were phased out, creating an implicit
third bracket, at 33 percent. Before TRA, there were fourteen tax brackets ranging from 11 to 50 percent. In 1990, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA90) created a new statutory bracket at 31 percent. OBRA93, enacted in August 1993, added
two statutory brackets for high-income individuals. With OBRA93, there are now five statutory brackets at 15, 28, 31, 36 and
39.6 percent. See Economic Report of the President, 1994, Table 1-4, p. 34.
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modeled as a system which imposes a uniform tax on all types of income, regardless of source. The
more complicated system in our model is one in which capital and labor income are taxed at different
rates. A basic principle underlying TRA was to broaden the tax base by eliminating tax breaks, thus
allowing revenue requirements to be met with lower marginal rates. We capture this principle by
eliminating the model's only tax break, the depreciation allowance. We compare the uniform tax system,
with and without the depreciation allowance, to the more complicated tax system. We also compare all
three systems to one that employs nondistortionary, lump-sum taxes. The various tax systems are
evaluated in terms of economic welfare (as measured by steady-state household utility), output (as
measured by steady-state GNP), and business-cycle characteristics (as measured by the relative standard
deviations and cross-correlations of aggregate economic variables).
Under each scheme, the government chooses a balanced-budget fiscal policy that maximizes
household welfare, given the constraints imposed by the particular tax system. In this way, we
endogenize the choice of fiscal policy, which consists of a set of stationary decision rules for tax rates
and the level of public expenditures. Our approach differs from that of Cooley and Hansen (1992), who
evaluate the welfare effects of various combinations of exogenous tax rates.
From the perspective of choosing an optimal fiscal policy, a uniform tax system imposes an
additional constraint on the government's decision problem, namely, that the tax rate on capital income
must be equal to the tax rate on labor income. Because a policy of equal tax rates is available to the
government, but not chosen, under the complicated system, we know that the additional constraint is
binding and thus results in a lower level of household utility than in the unconstrained case. Our aim
is to quantify this welfare effect and to evaluate the additional impact of the depreciation allowance.
We find that the difference in welfare between the complicated system and the simplified tax
system with a depreciation allowance is less than 0.1 percent of GNP, or $23 per person per year in
1993. The steady-state output loss associated with this version of the simplified tax system is slightly
less than 1 percent of GNP. These results suggest that a uniform tax system could actually be welfareimproving if sufficient cost saving were realized in the areas of compliance and administration. Without
the depreciation allowance, a uniform tax system significantly reduces household welfare and steadystate output, as compared to both the complicated system and a uniform tax system with a depreciation
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allowance. Household welfare is reduced by approximately 2 percent of GNP or $523 per person per
year in 1993. The output loss is over 4 percent of GNP. Eliminating the depreciation allowance reduces
household welfare because this tax break operates as an implicit subsidy to capital accumulation, and
partially offsets the income tax distortion. This is true even though the marginal tax rate on capital
income is lower under a system with no depreciation allowance. Because of the government's desire to
tax profits as much as possible, a high tax rate on capital combined with a full depreciation allowance
is superior to a low tax rate on capital combined with no depreciation allowance. Our result points out
the important role played by the depreciation allowance in encouraging capital accumulation. Thus, the
inflation-induced erosion of unused nominal depreciation allowances, which are carried over from year
to year in historical cost terms, may impose a significant welfare cost on the U.S. e ~ o n o m y . ~
Moreover, we find that the welfare differences between the various distortionary tax systems are
much smaller than the potential welfare gains from switching to a system of nondistortionary, lump-sum
taxes. Our calculations indicate that distortionary taxes impose a welfare cost exceeding 14 percent of
GNP. Because of distributional issues and concerns over the perceived fairness of the tax code, we do
not view the lump-sum tax system as a realistic policy option. However, it does provide a useful
benchmark for our analysis.
Finally, we show that the various tax systems have very different implications for the
comovement and relative variability of tax rates and aggregate economic variables over the business
cycle. Under the complicated tax system, the capital tax moves countercyclically and displays high
variability because it is used to absorb shocks to the government's budget constraint. In the model,
budget shocks are caused by changes in the size of the tax base due to business-cycle fluctuations. Under
the simplified tax system, government expenditures are much more variable because a separate
~
instrument for absorbing budget shocks is not available. Also, for a given variance of the technology
shock, we find that output, consumption, and hours worked are more variable under a system of lump-
i
4~udd(1989) emphasizes this point by treating the inflation erosion of unused depreciation allowances as an effective
increase in the tax rate on capital. See Altig and Carlstrom (1991) for a business-cycle model that incorporates inflation's effect
on the nominal taxation of capital income. Pecorino (1993) examines the growth effects of the depreciation allowance in an
endogenous growth model.
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sum taxes than under any of the distortionary systems. This occurs because movements in distortionary
tax rates tend to offset the effects of technology shocks, thus resulting in lower output variability.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner: Sections 2 and 3 describe
the model and the solution method. The choice of parameter values is discussed in section 4. Section
5 presents quantitative welfare comparisons based on steady-state analysis. In section 6, we examine the
business-cycle characteristics of the various tax schemes. Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2. The Model
The model economy consists of many identical, infinitely lived households, identical private
firms, and the government. Households derive direct utility from government-provided public goods
which are financed by taxes on households and firms. Following Benhabib and Farmer (1994), we
assume that firms exert some degree of monopoly power over the production of intermediate goods so
that they realize positive economic profits even though the market for final goods is perfectly
competitive. The profits are equal to the difference between the value of output and the payments to
labor and capital inputs. The purpose of introducing profits is to obtain a positive optimal tax rate on
capital, consistent with U.S.
observation^.^ As owners of the firms, households receive net profits in the
form of dividends, but consider them to be outside their control, similar to wages and interest rates. It
is assumed that profits are initially taxed at the firm level, then distributed as dividends and taxed again
at the household level. This formulation is intended to capture the double taxation of corporate dividends
in the U.S. economy. Furthermore, in the complicated tax system, we assume that the government can
distinguish between labor and capital income, but cannot distinguish between the different categories of
capital income, such as profits, dividends, and capital rental income. Therefore, the complicated system
includes only two types of distortionary taxes: a labor tax and a capital tax.
ones,
Manuelli, and Rossi (1993b) show that the existence of profits and a restriction on the menu of available tax
instruments (the absence of a separate profits tax) is one method of obtaining a positive optimal tax rate on capital in the steady
state. Without profits, the optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero (see Judd [I9851 and Chamley [1986]).
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2.1 The Household's Problem
Households maximize a discounted stream of within-period utility functions over consumption
and leisure, subject to a sequence of budget constraints. The decision problem can be summarized as
max
..
c, h,
k,,,
{lnc, -Ah, + s i n g , )
O<p<l,
A, BLO
(1)
t-O
subject to
kt+, = ( 1-6 )kt + x,
0 <6 < 1 ,
ko given.
In the above equations, c, represents private consumption goods. Households are endowed with
one unit of time each period and work h, hours during period t. Household preferences also include a
separable term representing the utility provided by public consumption goods g,. Examples of public
consumption goods that might affect household utility are national defense, police protection, and
government provision of food and housing during natural disasters. Public goods are assumed to be noncongestable and free of specific user charges.
Households maximize the utility function in (1) over c,, and h,, but view g, as outside their
control. The logarithmic form of the within-period utility function has been chosen for tractability and
for comparability with previous business-cycle literature. The separability in c, and g, implies that public
consumption does not affect the marginal utility of private consumption, a specification supported by
parameter estimates in McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993). The symbol E, is the expectation
operator conditional on information available at time t, and P is the constant household discount factor.
The fact that utility is linear in hours worked reflects "indivisible labor," as described by
Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985). This means that all variation in economywide hours is due to
variations in the number of employed workers, as opposed to variations in hours per worker. Real
business cycle models with indivisible labor are better able to match some key characteristics of
aggregate labor-market data. Specifically, U.S. data display a large volatility of hours worked relative
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to labor productivity and a near-zero correlation between hours and produ~tivit~.~
Equation (2) represents the period budget constraint of the household. The terms xt and kt
represent gross private investment and private capital, respectively. Households derive income by
supplying labor and capital services to firms at rental rates wt and rt , and pay taxes on labor and capital
income at rates z, and z,, respectively. The term Tt represents a lump-sum tax. An additional source
of income is the firms' net profits fit, which are distributed to households as dividends and are taxed
at the same rate as capital rental income rt k,. The term (Iz, 6kt represents the depreciation allowance,
where the parameter (I can be set to either 1 or 0,depending on whether this tax break is maintained
in the simplified tax system. Equation (3) is the law of motion for private capital, given a constant rate
of depreciation 6. Households view tax rates, wages, interest rates and dividends as determined outside
their control.
2.2 Household Optimality
The Lagrangian for the households' problem is defined as:
The household first-order conditions with respect to the indicated variables and the associated
transversality conditions (TVC)are:
'see Hansen (1985), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
7
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TVC:
limEopthtkt+,= 0.
t +-
The government's problem is solved by finding the set of utility-maximizing allocations ct , ht
and k;,,, such that the household's first-order conditions (5) and budget constraint (2) are satisfied. Given
these optimal allocations, the government uses the household equilibrium conditions to recover the
appropriate tax rates z, and z, that will support these allocations in a decentralized economy?
2 3 The Firm's Problem
The firm's problem is based on the model developed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994). A unique
final good yt is produced out of a continuum of intermediate goods y,, i E [0,1], using the following
constant-returns-to-scale technology: yt = [I,' yi,Xdillh, 0 < x <1. We assume that the final goods sector
is perfectly competitive, but that intermediate goods producers each exert a degree of monopoly power
that is captured by the parameter X. In the special case when x = 1, all intermediate goods are perfect
substitutes in the production of the final good, and the intermediate sector becomes perfectly competitive.
All intermediate goods are produced using the same technology with labor and capital as inputs:
yit = exp(zt) kiP1hi:',
Zt+l
= P z Z t +&,+I
where O < a i < l ,
a , + a , 2 1,
O<pz<l, ~,-iid(0,0;),
zo given.
(6)
(3
Notice that equation (6) allows for the possibility of increasing returns to scale in the production
7 ~ e Chari,
e
Christiano, and Kehoe (1993) for a more complete discussion of this equilibrium concept
8
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of intermediate goods8 The intermediate technology is subject to economywide exogenous shocks ( z ,),
which are revealed to agents at the beginning of period t. These shocks generate equilibrium businesscycle fluctuations in the model. Due to their monopoly power, producers of intermediate goods earn an
economic profit which is taxed at the rate z,
.
Under the assumption that factor markets are competitive, a symmetric equilibrium (k=
kt and
hit=ht for all i) implies the following expressions for the aggregate production function (y, = y, ), the
rental rate of capital, and the real wage.
where 8,
= X a,
e2 = X a,.
and
From (8), the aggregate technology can be rewritten as
1
y, = exp(nt)[k," h t e 2 ] ~ , where
1
(0, + €I2)- 2 1.
X
Depending on the value of X, the aggregate technology can demonstrate either constant or
increasing returns to scale. The after-tax profits, distributed to households in the form of dividends, are
2.4 The Government's Problem
The government chooses an optimal program of taxes and public expenditures in order to
maximize the discounted utility of the household. The vector !Pt= { gt , z, , z, , Tt ) summarizes
government policy implemented at time t. This is a dynamic version of the Rarnsey (1927) optimal tax
problem, involving a Stackelberg game between the government and households. To avoid timeconsistency problems, we assume that the government can commit to a set of state-contingent, stationary
policy rules announced at time zero. Also, to make the problem interesting, we rule out any time-zero
'see Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994) for more details regarding this formulation.
9
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levies on private-sector assets that might be used to finance all future expenditures. In addition, we
assume that the government adheres to a period-by-period, balanced-budget constraint? With these
assumptions, the government's problem is
subject to:
(i)
household first-order conditions and budget constraint,
(ii)
firm profit maximization conditions,
(iv)
4
(v)
T~~ = T
(vi)
T,,
= 1,
-- T,,
Tt
=
0,
for the complicated tax system,
=
T ~ ,@
= {
=
0,
=
Tt
1, 0 ] ,
g,,
Tt
=
0,
for the simplified tax system,
for the lump-sum tax system.
Constraints (i) and (ii) summarize rational maximizing behavior on the part of private agents and
constitute "irnplementability" constraints imposed on the government's choice of policy. Constraint (iii)
is a general version of the government budget constraint, where the squared term on the right-hand side
reflects the double taxation of firm dividends. Finally, (iv) through (vi) speclfy the constraints associated
with each of various tax systems we intend to analyze. The summation of the household budget
constraint (2) and the government budget constraint (iii) yields the following resource constraint for the
economy:
Because the resource constraint and the government budget constraint are not independent
' ~ d d i ngovernment
~
debt to the model introduces complications that we wish to avoid here. Specifically, equilibrium for
a model with debt and capital imposes an ex ante arbitrage condition on the expected returns from government bonds and private
capital. The steady-statelevel of debt is thus indeterminate (see Charnley [1985]).Furthermore, in a stochastic environment, the
government can vary the ex post combination of the capital tax and the bond interest rate in many different ways to raise needed
revenue, yet still satisfy ex ante arbitrage (see Zhu 119921 and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 119931).Excluding government debt
allows us to pin down a unique time path for the optimal capital tax.
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equations, equation (12) will be used in place of (iii) in solving the government's problem.
3. Solution of the Model
The governrnent's problem under commitment can be solved using the recursive algorithm
developed by Kydland and Prescott (1980). A recursive structure is obtained by defining the household
lagged shadow price h,-, as a "pseudo-state variable." Including h,-,in the state vector provides a link
to the past by which the policymaker at time t considers the fact that household decisions in earlier
periods depend on current policy by means of expectations. This is the mechanism by which the
commitment problem can be solved using dynamic programming. Appendix A describes the procedure
for formulating the recursive version of (1 1) and numerically solving the dynamic programming problem.
4. Calibration of the Model
To obtain quantitative welfare estimates from the model, as many parameters as possible are
assigned values in advance on the basis of empirically observed features of postwar U.S. data. Parameter
choices are also guided by the desire to obtain steady-state values for key model variables that are
consistent with long-run averages in the U.S. economy. Table 2 summarizes the choice of parameter
values and is followed by a brief description of how they were selected.
Table 2: Parameter Set
Parameters and Values
Agent
= 0.962
A = 2.50
B = 0.35
Firms
0,= 0.31
0, = 0.60
x = 0.91
6 = 0.07
Government
$ = { I , 0)
Households
p, = 0.85
a, = 0.02
The time period in the model is taken to be one year. This is consistent with the time frame of
most government fiscal decisions and the frequency of available data on average marginal tax rates. The
discount factor of P=0.962 implies an annual rate of time preference equal to 4 percent. The household
utility parameter A is chosen such that hours worked in the distortionary tax systems is close to 0.3. This
is in line with time-use studies, such as Juster and Stafford (1991), which indicate that households spend
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approximately one-third of their discretionary time in market work. The value of B is chosen to yield
a steady-state value of g/GNP near 0.22, the average ratio for the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992.
The exponents in the Cobb-Douglas production function are chosen on the basis of two criteria.
First, the chosen values of 8, and 8, are in the range of the estimated shares of GNP received by capital
and labor in the U.S. economy (see Christian0 [1988]). Second, the model's share of GNP devoted to
monopoly profits (= 1- 8, - 8,) is chosen to yield a reasonable value for the steady-state tax on capital
( T ~in) the complicated tax system. Because a separate profits tax is not available, the government uses
the tax on private capital to recapture a portion of these profits. In the model, the steady-state ratio of
profits to GNP is 0.09 and the resulting steady-state tax on capital is 0.30. This value of
T~ coincides
with the average effective corporate tax rate in the United States from 1947 to 1980, as estimated by
x is chosen such that the aggregate
scale. The value of x =0.91 yields
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).1° The monopoly power parameter
production technology demonstrates constant returns to
yt = exp (2,) k:34 hp.66. We also experiment with smaller values of X, such that the aggregate technology
is characterized by increasing returns to scale.
The private capital depreciation rate of 6 = 0.07 is based on the value estimated in Braun and
McGrattan (1993) and is consistent with values commonly used in the real business cycle literature.
Together with the values of P and €4, this depreciation rate implies a steady-state ratio of private capital
to GNP in the range of 2.27 to 3.1 1 for the various tax systems, and a ratio of private investment to
GNP in the m g e of 0.16 to 0.22. The corresponding averages for the U.S. economy from 1947 to 1992
are 2.58 and 0.21.
The process governing technology shocks was estimated using annual data from 1947 to 1992.
The series for zt was constructed by computing the changes in output not accounted for by changes in
the productive inputs." The estimated parameters, p, = 0.85 and o,= 0.02, represent values close to
1°~igherprofit levels imply a higher steady-state tax on capital in our model. When profits are zero (€I, +€I,=
1). the
optimal steady-state tax on capital is zero. If a separate profits tax was available, the government would choose to tax profits at
100 percent and ordinary capital income (r, k,) at zero percent (see footnote 5).
production function residual was measured as z, = InGNP, - 0.34hkI- 0.66hh,. The private capital stock k, is defined
as fixed private capital + stock of consumer durables + residential capital from Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United
States. U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). Real GNP and the labor input (h,= LHOURS) are from Citibase.
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those estimated by other studies using annual data, such as Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991). In the
simulations, the estimated value of o, yields a standard deviation of output in the range of 1.74 to 2.96
percent. The U.S. average over this period is 2.46 percent.
5. Steady-State Welfare Analysis
Based on our choice of parameter values, table 3 shows the steady-state values of key model
variables for each of the various tax systems. Of the three distortionary tax systems, the complicated
system has the highest level of steady-state utility and the largest output, followed closely by the
simplified system with a depreciation allowance. Table 4 indicates that the difference in utility between
these two systems is less than 0.1 percent of GNP, which translates to a loss of $23 per person per year
in 1993.12To put this number in perspective, Cooley and Hansen (1991) estimate the welfare cost of a
5 percent annual inflation to be 0.34 percent of GNP annually.
The simplified tax system could actually be welfare-improving if sufficient cost savings were
realized in the areas of compliance and administration. However, the necessary savings represent about
9 percent of the estimated total resource cost of administering the federal tax system.13Cost savings of
this magnitude would appear to be very difficult to achieve. Also, the simplified system's lack of an
explicit capital tax may be undesirable from the standpoint of redistributing resources in an economy
where wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of rich taxpayers.14
When the depreciation allowance is eliminated from the simplified system, household welfare
is reduced by over 2 percent of GNP, or $523 per person per year in 1993. Eliminating the depreciation
allowance reduces household welfare because it operates as an implicit subsidy to capital accumulation,
'%his figure is based on a nominal GNP of $6,510 billion and a total U.S. population of 258.2 million in 1993.
13~osen(1992, p. 351) estimates the total resource cost of administering the federal tax system to be $35.3 billion in 1982,
or 1.11 percent of 1982 GNP. If we assume that the ratio of resource cost to GNP is approximately the same in 1993, and that
the necessary cost savings to make the simplified system desirable amount to 0.1 percent of GNP, then the necessary savings
represent 9 percent (=0.1/1.11) of the total resource cost.
"?n the United States, the top 20 percent of households own about 80 percent of total wealth and earn about 42 percent of
pretax income. See McDermed, Clark, and Allen (1989). figures 13.1 and 13.2, and Rosen (1992), table 8.1. See Lansing (1994b)
for an optimal tax model with rich and poor households.
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and partially offsets the income tax distortion. This is true even though the marginal tax rate on capital
income (2,) is lower under this scheme. Because of the government's desire to tax profits as much as
possible (see Jones, Manuelli and Rossi [1993b]), a high tax rate on capital income combined with a full
depreciation allowance is superior to a low tax rate on capital income combined with no depreciation
allowance.15
Table 5 indicates that the welfare effects of tax simplification are much smaller than the potential
welfare gains from switching to a system of lump-sum taxation. Under the complicated system, the
welfare loss from distortionary taxation translates to $3,533 per person per year in 1993. However, our
representative household framework abstracts from any distributional role fuKied by a system of
distortionary taxes. The lump-sum tax system should thus be viewed as a benchmark, but not as a
realistic policy option.
'%hen profits are zero (1-9, -9,=0) and the government can tax labor and capital income separately, eliminating the
depreciation allowance has no effect whatsoever on the steady-state allocations. This can be seen from the government's recursive
problem in appendix A, for the complicated tax system (T,#T,); note that the depreciation allowance parameter I$ only appears
in the profit term of the (transformed) household budget constraint
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Table 3: Steady-State Comparison of Tax Systems
Variable
Complicated
Utility
-2.764
Tax Rate
zh= 0.22
2, = 0.30
W/
Simplified
Depr Allow
Simplified
No Depr Allow
Lump-sum
U.S.
Economya
-2.766
-2.798
-2.547
n.c.
z = 0.25
z = 0.20
T l y = 0.23
zh= 0.27, 0.23
zk = 0.30, 0.57
T l y =0.28
an.c. =not comparable. The U.S. values for k / y and g / y represent the 1947-92 averages, from Citibase.
Sources for U.S. tax rates are as follows: The two values for T, are averages from Barro and Sahasakul(1986), 194783, and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993), 1947-87, respectively. The two values for z, are averages from Jorgenson and
Sullivan (1981, table l l ) , 1947-80, and McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993), 1947-87, respectively. The value of T / y is the
average of total government receipts (federal, state, and local) as a percentage of GNP, 1947-92, from Economic Report of the
Presides, 1994, table B-80, p. 363.
Table 4: Effects of Tax Simplification
Welfare and Output Loss versus Complicated Tax Systema
Tax System
W/
Welfare Loss = AUl(5y)
Output Loss = Ay 1y
Simplified
Depr Allowance
Simplified
No Depr Allowance
'AU and Ay are normalized using the steady-state values of h and y from the complicated tax system, where h is the
marginal utility of private consumption (to convert AU into consumption units) and y is GNP.
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Table 5: Effects of Distortionary Taxes
Welfare and Output Loss versus Lump-sum Tax Systema
Tax System
Welfare Loss = AU/(hy)
Output Loss = Ay l y
Complicated
W/
Simplified
Depr Allowance
Simplified
No Depr Allowance
'AU and Ay are normalized using the steady-state values of h and y from the lump-sum tax system, where h is the
marginal utility of private consumption (to convert AU into consumption units) and y is GNP.
Source: Authors' calculations.
The welfare costs in table 4 tend to be higher for an economy with increasing returns to scale.
When
x = 0.75, the aggregate production technology is y, = exp (2,) k0.41
hbgO.In this case, the welfare
losses in the first column of table 4 become 0.19 percent and 2.69 percent of GNP, respectively, for the
two simplified systems.
6. Dynamic Simulation of Business-Cycle Behavior
Our simulation results (table 6 and figures 1 and 2) show that the various tax systems have very
different implications for the comovement and relative variability of tax rates and aggregate economic
variables over the business cycle. In the model, shocks to the government's budget constraint are caused
by changes in the size of the tax base due to business-cycle fluctuations. Because we have imposed a
balanced-budget restriction, government debt is not available to help smooth public expenditures when
budget shocks occur. In the complicated system, however, the shock absorbing function is performed
by a state-contingent capital tax, which moves countercyclically and displays high variability relative
to the labor tax. For example, a positive technology shock generates more tax revenue because GNP and
household incomes (the tax base) increase. This motivates a reduction in T~ because government
spending requirements can be met using a lower tax rate. Absorbing shocks mainly by changes in T ~ ,
as opposed to changes is T ~is ,efficient because capital is completely inelastic within a given period,
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unlike labor supply.16 The shock absorbing feature of
z, reinforces the variability of household
investment, but allows the government to maintain a very smooth series for g,ly,, as compared to the
other tax systems (see figure 2). Under the two simplified tax systems, the government prefers to absorb
budget shocks mainly by increasing the variability of g, . Changes in g, do not affect household decisions
due to the additively separable way in which g, enters the household utility function. The government
maintains a low variability in
z, to reduce fluctuations in household labor supply. Interestingly, the
simplified tax systems do a better job of matching the relatively high standard deviation of public
expenditures in U.S. data. In the complicated and lump-sum tax systems, the standard deviation of g,
is much lower than the U.S. value. For these tax systems, it appears that an additional shock is needed
to increase the variability of government spending.17
The labor tax (in the complicated system) and the uniform income tax (in both simplified
systems) are procyclical (table 6b). The government uses these taxes to help smooth households' aftertax income from labor. For example, a positive technology shock is accompanied by increases in z, and
2,.
This provides households with an implicit insurance mechanism against earnings variability, thus
leading to lower standard deviations of household consumption and hours worked in the distortionary
tax systems versus those in the lump-sum tax system (table 6a).
The model's prediction that the capital tax should display more variability than the labor tax is
consistent with the U.S. tax rate estimates we have chosen for comparison.18 The model disagrees with
the data, however, in predicting a negative correlation between z, and z,. The U.S. tax rate estimates
1 6 ~ h optimality
e
of using a state-contingentcapital tax to absorb budget shocks has been shown previously by Judd (1989)
and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1993). Bohn (1988) shows how nominal public debt can be used to absorb budget shocks.
17~dding
preference shocks to households' demand for public goods (to simulate wars, for example) would increase the
variability of g, in these tax systems. See Lansing (1994a) for an optimal policy model with preference shocks.
18~igures3 and 4 display the tax rate series before detrending. For quantitative comparisons (table 6) detrending is necessary
because the U.S.labor tax displays a distinct upward trend, while the U.S.capital tax displays a downward trend. These trends
have no counterpart in the model. The trend in T, is possibly linked to the phenomenon of "bracket creep," which existed before
tax schedules were indexed for inflation in 1985. Regarding the trend in T,, Auerbach and Poterba (1988) argue that the
downward trend is due to increasingly generous investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation schedules.
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display a positive correlation.19This suggests there may be rigidities in the U.S. tax code (not accounted
for in the model) that loosely connect the movement of capital and labor taxes over the business cycle.
Explicit modeling of such rigidities is a topic for our future research.
Without a depreciation allowance, the simplified tax system displays wildly counterfactual
behavior, predicting negative correlations with output for ct , ht , and 4 . This behavior can be traced to
the higher variability of zt that results from the lack of a separate tax on capital. The variability of zt
is such that movements in the tax rate can actually override the effects of technology shocks in
determining the behavior of household consumption and inve~tment.~
For a given variance of the technology shock, output is more variable under the system of lumpsum taxes than under any of the distortionary systems (table 6a). This occurs because movements in the
distortionary tax rates partially offset the effects of technology shocks, resulting in lower output
variability. The lump-sum tax system does a reasonably good job of matching the relative standard
deviations of hours and productivity, a feature typical of indivisible labor models (see Hansen 119851).
In all three distortionary systems, however, the standard deviation of hours relative to productivity is too
low, despite the presence of indivisible labor. The insurance features of the optimal tax rates are
responsible for the reduced variability of hours in these systems. Similar to the case for government
spending, our results suggest that an additional shock is needed in the distortionary tax models to
increase the variability of hours worked. Such a specification would be consistent with the position of
Aiyagari (1994), who uses a variance decomposition analysis to argue that the behavior of hours in U.S.
data is driven by multiple shocks.
191n the U.S. data, the correlation coefficient between (detrended) z, and z, equals 0.41, using the z, series from Barro
and Sahasakul (1986) and the z, series from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). The correlation is 0.52 using the z, and z, series
from McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1993).
''~xce~tfor the double taxation of dividends, the income tax with no depreciation allowance is equivalent to a production
tax which takes the form j,= (l-z,)exp (z,) [k:' h P ] ' I X .A tax of this fonn can be modeled as a negative technology shock.
See Abel and Blanchard (1983).
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Table 6a: Business-Cvcle Statistics for the Various Tax Svstems
Standard Deviation in Percent (all series detrended)a
Series
Complicated
Simplified
w/ Depr Allow
GNP=y,
2.32
2.34
Tax Rates
zh 4.12
z, 11.31
Simplified
No Depr Allow
U.S.
~conorn~~
Lump-sum
1.74.
2.96
2.46
5 5.65, 3.65
z
4.27
z
7.80
Tly
1.79
2,
Tly
16.4,4.82
2.44
Table 6b: Business-Cvcle Statistics for the Various Tax Svstems (continued)
Contemporaneous Correlation with Output (all series detrended)a
Series
Tax Rates
Complicated
z,
0.99
6.96
Simplified
w/ Depr Allow
z
0.99
Simplified
No Depr Allow
z
0.99
U.S.
Lump-sum
T l y 6.91
cono om^^
zh 0.37, 0.05
z, 0.10, 0.32
T l y 0.14
aModel statistics are means over 100 simulations, each 46 periods long, after dropping the first 50 periods. Parameter
values are from table 2. All series were logged and detrended (except for tax rates which were only detrended) using the HodrickPrescott Nter (see Prescott [1986]). The filter smoothing parameter was set at A = 100 since all data are at annual frequency.
b ~ . data
~ . cover the period 1947 to 1992. The following quarterly series from Citibase were annualized before
computing statistics: y, = GNPQ, c, = GCDQ+GCNQ (nondurables and services), g, = GGEQ, h, = LHOURS (household survey),
y, 1H , = GNPQLHOURS. The series for x,is fixed business investment + consumer durables expenditures +residential investment.
The series for k, is fixed private capital + stock of consumer durables + residential capital. Both x, and kt are annual series from
Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). Sources for U.S. tax rate data
are described in the notes to table 3. All series were logged (except tax rates) and detrended as in the model.
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7. Concluding Remarks
While our model is admittedly a very abstract and simplified representation of the vastly
complex U.S. tax code, we believe that it can be useful for examining key questions about the
institutional structure of our tax system. In our view, the strength of the model lies in the ability to
capture the general-equilibrium effects of endogenous fiscal policy. Using this approach, we find that
a uniform tax on all types of income yields almost the same welfare as a more complicated system with
separate tax rates on labor and capital income. We also find that the depreciation allowance plays an
important role in encouraging capital accumulation. In a related paper (see Guo and Lansing [1994]),
we extend our examination of various tax structures to include an analysis of single versus double
taxation of firm dividends.
In general, we find that the assumed structure of the tax system can have profound effects on
the characteristics of optimal fiscal policy and the resulting behavior of aggregate economic variables
over the business cycle. Although our model abstracted from economic growth, we expect that tax
structure would continue to have a significant impact in a model where growth is endogenous. Jones,
Manuelli, and Rossi (1993a) employ an endogenous growth model to derive optimal fiscal policy with
separate taxes on labor and capital, and no depreciation allowance. They also examine a case where tax
rates on labor and human capital are restricted to be the same, but physical capital is taxed separately.
In our current research, we are performing tax simplification experiments similar to those done here in
the context of an endogenous growth model (see also Pecorino [I9931 and Stokey and Rebelo [1993]).
Our work thus far agrees with the viewpoint of Slemrod (1990), who argues that selecting an optimal
tax structure can often be more important than the setting of optimal tax rates.
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APPENDIX A
A.l Recursive Formulation of the Government's Problem
To formulate the recursive version of the government's problem specified in equation (1 I), we
first substitute the household first-order conditions (5) into the household budget constraint (2), the
resource constraint (12), and the utility function U(.)to eliminate z,, z,, and c, .' The resource
constraint (12) can then be used to substitute out g,. For the lump-sum tax system, we use the
household first-order conditions to eliminate r,, w,, and c,; the government budget constraint to
eliminate T, ; and the resource constraint to eliminate g, .2 The vector of state variables for the
government's problem in period t is s,={z,, kt, h,,]. In the transformed problem, the government's
decision variables are h , , h, , and k+,. Using primes (') to denote next-period quantities, the recursive
version of the government's problem is shown in (A.1).
The Bellman equation in (A.1) summarizes the recursive nature of the problem The first two
constraints represent two versions of the household budget (after substituting in the first-order
conditions), depending on whether distortionary or lump-sum taxes are used. The next constraint imposes
the condition of equal tax rates on labor and capital for the simplified tax system. The symbols u,, and
u, represent composite error terms that arise due to the presence of E, in the first-order condition for
kt+,.The remaining constraints define the production technology, the factor prices r, and w, , and the law
of motion for the exogenous technology shock.
The dynamic programming problem applies for all t > 0. The problem at t = 0 must be considered
separately, as shown by Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and Charnley (1986).
At t = 0, the stock of private capital is fixed. Optimal policy thus implies a high initial tax on capital to
take full advantage of this nondistortionary source of revenue. We assume that this form of lump-sum
taxation is insufficient to finance the entire stream of future expenditures. The analysis here will focus
.,
,+,
'Due to the presence of the expectation operator in the first-order conditions for k the substitution is accomplished using
= f, ( - ) - u,, where f ,(.) is a function of random variables and ,u, is the forecast error. The assumption
the expression E f
of rational expectations implies E ,.,u, = 0.
,(a)
2 ~ u to
e the presence of monopoly profits in our model, the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Therefore, the
government's problem with lump-sum taxes must be solved in the same manner as the problem with distortionary taxes.
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on policy in stationary stochastic equilibrium, i.e., when t approaches infinity. The linear-quadratic
approximation method used to solve (A.l) is accurate only in the neighborhood of the deterministic
steady-state. Consequently, we do not solve the t=O problem or compute the transition path to the
stationary equilibrium.
v(s)
=
s
=
{ z , k, h-l }
U(.)
=
In(l/h) - A h
where
m a . E,{ U ( .)
subject to
A h + -kA-1
-
h
+
r-$6
m
wh
Bln
- 1 -kt+u, = O
(l-01-02)y
A h + I h - ' -1+6]k
A
+
2
flh
-x-
fl [v(st)I s ] }
+
k', h . 5
r-$6
x
(for the distortionary
tax systems)
- (0,+0,)y + u l = 0 (fortax
the lump-sum
system)
u Z = O (for the simplified
tax system only)
Equilibrium is defined as a value function V(s) and an associated set of stationary decision rules
that satisfy (A.l). The decision rules dictate a set of household allocations and prices at time t that can
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be implemented by means of the government's chosen policy. The government's explicit policy rules
for tax rates and public expenditures are recovered by substituting the implementable allocations and
prices into the applicable first-order conditions and budget constraints.
A.2 Computation Procedure
The dynamic programming problem in (A. 1) is solved numerically using a variant of the linearquadratic approximation technique first used by Kydland and Prescott (1982). An approximate version
of (A.l) is obtained by first substituting as many nonlinear constraints as possible into the return
function U(.).For constraints that cannot be substituted in, a Lagrange multiplier is used to incorporate
the constraint into a redefined return function, and the multiplier is treated as an additional decision
variable. A quadratic approximation of the return function is then computed in terms of the logarithms
of all
variable^.^ The solution algorithm exploits the certainty equivalence property of linear-quadratic
control problems. The optimal decision rules for the approximated economy can be obtained by solving
the deterministic version of the model4 An initial guess Vo is made for the optimal value function V(s)
in the quadratic version of (A.l). Sequential candidate value functions Vi are then computed by
successively iterating on the Bellman equation until the value function has converged. We verified that
the algorithm always converged to the same value function regardless of the initial guess for Vo. Once
the process has converged, log-linear decision rules that dictate household equilibrium allocations are
computed. Log-linear policy rules for z, , z, (or 7,) and g, can then be computed using the household
first-order conditions and the budget constraints, log-linearized around the steady state.
3 ~ h log-linear
e
version of the Kydland-Prescott method is described in Chrktiano (1988).
4
See Sargent (1987, p. 36). Specifically, the stochastic terms E , , u,, and u, are set equal to their unconditional means (zero)
in the numerical algorithm. With a quadratic objective, the first-order conditions are linear in all variables. This allows the
expectation operator in (A.l) to be passed through the expressions, dropping out any stochastic terms.
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FIG 1:
SIMULATED SERIES FOR TAX RATES
0.70
0.65
- lncorne Tow Rate (simplified system, w/ depr ollow)
7
0.60 -
I
0.55
-
0.50
-
0.45
-
+T , ,
*-
7
- Labor Tow Rote (complicated system)
- lncorne Tow Rate (simplified system, no
depr ollow)
0
[L
x
0.25 \
b-a
0.10
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
40
.
44
48
Year
FIG 2: U.S. & SIMULATED SERIES FOR GOVT EXPENDITURES (fraction of GNP)
0.30
I
I
I
-
g/y
g/y
g/y
I
I
(lump-sum system)
(complicoted system)
(simplified system. w/ depr allow)
ha'
0.10
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
Year
28
32
36
40
44
48
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FIG 3:
U.S. SERIES FOR CAPITAL TAX RATES
-
7k -7, -
1952
1957
1962
1967
Capital Tax Rate from McGrattan et 01. (1993)
Copital Tax Rate from Jorgenson & Sullivan (1981)
1972
1977
1982
-
1987
1992
1987
1992
Year
FIG 4:
1947
1952
1957
U.S. SERIES FOR AVERAGE AND LABOR TAX RATES
1962
1967
1972
Year
1977
1982
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