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Working Paver 9104

ON THE VALUATION OF DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
by As11 ~emirguc-Kunt

As11 Demirguc-Kunt is an economist at The
World Bank, Washington, D.C.,'andwas
formerly adissertation fellow'at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The author wishes
to thank Steve Coslett, Edward Kane, Huston
McCulloch, and James Thomson for helpful
comments and discussion.
Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comment.
The views stated herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.

March 1991

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I. Introduction
Valuing a deposit institution's capital is not easy. Current accounting
principles allow managers of deposit institutions to disclose less than their
best estimate of the value of their institution's portfolio. Federal
regulators often find that deposit institution managers have privileged
information about the riskiness of their firm's operations. Legal authority
to use book-value accounting allows these managers to cover up adverse
information.andweakens the effect of market controls that would otherwise
discipline institutions' risk exposure. On the regulatory side, book-value
accounting prevents deposit insurers from discovering problem situations
quickly and delays timely interventions.
The consequences of delaying the closure of institutions with inadequate
capital and the costs these institutions are likely to impose on the taxpayer
are fully discussed in the finance and economics literature. Work by Meltzer
(1967), Scott and Mayer (1971), Black, Miller, and Posner (1978), Merton
(1977, 1978). Karaken and Wallace (1978), Buser, C h m , and Kane (1981), Kane
(1981a, 1981b. 1985, 1989), McCulloch (1981), Guttentag and Herring (1982),
Karaken (1983), and Pyle (1984) warns federal officials of the dangers of such
actions.
In most cases, when failure cannot be prevented, the sooner the bank is
declared insolvent and its management changed, the smaller the losses will be.
Barth, Brumbaugh, and Sauerhaft (1985) compile data showing that the cost of
resolving a savings and loan association's ( S U ) insolvency rises on average
with the length of time that regulatory response is delayed. Their results
indicate that delay is indeed expensive, with costs increasing between
$254,000 and $371,000 for each month that an institution is permitted to
/

remain operating after it has become insolvent under generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP).

-...

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2

More than 1,000U.S. banks were closed during the 1980s, with 427 closed
in 1988-89 alone (see table 1).

At least some of these closures could have

been prevented, or would have been less costly to taxpayers, if regulators had
better information on the institutions' capital.
This paper seeks to develop a model for valuing the capital of deposit
institutions. A concept of regulatory capital developed by Kane (1989) is
modeled and estimated for a sample of failed and nonfailed institutions. Using
data of failed institutions is helpful in highlighting the risk-taking
incentives of low-capital institutions. Results confirm the importance of
enforcing timely closure rules.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the
necessary concepts. Section I11 develops the model, and section IV presents
and interprets the empirical results. Finally, section V summarizes and
concludes the analysis.

11. Valuation of Deposit Institutions' Capital
A firm's capital may be identified as a particular measure of its net

worth: the difference between the value of the firm's assets and nonownership
liabilities. In order to determine the level of capital, assets and
liabilities must be itemized, and an appropriate valuation rule must be
adopted (Kane (19891).
In defining capital, various categories of assets and liabilities, both
implicit and explicit, are recognized. ,Implicit assets and liabilities are
defined as all sources of positive and negative future cash flows that are
considered "unbookable" by the accounting profession.
Valuation of capital is crucial. Using different valuation rules leads to
different asset and liability values. Historical-cost principles, which
measure capital according to the historical cost at which banks acquired their

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3

balance-sheet positions, provide the basis for determining the book values of
U.S. banks' balance-sheet accounts. Book values are recorded in terms of
acquisition costs. As market prices change, these costs tend to depart from
market values.

Kane (1989) notes two shortcomings of historical-cost

accounting. First, using acquisition costs undervalues an institution's best
portfolio decisions and overvalues its worst ones. Second, by not modifying
the acquisition costs to reflect market developments, historical-cost
accounting neglects potentially observable changes in the value of a firm's
investments. This method exaggerates the economic relevance of the
acquisition costs of the institution's assets and liabilities and fails to
appraise its investment successes and failures on an ongoing basis.
To determine a depository institution's level of capital for regulatory
purposes, it is helpful to decompose its capital into two components:
enterprise-contributed equity and federally contributed equity (Kane [1989]).
Enterprise-contributed equity is the capital of the institution net of the
capitalized value of its deposit insurance guarantees. To the extent that
federal guarantees are underpriced, the deposit insurer contributes de facto
capital to the institutions. Federally contributed capital is determined by
the amount of risk that insurance agencies stand ready to absorb. These
valuable guarantees are actually equity instruments that make the U.S.
government a de facto investor in deposit institutions. Unless an appropriate
recapitalization rule is imposed on managers and stockholders, the capitalized
value of the guarantees increases as the institution's enterprise-contributed
equity decreases or as the riskiness of either its portfolio or its
environment increases. Clearly, the value of the federally contributed
capital should not be counted as a part of the institution's capital for
regulatory purposes.

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The appropriate insolvency criterion that regulators should adopt is the
market value of enterprise-contributed capital, which can be obtained by
subtracting the value of federal guarantees from the institution's market
value of equity. The capitalized value of the federal guarantees can be
estimated using one of the several approaches explained in section 111.
De facto or market-value insolvency exists when an institution can no
longer meet its contractual obligations from its own resources. This occurs
whenever the market value of the institution's nonownership liabilities
exceeds the market value of its assets; in other words, when the market value
of its enterprise-contributed equity becomes negative. However, in determining
official insolvency, regulators tend to look for book-value insolvency rather
than market -value insolvency.
Book-value insolvency exists when the difference between the book values
of an institution's assets and liabilities is negative. Even when an
institution is book-value solvent, it may be insolvent according to market
value because of refinancing difficulties that surface as an ongoing liquidity
shortage. A liquidity shortage occurs whenever an institution's cash, reserve
balances, and established lines of credit prove insufficient to accommodate an
unanticipated imbalance in the inflow and outflow of customer funds. If a
continuing liquidity shortage is not relieved by outside borrowing or
government assistance, assets may have to be sold at fire-sale prices--at less
than their equilibrium value. Such sales erode the institution's capital and
may cause its uninsured customers to move their funds to safer locations. The
resulting run on the institution's resources could cause the institution to
borrow nondeposit funds or to sell earning assets. Given that these runs are
/

typically motivated by the presence of large unbooked losses in an

-

.'

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institution's balance sheet, asset sales push the book value of the
institution's assets toward their market value, eventually resulting in the
institution's book-value insolvency.
Official (de jure) insolvency occurs when market-value insolvency is
officially recognized and the firm is closed or involuntarily merged out of
existence. De facto failure can be defined more broadly than closure as any
regulator-induced cessation of autonomous operations. These different
concepts are listed and briefly defined in table 2 .

They are consistent with

the conventional concepts found in Benston et al. (1986) and Kane (1985,
1989).
These definitions clarify the concept of economic insolvency for financial
institutions. Clearly, an institution's official insolvency and closure should
be determined by its economic insolvency.'

The next section discusses

alternative approaches for measuring economic insolvency.

111. Measure of Economic Insolvency: Net Value

In the literature, regressors used to explain the financial condition of
individual institutions (or their failure, since the distinction is not
usually made) are primarily ratios that are computed from banks' periodic
financial statements.2 Akaike's information criterion, which employs the
log-likelihood function of a model adjusted for the number of estimated
coefficients, is commonly used to select the combination of variables that
best fits a given set of data (Akaike [1973]). Usually, a large number of
financial ratios are tried before a final model is obtained.
This paper seeks to develop a measure of economic insolvency as
opposed to book-value insolvency. The concept of economic insolvency is
.. stressed because the analysis considers implicit as well as explicit assets.
This paper further seeks to avoid the traditional ad hoc choice of regressors

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common to balance-sheet and income-statement analysis. The choice of
candidate regressors in the accounting-ratio models lacks a compelling
theoretical foundation. Financial ratios are simply utilized in various
statistical procedures until they "work."
One alternative approach, introduced by Kane and Unal (1990) and applied
by Thomson (1987), is the statistical market value accounting model (SWAM).
S W A M decomposes the market capitalization of a firm (the value of a firm's
stock) by using accounting and capital-market information to explain the value
of the institution's equity.

SMVAM allows the empirical analysis of the

institution's financial condition to be based on a theoretical foundation and
permits an estimate of the enterprise-contributed equity of the institution to
be constructed.
For a deposit insurer, enterprise-contributed equity is the appropriate
indicator of a financial institution's economic insolvency, as explained in
the previous section. ~ifferentmethods for subtracting federally contributed
capital to obtain the enterprise-contributed equity are presented below.

The Statistical Market Value Accounting Model
Assuming efficient markets, SMVAM develops two distinctions that decompose
the market capitalization of a firm into three parts. The first distinction
decomposes market value into hidden capital reserves and recorded capital
reserves under GAAP. The second distinction decomposes hidden capital
reserves into values that are "unhooked but bookable" by accountants under

GAAP and into values that they treat as unbookable off-balance-sheet items.
The model develops explicit estimates of both components of hidden capital.
At any time, a firm's market capitalization (MV) is the product of its
share price and the number of shares outstanding. MV may be expressed 'a*.' the

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7
market value of bookable and unbookable assets, (%+A',),

minus the market

value of bookable and unbookable nonequity liabilities,
(Lm+L1,).

Isolating the value of federal guarantees (FCG) from

other unbookable assets, the following relationship is obtained:
MV- [F,, + (A',-L',)I

+ (&-L,).

(1)

Since recorded assets and liabilities are carried at historical cost, even the
bookable equity (&-L,)=B,

is not observed directly. It is assumed that

market participants estimate the market value of bookable equity elements by
applying a valuation ratio (k) to the value of the institution's book equity
(BV), i.e., the book value of assets minus the book value of liabilities.
Expressing the value of unbookable equity [FCG+ (A',-L',)]

as U,

and allowing for an approximation error, equation (1) is rewritten as
MV-U,+kBV+e.
Kane and Unal (1990) term this equation SMVAM. The equation can be estimated
either from time series for individual banks, cross-sectionally in each
period, or for pooled time-series, cross-sectional data.
SMVAM can use any flexible or functional form. However, the linear
approximation is adopted as a convenient specification. Having a small number
of parameters allows rich interpretations:
U, is the market's estimate of unbookable equity. It is the market
value of off-balance-sheetitems that also includes the value of
federal guarantees. A positive (negative) value implies that
unbookable equity serves as a net source of (drain on) capital for
stockholders.
kBV is the market's estimate of the value of the components of accounting

or book net worth. k is the valuation ratio of the market to boqk
value of the itemized assets and liabilities. Only if this ratio
equals unity is the accounting value of an institution's equity an

(2)

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8

unbiased estimate of the bookable components of stockholder equity. A
market premium (discount) exists when the ratio is greater (less) than
one.
The model envisages that market participants estimate the market value
of the elements of bookable equity by applying an appropriate markup or
markdown ratio, k , tc the accounting net worth reported by the institution.
The model also presumes that, to construct the market value of the
institution's equity, market participants add their estimate of unbookable
equity: the market value of off-balance-sheet items, which includes the value
of FDIC guarantees.
Hence, in equation ( 2 ) , U, is the portion of market value accounted for
by unbookable equity and kBV is the portion of market value accounted for by
bookable equity. The theoretical values of the intercept and the slope
coefficient are zero and one, respectively, is no off-balance-sheetitems
exist and if the bookable assets and liabilities are marked to market.
SMVAM allows us to study the economic solvency (or insolvency) of an
institution by studying the determinants of the market value of its equity.
To estimate the enterprise-contributed equity, it is first necessary to
estimate the value of federal guarantees.

Federally Contributed Equity
The market value of a firm's capital is equal to the market value of its
enterprise-contributed capital plus the market value of its insurance
guarantees (federally contributed capital).

Federal guarantees provide credit

enhancements that allow insured institutions to operate with less
enterprise-contributed equity, making the U.S. government a de facto investor
in deposit institutions. The market value of deposit insurance guarantees can
be defined as the incremental value these guarantees add to the market value

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9
of a financial institution's enterprise-contributed equity. Alternatively, we
may call enterprise-contributed equity the net value of the institution after
the value of the guarantees is taken out.
The literature presents different approaches on how to value &posit
insurance guarantees operationally. A common approach is to estimate this
value using an extension of the Black-Scholes (1973) contingent claims model.
Merton (1977). Markus and Shaked (1984). Ronn and Verma (1986), and Schwartz
and Van Order (1988) take this approach, viewing the insurance guarantee as a
put option that gives depositors the right to sell their claims on the
institution to the insurer at face value. Calculating the value of the
guarantee under this approach requires data on the market value of the
institution's capital, its assets, and the instantaneous variance of the
market value of its assees.

An alternative approach is discussed in Benston et al. (1986).

They argue

that the market value of a guarantee can be estimated either from the benefits
the insured party receives or from the costs the insurer incurs. Guarantee
benefits are defined as the capitalized value of the annual interest savings
(net of guarantor fees) that the guaranteed party achieves with the help of
its guarantee. Guarantee costs are defined as the risk-adjusted present value
of a fund of reserves that is sufficient to cover both the monitoring and
insolvency-resolution costs of the insurer. In a competitive equilibrium, the
two counterparts give the same value.
Following portfolio theory, the funding interest rate (Q) of an
institution that does not have a credible guarantee rises with its leverage
and with the riskiness of its portfolio. In contrast, assuming perfect
markets, a completely guaranteed institution could borrow unlimited amounts at
the riskless, or Treasury, interest rate

(q)regardless

of its leverage or

the riskiness of its portfolio. Then the gross benefits of a guarantee can be

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10
determined by the difference between these two rates: R,,-%.

To find the

net benefits of this guarantee, subtract all forms (implicit and explicit) of
annualized per-dollar premiums the guarantor collects in exchange for its
services. To avoid subsidies or taxes, this premium (%) should vary with
the riskiness of the institution and correspond to changes in R,,.
The insured institution's annual benefits per dollar of guaranteed
liabilities are the difference between the ex ante risk premium and the per

(R,,-q)
-%. For any R,,, unless % equals the
the institution is either taxed or subsidized.
risk premium R,,-q,

annum guarantee fee:
ex ante

To calculate the value of the guarantee using this approach, one must estimate
the institution's funding rate had it been uninsured (R,,)
the per annum implicit and explicit guarantee fee

and the value of

(%).

Another approach, discussed in Benston et'al. (1986) and applied by Kane
and Foster (1986), is to treat guarantee value as an implicit asset on an
institution's balance sheet. The estimate of the guarantee value is obtained
as a residual value by subtracting the market value of bookable and unbookable
assets from the market value of bookable and unbookable liabilities plus the
market value of the institution's stock.
This calculation of FG is possible if every other off-balance-sheet
source of value is accounted for. Kane and Foster (1986) use this approach to
value the Federal National Mortgage Association's (FNMA) guarantee value. It
is relatively easy to apply this approach to FNMA because of its simple
balance sheet, which consists mostly of priceable mortgages. To be able to use
this approach for a commercial bank, however, one must price the bank's more
heterogeneous and infrequently traded assets.
It is also possible to estimate the guarantee value within SMVAM. SMVAM
develops an estimate of the capitalized value of federal guarantees with the
help of certain simplifying assumptions.

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SMVAM and the Value of Federal Guarantees
Assuming that capital markets are efficient, the stock price of the
institution incorporates the per-share value of federal guarantees. If one
could also readily obtain a market value of the institution's
enterprise-contributed equity, then the value of the deposit insurance
guarantees would be the difference between these two values. The relationship
is clarified in figure 1. We would expect the market value to approach
enterprise-contributed equity (NV) at large positive values. This is because
the value of the insurance guarantees becomes negligible as the institution
becomes healthier, or has more of its own capital. In other words, for a
well-capitalized institution, federal guarantees do not provide a significant
level of credit enhancement. For positive values of enterprise-contributed
equity, the 45-degree line represents the asymptote to which the market value
approaches. When the enterprise-contributed equity is zero (at the origin) so
that the institution becomes market-value insolvent, its value is comprised
solely of its deposit insurance guarantees.
Unfortunately, the market value of enterprise-contributed equity is not
readily available. Instead, the book value of equity is used as a proxy for
this variable. The relationship is now different for three reasons: 1) book
values are not marked to market, 2) book values do not include
off-balance-sheetitems, and 3) book values are not necessarily exogenous.
As already discussed, the market value of bookable equity (B,) is not
observed, because recorded assets and liabilities are carried at historical
cost, To obtain Be, BV is adjusted by a valuation ratio. Kane and Unal
(1990) interpret SMVAM by imposing identifying restrictions on a two-equation
.

-

model of Ue and Be:
U.

-

aU + buBV

+

el

(3)

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12
B,

- a, + b,BV

+

e2.

Because all four coefficients cannot be identified using only BV, S W A M is
a reduced form of these two equations that can be solved by restricting b,
and a, to zero. As Kane and Unal discuss, to the extent these restrictions
do not hold, SMVAM is less effective in separating the components of hidden
reserves.
The value of federal guarantees is excluded from enterprise-contributed
equity by definition. Book values also exclude other off-balance-sheetitems,
because under GAAP, implicit assets or liabilities cannot be itemized. Again,
using only one instrumental variable (BV), it is not possible to distinguish
between the value of federal guarantees and other off-balance-sheetitems.
Treating BV as exogenous is another restriction. As Kane and Unal discuss,
BV may not be exogenous because GAAP gives recording options to institutional
managers and because regulators penalize low BV. Therefore, managers of
troubled deposit institutions especially use accounting options to overstate
capital and to reduce regulatory pressure.
These restrictions introduce errors into the relationship. A final
restriction is the linearity of the assumed relationship between MV and BV.
However, as.Kane and Unal note, .for a representative sample of the banking
universe, the range of variation (both upside and downside) is controlled by
market forces. Large holdings of capital are limited by takeover discipline,
since they reduce deposit-insurance subsidies. Low levels of BV are also
limited because of regulatory penalties.(Buser, Chen, and Kane [1981]).
To obtain an estimate of federally contributed equity, one or more
additional restrictions must be imposed. ~ss'umin~
that the unbookable equity
of the institution consists of the FDIC guarantees, U, can be taken as an
estimate of giet,the standardized value of federal guarantees. This
assumption is overly strong, especially for large institutions that have

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13
access to a broad range of off-balance-sheetactivities. The nonlinear
version of SMVAM explained in the next section is an attempt to remedy this
problem.
Having obtained an estimate of g

int

from SMVAM, the enterprise-

contributed equity or net value (NV) is given by subtracting giPtfrom
the predicted market value of the institution's stock. The equation is
estimated from time series for individual banks and from pooled time-series,
cross-sectional data for all institutions.

A Nonlinear Version
One of the assumptions SMVAM makes is the linearity of the relationship
between the market value and book value of the institution's equity. This is
not an adverse assumption if the sample is representative of the banking
universe.

However, this may not be true for a sample of unhealthy

institutions. The nonlinearity assumption may become overly violated for
institutions with almost zero or negative book values. To test the
sensitivity of results to this possible nonlinearity, I also consider a
nonlinear version of SMVAM.
In studying the relationship between MV and the market value of
enterprise-contributed equity, I use BV as a proxy for the unobserved
enterprise-contributed equity. This results in a similar but more complicated
version of the relationship given in figure 1. The nonlinear relationship
between market and book values is approximated by the following function (see
figure 2) :

MI

- O.Sb(BV-a)

+d0.25b2(~v-a12+

c2

(4

+ u.

Figure 2 makes simplifying assumptions that are later relaxed. It assumes
/

that all bookable equity is booked and marked to market (BV-Be) and tha't-

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14
there are no off-balance-sheetitems except for federal guarantees
(A,m-L'md).
Then equation (4) collapses to equation (1) with a-0 and b-1, and BV is an
unbiased proxy for NV. As explained below, parameters a and b are introduced
to capture biases when the above assumptions are relaxed. The numerical
parameters 0.5 and 0.25 ensure that for large MVs, the function approaches the
45-degree line in the absence of biases in BV. For large negative BVs, the
function has asymptote MV-0, i.e., MV approaches zero.
The two asymptotes of the function are theoretically plausible.
Institutions that are well capitalized may have high levels of BV (-NV, given
the above assumptions), in which case MV approaches BV. This is consistent
with the diminishing value of credit enhancements that federal guarantees
provide for well-capitalized institutions. Because BV is assumed to be an
unbiased estimate of the market value of bookable equity, the slope of the
asymptote (b) equals unity. In addition, since a stock price cannot become
negative, at negative book values the MV approaches zero (the horizontal
axis).
At any point in figure 2, the MV of the institution differs from its BV
(-NV) by the value of its federal guarantees. Thus, also at the origin, when
BV equals zero, the MV of the institution differs from zero by the value of its
insurance guarantees. Given the above,assumptions, the enterprise-contributed
equity also becomes zero (NV-0)

when book value equals zero. In this way, a

standardized value of the insurance guarantees can be approximated by the market
value of the institution at the point of economic insolvency (a).

In figure 2.

this corresponds to the height (c) of the function when BV equals zero, at (a).
It is important to note that the value of the guarantee'is

conditional on the

regulator's closure rule. If the authorities allow institutions to operate even
after they are economically insolvent, and the stockholders are allowed to claim

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15
future profits, this possible additional value reflects in a higher capitalized
value of the guarantees.
Figure 3 relaxes the assumption that BV is an unbiased estimate of NV.
There are two possibilities: 1) BV overestimates Be, or off-balance-sheet
items are a drain on the institution's capital, and 2) BV underestimates Be,
or off-balance-sheet items are a source of the institution's capital, Again,
the extent of this overestimation or underestimation may be affected by the
regulators' closure rule and their capital requirements. Because financial
institution managers can alter the value of BV under GAAP, greater penalties for
low levels of BV without the adoption of MV accounting rules may persuade the
institutions to become increasingly deceptive in their accounting practices as
BV declines into penalty ranges.
In the first panel of figure 3, BV overestimates the market value of
bookable equity. As a result, the institution's market value of bookable
liabilities exceeds that of its bookable assets before its BV becomes zero. If
off-balance-sheetitems (other than federal guarantees) are also a drain on
equity (or at least not a great enough source to offset the first effect), the
institution's enterprise-contributed equity becomes zero at point a, where BV is
still positive. To the right of point a, where the institution is economically
solvent, MV approaches BV. However, since BV overestimates Be, there is a
market discount and the slope (b) of the asymptote is less than unity. To the
left of point a, where the institution becomes more and more economically
insolvent, MV approaches zero. Again, conditional on the regulator's closure
rule, the standardized value of the insurance guarantees is given by the height
(c) of the function at the point of economic insolvency.

The interpretation of the second panel of figure 3 is similar. In this
case, BV underestimates the market value of bookable equity, or the
off-balance-sheetitems are a source of equity (or not a significant enough

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16
drain to offset the first effect).

Then, the institution becomes economically

insolvent only after its BV becomes negative. With BV a downward-biased
estimate of Be, the right asymptote has a slope that is greater than unity.
In other words, a market premium exists. The MV starts approaching zero to the
left of point a, and depending on the closure rule, the value of the guarantees
is again given by the height of the curve at a.
In light of this explanation, the parameters of the nonlinear model have the
following interpretations:
a

-

The point at which enterprise-contributed equity becomes zero and the
institution is economically insolvent. If there are no off-balance-sheet
items, and BV is an unbiased estimate of Be, then BV is also an
unbiased estimate of the enterprise-contributed equity (BV-NV) and point a
is where BV equals zero. If BV overestimates (underestimates) Be, or
off-balance-sheet items are a drain on (source of) equity, the institution

b

-

becomes economically insolvent where BV is greater (less) than zero.
As

with the slope coefficient in SKVAM, the slope of the asymptote reflects

the valuation ratio of the market to book value of the institution's
bookable equity. If BV represents an unbiased estimate of bookable equity,
the slope is equal to unity. Otherwise, there is a market discount

c

-

(premium) and b is less (greater) than unity.
At the point of economic insolvency, the M
V of the institution differs from
zero by the value of its deposit insurance guarantees. Given a particular
closure rule, the standardized value of the guarantees is given by the
height of the function at point a.
It is also possible to discuss the above model within an option-pricing

framework. The FDIC receives a compound option in exchange for its guarantee.
The received option is a call option, written not directly on the firm's assets,
but on the right to close out the firm's stockholders and to put a given

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17
percentage of the insolvent firm's unallocated losses to the uninsured
depositors by liquidating the firm (Kane [1986]).

However, as Kane emphasizes,

the ability of regulators to exercise this option is limited by their
constraints and incentives.
To minimize its losses, the FDIC should exercise its takeover option and
close the institution as soon as it becomes economically insolvent. If the FDIC
could exercise its option at the point of market-value insolvency, the put half
of the compound option need not be exercised, since net worth is approximately
zero and any losses would be minimal. Delays in exercising the takeover option
due to aforementioned constraints and incentives encourage an already insolvent
institution to take risks that make it likely to become more insolvent, causing
the put half of the compound option to gain importance once the call half is
eventually exercised. The implicit and explicit costs to the FDIC increase to
the extent that regulatory constraints prevent this put half of the option from
being exercised.
Therefore, it is possible to consider point a, the onset of market-value
insolvency, to be the theoretical exercise price of the call option. In theory,
an unconflicted agent would take over the equity of the firm at the point of
market-value insolvency. However, in practice, conflicted agents delay action
because of constraints and incentives. To the left of point a, if the
institution is allowed to operate, the FDIC's call option is out of money,
because any incurred losses primarily accrue to the insurance agency.
This nonlinear version can be used to test the sensitivity of the results to
nonlinearity. To obtain an estimate of the guarantee value within the nonlinear
version of SMVAM, we assume that the value of the institution's stock price
reflects a standardized value of federal guarantees when the institution's NV is
zero (c

-

.-

g

i.t

) . The nonlinear version is expected to produce a more

accurate estimate of guarantee value, since it is measured at the point where

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18

NV-0, whereas the estimate of the linear version is obtained at BV-0.

With this

specification it is also possible to parameterize c to be a function of the
riskiness of the bank and the size of its liabilities (Black, Miller, and Posner
[1978], Karaken and Wallace [1978], Sharpe [1978], and Kane [1985, 19891). The
average annual stock price range is used to proxy risk, and liabilities are
given by total assets minus the book value.

In this way, the FDIC guarantee

value varies both across time and among institutions with respect to their size
and riskiness (cirt-gint). The construction of NV parallels the linear
case, except that c is used as an estimate of the guarantee value instead of
ue

The equation is estimated for pooled time-series, cross-sectional data.

Comparison of S W A M and its Nonlinear Version
To show the relationship between SMVAM and its nonlinear version, equation

(4) can be rewritten as follows:
MV
where

4 is

4-

- c + b(BV-a) + 4 + u,
40.25b~(~v-a)~
+ c2

-

(c

(5)

+

0.5b(BV-a)).

the nonlinearity factor that SMVAM omits. Rearranging (5) as
(6)

MV-c - b a + b B V + $ + u
gives S W A M (2) with U,-c-ba, k-b, and e++u.
The nonlinear version collapses to SMVAM if BV is an unbiased estimate of
Be (a-0) and if there is no source of nonlinearity (+O).
Nonzero a affects only the U, coefficient of SWAM. To clarify this
effect, it is useful to remember that U, is the intercept (the height of the
function at BV-0).

In contrast, c is the height of the function at.NV-O.

Therefore, c changes if BV underestimates or overestimates Be, whereas U, is
always given by the intercept. Thus, for nonzero a, c does not equal U,.
a is greater (less) than zero, c is greater (less) than U,.

If

In addition, if

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19
the relationship between MV and BV is nonlinear, SMVAM is misspecified and its
coefficients are biased. These biases, resulting from nonzero a and
nonlinearity, are further discussed in Demirgiic-Kunt and Thomson
(1988).
In summary, both the linear and nonlinear SMVAM describe the & facto
deceptiveness of GAAP. Unless U,=O and k-1 for SMVAM, and b-1 and c-a-0 (or
a-C~/BV) for its nonlinear version, the accounting value of a bank's capital
represents a biased estimate of the market value of stockholder equity. If the
estimated U, and c are significantly positive, unbookable equity serves as a
net source of the institution's capital. A negative U, value in SMVAM
is interpreted to indicate that unbookable equity is a drain on institutional
capital. The nonlinear version does not allow a negative c by definition, since
MV cannot be negative for any BV.

A slope bias also exists if kzl and

bzl. Then, the changes in accounting values are also biased estimates of the
changes in the bookable equity of the institution. A k or b less (greater) than
unity is interpreted as a discount (premium) of the amount (1-k) or (1-b).

SMVAM: Specification
The specification of SMVAM is tested for omitted variables, functional form,
the stationarity of coefficient estimates, and the validity of OLS assumptions.
To test for omitted variables, additional candidate regressors (such as
stock market index, bank failure rate, business failure rate, interest rates,
volatility of interest rates, etc.) are included in SMVAM. The alternative
specifications, including the proxy variables and their various combinations,
are evaluated by F-tests.
In addition to the choice of regressors, the choice of functional form can
also introduce specification error into an equation. Given the nature of our
data set, SMVAM's linearity assumption may be too restrictive. Furthermore,

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visual inspection of the data indicates a nonlinear relationship between MV and

BV. As a simple test of fit, inclusion of squared BV (to represent a quadratic
form) as a regressor produces a significantly higher R ~ . Thus, the
theoretically justified nonlinear version is also estimated to test the
sensitivity of results to this form of nonlinearity.
Stationarity of SMVAM parameters is also tested for using the Chow test
(Chow [1960]).

For the pooled sample, the null hypothesis of stationarity

cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level. However, to allow for
possible differences among individual institutions, the equation is estimated
separately for each bank. The possibility of parameter shifts for different
groups of institutions is also investigated, using various partitions such as
failed/nonfailed banks, market-value solvent/insolvent banks, and large/giant
banks. Since preliminary results indicate significant differences among the
coefficient estimates of different subsamples, differences among all subgroups
are studied simultaneously to handle overlaps among partitions.

This is done

using slope and intercept dummy variables.
Presence of autocorrelated disturbances is detected by the Durbin-Watson
test (Durbin and Watson [1950, 1951, 19711).

Because the above-mentioned tests

presumably establish that the model specification is adequate, it is not
surprising that attempts to remove autocorrelation by including additional
exogenous variables prove unsuccessful. The equation is reestimated using the
Cochrane-Orcutt (1949) technique. The correlation coefficient is assumed to be
constant across institutions for the pooled sample. For individual-bank
regressions, the correction is made based on individual-bank correlation
coefficients.
Presence of heteroscedasticity is also detected using Breusch-Pagan (1979)
and Goldfeld-Quandt.(1965, 1972) tests. The formal model of the process
generating heteroscedasticity in the equation is not known. Still, since we

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21
might suspect that error variance differs due to differences in the size of the
included institutions, the equation (including the constant term) is deflated
alternatively by both total assets and book value. However, tests conducted
following these corrections still indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity.
Instead of specifying additional ad hoc error structures, White's (1980)
consistent estimator of the variance-covariance matrix is calculated.

Data-Related Problems
Data-related difficulties also need to be considered. In estimating SMVAM
for failed institutions owned by bank holding companies (approximately one-fifth
of the.failed sample), an additional problem arises. The book value and market
value of equity used are the individual bank's book value and the holding
company's market value,~respectively,
since the stock of the bank seldom trades
separately. As Kane and Unal (1990) also discuss, to the extent that holding
companies have other bank and nonbank subsidiaries and to the extent that the
book value of these subsidiaries is correlated with the book value of the bank,
the regression estimates of SMVAM would be biased.
This problem does not arise for the sample of nonfailed banks.

Included in

this subsample are one or multibank holding companies without nonbank
subsidiaries. Holding-company market value and consolidated book value are used
in estimating the regressions. However, by using consolidated data, options of
differential treatment of some components are neglected, such as different banks
owned by the same holding company. In'other words, the relationship studied is
between the holding-company market value and overall book values of the
subsidiaries.
In addition, the book-value data used in this study include loan loss
reserves. To the extent that loan loss reserves represent an estimate of
anticipated losses, they deserve to be offset against these losses. Only the

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22

amount over anticipated losses belongs in the book value of equity.

Including

gross reserves overstates the capital of the institutions.
Furthermore, the sample of institutions in this study is far from being
representative of the banking universe. This is a study of large commercial
banks; whether the results obtained here are applicable to other institutionsis
an issue that remains to be investigated.

Data Set
Panel data are used in estimating this model. A sample of failed and
nonfailed banks is chosen so that stockholder-contributed equity and guarantee
value can be compared and contrasted for the two groups of institution^.^
Analyzing data of failed banks is important because their federal guarantee
value and stockholder-contributed equity should differ drastically from those of
the nonfailed banks.

A list of failed banks with assets greater than $90 million (smaller banks
seldom prove to have actively traded stocks) is obtained from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation's Annual Reports from 1973 to 1989. Annual
data on number of shares, book value per share, total assets, and price range
are col1ecte.d from Moody's Bank Manual for each bank, where possible, from
1963 up to the date of failure. Variable definitions are given in table 3.
Table 4 lists the names of the 32 failed banks for which complete data could
be collected. Banks have an asset size range of $92 million to $47 billion.
Three-fourths of the failed banks are from 'southernstates (Texas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and California), and the rest are
from New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Alaska.
The universe of nonfailed banks is identified from Moody's Bank Manual
in three steps. First, each listed bank is screened to choose the banks that
come from the aforementioned 12 states. Second, all of these banks that fall

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23
within the failed-bank asset range are kept. Finally, all FDIC-member banks
with actively traded stock (as reported in the Bank Manual) are chosen to
constitute the universe of nonfailed banks. The banks in this universe are FDIC
members and have traded stock throughout the sample period (1963, or the date of
charter, to 1987).
The candidate banks are then separated into two groups based on their home
state. A random sample of 50 nonfailed banks is chosen from the two groups of
candidate banks such that the nonfailed sample has the same geographic
dispersion: 75 percent from the southern states, and 25 percent from the rest.
The resulting control sample also has an asset-size dispersion roughly similar
to that of the failed sample. The same annual data are collected for the
nonfailed banks.

IV. Empirical Results
Final specifications for the SMVAM are presented in tables 5, 6, and 7. All
of the reported results are obtained after the corrections listed above.
The SMVAM coefficients describe the de facto deceptiveness of GAAP. Only if
both U,-O

and k-1 would the book value of a bank's capital represent an

unbiased estimate of the market value of its stockholder equity. If the
estimated intercept is positive (negative), unbookable assets and liabilities
serve as a net source of (drain on) institutional capital. In addition, changes
in accounting values are biased estimates of changes in the market value of
bookable equity if the estimated k is not equal to one.
In this paper, SWAM is used to obtain an estimate of the capitalized value
of federal guarantees and therefore the value of enterprise-contributed equity.
However, as emphasized in the previous section, U, is an estimate of

-

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24
unbookable equity and may overestimate or underestimate the value of federal
guarantees, depending on the magnitude and effect of other off-balance-sheet
items on the capital of the institution.
The nonlinear version may be interpreted as an attempt to remedy this
shortcoming. By allowing the guarantee value to be estimated at the point where
the enterprise-contributed equity becomes zero, the c parameter is expected to
be a more accurate estimate. Allowing c to vary with the riskiness of the
institution and the size of its liabilities captures additional information
neglected by the linear version. A positive c indicates that federal guarantees
are a source of capital for the institution. Similarly, positive (negative)
values for the d and e parameters indicate that the value of the guarantee
increases (decreases) with an increase in the riskiness or liability size of the
institution. Parameter a measures the extent to which BV misrepresents the
enterprise-contributed equity. A positive (negative) a indicates that
enterprise-contributed equity becomes zero although BV is positive (negative).
This shows that BV overvalues (undervalues) its market value or that
off-balance-sheetitems are a drain on (source of) the institution's capital.
Finally, b corresponds to k in SMVAM.

SMVAM Results
Table 5 presents time-series results for individual banks. Table 6 gives
results of preliminary regressions obtained by partitioning the data in three
ways. Thefollowing sample partitions are considered: 1) failed/nonfailed
banks, 2) market-value solvent/insolvent banks, and 3) large/giant banks.
Sample partitions allow us to investigate the sensitivity of the results to
different breakdowns and to compare and contrast findings for different groups
of institutions.

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25

The breakdown between failed and nonfailed banks is straightforward and
employs the failure definition adopted in this paper. The second breakdown,
between market-value solvent and insolvent banks, is subject to estimation
error, since the market-value insolvency of institutions is not observed.
Before institutions can be identified as solvent or insolvent, an initial
estimation of the equation is necessary. The breakdown is based on the estimate
of the market-value-insolvencypoint, a, obtained from the nonlinear version of
SMVAM instead of the estimated NV obtained from SMVAM, which seems to be the
most obvious ~ h o i c e . However,
~
although NV gives us a ranking of institutions
according to their degree of solvency, it proves negative in only two
observations. This is the result of nonnegative book values.

Partitioning

according to the economic insolvency point obtained from the nonlinear model
produces plausible results. All failed banks are identified as market-value
insolvent at least one year before they fail.
The third breakdown, between large and giant institutions, is rather
arbitrary, however. Institutions with total assets greater than the mean asset
size of the whole sample ($1.9 billion) are considered giant. The "too large to
fail1'preferences of regulators can be used to justify such a partition.
The results for individual banks, and preliminary linear and nonlinear
results obtained for various sample partitions, are given in tables 5 and 6. The
individual-bank coefficient estimates can be summarized as follows:.

U,, the unbookable equity, is significant at 5 or 1 percent levels for 40
percent of the banks. Its sign is positive in almost all cases, implying
that the off-balance-sheetitems serve as a net source of the
institution's capital. One positive component of the intercept is the
/

value of the federal deposit insurance guarantee. The positive sign is

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26
consistent with the hypothesis that underpriced deposit insurance becomes
capitalized into the market value of undercapitalized institutions (Kane
[I9851) .

k, the valuation ratio, is highly significant and positive for 85 percent of
the banks.

It is significantly (at the 5 or 1 percent level) different

from unity in 53 percent of the cases and less than unity in 43 percent
of the cases. The combined OU;

and k-1 condition necessary for

recorded equity to be an unbiased estimate of market value holds only for

26 percent of the banks. These figures are consistent with Kane's (1985)
claim that accounting representations of the economic performance of
major banks are deceptive de facto.
The number of observations available for each institution varies. The fit of
individual-bank regressions, as measured by their respective R~ values, seems
to be directly related to the number of observations in their samples. To
increase the sample size and to capture cross-instirution effects, observations
on all institutions are pooled. To allow for differences among institutions and
to group them into classes with similar parameter estimates, the aforementioned
partitions are considered.
The linear and nonlinear SMVAM results (table 6) with panel data, using the
partitioned samples, indicate significant differences among failed/nonfailed,
insolvent/solvent, and large/giant institutions. However, analyzing these
results individually may be misleading if partitions overlap. The extent of
divergence between coefficient estimates for large and giant institutions
especially signals that differences among other partitions may be driven by the
size partition. To investigate whether this is true, all partitions are studied
/

simultaneously, using dummy variables. Results are given in table 7.

.

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27
The linear version is used as a benchmark in choosing the significant
partitions, since nonlinear estimation runs into convergence difficulties when
all partition dummy variables are included at once.
When all partitions are considered, only the size and failure partitions
prove significant. One possible explanation for why the market-value
solvent/insolvent partition is significant when studied separately, and
insignificant when studied simultaneously, is that this partition involves
estimation error. Insignificance of this partition may also be due to dominance
by the other two partitions.

Interpretation of Linear and Nonlinear SMVAM Coefficients
Linear version results indicate that the unbookable equity (U,) of giant
institutions is significantly greater than that of others. In fact, although
positive for all, the unbookable equity is significant only for giant
institutions (approximately 40 percent of mean NV).

The other sample partitions

do not appear .to affect the magnitude of unbookable equity. U, captures the
value of off-balance-sheet items as well as the value of federal guarantees.
Thus, this large U, value may be the result of giant banks' greater access to
a broader range of off-balance-sheetactivities. Another possible explanation
is the greater value of federal guarantees for these giant institutions. For
very large institutions, administrative, political, and economic difficulties
may cause the regulators to consider these institutions "too big to fail"
I

(Seidman [1986]).

Federal regulators may be especially reluctant to deal with

these insolvencies, since such failures tend to be more visible and more
difficult to carry out successfully, causing greater damage to the regulators'
performance image.

-. -

For the estimate of valuation ratio (k), size and failure
significant differences. The BV of giant institutions is significantly

lead to

.

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discounted by the market, particularly if the institution is also from the
failed group. However, for smaller nonfailed institutions, the market-to-book
valuation ratio indicates a significant premium.
Nonlinear-version results provide additional information. The significant
and positive a (a, al, and a2) coefficients indicate that BV overestimates
enterprise-contributed equity, NV, for all institutions. The extent of
overestimation is greater for giant (al) institutions and is even greater for
failed (a2) institutions. As a percentage of mean total assets, the
overestimation is 2.9 percent for large nonfailed banks. An additional bias of
.49 and 1.6 percent exists for giant and failed banks, respectively.
As in the linear case, the market valuation ratio (b) for large nonfailed
banks indicates a premium. Again, the BV of giant and failed institutions is
significantly discounted. The discount is larger for failed institutions, and
even larger if the failed institution is a giant bank.
The coefficients of risk (d) and liability size (e) are also positive and
significant. This result indicates that greater riskiness increases the value
of federal guarantees, as argued in section 11. The risk coefficient captures
the destabilizing effect of the current deposit insurance system. Also, the
greater the deposit debt of an institution, the greater the value of its deposit
guarantee, since the insurance agency suffers increased losses in the case of
failure. The implied value of federal insurance guarantees ( E ) is positive
for all institutions. However, this guarantee is significantly larger for giant
institutions (40 percent of mean NV as opposed to 30 percent for smaller
institutions).
In conclusion, recorded equity under GAAP is deceptive. BV is a biased
estimate of NV for all institutions. The market discounts BV for both giant and
failed institutions. All institutions appear to enjoy a positive guarantee
value, although it is not significant in the linear version. This federally

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29
contributed equity is significantly greater (in both versions) for giant
institutions. Risk-taking incentives provided by mispriced deposit insurance are
evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient found for the risk
variable. The theoretical discussion in section I1 is also supported by the
data. Riskier institutions have the advantage of increased amounts of federally
contributed equity, which undermines market discipline for all institutions.
According to SMVAM results, market values are not adequately proxied by book
values. This finding underlines the importance of using market data in studying
bank insolvencies.

V. Summary and Conclusions
This paper seeks to develop an empirical model to value a financial
institution's capital for regulatory purposes.

It is emphasized that

enterprise-contributed equity is the appropriate capital definition.
Through the use of Kane and Unal's (1990) SMVAM, the market value of the
institutions' equity is decomposed. My findings indicate that the accounting or
book value of a bank's capital represents a biased estimate of the market value
of stockholder equity for all institutions, and especially for giant ones. GAAP
as well as the more lenient Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) have been
used deceptively by financial institutions that feel the need to hide their true
value.

For regulatory purposes, it is important to adopt market-value

accounting, which provides a reliable measure of the firm's strength.
These results are further evidence.of the government's de facto capital
investment in financial institutions. By allowing those that are market-value
insolvent to operate, the government has accumulated a large de facto equity
stake in deposit institutions. Results obtained also support the hypothesis
that the government's stake is greater in giant institutions and grows with an
increase in the institution's riskiness and liability size. This evidence

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30
supports the idea that the present deposit insurance system has a destabilizing
effect.

It is in the interest of all institutions to increase their riskiness

in order to substitute federal equity for stockholder equity. Greater
risk-taking increases the government's equity stake in these institutions,
thereby increasing the loss exposure of the insurance agency and the taxpayer.
These policies destabilize the financial system by encouraging excessive
risk-taking for all institutions. To protect taxpayer interests, market
discipline must be restored.
In other papers, I (Demirgiic-Kunt [1990a, 1990bJ) use the estimate of NV
developed in this paper to study the failure decision-making of federal
regulators. The failure model developed adopts the S W A M and its nonlinear
version as the insolvency equations. The results confirm the superiority of NV
over BV in predicting bank failures. Furthermore, taking into account the
nonlinearity of the relationship between MV and BV leads to a more accurate
estimate of institution's NV. The greater discriminatory power of NV, estimated
using nonlinear S W A M , results in improved fit of the failure equation and in
higher classification accuracy.
Although the nonlinear version of SWAM does seem to produce an estimate of

NV that has a greater discriminatory power by itself, the results of the
out-of-sampleprediction indicate that the linear version also does well.

The

linear version may be preferred in practice, since it simplifies the estimation
of the model considerably.
The model developed in this paper could be used to determine the net value
for S&L.s and then to compare and contrast findings that apply for banks and
S&L.s

.

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Footnotes
1. Unfortunately, this is hardly the case. In other papers, I
(Demirgiic-Kunt [1990a, 1990bl) analyze empirically the failure
determinants of U.S. commercial banks. Results indicate that economic,
political, and bureaucratic constraints and regulatory incentives are
just as important in determining failure as the economic insolvency of
the institutions.
2.

For a review of empirical literature on bank failures, see ~emirgiic-Kunt
(1989).

3. The enterprise-contributed equity in our case is stockholder-contributed
equity, since the institutions considered in this study are
stockholder-owned rather than mutually owned.

4. As already mentioned, the market-value solvent/insolvent breakdown is
based on an initial estimation. As the estimated coefficient a in table
6 indicates, BV overestimates MV for both failed and nonfailed
institutions. The extent of overvaluation as a percentage of total
assets is about 4 percent for nonfailed banks and 6 percent for failed
banks. Thus, it is possible to classify failed banks with less than 6
percent book-to-assetratio and nonfailed banks with less than 4 percent
book-to-assetratio as market-value insolvent.
5.

For a model of regulatory failure-decision process and empirical
estimation, see ~emirg& -Kunt (1990a, 1990b) .

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Table 1

U.S. Bank Closures For Various Subperiods, 1934-1989

Average Number of
Closings per Year
Years

A l l Banks

Insured Banks

Average Deposits i n
Closed Banks ($ Millions)
A l l Banks

Insured Banks

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Report, 1987, and
telephone c a l l s to FDIC.

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Table 2 Bank-Failure Concept Definitions

Federally Contributed Equity

-

Enterprise-Contributed Equity

-

Book-Value Insolvency

-

Market-Value Insolvency
Economic Insolvency
De Facto Insolvency

Official (De Jure) Insolvency
Closure
De Jure Failure

De Facto Failure

Source: Author.

-

-

the capitalized value of the deposit
insurance guarantees.

the capital of the institution net
of the federally contributed equity.

when the book value of assets minus
the book value of liabilities (book
value of the net worth) is negative.

when the market value of assets minus
the market value of liabilities net
of the value of insurance guarantees
(enterprise-contributed equity) is
negative .

when the regulators judge capital to
be inadequate and the institution is
closed or merged out of existence.

any regulafor-induced cessation of
autonomous operations.

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Figure 1

The Relationship Between MV and NV

The Relationship Between G(NV) and MI

Source:

Author.

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Figure 2

Source:

Author.

The Nonlinear Relationship Between BV and MV when BV-NV

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Figure 3 The Nonlinear Relationship Between BV and MV when B V N V

MV

- 0.5b(BV-a) + d 0 . 2 5 b ~ ( ~ ~ -+a c2) ~ + u

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Table 3 Variable Definitions and Sources

MVt

-

Bvt

-

At

=

=t

-

RISK

-

market value of the institution's equity at time t. MV is
the price per share multiplied by the number of shares
outstanding. All data are obtained from Moody's
Bank Manuals.
book value of the institution's equity at time t. BV is
the book value of assets minus the book value of
liabilities and is given by the sum of capital stock,
surplus, undivided profits, and reserves. Data are
obtained from Moody's Bank Manuals.
total asset size of the institution at time t, as given in
Moody's Bank Manuals.

Source: Author.

total liabilities of the institution at time t, as given in
Moody's Bank Manuals.
average annual stock price range (high price-low price)/
[(high price + low price)/2]. High and low prices for the
year are obtained from Moody's Bank Manuals and The
Wall Street Journal.

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Table 4 Failed Banks With Assets More Than $90 Million, 1973-1989

Failure
Date

Assets

Bank

Oct. 1973

United States National Bank,
San Diego, California
(USN)

Oct. 1974

Franklin National Bank,
New York, N.Y.
(FNB)

3.6 billion

Oct'. 1975

American City Bank & Trust
Co., N.A., Milwaukee, Wisconsin
(ACB)

148 million

Jan. 1975

Security.Nationa1Bank,
Long Island, New York( SNB

198 million

Feb. 1976

The Hamilton National Bank
of Chattanooga, Tennessee
(WB)

Dec. 1976

International City Bank &
Trust Co., New Orleans,
Louisiana (ICB)

Jan. 1978

The Drovers' National Bank
of Chicago, Illinois
(DNB)

227 million

Apr. 1980

First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A.,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(FPC

5.5 billion

Oct. 1982

Oklahoma National Bank &
Trust Co., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma (ONB)

150 million

Feb. 1983

United American Bank in
Knoxville, Knoxville,
Tennessee (UAB)

778 million

$1.3 billion

412 million

.

.

176 million

<

Failure
e'n'=

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Table 4 (continued)

Failure
Date

Bank

Assets

Feb. 1983

American City Bank,
Los Angeles, California
(ACB)

Oct. 1983

The First National Bank
of Midland, Midland, Texas

1.4 billion

May 1984

The Mississippi Bank,
Jackson, Mississippi

227 million

$272 million

(MBJ)

July 1984

Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co., Chicago,
Illinois (CIB)

47 billion

Aug. 1986

Citizens National Bank &
Trust Co., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma (CNO)

166 million

May 1986

First State Bank & Trust Co.,
Edinburg, Texas
(FSB)

134 million

June 1986

Bossier Bank & Trust Co.,
Bossier City, Louisiana
(BBT)

204 million

July 1986

The First National Bank &
Trust Co., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma ( FNB)

1.6 billion

Sept. 1986

American Bank & Trust Co.,
Lafayette, Louisiana
(ABL

189 million

Dec. 1986

Panhandle Bank & Trust Co.,
Borger, Texas
( PBT

107 million

Failure
Type

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Table 4 (continued)

Failure
Date

Bank

Assets

Failure
m e

Aug. 1986

First Citizens Bank,
.Dallas,Texas
(FCB)

93.8 million

P&A

Nov. 1986

First National Bank &
Trust Co. of Enid, Enid,
Oklahoma (FBT)

92.4 million

Jan. 1987

Security National Bank &
Trust Co., Norman,
Oklahoma (SBT)

174.4 million

Oct. 1987

Alaska National Bank
of the North, Alaska
(ANB)

189 million

Feb. 1988

Bank of Dallas,
Dallas, Texas
(BOD)

170 million

March 1988

Union Bank & Trust
Co., Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma (UBT)

167.5 million

Apr. 1988

First City Bancorp
of Texas, Houston,
Texas (CBT)

11 billion

Apr. 1988

Bank of Santa Fe,
Santa Fe, New Mexico

151 million

July 1988

First Republicbank
Dallas, N.A., Dallas,
Texas (FRC)

19.4 billion

March 1989

Mcorp, Dallas,
Texas
(MCP)

20 billion

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

41
Table 4 (continued)

Failure
Date

Bank
Texas American Bancshares Inc.,
Texas (TAB)
National Bancshares Corp.
of Texas, Texas
(NBC)

Notes:

P&A
DA

P

-

Assets

Failure
Type

$5.9 billion

P&A

2.7 billion

P&A

Purchase 6 assumption transaction (27)
Open bank assistance (4)
Deposit payoff (1)

Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Annual Reports and
American Banker.

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 5

Banks
-

-

F a i l e d Banks
USN
1963-72
FNB
1963-73
ACB
1963 - 74
SNB
1963- 74
HNB
1963- 75

I CB
1966- 75

DNB
1963- 77
FPC
1968 79

-

ONB
1963-81
UAB
1963 - 82
ACB
1964- 82
FNM
1963-82
MB7
1963-83

L i n e a r SMVAM R e s u l t s f o r I n d i v i d u a l Banks

Urn

k

R~

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 5 (continued)

Banks

Failed Banks
CIB
1963-83
CNO
1966 - 85
FSB
1974-85
BBT
1967-85

ABL
1963-85
PBT
1963-85
FCB
1970-85
FBT
1970-85

ANB
1964-86
BOD
1963 - 87
UBT
1972 -87
CBT
1963-87

Uel

k

R~

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 5 (continued)

Banks

Failed Banks
BSF
1963-87

MCP
1963-87

TAB
1963-87
NBC
1963-87
Operating Banks
CFB
1963-87
CNB
1963-87

CCB
1963-87
ONB
1964-87
CCT
1963-87
FNB
1963-87

Ue

k

R~

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

45
Table 5 (continued)

Banks

Operating Banks

MBT
1963-87
NBT
1963-87
WHC
1963-87
VNB
1963-87
TCT
1963-85
RNB
1965-85
FCC
1968-87
PBT
1970-87
CNH

1970-87
NBC
1972-87
OSB
1975-87
MNB
1975 87

-

RCB
1976-87

ut3

k

R=

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 5 (continued)

Banks

Operating Banks
DBT
1976 - 87
NCB
1976-87
SLB
1977 -87
FBO
1977-87
FAB
1978-87
PSB
1978-87
CNO
1974-85

VBC
1964-87
CNY
1963-87
FAC
1968- 87
CBT
1972-87

U~

k

R~

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 5 (continued)

Banks

Operating Banks
FCT
1974-87
CUC
1975-87
CNC
1972-87
ABI
1973 - 87
BOC
1973-87
CFI
1968-87
FES
1970-87
RNC
1970-87

CPC
1973-87
GAC
1971-87
SMB
1968 - 87
HBM
1972-85
BAL

1968-87

u,

k

R~

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 5 (continued)

Notes:

*
*
*
*

significantly differs from zero at 5 percent
significantly differs from zero at 1 percent
significantly differs from one at 5 percent
Subscripts:
significantly differs from one at 1 percent
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Variable definitions and sources are given in Table 3.
Superscripts:

Source : Author.

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 6 SMVAM Results for Univariate Partitions-Linear and Nonlinear Versions

All Banks Pooled
LS:

U,: 25.15**
(7.12)

NLS: a: 95.81*
(8.58)

k: 0.72**,,
(0.08)
b: 0.71**,,
(0.02)

d: 14.83*
(3.95)

e: 0.0124* E : 27.07*
(0.0012)
(1.83)

Nonfailed Banks Pooled
LS:

U,: 14.01
(10.31)

k: 0.80*
(0.12)

Failed Banks Pooled
LS:

U,: 52.15**
(13.73)

NLS: a: 122.91**
(6.91)

k: 0.51**,,
(0.07)
b: 0.52**,,
(0.12)

d: 69.34**
(9.27)

e: 0.0178**
(0.0033)

2 : 54.87**

e: 0.0016
(O.OQ18)

S : 1.62

(6.30)

Market-Value-SolventBanks Pooled
LS:

U,: 11.52
(7.63)

NLS: a: 0.46
(1.56)

k: 0.85**
(0.18)
b: 0.99**
(0.01)

d: 2.00**
(1.00)

(1.33)

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 6 (continued)

Market-Value-InsolventBanks Pooled
LS:

U,: 45.68*

k: 0.71**,,
(0.04)

(7.46)
NLS: a: 115.87*
(26.20)

b: 0.32*,,
(0.14)

d: 84.09*
(36.17)

e:0.0216*
(0.004)

E:148.24*
(12.98)

e:0.0250*
(0.0039)

E: 7.60*
(0.92)

Large Banks Pooled
LS:

k: 1.09**
(0.18)

U,: 1.01
(1.55)

NLS: a: -0.85
(0.91)

b: 0.98**
(0.04)

d: -0.002
(4.15)

Giant Banks Pooled
LS:

U,: 142.83**
(39.72)

NLS: a: 51.71*
(20.62)

Notes:

k: 0.64**,,
(0.04)
b: 0.78**,,
(0.06)

Superscripts: *

d: 301.42**
(33.78)

e: 0.004
(0.003)

E : 175.11**

(27.16)

significantly differs from zero a t 5 percent
significantly differs from zero at 1 percent
Subscripts:
significantly differs from one at 5 percent
* significantly differs from one at 1 percent
Standard errors are given in parentheses. .Variable definitions and sources are given in Table 3.

Source: Author.

**
*

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Table 7 SMVAM Results for All Partitions-Linear and Nonlinear Versions

Linear

MV

- 1.31 + 121.68** SIZ + 1.31*BV
(3.27)

(32.83)

-

(0.14)

0.65* BV(S1Z) -0.25* BV(F)
(0.19)
(0.09)

Nonlinear

MV

- 0.5[b+bl(SIZ)+b2(F)][BV-a-al(S1Z)-a2(F)]

a: 9.08**
(3.75)

al: 53.57**
(2.38)

a2: 69.89*
(1.00)

b: 1.31*
(0.14)

bl: -0.52*
(0.14)

b2: -0.63*
(0.13)

d: 5.92**
(1.59)

e:.0.0049**
(0.0017)

E : 10.52**

(3.13)

+ [0.25[b+bl(SIZ)

cl: 109.34**
(3.43)

-

d ( m ) + e(t).
Notes: E
SIZ and F are the size and failure dummy variables,
respectively.
* Significantly differs from zero at 5 percent.
* Significantly differs from zero at 1 percent.
Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Variable definitions and sources are given in table 3.
/

Source: Author.

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

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