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Workinn Paver 9002

ON THE CHOICE OF THE EXCHANGE-RATE REGIMES
by Chien Nan Wang

Chien Nan Wang is an economist at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The
author would like to thank Anthony Koo,
Timothy Lane, Ronald McKinnon, Lawrence
Officer, Peter Quirk, Peter Schmidt,
Mark Sniderman, and Thomas Willett for
helpful suggestions.
Working papers of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland are preliminary
materials circulated to stimulate
discussion and critical comment. The
views stated herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of
the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.

April 1990

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ABSTRACT
This paper utilizes recent research developments in portfolio balance
theory and in real exchange-rate instability to synthesize, update, and test
the optimum currency area (OCA) theory. Four hypotheses, capturing the
central features of the OCA theory, are advanced and tested in a
multinomial-logit setup. The empirical results establish the linkage between
a fixed rate and financial integration, trade integration, plus inflation
convergence. The Mundell-Fleming ranking of regime is refuted in a
fundamental way. These findings are applied to a discussion of European
monetary integration, in relation to both its final objective and its
intermediate procedure.

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I. INTRODUCTION
The Single European Act, amending the Treaty of Rome, became effective in
July 1987. This act envisages the ending of all remaining restrictions on the
intracommunity flow of goods, capital, and labor in Europe by 1992. However,
the recommendation of the Delors Report for the intermediate procedures and
the final goal of European monetary union is facing objections from Britain
and raising concerns among other members of the European Economic Community.
In an area of increasing financial and trade integration, what is the
appropriate choice of an exchange-rate regime? This question can be addressed
in the context of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, which provides
criteria for different types of countries to choose between floating and fixed
exchange-rate regimes. (Useful reviews of the OCA theory can be found in
Ishiyama [1975], Tower and Willett [1976], and Obstfeld [1985].)
The OCA theory, however, has not incorporated more recent development of
the portfolio-balance theory and recent research on real exchange-rate
instability under a nominal floating exchange-rate regime. Moreover, existing
empirical studies of the OCA theory have generally confirmed the linkage
between trade integration and a fixed rate, but have found the linkage between
financial integration and exchange-rate regimes to be blurred (see Dreyer
[1977], Heller [1978], Holden, Holden, and Suss [1979], and Weil [1984]).
an environment of rapid, advanced telecommunication and liberalization of
capital control, financial markets are increasingly linked worldwide.l

It

is important to investigate the linkage between financial integration and
exchange-rate regimes more closely.

In

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This paper reviews and updates the OCA theory and then provides an
empirical study in light of more recent research developments. These
developments help strengthen the linkage between the fixed rate and financial
integration. The empirical evidence from this paper supports this theoretical
linkage, resulting in the refutation of the Mundell-Fleming ranking of
exchange-rate regimes. Three characteristics--financialintegration, trade
integration, and inflation convergence--areidentified empirically as
important criteria for a country to consider in choosing its own exchange-rate
regime. These findings are used in this paper to analyze European monetary
integration. The multinomial-logit analysis in this study highlights the
complicated nature of multiple-regime selections.

11. THE (EXTENDED) OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY
This section reviews, synthesizes, and updates OCA theory. Four
hypotheses and their antitheses, which capture the central features of the OCA
theory, are developed. These hypotheses are related to financial integration,
trade integration, inflation convergence, and labor mobility.
Mundell (1963, 1964) and Fleming (1962) examined the effect of the
exchange-rate arrangement on stabilization policies. The Mundell-Fleming
(M-F) proposition established in their work has proved its sustaining power
for the last 25 years. According to Dornbusch (1988):
The Mundell-Fleming model . . . continues virtually unchallenged
today. Of course, the models we use today have gone further in
separating short run and long run, in allowing a role for
expectations, and in taking into account the consequences of trade
imbalances for asset accumulation. Even the stock market has now
become a part of the wider model. But the conclusions remain close to
those of the Mundell-Fleming model.

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The M - F proposition is based on the assumption that prices adjust slowly
relative to exchange rates, and that capital mobility is a central factor in
the transmission of business cycles. Their proposition is:
(1) In a small, open economy with perfect capital mobility (perfect
asset substitution and instantaneous portfolio adjustment),
monetary policy is ineffective in changing output under a fixed
exchange rate because monetary expansion or contraction causes
incipient interest-rate changes and the offsetting capital flows;
(2) In a small, open economy with perfect capital mobility, fiscal
policy is ineffective in changing output under a floating exchange
rate, because the induced exchange-rate change causes
trade-balance adjustment that offsets the fiscal policy; and
(3) If the country is large or capital mobility is imperfect, each
policy retains some effectiveness due to the wedge between
domestic and world interest rates, although the qualitative
content of (1) and (2) remains important.
While the M - F proposition on relative policy effectiveness remains valid,
it is always generalized according to the ranking of exchange-rate regimes.
The effectiveness of monetary policy is often the central criterion for
choosing a nominal exchange-rate regime, resulting both from the relative
flexibility of monetary policy and from the monetary authority's ability to
determine the exchange-rate regime. We can thus form our first maintained
hypothesis :

H,:

Under increasing financial integration (or capital mobility), a
floating-rate regime (or more exchange-rate flexibility) is
preferred for the sake of monetary autonomy.

On the other hand, as financial integration increases, monetary and asset
shocks in one economy transmit rapidly and widely to other economies. This
diffusion of disturbances causes exchange-rate instability and volatile
expectations that, in turn, render monetary autonomy less viable and spill
over to real sectors. Therefore, a fixed exchange-rate regime would be
preferred.
To illustrate, we can consider different theories under the rubric of the
portfolio-balance models. In these models, the nominal exchange rate is an

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asset price that is predominantly determined in the asset market. The
empirical basis of this assertion is that marketable world wealth can be
counted in trillions of dollars; even a small shift in asset preference can
lead to a capital transfer that is much larger than what can be effected
through the current account. Also, asset price adjusts much faster than goods
price. Therefore, the nominal exchange rate is sensitive to changes in the
supply and demand of monies and securities.
Moreover, international portfo.1io preferences themselves become more
volatile with a floating exchange rate. Market participants form their
exchange-rate expectations based on speculations of future monetary, fiscal,
and exchange-rate policies according to news and guesses. This
forward-looking expectation can be highly unstable if the authorities do not
commit themselves to maintaining the exchange rate along a predetermined path.
Besides the auction-market nature of the foreign-exchange market, some
other theoretical arguments contribute to exchange-rate instability under a
floating-rate regime:

(1) overshooting due to instantaneous exchange-rate

adjustment to restore asset-market equilibrium when output and price adjust
slowly over time; (2) expectation errors due to wrong beliefs or insufficient
use of market information; (3) a bandwagon effect (jump-in of more
speculators) without sufficient economic rationale; (4) rational bubbles due
to persistent shocks in one direction; and (5) irrational bubbles due to
insufficient speculation.
The autonomy of monetary policy is weakened under these unstable
circumstances, which are exacerbated by increasing financial integration.
McKinnon (1982) argued that volatile exchange-rate expectation can cause
domestic (real) money-demand instability either through direct M1 currency

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substitution, because of the gap between the interest-rate differential and
anticipated exchange-rate change, or (more importantly) through indirect
impact on domestic- and foreign-bond yields that, in turn, will induce
international capital flow because of bond arbitrage in a highly mobile
international bond market.

Assuming money-market equilibrium, the domestic

inflation rate is the difference between the growth rate of nominal money
supply and real money demand. Thus, domestic price stability cannot be
achieved through independent monetary policy (without accommodating money
demand changes) provided by a floating rate. Therefore, direct or indirect
currency substitution will constrain monetary policy autonomy even if monetary
policy independence is granted.4
Also, under high financial integration, the government's control of credit
has already been undermined due to the huge inflow and outflow of capital. The
unregulated Eurocurrency market, or any comparatively unregulated financial
intermediaries, would contribute to this effect. Considering the monetary
interdependence under a floating-rate regime and the leverage of monetary
policy that exists under a fixed-rate regime (for large countries and in the
case of imperfect capital mobility), the benefit of a floating rate and the
corresponding monetary independence should not be overstated.
Moreover, Stockman (1983) and Mussa (1986) found that a nominal
floating-rate regime is associated with greater real-exchange-ratevariability
as compared to a nominal fixed-rate regime. Mussa attributes this phenomenon
to differential speeds of adjustment in asset and goods markets, while
Stockman points out the possible importance of real shocks in an equilibrium
model.

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In an equilibrium model, exchange-rate change is an optimal response to
exogenous shocks, and thus may well maximize national welfare. If there is
some price rigidity, however, a floating exchange rate may not be optimal. A
major reason is that real exchange-rate instability would incur costs in
international trade and finance. The instability can be distinguished in
terms of volatility and misalignment. Volatility is the short-term
fluctuation of nominal or real exchange rates about their long-term trends.
Misalignment refers to a sustained deviation from the fundamental equilibrium
real exchange rate (FER).

FER has been defined as the purchasing power parity

rate or as the rate that generates a current account surplus or deficit equal
to the underlying capital flow over a cycle (Williamson [1985]).
Volatility increases the uncertainty associated with international trade
and finance and may discourage these transactions. If the forward market can
be used to hedge the exchange risk, a hedging cost will be incurred.
Moreover, hedging cannot be perfect because the timing and magnitude of a
firm's foreign-exchangeneeds may not be predictable. Some empirical works
(especially those using earlier data) showed little evidence of trade
interruption (see International Monetary Fund staff [I9841 and the survey
therein).

Bailey and Tavlas (1988) find that effective exchange-rate

volatility is insignificant in affecting aggregate real exports. However,
what matters in the short run is the impact of bilateral exchange-rate
volatility on bilateral trade. On that account, most recent studies based on
bilateral trade and bilateral exchange-rate data find significant effects
(see, for example, Thursby and Thursby [I9871 and Cushman [1988]).
So far as the author can tell, there are only two published studies of
exchange-rate volatility on international finance (Cushman [I9851 and Bailey

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and Tavlas [1988]), and they find either a positive significant effect or an
insignificant effect of exchange-rate risk on direct investment. These
results are consistent with the model that states, in response to risk, that
multinational firms concentrate more on the home market, but offset this
somewhat by increasing foreign capital input and production. However, direct
investment is only one form of international financial flow. Others, such as
bank credit and deposit, bond finance, and portfolio investment, should also
be investigated. These forms of finance do not possess the special
characteristics of direct investment as stated above.
Misalignment may incur significant costs in finance and trade. Long-term
foreign lending cannot be well-hedged because short-term hedging on a
noncontingent basis covers only a small portion of the potential long-term
risk, and the transaction costs and the moral hazard associated with contract
enforcement of long-term contingent futures would be prohibitive (McKinnon
[1988]).

Therefore, long-term lending and investment may be severely affected

by misalignment.
Misalignment may also cause serious deindustrialization effects.
Production facilities may be mothballed or scrapped, and the reentry fee may
be prohibitive. The resulting unemployment is also costly. Moreover,
resources will shift back to the original sector when the exchange-rate change
reverses its direction, thus incurring more costs. Protectionist legislation,
which often occurs during the process of deindustrialization, imposes costs on
consumers throughout the economy. Marston (1988) provides a case study for the
sterling misalignment (1979-82) and the dollar misalignment (1981-85), finding
significant disruptive effects on the tradeable sector.

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Therefore, increasing financial integration exacerbates exchange-rate
instability, which may well incur costs on international trade and finance.
Also, the link between financial integration and a fixed rate is further
strengthened for domestic economic stability.
With regard to domestic stabilization, macroeconomic performance can be
evaluated in terms of variation of output and general price level relative to
their trends. Assuming the authorities cannot directly observe the source of
the disturbances, or if the macropolicy measures are uncertain in effect or
costly to use, then the optimal nominal exchange-rate regime functions as an
automatic stabilizer for the economy, yielding the best macroeconomic
performance on average.
More financial integration increases the need for stabilizing financial
shocks. Domestic money-supply shock will be ineffective to change domestic
output under a fixed rate (M-F proposition).

The same stability can be

reached by a foreign country if it adopts a fixed-rate regime. Changes in
money or asset demand will lead to changes in interest rates and exchange
rates that, in turn, will affect domestic and foreign output. A fixed rate
can prevent the spillover from financial sectors to real sectors. The
risk-sharing consideration suggests that the two regions would prefer a fixed
rate, together with appropriate international settlement arrangements
(Obstfeld [I9851) .
Therefore, although the M-F proposition on policy effectiveness may remain
valid (but weakened), it is relatively less important in determining an
exchange-rate regime. We can summarize the above discussions as our
alternative hypothesis :

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:H
:

Under increasing financial integration, a fixed-rate regime
(or lower exchange-rate flexibility) is preferred both because
monetary autonomy is constrained and because the impact of
stochastic disturbances on international trade, international
finance, and domestic output can be stabilized.
The second hypothesis is the existence of a link between trade integration

and a fixed exchange-rate regime. Under the rubric of trade integration, we
can incorporate a country's economic size, the relative importance of its
foreign-trade sector (openness), and its trade pattern (commodity and
geographic concentration).

These are associated concepts because a small

country usually has limited resources. Therefore, it must specialize in order
to exploit economy of scale, and it requires openness in order to diversify
its consumption bundle and to earn sufficient foreign exchange to pay for it.
In a small, open economy, the exchange-rate adjustment mechanism tends to
be less effective. To restore balance-of-payment(BOP) equilibrium,
exchange-rate adjustment needs to change the relative prices between domestic
and foreign goods (terms of trade [TOT]) and between tradeable and
nontradeable goods.

A small country has little market power to influence its

TOT, however. An open economy needs more price adjustment between sectors,
which is often difficult to achieve because of more effective pass-through
from a nominal exchange-rate change to domestic price (McKinnon [1963]).
A small country often does not have a well-developed financial market.
Monetary policy independence does not assure its effectiveness, because open
market operation is less viable. Also, a small country may face more
exchange-rate fluctuations because its foreign-exchange market is thin.
Because the tradeable sector is relatively important for an open economy,
the economy will incur more costs from exchange-rate volatility and
misalignment. Also, a relatively open economy is easier to adjust to external

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imbalance through absorption changes because less income adjustment is needed.
Furthermore, the lack of money illusion in an open economy and the downward
rigidity of wage rates will cause depreciations to raise labor costs more than
equivalent appreciations will lower them. Also, monetary and fiscal expansion
is more likely to occur in a more open economy where the deindustrialization
effect of appreciation is more serious. Therefore, in a regime of fluctuating
exchange rates, world inflation would be ratcheted up.
A more undiversified economy (in terms of commodity variety) will
experience more exchange-rate changes because microshocks (supply-demand
changes of individual goods) to the export sector do not cancel each other
out. As discussed earlier, exchange-rate change is more costly in a small,
open (undiversified) economy. Constant exchange-rate change will be even more
costly. Therefore, a fixed rate is preferred.
Another type of diversification is related to geographical factors. When
a country finds that a large share of its exports are sold to only one or to
very few countries, a case can be made for maintaining its exchange rate
pegged to a single country's currency (or to relatively few countries'
currencies) in order to promote trade.

We can summarize the effect of increasing trade integration as the second
maintained hypothesis:

H, :

Under increasing trade integration, a fixed-rate regime is
preferred for the sake of less inflation and lower costs in trade
and in BOP adjustment.

However, there are alternative cases based on stabilizing real shocks.

In

a small, open economy, the real disturbances originating in external sectors
are likely to dominate real disturbances of domestic origin. External real
demand disturbances tend to move the BOP and the domestic economy in the same

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direction. Therefore, expenditure-changingpolicy cannot restore internal and
external equilibrium simultaneously. This dilemma makes a case for a
flexible-rate regime (Whitman [1967]).

(A floating rate also tends to better

stabilize domestic real demand disturbances, parallel to the M-F proposition
on fiscal-policy ineffectiveness.) For the real external supply shocks, such
as productivity or technology shocks in the tradeable sector, differential
wage and price trends would be developed. A small, open economy will face
more international commodity arbitrage and more pressure for either an
exchange-rate or a wage-price adjustment. Then exchange-rate change provides
the least costly route that prevents wealth or relative-price effects from
taking place (see Friedman [I9531 and Kravis and Lipsey [1983]).

Thus, we

have the alternativehypothesis:

H,* :

Under increasing trade integration, a floating-rate regime is
preferred for the sake of stabilizing real shocks in the least
costly way.

Aside from the impact of financial integration, the insulation from
external (especially inflationary) shocks allows the authority to pursue
domestic macroeconomic targets. In the long run, a floating exchange rate
provides more policy independence than a fixed rate. Even though the
historical records attribute more variable and generally higher inflation to
the floating-rate regime, it is likely to be caused by multiple policy goals
or policy imprudence and does not negate the ability of independent monetary
policy to pursue a domestic inflation target (see evidence provided by Darby
and Lothian [1989].) However, concern about reduced monetary independence
under a fixed-rate regime is most pronounced in countries with either
relatively high or relatively low inflation rates.

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High-inflation countries often suffer from a weak fiscal system with
relatively heavy reliance on an inflation tax. Lower inflation rates will
reduce the government's seigniorage revenue and complicate its already
difficult fiscal problems.

Therefore, a flexible exchange rate is preferred.

Low-inflation countries generally are concerned that under a fixed,
disequilibrium exchange rate, heavy exchange-market intervention and massive
capital flows would prevent effective control of their money supply.
Therefore, these countries would lose both their price-stability objective and
their hard-won anti-inflationary reputations. They would suffer rather than
gain from monetary linkage to foreigners (see Frenkel and Goldstein [1988]).
Thus, we have our third maintained hypothesis:

H, :

With divergent inflation rates, a floating-rate regime is
preferred for the sake of seigniorage and for the ability to
maintain national price stability.

Alternatively, a fixed-rate regime provides valuable anti-inflationary
discipline. Under a fixed-rate regime, the government will be more prudent in
macro-policy management for fear of losing political support as a result of
lost reserves and huge exchange-rate changes. Also, government officials may
spur labor union leaders and businessmen to join the fight against inflation
by citing the danger of the BOP crisis. This is especially true when
coordination can help rectify the externality caused by the spillover when one
country's policies affect other countries' targets and when price-stability
objectives are convergent among regions. An interpretation of the EMS is that
high-inflation France and Italy borrow the anti-inflation reputation from
low-inflation Germany. Therefore:

H , :~

With divergent inflation rates and convergent low
inflation-rate consensus, a fixed rate is preferred in order to
provide external discipline on inflation.

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Mundell (1961) defines a currency area as an area with high resource
(capital and labor) mobility. Capital mobility has been discussed earlier.
In regard to labor mobility, without prompt and complete pass-through,nominal
depreciation causes real depreciation and may cause factors to move from
nontradeable-goods production to tradeable-goods production. Labor mobility
within a country directly influences the efficiency with which resources can
be transferred between sectors. The accompanying adjustment costs under a
floating-rate regime will be lower for a country with higher internal resource
mobility. On the other hand, BOP adjustment under a fixed-rate regime often
adopts the mechanism of overall deflation or inflation. Some factors simply
will not be used. Labor movement between sectors will not change the
situation (see McKinnon [1963]).

Therefore, we have the fourth maintained

hypothesis:

H, :

Under high labor mobility, a floating rate is preferred for the .
sake of relatively low cost of adjustment within a region (country).

However, in a currency area, interregional labor movement helps the
adjustment of a depressed region by changing its pattern of production and
resource allocation. Costly areawide price inflation is not needed to inflate
away pockets of unemployment. Therefore, high labor mobility among countries
promotes the formation of a currency area (see Mundell [I9611 and Tower and
Willett [1976]).

Interregional labor mobility and labor mobility within a

region are often correlated. The maintained hypothesis emphasizes the latter
mobility.

H,*:

If we, in turn, emphasize the former mobility, we have:

Under high labor mobility, a fixed rate is preferred for the
lower interregional adjustment cost.

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Some argue that, due to cultural and sociological differences, labor
mobility within a country is already difficult, which is even more true
concerning mobility across borders. Moreover, mobility due to homogeneity of
occupation (for example, movement within the automobile industry) may not be
useful because the whole industry may face the same drop in demand. On the
other hand, mobility compatible with diversity of occupation would be rather
unlikely (Ishiyama [1975], Yeager [1976]).

Therefore, labor mobility would be

an insignificant factor in determining exchange-rate-regimechoice. However,
in the Mundell tradition, we still incorporate it and test its significance.

111. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
A.

The Lonit Model
To test the (extended) OCA theory, a logit model is built that uses

country characteristics to explain the exchange-rate-regimechoice. An
independent-shock term is not incorporated. A reason is that
exchange-rate-regimechoice is a medium-term (at least for several years)
choice based on anticipated shock patterns. The correct way to separate and
specify the shock terms is unclear. More important, trade integration (which
is more susceptible to transmission of real shocks) and financial integration
(which is more susceptible to transmission of financial shocks) themselves
have already implied a circumstance with specific sources of shocks
anticipated to occur more frequently. These implied circumstances have been
embodied in the hypotheses to be tested, based on country characteristics.
Melvin (1985) provides an empirical study of exchange-rate-regimechoice
based on two types of disturbances: domestic money shocks and foreign price
shocks. Disturbance terms are created as the standard errors of second-order

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autoregressive equations on the percentage change in foreign price and money
supply from 1976 to 1978. Melvin finds that these shock terms have a
significant impact on exchange-rate-regimechoice. It is not clear, however,
how the current-period unexpected shocks can be used to explain the
exchange-rate-regimechoice that is based on anticipated shocks for
several future periods. Moreover, his shock terms may be correlated with
country characteristics.
The actual regime choice (the dependent variable) can be classified into
several major categories, while the explanatory variables are continuous
measures of country characteristics. For logit models, the relative odds of
choosing a discrete regime can be represented by a linear combination of
explanatory variables, where the coefficients are the maximum likelihood
estimates (MLE) .

B. The Exchange-Rate Regime (Dependent Variable)
A discrete qualitative measure for exchange-rate flexibility is used for
the dependent variable. The measure is defined according to International
Monetary Fund (IMF) classification of the exchange-rate practices of member
countries contained in the IMF's 1977 and 1980 annual reports. Data from 1977
are employed so that we can compare our results with those of several major
studies that use 1977 data; data from 91 countries are represented. Data from
1980 are employed so that we can compare a country's exchange-rate-regime
choice behavior over time; data from 88 countries are represented. While
using data from the 1980s would better reveal the current trend, one should
note that many developing countries fell into arrears in the 1980s. Those
countries adopted flexible exchange rates simply because they ran out of

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international reserves. Those exchange-rate arrangements are thus more of a
practical nature rather than a reflection of the choice based on country
characteristics (see Quirk [1989])
The dependent variables in terms of ascending order of flexibility are:

(a) Narrow Margin Peg

(NMP) : Maintains the exchange rate within
a margin of less than 2.25% of the
central rates, for a single currency
or for a basket of currencies.

(b) Wider Margin Peg

(WMP) : Maintains a margin greater than 2.25%
of the central rates.

(c) Crawler

(C)

:

Changes rates discretely according to
a set of predetermined indicators.

(d) Group Float

(GF)

:

EMS (snake) countries, which maintain
within-group rates up to a 2.25%
margin and between-group rates
without a margin.

(e)

(IF)

:

Does not maintain exchange rates
within a specific margin.

Independent Float

Here (a) and (b) can be subsumed under "peg," while (c), (d), and (e) can
be subsumed under "float."
The dependent variable can be viewed as the revealed preference of the
authorities regarding the exchange-rate flexibility adopted. It should
reflect the underlying cost-benefit calculations.
The second amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement came into effect
on April 1, 1978. It granted each member the right to choose its own form of
exchange-rate arrangement. Intending not to categorize exchange-rate
arrangements according to the previous adjustable-peg system, the IMF has not
classified member countries in terms of narrow/wider margin peg practices
since 1978. Therefore, 1980 data are used in distinguishing between countries
that peg and countries that float.

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C.

The Country Characteristics (Explanatory Variables)
The explanatory variables represent the factors thought to be important in

determining the size of the benefits and costs of adopting any of the
alternative regimes. They are crucial country characteristics suggested by
the (extended) OCA theory. Data from 1977 and 1980 are used.
X,

The measure of financial integration is proxied by the ratio

(FI):

of commercial bank holdings of foreign assets to central bank holdings of
foreign assets. An increase in this ratio is presumed to indicate increasing
depth in the foreign-exchange market.

Central bank holdings of foreign assets

is a scale factor to standardize the FI measure. The data are from
International Financial Statistics (IFS), June 1981 and June 1984.

X, (SIZE) :

Under the rubric of trade integratfon, four variables

(SIZE, OPEN, CC, and GC1) are created. The dollar value of each country's GNP
is used as a measure of size. The data are from World Bank Atlas, 1979
and 1982.
X,

(OPEN):

of (Export

+

Concern about openness relates to foreign trade. The ratio

Import) over GNP is used as the measure. GNP data are from the

World Bank Atlas, 1979 and 1982. Export and import data are from IMF
Direction of Trade, 1982.

X, (CC):

The measure of commodity concentration (CC), the inverse

measure of diversification, is the ratio of the largest trade category to
total trade from Standard International Trade Category (SITC) one-digit data.
It is derived from the U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,
1979, 1983, vol. I: Trade by Nation.

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X5 (GC1): The geographic concentration 1 (GC1) is the portion in total
exports to the largest trading partner. The data are derived from

U.N.

Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1979, 1983, vol. I: Trade
by Nation.

X, (RIR): The relative inflation rate (RIR) is calculated as the square
deviation of a nation's CPI inflation rate from the world weighted-average CPI
inflation rate. The world rate is a proxy for the inflation rate of the
nation's trading partners. The data are from

E,
June

1979, June 1982.

X7 (LM): The presence of domestic output originating in manufacturing
can serve as a proxy for the degree of labor mobility (LM).

A higher value

for this ratio is presumed to be associated with more developed markets and
more labor mobility.

The data are from the U.N. Yearbook of National

Accounts Statistics, 1980 and 1983.

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A.

1977 Data
The econometric results are reported here in two parts, using 1977 data.

The first part examines the exchange-rate.regime selection problem with three
alternatives: narrow margin peg (NMP), wider margin peg (WMP), and float. The
second part reclassifies the countries involved into two categories: peg and
float.

(1) The Choice Among Narrow Margin Peg, Wider Margin Peg, and Float
The maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the coefficients are reported in
equations (I), (2), and (3).

Here the relative odds of regime 1 with respect

to regime 2 are defined as the log value of Prob(regime l)/Prob(regime

2).

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Note: here we take the log values of the original independent variables as the
independent variables in estimation. Therefore, the estimated coefficients
can be interpreted as the elasticities of the relative odds with respect to
the country characteristics.

- 0.3296 log(LM)
(-0.4713)
log P (Y-NMP)

=

- 6.929 Constant
(-1.184)

0.2557 log(F1) - 0.1987 log(S1ZE)
(1.582)~~
(-1.22)
- 0.3647 log(0PEN) + 0.0349 log(CC)
(-1.727)"
(0.095)
- 0.9184 log(GC1) - 0.1736 log(R1R)
(-2.867)***
(-2.055)**
- 0.54 log(LM) + 7.12 Constant
(-1.04)
(1.575)

-

log(Pl/P3) - log(Pz/P3)
Since log(P1/Pz)
where P1=probability of choosing float,
Pz=probability of choosing wider margin peg, and
P3=probability of choosing narrow margin peg.
We can derive equation (1.3) from equation (1.1) and (1.2):
P(Y=Float) log P(Y=wMP) - - 0.6155 log(F1) + 1.0113 log(S1ZE)
+ 0.4934 log(0PEN) - 0.4274 log(CC)
+ 1.2447 log(GC1) + 0.4677 log(R1R)
+ 0.2104 log(LM) - 14.049 Constant

*@ Significant at
* Significant at
** Significant at

12% level
10% level
5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Overall', likelihood ratio index = 0.4293,
likelihood ratio statistics = 85.84.
From equation (I), the significant independent variables affecting the
relative odds of selecting a float regime, as compared to a NMP regime, are
FI, SIZE, and RIR. Their signs show that an economy more integrated with the

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international goods and capital markets is more likely to choose a fixed-rate
regime, and that an economy with a larger differential inflation rate from its
major trading partners is more likely to choose a floating-rate regime. We
label this as the conventional view of the OCA theory.
From equation ( 3 ) , the conventional view on financial integration (FI) and
inflation convergence (RIR) is significantly confirmed. Also, the impact of
trade integration is confirmed by the significant coefficient of SIZE.
However, the significant GC1 coefficient gives a different result (float is
preferred to WMP).

A probable reason is that a country with geographically

concentrated trade is susceptible to both microshocks and macroshocks from its
main trading partner(s).

For microshocks, exchange-rate adjustment may be

costly. However, for macroshocks, such as marketwide price changes (inflation
shocks) , exchange- rate adjustment is least costly. Therefore, when a floating
rate (which provides sufficient flexibility) is a viable choice, it is
preferred. Thus, an intermediate regime sometimes is less preferred to both
extreme regimes and vice versa.
From equation ( 2 ) , the significant variables affecting the relative odds
of selecting the WMP, as compared to the NMP, are FI, OPEN, GC1, and RIR. The
conventional views on trade integration (OPEN and GC1) are confirmed here.
However, FI and RIR have perverse signs that differ from the conventional
view.
The reason for the perverse sign of FI may be that WMP provides more
short-run flexibility, which can better contain the exchange rate that
maintains the asset-market equilibrium. (An asset-market-clearingexchange
rate exhibits significant short-runvolatility because of the various reasons
given in the section on the OCA theory).

Moreover, a wide band provides scope

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for anticyclical monetary policy. When the money supply is increased to
combat a depression, for example, exchange-rate depreciation should be allowed
to create an expectation for subsequent rebound that will compensate investors
for temporarily low interest rates. On the other hand, WMP's longer-run
stability provides an anchor for expectations of a longer-term exchange rate,
thereby promoting stabilizing speculation and greater stability of the
exchange rate. NMP enjoys stability similar to that of WMP in the longer run.
In the short run, however, NMP is likely to be subject to much heavier
speculative pressure and greater difficulty in accommodating anticyclical
policies.
The perverse sign of RIR can also be explained by the nature of WMP. Both
WMP and NMP do not provide sufficient flexibility in the long run for a
country to choose its trend inflation rate. In the short run, however, WMP
does not provide as much anti-inflationary discipline as NMP does. Therefore,
if a country chooses to peg its exchange rate, NMP is preferred to WMP. The
empirical results show that the domestic inflation target is more important
than the anti-inflationary discipline (because float is preferred to peg) and
that there are some (relatively weak) grounds for the discipline argument
(because NMP is preferred to WMP).
Though the intermediate regime (WMP) involves more complicated trade-offs,
taking equation (I), ( 2 ) , and (3) together.,a floating-rate regime is
preferred to a pegging-rate regime (which can be either NMP or WMP) for high
RIR, and a pegging regime is preferred to a floating regime for high FI, both
of which are compatible with the conventional view. Overall, this evidence
provides support for hypotheses H ~ * ,HZ, and H3:

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( H dominates
~ ~
HI) The Mundell-Fleming ranking of exchange- rate
regimes is overridden by the unstable nature of a floating
rate under increasing financial integration. We shall
elaborate on this result later.
(Hz dominates H ~ ~An) economy facing more real shocks because of
increasing trade integration still prefers a fixed rate
because, in an economy open to trade, a floating rate
causes higher inflation and incurs more costs in BOP
adjustment and trade.
(HJ dominates H ~ ~A )country with an inflation rate vastly different
from its major trading partners tends to adopt a floating
rate to preserve its domestic inflation target, while the
anti-inflationary discipline from a fixed rate may provide
fewer benefits.
This three-alternative,multinomial-logit model simulates real-world
choice among more than two alternative exchange-rate regimes. More important,
the economic content of multiple-regime selection is analyzed. Overall, the
likelihood ratio index (analogous to the multiple correlation coefficient,

R
'
)

is 0.4293, which is high among cross-sectional data results. The

likelihood ratio statistic, which tests the joint significance of all
coefficients, is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with 16 degrees of
freedom (number of parameters to be estimated).

It is 85.84, and is

significant at 1 percent level. The within-sample prediction of regime choice
has a success rate of 72.53 percent.
~ ~
We can elaborate on a major finding of this study now: " H dominates
HI." That is, high financial integration is shown to be associated with
fixed-rate regimes (WMP and NMP).

However, previous works by Heller (1977,

1978) and Holden, Holden, and Suss (1979) show a positive effect of CM (FI) on
choosing a flexible exchange-rate regime. Nonetheless, Heller employs
discriminant analysis, which does not provide a meaningful interpretation of
the coefficients for hypothesis testing (t-test); Holden, Holden, and Suss

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drop the SIZE variable, and the coefficient of FI is insignificant. By
employing a more complete set of explanatory variables, and by using a
multinomial-logit method, this paper reaches quite different conclusions about
FI .
According to the predominant Mundell-Fleming proposition, only two of the
three conditions can hold simultaneously: (1) monetary policy independence,
(2) a fixed exchange rate, and (3) free capital mobility. This proposition is
often used as an argument that floating exchange-rate regimes should be
adopted in a financially integrated world. However, the empirical results of
this paper show that, under high financial integration, a fixed rate is
preferred to a floating rate. Thus, the Mundell-Fleming regime ranking is
refuted.
There are two major explanations, as discussed in the section on the OCA
theory. First, national monetary autonomy has already been eroded by high
financial integration. High capital mobility makes control of the money
supply and credit difficult (with the possible exception of a resenre-currency
country) and makes the demand for money unstable. Even the independent
monetary policy itself can be viewed as a monetary disturbance if neither a
commitment nor a rule is attached. Second, under high financial integration,
a fixed rate would be quite beneficial. It can smooth the adjustment
mechanism, lower the costs in international trade and finance, and promote
domestic stabilization.

(2) The Choice Between Float and Peg
In order to provide a comparison with the above multiple-regime-choice
model and to provide a comparison with the model employing 1980 data (where no

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WMP category is available), a binomial-logit model is used to study the choice
between floating and pegging regimes. The binomial results (using 1977 data)
are :

log $(Y=Peg)

=

- 0.2736 log(F1)

+

(-0.857)
0.3892 log(0PEN)
(0.8376)
+ 0.6177 log(GC1)
(1.185)
+ 0.2084 log(LM)
(0.2237)

+

1.425 log(S1ZE)
(3.694)***
- 0.7905 log(CC)
(-1.389)'
+ 0.2982 log(R1R)
(2.247)**
- 15.58 Constant
(-2.817)"""

(4)

Significant at 18% level
Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
where the numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.
The likelihood ratio index = 0.5960, which is relatively high.
The likelihood ratio statistic = 75.19, which is significant at
the 1 percent level.
@

**
***

The significant coefficients, SIZE and RIR, both have signs compatible
with conventional theory.

(CC is significant at the 18 percent level.)

Compared with the three-alternative model in the last section, the hypothesis
testing in this two-alternative model does not incur any perverse sign (from
the conventional OCA view) on significant coefficients. This result is not
surprising, because the OCA theory was originally designed to distinguish the
choice between floating and pegging regimes. Also, there appear to be fewer
significant coefficients in the two-alternative model, probably because there
is a less-realistic choice between only two regimes.
The overall prediction rate is 89.01 percent, which is higher than that in
the three-alternative model (72.53 percent).

The reason may be that, with a

finer and more detailed classification, it is more difficult to make a
clear-cut choice. The likelihood ratio index and statistic also are
favorable. We can summarize the overall performance in the above (three- and

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two-alternative) models as satisfactory (better or much better than average).
This indicates that the OCA country characteristics as a group can reasonably
explain the behavior of the exchange-rate-regimechoice.
We can also summarize the significance-test results in the models above.
Most of the significant coefficients match the conventional view of the OCA
theory. (The three occasions of perverse signs have reasonable explanations.)
Only the coefficient of LM has never been significant (CC is significant only
at the 18 percent level. However, it is significant at the 10 percent level
by using 1980 data).

The insignificant LM seems to indicate that the effects

of internal labor mobility (pro-floating rate) and external labor mobility
(pro-fixed rate) cancel each other out; or that labor mobility simply does not
play a role in exchange-rate-regimeselection. That is, H, and H,* are
not meaningful distinctions. Moreover, RIR is significant in four out of four
occasions. FI and SIZE are significant in three out of four occasions, while
OPEN and GC1 are significant less frequently. Although there are some
insignificant coefficients, significant coefficients do reveal the validity of
the conventional OCA theory. That is, a country with the following
characteristics is likely to join a currency area: (1) high financial
integration, (2) high trade integration, and (3) inflation convergence with
the area.

B.

1980 Data
The current monetary system emerged only after the breakdown of the

Bretton Woods System.

As time passes and experiences accumulate, countries

are supposed to become more capable of selecting their regimes according to

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cost-benefit considerations. Thus, we expect that more recent data will
better reveal the validity of the OCA theory.
Therefore, we also employ 1980 data to reestimate the above models. After
selection and collection, the 1980 data include 88 countries. Our report will
focus only on the choice between float and peg due to the lack of finer IMF
classifications.

The Choice Between Float and Pee
Following the previous classification of countries into two cells, one for
float and one for peg, we obtain the following binomial-logit-modelresults:

- 0.8161 log(0PEN) - 2.084 log(CC)
(-1.246)
(-1.827)"
+ 0.0780 log(GC1) + 0.2439 log(R1R)
(0.1068)
(1.316)~
+ 0.4633 log(LM) + 0.0564 Constant
(0.6095)
(0.008)
@

Significant at 18% level
Significant at 10% level
Significant at 1% level
Where the numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.
The likelihood ratio index = 0.5221.
The likelihood ratio statistics = 63.69, significant at 1 percent
levels.

*
***

The significant coefficients are those of SIZE and CC; both have signs
compatible with the conventional theory. Adding to the 1977 data results, the
significant CC shows that a country with an undiversified composition of
tradeable goods is likely to join a currency area. FI and RIR are significant
only at the 18 percent level, with signs compatible with the conventional

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We get a lower prediction rate from 1980 data (82.95 percent) than from
1977 data (89.01 percent), which appears to contradict the statement discussed
in the beginning of this section. A probable explanation lies in the
disillusionment with the floating exchange-rate system. By comparing the
two-alternative model (float versus peg), we note that the significance levels
of individual coefficients change as we move from 1977 data to 1980 data.
While the significance level of RIR deteriorated from 5 percent to 18 percent,
the significance level of FI improved from lower significance to significance
at an 18 percent level, and the level of significance of CC improved from 18
percent to 10 percent. This evidence seems to indicate that (1) RIR becomes
less relevant, probably due to incomplete insulation under a floating-rate
regime; and (2) FI and CC become more relevant, probably due to a perception
change about the costs of exchange-rate fluctuation on finance and trade.
However, the OCA effect of individual country characteristics is still
significant (with correct signs) by using 1980 data. Furthermore, the
international economic environment is changing. For example, in 1980, the
United States adopted new monetary operating procedures, and a second oil
shock had just occurred. Both the disillusionment and the environmental
change make the comparative costs of different exchange-rate regimes less
certain. The country characteristic effect and model performance thus become
blurred accordingly.

V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, we ask the same question that Heller (1977) did:

Is the current international monetary system really a system,
or is it a haphazard collection of ad hoc arrangements
resulting from decisions by individual countries?

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The empirical study in this paper shows some inherent order in
exchange-rate-regimeselection, and the OCA theory provides acceptable
criteria for that choice. The empirical support comes from supportive
significance-test results and from reasonable model performance.
In agreement with previous empirical results, this study confirms the
relatively tight linkage between trade integration and a fixed rate, and
between inflation convergence and a fixed rate. However, labor mobility does
not exhibit a,significant impact on exchange-rate-regimechoice. In contrast
to previous (fuzzy) results, this study confirms the linkage between financial
integration and a fixed rate. A direct implication is to refute the relative
importance of the Mundell-Fleming proposition on the exchange-rate-regime
choice. Therefore, the result indicates a research direction that emphasizes
the potential importance of (direct and indirect) currency substitution and of
the costs of exchange-rate instability.
The findings of this study can readily be applied to policy decisions.
For western European countries attempting to form a currency area, for
example, the important consideration lies in the degree of intracommunity
trade and financial integration and on whether there is a near-consensus on a
common inflation rate. Prospective economic developments in western Europe
seem to be favorable. The 1992 economic goals promise an increasingly
integrated Europe in trade and finance, and all 12 European Community
central-bank governors endorse a low inflation policy. Therefore, the
conditions in western Europe justify the formation of a currency area.
As for the intermediate procedure, the gradual approach as adopted in the
Delors plan seeks to narrow the band successively and to reach full monetary
integration gradually. However, our empirical evidence shows that, in an

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increasingly financially integrated world, if countries prefer pegging with a
band, they should choose a wider band. The gradualism suggested in the Delors
plan is not compatible with the revealed preference of economic cost-benefit
considerations. Also, the speculative attack in the foreign exchange market
would force misalignment and hinder the gradual approach.
Our empirical evidence also shows that the inflation-rate convergence
favors a WMP. On the other hand, increasing trade integration favors a NMP.
However, in a time horizon of two to three years (1990-1992), trade volume and
prices may be sticky.'

Thus, increasing financial integration would be the

dominant factor because of the fast pace of adjustment in the asset market,
the huge volumes of financial transactions, and the earlier removal of
investment barriers (by 1990) in the European Community. However, occasional
parity adjustments may be needed to accommodate real shocks and policy
differences. The EMS tradition of striking a balance between rules and
discretion thus is worth preserving.
Therefore, in the transitional period, EMS countries can adopt a
hard-margin wider band with adjustable parities. The EMS can then jump to an
irrevocably fixed rate, or to a single currency, if substantial trade
integration, financial integration, and monetary policy coordination have been
achieved. Alternatively, EMS countries can fix their exchange rates
irrevocably in the very early stage. Eclecticism (gradualism) may only weaken
the system.

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FOOTNOTES
1. The United States liberalized its capital control in 1974; Great Britain
in 1979; Japan in 1980; and western Europe in 1990.
2 . The Mundell-Fleming ranking of the exchange-rate regimes has been reversed
by Fischer (1976) .and by Frenkel and Aizenman (1983). However, these studies
mainly assume a financially closed economy, which misses the central role of
capital mobility. Marston (1985) illustrates the importance of wage
indexation. Domestic full-indexationwill make fixed-rate and floating-rate
regimes indistinguishable. Foreign full-indexationwill make foreign
disturbances purely monetary. However, assuming there is a contractual lag of
wage adjustment and a certain degree of capital mobility, thus preserving the
assumptions in the M-F proposition, the M-F ranking of the exchange regimes
can still be reversed. This is a main theme of this paper, which refutes the
M-F ranking in a fundamental way.

3. Kareken and Wallace (1981) offer a rationale for unlimited M1 currency
substitution. Because fiat money is intrinsically useless, unbacked, and
costless to produce, the exchange rate, as the relative price between two fiat
monies, can be virtually anything. This is also the case for corresponding
world currency supply and currency composition.
4. National autonomy is often confused with national sovereignty. The latter
concerns the formal ability of a nation to act independently, free from
another nation's will, such as monetary policy independence. National
autonomy, in contrast, is the ability of a nation to attain its objectives
through unilateral action. That is constrained in an interdependent world.
5. Henderson (1984) uses a small general-equilibrium model to analyze
exchange-market-interventionpolicy. He finds that for a single open economy,
with disturbances to the home goods market, an aggregate (money supply)
constant policy incurs less variation in output; for disturbances to financial
markets, a rate (exchange-rate and interest-rate) constant policy also incurs
less variation in output. In a two-country world economy, Henderson finds
that a fixed rate minimizes output variation for a preference shift between
domestic and foreign assets. On the other hand, a floating rate minimizes
output variation for a demand shift between domestic goods and foreign goods.
6. In general, it is difficult to assess the relative insulating properties
of a floating rate versus a fixed rate without specifying the nature and
origin of the disturbances and what variable and which sector are to be
insulated. These properties are often model-specific, and there is a lack of
theoretical consensus in this area (see Bordo and Schwartz [1988]).
7. Besides the J-curve effect, the lack of sensitivity of trade volume and
price to exchange-rate variation can be the result of sunk costs. Under
exchange-rate uncertainty, a firm will wait and see before it changes trade
volumes and prices because of the significant irrevocable fixed costs involved
(see Krugman [I9891) . A practical reason for the insensitivity is the
difficulty in meeting the requirement for common technical product standards.

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