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U N IT E D S T A T E S D E P A R T M E N T OF L A B O R Frances Perkins, Secretary BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Isador Lubin, C om m issioner (on leave) A . F. Hinrichs, A c tin g C om m issioner + W artim e Development o f the A ircraft Industry Prepared by D IV ISIO N O F C O N S T R U C T IO N A N D PUBLIC E M P L O Y M E N T H E R M A N B . B Y E R , C hief B ulletin 7s[o. 800 For sale by the Superintendent o f Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. - Price 10 cents Contents Page (n i) 1 M tf* fcO Summary_______________________________________________ Description of the industry__________ Employment trends_________________ Trends in employment of women Employment distribution: Labor-market areas__________________________________________________ Geographic distribution______________________________________________ Labor turnover___________________________________________________________ Absenteeism of workers___________________________________________________ Hours and earnings_______________________________________________________ Production trends________________________________________________________ 9 11 12 18 19 21 Letter of Transmittal U nited States D epartment op L abor , B ureau op L abor Statistics, Washington, D . C., November 2 0 , 1944 • The Secretary op L abor : I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of the wartime development of the aircraft industry. This report was prepared by Leonard G. Levenson in the Bureau’s Division of Construction and Public Employment. A. F. H inrichs, Acting Commissioner. Hon. F rances P erkins , Secretary of Labor. (IV) B ulletin 7\[o. 800 o f the U n ited States B ureau o f Labor Statistics [Reprinted from the M onthly L ab or R e v ie w , November 1944] Wartime Development of the Aircraft Industry Summary Total employment in the aircraft industry did not exceed 100,000 workers in January 1940; but in the latter part of 1943, when the peak was attained, about 2,100,000 were at work. Since then employment has been steadily declining and in August 1944 was slightly more than 1,800,000. Increasing productivity has been of sufficient magnitude to permit schedule attainment despite this 14-percent decline in employment. The average airframe weight accepted per employee increased from 21 pounds in January 1941 to 96 pounds in M ay 1944. Along with this, the number of completed airplanes accepted rose from 1,000 per month early in 1941 to between 8 and 9 thousand per month thus far in 1944. Whereas about 4 million pounds (including weight of spare parts) were accepted monthly in the beginning of 1941, approximately 100 million pounds per month were being accepted in 1944. Prime contracting airframe, engine, and propeller plants are the most important subdivisions of the industry, accounting for approxi mately two-thirds of total employment. Airframe prime contractors alone employ from 45 to 50 percent of the total. This group, with about 59,000 workers in January 1940, reached an employment peak of 936,000 in November 1943 and declined 18 percent to 769,000 in August 1944. The number at work in engine plants increased 21 times from 16,000 at the beginning of 1940 to a peak of 340,000 by February 1944 but decreased 7 percent to 317,000 by August. Pro peller employment advanced from only 3,000 in January 1940 to 57,000 by the end of 1943. The August 1944 figure was 53,000 or 6 percent less. The important role played by women workers in the aircraft pro gram is measured by the ultimate employment of almost 500,000 women engaged in the production of airframes, engines, and propellers as compared with 23,000 in January 1942. Women represented 40 percent of the labor force in airframe plants and approximately 30 percent in engine and propeller plants in August 1944, whereas in January 1942 they had accounted for only about 5 percent. Because of the possibility of enemy attack, the coastal location of aircraft plants was a source of grave concern. In 1940, about 95 per cent of total airframe employment was in plants on both coasts, but by 1943 this was reduced to 61 percent. M ore important, in view of the threat from Japanese aircraft carriers, was the fact that the pro- (l) 2 portion on the W est Coast was reduced from 60 to 33 percent. Engine and propeller plants, formerly concentrated on the East Coast, had approximately 40 percent of their employment in Ohio and Michigan by 1943. Separation rates have been higher in airframe plants than in engine and propeller plants, but have been consistently lower than the average for manufacturing as a whole. Engine and propeller workers reported higher earnings than did airframe workers, but employees in all three branches of the industry showed an increase in income. Description of the Industry Prior to W orld War II the aircraft industry was a relatively un important segment of transportation-equipment manufacturing. W ithin 4 years it has become one of the Nation’s major industries in terms of employment and output. This report traces the industry’s meteoric rise as measured by employment and related factors. The aircraft industry is composed of eight subdivisions. These are airframes, gliders, special-purpose aircraft, engines, propellers, sub contractors, parts suppliers, and modification centers. The airframe plants are by far the most important in terms of both employment and function. Plants so designated assemble the fuselage, wings, and tail fabricated on their own premises and those of their subcontractors and, in addition, install the engines, propellers, instruments, and accessories necessary to complete the airplane for delivery. The airframe plant, often called the airplane plant, is truly a plant of final assembly, for it represents that stage at which a long series of assemblies culminates in the finished product. Glider and special-purpose aircraft are part of the airplane family. The glider is simply an unpowered airplane. Special-purpose air craft are primarily targets which are small, powered, pilotless air planes controlled by radio and used in training aerial gunners. Both types of craft are simple to build. The quantities needed, however, have been relatively small in comparison with total requirements. Production of aircraft engines calls for facilities specializing in the machining and assembling of an item requiring extremely close tolerances. This is reflected in the high proportion of skilled workers employed. However, immediate adoption of mass-production tech niques was made possible by the size of the unit, the great numbers of engines required, and the relative stability of design. The expe rience of the automobile industry in this type of production was used to good advantage. The manufacturing process is completely dif ferent from that of airframes, with the result that engine plants (which are virtually giant machine shops) cannot perform the opera tions of airframe plants which are enclosed assembly areas with high ceilings and wide bays. The propeller branch of the industry also is highly specialized. Al though a propeller may at first sight appear to be simple, it is actually extremely complicated. A large proportion of skilled workers is re quired in its production. The machined parts going into the hub of a propeller require the closest tolerances. The blades must be per fectly balanced. Furthermore, as changes are made, to improve the effectiveness of propellers in connection with existing engines or im 3 proved engines, they become more complex and continue to rely on highly skilled workmanship. Like engine plants, propeller plants are one-purpose establishments. The producers discussed thus far are classified as prime contractors. They enter into a contractual obligation directly with the Govern ment to deliver a finished product within a specified time. The ac cepted item must meet specifications, but how the job is to be done remains the responsibility of the prime contractor. The war brought with it pressure for unprecedented production in the shortest possible time. The aircraft industry met the challenge by subcontracting much of the work formerly done within the plant. Naturally, the ability to maintain the close tolerances of the aircraft industry was a major criterion in the selection of subcontractors. Many auto mobile plants took on the job of making items such as wing sections, fuselage sections, or tail assemblies, while plants in other industries did what they could to assist in aircraft production. As the pro gram progressed and some of the prime contractors completed their jobs, they in turn took on subcontract work. It is estimated that a fifth of total airframe production, a third of engine, and a fourth of propeller production has been accomplished by subcontractors. Parts suppliers are relied upon to furnish many of the items that go into the finished airplane. This branch of the industry is com posed of specialists in their respective fields, devoting their attention to such products as instruments, turbo-superchargers, generators, and the like. The war naturally resulted in expansion in this seg ment of the industry, and new specialists entered the field. In order to maintain standardization and simplify procurement of items com mon to several airplane models, the Government has followed the policy of contracting for equipment which is then turned over to manufacturers for installation. Allocation of scarce items is made in accordance with the relative need for different types of airplanes. Modification centers are a war innovation. When the airplane shortage was particularly acute, the latest changes in aeronautical design were incorporated into completed planes by modification centers until such changes could be introduced in the production line. In addition, these plants installed special equipment on com bat planes, to prepare them for flying conditions in different theaters o f operation. Improved production techniques and the current supply of aircraft are now such that in many cases the function of modification centers can conveniently be taken over by the airframe plants them selves. Coverage.— The basic data for this report were secured from the Aeronautical M onthly Progress Reports developed by the Army Air Forces, and from the Bureau’s reports on labor turnover and on hours and earnings. Arrangements have been made whereby all prime contractors of airframes, engines, propellers, gliders, specialpurpose aircraft, and modification centers submit detailed data monthly on these schedules. Prime contractors now account for about 65 percent of the industry’s total employment. Subcontractors and parts suppliers are not direct reporters under this program for the aircraft industry as such, but the data submitted by prime contractors include the basis for estimating off-site man-hours spent, permitting an estimate of the level of employment for these branches of the in dustry. Within the reporting group, glider, special-purpose, and 4 modification-center employment is relatively unimportant, repre senting less than 5 percent of the total. Consequently, in the present article major emphasis is placed on the prime contracting airframe, engine, and propeller plants in tracing the industry’s progress Employment Trends In January 1940 total employment in the entire aeronautical industry probably did not exceed 100,000 workers. When peak employment was attained in the latter part of 1943, about 2,100,000 were at work— 20 times the number 4 years earlier. In August 1944 employment was approximately 1,800,000, or 14 percent below the peak (table 1). From not quite 80,000 workers employed in prime contracting airframe, engine, and propeller plants at the beginning of 1940, the figure rose to over 1,300,000 by the end of 1943, or to 16 times the previous figure (table 2). The greater part of the expansion took place within a 2-year span. This is one of the most striking accom plishments of the war and resulted in the creation, in record time, o f the world’s most powerful air force. Airframe plants now employ about two-thirds of the workers in prime contracting establishments, engine plants a little over a fourth, and propeller plants only about 6 percent. T able 1.— Total Em ploym ent in the Aircraft Industry, b y T yp e o f Contractor, January 1942-A u gu st 1944 1 [In thousands] 1943 1942 Month Total January .................. February................ March..................... April....................... M ay................- ___ June........................ July........................ August.................... 8flptftmhftr_ _ Ofltnhp.r _ _ November.... ......... D ecem ber___ 618.4 682.8 736.1 792.6 848.2 930.0 1,000.3 1.099.4 1,179.8 1.280.3 1.384.3 1.496.5 Subcon Prime tractors and contrac parts tors 8 sup pliers * 460.4 601.8 538.1 572.6 611.2 664.0 710.3 772.4 819.8 879.3 939.3 1,003.5 158.0 181.0 197.0 220.0 237.0 266.0 290.0 327.0 360.0 401.0 445.0 493.0 Total 1.609.3 1,681.2 1.739.4 1.789.9 1.836.6 1.895.3 1.941.5 1.980.7 2.032.3 2.073.9 2.101.6 2,079.1 1944 Subcon Prime tractors and contrac parts tors 8 sup pliers8 1.064.3 1, 111. 2 1.148.4 1.180.9 1,211.6 1.252.3 1.281.5 1,304.7 1.338.3 1.364.9 1.382.6 1,369.1 545.0 570.0 591.0 609.0 625.0 643.0 660.0 676.0 694.0 709.0 719.0 710.0 Total Subcon Prime tractors and contrac parts tors8 sup pliers 3 2.079.9 2,062.7 2,018.1 1.986.9 1.956.5 1.909.6 1,883.4 1,811.0 1.368.9 1,356.7 1,327.1 1.305.9 1.285.5 1.254.6 1,235.4 1,186.0 711.0 706.0 691.0 681.0 671.0 655.0 648.0 625.0 i AH data are as of end of month. * Includes actual employment of airframe, engine, propeller, glider, and special-purpose aircraft plants, and modification centers. * Estimated; includes employment in many plants classified by the Bureau's Employment Statistics Division in other industries, such as electrical equipment and automobiles; all establishments having sub contracts are included, even when aircraft and parts do not constitute their primary activity. Airframe prime contractors had an estimated 59,000 persons at work in 21 facilities1in January 1940. During the course of the year, employment more than doubled, reaching 134,000. The monthly net increase averaged 7,000 workers. The net increase in 1941 was 180,000, an average of 15,000 per month, and when Pearl Harbor was i The term facility as used in this report represents a single plant fabricating a complete airframe, engine, or propeller, or different plants working under the same corporate management and together as a unit fabricating the complete airframe, engine, or propeller. 5 attacked, employment had exceeded 300,000. Immediately after ward, expansion was greatly accelerated largely because of the comple tion of new plants. The first half of 1942 witnessed an average month ly increase of 26,000 workers, but the average monthly gain for the last half of 1942 jumped to 43,000. The greatest increase in any one month occurred in December 1942, when 49,500 workers were added. N ot only were existing plants expanded, but new plants were put into operation. There were 54 facilities at that time as compared with 21 in 1940. Thus, by December 1942, employment stood at 730,000, a net increase of 417,000 workers over the end of 1941, T able 2.— Total Em ploym ent in Prim e Contracting Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants, January 1940-A u gu st 1944 1 Total employment in— Total employment in— Year and month Engine All plants Airframe plants plants Pro peller plants mo Year and month Engine All plants Airframe plants plants Pro peller plants 1949—Con. January 2.. February.. March....... April.......... M ay....... . June.......... July______ August___ September. October___ November. December.. 77,600 82,416 87,742 95,182 104,066 114,698 126,214 135.293 146,054 156,353 167.294 178,489 59,000 62,125 65,518 71,116 77,246 85,744 93,799 101,030 108,710 117,637 125,501 133,654 33,290 36,129 38,848 2,500 2,858 3,118 3,395 3,644 4*129 4,373 4,525 4,952 5,426 5,664 5,987 194,135 204,962 216,156 231,102 246,006 269,059 293,661 319,125 341,450 371,247 391,453 423,027 146,197 153,554 161,231 172,240 183,134 200,260 218,925 238,549 255,796 276,810 291,574 313,297 41,329 44,143 47,205 50,461 53,960 59,381 64,813 70,213 74,710 82,907 87,544 96,746 6,609 7,265 7,720 8,401 8,912 9,418 9,923 10,363 10,944 11,530 12,335 12,984 460,356 501,753 538,060 572,616 341,603 368,669 390,278 412,927 104,156 116,804 129,387 138,974 14,597 16,280 18,395 20,715 16,000 17,433 19,106 20,671 23,176 24,825 28,042 29,738 1941 January___ February.. March....... April.......... M ay.......... June.......... July........... August___ September. October___ November. December.. 1949 January___ February.. M arch.___ A p ril....__ M ay......... June......... July_____ August___ September October. _. November December. 611,272 653,033 695.359 753,425 796,954 852,862 910,932 970.359 439,188 470,765 505,274 553,240 589,503 635,056 680,535 729,995 148,738 156,964 162,893 170,680 176,597 185,387 195,869 204,177 January... 1,027,914 February.. 1,072,573 March___ 1,106,664 April......... 1,139,018 M ay......... 1,166,555 June......... 1,203,479 July 1,233,385 August___ 1,257,427 September 1,290,181 October__ 1,311,765 November 31,326,345 December. 31,310,799 770,471 800,055 819,848 839,349 856,244 881,139 900,584 907,098 924,872 931,109 936,466 922,859 219,084 40,332 232,186 244,434 42,382 255,547 44,122 263,684 46,627 273,798 48,542 282,944 49,857 297,329 53,000 310,573 54,736 325,916 54,740 336,128 *53,751 *54,637 913,091 898,865 875,423 856,325 840,351 811,623 796,976 769,282 337,698 * 57,164 339,833 57,093 335,614 56,620 334,458 56,399 332,149 55,224 331,667 54,684 329,620 54,270 53,291 317,346 23,346 25,304 27,192 29,505 30,854 32,419 34,528 36,187 1943 1944 January.... 31,307,953 February.. 1,295,791 March___ 1,267,657 April........ . 1,247,182 M ay......... 1,227,724 June......... . 1,197,974 July.......... . 1,180,866 August___ 1,139,919 1 All data are as of end of month. * Estimated. * A change in propeller coverage occurred in December 1943 and January 1944, adding 1,500 workers in December and 2,500 more in January. If November and December data were placed on a comparable basis with those for January and subsequent months, propeller employment would be 57,400 Mid 57,100, respectively, and the corresponding figures for total employment would be 1,330,000 and 1,313,300. Revised figures are not being published for months prior to November or for November and December since the per cent of difference would be insignificant in most months, and the revised series would differ from the official series used by the Army Air Forces and the Aircraft Resources Control Office. Employment continued upward in prime contracting airframe plants during the first 11 months of 1943, though at a slower pace. The monthly average increase for the period was down to 19,000, reflecting the general tightening of the labor market and the completion of the program of staffing needed at the levels of efficiency that had been at tained. In November 1943 peak employment of 936,000 was reached, or more than 15 times the 59,000 so employed at the beginning of 1940. 620031°— 44-------2 6 Since November the employment level has been receding steadily. The average monthly decrease for the 9-month period— November 1943 to August 1944— was close to 19,000 workers. By the end of August, airframe employment had dropped to 769,000, a decline of 167.000 or 18 percent from the peak. It is significant, however, that output has continued to increase despite the employment decline as a result of increasing productivity.2 The need for multiple-engine airplanes resulted in extremely high engine requirements. The automobile industry provided valuable assistance on this problem and consequently is well represented in the engine phase of aeronautical production. Pratt & Whitney engines are being manufactured by Buick, Chevrolet, Ford, and Nash; Wright engines by Chrysler and Studebaker; and Rolls-Royce Merlin engines by Packard. B y the time the engine industry reached peak employment, 50 percent of the workers employed in engine manufac ture were under automobile management. A t the beginning of 1940 there were only about 16,000 at work in engine plants and nearly 90 percent were employed by two firms—• Pratt & Whitney and the Wright Aeronautical Corporation. The engine branch of the industry more than doubled its employment during 1940 as a result of the impetus given by the European war, ending the year with almost 39,000 workers. By the end of 1941 employment was in the vicinity of 97,000, nearly 2 % times the num ber at the end of 1940. Engine plants were able to recruit and train employees in sufficient numbers to add an average of 9,000 per month in 1942, and an average of 11,000 per month in 1943. This continued expansion raised employment to 204,000 in December 1942 and to 333.000 in December 1943. The peak was not reached until Feb ruary 1944 when 340,000 were at work in 19 facilities. Since then employment has declined each month, although horsepower produced has remained about the same. The number at work dropped to 317.000 by the end of August 1944— a decline from peak of 22,500 or 7 percent. The rapid expansion experienced by the propeller branch of the industry paralleled that of engines. There were fewer than 3,000 workers engaged on propeller production in 1940, representing the total employment of the only two producers in the field, Hamilton Standard and Curtiss Propeller Division. These two doubled their employment by the end of the year. Three more facilities entered the industry in the following year, so that employment more than doubled, reaching 13,000 by December 1941. B y the end of 1942 there were 9 propeller facilities in operation and employment had made an almost threefold expansion over 1941. The peak of 57,000 was attained toward the end of 1943.3 However, by August 1944 the figure dropped to 53,000, or 6 percent, following closely the decrease in engine employment. The effective use of the glider as a tactical weapon was disclosed in the German invasion of Crete in M ay 1941. In June 1942 there were about 2,000 persons at work in this phase of the aircraft pro gram. Thereafter expansion was very rapid, as evidenced by the 2 See section on production trends, p. 21. 8 A change in propeller coverage occurred in December 1943 and January 1944, adding 1,500 workers in December and 2,500 more in January. If November and December data were placed on a comparable basis with those for January and subsequent months, propeller employment would be 57,400 and 57,100, respectively. 7 December 1942 employment figure of 12,000. The peak came toward the end of 1943 when 16,000 were employed, but the figure was again down to 12,000 by June 1944 and remained without change thereafter. The modification centers came into existence in the middle of |1942 and by the end of the year employed 20,000 workers. This figure more than doubled during 1943, and during the first 6 months of 1944 employment rose to about 43,000. It remained fairly constant up to July but declined to 33,000 by the end of August. Koughly, 1 worker is employed by subcontractors and parts suppliers for every 2 workers engaged in plants of final assembly. Toward the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, subcontracting plants em ployed about 700,000 workers (table 1). It is reasonable to expect an employment decline in these facilities commensurate with that of final assembly plants, since they are so closely affiliated. Accord ingly, employment among subcontractors is estimated to have been about 650,000 by mid-1944 and 625,000 in August. TREN D S IN E M PLOYM EN T OF W OM EN Competition of other war industries and the armed services for manpower made it plain that production schedules could be met in the aircraft industry only by extensive employment of women workers. There was at first reluctance to hire women for jobs cus tomarily filled by men, but by 1942 the industry had recognized the need for making the adjustments necessary for the mass hiring and utilization of this new and inexperienced labor force. The signifi cant role eventually played by women in aircraft production may be measured by the fact that whereas these plants had practically no women workers before the war, toward the end of 1943 prime con tracting airframe, engine, and propeller plants employed almost 500,000— 37 percent of the entire work force (table 3). The airframe branch of the industry had numbers o f jobs that could be broken down and thus performed, after only nominal training, by inexperienced women workers. A t the beginning of 1942, the 18,700 women employed in prime contracting airframe plants con stituted only 5.5 percent of total employment. Within that year alone, female employment showed a more than twelvefold increase, and finally in December comprised exactly one-third of the entire labor force. Although expansion did not continue at this rapid pace, some increase occurred in each succeeding month until in November 1943, when the peak female employment of 370,300 was attained, women represented practically two-fifths of the work force. Thereafter the number of women workers declined, along with the drop in total employment, but their proportion of the total remained about the same. It is beyond the scope of this report to examine the volume of female employment in individual airframe plants. It is, nevertheless, interesting to note that at peak employment, three m ajor plants had more women than men on their pay rolls. The total number o f employees required by engine plants was a great deal smaller than that needed by airframes. This branch of the industry, therefore, delayed large-scale hiring of women. Early in 1942 there was a female work force of nearly 4 percent of the total employment, which expanded to 17 percent by the end of the year as compared with the 33 percent for airframes. Nevertheless, this 8 represented more than a sevenfold increase, from 3,900 in January to 34,100 by December. The engine plants apparently felt their manpower squeeze in 1943, for by November, when peak female employment was attained, they had 103,100 women workers who made up 31 percent of the labor force. There has been some decrease since then, especially between July and August 1944, but the number has remained at about 100,000 and the proportion at about 30 percent. T able 3.— Total Fem ale Em ploym ent in Prim e Contracting Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants , January 1942-A u gu st 1944 1 Number of women in— Year and month 1M January.............. February............ March................ April................... M ay.................... June.................. July.................... August................ September......... October.............. November.......... December....... . ms January.............. February............ March................ April................... May___________ June.................... July.................... August................ September......... October............. November........ . December........... 19U January.............. February............ March................ April................... M ay................... June.................... July.................... August................ All plants Airframe plants 23,137 30,218 38,455 48,009 60,350 77,135 95,482 119,967 153,301 196,665 237,002 280,497 18,656 24,226 30,448 38,442 48,218 63,307 79,346 100,966 131,351 168,993 202,542 240,595 321,788 351,752 370,635 387,092 274,248 295,743 309,129 319,329 402,385 421,548 435,468 449,938 468,169 479,923 >486,073 3 472,519 3466,292 461,074 454,412 448,066 445,725 439,603 435,608 419,216 328,740 340,288 347,494 353,656 363,952 367,701 370,262 358,823 351,509 346,028 339,296 333,316 319,055 307,699 Percent of total employment All Engine Propel plants ler plants plants 3,920 5,352 7,040 8,225 10,348 13,565 15,913 18,480 23,517 29,394 34,090 561 640 967 1,342 1,784 2,142 2,571 3,088 3,470 4,155 5,066 5,812 41,247 47,889 52,779 58,110 62,873 69,730 75,970 83,694 91,353 99,199 103,112 100,657 6,293 8,120 8,727 9,653 10,772 11,530 12,004 12,588 12,864 13,023 3 12,699 >13,039 31.3 32.8 33.5 33.9 100,743 100,732 100,450 99,704 99,434 99,929 101,217 96,417 >14,040 14,314 14,666 15,046 14,996 15,312 15,336 16,100 11,686 Air frame plants 5.0 5.5 7.1 8.4 9.9 11.8 13.7 15.9 19.2 23.1 26.0 28.9 7.8 9.3 6.0 6.6 11.0 13.4 15.7 18.2 22.3 26.6 29.8 33.0 Pro Engine peller plants plants 3.8 4.6 5.4 5.9 7.0 7.4 8.3 9.3 10.5 12.7 15.0 16.7 3.8 3.9 5.3 6.5 7.6 8.5 9.5 10.5 11.2 12.8 14.7 18.1 18.8 20.5 21.6 22.7 16.4 20.1 20.5 21.9 35.0 35.2 35.7 36.2 36.5 36.7 36.0 35.6 37.0 37.7 38.0 38.4 38.6 38.6 39.0 39.3 39.5 39.5 38.9 25.4 26.8 28.1 29.4 30.4 30.7 30.2 24.1 24.2 23.5 23.8 23.6 23.9 35.7 35.6 35.8 35.9 36.3 36.7 36.9 36.8 38.5 38.5 38.8 38.9 39.4 40.0 40.0 40.0 29.8 29.6 29.9 29.8 29.9 30.1 30.7 30.4 24.6 25.1 25.9 26.7 27.2 28.0 28.3 28.3 34.5 23.8 23.1 23.7 i All data are as of end of month. Data are not available prior to 1942. * A change in propeller coverage occurred in December 1943 and January 1944, adding 450 women workers in December and 450 more in January. If November and December data were placed on a comparable ba sis with those for January and subsequent months, employment of women in propeller plants would be 13,600 and 13,500, respectively, and the corresponding figures for total female employment would be 486.900 and 473,000. Revised figures are not being published for months prior to November or for November and December, since the percent of difference would be insignificant in most months, and the revised series would differ from the official series used by the Army Air Forces and the Aircraft Resources Control Office, Total labor requirements in propeller plants were, considerably lower even than for engine plants, and many jobs were not adaptable to women workers. In January 1942 there were fewer than 600 women propeller workers— nearly 4 percent o f total employment. By the end o f the year 5,800 women were at work. As these represented 16 percent of the total, this branch of the industry kept pace with the engine branch which ended 1942 with a woman Work force of 17 percent. Addition o f female workers in propeller plants continued steadily throughout 1943. B y the end of that year the approximately 13,000 employed were nearly a fourth o f the labor force. Female 9 employment in propeller plants did not reach peak until July 1944, when 15,300 workers, or 28 percent of total employment, were women. This was not quite the proportion (31 percent) attained in engine plants. Employment Distribution L A B O R -M A R K E T A R E A S An indication of the recruitment task which confronted aircraft management and assisting governmental agencies may be gauged by an examination of the industry's employment, as shown by W ar Man power Commission labor-market-area classifications.4 During each month of 1943 and of 1944 through August, more than half of the total workers in prime contracting airframe, engine, and propeller plants were in Group I areas, i. e., areas of existing labor shortage (table 4). If plants in areas of labor stringency are included (Group II), about 85 percent of total employment is accounted for during 1943 and approximately 80 percent through August 1944. Airframe plants throughout the period had far more employment in Group I areas than did engine and propeller plants. Propeller plants had least employment in areas of labor shortage. The proportion of both airframe and propeller Group I employment decreased during the period January 1943-August 1944, while engine employment tended to increase. The recruitment problem should, of course, be considered on a case basis, for conditions vary from locality to locality and in many instances the plants themselves, because of their size, created the labor-market conditions that existed. Nevertheless, the critical manpower situation in general is readily apparent from consideration of these data. The location of airframe plants was such as to place 70 percent of employment in areas of existing labor shortage (Group I) in January 1943. In February, the airframe proportion dropped to 66 percent, and labor-market conditions continued to keep about two-thirds of total employment in Group I until peak employment was reached in November 1943. B y December, 60 percent was in Group I, but in M arch 1944 the ratio declined to 55 percent where it remained through June. Though the proportion in Group I advanced to 58 percent in July and August, evidence of improved labor-market conditions was apparent. Employment in Groups III and IV approximated 14 per cent throughout 1943, as compared with 23 percent for the period April through August 1944. Engine plants have never had as much Group I employment as airframe plants, but the volume in this classification increased rather than decreased as time went on. Roughly, a third of engine employ ment was in Group I areas from January through August 1943. For the remainder of the year, the proportion approximated 45 percent. Except for January, 47 percent of employment was in areas of labor shortage dining the first 7 months of 1944. In August the proportion dropped to 40 percent. About 50 percent of the employment was in areas of labor stringency (Group II) at the beginning of 1943, but the ratio declined to nearly half of this by July 1944, rising in the following * * Group I—areas of current labor shortage; Group n —areas of labor stringency and those anticipating a labor shortage within 6 months; Group III—areas in which slight labor reserves will remain after 6 months; and Group IV—areas in which substantial labor reserves will remain after 6 months. Throughout this discussion the labor-market classifications are current as issued monthly by the War Manpower Commis sion. For example, an increase in percentage of employment in Group I areas may be caused either by an increase in the number of areas classified as Group I or by an increase in actual employment. 10 month, however, to 40 percent. Whereas, during most oi 1943, approximately 15 percent of total engine employment was in areas experiencing neither shortage nor stringency, this rose to almost 25 percent during 1944. T able 4.— Percentage Distribution o f Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Em ploym ent by W M C Labor-Area Classification , January 1943-A u gu st 1944 1 1943 Type of plants and W MO labor-area classification2 Janu Febru March April ary ary All plants................................ 100.0 Group I............................ 61.3 Group II........................... 22.7 Group III......................... 10.3 Group IV ......................... 6.7 100.0 57.6 29.0 7.8 5.6 May June July Au Sep Octo gust tember ber 100.0 56.4 30.3 7.8 5.5 100.0 58.6 26.4 8.5 6.5 100.0 57.7 27.0 8.9 6.4 100.0 57.1 27.6 9.0 6.3 100.0 56.9 28.1 9.3 5.7 100.0 100.0 56.0 61.0 29.0 24.5 9.3 • 8.9 5.7 5.6 100.0 58.0 26.2 10.3 5.5 Airframe plants...................... ioa<r 100. (T Too.o Group I ............................ 70.4 65.7 64.6 Group II........................... 16.8 21.8 23.0 Group III......................... 6.6 5.4 5.4 Group IV .......................... 7.2 7.1 7.0 100.0 68.1 17.9 5.7 8.3 100.0 66.7 19.0 6.0 8.3 100.0 66.2 19.6 6.1 8.1 300.0 67.0 19.1 6.6 7.3 100.0 65.8 20.3 6.4 7.5 100.0 68.6 18.2 6.0 7.2 iooTo 64.7 20.0 8.2 7.1 Engine plants......................... 100.0 Group I............................ 35.2 Group II........................... 42.9 Group III......................... 20.2 Group IV .......................... 1.7 100.0 35.0 51.0 12.6 1.4 100.0 34.2 51.8 12.5 1.5 100.0 32.7 51.3 34.6 1.4 100.0 33.5 50.2 14.9 1.4 100.0 33.1 50.9 14.6 1.4 100.0 32.8 51.5 14.4 1.3 100.0 34.1 50.6 14.1 1.2 100.0 45.4 39.5 12.9 2.2 100.0 45.1 39.9 12.8 2.2 Propeller plants...................... 100.0 Group I ............................. 27.6 Group II........................... 44.9 Group III......................... 27.6 Group IV .......................... 100.0 26.4 45.7 27.9 100.0 27.5 45.8 26.1 .6 100.0 26.6 46.0 26.7 .7 100.0 26.0 44.5 28.5 1.0 100.0 26.3 43.1 29.2 1.4 100.0 11.4 57.3 29.8 1.5 100.0 10.7 55.5 32.2 1.6 100.0 20.8 45.0 34.2 100.0 20.0 47.7 32.3 1943—Con. Type of plants and W MO labor-area classification2 1944 No vem ber De cem ber Jan uary Feb ruary March April May June July All plants................................ 100.0 Group I............................. 58.0 Group II........................... 26.4 Group III......................... 10.4 Group IV ......................... 5.2 100.0 54.5 29.9 10.3 5.3 100.0 51.6 31.2 10.9 6.3 100.0 55.6 25.8 12.0 6.6 100.0 51.3 28.9 13.5 6.3 100.0 51.0 25.9 17.3 5.8 100.0 50.4 26.8 16.9 5.9 100.0 50.7 26.6 17.1 5.6 100.0 53.2 22.2 19.2 5.4 100.0 50.7 26.9 11.3 11.1 Airframe plants...................... 100.0 Group I............... ............ 65.0 Group II........................... 20.2 Group III......................... 7.9 Group IV .......................... 6.9 100.0 60.3 25.0 7.6 7.1 100.0 60.2 25.3 5.9 8.6 100.0 61.6 22.1 7.7 8.6 100.0 55.4 26.4 9.8 8.4 100.0 55.1 22.1 14.7 8.1 100.0 54.2 22.8 14.8 8.2 100.0 54.8 22.5 15.2 7.5 100.0 57.6 16.9 18.1 7.4 100 0 57.6 18.1 11.4 12.9 Engine plants......................... 100.0 Group I ............................. 44.7 Group II-......................... 40.4 Group III......................... 13.8 Group IV .......................... 1.1 100.0 44.4 40.0 14.4 1.2 100.0 35.4 41.7 21.7 1.2 100.0 47.4 29.3 20.9 2.4 100.0 47.4 29.5 21.2 1.9 100.0 47.6 29.0 22.4 1.0 100.0 47.5 28.2 23.3 1.0 100.0 47.5 27.7 23.4 1.4 100.0 47.9 27.0 23.6 1.5 100.0 40.4 39.5 11.6 8.5 Propeller plants...................... 100.0 Group I-„.......................... 20.3 Group I I ........................... 47.6 Group III......................... 32.1 Group IV .......................... 100.0 19.7 50.0 30.3 100.0 9.5 64.5 26.0 100.0 9.6 64.3 26.1 100.0 9.6 64.4 26.0 100.0 9.6 65.0 25.4 100.0 9.4 78.5 10.8 1.3 100.0 9.2 81.2 8.3 1.3 100.0 20.5 70.2 8.0 1.3 100.0 11.6 79.2 7.9 1.3 Au gust 1All data are as of end of month. * Group I—Areas of current labor shortage; Group II—Areas of labor stringency and those anticipating a labor shortage within 6 months; Group III—Areas in which slight labor reserves will remain after 6 months; and Group IV—Areas in which substantial labor reserves will remain after 6 months. The propeller branch had about half of its employment in Group II areas during 1943. However, beginning with January and continuing through the first 8 months of 1944, Group II employment increased from 65 to 80 percent. Sharp variations in employment in labor 11 market area classes indicate the preponderance of a few large plants in the reporting sample causing major shifts which were of less signif icance than might at first appear. GEOGRAPHIC D IST R IB U T IO N During World War I the sea was considered an adequate barrier against the enemy, completely excluding the necessity of considering, in the location of industrial facilities, the possibility of attack. The product of the industry with which this report is concerned changed all that. Because of the potentialities of the present-day airplane as an offensive weapon, it could no longer be taken for granted that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans made this continent impregnable. Consequently, the coastal location of the airframe, engine, and pro peller plants at the outset of the war was a source of uneasiness. Plans for new plants called for location within the interior of the country. Existing facilities, however, were expanded, despite their questionable location, because of the urgent need for airplanes. The extent of the geographic dispersion of the industry is apparent from the fact that at the time of the United States’ entrance into the war, airframe, engine, and propeller plants were situated in 16 States as compared with 25 States by the end of 1943. The shift in geographic distribution can be visualized in more detail from consideration of changes in the proportion of employment in the six Army Air Forces Procurement Districts 5 as the industry grew (table 5). In 1940, approximately 60 percent of airframe employment was in the Western District and 35 percent in the Eastern District. Thus, 95 percent of the industry was in a vulnerable location. One year later, almost 90 percent of the airframe workers were still on both coasts. It was not until 1943 that the results of inward migration became appar ent. B y the end of that year, although 28 percent of employment was in the Eastern District, the proportion in the Western District had fallen to 33 percent. Thus, within a 3-year period the 95 percent coastal employment was reduced to 61 percent, but especially impor tant (in view of the threat from Japanese ship-based air power) was the fact that the proportion on the West Coast decreased from 60 to 33 percent. Despite the inland shift, southern California continued to be the most important airframe region. At the beginning of 1940, the State of California had 32,000 airframe workers or more than half of total airframe employment. B y the time Pearl Harbor was at tacked, this figure exceeded 150,000 and was 48 percent of the total. Peak was reached in July 1943 with 280,000 at work, but the propor tion of the total had fallen to 31 percent. New York was the only other State tliat approached California in airframe employment; the highest level attained in New York was slightly more than 135,000 in September 1943. The move inland is readily apparent from the employment peak in 1943 of 41,000 for Oklahoma and 69,000 each for Kansas and Texas. Engine employment was found in 7 States in 1940, Connecticut and New Jersey being the principal areas of production. Conse-* * States included in Army Air Forces Procurement Districts are as follows: Eastern.—Connecticut, Dela-< ware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,mud Vermont. Southeastern.—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Central.—Michigan and Ohio. Mid-Central.— Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Mid-Western.—Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyo« ming. W&stern —Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. 12 quently, the Eastern District had from 80 to 90 percent of all engine employment throughout the year. As a result of the entrance of the automobile industry into this phase of aircraft manufacture, the Central District (covering Ohio and Michigan), which had accounted for only 2 to 5 percent of engine employment in 1940, contained 39 percent of the workers by the end of 1943. The proportion in the Eastern District had declined to a third. Michigan led all other States in engine employment by November 1943, with 97,600; this figure was more than double that for either Connecticut or New Jersey, the former leaders in the field. The West Coast, though first in air frame production, had but one small engine plant whose prime con tracts were completed by mid-1943. T able 5.— Percentage Distribution o f Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Em ploym ent, b y A rm y A ir Forces Procurement D istricts, June 1 9 4 0 -June 1944 1 1940 Army Air Forces Procure ment District June 1942 1941 Decem June ber Decem June ber 1944 1943 Decem ber June Decem June ber All plants.............................. Eastern.......................... Southeastern.................. Central....... ................... Mid-Central................... Mid-Western................. Western.......................... 100.0 48.1 .5 .3 2.9 2.3 45.9 100.0 46.5 .6 1.1 3.8 4.0 44.1 100.0 42.7 .9 .4 .7 3.4 5.6 42.7 100.0 36.2 .8 9.9 4.1 6.9 42.1 100.0 35.0 .7 15.8 5.2 10.0 33.3 100.0 33.7 .9 17.6 5.5 12.6 29.7 100.0 31.3 1.5 19.4 7.0 14.6 26.2 100.0 30.3 2.3 19.3 8.7 16.2 23.2 100.0 28.9 2.9 19.7 9.6 17.5 21.5 Airframe plants.................... Eastern........................... Southeastern.................. Central_______________ Mid-Central__________ Mid-Western................. Western.......................... 100.0 35.0 .7 100.0 35.1 .7 100.0 33.2 1.2 .8 100.0 30.2 1.1 2.7 3.1 61.2 5.4 58.8 7.5 57.3 9.3 56.7 100.0 30.7 1.0 8.3 .1 13.8 46.1 100.0 30.5 1.2 11.6 .6 16.7 39.4 100.0 28.3 2.0 12.6 2.0 19.4 35.7 100.0 28.1 3.2 11.1 2.6 22.0 33.0 100.0 27.1 4.1 11.4 2.7 23.1 31.6 Engine plants....................... Eastern............. ............. Southeastern. Central........................... Mid-Central................... Mid-Western Western 100.0 84.8 100.0 77.4 100.0 66.6 100.0 49.9 100.0 44.0 100.0 41.7 100.0 37.6 100.0 33.0 1.5 13.3 5.0 17.2 17.6 15.5 33.1 16.7 36.5 19.3 36.0 22.2 .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .1 38.0 22.5 1.7 .2 38.6 25.6 2.8 100.0 30.4 .6 36.5 25.9 6.6 Propeller plants.................... Eastern............ .............. Southeastern... _T _ Central _ _ _ Mid-Central __ Mid-Western Western 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.3 100.0 79.1 100.0 61.8 100.0 52.9 100.0 51.3 100.0 49.7 100.0 48.0 7.7 12.4 8.5 27.5 10.7 37.0 10.1 37.6 11.1 40.6 9.7 41.8 10.2 i All data are as of end of month. In 1940 all propeller employees were in the Eastern D istrict, in the States of Connecticut and New Jersey. As in the case of engines, the assistance of outside industry had the effect o f moving part of the production inland. In December 1943, 50 percent o f the employment was in the Eastern and 40 percent in the Central D istrict. In June 1944, Ohio had more propeller employment than any other State, with almost 14,000 employees; and Michigan and New Jersey were next, with 9,000 each; Connecticut had approximately 8,000 workers. States on the West Coast had no propeller production. Labor Turnover The magnitude o f the task confronting persons concerned with the manning o f aircraft plants becomes clearer when consideration is 13 to turnover in the industry. Before additional workers could fiven e added to the labor force to provide for increased schedules, those who quit or were drafted had first to be replaced. The recruitment problem became more and more difficult as time passed because of increasing competition for a rapidly depleting supply of labor. Thus, in 1941, airframe, engine, and propeller plants had to hire 1,500 workers to increase employment by 1,000, but in the following year to obtain the same increase it was necessary to hire 2,100 workers. The situation was most critical in 1943, though this ratio was no longer meaningful, as the rate of expansion slowed down. The main cause of this situation was separations, 60 to 70 percent of which were voluntary. In 1941, the average monthly rate for all separations was 3.3 per 100 workers. It rose to 5.3 in 1942 and to 5.7 in 1943 (table 6). T o meet this situation the War Manpower Commission intro duced certificates of availability and a controlled-referral program to help keep the production lines manned. It should be noted, however, that separation rates in airframe, engine, and propeller plants have consistently been lower than the average for manufacturing as a whole. The separation rate averaged 6.3 percent in the first 8 months of 1944, but the increase over 1943 was due to an increase in discharges and lay-offs and not to an increase in the quit rate. It was more difficult to recruit and maintain the airframe branch of the industry than the engine and propeller branches, not only because more workers were required, but because airframe employees showed a much higher incidence of quits than engine and propeller workers. For the whole year 1941, approximately 30 airframe employees of every 100 on the pay roll quit, as against only 17 in engine and pro peller plants. These voluntary withdrawals remained at about the same level in engine and propeller plants in 1942 but increased to approximately 45 quits per 100 employees in airframe plants. All 3 branches recorded increases in 1943, but again the quits rose most in airframe plants, advancing to 55 per 100 employees. There were 37 quits for every 100 employed in propeller plants in 1943 and only 30 in engine plants. The 1944 picture through August remains sub stantially the same, the poorest showing being made by airframe and the best by engine plants. For a variety of reasons the quit rate among female workers was roughly double that of males in 1943 and somewhat less than double in 1944 (table 7). The female quit rates have been highest in airframe plants. W ith women accounting for 40 percent of airframe employment and about 30 percent of engine and propeller employment, the effect on separation rates is obvious. The greater instability among airframe workers is understandable. The difficulty is a basic one inherent in the mushrooming of an indus try. The necessity for hiring thousands of workers in a short space of time resulted in the acquisition of many inadaptable to factory employment. Turnover is always greater among those newly hired than among those with longer work experience in an establishment. Reference has already been made to the larger proportion of women in this branch of the industry and the effect of their higher quit rates. Serious housing, transportation, and shopping problems have arisen in centers of large airframe production, and these too have contributed to the higher separations in this branch of the industry. This has affected women especially, many of whom, with home responsibilities as well, found continuous work 6 days a week impossible. Though 14 there is no record of the number of individuals quitting the industry as opposed to those moving from one establishment to another, it is significant that many of the quits have been temporary as indi cated by the numbers rehired. Fortunately, airframe management and labor have recognized the problems involved and have done much to meet them in order to keep production lines fully manned. T a b l e 6.— Labor-Turnover Rates (per 100 Em ployees) in Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants,1 January 1941-A u gu st 1944 [1944 figures revised] Total airframe, engine, and propeller plants Year and month mi* Annual rate *_____ January.................. February................ March..................... April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August.................... September............ October................... November.............. December............... 1942 3 Total accessions Airframe plants Separations Total 114.7 ====== 12.0 7.8 8.1 9.5 9.9 10.2 11.3 10.1 9.5 9.6 7.4 9.3 39.0 Quits Mili tary Total acces sions All other2 Separations Total 27.0 ===== 2.2 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.4 1.8 1.9 3.7 — .4 .5 .4 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .1 .2 .2 .8 8.3 3.3 3.2 3.9 3.4 3.5 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 2.6 3.3 .7 .7 1.0 .6 .7 .6 .7 .7 .5 .9 .6 .6 124.1 43.0 ..,, ----= 3.5 12.0 3.5 7.8 4.1 9.0 10.3 3.7 10.5 4.0 10.9 3.0 3.3 12.5 11.4 3.6 3.6 10.5 10.6 3.9 8.2 3.0 10.4 3.8 _ — = Quits Mili tary 30.2 - ■— 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.8 3.0 2.7 2.1 2.2 All other2 3.6 9.2 .4 .4 .4 .3 .3 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .9 7i .8 1.3 .6 .9 .5 .8 .7 .5 1.0 .7 .7 Annual rate 4~ ....... 123.9 63.9 38.5 17.2 8.2 134.6 72.0 45.2 18.0 8.8 January................... February................ March..................... April........................ M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August.................... September.............. October................... November.............. December............... 11.3 8.2 8.7 9.5 8.9 10.3 10.6 10.9 12.0 12.3 11.6 9.6 3.7 3.5 4.6 5.3 4.8 4.3 5.1 6.1 7.2 7.4 6.3 5.6 2.0 2.2 3.0 3.8 3.4 2.9 3.1 3.6 4.1 3.9 3.4 3.1 .9 .7 .8 .9 .8 .9 1.3 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.2 1.7 .8 .6 .8 .6 .6 .5 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .8 11.2 8.0 8.7 10.0 9.9 12.0 12.5 13.0 13.6 13.3 12.4 10.0 4.1 3.9 5.4 6.1 5.6 4.9 5.7 7.1 8.1 8.0 6.9 6.2 2.4 2.6 3.6 4.4 4.0 3.5 3.7 4.3 4.8 4.4 3.9 3.6 1.0 .8 .9 .9 .9 .9 1.4 1.9 2.5 2.8 2.2 1.8 .7 .5 .9 .8 .7 .5 .6 .9 .8 .8 .8 .8 194S • * Annual rate4___ _ 91.4 68.6 49.9 11.1 7.6 92.5 73.7 55.0 10.9 7.8 January................... February................ March..................... April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August.................... September.............. October................... November............... December............... 10.2 8.9 8.9 7.5 7.0 8.1 8.1 7.2 7.9 7.3 6.1 4.2 5.6 5.5 6.3 5.6 5.1 5.5 6.2 6.4 6.3 5.8 5.4 4.9 3.3 3.3 4.3 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.8 5.1 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.5 1.8 1.7 1.4 .9 .6 .7 .8 .8 .7 .7 .5 .5 .5 .5 .6 .5 .6 .7 .6 .5 .6 .6 1.0 .9 10.5 9.1 8.9 7.4 7.1 8.5 8.3 7.3 8.1 7.5 6.0 3.8 6.1 5.9 6.7 6.0 5.5 5.9 6.6 6.9 6.9 6.2 5.7 5.3 3.7 3.7 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.6 5.2 5.6 5.5 4.9 4.2 3.9 1.8 1.7 1.4 .8 .6 .7 .7 .8 .7 .7 .5 .5 .6 .5 .5 .6 .6 .6 .7 .5 .7 .6 1.0 .9 5.4 4.4 4.1 4.1 4.8 5.5 5.0 4.2 5.7 5.1 6.4 5.8 7.2 6.3 6.3 7.9 4.0 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.9 4.6 5.7 .6 .5 .8 .9 1.1 .8 .6 .4 1.1 1.0 1.4 .8 .8 1.5 1.1 1.8 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.5 5.6 5.0 4.5 6.1 5.5 6.9 6.1 6.7 8.0 6.4 8.7 4.3 4.0 4.6 4.3 4.7 5.4 4.9 6.2 .6 .5 .9 1.0 1.2 1.0 .7 .5 1.2 1.0 1.4 .8 .8 1.6 .8 2.0 19U 1 January................... February................ March..................... April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July........................ August.................... See footnotes at end of table. 15 T able 6.— Labor-Turnover Rates (per 100 Em ployees) in Airfram e, Engine, and P ro peller Plants, January 1941—August 1944 — Continued Propeller plants Engine plants Year and month Separations Separations Total acces sions Total Quits Mili tary All other * 6.9 71.0 24.4 17.2 2.6 4.6 .5 .6 .4 .5 .5 .7 .9 .8 .6 .6 .4 .4 7.2 5.9 6.7 6.3 5.8 6.3 6.1 4.0 3.9 6.1 5.1 7.6 1.1 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.6 2.6 1.7 2.5 1.7 1.2 1.2 .9 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.3 2.1 1.7 1.4 2.2 1.5 .9 .8 .1 1.2 .3 .1 .3 .1 .1 .1 («) .1 (6) .2 .1 .4 1.0 .5 .3 .4 .8 .2 .3 .1 .3 .2 15.1 6.6 90.2 35.9 17.6 13.6 4.7 .7 .5 .5 .8 .7 .8 1.2 1.4 2.1 2.6 2.2 1.6 .6 .5 .6 .7 .5 .5 .6 .5 .6 .5 .5 .5 11.3 11.9 11.2 9.9 7.8 5.2 5.4 4.8 4.7 5.6 6.0 6.4 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.6 3.6 4.0 4.8 3.8 2.6 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.0 .9 .4 .5 .8 .6 .9 1.0 1.2 1.9 2.3 1.9 1.2 .3 .2 .4 .3 .4 .3 .4 .8 .4 .4 .4 .4 29.7 11.3 7.5 82.5 55.7 36.9 10.8 8.0 1.6 1.3 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.2 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.0 .8 .7 .8 .7 .7 .6 .5 .5 .5 .5 .7 .5 .5 .7 .7 .6 .6 .7 .7 .8 7.4 7.8 8.0 6.3 7.9 7.0 8.1 7.0 7.8 6.2 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.0 5.5 5.4 4.9 6.2 6.1 5.2 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.7 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.5 3.8 3.9 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.1 .9 .8 .7 .7 .6 .7 .6 .4 .5 .4 .4 .4 .4 .5 .8 .6 .4 1.0 1.7 .9 3.0 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.8 4.1 .6 .5 .7 .7 .6 .4 .3 .2 .7 .9 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.6 1.6 4.7 4.4 4.0 5.1 4.6 5.7 6.3 4.6 4.8 4.3 4.7 6.1 7.3 5.7 6.4 6.5 3.4 3.0 3.4 4.6 4.9 4.7 5.3 5.5 .8 .7 .8 .9 .7 .4 .3 .3 .6 .6 .5 .6 1.7 .6 .8 .7 Total acces sions Total Quits Mili tary 19419 Annual rate4—....... 90.0 27.3 17.2 3.2 January................... February................ M a rch .................. April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August.................... September.—......... October................„ November.............. December............. . 12.0 8.1 6.1 7.6 8.6 8.5 8.3 6.7 7.1 6.7 4.9 5.4 1.9 2.3 3.5 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.4 1.4 1.8 1.0 1.2 2.9 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.6 .9 .9 .4 .5 .2 .4 .2 .3 .2 .1 .1 .2 .1 .5 19429 Annual rate 4_____ 93.1 40.8 19.1 January.................. February................ March..................... April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August.................... September___ ____ October................... November.............. December............... 11.7 8.2 8.5 7.8 6.3 6.2 5.7 4.8 7.4 8.9 9.3 8.3 2.4 2.3 2.7 3.4 2.9 2.9 3.4 3.3 4.6 5.0 4.4 3.5 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.4 194S9 Annual rate 4—....... 87.1 48.5 January.................. February................ March___ '_______ April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August.................... Septem ber............ October................... November.............. December............... 9.3 7.8 8.6 8.0 6.5 6.6 7.0 6.8 7.3 6.8 6.6 5.8 3.8 3.6 4.5 4.0 3.6 4.0 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5 19449 January.................. February................ March............ , ___ April....................... M ay........................ June........................ July......................... August— . .............. 7.0 5.6 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.2 4.8 3.2 4.3 4.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.7 5.9 All other 9 1 Turnover data are not strictly comparable with employment data, since they have been obtained from different sources and coverage is not identical. 2 Includes discharges, lay-offs, and miscellaneous separations. 9 Based on wage earners only. 4 Annual rates are the sums of the monthly rates per 100 employees. * Based on total employment. • Less than a tenth of 1 percent. 16 T able 7.— Labor-Turnover Rates (per 100 Em ployees) in Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants, b y S ex, January 1943-A u gu st 1 9 4 4 1 11944 figures revised] Total accessions Year and month All plants Male Female Airframe plants Male Female Engine plants Male Female Propeller plants Male Female 1948 January.................... February.................. March....................... April......................... M a y ........................ June.......................... July........................... August...................... September................ October—. ................ November-............... December................. 7.5 6.7 7.0 6.3 5.5 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.6 6.6 4.9 3.6 17.1 13.3 12.2 10.3 9.5 11.1 10.5 9.3 10.0 9.2 7.3 4.5 7.8 6.9 7.2 6.5 5.7 6.9 7.0 6.1 7.0 6.4 5.1 3.5 17.0 13.2 11.9 9.8 9.3 11.2 10.4 9.3 9.9 9.2 7.4 4.1 6.9 6.1 6.1 5.9 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.3 3.9 18.9 14.0 14.2 13.1 10.2 10.0 11.0 9.5 10.9 9.5 7.1 6.7 4.4 5.8 6.5 5.1 6.1 6.3 7.4 6.6 7.2 5.6 4.6 3.9 16.7 13.8 12.9 9.5 12.8 13.6 10.3 8.1 9.6 8.0 5.5 5.0 _ m January.................... February................... March....................... April......................... M a y ........................ June.......................... July........................... August—................... 4.5 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.5 4.2 3.8 3.3 6.1 5.5 5.7 5.4 6.6 7.7 7.0 5.7 4.5 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.6 4.4 3.8 3.5 5.8 5.2 5.1 4.9 6.1 7.4 6.7 6.1 4.8 4.1 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.5 2.8 7.8 7.2 8.0 7.0 8.8 8.6 7.7 3.9 3.4 3.8 3.1 4.0 3.6 4.4 5.3 4.2 8.5 5.9 6.4 8.1 7.2 9.0 8.6 5.5 Total separations8 Year and month All plants Male Airframe plants Female Male Female Engine plants Male Female Propeller plants Male Female 1948 January..................... February................... March....................... April......................... M a y --...................... June.......................... July........................... August...................... September................ October................ — November................. December................. 5.6 5.5 6.0 4.9 4.4 4.6 5.2 5.5 5.5 4.9 4.3 4.0 5.7 5.6 6.8 6.8 6.5 7.1 7.8 8.1 7.8 7.4 7.2 6.6 6.0 5.9 6.4 4.9 4.6 4.8 5.5 5.9 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.2 6.0 5.9 7.2 6.8 6.9 7.5 8.2 8.5 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.0 4.0 3.9 4.3 3.6 3.5 3.7 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.2 3.0 2.6 3.6 3.6 4.7 5.3 4.1 4.7 5.5 6.0 6.3 6.0 5.5 4.7 3.8 3.6' 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.3 5.1 4.5 6.2 5.6 5.4 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.7 4.5 5.3 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.3 7.3 4.4 1944 January..................... February................... March....................... April.......................... M a y --...................... June........................... July........................... August...................... 4.7 4.3 5.7 5.3 5.8 6.3 5.2 6.8 7.3 6.4 7.5 6.8 7.2 8.7 7.9 9.8 5.1 4.7 6.2 5.6 6.2 7.1 5.4 7.6 7.8 6.7 8.0 7.1 7.5 9.4 7.9 10.3 3.5 3.2 4.3 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.6 4.8 5.3 4.9 5.9 5.7 5.7 6.8 8.1 8.2 4.8 4.4 4.9 6.1 6.8 5.4 6.3 6.3 4.8 4.2 4.2 6.0 8.3 6.3 6.8 6.9 See footnotes at end of table. 17 T able 7.— Labor-Turnover Rates Cper 100 Em ployees) in Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants, b y Sex , January 1943-A u gu st 1 9 4 4 1— Continued (1944 figures revised] Quits Year and month All plants Male Airframe plants Female Male Female Engine plants Male Female Propeller plants Male Female 1943 January..................... February.................. M arch...................... April......................... M a y -....................... June.......................... July........................... August...................... September................. October..................... November................. December................. 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.9 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.5 5.0 4.9 5.9 6.1 5.7 6.2 6.9 7.3 7.1 6.6 5.7 5.4 2.8 2.8 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.9 4.2 4.3 3.5 3.1 2.7 5.3 5.2 6.3 6.4 6.0 6.6 7.4 7.8 7.4 7.0 5.9 5.7 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.9 2.9 3.4 4.1 3.3 3.9 4.4 5.2 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.0 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.5 2.0 2.0 3.9 3.6 3.4 4.5 3.7 4.0 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.2 3.8 4.4 4.4 5.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 , m January..................... February................... March....................... April......................... M a y ........................ June.......................... July........................... August...................... 3.0 2.8 3.3 3.1 3.3 3.8 3.5 4.5 5.8 5.2 5.8 5.7 6.0 6.7 6.6 7.7 3.2 3.0 3.6 3.2 3.5 4.2 3.6 4.9 6.2 5.5 6.3 6.1 6.5 7.3 6.7 8.2 2.3 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.2 4.5 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.7 6.2 6.2 3.2 2.9 3.3 4.3 4.4 4.4 5.1 5.4 4.1 3.3 3.5 5.3 6.1 5.4 5.9 5.9 * Data not available prior to January 1943. 2Includes quits, military separations, discharges, lay-offs, and miscellaneous separations. M ilitary separation rates were about the same for the 3 branches of the industry (table 6). Withdrawals for the armed forces were very small during 1941, amounting to less than 4 per 100 employees* W ith the United States’ entrance into the war, inductions increased, resulting in 17 of every 100 employees being taken into the services during 1942. While the average monthly rate for 1941 was 0.3 per 100 workers, it increased to approximately 1.5 for 1942, with the peak of 2.8 coming in October. Manning and replacement schedules did much to slow down the rate of induction during the beginning of 1943. However, the demand for workers was so great and the supply of available manpower so limited that West Coast airframe manufacturers made it clear that their plants could offer airplanes or men for the services but not both. There was agitation for draft deferment for W est Coast airframe workers in October 1943, and a stay of induction was finally ordered early in November for this area. The military separation rate consequently declined to 0.5 per 100 by November 1943. Nevertheless, about 11 out of every 100 airframe, engine, and propeller workers entered the armed forces during 1943. Cancellation of occupational deferments held by men under 26 years of age increased the military separation rate during the first half of 1944, but the industry’s increased productivity was 18 relied upon to offset the manpower taken by the armed forces. Since th$n the rate has been declining in line with the retarded rate of induction. Discharges and lay-offs were of little significance until 1944. With workers so hard to get, discharges were largely confined to cases of serious infraction of company regulations. This was particularly true through 1943. Later, plants began to weed out unsatisfactory per sonnel. Lay-offs, except in a few isolated cases, were unheard of prior to 1944 but have been increasing. Contract terminations and cutbacks, inevitable after the defeat of Germany, will cause the discharge and lay-off rates to become more important in the near future. Absenteeism of Workers Absenteeism became of major concern during the present emer gency because lost time could not be afforded in the production of vitally needed war goods. The aircraft industry, particularly the airframe branch, realized that a reduction in absenteeism was possible only by a determination of the causes and the adoption of remedial action designed to keep worker morale high both on and off the job. The measures taken, especially with reference to the provision of community facilities, were never adequate to counteract the strains imposed upon living and working conditions by the exigencies of the war. * Efforts were made to provide more adequate wash- and lunch room facilities. Absence-control measures were undertaken, to give assistance where needed or to institute disciplinary action where necessary. In addition, health and recreation facilities were estab lished and personal services provided, such as assistance in finding housing and making car-pooling arrangements. Day nurseries were established so that women workers could be on the job regularly. Provisions were also made for additional housing, better transporta tion facilities, and more convenient shopping hours. Despite the vigorous action generally adopted by airframe plants, absence rates were slightly higher in this branch of the industry than in engine and propeller plants in 1943. Kates in 1943 were generally about 7 to 8 percent in airframe plants and 6 to 7 percent in engine and propeller plants (table 8). During the influenza epidemic in December 1943, the absence rate slightly exceeded 10 percent for airframes and approximated 9 percent for engines and propellers. W ith the turn of the year, the rates returned to their former level. However, during March and April the propeller branch, with rates of about 8 percent, exceeded the airframe figure. The sharp drop registered from April to M ay for the three branches is not a real measure of change, since the figures for April and all previous months were computed for direct workers alone and all subsequent figures are based oh total employment. Since April, the rate for all branches has been around 6 to 7 percent. Throughout the period covered, the combined airframe, engine, and propeller rate showed slight variation from the average for all manufacturing. Thus, in March 1943 the combined aircraft figure was 6.6 percent as compared with 6.1 for all manufacturing. In August 1944 the rates were 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. 19 T a b l e 8.— Absence Rates 1 in Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants, January 1943-A u gu st 1944 19434 Month January.................................. February................................ March..................................... April....................................... M ay........................................ June........................................ July........................................ August.................................. September............ ................. October.. ................................. November.............................. December............................... 1944* All All Airframe Engine Propeller Airframe Engine Propeller plants plants plants plants plants plants plants plants (8) (8) 6.6 6.5 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.6 7.1 7.3 7.1 9.7 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.7 7.1 7.2 7.8 8.0 7.4 7.5 7.3 10.1 (8) <8) 6.1 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.6 6.1 6.6 6.8 8.7 (8) (8) 6.0 6.3 5.9 6.4 6.9 7.6 7.2 7.3 6.5 9.1 7.1 7.5 7.1 7.9 6.4 6.2 6.4 6.5 7.4 7.7 7.3 8.1 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.5 7.3 6.3 6.2 6.9 7.3 6.5 7.5 7.9 8.4 6.5 5.2 6.2 6.1 i Based on workweek nearest 15th of month. * Absence rates for period January 1943-April 1944 based on man-hours lost as a percent of time worked plus time lost by direct workers. Beginning with May 1944 absence rates are based on total employment and represent man-shifts lost as a percent of man-shifts scheduled. * Reports for engine and propeller plants not submitted prior to March 1943. Hours and Earnings 6 As in other war industries, aircraft workers have experienced materially increased earnings. This was the result primarily of the extended workweek and resulting overtime pay (time and a half for all hours in excess of 40) as well as increases granted in hourly rates. Upgrading as a result of acquired skill and differentials for second- and. third-shift employment also had their effect. When the National War Labor Board assumed responsibility for wage structure, there was no uniformity in hourly rates paid to air frame workers performing identical jobs. The Board considered it impossible to act equitably under the circumstances and appointed a special committee to study the wage structure of West Coast airframe plants. On the basis of this study, which covered eight companies, the committee in March 1943 proposed various changes for the region. This served as a pattern for the airframe industry and, together with subsequent orders, resulted in the establishment of basic rates for specified occupations and grades, entrance rates, provision for auto matic upgrading, and shift differentials. Average hourly earnings in airframe plants increased steadily from $0.69 in January 1940 to $1.16 by August 1944 (table 9). The average weekly earnings rose from $27.85 to $54.15 during the same period. This exceeded the income for manufacturing workers generally, since the average hourly earnings for this group rose from $0.66 to $1.02 and average weekly earnings from $24.56 to $45.85 during the correspond ing period. However, the workweek of airframe wage earners was longer than that prevailing in manufacturing as a whole, namely, 41 hours as against 38 in January 1940 and 47 as against 45 in August 1944. The airframe hourly earnings continued to rise in 1944, probably because of the decrease in the number of learners and the effects of upgrading resulting from acquired skill. •The aircraft figures shown here cover all prune contractors of completed airframes, engines, and propellers, including converted plants. They should not be compared with monthly data for the aircraft ana aircraft-engine industries released by the Bureau’s Employment Statistics Division which exclude converted plants but cover subcontractors and parts manufacturers as well as prime contractors. 20 T able 9.— Average H ours and Earnings 1 o f W age Earners in Airfram e, Engine, and Propeller Plants, January 1940-A u gu st 1944 Airframe plants Engine plants Propeller plants Average Average Average Year and month Week Weekly Hourly Week Weekly Hourly Week Weekly Hourly earn earn earn earn earn earn ly ly ly hours1 23 4 ings ings hours2 ings ings hours2 ings ings mo January. ........... February 4......... March................ April.................. M a y .................. June................... July................... August.............. September......... October.............. November......... December.......... 40.6 39.9 41.1 40.6 40.0 41.8 41.3 43.6 44.3 44.0 44.3 44.5 $27.85 27.55 28.48 28.16 28.18 30.37 29.88 31.87 32.34 32.64 32.95 32.97 $0.69 .69 .69 .69 .70 .73 .72 .73 .73 .74 .74 .74 47.0 44.9 45.4 46.1 46.0 46.9 46.0 46.1 47.1 45.9 43.4 46.5 $40.09 38.90 38.15 38.32 37.47 38.55 37.91 38.65 38.50 38.61 37.23 39.39 $0.85 .87 .84 .83 .82 .82 .82 .84 .82 .84 .86 .85 45.8 37.6 45.5 45.4 44.0 45.0 42.9 44.2 44.7 44.1 37.6 44.7 $35.29 27.69 34.94 34.73 32.82 34.41 32.16 33.71 34.09 33.77 29.37 34.30 $0.77 .74 .77 .77 .75 .76 .75 .76 .76 .77 .78 .77 January............ February........... March............... April.................. M ay................... June................... J u ly .................. August.............. September......... October............. November 4....... December4....... 44.7 45.3 44.9 45.2 45.2 44.6 44.5 45.5 45.4 44.9 44.0 45.8 34.08 34.85 34.50 35.11 35.21 34.80 35.32 37.85 37.81 38.63 39.34 41.53 .76 .77 .77 .78 .78 .78 .79 .83 .83 .86 .89 .91 46.3 45.5 45.8 41.9 47.0 47.0 47.0 47.0 48.1 47.2 47.7 48.3 41.22 39.57 40.79 38.36 45.07 46.49 47.36 48.71 50.82 52.04 55.28 55.63 .89 .87 .89 .92 .96 .99 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.10 1.16 1.15 45.1 47.4 47.7 37.9 47.4 48.5 49.6 3 42.1 45.7 48.6 44.8 53.2 37.26 39.28 41.15 31.39 43.30 44.40 46.33 46.26 46.50 49.26 51.37 63.95 .83 .83 .86 .83 .91 .92 .93 *1.10 1.02 1.01 1.15 1.20 January___ February... March......... April........... M ay............ June............ July............. August........ September 4. October....... November— December- . 48.9 47.5 47.6 47.4 46.7 46.1 4516 46.0 45.8 45.7 46.1 46.4 46.12 44.35 44.33 44.62 44.52 44.65 44.49 44.78 45.34 44.35 44.91 45.59 .94 .93 .93 .94 .95 .97 .97 .97 .99 .97 .97 .98 50.6 49.7 49.3 48.5 48.3 48.2 48.0 48.3 47.6 48.8 47.3 47.1 62.09 59.34 60.93 58.90 58.43 58.07 59.61 60.21 61.00 61.14 59.25 58.92 1.23 1.19 1.23 1.21 1.21 1.21 1.24 1.25 1.28 1.25 1.25 1.25 52.0 49.7 50.1 50.9 51.5 51.0 52.1 48.9 47.7 48.3 46.2 48.9 59.10 54.15 56.42 58.04 59.51 59.58 59.01 57.47 59.44 60.18 56.38 59.89 1.14 1.09 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.17 1.13 1.18 1.25 1.24 1.22 1.22 January___ February... March_____ April........... M ay............ June............ July............. August........ September4. October....... November— December. _ 46.3 45.9 46.1 47.1 46.7 46.4 45.4 45.6 46.5 46.6 46.6 45.6 45.82 45.89 46.48 48.90 49.21 49.47 48.31 48.97 51.58 51.30 51.84 51.12 .99 1.00 1.01 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.12 47.2 47.8 48.5 48.0 48.8 46.7 46.7 47.1 47.7 47.7 47.4 46.2 59.84 60.21 61.33 60.40 62.10 59.03 59.40 59.70 62.25 61.14 61.14 58.47 1.27 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.26 1.27 1.27 1.30 1.28 1.29 1.26 49.0 47.4 47.7 48.2 48.2 48.3 48.3 49.0 49.0 47.0 47.6 47.2 59.62 58.05 58.18 60.14 60.27 60.56 60.94 61.27 64.11 58.89 59.75 59.89 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.26 1.25 1.31 1.25 1.26 1.27 47.6 47.3 46.8 46.6 46.8 46.9 46.5 46.8 53.94 53.64 53.55 53.54 54.30 54.37 53.90 54.15 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 47.7 46.9 47.1 47.1 46.0 46.7 42.2 45.4 61.51 60.39 60.97 61.15 59.49 60.93 55.32 59.19 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.30 1.29 1.31 1.31 1.30 48.8 47.4 46.5 46.7 46.4 47.3 44.3 48.3 62.02 59.52 58.54 59.10 58.16 60.61 57.00 62.72 1.27 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.25 1.28 1.29 1.30 mi 19U January_______ February........... March................ April.................. M ay................... June................... July................... August8............ . 1 Based on workweek-nearest 15th of month. The figures shown cover all prime contractors of completed airframes, engines, and propellers, including converted plants. They should not be compared with monthly data for the aircraft and aircraft-engine industries released by the Bureau’s Employment Statistics Division which exclude converted plants but cover subcontractors and parts manufacturers as well as prime contractors. 2 Average weekly hours are for all wage earners and therefore not strictly comparable with the average weekly hours shown for direct workers in other series. 3 Fluctuation of hours and earnings in this month was caused by a strike in 1 plant. 4 Fluctuation of hours and earnings in this month caused by holiday. 8 Preliminary. 21 Both engine and propeller plants reported higher earnings than air frame plants, with the hourly average for engines slightly more than that of propellers. A longer workweek and more second- and thirdshift employment had some effect. However, the greater proportion of skilled workers in these branches was primarily responsible for the higher earnings. In January 1940 engine wage earners averaged a 47hour week and earned an average of $0.85 per hour or $40.09 per week. Propeller wage earners had a 46-hour week and averaged $0.77 per hour or $35.29 per week. Because of longer hours the weekly earnings for propeller wage earners at times slightly exceeded those of engine workers. The variation in earnings between the two branches was narrowed in June 1944; at that time both engine and propeller wage earners approximated a 47-hour week with hourly earnings of about $1.31 for the former and $1.28 for the latter. This resulted in weekly earnings of $60.93 for engine wage earners and $60.61 for propeller workers. Both branches of the industry reported hourly earnings averaging $1.30 for August. However, propeller hours exceeded those of engines, resulting in an earnings figure of $62.72 as compared with $59.19 for engines. Production Trends The number of completed airplanes accepted each month has risen steadily from January 1941. At that time approximately 1,000 com pleted planes were accepted monthly. The figure had risen to almost 2,500 by the end of the year, around 5,000 by the end of 1942, and 8,800 by the end of 1943. In March 1944 alone, 9,117 completed units were accepted, the record for any one month (table 10). While this eightfold increase in acceptances is in itself considerable, the performance it represents is actually even more outstanding. Prior to 1943, production was concentrated on lighter airplanes. There was need for large numbers of primary, basic, and advanced trainers. Fighters predominated among the combat airplanes. Beginning with 1943, particularly the latter part of the year, heavy bombers and cargo ships became a significant part of total acceptances. T o evaluate properly this shift in type of production, together with the fact that each airplane has its complement of spare parts, it is necessary to consider the airframe acceptances in terms of weight rather than units. The total weight of monthly acceptances includ ing spare parts was about 4 million pounds early in 1941; it had almost tripled by the last quarter of the year, reaching about 10 million pounds per month. The increase continued during 1942 and by the end of 1943 the acceptance figure was close to 90 million pounds. In M ay 1944 over 102 million pounds were accepted, more than in any previous month and 30 times the number in January 1941. The average weight per acceptance each month was about 4,500 pounds in 1941 and increased to 9,800 pounds by the end of 1943. It rose during 1944 because o f continued large-scale production of heavy bombers and transports and the introduction of superbombers into our aircraft program. The highest average weight per acceptance ever attained was 12,150 pounds reached this June, roughly 3 times the average weight of acceptances in the early stages of the production program. 22 T a b l e 10.— N um ber and W eight o f Airfram e Acceptances and N um ber o f Airfram e W orkers (Including Subcontracting), January 1941-A u g u st 1944 Acceptances Year and month Total number of complete units * Total employment, Total including weight estimate including for sub spares8 (in contracting pounds) 1941 January........... February......... March.............. April......... . M ay................. June................. July.................. August............. September____ October_______ November....... December____ 1,012 963 1,136 1,391 1,329 1,478 1,462 1,854 1,946 2,284 2,138 2,462 3,420,300 4,120,100 4,699,500 6,386,900 6,056,200 6,908,000 6,263,600 8,713,500 9,077,100 10,588,200 9,658,100 13,497,100 January. _. February.. March....... April......... M ay.......... June.......... July.......... August___ September. October__ November. December. 2,977 3,047 3,483 3,506 3,984 3,738 4,106 4,281 4,307 4,063 4,812 5,501 15,021,700 16,660,500 20,318,000 20,057,400 23,237,000 24,846,300 27,402,700 29,025,000 32,148,800 30,848,400 35,064,700 41,178,600 January. .. February.. March....... April......... M ay.......... June.......... July........... August___ September. October__ November. December . 5,014 5,423 6,265 6,472 7,087 7,097 7,376 7,613 7,598 8,363 8,791 8,802 1944 January........ February___ March............ April............. M ay............. June.............. July.............. August......... 8,789 8,761 9,117 8,331 8,902 8,049 8,000 7,937 Average weight * per unit accepted pounds) 1 162,200 170,600 *• 179,200 191,200 203,100 222,300 242,900 265,500 283,800 310,800 327,600 356,300 Average weight * accepted per employee (in pounds) Average number of employees per complete unit accepted 3,380 4,278 4,137 4,592 4,557 4,674 4,284 4,700 4,664 4,636 4,517 5,482 21 24 26 33 30 31 26 33 32 34 29 38 160 177 158 137 153 150 166 143 146 136 153 145 388,600 423,700 448,300 479,900 510,200 553,800 594,300 658,200 710,500 774,100 840,500 913,000 5,046 5,468 5,833 5,721 5,833 6,647 6,674 6,780 7,464 7,593 7,287 7,486 39 39 45 42 46 45 46 44 45 40 42 45 131 139 129 137 128 148 145 154 165 191 175 166 37,532,100 43,961,600 51,038,900 55,252,100 60,692,700 61,535,600 65,458,500 69,296,700 71,103,900 76,256,500 82,444,600 86,353,400 975,500 1,013,100 1,037,800 1,062,300 1,084,200 1,115,100 1,139,600 1,148,100 1,170,900 1,179,100 1,185,500 1,167,900 7,485 8,107 8,147 8,537 8,564 8,671 8,875 9,102 9,358 9,118 9,378 9,811 38 43 49 52 56 55 57 60 61 65 70 74 195 187 166 164 153 157 155 151 154 141 135 133 89,989,000 93,500,000 101,400,000 96,400,000 102,400,000 97,800,000 93,900,000 93,900,000 1,156,100 1,137,900 1,108,400 1,084,300 1,063,400 1,027,600 1,009,000 973,300 10,239 10,672 11,122 11,571 11,503 12,151 11,738 11,831 78 82 91 89 96 95 93 96 132 130 122 130 119 128 126 123 1 Latest revisions released by the Army Air Forces. Excludes spares. 8Data from January 1941-December 1943 are latest revisions released by the Army Air Forces. Data for January-August 1944, from War Production Board. * Weight of spares included in computation of average. The remarkable achievement in productivity is particularly evident from the decrease in the number of employees per acceptance (in cluding subcontractors as well as prime contractors) and the substan tial increase in the weight accepted per employee. During the period 1941-43, the number of employees per acceptance varied con siderably from month to month but ranged roughly from 130 to 180 workers. However, with the beginning of 1944, the range was at a much lower level, namely, between 120 and 130. The average weight accepted per employee doubled between the early months of 1941 and 23 the summer of 1942. Then, with the beginning of a new phase in the production program, there was no increase in accepted weight per employee until the early spring of 1943. From that time onward the increase in accepted weight per employee has been rapid, almost doubling in a year and reaching 96 pounds in M ay 1944, as compared with only 21 pounds in January 1941 and 49 pounds in M arch 1943. Part of the increase in 1941 was due to a lengthening o f hours, but since 1942 the increase described is an increase in hourly output as well as per worker per month. Because of this increase in output, the labor cost per pound of airplane is only about a third as great as it was early in 1941, despite the fact that earnings per hour are over half again as large. The pattern of increasing productivity in the airframe branch as shown here may be taken as an illustration of the production experience of the other branches of the aircraft industry. PQ ByiCTO RY BUY U N IT E D STATES BO N D S AND STAMPS If. S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 19 4 4
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