Full text of Trade-Union Policy and Technological Change, Report No. L-8

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THE WPA NATIONAL RESEARCH PROJECT
ON REEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND RECENT CHANGES
IN INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUES
Under the authority grantedby the President in the Execu
tive Order which created the Works Progress Administration,

AdministratorHarry L. Hopkinsauthorizedthe establishment
of a research program forthe purpose of collecting and ana

lyzingdata bearingonproblemsof employment,
unemployment,
and relief.

Accordingly, the National Research Program was

established
in October1935underthesupervisionof
Corrington
Gill, Assistant Administrator of the WPA, who appointed the
directors of the individual studies or projects.
The Projecton ReemploymentOpportunitiesandRecent Changes
in Industrial Techniques was organized in December 1935 to

Inquire,
with the cooperationof
industry,labor,and govern
mentaland private agencies, intothe extentof recent changes
in industrial techniques and to evaluate the effects of these
changes on the volume of employment and unemployment. David

Weintrauband Irving Kaplan,members of the research starr
of the DivisionofResearch,Statistics,and Financewereap
pointed, respectively, Directorand Associate Director of the
Project. The task set for them was to assemble and organize
the existing

data which

bear

on

the problem

and to augment

thesedata by field surveysand analyses.
To this end, many governmental
agencieswhicharethe col
lectorsand repositoriesof pertinent informationwere invited
to cooperate. The cooperating agencies of the United States

GovernmentincludetheDepartmentof Agriculture,the Bureau
of the Department of the Interior,the Bureau of

of Mines

Labor Statistics

of

the Department

of

Labor,

the Railroad

Retirement Board, the Social Security Board, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue of the Department of the Treasury, the De

partmentof Commerce,the FederalTrade Commission,and the
Tarifi

Commission.

The following private agencies joined with

the

National

ResearchProject in conductingspecialstudies: the Indus
trial ResearchDepartment
of the Universityof Pennsylvania,
the NationalBureau of EconomicResearch,Inc., the Employ
ment Stabilization
Research Institute of the University of
Minnesota, and the Agricultural Economics Departments in the
Agricultural Experiment Stations of California, Illinois,
Iowa, and New York.

Since September 1, 1939, the Project has been sponsored
Planning Board, Executive orrice
Resources
of the President, Washington, D. C.

by the National

fairly uniform standardsof working conditionsover
the entire area of the "competitivemarket."
This report, on Irade-Union Policy and Techno
logical change, brings together widely scatteredmate
rial.
It should prove helpful to industrial, labor,
and governmental bodies alike.

Respectfullyyours,

Sir
Comington
Corrington Gill
Assistant Commissioner

2

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

oronothermanual
trades
wasmechanizedeitherpartially
orwholly.
A
highdegree
ofdivision
oflabor
resulted
inthesplitting
upofmany
handicraft
skills
intoanumber
ofsemiskilled
andunskilled
operations.
Specialization
ina restricted
numberoreven
inoneofaseriesof
oper
ations
became
theorder
oftheday.Mechanization
ofmanual
operations,
although
a highly
dramatic
formof change,
hadin mostinstances
been
onlytheforerunner
of awholeseries
of minor,
day-to-day
improvements

inmachineryand
processeswhich,
although
less
impressive
intheir
imme
diate,
individual
effects
onlabor
requirements,
haveoperated
toproduce
cumulative
results
whichhaveoftenoutweighed
themorerevolutionary
changes.
Mechanization
was,furthermore,
notconfined
totheproduction
process
proper;
auxiliary
operations,
suchas handling
of materials
in
raworfinished
formandinterprocess
transportation,
havealsobecome
subject
to mechanical
innovations.

In thebeginning
ofthiscentury,
various
special
systems
ofshopand
plantmanagement
became
popular.
Theattention
of trained
engineers

wasdirected
tosystematic
work
analysis
with
theaidoftime-and-moti
study,
andemphasiswas
placed
anorganization
ofproduction
onthebasis
of themosteconomical
technical
level.Thecumulative
results
of small,

day-to-day
changes
in equipment
insuchindustries
as textiles,
auto
mobiles,
steel,
andmachinery-manufacture
weretranslated
intomultiple
machine
operation
andreductions
in thenumber
of workers
assigned
to
specific
operations.
In thevarious
branches
of thetransportation

industry
gradual
improvements
insafety
devices
andautomatization
of
individual
operationswere
utilized
toreduce
operating
crews.
Changes
in office
equipment
andcommunication
facilities,
notably
on therail
roads,
provided
a technical
basis
forconsolidations
ofvarious
operating

units.
Standardization
ofoperations,
personnel-selectionpolicies
and
incentive-wage-payment
methods
became
important
toolsin thehands
of

management
inthedrive
toward
improvements
inefficiency
ofindustrial
operationand
theattainment
ofhigher
output
perdollar
oflaborcost.
What
specific
problems
have
these
changes
produced
fortrade-unions?
In thefirstplace,
theprimary
concern
of trade-unions
is to maintain

employment
opportunities
fortheir
members.
Where
technologicalchanges
resulted
inreduced
labor
requirements
perunitofoutput
without
a com
pensating
increase
inthedemand
fortheproduct,
displacement
of labor
wastheresult.Besides,
changes
inskillrequirements
haveat times

beenmoreprominent
thanthereduction
inthenumber
ofjobs.Froma
trade-union
standpoint
thespecific
skills
thatthemembers
of a union
possess
constitute
animportant
source
of bargaining
power
fortheunion

4

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

havekeptsuchproblems
continually
on theorderof business
of trade
unions.In instances
wherethespeedof themachine
is in question
or
wherereduction
increws
andstretch-out
areinvolved,
similar
problems
withrespect
todetermining
theworker's
ability
toworkunder
a specific
work load without undue strain have arisen from time to time. Since

theproblem
ofwhattheworkloadshould
be involves
a gooddealofsub
jective
judgment
onthepartoftheworkers
as wellas employers,
it has
often
occasioned
important
labor-relations
conflicts.
Furthermore,
theimpact
of technological
changes
on thevolume
and
character
oflabor
requirements
is usually
atleast
partially
andinsome
instances
wholly
indirect.
Thatis,theeffect
is produced
at a place
farremoved
fromthepoint
of thechange
through
itscompetitive
influ
enceon themarket
asa whole.Forexample,
technological
change
inone

plant
maybeaccompanied
byaproduction
increasewhich
permits
retention
oftheentire
workforce
butinvolves
theshut-down
ofa competing
plant.
Changes
whichimprove
theefficiency
of utilization
ofrawmaterials
and
fuelsin a manufacturing
industry
mayaffect
laborrequirements
only
in other
industries
andina different
locality.
Also,
competition
from

substitute
products
affects
labor
requirements
indirectly.
Improve
ments
intransportation
andcommunication
facilities,
thediscovery
of
newsources
of rawmaterials,
andtheexhaustion
of oldsources
have
frequently
resulted
intherelocation
ofplants.
Suchrelocations
some
timestaketheformof a growth
of new,highly
efficient
plants
in new

communities
andthecreation
ofanexcess
capacitywhich,
through
com
petitive
pressure
in themarket
as a whole,produces
unemployment
and
shut-downs
intheoldcommunities.
Through
theirinfluence
on thecom

petitive
market
theindirect
effects
inturnbecome
important
factors
incollective-bargaining
negotiations
evenwhere
nochanges
wereactually
introduced.

Finally,
oneof themostserious
problems
thattechnological
changes
havecreated
fortrade-unions
inmanyinstances
istheextension
of juris

diction
overtheneworchanged
jobs.In instances
where
changes
in
techniques
madeit unnecessary
foremployers
to employ
union
members
at
thenewjobsandworkers
wererecruited
in theopenmarket,
collective
bargaining
relations
became
strained;
insomeinstances
theunions
were
faced
withextinction
until
theysucceeded
inestablishing
theirjuris
diction
overthechanging
jobs. In manyinstances
the unionmembers
who

werestillabletofindemployment
at theiroldtrades
werehostile
to
thenewtechnology
andtheworkers
employed
at it. Thisattitude
facili
tatedtheemployment
of nonunion
labor,andthetransfer
of unionmembers
to the newjobstherefore
becamedifficult
or impossible.
Besides,
the

6

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

struggle
against
insecurity
occasioned
by technological
change?Inthe
faceof everrecurring
technological
changes
trade-unions
haveresorted
to awidevariety
ofmeasures,
ranging
fromprohibition
oftheoperation
of machinery
to activecooperation
withemployers
in theintroduction
of

changes.
Regardless
of thespecific
measures
adopted,
theprimary
ob
jectives
behind
alltrade-union
actions
withrespect
totechnological
change
havebeentheprotection
of employment
opportunities
andincome
andtheimprovement
ofworking
conditions
withrespect
tohealth,
safety,
and leisure.Onlywiththese
objectives
in viewis itpossible
to ex
plainthewiderangeandseemingly
contradictory
policies
employed
in
specific
instances.
In situations
wheretechnological
change
was intro

ducedin suchaway thatnoalternative
to displacement
or otherforms
of insecurity
wasoffered,
either
because
ofadverse
economic
conditions
or lackofconsideration
onthepartof employers
fortheneeds
oftheir
employees,
opposition
tochange
wasbound
to develop.
Suchopposition,
however,
has notnecessarily
becomean integral
partof trade-union
policy.In fact,thetendency
incollective-bargaining
relations
over
a longperiod
oftimehasbeentoresort
to aneverincreasing
variety
of

measures
designed
toprovide
somedegree
ofemployment
andincome
secur
ityin thefaceoftechnological
change
precisely
inorder
toprevent
the
development
of opposition
of unionmembersto changein anyform. This
tendency
hasbeenparticularly
manifested
in industries
wherethe active

cooperation
of theworkers
involved
isessential
tosuccessful
operation.
Theresentment
of workers
to insecurity
occasioned
bytechnological
changehasfoundconcrete
expression
in a variety
of formsin thecourse

of thepastcentury.
In theearly
daysof theintroduction
of machin
ery workersfrequently
resorted
to directactionagainstmachines
or

Alrefusalto operate
them.Prohibition
to operate
machines
foundexpres
sionin official
trade-union
policy
of suchunions
as theStonecutters,
theMolders,
theCigarmakers,
theWindowGlassWorkers,
andothers.

Withrareexceptions,
however,
these
measures
failed
toprovide
thede
greeof security
theworkers
soughtto attain,
and theyweredisastrous

to theunions.Theseandsimilar
experiences
havegenerally
convinced
trade-unions
thatitisdangerous
strategy
tooppose
theintroduction
of

machinery;
practically
allunions
have
atonetimeoranotherofficially
proclaimed
thisprinciple
as basicunionpolicywithrespect
to all
technological
changes.Thisdoesnot mean,however,
thatworkershave
learned
to accepttechnological
changewithout
resentment,
regardless
of

itsconsequences.
Itdoesmeanthatasfaras trade-union
policy
iscon
cerned
efforts
arebeing
madetodirect
theresentment
ofworkers
against

8

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

In individual
instances
wheretrade-unions
havebeenableto secure

Z

acceptance
ofthese
policies
byemployers,
agreements
havealsobeen
entered
intowith
theaimofimproving
various
phases
ofproductive
ef
ficiency.
A basic
condition
forsecuring
suchcooperation
on thepart
oftrade-unions
hasbeen,
ineachinstance,
thattheworkers'
jobs,
earn
ings,
andstandards
ofworking
conditions
wouldbesafeguarded.
These

attempts
atunion-management
cooperation
represent
another
phase
ofa
conscious
effortmadeby trade-unions
andemployers
to removeopposition

to technological
change
fromthesphere
ofcollective-bargaining
rela

tions
byproviding
anopportunity
fortheworkers
involved
toshare
in
sucheconomies
as might
beobtained
fromimproved
productivity
or greater
plantefficiency.

Theevolutions
of trade-union
policy
withrespect
to technological
changesoutlinedherehavenot beensolelythe work of trade-unions.

Manyemployers,
too,realize
thatinsecurity
breeds
indifference
andeven

barriers
toefficient
production.
Itisnotsurprising,
therefore,
to
findinstances
where
employers
havevoluntarily
regulated
theintroduc
tionof technological
changes
in order
to reduce
displacement
andinse
curityto a minimum.
OBJECTIVE

AND

SCOPE

OF STUDY

For overa centurytrade-unions
havebeenthe firstlineof defense

against
allforms
of insecurity
thattheir
members
andworkers
ingeneral
havebeenexposed
to as a result
of theintroduction
of technological
changes.
Theirexperiences
in dealing
withthese
problems
through
col
lective
bargaining
haveserved
tocrystallize
a series
of policies
and
practices
withrespect
to protection
of workers'
earnings,
employment,
andotherconditions
of work. Theobjective
of thisstudyis to organize
andpresent,
in a systematic
way,whatever
information
is available
which

wouldthrowlighton thecharacter
of theprotection
thattrade-unions
havesought
fortheir
members
inthefaceoftechnological
change.
Thenature
ofcollective
bargaining
andthecharacter
oftheproblems
thataresubject
tocollective
agreements
setdefinite
limits
to the
x

scope
ofthisstudy.Themeasures
thathavebeenadopted
withrespect
to technological
change
through
collective
bargaining
havedealtwith
protection
ofemployment
opportunities,
earnings,
andconditions
ofwork
primarily
at thepoint
of production.
Thatis,theyprovided
somepro
tection
for thoseworkers
who hadstillretained
someclaimto a job in

aplant
orindustry.
However,
somemeasures,
although
negotiatedat
the
pointof production,
havehadtheeffect
of alleviating
thehardships
of thosedisplaced
duringthe periodof readjustment.
Evenin thecase

CHAPTER

MINIMIZING

II

DISPLACEMENT

Recognized
controloverdefinite
categories
of workin an industry
or

occupation
hasbeenoneofthemajor
objectives
oftrade-unions
underany
conditions.
Aslongas occupations
remain
relatively
stable,
provisions

incollective
agreements
usuallycover
thevarious
claimswith
regard
to
jurisdiction
over
specified
trades
andoccupations.
Whentechnological
changes
create
newoperations
andmodify
oreliminate
oldones,
however,
theproblem
frequently
arises
as to whichgroupofworkers
should
be
assigned
to thechanged
jobs.Attempts
tocontrol
employment
opportuni

tiesunder
suchchanging
conditions
resulted,
ina number
ofinstances,
inspecific
collective
agreementswhich
stipulated
that
aworkershould
notbeeliminated
fromhisjobwhen
technological
change
hasmodified
it;
thatwhere
jobshavebeencompletely
eliminated
andnewonescreated
the
displaced
workers
should
betransferred
to thenewjobs;
andthatwhere

thenumber
ofjobshasbeen
reducedby
thechange,
other
jobs
atdiffer
entoperations
should
beprovided.
Suchprotective
measures
havenot
been
confined
toregulation
ofdisplacement
alone.Insomeindustries
provisions
against
displacement
alsoinvolved
agreements
overtherate

ofintroduction
oftechnological
changes
inorder
toaccomplish
thesame
ends.Although
agreementswhichprovide
forsuchregulation
andcontrol
ofdisplacement
havebeen
concluded
only
inalimitednumber
ofinstances,
trade-unions
haveincreasingly
sought
suchadjustments
inrecent
years.
X.
Factors
whichhavetended
toaggravate
displacement
arising
fromtech

nological
changes
have
originated
intrade-unionpolicy
based
onlimited
organizational
objectives
as wellas in employer
hostility
toward
col

lective
bargaining.
Inthefirst
place,
thenarrowbasis
oftrade-union
organization,
which
wasfrequently
limited
toa group
ofskilled
crafts
orevena single
craftinan industry,
hadat timesmadetheunionin
effectual
whentechnological
changes
modified
oreliminated
these
crafts,

andthenewoccupationswere
excluded
fromunion
jurisdiction.
Inthe
second
place,
employers
havefrequently
questioned
theverybasis
of col
lective
bargaining
whentheyrefused
torecognize
a union's
jurisdiction
overthechanging
jobson thegrounds
thattechnological
changes
made
itpossible
forthemto employ
laborhired
in theopenmarket.Insuch

instances
theproblem,
instead
ofconsisting
of negotiations
regarding
adjustments,
consisted
ofthebasic
struggle
forunion
recognition.
Fi
nally,
various
trade-unions
operating
in closely
related
craftshave
10

UNION POLICY AND TECANOLOGICAL CHANGE

12

duallocalswereorganized
in a numberof citiesby workers
who opposed
the policyof the union. Since that time every effortof the union has

beendirected
toward
establishing
control
overthemachines.
Displace
ment,particularly
of unionmen,hadalready
takenplace,however,
since

nonunionmen
hadbeen
employed
toworkon
them.2
Whenmolding
machines
beganto makeinroads
intoironmolding
in the

decade
from1890
to1900
themolders
refused
tooperate
themon
theground
thattheworkwasmonotonous
anduncongenial
toskilled
molders.
Manu
facturers,
too,instead
of transferring
skilled
molders
to operate
the
machines,
preferred
to employunskilled
labor. It was not until1899

thatofficers
of theunionbeganto urgetheirmembers
to accept
jobs
at themachines;3
actual
organization
of machine
operators
intoseparate

locals
orinto
existing
unionswasnot
begun
until
1903,
and
evenin1907
4
therewerefewsuchworkers
actually
enrolled
asmembers.

Inthestove-manufacturing
branch
ofthemolding
industry
anagreement
wasfinally
reached
whichenabled
theunionto extend
itsjurisdiction
overthemachine
operators
in1908.In themachinery
andjobbing
branch
oftheindustry,
where
machinery
wasintroduced
to a greater
extent,
the

National
Founders
Association
abrogated
itsagreement
in1904
andmost
of

theemployers
operatedonan
open-shop
basis.
Thetrade-union
members
werereluctant
to accept
jobsat machines
because
employment
opportu
nities
wereplentiful
as a result
of theincreased
useof machinery
and
machine
parts
inmanyindustries.

Formany
years
theCigarmakers'
International
Union's
struggles
against
displacement
wereaimed
primarily
atprotection
of"journeymen"
whomade
a completecigar. Although
theInternational
advocated
extension
of
jurisdiction
overwomen
workers,
teamworkers,
andmachine
operators,
the
highdegree
of autonomy
exercised
by thelocalbranches
of theunion
untilthe late1920'sand the predominance
of journeymen
in the union

timeandagain
prevented
theInternational
fromcarrying
outanyuniform
policy
withrespect
tomachinery
orother
changes.
Whenthemoldwasintroduced
inthe1860's
theInternational
prohibited

itsmembers
fromworking
withworkers
whousedthemold.Suchaction,
however,
resulted
in theemployment
of unskilled
labor,
andthepolicy
2George
E.Barnett,
Chapters
onMachinery
andLabor
(Cambridge,
Mass.:
Harvard
University
Press,1928),
pp. 30–84.

3F.W.Hilbert,
nTrade-Union
Agreements
intheIron
Molders'
Union,"
inJacob
H.
Hollander
andGeorgeE. Barnett,eds.,Studiesin American
TradeUnionism
(New
York:

Henry Holt and Co., 1906), pp. 249-50.

4Frank
T.Stockton,
TheInternational
Molders
Union
of North
America
(Baltimore,

Md.:

The JohnsHopkinsPress,1921),D. 192.

5

RussellS. Bauder,
"National
Collective
Bargaining
intheFoundry
Industry,"
The AmericanEconomicReview,Vol. XXIV,NO. 3 (Sept.1934),DD. 462-77.

14

UNION 'POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

securedconsent
to employunionmen at the machines,
not enoughworkers

werewilling
to accept
thejobs,andworkers
hadto be securedby the
unionfromoutside
thetrade.8Thecoopers,
too,refusedto acceptjobs

in machine
plants
fora longtime,
andasa result
theindustry
gradually

slipped
awayfromunion
control.
In1905theCoopers'
International
Union
urged
itsmembers
toaccept
jobsatmachines
andstated
thatits
policy
hadbeenchanged
to makeit possible
to organize
theworkers
in
machine
plants.Eveninthecaseof theintroduction
of thelinotype
intoprinting,
wherecomparatively
favorable
conditions
existedfor the

transfer
ofworkers
tothemachines,
somecompositors
preferred
tocompete

withmachine
production.
Partnerships
were
formed
bygroups
ofworkers
whosecured
workfromnewspaper
offices
andoperated
underwhatever
terms

theycould
get.10
Thistendency
onthepartofa union
membership
to
continue
topractice
theoldskill
andshunwork
atthechanged
methods
hasbeenparticularly
strong
in theearly
stages
of theintroduction
of
a newtechnique,
whenonlya portion
of theindustry
hasbeenaffected,
or whenonlypartof theworkhasbeentransferred
to the machines.

In practically
allinstances,
however,
theunionleadership
hasbeen
quickto sensetheeffects
of technological
changeandadvocated
revision

of policy
longbefore
themembership
wasreadyto acceptit. This may

bedueinlarge
measure
tothefactthattheofficers
oftheunions
are
concerned
to a greater
extentwiththe taskof preserving
the unionas

aninstitution.
Failure
toextend
thejurisdiction
ofa union
overthe
new processes
of production
wouldinevitably
lead to the dissolution
of the unionwhenits members
are no longerneededin the industry.In

industrieswhere
negotiations
forcollective
agreements
arecarried
on
by thenational
officers
oftheunion,
competition
created
by differences
in technology
frequently
becomes
a factor
in themakingof agreements
longbefore
itsinfluence
isfeltbythelocal
union
membership.

Collective
bargaining
isnota one-sided
activity,
anditwouldbea
mistake
to place
theentire
responsibility
forfailure
to extendjuris
diction
overthechanging
jobson trade-union
policy
alone.Employers,
too,havefrequently
refusedto recognize
unionjurisdiction
overthe

changed
jobs
andhave
insomeinstances
utilized
thechanging
conditions
asa basis
forsevering
collective-bargaining
relations.
In thejobbing
andmachinery
branchof the molding
industry,
for instance,
the National
8

Minutes
of theproceedings
ofthe Thirty-ninth
AnnualConvention
of theGlass

BottleBlowers'Association
ofthe UnitedStates
Aug.2-12,1915),D. 52.

nd Car

(East St. Louis, ill.,

onthe
Machinery
Problem
OnceMore,"
TheCoopers'
International
Journal,
Vol.XIV,
No. 3 (Mar.1905),pp. 137-8.

10Barnett,
op.cit.,
D.18.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

16

manufacturers
whowould
employ
itsmembers.
TheGlass
Bottle
Blowers,
on

theother
hand,
hadtotrainpressers
forthemachineswhilesuchworkers
wereavailable
in therivalunion.Thusthejurisdictional
conflict

ofthetwounions
resulted
inthetraining
ofadditionalworkerswhile
machinery
wasdisplacing
those
already
trained.13
Similar
claims
wereputforth
bytheInternational
Brotherhood
of Team
sters,
Chauffeurs,
Stablemen
andHelpers
andtheAmalgamated
Association
of Streetand Electric
RailwayEmployes
for thecontrolof the jobson

busoperation.
TheAmalgamated
claimed
thatsince
busses
weredisplacing
carstheworkbelonged
under
their
jurisdiction.
Theteamsters,
onthe
other
hand,
claimed
thatbusdrivers
werechauffeurs
andtherefore
should
jointheirunion.In 1925theAmerican
Federation
of Labortriedto set

tlethedispute
by granting
theAmalgamated
jurisdiction
overallbusses

andcoaches
operated
byorinconnection
withstreet
orelectric
rail
ways.Theteamsters'
union
didnotaccept
theproposal
andthestruggle
continued
aslateas1933.14
Jurisdictional
disputes
overthesameworkhavebeenfrequent
inthe
building
tradeswhennew materials
or new machines
wereintroduced
or

whenworkshifted
fromthebuilding
siteto thefactory.
Whenwoodwas
being
supplanted
bysteel,
forinstance,
thecarpenters
andthe sheet
metal
workers
claimed
thesamework.Thestruggle
lasted
nearly
a quarter

ofa century.
Thecarpenters
claimed
theworkonthegrounds
that
their
workwasbeing
displaced.
Thesheet-metal
workers
argued
thattheyhad

jurisdiction
overallsheet-metalwork.
Since
thecarpenterswere
the
morenumerous
group
theysucceeded
ingaining
agreements
withcontractors
forthecontrol
of thework.In 1921thematter
wasbrought
before
the
National
Boardof Jurisdictional
Awardsand a decision
favorable
to the
SheetMetalWorkers'
Unionwasrendered.
Thecarpenters,
whoby thattime
controlled
nearlyallthe work,refused
to abideby thedecision
andin

1926mostof theworkwasconceded
to them.15Whenbuilding
tileand
glazed
brick
cameon themarket,
thetilelayers
claimed
thework.The
bricklayers,
on theotherhand,
argued
thatallexterior
workbelonged
to them. Thisdisputelastedfrom1908to 1920,whenan agreement
was

reached
withtheTileandMantel
Contractors
of America
which
"gavethe
bricklayers
exclusive
jurisdiction
overtheinstallation
of exterior
and
interior
tileand related
work. The tilelayers'unionwas gradually
1116
affiliated
withthebricklayers'
union.
13Barnett,
op.cit.,
pp.72-9.
14Emerson
P.Schmidt,
Industrial
Relations
in Urban
Transportation
(Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press, 1937), pp. 235-6.
15WilliamHaber,
Industrial
Relations
in theBuilding
Industry
(Cambridge,
Mass.:

Minn.:

HarvardUniversity
Press,1930),pp. 157-8.

1610id.,
d. 159.

18

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

technological
changes
have
affected
thespecific
operations.
Where
the
newtechnique
fundamentally
changed
thejob,asin thecaseof theintro
duction
of semiautomatic
machinery
intothemanufacture
of glassbottles,
transferinvolvedtheassignment
of blowersto operatethe machines.

Similar
protection
is frequently
provided
forin agreements
wherethe
workis onlymodified
in lesserrespects.In suchinstances
agreements
provide
against
transfer
of tasksfromworkerswho
hadperformed
thework
before to new workers. In somecases
trade-unions
havesecured
provi
sionsinagreements
which
stipulate
thatthedisplaced
workers
should
be
assigned
to different
operations
in theplantwherethenumber
of jobs
hadbeenreduced
or someoperations
hadbeencompletely
eliminated.
In
allinstances,
however,
theobjective
is similar
in thatan attempt
is

madeto securetheworkera job.

Although
theintroduction
of machinery
in theglass-bottle
industry
created
a jurisdictional
problem
between
theunions
in theindustry,
the
transferof a considerable
numberof workersto the semiautomatic
machine

wasfacilitated
bytheconciliatory
attitude
of theGlass
Bottle
Blowers'
Association,
as wellas by its control
overmostof theskilled
blowers
who were still needed forthe manufactureof narrow-mouthware. From

1898to 1905semiautomatic
machines,
whichrequired
a gooddealof the
skillof the handworkers,
wereusedin the manufacture
of wide-mouth
wareonly. Because
of theincrease
in demandfor bottles,
therewas no

decline
in thetotalnumber
of persons
employed
by theindustry.
This

wasnoguarantee
against
displacement
andchanges
inpersonnel,
however.
The Association
adopteda policyof transferring
jar blowersto forms

of wareunaffected
by themachine
andtransferring
handblowers
toma
chines.Thefirstpartof thepolicy
wassuccessful
because
of the
general
increase
in thedemand
forglassware.
Thesecond
partof the

union's
program
wasmuchlesssuccessful.
Training
wasnecessary
and
employers
werereluctant
toconcede
thathaving
beena handblowerwas
an
assetto a worker
whentransferred
tomachine
operation.
Besides,
many
workers
preferred
tostick
totheir
craft
aslongas there
wassomepros

pectoffinding
work.Despite
these
difficultiesmany
suchtransfers
weremade.18

In 1904theOwensautomatic
machine
wasintroduced
forthemaking
of
heavy,
narrow-mouth
glassware.
Thismachine
wascompletely
automatic
and

could
beoperated
withunskilled
labor.Inthefirst
years
following
their introduction
thesemachineswere not very versatile

their ef

fect
onemployment
opportunities
wasnotgreat.Atthesametimethe
1BBarnett,
op.cit.,
pp.65-84.

20

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

Asearlyas 1889theInternational
Typographical
Union
adopted
a res
olutionat its conventionwhich instructedthe localsto see to it that

practical
printers
areemployed
wherever
themachine
isintroduced.
The
membership
showed
somereluctance
to learnhowto operate
themachine,
anda resolution
waspassed
thefollowing
yearwhichurgedthemembers

toacquire
theknowledge
requisite
formachine
operation.22
During
these
yearstheInternational
alsoacquired
control
overtheactions
of its
locals
withrespect
to theintroduction
of themachine
andwasableto
enforce
a uniform
policy.
Thatthere
wassomeresistance
onthepartof
themembership
isfurther
indicated
bythefactthatatleast
onestrike
isrecorded
against
thelinotype
inspiteof previous
convention
deci
sionsagainst
suchaction.In thisinstance
theworkers
atZanesville,
Ohio,
struck
against
thelinotype,
buttheInternational
president
sent
unionmenfromothertownsto takethe placesof thelocalmembers,
and
thestrikers
returned
to work.23

In thepottery
industry
theNational
Brotherhood
of Operative
Potters
hasinsisted
on systematic
transfer
of workers
to the newjobswhentech

nological
changes
wereintroduced;
in general,
theemployers
acceded
to
theprinciple
thatthejourneyman
should
follow
hisworktothenewproc
esses.
Theemployer's
attitude,
nodoubt,
reflected
inpartthenature
of thechanges,
whichfailed
to eliminate
theworkers'
skillentirely.
Forinstance,
thesubstitution
ofcasting
forpressing
resulted
in the
displacement
of pressers
by casters,
buttheskillof thepresser
was
stillan asset.Moreover,
skilled
pressers
whoweretransferred
to cast
ingwereableto earnmorethantheydidformerly.Whenan attempt
was

madeby a firmat Wheeling,
WestVirginia,
to employ
womeninstead
of
menthemembers
oftheBrotherhood
threatened
to quit,
andthesituation
wasfinally
adjusted
by agreement.
A uniform
scalewasadopted
fora

fewlines
ofwareandcasting
andpressingwere
madeinterchangeable
in
journeyman-status
andapprenticeship
rules,
thusremoving
anyadvantage
thatmightaccrueto an employer
employing
women. Although
no rulewas
laiddownagainst
theemployment
of women,no serious
effortwas madeto

denyinpractice
theunion
claim
that
castingwas
ajourneyman's
joband
thatpreference
should
be givento members
ofthecraftfromwhich
the
workwastransferred.
Thedisplacement
in thiscasehadbeenso gradual
thatnearly
allof thepressers
weretakenonascasters
orfoundother

ware-making
jobs.When
thesaggermakingmachinewas
introduced
themanu
22Barnett,
op.cit.,
pp.3-30.

230.s.
Congress,
House
ofRepresentatives,
Eleventh
Special
Report
ofthecom
missionerof Labor: Regulationand Restrictionof Output,H. Doc. No. 734, 58th

Cong. , 2d sess. , 1904, p. 38.

22

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

unchanged
except
forthemanner
oftransmitting
reports.
TheOrder
of
Railroad
Telegraphers
brought
thiscasebefore
the National
Railroad
Adjustment
Board.Theaction
of thecarrier
inabolishing
thetelegra
phers'
positions
andthereclassification
without
negotiations
werefound
to be in violation
of theschedule
rules.The Boardwas of theopinion

thatwhentheneedfora service
disappears,
theposition
catering
to
theservicemay be abolished.
Butwhenthefunction
of thejobremains
substantially
thesame,it cannotbe transferred
to another
employee
at
a lowerratethanthe schedule
rate,eventhougha different
titleis
25
assigned
to thejob.?

Another
casebearing
on a similar
problem
involved
theBrotherhood
of
Railway
Clerks.In thiscasean electricallydriven
belt-conveyor
system

wasinstalled
by a carrier
in themailandbaggage
department
ofthe

station,
andthenewpositions
createdwere
assigned
tomennotcovered
bycollective
agreement.
Thequestion
at issue
waswhether
ajob might
beremoved
fromthescope
oftheagreement
whenthenature
of thejobwas
changed
by theintroduction
of a newtechnique.
Theaward
sustained
the

position
oftheemployeesthat
achange
inthetechnique
ofperforming
a certain
operation
didnotoperate
toremove
thisworkfromthescope
of
28
theworking
agreement
underwhich
it hadbeenformerly
performed.
Therailroad-shop
craftsusually
maintain
cleardistinctions
between

crafts
andvarious
grades
ofapprentices.
Whennewtools
ordevices
are
employed,
theirrulesusually
describe
in detailwho is to perform
the

workin orderto avoidthecreation
of newpositions
or thetransfer
of
workfromonecraftto another.
Onecasebrought
before
theNational

Railroad
Adjustment
Board
accused
acarrierof
violating
theagreement
by
permitting
an advanced
machinist's
helper
to useanoxyacetylene
cutting
torch. The Boardfoundthatthe actionof thecarrierwas in violation

of theruleconcerning
welders.
Thisruleprovides,
in part,
thatwhere
oxyacetylene
or otherwelding
processes
areused,
eachcraftshallper

formtheworkwhich
hasbeengenerally
recognized
asthework
belonging
27
to that
craft
prior
totheintroductionof
such
processes.
Thesecasesillustrate
thegeneral
tendency
on thepartofrailroad
unions
to safeguard
theirmembers
against
displacement
by newworkers

whentechnological
changes
occur.
Theagreements
oftheengine-service
employees
withthecarriers
include
clauses
whichin mostinstances
are
25National
Railroad
Adjustment
Board,
Awards
301to400,ThirdDivision
(Award
No. 308, Doc. NO. TE-314, 1938), III, 23-4.

26NationalRailroadAdjustment
Board,
Awards
1 to100,
Third
Division
(Award
No.5.
Doc. No. CL-2, 1938), I, 8-7.

27National
Railroad
Adjustment
Board,
Awards
oftheSecond
Division
(Award
No.3,
Doc. No. 5, 1938), Dp. 5-8.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

24

accomplished.In caseswhereanyof the members
of the organ

ization
areeliminated
by thisinstallation,
suchemployee
will
be givenpreference
for any position
thatmay be open
on
the
31

scaleof wagescoveringthe occupation
they will assume.

Intheagreement
between
theTransport
Workers
Unionand
theFifth
Avenue
Coach
Company,
concluded
in1937,
there
isa provisionwhich
prevents
the
company
fromreducing
itstwo-man
busses
to one-man
operation
without
consent
of theunion.Preference
isalsoto be givenconductors
when
vacancies
ofdrivers
areto befilled.32
There
areother
employers,
how
ever,whofinditadvantageous
toadopt
a policy
of voluntary
transfer.
In recentyearssomeindustrial
managers
haveevenadvocated
theadoption

ofa policy
oftraining
workers
inmore
than
oneoccupationso
that
they
maybe readyto takeotherjobswhentechnological
changes
eliminate

a specific
operation
oroccupation.
Thispolicy
hasbeenadvocated
in
orderto avoid
dismissing
middle-aged
andolder
workers
whentechnolog
33
icalchanges
occur. Sucha policy,
however,
alsoenlarges
thelabor
reserve
available
for any occupation
andthereby
reduces
the unions'
con
troloverthesupplyof workersfor particular
occupations.Thisis

especially
important
in industries
wherelabor
is organized
along
craft
lines.

Theproblem
ofdisplacement
asa result
of technological
change
cannot
be solvedsolelyby the transferof workersto the new jobs,for the
changemayaffectlaborrequirements
so drastically
thatonlya small

portion
ofthestaffis required
under
thenewprocess.
Butchanges
in
skillrequirements
frequently
alsoresult
intheemployment
of newwork
ersfortheremaining
jobs.In thesteel
industry,
forexample,
themajor

installations
ofnewequipment
forreducing
unitcosts
inrecent
years
havebeenthecontinuous
wide-strip
mill,
thecold-reducing
tin-plate
plant,
andthewiremill.Mostof themanual
workperformed
underthe

oldprocess
hasbeen
eliminated
inthecontinuous
wide-stripmill.
The
rollers'
work,a highly
skilled
occupation,
andotheroccupations
which
required
a longperiod
of training
havebeendrastically
reduced
or elim

inated.
Thenewprocess
requires
forthemostpartpersons
of different
training
to operate
theautomatic
machines,
andtheworkcanbelearned
in a relatively
shorttime. Anofficial
of theSteelWorkers
Organ
izing
Committee
reported
thatoneexecutive
of a steelfirmstated
that
31Trade
Agreements,
1925,
D.104.
32nCollective
Bargaining
ontheNewYork
City
Trans1t
Lines,
1937,"
Monthly
Lador
Review,Vol. 46, NO. 3 (Mar.1938),p. 691.

33Morris
S. Viteles,
"theApplication
ofPsychology
inIndustrial
Relations,"
Understanding
andTraining
Employees
(NewYork: American

Management Association,

1938), pp. 27-8.

34EarlM. Richards,
"Methods
of Lowering
Unitcostsin theSteelIndustry,
A Symposium on Unit Costs (New York: AmericanManagementAssociation,1939),
D.

22.

26

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Suchretraining
insomeinstances
hasbeenundertaken
bytrade-unions,
by

employers,
orbyboth
incooperative
schools.
There
isadearth
ofinfor
mationon theextentandcharacter
of theretraining
thathasbeengoing

on,andit willbe possible
toindicate
onlya fewexamples
of types
of
training
thathavebeenundertaken
and of theimportance
of such train

ingtotheproblemof
transferas
analternative
todisplacement.
Intheprinting
industry
technological
changes
have
necessitated
peri
odicreadjustment
of pressmen
andtheirassistants
to changing
condi
tions.In thefirstplace,
automatic
feeders
havebeendisplacing
the
hand-feeding
process,
andthecomplement
of mento amachine
hasbeen
reduced.Thishasaffected
theassistants
primarily,
butthe pressmen,

too,required
retraining.
Secondly,
therehasbeena tendency
to intro
ducesmallhigh-speed
presseswhich
feedtheir
ownsheets
andwork
faster
andmoreefficiently
on manykinds
of printing
jobsthando thelarger

presses.
Some
retraining
isnecessary
even
inthose
instances
where
the
assistants
are used on the new machines.

In NewYorkCitya schoolhasbeenorganized
forthetraining
of press

men. Thisschool
is operated
as acooperative
enterprise
andismain
tained
bytheBoard
ofEducation
oftheCityofNewYork,
theInternational
Printing
Pressmen's
andAssistants'
Union,
andthePrinters'
League.

Morethan50journeymen
havebeengraduated
eachyear,
amajorityof
these
having
risen
fromthe
ranks
ofthepress-assistants'
union.
Since
thepress
assistants
havebeenaffectedmost
by thetechnological
changes
intheindustry,
theschool
performs
animportant
function
in retraining

assistants
intopressmen.
Inaddition,
themanufacturersof
newpresses
furnishinstruction
to journeymen
pressmen.In some instancesmanu
facturers'schoolshave been establishedand free instructionhas been

given.Press
assistants,
however,
areleftlargely
topickuptheir
knowledge
ofthenewprocesses
onthejobthrough
coaching
bythepress
menwhennewpresses
areinstalled.38
Someretraining
has alsobeen

carried
onbytheunion
itself.
Years
agothePrinting
Pressmen's
Union
established
aprinting
plant
fortheretraining
ofpressmen
atthePress
men'sHomein Tennessee.
The unionsecured
the mostup-to-date
presses

inthecountryandgave
notice
tothemembership
that6monthsbeforeany
newpatented
device
wasto be puton themarket
thefirst
sample
of the
device
wouldbesecured
bytheunionandanymember
of theorganization
could
be retrained
tooperate
thenewpress
at thePressmen's
Home.37
38Elizabeth
F.Baker,
"Machinery
Versus
Trade
Sk111,"
inMorse
A.Cartwright,
ed.,
Unemployment and Adult Education (New York: American
Association
for Adult
Education, 1931), p. 29.
37

SpencerMiller,
Jr.,"Organized
LaborForestalls
Displacement,"
in Cartwright,

op. cit., p. 48.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

28

a driving
schoolwhere
themencould
takefreedriving
lessons
onthe
company's
time. Alltheworkers
tooklessons,
buta fewwereincapable

oflearning
todrive
a busandwere
kept
onthepayrollinsomeother
capacity.
Therestwereassigned
tobusses
ontheir
oldroutes.
By
June1935,180menhadbeensuccessfully
retrained
and400others
were
enrolled
so thattheycouldbe assigned
to busses
as further
changes
40
were made.4

In themanufacture
of automobile
bodies
woodhasbeenreplaced
by steel

tosuchan extent
thatmostofthewoodworking
crafts
havebecome
obso
lete.

In 1932,for instance,
theaverage
bodymanufactured
at theSeaman

BodyCorporation
consumed
about
250feetof lumber;
in 1935theaverage

body
required
only
50feetoflumber.
Thiscorporation
adopted
apolicy
thatdisplaced
employees
should
havefirst
callonallnewjobs.Inthe
words
ofthepresident
ofthecorporation,
thereason
fortheadoption
of
thispolicy
wasthatdismissal
in timeofdepression
"mustunavoidably

have
a harmful
andcostly
effect
upon
themorale
ofourremainingwork
ers."Some300menaffected
bythechange,
therefore,
wereretrained
and
Sincethe men in the plantwereon gangpiece
transferred
towelding.
rates,thenewworkers
wouldhavebeenunwelcome
on the gangsif theyhad

hadtobe retrained
at theexpense
of thegangs.Thecompany
decided
to
paythetransferred
menminimum
hourly
rateswhiletheywerelearning.

Thustheywere
welcome
onthegangs
since
whateverproduction
theycon
tributed
meantso muchgreater
earnings
to theexperienced
employees.
Whenthetransferred
workers
gained
enough
skilltheywereassigned
form
allyto a gangandwerepaidliketherest. If a manwas notadaptable,

hewastried
onother
jobsuntil
a suitable
position
wasfound.However,
somewereunable
to learna newtradeandweredismissed.
Of the300men,
morethan200 wereover40 and the oldestwas 69. Over99 percent
were

successfully
rehabilitated
at anaverage
costof$50permananda total
costof$15,000.41

Theproblem
ofretraining
involves
considerable
planning,
expense,
and
facilities.
In theinstances
citedabovetheretraining
wasundertaken
either
bya trade-union,
theemployer,
orboth.Withtheexception
ofthe
Printing
industry,
suchretraining
hasbeenprimarily
a plant
practice.
REGULATION

OF THE

RATE

OF

INTRODUCTION

Regulation
of therateof introduction
of newtechniques
in order
to
minimize
displacement
hasbeenadvocated
by trade-unionists
fora long
40mTrolley
MenRunGreen
Line
Busses,"
TheNewYork
Times,
June
23,1935,
sec.
3,
P. 7.
41
HaroldH.Seaman,
"Woodworkers
AreWelders
Now,"
Factory
Management
andMain
tenance,

vol. 93, No. 9 (Sept.1935),pp. 365-6.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

30

as a relief measure. By retardingdisplacement
of labor
by machines,it would allow more time for those adjustments

well

43
whichoursocialbodyis so slowin accomplishing.

Inrecent
years
regulation
oftherateofintroduction
oftechnological
changes
hasbeengiven
considerable
attention
bymanagement
aswellasby

labor.
Evidence
ofincreasing
interest
insuchregulation
maybefound
in thestatements
of policyof management,
in records
of plannedinstal

lations
ofnewtechniques,
andinthereasoning
underlying
specific
ar
bitrationawards.

The agreements
betweenthe UnitedMineWorkersof Americaand mine
operators
do notplaceany limiton theintroduction
of machinery.
How

X

ever,
theapplication
ofa machine
differential
to mechanized
operations
insucha fashion
as to limittheoperatorwho
introduces
machinery
to
a return
on hisinvestment
plusa "fair"
profit
isdesigned
to remove,
to a largeextent,
thefullcompetitive
advantage
thatmechanization
might
otherwise
provide.
It isclaimed
thattheapplication
ofthedif
ferential
hada retarding
effect
onmechanization
because
theregulatory
influence
thatcollective
bargaining
exercised
on themajorportion
of

theindustry
through
theprinciple
of"competitive
equality"
resulted
in
theelimination
ofadvantages
onthepartofindividual
operators
over
their
competitors.44

According
tooneofficial
oftheUnited
MineWorkers,
local
unions
have,in individual
instances,
beenableto convince
mineownersthat
introduction
of machinery
shouldbe plannedovera periodof yearsand

adjusted
to thenormal
rateof turn-over
in order
to minimize
displace
In someinstances
theoperators
themselves
adopted
plansfor

ment.45

gradual
mechanization.
For instance,
mechanization
of the minesat New

Orient,
Illinois,
wasplanned
over
a period
ofabout
7 years.
According
toonestatement,
thecompany
inthis
case
completed
thechangewith
its
ownmanpower,
withthepossible
exception
of"specialist
service."
The
workersinvolvedwere unionmembers. It is claimedthat

to selectmenfromthe existent
organization
for the newjobs
made availableby increasedmechanization
will have an impor
tant bearingon the moraleof the workerbody, by showingthat
there is an opportunityfor good men. This policywill serve
as

a real incentive for better work and it will stimulate ef

forttowardthe masteryof
broader
knowledge
andtheattainment
46
of greaterproficiency.

43Cigar
Makers
Official
Journal,
Vol.
58,No.1(Jan.
1934),
D.7.
44A
*Arthur
E. Suffern,
TheCoalMiners'
Struggle
for Industrial
Status(NewYork:
The Macmillan Co., 1926), D. 329.

45Interview
withD. A. Lewisof theUnitedMineWorkersof America,
Washington,
D. C., September 1938.

Pootnote46 appearson followingpage.

UNION

32

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

in theaverage
output
peroperator
during
theseyears.In spite
of the
factthatthetotalnumber
of operators
increased
whenmeasured
by the

over-all
changes
inemployment
ofoperators
from1921to1930,
theim
mediate
effect
in eachinstance
where
thedialtelephones
wereintroduced
was a reduction
in the numberof operators.
Thesurveyalsofoundthat

complete
conversion
fromthemanual
tothedialsystem
on anysingle
ex
change
involves
an average
displacement
of abouttwo-thirds
of thetotal
numberof operators.That a drasticreductionin the numberof operators

wastheimmediate
result
of thechange
to thedialsystem
wasshownby
an analysis
of 20 individual
exchanges
before
andafter
thechange.
The
factthatthedemand
fortelephones
hadincreased
andtheinstallations
weregeared
to a highrateof normal
turn-over,
amounting
in somein

stances
toasmuchas40percent,
enabled
thecompanies
toretainmost
of theemployees
with"regular"
status
whiledismissals
wereconfined
primarily
to"temporary"
employees
whowerehired
during
thepreparatory
period
of planning
forthechange
which
lasted,
at times,
over2 years.

Manyemployees
werealsotransferred
fromoneunit
toanother
whereva
cancies
occurred.
In commenting
on itspolicy
of gradual
andplanned

introduction,
anofficial
of a telephone
company
stated
in 1931that
"wenowfeelwarranted
in promising
employment
to allourregular
em
ployees
involved."48

Intheclothing
industry
regulation
ofintroduction
oftechnological
changeassumed
theformof a definite
policyandbecamepartof the

collective-bargaining
process.
IntheChicagomarket
theAmalgamated
Clothing
Workers
of America,
forinstance,
didnotoppose
change
buthas
successfully
maintained
thattechnological
change
cannot
be introduced
attheexpense
of theworkers'
security
ofemployment
andincome.49

Ina caseheard
before
theTrade
Board
in1924involving
theHart,
Schaffner,
andMarxCompany,
forexample,
thecompany
applied
forapiece
ratewhenitwanted
tochange
fromhandtomachine
tacking
of plain
edges.
Thischange
wouldhaveoccasioned
thedisplacement
of a number
of work
ers. In linewithprevious
decisions,
thecompany
proposed
to transfer

theworkers
affected
bythechange
toother
shops
orother
operations.
Theunionclaimed
thatthischange
couldnotbe accomplished
without
reducing
theearnings
of these
workers
as wellasendangering
theearn
ingsof workers
in othershops,
sincetherewasalready
an excess
of

48«The
Dial
Telephone
andUnemployment,"
Monthly
Labor
Review,
Vol.
34,No.2

(Feb.1932),pp.235–47;EthelL. Best,TheChangefrom
ManualtoDialOperation
in theTelephone
Industry
(U. S. Dept.
Labor,Women's
Bur.,Bull.No.110,1933),
DP. 1-15.

48W.
M.Leiserson,
"ConstitutionalGovernment
inAmerican
Industries,"
TheAmerican
Economic Review, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Mar. 1922), "Supplement," pp. 73-4.

34

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

out this policy. And if manufacturers
finallyfind themselves

witha surplus
ofworkersattached
to theirplants,
"dismissal
wage" is resortedto ....

at all times somethingsubstan

tiallybetterthanplain
discharge
has beencomingthe way of
54

the displacedworker.

Regulation
of therateof introduction
of technological
changes
in
orderto minimize
displacement
hasbeensuggested
in various
arbitration
awards
as ameansof preventing
thedevelopment
of resistance
tochange.
Thispolicy
provided
thebackground
forthedecisions
in theclothing
industry.
Similar
reasoning
wasinvolved
in a casein theprinting
in
55
dustrywhichcameup for arbitration
in June1928.

In this instance

thedischarge
of utility
menon sevenpresses
operating
twoshifts,
or
14men,wasinvolved.
ThePrinters'
League
argued
thatthequestion
was
purely
a technical
oneandshould
bedetermined
on thebasis
ofwhether
or notthesemenwereneeded
andwhether
or notcompetitive
plants
used
them on similar presses. Theunion
tooktheposition
thatthesemen
were needed.

After
a thorough
investigation
of theproblem
thearbitrator
considered
thattheevidence
withregard
to theneedof themenon thepresses
was
inconclusive
although
he believed
thatfivemenwereprobably
notneeded.

Heruled
thatthefirm"isjustified
inremoving
theutilitymen
from
thepresses
butisnotjustified
indischarging
themfromitsemploy
ment." Otherjobsshouldbe foundfor themen. Thisaward,the arbi

trator
thought,
would
aidinthedevelopment
of a constructive
policy
for
dealing
withallsuchquestions.
Thedecision
thatother
jobsbe found
forthemenwouldrequire
thatthechange
be madegradually.
Theprin
ciplebehind
thedecision
wasthat"theemployer
shallbefreeto make
improvements
in methods
of production,
butthatsuchchanges
shallnot
bemadeat theexpense
of theworkers
whohavebeenfaithfully
performing

their
duties."
Thedecision
ended
withthisstatement
regarding
the
operation
of thispolicy:
No employeewould lose his livelihoodon accountof any im

provement
unlessthe firmitselfwerelosingand in financial
straits,
butchanges
wouldbe madegradually,
as fastas other
work could be found for him.

This might involve some expense

to the employer,
but it wouldbe a temporary
expensewhichhe
expense
of
may legitimately
be askedto carry. Thistemporary
makingthe changesgraduallywouldbe small comparedto what he
incurswhen the workersresistimprovements
for fear of loss of

54J.
B.S.Hardmen,
"Amalgamated
Unionism,"
TheNewRepublic,
Vol.
LX II,

No.

(Oct.28, 1931),pp. 294-7.

55Emily
C. Brown,
Joint
Industrial
Control
in theBookandJOBPrinting
Industry
(U. S.Dept. Labor, Bur. Labor Statistics, Bull. No. 481, Dec. 1928), pp. 113-5.

36

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

speeding
upoftheintroduction
ofnewequipment
even
though
suchequip
mentmaydisplace
someadditional
workers.58
Although
thepolicy
oftheAmalgamated
Clothing
Workers
of America
has
beencitedas an exampleof insistence
on gradualintroduction
by the

union,
therewerealsoinstances
wherethisunion,
likethe American

Federation
ofHosiery
Workers,
aided
intheintroduction
oftechnological
changes
eventhough
theyinvolved
somedisplacement.
Buthere,again,
competitive
conditions
werebelieved
torequire
suchadjustments
inorder
to prevent
nonunion
employers
fromobtaining
differential
advantages
through
technological
changes.59
LIMITATION

OF

NEW

ENTRANTS

Gradual
introduction
oftechnological
change
oradjustment
oftherate
of introduction
to therateof turn-over
implies
limitation
of newen
trantsintotheplantor occupation
withrespect
towhichtheadjustment

is planned.
Inthearbitration
awards
in theclothing
andprinting
in
dustries,
citedin thediscussion
of regulation
oftherateof introduc

tionofchanges,
reference
hasbeenmadeto thefactthattheavailability

ofjobsinother
occupations
hasoften
entered
intothe
deliberations
of
thearbitrators.
Changes
were
approved
oncondition
thatthedisplaced
workers
wouldbe transferred
to otherjobs. Employers
weretherefore
required
to plantheintroduction
of technological
changes
so thatno
displacement
wouldoccur. Suchplanning
required
thatnonewworkers
be hireduntilthedisplaced
onesfoundjobs.

However,
idealconditions
seldom
exist.At times it is necessaryto
hireadditional
employees
duringthe periodof adjustment
in orderto

meetproduction
needs.Limitation
of entrants
in suchinstances
has
frequently
beenaccamplished
by hiring
additional
employees
ona tempo
rarybasis.In thedescribed
caseofthechange
fromthemanual
to the
dial telephone,
for example,
vacancies
due to normalseparations
were

filled
byengaging
persons
ona temporary
basis.These
employees
werethe
firstto bedismissed
whenreductions
in theworking
force
tookplace.
Theexperiment
at thePequot
Cotton
Millsisanother
illustration
of
an attempt
to reduce
displacement
by limiting
entrants
to occupations,
during
theinstallation
ofa labor-saving
change,
by hiring
workers
on
58NationalAgreement
andUniform
Price
Scale
ByandBetween
Pull
Fashioned
Hosiery
Manufacturers
of America,
"Inc.,and AmericanFederation
of Hosieryworkers,
1937-1938 (Philadelphia, Pa.:

The Joint Committee in the Full Fashioned Hosiery

Industry);
Articles
of Agreement
Entered
IntoByand Between
FullFashionedHosiery

Manufacturers
of America,
Inc.,and AmericanFederation
of HosieryWorkers(mimeO.
July 15, 1938).

59Frank
Rosenblum,
"Trade
Union
Tactics
Under
Changing
Industrial
Cond1t1ons,
The Advance, Vol. XVI, No. 11 (Mar. 14, 1930), D. 7.

38

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Where
thisplaniscarried
out,therefore,
itinvolves
notonlyreduc
tions
inlabor
requirements
butalsoa decrease
inemployment
opportuni

ties
forskilled
workmen,
particularly
weavers,
andanincrease
inthe
proportionate
useof unskilled
"hands."
Theassurances
thattheworkers
sought
inthefaceofthese
changes
involved
protection
against
demotion
to lessskilled
jobsaswellaslossof employment.
Theunion,
on the
advice
of thetechnician,
proposed
thatduring
theprocess
of gradual
development
of the newstandards
of outputnewworkersshouldbe hired

ona temporary
basis
andthatdischarges
or lay-offs
beconfined
mainly
to them.Thecompany
accepted
thisplanandshortly
aftertheadoption
of the"jointresearch"
plan"provisions
weremadeto create
a group
of
temporary
workers
whowouldbearthebruntof thedischarges
andlay-offs
thatmightresultfromthe 'stretch
outs.'" No program
was,however,
63
workedoutto takecareof demotions.

Installation
ofthe"stretch-out"
wasonlypartially
adjusted
tothe
normal
rateof turn-over
andtheresults
in theweaving
andspinning
de

partments
after
2 years
of"joint
research"meant
loss
ofemployment
and
demotionsto some workers.

In theweaving
department,
forexample,
the

totalnumber
of jobswasreduced
by 156,andthenumber
of skilledweavers

required
wasreduced
by123. In thespinning
department
thenumber
of

spinners
required
wasreduced
by79,whereas
36newframe-cleaning
jobs
werecreated;
thisresulted
in a netreduction
of 43jobs.In spinning
the changewas so gearedto the normalturn-overthatonlyone worker

Intheweaving
department,
ontheotherhand,
100workers
wereactually
laidoffas a result
of the"stretch
-out."The planto
hireworkers
on a temporary
basisduring
theperiod
thatthechanges

was laid off.

werebeingmadeconfined
dismissals
andlay-offs
to thisgroupof workers
64

mainly;
"nearly
all"
oftheregular
employees'
jobsweresaved.
Limitation
of newentrants
is frequently
accomplished,
in a moregen

eralway,by limiting
thenumber
of apprentices
to journeymen
ina par
ticular
locality
or evenon a national
scale. Such limitationscan be

effective
onlyin occupations
whichcontinue
to retain
a considerable

degree
ofskill
inspite
ofchanges.
Inthecigar-manufacturing
industry,
forinstance,
theadvance
oftechnology
caused
a splitting
upofskilled
occupations
intoa number
of operations
eachof whichcouldbe learned

within
a relatively
short
time.65
The3 years
of apprenticeship
re
quiredto become
a skilled
handcigarmakerwereno longer
necessary,
and
63

Ibid., pp.33-4.
Ibid., pp. 74-5.

84

65Cigar
Makers
Official
Journal,
June15,1920,
d.3.

40

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

continued
to manufacture
by hand,andin 1929the unionexpressed
regret

thattheartof bottle
blowing
waspassing
outof existence
because
it
89
waspractically
impossible
togetyoung
mento learn
thetrade.
In thewindow-glass
industry,
too,thecontinual
substitution
ofma
chinery
forhandproduction
madeitincreasingly
difficult
togetmento
trainforcertain
operations,
particularly
blowing,
andtheNational
Window
Glass
Workers
Union
expressed
concern
in 1920thatunless
appren

ticeswould
learn
blowing,
handproductionwould
have
tobecurtailed.70
A device
ofoperating
thehandplants
during
twoperiods
oftheyear,
adoptedduringthe WorldWar in orderto make it possibleto operate

theplants
at fullcapacity
andthusconserve
fuel,waslaterusedin
orderto enable
theuniontosupply
enough
trained
mento operate
all
handplants.Asfaras mobility
of theworkers
wouldpermit,
thesame

labor
force
wasusedtooperate
halfoftheplants
during
oneperiod
of theyearandtheotherhalfduring
another
period.Thefactthat
no newworkers
wanted
to acquire
a skillwhichwasrapidly
beingsup
plantedactually
produced
a shortage
of handworkersand necessitated

thisarrangement.71
Theproblem
of limitationof
entrants
by trade-union
regulation
on
thebasis
ofan entire
locality
canbestbe illustrated
by themeasures
adopted
by theprinting-pressroom
unions.Withtheintroduction
of auto

maticmachinery
in thepressroom,
thepressmen
havecontinually
feared
thattheassistants
would
encroach
ontheir
jobs.Apprentice
rules
agreed
to in thecontracts
between
the Printers'
Leagueand the International
PrintingPressmen's
and Assistants'
Unionof NorthAmericahavebeen

stringent.
In NewYorkCityin1932only3 or4 percent
a year,
orless
than100ofthe2,500
members
oftheAssistants'
Union,
could
beappointed
as apprentice
pressmen.
Thoseeligible
forselection
hadto have5 years
of experience
as assistants.In orderto becomea journeyman
pressman

a candidatemust
have
served
4moreyears
asanapprentice,
or9years
in
all.Moreover,
since
1925theNewYorkAssistants'
Union
hasbeenclosed
to new members.72

On thewholetheinstances
whereapprenticeship
limitation
playsan

important
role
inreducing
displacement
areconfined
toindustrieswhere
a relatively
longperiod
oftraining
isstill
required.
With
thegradual
69Minutes
oftheProceedings
ofthe
Fifty-first
AnnualConvention
oftheGlass
BottleBlowers'Association
of the UnitedStatesand Canada(AtlanticCity, N. J.,
July 8-16,1929),D. 240.

70National
Window
GlassWorkers
Journal,
October
1920,D. 19.

711bid.,
December
1923,
pp.15-6.
72€11zabeth
F. Baker,
Displacement
of Men byMachines
(NewYork: Columbia
sity Press, 1933), DP. 189-90.

Univer

42

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGY

CHANGE

Opposition
to reduction
in thesizeof crewshasbeenmostfrequent
in thetransportation
industry,
including
streetcar
and railroad
trans

portation.
Thestruggle
of theAmalgamated
Association
of Street
and
Electric
Railway
Employes
against
theone-man
carisoneexample.
Thefirsthorse-drawn
carsrequired
onlyoneoperator,
thedriver,
who
usually
performed
thefunctions
of theconductor.
As thecarsbecame

larger,
especiallywith
theintroduction
ofelectricity,
itbecame
cus
tomary
toemploy
adriver
anda conductor.
Withimprovements
indesign
andconstruction
of carsandthedevelopment
of safetydevices,
however,

a movement
toeliminate
theconductor
began.Asearly
as 1899a company
at Belleville,
Illinois,
discharged
all conductors
and assigned
their
duties to the motormen. The unioncalleda strikewhichwas aidedby

thelocallabororganizations
andthecompany
wasforced
toreverse
its
order.During
theWorld
Warandimmediately
afterwards
theone-man
car
madeconsiderable
progress.
Labor
wasscarce
andunionopposition
was
slightly
relaxed.
Furthermore,
bythistimean improved
typeofsafety
carwasintroduced
equipped
withbetter
brakes,
better
registering
de
vices,andotherfacilities
for one-man
operation.
Whenthe unionagain

renewed
itscampaign
against
theone-man
caritsucceeded
inobtaining
a differential
of from2 to 7 centsper hourin therateof payfor one
mancar operators.By 1921the unionrealized
thatothertactics
were

needed
tosupplement
opposition,
andit wasdecided
to concentrate
on
gaining
union
control
oversystems
whereone-man
carswerein useandat
thesametimeto continue
opposition
to thespreadof the practice
into

newcenters.
Butopposition
wasonlypartially
successful
despite
the
union
campaign
showing
pictures
of hold-ups
andcollisions
incident
to
one-man
operation.
Thedifferential
rates
infavorofone-man
caroper
ationprovedtooattractive
to workers.75

Thesubstitution
of Diesel
gas-electric
andoil-electric
powerfor
steamon theAmerican
railroads
has,fromtheearlytwenties,
constituted

an immediate
threat
of displacement
to someoccupations
of theengine
service
crews
wherever
suchchanges
havebeeninstituted.
Onsteam
loco
motives
theengine
crewnormally
consists
of theengineer
anda fireman
or helper.Thesubstitution
of theDiesel
engine
usually
resulted
in

theeliminationof
thefiremanor
helperexcept
insuchcaseswhere
the
Brotherhood
of Locomotive
Firemen
andEnginemenwas
abletosecure
agree
mentsproviding
fortheemployment
of an engineer
anda helper
in the

Dieselenginecab.
Although
theBrotherhood
didnotobject
tothechange
inequipment,
itconducted
avigorous
campaign
against
themanning
ofthe

Diesel-engine
cabbyoneman
ontheground
that
suchoperation
isunsafe.
75

5schmidt,
op.cit.,pp.244-7.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

44

desirable
to extend
theprovisions
of theagreement
to Diesel
locamo
tivesin othertypesof service:
Firemen(helpers)shallbe assignedto certainDiesel-electric
locomotives in yard service

.

and the managements agree

to become partiesto a concertedmovementif and when inaugum

ratedby ourBrotherhood
forthepurpose
of securing
firemen
as
80
helpers
on thattypeof powerin switching
service.

InFebruary
1937theBrotherhood
of Locomotive
Firemen
andEnginemen
metwiththemanagements
of 90 ClassI railroads,
andan agreement
was
reachedwhich
wasto govern
theemployment
of firemen
(helpers)
on Diesel

electric,
otherinternal-combustion,
andsteam-electric
locomotives
in
passenger
as wellasotherservice.
Thusfarthepractice
of employing
twomenin theengine
cabhadbeenadopted
in passenger
service
mainly.
According
to thissettlement
twomenwereto be employed
on allDiesel
locomotives
in passenger
service
and,in addition,
on allDiesel
locomo
tives
weighing
morethan90,000
pounds
on drives
in anykindof roadand
yardservice.81Thisagreement,
it wasgenerally
estimated
by railroad
managements
andunion
officials,
wouldnotonlycheck
further
displace
mentof firemenbut hundreds
of "firemen-helpers"
wouldactually
be em
82
ployedon locomotives
thatwerebeingoperated
withoneman.
Mr. D. B.

Robertson,
president
oftheBrotherhood,
stated
that
theorganization's
campaign
fortheinclusion
of a helper
on Diesel
engines
wasbased
on
thefollowing
threearguments:
First,the unionemphasized
the necessity
of safetyto both
thetraveling
publicandto railroad
employes.
The second point touched on the economicnecessityof the

railroads
bearing
theirshareof the burdenof unemployment
by
providingagainstits increasein the industry.
A third point was that the railroadsshould permitemployes

to sharein the increased
production
of laborand in the re
83
sultsof technological
improvements.

Railroad
unionshavein general
beenin a morefavorable
position
to secureprovisions
againstdisplacement
of theirmembersthanother

unions.Thisis so largely
because
of thesemipublic
character
of the
railroad
industry,
which,
because
of therequirements
of safety
andun
interrupted
operation,
hasbeensubject
to public
regulation
fora long
time.

Regulation
ofcompetitive
conditions
in theindustry
makes
it

80

"Ibid.,
pp.351-2.

811bid.,
vol.
102,
No.3 (Mar.
1937),
p.147;
"Fight
forTwo-Man
Engine
CabCrews
Won by B. L. F. & E.," Labor,Vol. XVIII,No. 29 (Mar.9, 1937)
, D. 1.

82

RailwayAge(vol.102,No.10(Mar.6, 1937),
D. 402)estimates
that"230new

JOBS will be created for firemen."

The Brotherhood estimated that 700 additional

Jobswouldresult
fromtheprovisions
ofthe agreement
(Brotherhoodof
Locomotive
Firemen
andEnginemen's
Magazine,
Vol.102,No.3 [Mar.1937),
D. 147).
83
*Fight for Two-Man Engine Cab Crews won by B. L. F. & E.," loc. cit.

46

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

provided
fortheknitters.
Wherethisis donethehelpers
perform
un
skilledtaskswhiletheknitterassumesthe function
of an expert. A
considerable
amountof theskilled
knitter's
workis thustransferred
to

unskilled
helpers.
On thelong-section
footing
machines
of highspeeds
evensingle-machine
operation
cannot
bedoneeffectively
without
ahelper.
Although
therehasbeena tendency
in recent
yearsto improve
thema
chines
bymaking
themmore
automatic,
theincrease
insizeandspeedof
machines,
coupled
witha tendency
toward
production
of morevaried
and

complicated
styles,
increased
thedegreeof
skill
andvigilance
required.
Throughout
theperiod
thatdouble-machine
operation
hasbeenaproblem
in thefull-fashioned
hosiery
industry
therehas beena differentiation

in theunionpolicy
withrespect
to thetwotypes
of knitting
machines
usedforthecompletion
of thestocking:
(a)thefooting
machine,
or the
"footer",
whichknitsthefootof thestocking,
and(2)thelegging
ma
chine
which
knits
theleg. Although
bothoperations
require
theworkof

a skilled
knitter,
"footer"
operation
and"legger"
operation
havebeen
specialized
jobsandarenotinterchangeable.
Although
union
rules
were
relatively
favorably
inclined
topermit
double-machine
operation
on leg

gers
fromtime
totime,
theywere
continuallymore
stringent
ifnotpro
hibitive
toward
double-machine
"footer"
operation.
Thiswassofortwo

reasons.
First,
knitting
thefoot
isa shorter
operation
andnormally
theratiobetween
"footers"
and"leggers"
is on theaverage
aboutone

"footer"
tothree
"leggers";
doubling
upoffooterswould
furthercurtail
comparatively
limited
employment
opportunities
forfooter
operators.
Second,
therehasbeena tendency
at alltimes
to makefooting
machines

longer
(more
sectionspermachine
capable
ofproducingmore
stockings
at
a time),
on theaverage,
thanlegging
machines;
doubling
up is therefore
more difficult.

Whenthedouble-machine
systemwasintroduced
in thePhiladelphiamar
ketin theearly1900'stheknitters
objected
to thechangeonlyin rare

instances.
In thefirstplace,
theexpanding
industry
required
more
skilled
knitters
thancouldbe supplied
andtheemployment
of helpers
on thedouble
jobsprovided
opportunity
forthetraining
of knitters;
in

thesecondplace,
earnings
ondouble-machineoperation
weremuch
higher.
By 1910,however,
enough
knitters
hadbeentrained
to causea gooddeal

ofconcern
among
theunion
members,
particularly
thefooter
operators,
andthePhiladelphia
localruled,
in October
of thatyear,thatunion

knitters
mustrefuse
toruntwofooting
machines.
However,the rules
continued
to permittheoperation
of legging
machines
of from12 to

20sections
onthedouble-machine
basis.In1913,
whentheAmerican
Federation
of FullFashioned
Hosiery
Workers
wasformed,it responded
to

UNION

48

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

footers
larger
than22sections
theagreement
permitted
theemployment
of
helpers,
butifthemanufacturerwanted
tooperate
these
machines
without
helpers,
the knitterwas to receiveone-half
of the helper'sratein
86
addition
to hisregular
rate.

It isdifficult
togeneralize
ontheexperiences
ofthehosieryworkers
withrespect
todouble-machine
operation
since
therewere
manytendencies,
suchasthescarcity
of knitters
andbetter
earnings
as wellas competi
tiveconditions
betweenunionized
and ununionized
areas,whichfavored

theextension
ofdouble-machine
operation
fromtimetotime;on theother
handsuchfactors
as increase
in thesize,speed,
andautomaticity
of
machines
andmorediverse
styles
tended
to counteract
thepressure
for
double-machine
operation.
On thewholethepolicy
of theunionhasbeen
toeliminate
suchoperation
evenwhen
concessions
inwagerateshadto be
madeonsingle-machine
jobs.
Theintroduction
of newandimproved
printing
presses
ledthe Inter
national
Printing
Pressmen's
andAssistants'
Union
toadopt
apolicy
which

opposed
increases
inwork
assignments.
Withtheintroduction
ofauto
matic
feeding
devices
thepressassistants
became
moreandmoregeneral
assistants
to pressmen.
Theunionsought
to prevent
displacement
of

assistants
bylimiting
thenumber
ofpresses
uponwhich
assistants
might
workandby preventing
a pressman
fromfeeding
hisownmachine.This
policy
wasdeveloped
asa result
of a ruleadopted
asearly
as 1896.The
rulestated:
No memberof a subordinatepressmen'sunionshall be allowed
to feed his own cylinderpress or operatean automaticfeeding
machinewhen so attached,nor shall he performany work in the

natureof makingreadyor preparing
a pressto produceany
87

printingproductwithoutan assistant.

Thisruleapplied
onlytolarge
cylinder
presses,
butsince1901feed
ersof thesmaller
presses
sought
similar
protection.
At firstthey
were not successful. In1909they
succeeded
onlyinestablishing
a dif
ferential
wageratebetween
assistants
engaged
infeeding
onemachine
and

those
engaged
infeeding
twomachines.
However,
aninformal
ruleofthe
unionprevented
assistants
fromworking
on twomachines
by imposing
pen

alties
- lossofunion
cardandfines
- forsuchpractices.
Butby1911
theNewYorkprinters
faced
suchserious
competition
fromnonunion
and
86Gladys
L. Palmer,
UnionTactics
andEconomic
Change
(Philadelphia,
Pa.:

Univer

sityof Pennsylvania
Press,
1932).
DD; 91-9;National
Agreement
anduniform
Price
ScaleByandBetween
FullFashioned
Hosiery
Manufacturers
ofAmerica,
Inc.,
and American
Federation
of HosieryWorkers,
1937-1938;
GeorgeW. Taylor,The
Pull-fashionedHosiery Worker(Philadelphia,Pa.: University of Pennsylvania

Press, 1931), pp. 52-88; and letter to the author from George W. Taylor, dated
August

8, 1939.

87Baker,
Displacement
ofMenbyMachines,
p.131.

50

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

unionhasbeenconfronted
within thefaceof these
changes
is typical
of other industries.
The SWOC favors technologicalimprovementsand carries on
a continualprogramof educationamong its membersas to the

futility
of opposing
progress.But unlessprovisions
are made
to care for displacedworkers,the speed with which industry

is introducing
laborsaving
devicesmay be checked
by the re
89
volt of the men involved.

Inrecent
years
some
employers
have
realized
theundesirability,
from
an economic
standpoint,
ofa feeling
of insecurity
onthepartof their
personnel
andhaveplanned
theintroduction
of technological
changes
so
thatworkers'
jobswouldbe moresecure.

89H.
J.Ruttenberg,
"The
B18Morgue,"
Survey
Graphic,
vol.
XXVIII,
NO.4(Apr.
1939), p. 269.

52

UNION POLICY AND TECANOLOGICAL CHANGE
Asidefromthedetermination
of standards
of output
andstandard
con

ditions
of operation,
thesetting
of newrateson newor modified
oper
ations
involves
somebasic
considerations
withreference
to thedegree
of skillrequired
before
andaftera change
andtowhether
or notwage

rates
should
bechanged
when
changes
inskill
requirements
occur.
There
is also the question
of whetherwage ratesshouldbe adjusted
so that
workerssharein the benefits
of technological
changethroughhigher
average
earnings.
Trade-unions
havefromtimeto timecopedwithall of theseproblems

in theireffort
to maintain
or improve
earnings
ofworkers
whosejobs
haveundergone
technological
change.In thelight
of theseconsider
ations,
trade-union
policies
onearnings
andtechnological
change
are

discussed
under
thefollowing
topics:
(1)Standards
ofoutput,
(2)earn
ingsandnewoperations,
and(3)earnings
andincreasing
productivity.
STANDARDS

OF OUTPUT

Fromthepointof viewof a wagepolicy
thesetting
ofstandards
of
output
andthedefinition
of thestandard
conditions
of operation,
as
wellas themanner
in which
suchstandards
maybechanged
whentechnical
conditions
of operation
change,
areof utmost
importance.
Trade-unions
are not onlyinterested
in the problem
of ratesper pieceor per hour
but also in the conditionsunderwhichthe workershaveto work in order

toearnthese
rates.Whenstandards
ofoutput
aresettoohighorwhen
changes
intheproduct,
inoperations,
andinequipment
makeitmoredif
ficultto maintain
them,it frequently
becomes
difficult
to approximate

established
levels
ofearnings.
Thequestions
therefore
arise:
Who
shalldetermine
what
thestandard
task
foranyoperation
shall
be,andin
whatmanner
maythestandard
taskbechanged
whenchanges
intechniques
takeplace?Thesequestions
havebeenconstant
causes
offriction
be

tween
organized
laborand
management.
Management
hascharged
frequently
thatlabor
attempts
tolimitoutput
bysetting
itsownstandards
of out
puteither
through
openrestrictions
or tacitunderstanding
among
work
men.Ontheotherhand,
where
management
exercises
complete
control
over
setting
andchanging
standards
of output,
laborfrequently
charges
that
"speed-up"
methods
areemployed
andthatthestandards
ofoutput
areset
at a levelthatonlythefastest
workers
can obtain.

Among
theironmolders,
forinstance,
therewasa practice
to observe
a "setday'swork." A "set"wasconsidered
to be the numberof castings

whichan employer
expected
a molder
todo in a day. Theworkmen
later
beganto adopt"sets"forthemselves,
andfinally
theamount
ofwork
whichwas expected
of workers
cameto be subjectto agreements
between

UNION

54

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

industry,
forexample,
theemployment
ofskilled
printers
iscontrolled
by theunion.Theemployer
is usually
givena certain
period
of time
during
whichhe maytestthecompetency
of a worker
sentby theunion;
thisis hisonlyopportunity
tocheck
theworker's
output.Although
the
union
doesnotpermit
theemployer
to seta definite
timefora task,

there
isnevertheless
a certain
level
ofefficiency
expected
ofworkers
which
isestablished
through
indirect
methods.5
Practices
similar
tothe
onecurrent
intheprinting
industrywith
respect
tosetting
standards
of

output
arealsoprevalent
inother
industrieswhere,
because
oflack
of
standardization
intheproduct,
workers
canexercise
a gooddealofcon
troloverthe rateof performance.
In suchindustries
the attempts
to

measure
theday's
workandtosetdefinite
quantities
ofexpected
output
may be thesubjectof constant
friction
between
workersand employers,

either
openor implied.
In contrast
to thesesituations
wheretrade-unions
exercise
a good
measure
ofcontrol
oversetting
standards
of output,
ina number
of in
dustries
management
hasinsisted
thatthesetting
ofstandards
ofoutput
is its exclusive
functionand thatworkersmustadjustthemselves
to
whatever
standards
areset. Withtheadventof scientific
management
and

itsmethods
of standardization
ofworkandthesetting
ofstandards
of
outputwiththe aid of time-and-motion
study,theclaimwas generally

advanced
by theearly
exponents
ofscientific
management
thata solution
to theproblem
ofsetting
standards
of output,
bothquantitatively
and
qualitatively,
wasat lastfound,
sincetimestudyaffords
a completely
objective
method
forsetting
suchstandards.
According
to thispoint
of view,
expressed
byFrederick
W.Taylor,
time-and-motion
studyinves

tigates
scientifically
whata worker's
taskshall
be,andthisisnot
subject
tocollective
bargaining,
for"'asreasonably
. ... might
we
insist
on bargaining
about
thetimeandplace
oftherising
andsetting

ofthesun.'16
Incommenting
onthis
position
Mr.Hoxiewas
oftheopin
ionthat,in order
to makeit possible
to uphold
theclaimthatthede

termination
ofthetask
iscompletely
objective
andthatthetask
setfor
a workercan be accomplished
withoutoverstrain
andexhaustion,
it must

beshown
thatthejudgment
ofthetime-studyman
doesnotenter
into
the
process.

But this is exactlythe case with tasksset by the processof
At a score of pointsin this process,the
judgmentof the employer,the time study man or the workersmay
time study

.

Fray
L.Atwood,
"The
controlof
costs
andProduction
ina Printing
Plant,'A
Sym
posiumon UnitCosts(New York: American Management Association, 1939), D. 14.

BRobert
F.Hoxle,
Scientific
Management
andLabor
(NewYork:D.
1915), p. 40.

Appleton and co.,

56

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
planof 'scientific
management'
directed
towardincreasing
the
110
efficiency
of workers
whonowhavejobs.

In recentyearstherehasbeena tendency
to include
provisions
in
collective
agreements
whichemphasize
trade-union
participation
in the

setting
ofstandards
ofoutput.
These
provisions
varyfromprovisions
for the rightof workersto protestwhentheythinkthatthe standards

ofoutput
havebeensettoohighby management
to actual
joint
participa

tionintheir
determination.
Inoneagreement
intheflat-glass
in
dustry,
forexample,
therightofmanagement
tosetstandards
of output
independently
is specifically
provided
for,butprovision
is alsomade
forreview
incases
where
grievances
arise
inconnection
withchanges
in
workassignments.
Theclausereads:
NUMBER OF EMPLOYES ON AN OPERATION . The Company does not
recognizethe right of its employesto dictateor declarethat
any certainnumberof employesshall be maintainedin connec

tionwithany of its variousoperations.
Consideration

shall

be givento the possibility
that increasedproductionor speed

of operation
may possibly
imposeunduehardship
on employes.
The Companywill give consideration
to such increasedwork as

maybe imposed
uponemployes
by increase
in production
and
speeds of operationor an increasednumberor size of machines
and any other matters that may increasethe work of the em

ployesor imposeuponthemunduehardships;
andwillcooperate
with the.Industrial
RelationsCommitteein studyingand working

outagreements
covering
thenumber
of employes
to be usedand
additionalemployesto be added so as not to impose hardships

on theemployes.11

"Speed-up"
wasoneofthechief
grievances
oftheautomobileworkers
during
thecampaign
fororganization
inthisindustry.
Manyofthe
agreements
signed
by various
automobile-manufacturing
concerns
provide
forthehandling
of grievances
without
specifically
mentioning
speedof

operation.
A number
ofagreements,
however,
include
specific
clauses
dealing
withtheworkers'
rights
withrespect
to requests
forretiming
of jobs. Oneagreement
provides:
In consideration
of the abolitionof piece-workit is agreed

thatemployees
shallapplythemselves
to theworkwiththesame
diligence
as formerly
andthatthe Corporation
willestablish
a rateof production
for its different
operations
whichsaid
rate shall be considereda day's productionfor each employee
engagedtherein. If a ShopSteward
believes
a rateof produc
tion is incorrectly
set he may take it up throughthe grievance
12
procedure.

1010id.,
D.293.

12AgreementGoverning
Wagesand
WorkingRules
ofthePederationof
Plat
Glass
WorkersofAmericafor
Members
Employed
bytheMississippiGlass
Co.(Dec.30,
1837),pp. 9-10.
12

Agreements
Entered
IntoBetween
International
Union,
United
Automobile
Workers

ofAmerica
andEmployers
intheAutomobile
andOtherIndustries(Internationel
Union,
UnitedAutomobile
Workers
opAmerica,May1937),
Vol.One,D. 22.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

58

the date the low rate is calledto the Company'sattentionand
16
the date the new rate is established.

Theclausesfromvarious
agreements
in the automobile
industry
quoted

above
do notexhaust
thenumber
ofsuchprovisions.
These
wereselected
witha viewto presenting
therangeof variations
between
them.Many
moreof theagreements
include
clauses
similar
to oneor another
of these
provisions,
andtheyaim,basically,
at thesamething the rightto

havea jobretimed
under
certain
specified
conditions.
Itmaybestated
in general
thatorganized
laborisseeking
to haveavoicein thedeter
mination
of whatthestandards
of output
shallbe:
A workerwill want to live up to a standardthat he himself
helps to set, and agreesto. There can be no disputebetween

foreman
andmenaboutthe properspeedof workwhenproduction
standards
havebeencarefully
set up by agreement
between
the
unionand management.
Someof the mostprogressiveand
suc

cessful
unions
have
employed
thismethod
withbenefit.17
Onewriter
whoinvestigated
collective
bargaining
in theautomobile
industrywrites:
Since complaintsof undue speed were among the most serious

grievances,
the unionswereactivefromthe startin efforts
to slow down the lines.
In many plantsit was possibleto
reach agreementthroughnegotiationon fair speed of the con
veyors, or proper manning of the lines.

In some, lines were

lockedafter the agreementin orderto assurea steadyspeed.
In others, men watchedthe conveyorclocks and were quick to
object to any increase. In some plants the matter of speed
and man-powerwas the sourceof great and continuingfriction,

and resulting
in
neversatisfactorily
removedbynegotiation
18
frequent slowdowns and sitdowns.

Theautomobile
industry
hashadcomparatively
little
collective-bar
gaining
experience.
Thereis a gooddealof mistrust
on bothsides
and

charges
of"speed-up"
and"restriction"
ofoutput
arestill
prevalent.
Theabsence
of established
procedure
fordetermining
ratesof perform
ancewithactual
union
participation
makes
foragooddealof individual,

subjective
judgment
onthepart
oftheworkers
andfrictionwith
manage
ment.19
There
isa general
belief
thatworkers
cannot
participate
in
determining
ratesof performance
sincethatwouldinvolveinterference

withmanagement.
Atbest,
itisfelt,
workers
"should
certainly
protest"
18Ibid.,
D.81.

Problems
(Pittsburgh,
Pa.:Steel
17Production

Workers Organizing Committee,

Pub. No. 2, 1938),D. 11.
18.

PEmily
C. Brown,
"TheNew Collective
Bargaining
in MassProduction:
Methods,

Results,Problems,
" The Journal of PoliticalEconomy, Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (Feb.
1939), pp. 48-9.
19
Ibid ., pp. 48-50.

60

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

conditions
of operation,
trade-unions
haveusually
soughtthe adoption

of someprovision
whichwouldprevent
theshifting
of theexpense
of

experimentationwith
newmethods
ofproduction
totheworkers
intheform
of lowerearnings.

Although
theforms
thatthespecific
provisions
forthemaintenance
of earnings,
before
a newrateon a newoperation
hasbeenset,have
differed
inindividual
industries,
theobjectives
of theprovisions
are
usually
similar.In thewordsof a delegate
to a ShoeWorkers
Union

convention,
"intheevent
ofa newmachine
coming
in,youcanarbitrate,
butfirstmakehim(theemployer)
paythewagescalewhichyouragree
mentwiththemanufacturer
sayshe mustpay,theday priceuntilthema
1122 The difficulties
chineistried
out,andyouwon'thaveanytrouble.
of adjusting
claims
as to ratesandearnings
areattributed
at least

partly
tothelackofawagepolicyduring
theprocess
ofintroduction.
A similar
point
of viewisembodied
in the1920awardof theBituminous
CoalConmission
appointed
byPresident
Wilson
toarbitrate
thebituminous
coalstrike
of 1919.Section
4 oftheaward
provides:
That pendingthe joint districtagreementbetweenthe miners

andoperators
covering
a fairschedule
ofrates
forpiece-work
or tonnage
operation
of any newdeviceor machinery,
theright
of the operatorto introduce
and operateany such new deviceor

machinery
shallnot be questioned,
and hisselection
of such
men as he may desire to conduct tests with or operate such
deviceor machineryshall not be in any way interferedwith or

obstructed
by the minersor theirrepresentatives,
provided
the
wagesoffered
areat leastequalto theestablished
scalerates
for similar labor.

After the device or machine shall have passed the experi
mental stage and is in shape to be introducedas a regular
componentpart of the productionof coal, then for the purpose

of determining
a permanent
scaleof rates(suchratesto con
tinue untilthe joint scale conferenceabovereferredto fixes

a scale)
foroperating
suchdeviceor machine,
the mineworkers

mayhavea representative
present
fora reasonable
timeto
witness
itsoperation,
afterwhicha schedule
of ratesshallbe
determined
by mutualagreement,whichscale shall be concluded

within
80daysafter
a fairtesthasbeenmade.23
Thustheprocedure
established
by theawardspecified
thatduring
the
period
of experimentation
withnewmachinery,
before
a rateis setby
mutualagreement
between
theunionand the operators,
theratesoffered
shouldbe "at leastequalto the established
scaleratesfor similar
22quoted
by Augusta
E. Galster,
TheLaborMovement
in theshoeIndustry
(NewYork:
The Ronald Press Co., 1924), D. 112.

23Louis
Bloch,
Labor
Agreements
inCoalMines
(NewYork:Russell
1931), D. 192.

Sage Foundation,

62

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
individualfor (5) five weeks prior to the style development
If a new employee is placed on such jobs,
paymentis to be made at a rate equivalent
to 98% of the aver
28
age hourlyearningsof the department.

experimentation.

Thisprovision
summarizes
theresults
of previous
decisions
of the
Impartial
Chairman
withrespect
to styledevelopment.
It is appropri
ate,therefore,
toreviewbriefly
thereasoning
thatunderlies
the"98%
styledevelopment
rate"whichis embodied
in one of thedecisions
of the

Impartial
Chairman.27
An understanding
wasreached,
according
to thisdecision,
whichset
forththata newstyleor a styledevelopment
is definedas a styleof
productfor whichno rate has previously
beenset. Such development

usually
requires
aperiod
ofexperimentation.
During
suchtime
theem
ployees
wereto receive
a compensation
thatmorenearly
approximated
theiractualaverage
earnings
thandid the minimum
hourly
ratesprovided
in theagreement.The union maintainedthat for style development100
percent
of theaverage
actual
earnings
shouldbe paid. Themanufacturers,

on theotherhand,
advanced
theargument
thatstyle
development
involved
expenses
andrisksto themandbenefits
in theformof employment
to
theiremployees;
thelatter
should
therefore
bearpartoftheexpense.
Besides,
theyargued,
ifanemployee
wereto receive
100percent
of his
average
earnings
whilea stylewas beingdeveloped,
he wouldlackthe
incentive
to develop
thestyleto a production
basiswhenpiecerates

could
beestablished.
TheImpartial
Chairman
sawmerits
inthese
argu
mentsandruledthatthe98-percent
average
ratebeestablished
during
theperiod
ofdevelopment.
Thus,although
thisrateprovides
a measure
of protection
against
lossofearnings,
it alsomakestheworkers
bear
someof theexpenses
ofexperimentation.

Thefollowing
examples
willillustrate
theprocedure
followed
inthe
process
of a fewactual
changes.
Theintroduction
of thethree-carrier
tackle
as an attachment
totheknitting
machine
notonlyconstituted
a
stylechange
buta technological
change.A number
of hosiery
mills
had

been
experimenting
withthethree
alternating
maincarriers
instead
of
a single
maincarrier
in order
to minimize
thepossibility
of ringson

stockings
caused
byuneven
silk.Theknitters
whoworked
onthenewat
tachment
werebeing
paid,
ona timebasis,
at 98 percent
oftheir
former

average
hourly
earnings,
anditbecame
necessary
todetermine
apiece
28

National
Agreement
andUniform
Price
ScaleBy
andBetween
FullFashioned,Hosiery

Manufacturersof America,Inc. and American Federation of Hosiery Workers,
1937-1938.(Philadelphia,Pa.: The Joint Committee in the full fashioned Hosiery
Industry),
D. 28.

27pull-fashioned
Hosiery
Industry,
National
Labor
Agreement,
ndecisions
ofthe

ImpartialChairman,GeorgeW. Taylor"(Philadelphia,
Pa.: officeof the Impartial
Chairman, Ser. E-22, mimeo., Dec. 11, 1931).

64

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

piece
rateissetuntil
theoutput
perworker
ona full-production
basis
isdetermined.
Finally,
a permanent
rateissetonthebasisoftheex
perience
duringthesetwostages.

Often
thetemporary
rateisadjusted
a number
oftimes
before
theper
manent
rateis agreedupon. Forexample,
in thecaseof the introduction

oftheParamount
electric
drying
equipment
thecompanywhich
introduced

theequipment
began
paying
theboarders
whooperated
itonthebasis
of98 percent
of theiraverage
earnings
priorto theinstallation.
In
October
1934thecasewasreferred
to theImpartial
Chairman
inorder
to

seta temporary
boarding
rate.Boththecompany
andtheunionwanted
to
havea pieceratesetfortheboarders.An analysis
was madeof thepro
ductionthat had been attainedby the boardersand a temporaryrate was

suggested
bytheImpartial
Chairman
based
upon
theoutput
oftheboarders
whowere"mostexperienced
on thenewequipment."
Thistemporary
rate
wasto be revised
laterwhenmoredataon theexperience
withthenew
equipment
becameavailable.30

A fewweeks
lateranother
casecamebefore
theImpartial
Chairman
in
volving
thesameequipment.
In thiscasethecompany
beganto payits
boarders
according
to thetemporary
ratesetby theprevious
decision,
forthisrateapplied
to allsignatory
concerns.
Factspresented
showed

that
thisrate,
because
ofthechange
inmethod
ofoperation
andexper
imentation
withdifferent
procedures,
resulted
ina striking
decrease
in

earnings
during
thefirst
fewweeks
ofoperation.
TheImpartial
Chairman
ruledthatworkers
whoweretransferred
fromother
types
ofequipment
to
thistypewereto receive
98 percent
of their
average
earnings
forthe
first
weekson thenewequipment,
andafter
thisperiod
thetemporary

piece
ratewas
tobecome
applicable.31
InJanuary
1935these
temporary
rates
cameupagain
forrevisionbe
foretheImpartial
Chairman.
Investigation
oftheoperation
ofthenew
equipment
indicated
thatthetemporary
rateshould
berevised
inorder
toprevent
a decrease
intheboarders'
earning
power
andto prevent
a
labor-cost
advantage
tothemanufacturers
using
this
equipment
compared
withother
signatory
concerns.
Theinvestigation
alsodisclosed
thatthe
claimof themanufacturers
thatboarders
couldadaptthemselves
to the
newequipment
in2 weekshadnomerit.After
several
months
of opera

tionproduction
records
gavenoindication,
according
totheImpartial
Chairman,
that
productionwould
reach
a level
claimedby
thetwocampanies
operating
this
equipment.
While
improvement
overthe
then-existing
level
3010id.
(Ser.
0-30,
mimeo.,
Oct.11,1934).
3110id.
(ser.
6–32,
mimeo.,
Oct.
28,1934).

UNION

68

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

machinery
for the workerswhentheyfeelthatthe job is incorrectly
Someof the agreements
of the UnitedAutomobile
Workers
contain

timed.

clauses
similar
tothefollowing:
Employees
shallhavethe rightthrough
the properpersonor
persons
to question
thetimestudyof anyjob thatmayappear
to be improperly
timed,evento the extentof askingfor the
retimingof any job. Uponreceiptof a requestfor retiming
any job the companyshall have a periodof three days from the

dateofrequest
forsuchretiming.
If

an increase or decrease

is madeon theirretiming
saidincrease
or decrease
shallbe

retroactive
totheexpiration
ofthisthree-day
period.39
EARNINGS

AND

INCREASING

PRODUCTIVITY

Whentechnological
changes
alterthenature
of theworkofspecific
occupations,
a basis
isfrequently
provided
forconflicting
claims
onthe
partof employers
and trade-unions
withrespect
to thedetermination
of

thewagelevel
thatshould
be provided
forthemodified
operation
orthe
category
ofworkers
thatshould
beassigned
to perform
thework.Employ
ershavefrequently
tended
toratethenewjobsona lower
basis
whenthe
workcouldbe assigned
toworkers
oflesser
skillthanwasrequired
be
forea change.Thearguments
thatwereusually
presented
by organized

labor
against
reductions
inearnings
werebased
ontheproposition
that,
whentechnological
changes
hadresulted
in increased
productivity
and
economies
to themanufacturers
whoinstituted
them,theseeconomies
should

besodisposed
ofthattheworkers
involved
would
receive
a shareofthem

intheformofeither
increased
compensation
orshorter
hours;
inno
case,it hasbeenargued,
should
sucheconomies
result
inreductions
in
theworkers'
earnings.
Inthewordsof
onelabor
leader:
Organizedlabor carryingthru a sound policytries to see that
the introductionof machinery does not lower and if at all
possible,that it may increasethe standardof wages,so that a
part of the savings effectedby the use of the machinesmay

thusbe givento theworkers.40

Arguments
infavor
ofsharing
thebenefits
ofincreased
productivity
have

not,however,
beenconfined
tocases
ofreclassification;
trade-unions
havein recent
years
increasingly
usedthemwhenattempts
weremadeto
increase
earnings.

Whetheror
notearnings
arereduced
asaresult
oftechnologicalchanges
dependsto a largeextenton the natureof the change,the degreeto

30Agreements

BetweenInternationalUnion, UnitedAutomobileWorkersof

America
andEmployers
in theAutomobile
and OtherIndustries,
Vol.One,pp.54-6,
Pr.

63

40sidney
Hillman,
"TheProblem
orEmploymentinthe
clothing
Industry,"
TheAdvance,
Vol. XIII, No. 9 (Aug. 28, 1927), D. 10.

70

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
4.

Governmental authorities may impose greater taxes.

5.

We may hoardthe profits,eitherin cash or inventories.

He alsosuggests
thatsharing
theprofits
withworkers
is themost
practical
method
ofdisposing
ofthegains.
In thefaceof the cryingneedfor improved
livingstandards,

opposition
to newmachinery
is a tragedy.
It

calls for a bete

ter job of merchandisinglabor-savingdevices. We must in
troduce them so that workmen are eager to use them, so that
everyoneprofitsby them, and so that the investorcan finance
42

them.

Theformsthrough
whichthebenefits
of increased
productivitymay
be
reflected
in theearnings
of theworkers
involved
arevaried.Asfar
as collective-bargaining
negotiations
overwageratesareconcerned,
casesfalling
intotwoclassifications
areof particular
importance:
caseswherethemaintenance
of thelevelof earnings
prevalent
before
thechange
maybe enforced
through
collective
bargaining
in thefaceof
demands
of employers
thata reduction
inskill
merits
lower
earnings;
and
cases
wherethebenefits
maybe passed
on partly
through
a differential
in theratewhichpermits
workers
on thenewoperation
to increase
their
earnings
relative
to theearnings
of workers
whooperate
under
theold
A fewexamples
taken
fromtherecords
of wagepolicies
andwage
negotiations
of individual
unions
willillustrate
theseapplications
of

theproposition
that
workers
should
share
intheeconomies
ofincreased
productivity.
President
Hughes
of theBrotherhood
of Operative
Potters
formulated
the
wagepolicy
of thatunionwithrespect
to introduction
of machinery
as
earlyas 1899,whentheintroduction
of a "dishjigger"
threatened
to
takeawaytheworkon certain
types
of warefromthedishmaker
"atthe
bench":
"It appearsto us that it wouldbe wise for the dishmakers
to
regulatea pricefor ware made in this manner. If it is longer
neglected, the result may be disastrous to that branch.

In

endeavoringto regulate such matters,we believe it best to

firstascertainjust
whatadvantages
a man operating
a machine
has over anotherworkingon a whirler. Then regulatethe price
to allow for the difference. In this way we do not antagonize

improved
machinery,
but endeavor
to derivewhatever
benefits
thatmay accruefromthe machine,
lightening
the laborandat

thesametimeregulating
yourprices,
so as to enable
youto
earnthe sameor as goodwagesas the manworking
by hand."43

42H.
P.Losely,
"Applying
Technological
Gains
toReconcile
MantoMachine,"
The

IronAge,Vol.132,No.20 (Nov.18,1933),pp.10-2,58.

43McCabe,
National
Collective
Bargaining
inthePottery
Industry,
D.25.

72

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

samefirmsemployed
newcrews
recruited
fromnonunion
sources,
andlower
rateswereestablished.
In general,
however,
the aimsof the unionto

maintainearningswere
clearlymanifest
during
allthenegotiations.
The
policyas a wholewas basedon thecontention
thatworkersareentitled

toshare
inthebenefits
ofincreased
productivity.44
Inthemen's
clothing
industry
inChicago
thewage
principles
involved
whena machineis introduced
is illustrated
by a case heardbeforethe
TradeBoardand the Boardof Arbitration.
In thiscasethe employers

contended
thattheycouldemploy
a groupofworkers
at themachine
who

werelessskilled
andwhoshould,
therefore,
receive
a comparatively
lower
wagerate.BoththeTrade
Board
andtheBoard
of Arbitration
ruled
against
it. Thiscaseinvolved
thequestion
ofwhether
theshoptrimmers
or thejoker-sewers
should
runa stamping
machine
which
would
perform
the
workthathadbeenperformed
by bothclasses
ofworkers
until
thattime.

A higher
rate
would
besetifthetrimmers
were
toperform
theworkthan
if thejoker-sewers
weretodo it. TheTrade
Board
ruled
thata machine
wasreplacing
handworkin thetrimming
section,
andtherefore
trimmers
shouldmanthemachines.
Thecompanyappealed
fromthisdecision
on the
groundsthatthemachineis a substitute
for joker-sewing
and thatthe

company
should
notberequired
tousepersons
whodonotknowthework
andreceive
highrates.TheBoardof Arbitration
ruledthatsincemost
of the handworkhadtheretofore
beendoneby trimmers,
theworkon the

machines
should
gotothemattrimmer's
earnings.
Thus,unlike
otherin
stances
wheresuchchange
frequently
resulted
in thepayment
of lower
rates,the higherratewas established
and the Boardcommented
in the

following
way:"This
decision
doesnotgivethecompany
thegreatest
im
mediate
gainfromthenewmachine.
TheChairman
is oftheopinion,
how
ever,thatthecompany's
interests
arebestserved
in thelongrunby
avoiding
thedevelopment
of opposition
to machinery
andnewmethods."45

Another
arbitration
caseexemplifies
a situation
thatinvolved
thedis
tribution
of thebenefits
fromincreased
productivity.
TheChildren's

Dressmakers'
Union,
Local91
(NewYork
City),
oftheInternational
Ladies'
Garment
Workers
Union,
anda firmmanufacturing
house
dresses
andbath
robescouldnotagreeon thedivision
of theeconomies
in production
An in
costs
which
resulted
fromthe
introduction
ofimprovedmachinery.

vestigation
disclosed
thathourly
earnings
of theworkers
whooperated
thesemachines
hadincreased
over14 percent.
Thearbitrator
decided
4410id.,
DD.258-84.

45w1lliam
G.Haber,
"Workers'
Rightsand
theIntroductionof
Machinery
intheMen's
clothing
Industry,"
The Journalof Political
Economy,vol.XXXIII,No.4 (Aug.
1926), DD. 400-1.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

74

inMarch1937,to experiment
withthenewsystemof production
by in

stalling
itina single
shop.During
themonth
ofAprilproduction
under
the straight-line
systemexceededby 40 percentthe quotaset on the
basisof theformeroutputunderthe bundlesystem. It was agreedbe

tweenmanagement
andlabor
inthiscasethatthebenefits
resulting
from
thischange
bedivided
equally
between
theworkers
andmanufacturers.
Thusthemanufacturers
werenotonlypledged
to maintain
former
earnings

buttoincrease
themwhenproductivitywas
increased
asa result
ofthe
48

change.

Although
thecasescitedthusfardealwithisolated
instances,
they

nevertheless
illustrate
oneofthechief
concerns
oforganized
labor
to
evolve
a policy
withrespect
to technological
change
which
aimsat the
protection
andimprovement
ofworkers'
earnings
whenchanges
are intro
duced.Insomeindustries
theverystructure
of thewagescale,
evolved

over
a longperiod
oftime,
takes
intoaccount
increases
inproductivity
caused
by technological
changes
andsecures
fortheworkers
participa
tionin thebenefits
derived
fromsuchchanges.
Thedualsystemof
wage
payments
prevalent
on therailroads
forthetrainandengine
-service
workers
issoconstructed
thatitis ofspecial
interest
totheemployees
to speedup traffic.In theroad-freight
service,
forexample,
100 miles

or lessconstitutes
a day's
workforthetrain,
andengine-service
crews.

Onan hourly
basis
thestandard
output
iscalculated
at123miles.
When
an engineer
hasperformed
hisstandard
day's
work,
thatis,100miles
run
in8 hoursor less,hereceives
thescheduled
dailywages
regardless
of
thenumber
of hours
actually
consumed
in making
thetrip.If thesame
100-mile
runconsumes
morethan8 hours,
thatis,if traffic
conditions

weresuchthatitwasimpossible
toaverage
thestandard
122miles
per
hour,theengineer
receives
payfor100mileson an hourly
basisplus
"timeand a half"for all hoursover8. In theeventthattheengineer

performs
a longer
runthan100miles
in8 hours,
orwhenheaverages
more

than
thestandard
122miles
perhour,
hereceives
additional
payforevery
mile
above
100ona straight-time
basis.
Thusthetraincrews
stand
to
benefit
fromincreased
speedinfreight
service
because
oftechnological
changeseitherin the formof leisurewhenthe standard
day'sworkis

completed
inlessthan8 hours
or in theformof higher
paywhentheout

putperdayexceeds
thestandard
output.
Further,
bycutting
therunning
timethetrain
-service
crewsnotonlyincrease
theirleisure
butalso
increase
theavailability
ofthetracks
andengines
forotherservice.49
48N.
I.Stone,
Systems
ofShop
Managementinthe
Cotton-Garment
Industry
(WPA
NationalResearchProjectin cooperationwith Bureau of Labor Statistics,U.S.
Departmentof
Labor,
Report
No.B-5,Aug.1938);
HughL. Thompson,
"Going'Straight
Line',"
Factory
Management
andMaintenance,vol.
97,No.1 (Jan.1939),
D. 89.

4 Harold
G.Moulton,
TheAmerican
Transportation
Problem
(Washington,
D.C.: The
Brookings
Institution,
1933),pp. 188-91.

UNION

76

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

agreements
havebeennegotiated.
Theaward
of theBituminous
CoalCom
mission
of 1920specifically
recognized
thecontention
of theunion
that
miners
should
sharein thesavings
fromnewtechniques
whenit stated
thataftera periodof trialof a loading
machine
the"mineworkershall
receive
the equivalent
of thecontract
ratesfor the classof workdis

placed
plusa fairproportion
of thelabor-saving
effected."
Although
thereis no conclusive
evidence
to showwhetheror not earnings
of ma

chine
miners
haveincreased
substantially
overearnings
of pickminers,
it is generally
believed
thanan effect
of thedifferential
hasbeento

prevent
adecrease
inearnings
ofhandminers
because
ofmachine-mining
competition.51
Demands
that
thewage
negotiations
inthemining
industry
should
takeintoaccount
increases
in productivity
because
ofmechaniza
tionarestillpartandparcel
of thepolicy
of theUnited
MineWorkers
of America. In 1937it wasagreed
between
themineoperators
andthe
unionto establish
a Mechanized
Mining
Commission
to studytheproblems
which
havearisen
asa result
ofmechanization
in coalmining
andtopro
videdataon changes
in productivity
whichwouldserveas a basisfor

wagenegotiations.
According
totheproceedings
oftheMineWorkers'
convention
of1938,
thepreliminary
findings
ofthecommission
indicate:
1. That there is a wide enough margin in cost reductiondue

to mechanical
loading
to allowparticipation
in the benefits;
2. Thata highday-rate
is inadequate
without
a guaranteed
num
52
ber of workingdays per year,or guaranteed
annualearnings.

In someinstances
theestablishment
of a differential
wageon a new
method
of operation
hasserved
as a meansof overcoming
resistance
to
change.Officials
of the Amalgamated
Association
of StreetandElectric

Railway
Employes,
forexample,
complained
thatalthough
thedelegates
to theconventions
press
foraction
against
one-man
caroperation,
the
workers"breaktheirnecksto get on the one-mancar"becauseof the

union's
insistence
onextrapay
forsuchoperators.
In manyinstances
the
companies
granted
thedifferential
of from2 to7 centsvoluntarily
in
order
toinduce
theworkers
toaccept
theone-man
car.Thus the union was
confronted
witha struggle
against
theone-man
carwhile
thewagediffer

ential
which
itobtained
inthecourse
ofthat
struggle
actuallyencour
53

agedtheacceptance
of thechange
on thepartof manyof itsmembers.
In contrast
withthepolicy
of theUnited
MineWorkers,
wherethewage

differential
on machine
operation
hasserved
toprevent
reduction
of
611sadorLubin,
Miners'
Wagesandthecostofcoal
(1st
ed.;New
York:
McGraw-H111
Book

Co.,

Inc. ,

4)

DD. 69-80, 253–64; Arthur E. Suffern, The Coal Miners!

Struggle
for Industrial
Status(New York: The MacmillanCo., 1928),pp. 327-43.

52proceedingsof
theThirty-fifth
ConstitutionalConvention
oftheUnited
Mine
Workers
of America
(Washington,
D. C., Jan.25-Feb.
3,1938),I,22-6.

53

Emerson
P.Schmidt,Industrial
Relations
inOrban
Transportation
(Minneapolis,
University of Minnesota Press, 1937), pp. 244-7.

Minn.:

CHAPTER

REDUCTION

IN

IV

HOURS

OF

WORK

Shorter
workperiods,
perdayandperweek,havealways
beena major

objective
oforganized
labor,
regardless
ofscarcity
orabundance
ofem
ployment
opportunities.
Thevarious
philosophies
underlying
theshorter
hourmovements
havebeenexpounded
alongtwogeneral
lines: thatshorter
hoursarenecessary
in orderto provide
adequate
leisureandrelieffrom

increasing
intensity
of laborandthatshorter
hoursarean effective
method
ofcoping
withunemployment,
particularly
unemployment
occasioned

bytechnological
change.
Thearguments
thattrade-unionists
haveused
infavor
ofshorter
hours
have
been
asvaried
astherange
ofvirtues
at
anyperiod
oftime.Inthewords
ofonetrade-unionist:
To diminish the hours of toil is to increase the value of la

bor, is to multiplythe number of laborers,is to add to the

moraldignityand religious
spiritof the times,is to change
forthe betterthesocialstateand character
of the people,
andthiswillbe to strengthen
the patriotism,
the commercial

credit,
andthepolitical
institutions
ofthecountry.

Althoughshorter
hourswere
to"multiply
thenumber
oflaborers",
thecase
forshorter
hours
inthisstatement
is basedprimarily
on moral
grounds.
When thisstatementwas made(sometimein the 1860's)hoursof laborwere

verylongandtheproblem
ofsecuring
moreleisure
timewasof paramount
importance.
Trade-unionists
argued
thata reduction
in hoursofwork,
whether
it isaccompanied
by increasedwage
ratesor not,wasdesirable,
sincesuchreduction
wouldmakelabormorescarceand,in consequence,

wages
wouldrise.Thistheory
wasexpressed
ina jingle
whichwascur
rentduringthelatterhalfof the nineteenth
century:
Whetheryou work by the pieceor work by the day,
2
Decreasing
the hoursincreasesthe pay.

In lateryears,however,
trade-union
policydefinitely
insisted
thata

reduction
inhours
ofworkbe
associatedwith
increases
inhourly
rates
so thatearnings
fortheshorter
workperiod
should
equaltheearnings
priorto thereduction.

Asit stands
at present,
thepolicy
of organized
laborwithrespect
to shorterhourscentersprimarily
aroundthe needto increase
jobsand
to reduceunemployment.
It embodiesthe argumentthatshorterhours

1JamesC.
Sylvis,
TheLife,
Speeches,
labors
andEssays
ofWilliam
H.Sylvis

(Philadelphia,
Pa.: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger,1872), pp. 124-5.
2

Quotedby JohnR. Commonsand Others,Historyof Labourin the UnitedStates

(New York:

The MacmillanCo., 1918),II, 90.
78

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

80

In theireffortsto achieveshorterhours,trade-unions
havedistin

guished
inrecent
years
between
reductions
of hours
ofworkin industry
a whole,
suchas theproposal
fora 30-hour
weekinallmanufacturing
industries,
and reductions
in hoursof workin individual
industries

wheretechnological
changes
haveresulted
in economies
in laborcosts
perunitofproduct.
Whereas
intheir
arguments
fora general
reduction
in hoursof workwithouta reduction
in totalearningsthe problemof

increased
unitcostscouldnotbe avoided,
wheretechnological
changes

haveresulted
ineconomies
inlabor
costs
inspecific
industries
labor
hasmoreandmorecameto lookupontheshortening
ofworking
hours
as
oneof themethods
ofsharing
theeconomies
achieved
by technological

changes.
Theresolution
adopted
atthe1938convention
oftheInter
national
Lodgeof theAmalgamated
Association
of Iron,SteelandTin
Workers,
forinstance,
askedthattheorganization
submit
toCongress
a proposal
forlegislation
fora "six-hour
dayanda thirty-hourweek
for
allindustries
inInterstate
Commerce
without
anydecrease
intheestab
lished
wages"
onlyas an initial
stepto an investigation
by Congress
of the"curtailed
jobopportunities
inspecific
industries
through
tech

nicalimprovements"
inorder
toobtain
appropriate
legislation
"which
willmaketheproper
andfairadjustment
between
Capital
andLabor
ofthe
benefits
which
arederived
through
suchtechnological
improvement."
The
reasons
forthisresolution,
itwasstated,
arethebeliefs
that(1)be
causeof technological
improvements
it isanticipated
"thatwithin
the

next
three
years
only
20%or25,000
ofthe125,000
Steel
Workers
normally
employed
onthesheet
bar,heavy
plate,
sheet
andblack
plate
millswill
stillhavejobs"and(2)that"corporate
management
andinvested
capital
haveabsorbed
thepredominant
share
ofthebenefits
ofsuchtechnological
118 A
improvements
withLabor's
onlyshare
being
greater
unemployment.
similar
resolution
makingpractically
thesame
points
astolackofwork

ers'participation
in thebenefits
derived
fromtechnological
change
was
adopted
at the1938convention
of theUnited
MineWorkers.?
Theseres
olutions
andothersadoptedby otherunionsindicate
thatwheretechno

logical
changes
haveaffected
employment
opportunities
trade-unions
have
sought
toshare
inthebenefits
ofreduced
production
costwhich
resulted
fromsuchchanges
through
a reduction
in hours
ofworkwithout
a reduc
tionin earnings.
Trade-unions
haveusedtwo mainarguments
withrespectto the rela

tionship
between
shorter
hours
andphysical
output:thatshorter
hours
6

Journalof theProceedings
of theInternational
International
Lodge
A. A.ofI.S. and1. W.of
Lodge of North America,1938),

North America(Pittsburgh,Pa.:
DD.
7

3049-50.

Proceedings
of theThirty-fifthConstitutional
Convention
of the UnitedMine

WorkersofAmerica(washington,
D. C., Jan. 25-Feb.3, 1938),I, 309.

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

82

11
As an illustration
crushed
stone,
bituminous
coal,andpetroleum.

of thesecondpointtheresolution
adopted
at theInternational
Ladies'

Garment
Workers'
convention
in May1937maybecited.It observed
that
"theshorter
work-week,
as established
by thethirty-five
hour
week,was promptly
met by employers
withnewlabor-saving
de
vices, a more intensespeed-upsystem of productionand the
establishment
of the sectionsystemof productionin factories

whereit neverexistedbefore,thus,tendingto destroythe
immediate gainswhich were obtainedby the thirty-fivehour
week

n12

The resolution,
therefore,
provides
"thatimmediately
afterthisconvention
the incoming
General
Executive Board shall commence an activecampaignin all mar

ketswherecoats,
suitsanddressesarebeingproduced
.
that in all
to put into effectthe thirty hour week,
future negotiations
for the shorter work week there shall be
no reductionin wages by reason thereof,and that particular

attention
be paidto safeguarding
the interests
of theworkers
in all cases where the introduction of new machinery may create

undue
hardship
andadditional
unemployment.-13
Although
shorter
hoursusually
provide
morejobsat first,
increased
productivity
eventually
outstrips
thegainsmadeandthemaintenance
of
a givennumberof jobscomesto depend,in mostindustries,
upona con

tinuously
expanding
volume
of production.
Thishasbeentheexperience

throughout
ourindustrial
history
andislikely
tobetheexperience
in
thefuture.It isof interest
to seehowthisdynamic
process
worksin
giveninstances.
Such studiesas havebeen made of the effectsof reducedhourson labor

productivity
frequently
do notseparate
theeffects
of othermanagerial
changes
which
areintroduced
simultaneously
withthereduction
in hours.
Thusthechange
fromthreeshifts
of 8 hours
eachto fourshifts
of6
hours
eachat theKellogg
Company,
Battle
Creek,
Michigan,
issometimes
citedas an example
wherethe reduction
in hoursaloneresulted
in num
erous economies. But in this instancethe reductionof hours was ac

companied
by a series
of otherchanges.
Under
theoldplanofworking
11HarryMagdoff,
Irving
H.Siegel,
andMilton
B.Davis,
Production,
Employment,
andProductivityin
59 Manufacturing
Industries,
1919-38
(WPA National
Research

Project,Report No. 9-1, May 1939), Part One,D. 81. See also the following
studlesconductedbythe WPA NationalResearchProjectin cooperationwiththe

U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines: Harry S. Kantor and GeofPrey

A.Saeger,Changesin Technologyand
LaborRequirementsin
theCrushed-Stone
Industry
(Report
No.E-8,Feb.1939),D. 114;0.E. Kiessling
andothers,Tech
nology,Employment,
andOutputperMan in Petroleum
andNatural-Gas
Production

(Report No. E-10, July 1930), p. 307; Willard E. Hotchkiss,F. G. Tryon, and

others,Mechanization,
Employment,
and OutputperMan in Bituminous-Coal
Mining

(ReportNo. E-9, Aug. 1839),II, 342.
12

Reportand Record:Twenty-third
Convention,
International
Ladies!Garment

Workers'Union(AtlanticCity, N. J., May 3-15, 1937),"Reportof Proceedings,"
P.
13

265.

3Ibid.

84

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

ona straight
hourly
basis
bothbefore
andafter
thechange,
andthatwith
theexception
oftheforeladies
whosuffered
a reduction
in hourly
rates,
therestreceived
thesamehourly
ratesof paydespite
theirincreased
productivity.17

In1920theNational
Industrial
Conference
Board
published
theresults
ofa survey
of theeffects
ofa workweek
of48 hours
or lesson output.
Thesurvey
involved
436plants
and373,536
workers.
In87.2percent
of
theestablishments
studied
a reduction
to a workweek
of 48 hoursor less

wasaccompanied
bya decrease
inweekly
output
perworker;
in8.7percent
oftheplants
theworkers
wereableto maintain
their
output;
in4.1per
centoutput
was increased.
Of theestablishments
whichshoweda decreased

weekly
output,
slightly
morethantwo-fifths
maintained
thesamehourly
output;in aboutone-fifth
of the establishments
hourlyoutputwas in

creased
sufficiently
to offset
at leastpartially
thelossin working
time;in one-sixth
of theseestablishments
therewas a decrease
in hourly

aswellasweekly
output.
Changes
inmanagement
orequipment
accompanied
thechanges
in hours
ina number
ofestablishments
andin a significant
18

numberof instances
accounted
for markedincreases
in output.
The character of the work, i. e., whether the processwas

largelyhandworkor machinework,for the mostpartdeter
minedwhetheror not it was possiblefor the workerto increase
hourly output.

In those industries,such as cotton manufacturing,where

highlyautomatic
machine
processes
predominated,
the output
was
limitedalmostentirelyby the speed of the machines. In

prac

tically every case a reductionin hours was accompaniedby a
decrease in output. In those industries,
however,where hand

processes,
or wherethe
in the manufacturing
workpredominated
skill and speed of the operativein handlingthe machineswere

- suchasinthebootandshceindustry
factors
thecontrolling
, and in certainmis
or in certainkindsof metalmanufacturing
it was possibleto increasethe hourly
cellaneous industries

ofentirely
oftheworkers,
insomecasesto theextent
output
for the lossin workingtime or evenexceeding
compensating
theprevious
weeklyproduction.19

In1929
theNational
Industrial
Conference
Board
publishedanotherstudy
oftheexperiences
of manufacturers
withthe5-dayweek.Of 94 plants

which
hadreduced
theirworkweekfromså
or6 days
to5 days,
6 reported
a "substantial
loss"in output
perweekandapproximately
one-quarter
reported
thatoutput
haddeclined
in the"sameproportion."
Forty-six
oftheplants
reported
noappreciable
change
inoutput,
and18 companies
1710id.,
D.

2.

18PracticalExperience
withtheWorkWeekofForty-Eight
Hours
orLess(NewYork:
NationalIndustrial
Conference
Board,Dec.1920),pp. 7-8, 10.

19Ibid
., pp.9-10.

CHAPTER

SECURITY

V

OF JOB

TENURE

Regulation
of jobtenure
- either
intheformof provisions
in collec
tiveagreements
or ofcrystallized
shoppractices
embodying
thespecific
claimsof workers
on available
workin a plantor evenin a singleoccu

pation
ina plant
- hasalways
beenan important
factor
in collective
bargaining
relations.
Evenunder
normal
conditions,
whenjobsarereadily

available
andtechnical
conditions
ofoperation
arerelatively
stable,
separation
fromaspecific
plant
involves
samelossofincome.
Themag
nitude
ofthelossvaries
withtheperiod
of unemployment,
thedegree
of

transferability
ofacquired
skill
andexperience,
andthegeographical
accessibility
of otherplants
where
similar
categories
oflabor
areem

ployed.
Whentechnological
changes
takeplace,
however,
thevalue
of
experience
andskill
frequently
disappears.
In instanceswhere
such
changes
areaccompanied
by a decline
inemployment
opportunities,
loss
of tenure
ina plant
maymeanprolonged
unemployment
forsame,
complete
separation
froman industry
forothers,
andtheindustrial
scrapheapfor

theolderworkers.
Furthermore,
inthemass-production
industrieswhere
largenumbers
ofsemiskilled
andunskilled
workers
areemployed,
theex
perience
acquired
through
years
ofservice
isoftenofa highly
special
izedcharacter
andisvaluable
onlyina limited
market,
frequently
ina

single
plant
ora single
department
ina plant,
Lossoftenure
insuch
instances
deprives
workersof a valuable
marketfor theemployment
of
theirexperience.

Underconditions
whereemployment
andincome
varyto a considerable
extentwiththecharacter
of thetenureand theworker's
claimon avail

ableworkwithina plant,it is onlynatural
thatinsistence
on the
elimination
of arbitrariness
inmatters
of lay-off,
dismissal,
andre

employment
should
become
important;
thisisparticularlytruewhen
there
is a scarcity
of jobs. In recent
yearstherehasbeena tendency
in
collective-bargaining
relations
to provide
thatsecurity
of jobtenure

should
increasewith
thenumberof
years
ofservice.1
Trade-unions
have
1that
theuseoftheseniority
principle
inindustrial
relations
hasincreased
in

recent years is generallyagreed upon by studentsof industrialrelations. The
very extensionof collectivebargaininginto such mass-production
industriesas
steel, rubber,and automobilesand the prominencethat seniorityprovisionsOC
cupy in most of the collectiveagreementsin these industriesare indications
of

See J. Douglas
Brown,The Seniority
principle
in Employment
Relations
(Princeton,
N.J.: Industrial Relations Section,

the growing importance of this principle.

PrincetonUniversity,Rept. No. 53, prelim.mimeo., May 1938);Alec H.Mowatt,
*SeniorityProvisionsin CollectiveAgreements,"MonthlyLaborReview, Vol. 47,
No. 8 (Dec. 1938),D. 1250;SumnerH. Slichter,
"The Contentsof collectiveAgree

ments,"TheSocietyfor the Advancement
of Management
Journal,
Vol.III,No.1
(Jan.1938),
D.14;Curtailment,
Layoff
Policy,
andSeniority
(New
York:National
Industrialconference Board, Jan. 1938).

86

88

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

interaction
of uniondemands,industryrequirements,
and management

policies;
andno matter
howtheseprovisions
arephrased,
theyrequire
muchinterpretation
inactual
operation.
Aside
fromthese
modifications,
whicharea sourceof continual
friction,
theunitin whichtheseniority

principle
is to operate
frequently
provides
furthercause
fordisagree

ment.Where
variations
inskill
requirementsexist
between
departments,
application
ofseniority
ona plant-wide
basis
naturally
implies
a sys
temof transfer
ofworkers
fromdepartment
todepartment
andrequires
a

training
program
inorder
toenable
workers
totakethejobsofthose
displaced
in theprocess
of"bumping."
Allthis,
it is claimed
byem
ployers,
results
ininefficiency
andadded
costperunitofproduct.
The
tendency
insuchcases,
particularlywhere
highly
skilled
occupations
are

involved,
istorestrict
theoperation
ofseniority
toa single
depart
mentandat times
toa single
occupation
inadepartment.
As wasstated
above,
themostfrequent
modifications
arethosewhich
provide,
insomeform,
that"ability",
"merit",
or"experience"
shallcon
stitute
thefirstprinciple
in selection
foremployment
orpromotion
and
thatseniority
shall
prevail
onlywheretheability
oftwoor morework
ersisequal.Where
suchqualifications
areintroduced,
roomisleftfor
manydisputes,
particularly
wherethe testof "ability"
is in the hands
of management
exclusively.4
Trade-unions
havetherefore
insisted
that

theyhavea voiceinrating
theemployees
andthata definite,
agreed

uponprocedure
beworked
outforsuchrating.
Insome
instances,
partic
ularly
intheskilled
occupations,
successful
performance
fora period
of
years
is usually
accepted
as proof
ofability.
Someagreements
provide
thatemployees
withexceptional
ability
or em
ployees
who,because
of their
specific
skillor ability,
are indispen
sablein a plantshouldbe exempted
fromthe application
of seniority.

Trade-unions
frequently
accede
tosuchdemands
ofemployers,
butas part
of the bargain
members
of theshopcommittees
arealsoplacedon suchex

empt
lists.
Agreements
incorporating
suchprovisions
arefrequent
inthe
automobile
industry.
The management
in each plantwill preparea separatelist
of employees,
whoin thejudgmentof the management
shouldbe
retained or recalledto work, regardlessof any other provi
sions, in orderto facilitatetooling or rearrangement
of the

plant,the takingof inventory
and the starting
of production
and similar

situations.

In the selectionof this list,length

of serviceshallbe secondaryto otherqualifications,
but
shouldbe givenreasonable
consideration.
4Mowatt,
op.cit.,pp.1254-5.

90

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

overtimeand the work-weekand workingconditions,accounting
of them.
In several mills the questionof the sen

for most

iority status of foremen who were demoted to the ranks because
of the layoffswas a seriousissue one not yet satisfactorily

settled.8

In someinstances,
thedesireof trade-unions
to distribute
theeffects

of lay-offs
moreequally
amongallworkers
attached
to aplantresulted
in a combination
of someform of distribution
of available
work with sen

iority.Forexample,
theagreement
between
theFirestone
Tire& Rubber
Company
andtheUnited
Rubber
Workers
of America
provides
that"before

laying
offinanydepartment
thehours
shall
bereduced
totwenty-four
(24)hours
perweek
foraperiod
ofeight
(8)consecutiveweeks."9
At
timesunions
havegoneoutonstrike
in order
toenforce
suchprovisions.
In October
1938theUnited
Automobile
Workers,
claiming
thatitssenior
ityagreement
hadbeenviolated,
called
a strike
inChrysler's
Plymouth
plant.The meninsisted
thattheworkweek
shouldremainat 32 hoursun

tilallpersons
on theseniority
listsshould
havebeenreemployed
when
theusual
seasonal
pick-up
inactivity
began.Atthattimethecompany

wasabout
toincrease
theworkweek
to37hours.
According
totheagree
ment,theChrysler
Company
wastodismiss
probationary
employees
first;
thenthe hourswereto be reduced
to 32 perweek;finally,
whenfurther
reduction
in thelaborforcewas necessary,
thelay-offs
wereto be made

on a seniority
basis.Theunion
contended
thatinreemployment
the re
verseorder
wastobefollowed.
Menwereto bereemployed
on thebasis
of seniority
andwork32 hoursper weekuntiltheseniority
listwas ex
10
hausted,
andthenthehours
wereto be increased.
The union was anx
iousto protect
theeligibility
oftheworkers
forreemployment,
because

extended
unemployment
mightmeanlossof statusandeventual
elimination
fromthe industry.

While
some
formof
sharing
thework
hasbeen
frequentlyused
asa modi
fication
ofseniority,
it hasa broader
function,
andsomeunions
have

usedvarious
share-the-work
plans
asa means
ofretaining
tenure
forthe
workers.
In theneedle
trades,
forinstance,
hiring
isdonethrough
the
unions,usually
fromlistsestablished
by theunions.Whena workeris

senttoashopheserves
a specified
trial
period.
Once
thetrial
period
is overhe becomes
a permanent
employee
of theshopandis thereby
en
titledto sharewithall the otherworkerswhatever
workis available.
Ba.C. Brown,op.cit.,p. 41.

This was the conclusion reached from a study in

1937 of threesteelcorporations
employingabout 100,000men in nine plants. The
study was basedon interviews
with bothmanagement
and unionofficials.
9

Agreement
Betweenthe Firestone
Tire& RubberCompanyand the UnitedRubber

Workersof America,LocalNo. 7 (Akron,Ohio,Apr.28, 1937),D. 3.

10mAuto
UnionCoolson32-Hour
Week,"
TheNewYorkTimes,
October
20,1938,D. 2.

UNION

92

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

Other
agreements
provide
fora classification
of"temporary"
employees
to
whomseniority
doesnotapply.Whenthe"temporary"
workers
acquire
a
"pertanent"
status,
however,
theyaresometimes
given
credit
fortheen

tireperiod
ofemployment.13
Classifications
of"temporary"
employees
werecreated
ina number
ofinstances
where
technological
changeswere
introduced
andattempts
weremadeto regulate
therateof introduction.
Suchemployees
wereusually
informedwhen
theywere
hired
thattheir
em

ployment
wasofa temporary
nature
andthattheywould
bethefirst
to
lose
their
jobs.Insuchinstances
theemployees
with
"permanent"
status
enjoyagreaterdegree
oftenure
security.
Seniority and the Older Worker

Usually
yearsofservice
andaccumulated
experience
coincide
to the
benefit
oftheworker,
butat times
(especially
incasesof technological
change
whenthevalueof experience
disappears)
longattachment
to a

plant
tends
rather
tobecome
related
tothedisadvantages
ofadvancing
age.

Lossof tenurefor an olderworkerfrequently
meansextremediffi

culty
infinding
otheremployment.14
Inthebuilding
trades,
whereplants
in theordinary
sense
of theworddo notexist
andwhere
attachment
toan
employer
isusually
ofa casual
nature,
special
provisions
arefrequently

made
incollective
agreements
fortheemployment
ofdefiniteproportions
of olderto youngermen. An agreement
of thePainters'
District
Council

No.9, of NewYorkCity,provides
thatanemployer
employing
10 journey
menbutlessthan20shallemploy
at least
i journeyman
aged55 years
or
over;those
employing
20 or morearerequired
to hireat least2 such

olderworkers.
Similarly
thePlasterers'
Local
No.60,ofNewYork
City,
hasanagreement
which
requires
theemployment
ofnotfewer
than10per
centof"superannuated"
menwherever
morethan10 journeymen
plasterers
areatwork.TheBricklayers'
Local
No.1, ofPhiladelphia,
Pa.,hasan
agreement
whichrequires
thatonemanin sixbe at least55 yearsold
where
lessthaneightmenareemployed
andthatoneineightbe thisage
15
where
eight
ormore
areemployed.
The New York ElectricalContractors

Association
andLocalNo.3 of theInternational
Brotherhood
of Elec

trical
Workers
signed
anagreement
onDecember
13,1939,
which
requires
13Mowatt,op.
cit.,
D. 1251.
14the
Committee
onEmployment
Problems
ofOlder
Workers
appointed
by theUnited
StatesSecretaryof Laborreportedin March 1939 that molderworkershave an ad
vantagein seniorityrules and generalpersonnelpolicy,on the whole, but when
theyare oncedisplacedby lay-offs,shut-downs,
mergers,technological
progress,
or otherimpersonalcauses,
it is verydifficultfor them tosecure reemployment.*

See"EmploymentProblems
of OlderWorkers,"
MonthlyLabor
ReviewsVol.48, NO.5

(May1939),p. 1077. See also WPA National Research Project reports in the series
"Studiesof the Effectsof IndustrialChange on LaborMarkets"and "Philadelphia
Labor Market Studies."

15mProtecting
Older
Workers,"
TheHosiery
Worker,
April
1,1938,
D.3.

UNION

94

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

engine-service
employees
withrecords
of lessthan10 yearsofservice

hadtheir
earnings
reducedby
about
one-half
from1929to1933;
those
withservice
records
of25 to20 yearsloston theaverage
only25 per
centof theirearnings;
thegroupwithlongest
service
records130years

ormore)
lostonly17 percent
on theaverage.
A similar
spread
in earn
ingsbetween
theemployees
withlongandshortservice
recordswas
found
among
station
agents,
telegraphers,
anddispatchers:
thosewithless
than10 yearsof servicesuffered
a reduction
of aboutone-third
from
1929 to 1933;the workerswith servicerecordsof 20 yearsor more in the

sameoccupational
classes
lostonly14 percent
of their
earnings.
Al
though
thedifferences
werenotso prominent
between
theyounger
and
older
maintenance
employees,
theywere
significant:
thosewith
records
oflessthan10 years
ofservice
hadtheirearnings
reduced
from40 to
45 percent;
thegroup
with25 to 29 yearsofservice
lostonly28 per
cent;thosewith30 or moreyearsof service
earned26 percent
less. The
averagelengthof serviceof all railroad
employees
was foundto have
19
doubled
between
1925and1933.
Thesefindings
showthatin therailroad
service
theposition
of older

workers
ismuchmorefavorable
thanthatof youngerworkers.
Thisisdue

toa large
extent
totheoperationof
senioritywhich
isadhered
tomore
strictly
inthisindustry
thaninanyother.These
factshavebeengen
erally
recognized
byrailroad
labor,
andvigorous
effortswere
madefor
an old-age
retirement
system
tosupplement
theseniorityarrangements.
committeea
representative
of the
Atthehearings
before
a Congressional
employees
summed
uptheposition
of therailroad
employees
inthefollow
ingway:
Without a satisfactory
retirementsystem the aged employees
are often continued

in the service

when it would be in the in

terestof economical
operation
to retireand paythempensions,
and withoutmakingthiscompulsory
on all the veryemployees
who will be most in need of the pensionon retirementwill not
have taken advantageof the benefitsof the retirementsystem.

If it be goodbusiness
judgment
to replace
worn-outand de

preciated
equipment
withnewandefficient
equipment,
it is
equally in the interestof efficientand economicaloperation
to retire employeesworn out throughlong years of serviceto

theindustry
andto bringintothe industry
an equalproportion
20
of younger
andmoreactiveemployees.
1910id.,
D.17.

200.
s.Congress,House
ofRepresentatives,
Railroad
Employees
RetirementSystem,
Hearingsbeforethe Committeeon Interstateand Foreigncommerceon H. R.9596,
73d Cong., 2d sess., June 8, 1934, p. 17.

UNION

96

POLICY

ANNUAL

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

EMPLOYMENT

CHANGE

QUARANTEES

Although
theprinciple
ofseniority
eliminates
to aconsiderable
extent
arbitrariness
in lay-off
and reemployment
andassures
a greater
degree
of

jobtenure
tothose
whohavebeenattached
toaplantfora longer
period
of time,it by no meansprovides
any promisethatsuchattachment
will

result
inanydefinite
employment
or income
security.
In fact,where

technological
changes
areaccompanied
bya reduction
inthenumber
of
jobs,
those
withleast
seniority
mayfindlittle
consolation
in thefact
thattheir
names
areat thebottom
of a seniority
roster.The realiza
tionof thefactthatjob tenurehasvalueonlywhen it provides
some

actual
advantage
in theformof income
hasprompted
someemployers
to
combine
someformof annual
employment
andincome
guarantees
withpre

ferred
tenure.
Suchguarantees
havebeenadopted
primarily
inestab
lishmentswhere
somedegree
ofstabilization
ofproductionwas
possible.
Someannual-employment
andincome-guarantee
plans
wereadopted
through
collective
bargaining;
others
wereinstituted
as partof company
per
sonnelpolicy.

Theoldest
of theunionplans,
adopted
in thewallpaper
industry
in
1894,provided
fora guarantee
offull-time
employment
for11 months
of

theyear.In1892theNational
Wall
Paper
Companywas
formed,
acquiring
control
overmostof themanufacturing
industry.
Asa result
ofthere

organization,
operations
were
suspended
in1894
fora longer
period
than
usualin orderto effectsomeeconomies.
Sincethecompanyhadno stock

on hand,
itwasforced
to yield
to themachine
printers
andcolor
mixers
who refusedto beginwork unlesstheirdemandsfor annualemployment

andannual
incame
guaranteeswere
satisfied.23
Although
theguarantees
of employment
andincome
on an annual
basis
weresuccessively
modified,
theemployers
continued
to beartherespon
sibility
fora minimum
number
ofweeksofworkor income.Atfirst
the
agreement
provided
fora guarantee
of52weeks
ofworkorfull-time
pay;
latertheguarantee
wasreduced
to 50 weeks.In 1912a basicchange
in theguarantee
tookplace.Theperiod
of guaranteed
full-time
work
or fullpaywasreduced
to 45 weeks,
butwhena worker
wasunemployed
he wasentitled
to an additional
5 weeksperyearwithhalfpay. In
1929these
provisions
werefurther
modified
andprovided
only40weeks
ofguaranteed
employment
orfull-time
paywithout
otherbenefits
incase
ofunemployment.24
23Bryce
M. Stewartand

York:
24

Others, Unemployment
Benefitsin the UnitedStates(New
Industrial
Relations
Counselors,
Inc.,1930),D. 366.

Ibid.,pp.135-8.

98

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

wasincorporated
intotheagreement.
According
to thisplan,theex
pected
volume
of business
foreachdepartment
isestimated
atthebegin
ningofeachyear.Thelabor
costforthisestimated
volume
ofworkis
budgeted
into52 weeklyallotments
for the numberof workers
which,as

pastexperience
hasindicated,
wouldbe required
to do thework.The
workweek
isfigured
at40 hours.

Ina sense,
thesecurity
involved
inthisplanisalsointended
to
stimulate
greater
output.Ifat theendof theyeara department
has
producedless
thanitsbudgeted
volume,
thenthemembers
ofthedepart
mentbecome
indebted
to produce
thatmuchworkat thefirst
opportunity.

Bonuses
arepaidifproduction
isexceeded.29
In1936theworkers
com
pleted
their
allotted
output
withmuchsaving
in time:
the dry sausagedepartment
completed
its5,280,000
poundbudgetin thirty-nine
weeks. Theoretically
theworkers
could have taken the next thirteenweeks off, with nothingto
do but
collectpay checks. Instead the company per
suadedthem to work the remainingthirteenweeksfor nine extra
pay checks as a bonus. And in all likelihoodthe department
30

budget
of production
willberaised
nextyear.
Charges
ofspeed-up
raised
a gooddealof discussion.
TheNational
Industrial
Conference
Boardhadthisto sayabouttheplan:
Another
problem
arising
outof the operation
of thestraight
time plan was that eachdepartmentdid its work faster,because
the employeeshad a certainamountof work to do, ratherthan a
certain amount of time to put in. For this reason,there was
a naturaltendencyto put more work on a department.Some of
the early agitatorschargedthat the straight-time
plan was a

speed-up,
and,findingthattherewas somejustification
for
this claim,the company31
incorporated
a bonusclausein the

straight-time
arrangement.

Since
theunionization
of theplant
theunionhasbeenactive
in set
tlinggrievances
arising
outoftheoperation
of theplan,particularly
withrespect
to workassignments.
A drawback,
fromthestandpoint
of the supervisory
group,is
thatthe grievance
committee
representatives
havebeenzealous
at alltimesin holding
thecompany
to the letter
of the agree
32
ment in respectto the work expectedof them.

TheProctor
andGambleplanguarantees
48 weeksof employment
eachyear

toallregular
employees
having
a minimum
of2 years
ofservicewith
the
company.
Thisplanhasbeenineffect,
withcertain
modifications,
since
29.AnnualWageand
Guaranteed
Employment
Plans,"
Monthly
Labor
Review,
Vol.
47,
No. 1 (July1938),p. 57.
OnTheName 18 HOR-melmFortune,Vol. XVI, No. 4 (Oct.1937),p. 138.

30.

317.Beatrice
Brower,
Assuring
Employment
orIncome
toWageEarnersA
(New York: NationalIndustrial conference Board, Apr. 1938), p. 6.
32
Ibid., D. 7.

Case Study

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

100

H. L. Nunn,
president
of thecompany,
hadthisto sayof temporary
em
ployees:
At the time we enteredinto this contractwith our workers,
the employeeswho were then with the companywere designatedas
Class A' members.
New employeeswere 'ClassB' members. The
contractwas not intendedto cover the 'ClassB' group until

the 'A'workers
andthe management
agreedthatexisting
condi
tions and the service records of the 'B' workers had made it
safe and desirable

to absorb them as 'Class A' members.

[Thetenureof 'Class
B' workers)
was indefinite
at the time
the first contract was made, and still is to a certain extent.

Underthelastcontract
the workers
andthe management
agreed
thataftera 'Class
B' member
hadbeenwiththecompany
fortwo

years
hewould
participate
inallthebenefits
ofthecontract
except
security
ofemployment.37

Thusthepermanent
employees
achieve
ameasure
oftenure
securityand
sharein thefortunes
of general
business
conditions,
whereas
thetem
porary
employees
absorb
mostof theinsecurity.
TheGeneral
Motors
Corporation
recentlyannounced
thatithassetuptwo
plans,an Income
Security
Planforallemployees
with5 yearsof service

anda Lay-off
Benefit
Planforallemployees
withmorethan2 years
but

lessthan5 years
ofservice.
TheIncome
Security
Planwillassure
a
weekly
paycheck
of 60 percent
of thestandard
weekly
earnings
based
on
a 40-hourweek.
Whentheemployee's
payfallsbelow
the60-percent
min

imum,
thecompanywill
advance
sufficient
funds
tobring
thetotal
up
totheguaranteed
level.
This
advance
ispayable
inwork
only
andwith
out interest.

Whenweekly
earnings
areover60 percent,
theemployee

willrepaytheadvance
at the rateof one-half
theexcess.The Lay-off

Benefit
Planwillguarantee
eligible
employees
40percent
ofthestandard

weekly
earnings,
except
thatthetotal
advance
islimited
toearnings
for
72 hours.38

In mostinstances
theplans
whichguarantee
employment
or income
onan
annualbasisguarantee
onlya limiteddegreeof tenure,and thatonly

to portions
of theworking
force.Temporary
employees
usually
do not
participate
inwhatever
benefits
theplans
provide.
Theconditions
under
which
thestatus
ofan employee
maybechanged
from"temporary"
to"per
manent"vary,and in someinstances
as muchas 2 yearsof serviceare

required.
Onefeature
which
distinguishes
theplans
under
collective
agreements
fromvoluntary
onesis thefactthatthetrade-unions
have
a voicein the formulation
of the plansand the conditions
of their
37H.L.Nunn,
"A NewConcept
by Capitalof
Labor's
Relationship
inIndustry,"
The
Statusof IndustrialRelations
(New York: AmericanManagement
Association,
1938),
DD. 41-2.

381939
Employe
Benefit
Plans
(General
Motors
Corporation,
Nov.1938),
pp.1-6.

102

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

1139
withinthelasttwo years.
Another
studymadeby the UnitedStates

Bureau
of LaborStatistics
in 1934indicates
thatup to April
of that
year221planshadbeenin usein theUnited
States,
including
plans
of companies
makinginformal
payments
and payments
in lieuof notice.

Of the182plans
forwhichcomplete
information
wasavailable,
only98
wereformal
plans.40
To someextent,
however,
figures
on thenumber
of
dismissal-wage
plansunderstate
theextent
towhich
workers
areafforded
thisformofcompensation;
as is thecasewithother
formsof employee
welfare,
suchplans
aremostcommonly
found
amongthelarger
companies.
Over80percent
of thecompanies
withformal
plans
studied
bytheBureau

ofLabor
Statistics
employed
1,000persons
ormore.41
Ontheother
hand,
anyattempt
at evaluation
of theextent
of coverage
requires
further
qualification,
sinceonlya portion
of theemployees
in mostconcerns
are

eligible
forsuchcompensation.
Dismissal-wage
plans,
moreover,
were
usedmoreoften
bycompanies
in nonmanufacturing
industries
which
"deal
rather
directlywith
thepublic,
andso areespeciallydesirous
of main
taining
goodpublicrelations

1142

Fewplanswerefoundto have

anyagerequirements
foreligibility
butsincemanyfirmshavelong
service
requirements,
theeffect
insuchinstances
istopaycompensation
mainly
toolder
workers.
Theminimum-service
requirement
varies
greatly
fromplant
to plant.Thestudyindicates
thatin general
long-service
employees
aremorelikely
to receive
compensation
andthatthesalaried
employees
withshortservicerecords
are morelikelyto receive
compen
43

sation
thanthewageearners
withequal
service
records.
Selected Cases

Oneofthefirst
companies
toadopt
dismissal
compensation
formanual

workerswas
theDelaware
andHudson
Railroad
Company
in1922.Inasense,
however,
thiswasnota genuine
dismissal-compensation
planbecause
the

requirement
foreligibility
stipulatedprevious
contribution
onthepart
oftheworkers
totwooutofthree
company
insurance
plans.Theplan
provided
fora payment
of$15.00
perweekto discharged
workers
fora
maximumperiod
of 6 weeks,
providing
thattheywereunemployed
during

this
period
andtheir
annual
earnings
hadbeen
over
$1,000;
payments
of
3oEverettD.
Hawkins,
Dismissal
Compensation
Plans
inBighty
Companies
(Princeton,
IndustrialRelationsSection,PrincetonUniversity,mimeo.,Dec. 1832),
See also F. BeatriceBrower,DismissalCompensation
(New York: National
Industrial
Conference
Board,Sept.1937);J. DouglasBrownand EverettD. Hawkins,
DismissalCompensation
(Princeton,
N. J.: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton
University,
mímeo.,1931).

N. J.:
p. 3.

40Everett
D.Hawkins,
D19missal
Compensation
inAmerican
Industry,"
Monthly
Lador
Review,Vol.39, No. 6 (Nov.1934),pp. 1067-8.

4110id.,
D. 1089.
42Ibid.,
pp.1088,1070.
43
Ibid.,DD.1070-1.

104

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

Theagreement
of 1936provides
fora dismissal
wageincasesof the
coordination
of facilities
of two or morecarriers
butdoesnotapplyto
consolidations
whereonlyonecarrier
is involved.
A summary
of thepro
visionsof the act follows:

(1)Eachcarrier
whocontemplates
a "coordination"
mustgiveat least
90 days'written
notice
to theemployees
affected;
within10 daysof re
ceiptof suchnotice
a conference
between
representatives
of the employ

eesandtherailroads
interested
insuch
a change
must
besetwhich
isto
beginwithin30 daysof thedateof receipt
of thenotice.

(2)Foraperiod
of5 years
fromthedateofthecoordination,
anyem
ployee
whohasbeentransferred
toa position
which
carmands
lowerearn
ingsshallreceive
thedifference
in earnings
between
thesecondandthe

first
position.
Ifinthecourse
ofthe5-yearperiod,
however,
there
becomes
available
a third
positionwhich
commands
higherearnings
than
thesecond
position
butlower
thanthefirst
andiftheemployee
doesnot
wanttoaccept
it(providing
thethird
position
doesnotrequire
a change

ofresidence
andtheemployee
isentitled
toitunder
theseniority
rules
of theworking
agreement),
heshallthenbeconsidered
as occupying
the
thirdposition;
thatis,heshallreceive,
inaddition
to hissalary
at
thesecond
position,
thedifference
between
thefirst
andthethirdin

stead
ofthedifference
between
thefirst
andthesecondpositions.
(3)Employeeswho
losetheir
positions
asa result
ofa coordination
of facilities
shallreceive
a "coordination
allowance";
thisis to be

basedon length
ofservice
andis to be equalto 60 percent
of theav
eragemonthly
compensation
of theposition
heldbyanemployee
forthe
12 months
prior
to thecoordination.
It shallbe paidfora period
of

from
6 months
to60months
according
totheemployee's
length
ofservice.
Employeeswith
less
than
1 year
ofserviceshall
receivea
lumpsum
equiv
alent
to60days'
payatthestraight-time
daily
rateoftheposition
lastheldat thetimeof thecoordination.

(4)Employees
whoelectto resign
because
theyprefer
an allowance
to
allotherbenefits
associated
withtenure
shallreceive
a lumpsum,and

this
sumistobeequivalent
tofrom3to12months'
wages,
accordingto
length
ofservice.
15)Anemployee
istobereimbursed
foralllosses
incurredbecause
of
moving
to hisnewposition,
suchas traveling
expenses
forhimself,
his

family,
andpersonal
effects
andlosses
incurredbecause
ofanunexpired
lease or sale of homeof otherreal estate.

(6)Disputes
arising
asa result
ofthis
agreement
aretobesubmitted
to arbitration.47
Footnote
47 appears
onfollowing
page.

106

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

remaining
-all long-service
- employeeswere
given
i week's
payforeach
yearof service.In thefour plantsmentioned
above,3,200weredis
placed,
509of whomreceived
dismissal
campensation
varying
from$104to

$2,088.50
Results

Twostudieshavebeenmadewhichpermitsomecommenton the practice

ofthedismissal
wage
asamethod
ofalleviating
thehardships
ofunem
ployment.
In 1928R. J.Myerstraced
theemployment
histories
ofdis

placed
cutters
intheChicagomen's
clothing
industry
fromthetimeof
their
displacement,
comparing
datafor217ofthe236whohadreceived
a
$500dismissal
wagefromtheHart,Schaffner,
andMarxCompany
in 1926
with153other
cutters
thrown
onthelabor
market
without
a compensatory
allowance.51Thosein thefirstgrouplostan average
of 5 monthsbefore

getting
regular
employment;
thoseinthesecond
grouplost5.8months.
It is believed
thatthediscrepancy
wouldhavebeengreater
ifa number
hadnotusedtheir
dismissal
wagetotakea vacation.
After
thelapse
of

several
years,
25percent
ofboth
theformer
Hart,
Schaffner,
andMarxem
ployees
andtheother
cutters
werereemployed
intheindustry
either
as

cutters
ortailors;
7.4percent
oftheHart,
Schaffner,
andMarx
cutters
and6.5percent
of theothercutters
werestillseeking
work;therest
werespread
overa variety
ofoccupations.
Over46 percent
oftheformer
Hart,
Schaffner,
andMarxcutters
andover45 percent
oftheother
group

were
earning
less
than
formerly.
Thefollowing
conclusions
were
drawn:
Practically
thesameproportion
ofboth
groups
hadgone
back
totheirold
occupations
inChicago;
thedistribution
among
other
occupationswas
sim
ilarforbothgroups;
theformer
Hart,
Schaffner,
andMarxemployees
lost
somewhat
lesstime,on theaverage,
inobtaining
regular
jobs;andthey
weresomewhat
moresuccessful
inreadjusting
themselves.

In1930
Clague
andCouper
oftheYale
Institute
ofHuman
Relations
made
a studyofworkers
displaced
by theclosing
oftwoUnited
States
Rubber

Companyplants
inNewEngland.
Foroneoftheseplants,
which
shut
down
on April
6,1929,
those
receiving
a dismissal
wage(allpersons
45 years
of ageor overwith10 yearsor moreof service
andall persons
with15

yearsor moreofservice
regardless
of ageweregiven
i week's
payfor
eachyearof service)
werecompared
withthosenotreceiving
it. Of the

97 whohadreceived
dismissal
compensation,
90 wereinterviewed.
The
amounts
theyhadreceived
varied
from$137to$2,088.Losses
in earn
ingswereheavy;
in1929-30
theyearly
earnings
of themenwereonly40
50Brown
andHawkins,
op.cit.,DD.17-8.
51myers,
loc.cit.

CHAPTER

VI

UNION INTEREST IN MANAGERIAL PROBLEMS

Theinformation
presented
inthepreceding
chapters
hasshown
thatbe
hindmanyof theadjustments
providing
somemeasure
ofsecurity
forthe
workersinvolved
therelay the interest
of bothmanagement
and organ

izedlaborinpreventing
theresentment
against
insecurity
occasioned
by
changes
in techniques
fromcrystallizing
intoopposition
tochange
of any
kind.Fromthestandpoint
of management,
optimum
performance
bylabor

under
changing
conditions
ofproduction
frequently
required
notmerely
labor's
"grudging
submission"
to managerial
policies
butalsoitsactive

interest
intheir
execution.
Suchparticipation
inthesolution
ofman
agerialproblems
hasbeenespecially
important
ininstanceswhere
thein
troduction
ofnewtechniques
involved
thechanging
ofshopcustoms
and
rules
evolved
through
collective
bargaining.
Trade-unions
havegenerally
cometo recognize,
moreover,
thatquestions
of employment,
wagerates,
workloads,
jobtenure,
andallother
working
conditions
cannot
bedealt

with
effectively
under
collective
bargainingwithout
considering
thegen
X

eraleconomic
context
ofeachindustry,
particularlywhen
theindustry
is
a highly
competitive
one. In brief,interest
in efficient
management
and
inregulation
of undesirable
competitive
practices
in industry
asawhole
andthedesire
to regulate
technological
change
through
collective
bar

gaining
have
served
tointerest
trade-unions
inmanagerial
problems.
To a considerable
extent,
also,trade-union
interest
in managerial

problems
developed
inresponse
tothespread
of"employee
representation"
after the World War. In the face of intensified
mechanization
in indus

tryanda widespread
application
of"scientific
management"
andeffi

ciency
engineering
inthemass-production
industries,
employers
found
the
employee-representationschemes
flexible
instruments
forinitiating
and
maintaining
theworkers'
interest
inmanagerial
problems.
Management
contended
thattrade-unions
areexclusively
protective
organizations
and
that"restriction
ofoutput"
isinherent
intheir
functions,
notonlybe

cause
oftheir
occasional
outright
opposition
totechnological
changes
butalsobecause
theirnumerous
rulesandregulations
on everyphase
of
shopconduct
hamper
management
in itsdriveforlowerunitcosts. To
1Lewis
L. Lorwin,
TheAmerican
Federation
oflabor(Washington,
D. C.:

The

BrookingsInstitution,
1933),pp. 201-21.

2These
arguments
werequite
general
evenbefore
theWorld
War.They were

particu

larlypronounced
duringthe struggleof organized
laboragainstcertainfeaturesof
"scientificmanagement"in the early part of this century,and were crystallized
during the investigationof the United States Commission on Industrial Relations in
1914

and 1915.

See RobertF. Hoxle,Scientific
Management
and Labor(NewYork:

D. Appleton and Co., 1916), DD. 15-7.
108

110

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

of collective-bargaining
relations
a largevariety
of activities
has
at one time or anotherbeen includedunderit. In theprinting
industry,

forexample,
itmeant
anagreement
between
theInternational
Printing
Pressmen's
andAssistants'
Unionandtheemployers
whichprovided
for

joint
apprenticeship
training,
advanced
training
under
union
direction
exclusively,
anda consulting
service
provided
bytheunion
tocampanies
withwhichit hadagreements.
In thepulpandsulphite
paper-making
industry
in Maineitconsisted
of jointparticipation
in an accident
prevention
program.
Intheelectrical
industry
theInternational
Broth
erhood
ofElectrical
Workers
andtheemployers
maintained
a Joint
Council

onIndustrial
Relations
forthesettlement
ofdisputes,
andinNewYork
theunionmadea survey
of thekindsof electrical
installations
con

tractors
werepermitting
andsupplied
advice
onstandards
ofworkmanship
andeconomical
methods
forinstallations.
Inthefull-fashioned
hosiery
industry
itinvolved
arbitration
ofdisputes,
theestablishment
andmain
tenance
of production
standards,
and"servicing"
theindustry,
thatis,

sending
inexpert
workers
toteach
theless
skilled
howto
getbetter
production.
Theinterest
oftheInternational
Photo-Engravers'
Union
in
managerial
problems
issaidtoconsist
of a union-financed
research
de
partment
which
actsasa clearing
house
fortechnical
information
andas
a testing
ground
fornewideas,
witha full-time
directorwhose
services
are available
to employers
as well as to members.The International

Ladies'
Garment
Workers
Union's
interest
inmanagerialproblems
consists
of participation
in a jointprocedure
forsetting
piece
ratesand uti
lization
of expert
engineering
service
forthispurpose.
In maritime
shipping
on thePacific
Coastitconsists
of an agreement
between
the
International
Longshoremen's
Association,
Pacific
Coast
District,
andthe
respective
employer's
association
for jointcontrol
andfinancing
of the

hiring
halls,
provided
thatthepersons
incharge
ofdispatching
mento
theirjobsbeselected
bytheunion.4
Thustherange
ofactivities
said
to be indicative
of thechanges
incollective
bargaining
is quite
varied
andincludes
problems
oftraining,
expert
service,
shopdiscipline,
rate

setting,
determination
ofstandards
ofoutput,
and,
ingeneral,
improve
mentsin productivity.

Thereport
oftheExecutive
Council
oftheAmerican
Federation
ofLabor,
presented
at theannual
convention
of theFederation
in 1925,
analyzed
4w1111am
Green,
"RecentTrend
intheorganized
Labor
Movement,"
TheAnnals
ofthe
AmericanAcademyof Politicaland SocialScience,
Vol. CXLIX, No. 238 (May 1930),

Part I, The

Second Industrial Revolution and Its Significance, " DD. 189-90;

CharlesB. Coates,
"TheUnionof Tomorrow,"
FactoryManagement
and Maintenance,
Vol.98,No.9 (Sept.1938),
DD.42-4;MarvelKeller,
Decasualization
of Longshore

WorkinSan
Francisco
(WPANational
ResearchProject,
ReportNo.1-2,
Apr.1939),
12-3.

PD.

112

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

any previousauthoritative
utterancesby Americantrade union

leaders,
and,in respect
to industrial
management
andresearch,
place Americantrade unionismin advanceof labor in any Euro
pean country,so far as my knowledgegoes.

Regarding
theimplications
ofthispolicywith
respect
toincreased
productivity,
Sumner
H.Slichter
stated:
Public opinionin this country has been tolerantof the em
ployerwho refusedto deal with organized
labor becausethe man
in the street
rightlyor wrongly has felt that unions took

insufficient
interest
in production
and weretoo disposed
to

practice
restrictive
policies.
If it now appearsthat unions
are both able and willingto rendersubstantialassistanceto
management
in increasing
output
andreducing
costs,
theopen

shop employersof the countryare likelyto be faced with an
ever more insistentdemand thatthey recognizeunionsand ac

cept
their
offer
ofcooperation.8
Thus,in spite
of themanifold
meanings
thatwereattached
to thegrowth
of trade-unions'
interest
in managerial
problems,
the attempt
to arouse

theworkers'
interest
inincreasing
productivity
andreducing
unit
costs
stands
outas thecentral
objective
of thepolicy.Inspecific
instances
themeansforachieving
thisobjective
arevaried
andmayassume
many
forms. In 1927theExecutive
Councilof the American
Federation
of La

borlisted
thefollowing
activities
of unions
as representative
of the
neworientation:
Maintenance
of agencies
to interpret
collective
agree

ments,
arbitration
based
onresearch,
joint
determination
ofproduction
standards,
joint
plans
foreducating
craftsmen,
union
supervision
of
production,
andjoint
committees
toconsider
improvements
inoperating
efficiency.
Oneof theunions
whichenlarged
itsscopeofcollective-bargaining
relations
to include
managerial
functions
is theAmalgamated
Clothing
Workers
of America.
Inthemiddle
1920's
thisunion
embarked
upona pol
icyofassisting
oneof thelargest
firmsin theclothing
industry,
the
Hart,
Schaffner,
andMarxCompany,
toreorganize
itsproduction
on amore
efficient
basis;
theobject
wasto enable
thecompany
to changeto a
lower-priced
lineofgarments
andthereby
improve
itscampetitive
position
withrespect
to nonunion
competitors
whowerecatering
tothegrowing
de
mandforcheaper
clothing.
Thecharacter
of thechanges
involved
andthe

degree
towhichtheunion
helped
to install
themareexemplified
in the
agreement
between
theunion
andthecampany,
known
as the" X-Construction
Plan",
whichwasintroduced
in oneshopin 1925andwaslaterextended
?Ibid.,pp. 249–50.

8Bulletin
of-the
Taylor
Society,
Vol.XI,No.1 (Feb.
1926),
D.3.
9

Jean C. Trepp,Union-Managementcooperationand the southern OrganizingCam
(oct. 1933),D. 807.

paign," The Journalof Political
Economy,Vol.41, No.

114

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

efficient
productionmethods.
Thefirmwas
subsequently
putonasound
basis,
anditsmanager
is quoted
assaying:
" I wouldn't
haveattempted
to reorganize
the plantwithout
their help. They know more about piece rates and production
methods than any single factor in the industry. But, above

all,theyhandlethe humanproblem,
the problem
of getting
our
1,400 employeesto give their best to the job far betterthan
we could.
We've increasedwages steadily. They've increased
production. We'vebeenableto lowerpriceswithout
cutting
qualityone whit. our inventories
are no highernow than last
12
year and we've had no lay-offs."

Inoneinstance
a firmwasinsuchbadfinancial
shapethatitsbankre
fusedto extendfurther
credit.The unionstepped
in andthrough
itsown

bankarranged
fora loanwhich
enabled
thefirmtostay
inbusiness,13
Thethorough
familiarity
oftheunionwith
managerial
problems
enabled
it in1928to openupitsownplant
in Milwaukee
inanattempt
to induce

a nonunion
firmtodealwith
theunion.
A companywhich
hadbeendealing
withtheunion
triedtoinaugurate
an open-shop
policy;
thisresulted
in
a lock-out
ofabout800employees.
Theunion's
decision
to openitsown
plant
wasbotha financial
expedient
andan organizational
tactic.The
employment
of 235of thelocked-out
workers
madeit possible
to reduce
thedrainon union
funds
because
ofthepayment
ofunemployment
benefits,

while
theunion's
competitionserved
aspressure
onthecompany
toresume
collective-bargaining
relations.
Theplant
wasopenedby
theunion
asa
contractor
forHart,
Schaffner,
andMarx.Theunion
receivedbundles
of
cutgoods
fromthecompany
andwasincomplete
control
overallphases
of
management.14

Thedifferent
phases
of managerial
functions
in whichtheAmalgamated
Clothing
Workers
hasbeenengaged
at various
timesincluded
thefollow
ing:Services
ofexpert
technicians
tounion
employers,
introduction
of
production
standards
andpiecework,assumption
of responsibility
for
discipline,
extension
of credit,
andadvice
on theinstallation
of new

machinery
andefficient
production
methods
andontheregularizationof
production.
Theunion's
position
inregard
tosuchcooperation
isstated
by oneof itsofficials
as follows:
The question has been raised in this conference:

How

can

a

unioncooperate
withmanagement
in increasing
efficiency
and
productionwithoutaddingto the alreadydistressingsituation
of making the workers so productivethat they produce them
selves out of jobs?

12Coates,
op.cit.,
D.43.
13Cooper,
op.cit.,
D.83.
14 Ibid., pp. 94-5 .

It is a veryproperquestion
to ask and

116

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

astowhatwasto be accomplished.
Thecooperative
relationshipwas
to

evolve
intheprocess
ofsolving
day-to-day
shopproduction
problems
as
they arose. Thegeneral
objectivewas
toimprove
operating
conditions
in
17
theshop. Later
theplanwasextended
to alltheB.& 0. shops.

Themechanism
forcooperation
wasthesameas thatforcollective
bar
gaining
- theregular
shopcommittee.
Untilthistimethefunctions
of
thiscommittee
wereto takeupwiththemanagement
grievances
regarding

working
conditions
andenforcement
ofshoprules.
These
functionswere
retained
by thecommittee.
However,
theproblems
of running
theshop

fromtheproduction
anglewere
notdiscussed
atthesamemeetings
aswere
thegrievances.
Separate
"round
table"
conferences
wereheld,
andpro
posals
weremadebothby management
andunionrepresentatives
forthe

improvement
ofoperating
conditions.18
Thesuggestions
discussed
at
theseconferences
concerned
installations
of newcranesto eliminate
much

strenuous
lifting,
construction
of a rackfortools,
better
routing
of

materials,
jobanalysis
andstandardization,
installation
ofsafetyde
vices,
andotherproblems
dealingwith
efficient
operation.
Theconditions
forcooperation
were
theregularization
andimprovement
of employment
andtheevolving
ofsomemethod
by meansof whichworkers
wouldsharein thebenefits
ofsuchcooperation
through
somefinancial

gains.
Regularity
ofemployment
wastobeaccomplished
byabolishing
the
"contracting
out"
system
andplanning
aprogramfor
therebuildingof
lo
comotives
andcars.Mr.Beyer
regarded
theregularization
ofemployment
as thechiefrequisite
forsuccessful
cooperation:
Frankly, it is fatuousto expect intelligentworkmen in this

day andageto becomeenthusiastic
aboutincreased
production,
the elimination
of waste,or greatershopefficiency,
if the
net result is to throw them out of work that much sooner,

even

19

if onlytemporarily.

Therewasno definite
planon themethod
of sharing
financial
gains.
It wasclaimedbothby the management
and the unionsinvolved,
however,

thatearnings
wereimproved
andthatovertime
payforSunday
workwas
restored.
Insomeinstances
thebenefits
wereto beshared
in theform
of vacations
withpay. There
is nodefinite
information
as to themagni
tudeandexact
nature
ofthese
gains.20
170tto
s. Beyer,
"Experiences
withcoöperation
Between
Labor
andManagement
in the
Railway
Industry,"Wertheim Lectureson IndustrialRelations,1928 (Cambridge,
Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1929), DD. 10-1, 27.

See also Selig Perlman and

PhilipTaft,History
of Laborin the United
States,
1898–1932
(TheMacmillan
Co.,
1935),vol. IV, "LaborMovements,D.

582.

18Beyer,
op.cit.,
p.18.
19Idid..
D. 13.
20

°Louis
A.Wood,
Union-Management
Coöperation
ontheRailroads
(NewHaven,
Conn.:

Yale University Press, 1931), pp. 233-50.

118

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

although
hired
bythecompany,
wasengagedwith
theapproval
ofa union
22
official.?

The researchcommittee's
procedure
in settingup job standards
was

unique.Afteran operation
hadbeendecided
uponforstudy,
a union
delegate
andtheoverseer
oftheroomconcerned
jointly
selected
a number

ofaveragemen
forstudy.
Whenstandards
hadbeen
set,theunion
repre
sentative
explained
totheoperatorthe
standardpractice
agreed
uponand
requested
thattheoperator
explain
anydifficulties
thathe mighten
counter.
After
thejobwasthussetandchecked,
itwassubject
tore
viewby thewasteeliminationcommittee.
This,however,
didnotinvolve
anyvoting;
infact,jointagreement
was notrequired.
Thetechnician

usuallypresentedthe
figures
foreach
jobstandard,
andboth
sides
could
offer
criticism
andobjections.
Itwasuptotheengineer
todecide
whether
anyofthecriticisms
orobjections
should
begiven
anyweight
andhowmuchweight.In otherwords,
thefunction
of thecommittee
as
23

awholewasconsultative,
andthetechnician
hadthefinalsay..

Inthiscase,too,thequestion
ofemployment
guarantee
isconsidered
bythetechnician
asoneofthechief
problems
inthesuccessful
partici
pation
ofworkers
in measures
designed
to increase
theirproductivity.
Mr. Goodellstatedthat

anycompany
desiring
to enlist
thegenuine
cooperation
of its
employees must safeguard their jobs. No group of American
workmenwill help you saw off the limb on which they are sit

ting.Buttheywill
helpyousavethetree.24
In actuality
theresults
didnotcompletely
protect
theworkers'
jobs.
Manyworkers
weredismissed
andothers
weredemoted
to lessfavorable
positions.
Theseniority
rulesof theunion
agreements
generally
pro

tected
theworkerswith
longer
service
records.
Thecompany
also
adopted
theplanof hiring
employees
on a temporary
basis
onlyduring
theperiod
of change.To a largeextentdismissals
wereconfined
to thesetemporary

employees.25
Thesavings
achieved
bythemanagement
as a result
of thechange
were
substantial,
oneestimate
placing
suchsavings
at $230,000
a yearin
direct
laborcosts.According
to estimates,
theresults
of thechange
showedthatexpenses
involved
in thejointresearch
werepaidforby the
22Franc18
Goodell,
"JointResearch The Technician'sPoint of View," American
Federationist,
Vol.37, No. 3 (Mar. 1930),DD. 293-4.
237
Ibid., pp. 294-5.

2410id.,
D.298.

25R1chmond
C.Nyman,
Union-Management
Coöperation
inthe"Stretch
Out"
(NewHaven,
Conn.:
Yale University

Press, 1934),

pp. 75-7.

120

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

Committee
of theCongress
ofIndustrial
Organizations.
Thepamphlet
sug

gests
that
undercertain
conditions
local
shoporganizationsmaytake
the
initiative
in developing
cooperation
withmanagement
for"better
prac
tices"withthe objective
of wasteelimination.
In thefirstinstance,
theunioncautions
thelodgesnotto beginanything
unless
collective
bar

gaining
hasbeen
securely
established
onacontractual
basis.
"Theunion
maythenappoint
a Research
Committee.
Thisshould
be,in mostcases,
entirely
separate
anddistinct
fromthecommittees
or officials
engaged
in negotiating
about
wagesor grievances.
Itshould
be composed
of men
whohavea knackforhandling
factsandfigures,
andof menwhohave

ideas
about
betterways
ofdoing
things."
Thecommittee
istostudy
the
problem
of whether
thereis a possibility
fortheimprovement
of shop
practices
for the benefitof bothemployer
andworker. If

there seems

to be any chanceof thatsort,thenthe committee
is to reportto the

union's
governing
bodyandobtain
approval.
Theemployer
should
thenbe
sounded
out,andthefollowing
typeof agreement
should
beconcluded:
1.

Theunion
agrees
toco-operate
withthemanagement
in order
to reducecosts,enlargesales,improvequalityand in gen
eral to advancethe interestsof the industry.

2.

Themanagement
agrees
to shareequitably
withthe unionany
benefitsso obtained,in the form of increasedemployment,
better working conditions,increasedwages or decreased
hours.

3.

Nobody is to lose his job as a result of any improvement
that is installed. If ways are discoveredto do more work

with less labor,they are to be put in gradually,and then
only with the consent of the union. They must be installed
as for
in such a way that no discharges are necessary

instance
at a timewhensalesandoutputareincreasing.
4.

The research must be truly joint in every respect.

All

facts and plansare to be revealedto the union committee,
and its understanding
and consentmust be obtainedat every
30
step.

Although
thereis noinformation
on howthisplanis actually
operat

inginspecific
instances,
itsexposition
oftheproblems
involved
isof
special
interest.
Thereis someinformation
as to the extentof its
adoption
by employers.
According
to an article
published
recently,
an

official
oftheSteel
Workers
Organizing
Committee
reports
thatofthe
541employers
under
contracts
withtheunion,
30 percent
haveconcluded
or begun
negotiations
toputintoeffect
intheir
plants
theprogram
out
31
linedabove."

30Production
Problems
(Pittsburgh,
Pa.:SteelWorkersOrganizingCommittee,Pub.
No. 2), pp. 4-5.

31Harold
J. Ruttenberg,
"TheStrategy
of Industrial
Peace,"
Barvard
Business
Review,Vol. XVII,No. 2 (Winter1939),pp.175-6.

122

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

Although
thisadvice
wasnotadhered
to in allinstances,
thebasic
needs
oftheworkers,
namely,
employment
andincome
security,
nevertheless
con
stituted
a limitto thedegree
to whichtheirinterest
in managerial
problems
couldbesecured.
"Forworkers",
inthewords
ofWilliam
Green,
"cannot
wholeheartedly
cooperate
to improveefficiency
if theyhaveno

share
intheresults
andif,byincreasing
production
andeliminating
waste,
theysucceed
onlyinworking
themselves
outof a job."33
Inthe
cases
where
trade-unions
haveparticipated
inthesolution
ofmanagerial

problems,
theproblem
ofemployment
andincome
security
hasbeenvari
ouslyapproached.

In thefirstplace,
thereweretheprovisions
for regularization
of
production
andemployment.
In themen'sclothing
industry
an attempt
wasmadeto attract
a lineof lower-priced
clothes
intounionshops.
In thehosiery
industry,
aswellas inclothing,
improvements
in effi

ciency
inindividualplantsweremade
with
theobjective
ofenabling
union
plants
to operate
incompetition
withnonunion
plants.In therepair
shops
oftheB.& O.,abolition
ofthecontracting-out
systemwas
to pro
videmoreregular
employment.
TheSteelWorkers
Organizing
Committee
requires
thatagreements
forwaste
elimination
provide
thatnooneshould
losehisjobas a result
of anytechnological
change.In theNaumkeag
Cotton
Mills
an attempt
wasmadeto confine
dismissals
to temporary
em
ployees.
Inmostinstances,
someformofregularization
ofemployment
or
assurance
thatno dismissals
wouldresultfromtheworkers'
participation

inthesolution
of managerial
problems
wasofparamount
importance.
Second,
although
provisions
fordefinite
methods
ofsharing
theecon
omiesof increased
productivitywere
rare,therewassufficient
indi

cation
that
trade-unions
have
considered
suchprovisions
important.
In
themen's
clothing
industry
andontherailroads
themainfinancial
gains
weretocomefromimprovements
inemployment.
TheAmalgamated
Clothing
Workers
of America
negotiated
specific
agreements
forunemployment
in
surance
anddismissal
compensation
initsvarious
markets.
TheSWOCplan

stipulates
that
definite
proportions
forthesharing
oftheeconomies
be
provided
inevery
agreement
forwaste
elimination.
During
the1920's
whentheAmerican
Federation
of Laborworked
out
itspolicy
of union-management
cooperation,
it alsodeveloped
its"so
cialwage"
theory,
whichwastobe partof theentirepolicy,
andthe
33w111iam
Green,LaborandDemocracy
(Princeton,
N. J.:

Princeton University Press,
1939), pp. 106-8. That security ofemployment and income is basic in any effort
to gain the workers' interest inmanagerial problems has been stated by other labor

leaders (see Morris L. Cooke and Philip Murray, OrganizedLabor and Production

1940],D. 221; and idney Hillman,"The Promiseof
[New York: Harper& Brothers,

American
Labor,TheNewRepublic,
25thanniv,no.(Nov.8,1939),Pt.Two,D. 63.

124

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

employment
opportunities
wererelatively
abundant,
plans
forunionparti
cipation
inthesolution
of managerial
problemswere
discussed
everywhere.
Withtheadvance
of thedepression
therewasa lullin theenthusiasm.
Nodoubt
thelargevolume
of unemployment
madeitdifficult
to gainthe
workers'
interest
inwaste
elimination
andincreased
productivity,
par
ticularly
whentheirjobswereat stake.In an articlepublished
in
August1933,Mr.Beyer,hitherto
an enthusiastic
advocate
of union
management
cooperation,
almost
sounded
a noteofdespair.
The scientificevidenceavailable,in short, reveals that

oth the immediate
and long-range
effectof unemployment
in
industry,
especially
thattyperesulting
fromtechnological
causes,i.e.,introduction
of labor-saving
machinery,consoli

dation
of facilities,
transfer
of work,application
of so-called
scientificmanagementdevicesand the like, is the generation
of attitudesand methodson the part of industrialworkersde

signedto protect
themselves
against
theencroachments
of unem
ployment. It is the contention of all those who have studied
the phenomenon
conscientiously,
that this situationis far more
seriousthan is ordinarilyappreciated,
that it does not make
for the best in the employee as a member of society,nor for
his best as an employeeof industry.It is conducive, in short,
to antisocial character traits which reflect themselves in the
35

performance
of industry.

Thus
success
orfailure
insecuring
trade-union
cooperation
toimprove
production
efficiency
doesnotdepend
on trade-union
policy
alone.The
insecurity
withwhichworkers
in industry
arefaced,
particularly
peri
odicmassunemployment,
reacts
on individualworkers
andtendsto evoke
attitudes
whichresult
in inefficiency
andwaste,
regardless
of trade
union
policy.38
To theextent
thattechnological
changes
havecontrib
utedto thefeeling
of economic
insecurity,
theworkers'
resentment
against
lossofskill,
employment,
andearnings
hasfrequently
developed
intoopposition
tothechanges
themselves.
On theotherhand,
theadop
tion of measureswhich have tended to reassureworkers in the face of

technological
changes
andto aidthemin themaking
of difficult
adjust
mentshastended
to remove
theiropposition
to change.

Finally,
union
interest
in managerial
problems
couldnotbe secured
unlessthe employers
accorded
the unionsfullrecognition
and assured

their
status
ascollective-bargaining
agencies
fortheworkers
involved.
In fact,
in industries
where
highly
competitive
conditions
prevailed
be
tweenunionand nonunion
shops,trade-unions
frequently
aidedmanagement
35

PottoS. Beyer,"Unemployment
and the Moraleof Industry,"AmericanFederationist,
Vol.40, No. 8 (Aug.1833),D. 862.

36stanley
B.Mathewson,
Restriction
ofOutput
Among
Unorganized
Workers
(NewYork:
The Viking Press, 1931), D. 210.

126

UNION

POLICY

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE

By theintroduction
andmaintenance
of approximately
uniform
labor
standards
on an industry-wide
basis,
or onthebasis
of thatsegment
of

an industrywhich
operates
inthesamecompetitive
market,
collective
bargaining
hassought
to remove
labor
standards
fromthefieldof com

petition.
Totheextent
that
thishasbeenpossible
inindividual
indus
tries,
opportunities
fortheadoption
ofmeasuresdesigned
tocounteract
theinsecurities
resulting
fromtechnological
changes
haveincreased,
and,consequently,
thescopeof unioninterest
in managerial
problems
has
beenenlarged.

38[Con.]which
isatpresent
engaging
theattention
ofagreatmany
Governments.
It is a matter of immediate concern both to workers and to employers. The object
of the procedureis to give all the workersand all the employersof an industry
the benefit of the same conditions of labour

implying the same conditions of

operation- which the employers'and workers'organisations
have established
by
spontaneous collective bargaining.

The organised workers have thus a guarantee

that the standardof livingfixedby collectiveagreementwill not be undermined
by unorganised
workersacceptinglowerwages,and the employers
are similarlypro
tectedagainstunfaircompetitive
practices
as regardslabourconditions."(Ital
ics in original.)

UNION POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

128

Page

General Motors Corporation
Glass

Bottle
Canada

Blowers

100

' Association

of the

United

States

and

13-4,15-6,18-9,39-40,77

56
Glass Workers of America, Federation of Flat
Glass Workers Union, National Window
6,11,40
Glass Workers' Union of North America, American Flint.. 15-6,67
Goodrich, B. F., Company
86

H

Hart, Schaffner & Marx
Hormel, Geo. A.,

&

32-3,105,106,112-3,114

Company

97-8

35-6,
Hosiery Workers, American Federation of
45-8,61-6,87,110,115,122
I
Interstate

Commerce

Commission

103

Iron,Steel, and Tin Workersof America,Amalgamated
Association

53,80

of ..
K

Kellogg Company

82-4
L
110

Longshoremen's
Association,
International
M

55-6,115
Machinists, International Association of
Maine Central Railroad Company
43-4
76
Mechanized Mining Commission
Mine Workers of America, United
29,30,60–1,75-6,80,91
6,
12,14-5,52-3,81

Molders'Union of North America,International
N

Nash Company(Cincinnati
) ....
National

Bituminous

Coal

113

National Board of Jurisdictional
National
National

60-1,78

Commission

Founders
Association
Industrial
Conference

Awards

16

Board

.

21-3
81-2

National Railroad Adjustment Board
National Research

Project

National Wall Paper Company
Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company

12,14-5
84-5,98

98-7

36-8,117-9,121,122,123

New York, New Haven and HartfordRailroadCompany,The
Nunn-Bush Shoe Company

43-4
99-100

P

Packing House Workers, United

97-8

Painters,Decorators,and Paperhangersof America,
Brotherhood of, District Council No. 9

92

THE LIBRARYOF THE

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71940

UNIVERSITY
OFILLINOIS