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STATEMENT ON
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL INTERSTATE BANKING

PRESENTED TO THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSURANCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS

BY

WILLIAM R. WATSON
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

10:00 a.m.
Thursday, April 25, 1985
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2128

Mr. Chairman:
I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify on behalf of the FDIC
before

the

Subcommittee

on

Financial

Institutions

Supervision,

Regulation

and Insurance on various issues relating to interstate banking.

We are all
for some time.

aware that

limited d£ facto interstate banking has existed

Entry to this market basically has been limited to the larger

banks and bank holding companies, and has been accomplished in large measure
by

establishing

offices

or

subsidiaries

that

do

not

in their name or possess federal deposit insurance.
ties normally do not perform the full

have

the word

"bank"

These interstate facili­

range of banking activities,

but do

provide a means for out-of-state banking organizations to compete in segments
of

local

banking markets.

They are known by such names as loan production

offices, mortgage companies, consumer finance companies and Edge Act Corpora­
tions.
nies,

Additionally, many industrial

banks are owned by bank holding compa­

and many of these are insured by the FDIC.

To provide a measure of

the magnitude of this activity, a 1983 study conducted by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta
organizations.
tocompete

for

correspondent

identified approximately 7,600 interstate offices of banking
Moreover,

a physical market presence is not always necessary

banking

services;

credit

card

banking

services

currently

and

are

other loans

the

and

best examples,

various
although

advances in technology may significantly increase the importance of consumer
electronic banking.

More
have

recently,

emerged.




two

First,

other

the

vehicles

willingness

for
of

entry

the

FSLIC

into interstate
to

arrange

markets

interstate

-

2-

acquisitions of troubled savings and loan associations by bank holding compa­
nies provides an opportunity for banking organizations to acquire interstate
subsidiaries that have very liberal deposit and investment authority.

However,

the activity that has received the most attention and raised the most contro­
versy is the nonbank bank.
tages

over

the

to interstate

more

Although the nonbank bank option does have advan­

limited

banking

service

facilities,

their

is grossly overemphasized.

importance

relative

Their importance probably

relates more to the ability of nonbank firms to own entities that are called
banks

and

are

do

not

think

is

a more

eligible

for

nonbanking

significant

federal

ownership
departure

deposit

insurance.

of banks should
from

perceived

While

I personally

present any problem,

tradition

than

the

it

use of

nonbank banks as a vehicle for interstate expansion.

All
full

of

the

service

existing

banking

that would not exist

interstate

facilities,
if full

options

and

are

undoubtedly

imperfect
result

interstate banking existed.

substitutes

in

for

inefficiencies

The economics of

this situation argue for unlimited interstate banking, and the signals provided
by

the

market

indicate

its

inevitability.

The

only

substantive

questions

relate to when and how.

Interstate banking, whether on a regional or national basis, has a variety
of

potential

benefits

that

undoubtedly

are

familiar

to

this

Subcommittee.

Removal of barriers to entry generally serve to increase competition, reduce
prices and improve the quality of products available to users of bank services;




-3this

should tend to be beneficial

to local banking markets.
nity to reduce

to consumers

and others who are limited

Moreover, geographic expansion affords an opportu­

risk through diversification of deposit sources and lending

opportunities.

Rather than dwell on the virtues of interstate banking opportu­

nities,

direct the remainder of my comments to the purpose of this

I will

testimony,

first

focusing

on

the

general

area

of geographic

expansion

and

then on the regional pact concept.

As the deposit insurer, one of our major concerns relates to the effects
of

interstate

the

banking

system as

on

the

a whole.

As

safety and
indicated

soundness of individual

earlier,

geographic

banks and

expansion

should

afford the opportunity to diversify and to reduce risks.

Although the benefits

of

disregarded,

geographic

the

most

lending

significant

a more

stable,

number

of

retail

banks

diversification
risk

reduction

for

not

for many

deposit base.

compete

should

be

banks

derives

from

perhaps
building

While this may mean that an increased

a relatively

fixed

amount

of

retail

deposits

in local markets, it could result in a reduction in the extreme funding vulner­
ability of a few institutions.

There

is

always

the

danger that

banks

or

bank

holding

companies may

be willing to pay unjustifiable premiums to gain an early entry into selected
markets.

While mistakes

acquisitions
a

significant

gained

in

and

the

accounting

deterrent

evaluating

undoubtedly will

the

to

treatment

unwise

potential

be made,
of

decisions.
of

the

premiums

need
paid

Moreover,

out-of-state

as

markets,

to capitalize
should

experience
the

to pay a price above the economic value of a franchise should diminish.




provide
is

tendency

-4Perhaps the greatest

risk to the

insurance fund of interstate

banking

emanates from the probable increased number of "large" banks and the potential
for a significantly increased size of the largest banks.
more importantly,

the practical

that larger failed or failing

The statutory and,

restraints placed on the FDIC normally mean
bank situations are more difficult to handle

than small to moderate sized banks, and can result in a proportionately larger
exposure

to loss.

However,

if it is accompanied
be

a

larger

which

number

may more

than

in a world of interstate

banking,

by strong antitrust enforcement,
of eligible

potential

counterbalance

the

acquirors

negative

particularly

there probably would
in any

effects

of

size

category,

increased

bank

size.

There also are other important public policy issues raised by interstate
banking.

One fear that frequently is raised

banks in such an environment.
banks,

The evidence we have seen suggests that small

at least those that are well-managed,

out-of-state

competitors.

relates to the fate of small

Available

will

evidence

not be hurt by entry of

suggests

that

economies

of

scale above a reasonably small asset size are not significant, and that smaller
institutions
banks.
utes,

generally

have

better

returns

than

regional

and money center

Moreover, in states that have long-standing statewide branching stat­
small

independent

banks

continue

to

exist

and

usually

earn

returns

above those reported by their larger competitors.

Perhaps the most important issue related to interstate banking concerns
the concentration of economic power.




In our judgment, current bank antitrust

-5laws and guidelines are sufficient to control
banking
are

markets.

ill-equipped

national level.
we

However,

believe

combined

existing

to deal

with

law

practice

in

the

banking

area

undue concentrations of economic power on a

Although there are a variety of ways to deal with the problem,

that legislation validating

with

and

undue concentrations in local

a prohibition

industry,

would

make

to enter

a market,

"potential

of a combination

sense.
but

the

It

seems

of the

desirable

to

competition"

concept,

largest firms
encourage

in the

large

banks

undesirable to allow that entry to occur by means

of the acquisition of one of the dominant firms within that market if a "toe­
hold"

acquisition

or

de

novo

entry

are

viable

alternatives.

Likewise

it

does not seem desirable to allow a combination of two or more of the largest
firms,
and

even though

they do

means

of

not

their share of the aggregate market is relatively small

compete

implementation

in any common
need

markets.

to be worked-out,

Although
we

the numbers and

believe

that

this

is a

sensible way to approach the problem.

If
laws

the

is

factor

constitutionality

upheld
in

by the

determining

Supreme
the

before

authorizing

full

the

Court,

future

there are definite advantages
step

of

Massachusetts-Connecticut
regional

structure

to regional
interstate

of

pacts
the

be an important

banking

interstate
banking,

will

reciprocal

system.

While

banking as an interim

there

are

disadvantages

in allowing this to happen without some Congressional guidance.

Although we have no problem with

the regional

pact concept -- indeed,

they are probably desirable as an interim step in that they will allow regional




-

banks

to

strengthen

their

position

—

there are potential

concerns.

of

the

being

case

currently

6-

in

anticipation

of

nationwide

One problem area comprises

considered

by the

Supreme

banking

the substance

Court;

these

pacts

do discriminate against banks and holding companies headquartered in states
excluded from the pact.
that

the

banking.

existence

of

A second area of concern relates to the possibility
regional

pacts may delay or prevent full

interstate

Banks participating in a pact will have the opportunity to consoli­

date their positions within the region, and some may not find it economically
advantageous to expand beyond the regional level.

There would be an incentive

for those banks not wishing to expand further to resist any move that would
expose them to competition from out-of-region banks.

In sum, we believe that interstate banking is both desirable and inevita­
ble,

and ultimately will work to the benefit of users of banking services.

Moreover,

there appears to be no safety and soundness problems that are not

outweighed by the potential public benefits to be derived from the opportuni­
ties for increased competition and risk reduction.

Our major concern relates

to control of excessive concentrations of power within an interstate banking
environment; we would not favor interstate banking that was not accompanied
by
the

stronger
regional

provided

antitrust

enforcement

than

pact concept as a means

that consolidations within

currently

to phase

exists.

in full

We

interstate

support
banking,

these pacts are governed by rules that

ultimately result in a more competitive nationwide banking system.




also