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A Perspective on U.S. International Trade
Louisville Society of Financial Analysts
Louisville, Kentucky
November 19, 2003
Published in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2004, 86(2), pp. 1-7

I

am very pleased to be back in Louisville
again, to meet tomorrow with the board of
the Louisville branch of the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and today to discuss trade
issues with the Louisville Society of Financial
Analysts. Trade is an important issue for the
United States and for the entire world. My purpose is to review the fundamentals of the argument for free trade in the hope that returning to
basics will be helpful to public understanding
of trade issues.
A well-known joke says that you could lay
all the world’s economists end to end and they
still wouldn’t reach a conclusion. And Harry
Truman’s famous plea was for a one-armed economist. In fact, there is no issue on which economists are more closely in agreement than the
fundamental case for free trade. Economists end
to end see eye to eye on this issue, and the twoarmed economist does not go through the usual
dance “on the one hand, on the other hand” when
discussing the fundamental case for free trade.
There are special cases and temporary exceptions
that modify the case for free trade, but they do
not challenge the basic argument.
Despite this consensus among economists,
substantial public opposition to reducing trade
barriers exists. In fact, opposition can be found
at both the left and right ends—and the middle—
of the political spectrum.
In my remarks today, I will address three questions. First, why do economists support free trade
1

See Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992).

2

See Mayda and Rodrik (2001, p. 1).

policies? Second, what are the reasons for public
opposition? Third, what can be done to narrow
the gap between economists and those opposed
to free trade?
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their comments—especially Cletus Coughlin, vice president
in the Research Division, who provided special
assistance. However, I retain full responsibility
for errors.

THE OPINIONS OF ECONOMISTS
AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC ON
FREE TRADE
A 1990 survey of economists employed in the
United States found that more than 90 percent
generally agreed with the proposition that the use
of tariffs and import quotas reduced the average
standard of living.1 These results are more than a
decade old; however, few economists would disagree with the following statement that appeared
in 2001: “The consensus among mainstream economists on the desirability of free trade remains
almost universal.”2
On the other hand, the general public is much
more reluctant to reduce trade barriers than economists are. Well-publicized protests against meet-

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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE

ings to discuss the reduction of trade barriers have
become common. The concern about free trade
policies is not limited to the protestors. In a 1998
survey, only 32 percent of the general public was
in favor of eliminating tariffs and other import
restrictions to achieve lower prices when the cost
would be that certain jobs in import-competing
industries would likely be eliminated.3 Meanwhile, 49 percent were more sympathetic to the
argument that tariffs are necessary to protect jobs.

WHY ECONOMISTS SUPPORT
FREE TRADE POLICIES
Underlying the consensus among economists
is the judgment that nations are better off with
free trade than with policies restricting trade.
Before I begin discussing the analytics of international trade, let’s begin by thinking about our
own behavior. Most of us have jobs. With the
income from our jobs, we buy numerous goods
and services—food, clothing, fuel, houses, entertainment, and so on. Our economic behavior
reflects the fact that we live in a highly interdependent world in which jobs are specialized.
A typical household buys goods and services produced not only in its home state but also throughout the United States and the rest of the world.
Indeed, each of us directly consumes only a tiny
proportion of our production—the most important
exception is household services, such as cleaning,
cooking, and yard care. Would our lives be better
if each of us individually grew all of our food,
made all our clothes, pumped and refined all
our oil, built our own houses and made movies?
Obviously, the answer is no. Even the early settlers on the American frontier relied on others to
make many of their tools, for example. Pure selfsufficiency is a recipe for a Stone Age standard
of living.
Broadening the arena for trade just a little
would help just a little. Would the residents of
Kentucky be better off if they traded only with
others in Kentucky and had no economic relation3

2

See Reilly (1999).

ships with the rest of the United States? Once
again, the answer is no. By specializing in certain
activities, regions as well as individuals are able
to maximize the value of work effort. By producing most goods and services for sale to others, we
trade our output for the goods and services that
we are not especially adept at producing.
The wisdom of specialization and exchange
that holds for individual and interregional trade
holds for international trade as well. Nearly 200
years ago, the economist David Ricardo demonstrated the gains from trade. To explain the principle of comparative advantage he used the
example of England and Portugal trading cloth
and port wine. The trade made both countries
better off. His work was a generalization of Adam
Smith’s great insights concerning the gains from
exchange.
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage
showed that nations, similar to individuals, gain
from trade. Assuming that relative prices, such
as the price of an apple relative to the price of a
shirt, differ across two countries, then both countries can gain from trading with each other. An
important point is that, even if the average worker
in one country is more productive in producing
each and every good than the average worker in
the other country, gains from trade are possible.
The gains from trade depend on comparative and
not absolute advantage.
I believe it was Paul Samuelson, the first
Nobel Laureate in the United States, who gave
this example: Suppose an economist is a brilliant
theorist and the best typist in the university.
Should the economist type her own papers?
Clearly, the economist will be more productive
if she hires a secretary to do the typing; she, the
economist, has a comparative advantage in developing economic theory and he, the secretary, has
a comparative advantage in typing.
The same principle of comparative advantage
holds for a country. If Portugal can produce both
port wine and cloth with fewer hours of labor
input per unit of output than can England, it will

A Perspective on U.S. International Trade

still pay Portugal to produce wine and trade
with England for cloth, assuming that England is
comparatively more efficient in producing cloth
than wine. The proposition generalizes to many
goods and many countries. As long as resources
move into those activities in which the country
is most advantaged or least disadvantaged, then
all trading partners can be better off by trading
some of the output that they produce at relatively
low cost for some of the output that they produce
at relatively high cost.
So far my discussion has focused on what
economists term the “static gains” from trade.
These gains arise from the reallocation of existing
productive resources and the subsequent international trade. Free trade might also generate
dynamic gains by stimulating economic growth.
Economic theory suggests a number of routes by
which free trade stimulates economic growth by
increasing either productive resources or technological change. In practice, these increases are
often triggered by the spur of competition when
countries liberalize trade. There are many success
stories of growth through trade, and no such stories of growth through self-sufficiency as far as I
know.
An important growth mechanism arises when
trade raises a country’s real income, some of
which is saved. The increased saving raises the
availability of funds for investment spending,
which augments a country’s productive capital
stock. Developing countries with relatively liberal trade regimes also commonly attract capital
from abroad, further augmenting resources
devoted to capital formation.
Free trade also increases the possibility that
a firm importing a capital good will be able to
locate a supplier who will provide a good that
more nearly meets its specifications. The better
the match, the larger is the increase in the firm’s
productivity. A related idea is that international
trade may spur the diffusion of technology by
increasing the commercial contacts between
employees in firms from different countries.
4

Another route for economic growth arises due
to the increased competitive pressures associated with international trade. By reducing trade
barriers, firms that were previously protected are
now faced with competitors and, unless they
become more efficient and responsive to consumers, they will perish. The result is that productive resources will be used more efficiently
in producing goods that consumers desire.
A final route arises because, as trade barriers
are reduced, the size of the market that a firm
faces increases. In some cases, firms may be able
to expand output at lower per-unit costs. The
larger market size might also spur increased
research and development spending that could
spur additional growth.
How does the theory of international trade
work in practice? Specifically, does international
trade allow a country to achieve a higher real
income than it would have otherwise achieved?
The short answer is yes, but it is hard to pin down
by precisely how much.4 For a country as a whole,
the gains are bound to be less for a large country
such as the United States than for a small country
such as Belgium. Clearly, the costs to Belgium of
cutting off all trade with those outside its borders
would be huge, as would also be true for a state
with roughly similar population, such as Ohio.
There is an enormous professional literature
on cases in which some protection might be justified or justified for a short period of time. My
own judgment is that few of these arguments really
stand up to rigorous analysis. I believe that the
correct starting point for analysis is always that
trade restriction imposes net costs on society.
That is, protection produces gains for some and
costs for others, but the net of gains and costs is
negative.
The professional literature provides estimates
of the cost of protecting a variety of industries. It
is not uncommon to find estimates indicating
that the cost per job saved is more than $500,000
or in some cases even as large as $1 million.

See Frankel and Romer (1999) and Irwin and Terviö (2000).

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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE

REASONS FOR PUBLIC
OPPOSITION
If the logic and evidence supporting free trade
is so convincing for economists, why is the general public reluctant to embrace free trade? I’ll
develop three themes in attempting to answer this
question. The first theme is that many people do
not understand the benefits of free trade. I’ll call
this “Theme LU,” where “LU” stands for “lack of
understanding.” The second theme is that certain
industry groups are able to apply their political
power to gain protection, usually because those
who bear the costs of protection are inadequately
represented in the political process. I’ll call this
“Theme PP,” where “PP” stands for “political
power.” My third theme is that protection can
result from a fully reasoned preference to pay the
costs to provide protection because the costs are
spread across a wide number of people and
because those who are protected would be severely
impacted by free trade. I’ll call this “Theme RP,”
where “RP” stands for “reasoned preference.”
A good place to begin developing these
themes is to reflect first on the case for free trade
within the United States. One of the great achievements of the U.S. Constitution was to ban trade
restrictions, with minor exceptions, across state
lines. Since the early days of the United States,
trade within the country has been a great source
of economic growth. Some of the transitions have
been painful for regions losing jobs, and yet public support for free trade within the United States
has never been shaken. New England, especially,
has seen many of its manufacturing industries
move to other parts of the country and outside
the United States as well. The movement of the
textile industry to the South is the most famous
example. To this day, a traveler in New England
can see numerous textile mills built in the 19th
century still standing, but converted to other uses.
The job losses in New England were painful,
and it took many years to restore full employment
there. Workers had to retrain, and some found
that they could never restore their previous level
of income. Yet the nation supported the industrial
transformation, and not just because the Constitu4

tion demanded it. New jobs appeared in southern
mills, lifting many workers out of rural poverty.
The situation was one of “us against them” but
the us and the them were in the same country,
though in different regions. In some cases, government aid softened the blow suffered by newly
unemployed workers in New England, but for
the most part they and their families bore the
costs of the industrial transformation.
Once the transformation was complete, both
New England and the South gained from the
new patterns of trade within the United States.
The regions as a whole gained, but obviously
many individuals and individual firms in New
England did not. Trade does create losers, even
though regions as a whole gain.
The gains from international trade are harder
to understand than the gains from interregional
trade. Within a country, it is easy to see that trade
creates jobs in some regions and destroys jobs in
other regions. Some of the adjustments from international trade involve job creation abroad and
job losses at home. The gains from such trade are
much harder to understand. This lack of understanding—my Theme LU—has a lot to do with
support for restrictions on international trade.
Let me try to dispel some of the poor understanding of this issue. I’ll focus on job gains and
losses. On the surface, in any given country it
appears that exports add jobs and imports cost
jobs when workers in the home country find that
they cannot compete with low-cost goods from
abroad. So, it appears that a country could add
jobs in total by subsidizing exports and blocking
imports. Let’s follow the logic of just such a policy,
and let’s assume that no countries abroad retaliate.
Let’s also assume that the home country is capable
of producing all the goods that had been imported,
so that blocking all imports does not create any
untenable shortages of particular commodities.
Suppose exporters insist on payment in dollars for the goods they sell. How will foreigners
obtain dollars once all their exports to the United
States are cut off? Will U.S. banks lend the dollars,
even though foreign firms have no possibility of
selling goods in the United States to obtain dollars
to repay loans? The answer is obvious.

A Perspective on U.S. International Trade

Or perhaps U.S. exporters will accept foreign
currency in payment for the goods sold abroad.
What will they do with the foreign currencies?
The currencies cannot be used to buy goods to
import into the United States because all imports
are blocked. The foreign currencies cannot be
sold abroad for dollars because foreigners have
no dollars to sell as a consequence of not being
able to earn dollars through sale of goods to the
United States. Exporters could use the foreign
currencies to buy assets abroad, such as land,
but presumably at some point they will tire of
exchanging all their goods for foreign assets.
This argument makes clear that the heart of
the argument against restricting imports is that
doing so restricts exports. Every exporting firm
and every worker employed by such a firm ought
to have an intense interest in maintaining free
trade. The connection may seem remote, but it is
real: every dollar of blocked imports is also, at least
eventually, a dollar of blocked exports. To point
out the folly of the view that exports are good and
imports bad, a 19th century economist satirically
wondered whether the best outcome would be
for ships transporting goods between countries
to sink so that all countries could have exports
without imports.
It is clear that imports and exports are connected in a fundamental way. Nevertheless—and
this is a key point—a dollar of blocked imports
has concentrated positive effects for the protected
industry but diffuse negative effects across all
export industries, amounting to pennies per item
for any given export industry. In terms of jobs,
blocking imports has obvious job benefits for the
protected industry, whereas the job losses from
reduced exports are spread widely across many
industries. Trade restriction produces concentrated benefits and extremely diffuse and hard to
understand costs. The costs are borne by export
firms and their workers and by consumers who
pay higher prices.
This fact, that protection produces concentrated gains and diffuse losses, is the source of
Theme PP. Industries suffering from imports have
a great incentive to seek redress through the political process, and they are often successful in doing

so. Industries suffering a handful of job losses, and
consumers paying a few pennies more for the
goods they buy, may not even notice the losses.
In any event, because the losses are individually
small, those bearing the losses have no incentive
to organize politically to fight protection. But keep
in mind that a job loss here, and two or three
there, can add up to many job losses per job saved
in a protected industry.
My third theme is that fully informed voters
might rationally prefer protection in some cases.
Being unemployed, regardless of its length, is a
noteworthy cost that generates opposition to proposed trade policy changes from both those likely
to be adversely affected and those who empathize
with them.
Consider the policy choices available to
policymakers who are trying to protect jobs. There
are really only three options. One is to swallow
hard and do nothing. This option may sound
cruel, but the fact is that the government leaves
family and markets to handle many types of misfortunes that befall us. A second is to provide
adjustment assistance to help workers make the
transition from industries suffering intense import
competition to new industries.
A third option is to impose import restrictions.
As I have already emphasized, these restrictions
impose costs on the rest of society. A natural question is why individuals, including those with
relatively low incomes, should bear the costs of
maintaining jobs in other industries. The question
is particularly pointed when workers in protected
industries are earning wages above the national
average.
In some cases, certainly, protection improves
the job and income prospects of low-income
workers. Many voters do appear willing to support trade restrictions to protect such workers.
Protection in these circumstances seems to fit
my Theme RP—that voters have a reasoned preference to bear the costs of protecting low-income
workers. The willingness, therefore, to support
trade restrictions may in some cases simply reflect
a concern for others.
This sense of community may extend beyond
U.S. borders. Many U.S. consumers appear will5

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE

ing to pay higher prices for items produced under
better working conditions in developing countries.
Moreover, most Americans favor linking labor
standards to trade. For example, the 1999 Program
on International Attitudes survey found that 93
percent of respondents felt that as part of international trade agreements countries should be
required to maintain minimum standards for
working conditions.5 However, this linkage may
instead reflect self-interest. By effectively raising
the cost of its competitors, higher labor standards
would serve the interests of those being harmed
by the imports from low-cost competitors.
Similar to linking labor standards to trade,
some sentiment exists for linking environmental
standards to trade. Underlying this sentiment is
a belief that by stimulating growth, trade contributes to environmental problems. Some of the
concern about the environment can be linked to
U.S. jobs. One argument is that lower environmental standards abroad make the U.S. a lesscompetitive location and induce firms to relocate.
Thus, by harmonizing environmental standards,
the disadvantages of production in the United
States due to environmental controls would be
eliminated.
Many economists, however, would argue
that environmental problems should be handled
nationally and that international differences in
environmental standards are natural. Moreover,
economic growth provides both the resources and
the demand to raise a country’s environmental
standards. In fact, the ideal tradeoffs between
economic growth and environmental quality that
a country might make are likely to depend on its
level of economic development. For example,
research by economists Gene Grossman and Alan
Krueger finds an inverted U-shaped relationship
between pollution and economic development.6
For very poor countries, increases in per capita
gross domestic product are associated with worsening environmental conditions. Beyond some
income level, however, increases in per capita

gross domestic product are associated with
improving environmental conditions; wealthier
societies can and do spend more on pollution
control. The turning point varies for the specific
pollutant, but in almost every case the turning
point occurs at a per capita income of $8,000 or
less in 1985 dollars. Thus, raising the income of
poor countries, a direct result of increased international trade, may be the most important factor
in improving environmental conditions in lowincome countries.
Despite the insights from my second and third
themes, I return to Theme LU—that attitudes
toward trade are heavily influenced by a lack of
understanding. Quite generally, the public fails
to see any broad-based gains from trade. For example, the 1999 Program on International Attitudes
survey found that Americans viewed the benefits
of trade as flowing to business, rather than to
themselves or to American workers in general.
Although the survey did not ask respondents
whether they thought gains from trade went to
foreigners, I’m guessing that many Americans do
believe that foreigners harvest the gains and the
United States loses from trade.
The difficulty of envisioning broad-based
gains for the United States is understandable. It
is difficult for the general public to perceive that
reducing import barriers lowers prices, raises
average wages, and improves jobs across a wide
range of U.S. industries. It is also difficult for the
general public to envision how freer trade will
spur economic growth that will improve its wellbeing. Because U.S. international trade is already
largely free, the gains for an average U.S. individual of fostering free trade are small. In other
words, the gains from even freer trade as a share
of total economic activity in the United States
are relatively small; however, the total gains are
substantial.
The general public is also concerned about
the large and increasing U.S. trade deficit. Some

5

See the University of Maryland, Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA).

6

See Grossman and Krueger (1995).

6

A Perspective on U.S. International Trade

of the concern reflects a view that U.S. exports
should equal U.S. imports. This view fails to
appreciate that a country’s trade balance and its
capital account are very closely related. In a
speech November 14, 2003, at the Tucson chapter of the Association for Investment Management Research, I examined this relationship. I do
not have time today to develop the points I made
in that speech, so I will summarize some key
points.
Via basic accounting, a country’s capital
account surplus is equal to its current account
deficit. For simplicity, let’s view the current
account deficit as the trade deficit. A common
mistake is to treat international capital flows as
though they are passively responding to what is
happening in the trade account. In fact, investors
abroad buy U.S. assets not for the purpose of
financing the U.S. trade deficit but because they
believe these assets are sound investments, promising a good combination of safety and return. On
a personal level, every one here has the option
of moving funds abroad, for example, through
mutual funds that invest in foreign stocks and
bonds. Why is the net capital flow into rather than
out of the United States? The reason is that for
most investors the United States is the capital
market of choice. There is no better place in the
world to invest.
In sum, the United States has created for itself
a comparative advantage in capital markets, and
we should not be surprised that investors all over
the world come to buy the product. As investors
exploit the opportunities provided by U.S. financial markets, trade deficits can arise. Thus, my
view is that our current trade deficits are not a
cause for alarm because on the whole they reflect
extremely positive forces driving the U.S. capital
account.

NARROWING THE GAP
Now let me turn to the issue of how to narrow the
gap between the opinions of economists and the
general public. The first response of economists
to narrowing the gap involves education. That is
the obvious implication of Theme LU. However,

the educational challenge is large because the
majority of the general public will not be sitting
through an international trade course. These
communication issues are especially important
because economists’ arguments are often focused
on issues that the general public tends to ignore
or, at least, downplay.
Economists often focus on consumption
aspects of international trade. They stress that
free trade allows for increases in well-being
because consumers can buy more and varied
goods at lower prices. Public discussions, however, usually focus on jobs and production.
The statement that imports destroy some jobs
is certainly correct; however, the key point is that
trade causes a change in the distribution of jobs
and no major change in the number of jobs, once
adjustments to changing trade patterns are complete. The nature of the popular discussion highlights the job destruction aspects of trade and
downplays the job creation aspects of trade. It is
far easier to identify a closed plant or laid-off
factory workers than it is to find the new economic
activity, which is often widely dispersed, resulting from a reduction in trade barriers.
It is easy to see why workers losing their jobs
would be passionately opposed to international
trade. Conversely, the diffuse beneficiaries of free
trade may not even realize that their good fortune
arises from free trade. To maintain support for
free trade policies, therefore, it is important to
identify export success stories and to stress the
broad-based gains to consumers stemming from
lower prices.
In light of the costs imposed on some by trade,
an argument can be made that programs should
be available to reduce the cost for those harmed.
The trade adjustment assistance program, which
is administered by the U.S. Department of Labor,
allows those who lose their jobs because of
increased imports to receive unemployment compensation for an additional period beyond that
received by other displaced workers. In addition,
trade adjustment assistance recipients can also
participate in retraining programs plus receive
out-of-area job search allowances and moving
expenses.
7

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE

To the extent that this program is sufficiently
funded and successful, it is possible that this
program would reduce workers’ lobbying efforts
against trade liberalization. Even if voters are
motivated by their perceptions of collective well
being and not simply their own individual well
being, trade adjustment assistance might increase
support by those who gain and those who lose.
A third way to bridge the gap between supporters and detractors of trade liberalization is to
increase the topics involved in trade negotiations.
Sentiment is strong for linking labor and environmental issues with trade negotiations. Sentiment
also exists for multilateral trade negotiations to
deal with investment policy, competition policy,
electronic commerce, and better enforcement of
intellectual property rights. What is unclear is
whether such changes would ultimately increase
the prospects for liberalizing trade. Expanding
the agenda might provide negotiators with more
opportunities for compromise; however, expanding the agenda might also bog down negotiations
by introducing issues upon which compromise
is very difficult.
Negotiations to reduce trade barriers are
motivated by the desire to reap the benefits from
freer trade. Negotiations—whether they are multilateral, regional, or bilateral—are always contentious. The multilateral agreements underpinning
the World Trade Organization attempt to counteract protectionist pressures. As a last resort, the
dispute settlement process allows countries to
retaliate against a member found in violation of
an agreement.
Retaliation provides a mechanism to enforce
the treaty. We might also think of targeted retaliation as a way to make highly visible the job losses
in export industries when a country imposes
import restrictions. As argued earlier, in the
absence of targeted retaliation, job losses in
export industries are widely scattered and difficult to identify. Targeted retaliation, however,
can create visible, concentrated costs on certain
export industries—costs that are designed to create political opposition to import restrictions. I
might note that nations ratifying the WTO treaty
were very familiar with the retaliation rules, as
8

they had been applied for many years under
WTO’s predecessor organization, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or the GATT.

CONCLUSION
I can summarize my perspective on international trade in a few words. Free trade is a policy
that increases economic well being for a country
as a whole. Specialization and exchange are the
routes that generate the benefits. Specialization
allows for increased productivity and higher
wages, while open markets are more competitive
and yield lower prices for consumers.
I’ve suggested three themes as to why freetrade policy continues to be a matter of controversy: first, that many trade issues are poorly
understood; second, the concentrated nature of
adverse trade effects combined with the diffuse
nature of trade gains creates a political dynamic
favoring protection in some cases; and, third, in
some cases voters may prefer to pay the costs of
protection for the purpose of sheltering vulnerable groups from the full rigors of open international markets.
The challenge for educators, economists, and
policymakers is to find ways to increase political
support for free trade. It is clear that there is much
work left to be done.

REFERENCES
Alston, Richard M.; Kearl, J.R. and Vaughan, Michael
B. “Is There a Consensus Among Economists in the
1990’s?” American Economic Review, May 1992,
82(2), pp. 203-9.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. and Romer, David. “Does Trade
Cause Growth?” American Economic Review, June
1999, 89(3), pp. 379-99.
Grossman, Gene M. and Krueger, Alan B. “Economic
Growth and the Environment.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May 1995, 110(2), pp. 353-77.
Irwin, Douglas and Terviö, Marko. “Does Trade Raise
Income? Evidence from the Twentieth Century.”

A Perspective on U.S. International Trade

NBER Working Paper 7745, National Bureau of
Economic Research, June 2000.
Mayda, Anna Maria and Rodrik, Dani. “Why Are
Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist
than Others?” NBER Working Paper 8461, National
Bureau of Economic Research, September 2001.
Ricardo, David. On The Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation. New York: Penguin, 1971.
Reilly, John E., ed. American Public Opinion and
U.S. Foreign Policy 1999. Chicago: Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations, 1999.
University of Maryland, Program on International
Policy Attitudes. Americans on Globalization:
A Study of Public Attitudes. College Park, MD:
March 2000.

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