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NEW S R E LEA S E
FEDERAI DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

PR-134-84 (10-30-84)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE




SOME STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT PENN SQUARE

An address by

William M. Isaac, Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Washington, D.C.

before the

Uninsured Depositors of Penn Square Bank

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
October 30, 1984

I am pleased that your Senators and Congressmen have provided
this forum for me and FDIC staff members to meet with those of
you who have been affected by the failure of Penn Square Bank.
In a moment, we will open the meeting and try to respond to all
of your questions and concerns. But let me begin with some general
comments.
When Penn Square failed on July 5, 1982, the Oklahoma City
area was reminded of an unpleasant fact of life: there is no such
thing as a painless bank failure. People and businesses get hurt.
The entire community experiences stress and uncertainty.
Due to its size, the volume of uninsured deposits at risk
and the vast amount of loan participations sold to other banks,
the Penn Square failure was more disruptive than most. Its effects
are still being felt not only in Oklahoma, but throughout the
nation.
We at the FDIC are keenly aware of the trauma accompanying
bank failures. We try in every way possible to minimize the impact
on innocent victims.
It would be easy to get the impression from some of the local
media coverage that the FDIC is something other than the "good
guy" in this sordid affair.
Some people seem to have lost sight
of one central fact:
the FDIC is not even remotely responsible
for the demise of Penn Square or any of the pain and suffering
the failure has caused.
The FDIC first learned of the seriousness of the Penn Square
problem a few days before the bank failed.
Our people worked
around the clock for the next two weeks in a highly successful,
even heroic, effort to avoid the slightest delay in making funds
available to insured depositors.
For the next several months our
people worked 16-hour days, seven days a week, issuing receiver­
ship certificates to uninsured depositors, trying to get a handle
on the loan portfolio, balancing the bank's books and investigating
potential civil and criminal claims. The bank's records and books
of account were in complete disarray.
The working conditions were almost insufferable.
The hours
were long.
Office space was dingy and cramped.
The pressures
were intense.
Scores of people were forced to leave family and
friends behind in distant cities while they lived out of suitcases
for months on end.
Some of our employees were literally driven
to the point of exhaustion.
I have never been more proud of our people.
the FDIC's finest hours.

It was one of

I have often wondered why our employees are willing to make
these kinds of sacrifices.
I have not been able to come up with
any satisfactory explanation other than that they believe in the
importance of what they do. They ar e true public servants.




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2

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No, the people of the FDIC are not the source of your prob­
lems.
Let me be blunt about who is. The Penn Square debacle was
caused by a gross dereliction of duty on the part of the bank's
board of directors and management.
They were able to perpetrate
their abusive practices by obtaining funds -- normally through
money brokers -- from banks, credit unions and S&Ls around the
nation.
These financial institutions, which held 80 percent of
the uninsured funds at Penn Square, were motivated solely by a
desire to make a fast buck.
Many of you have asked why the FDIC chose to handle the Penn
Square failure through a payoff of insured depositors rather than
a merger, as we typically do.
The answer is simple:
we had no
choice.
When a merger of a failed bank is arranged, the FDIC must
provide protection to the purchaser against any contingent or offbalance sheet claims.
Penn Square had sold more than $2 billion
in loan participations to other banks and had outstanding nearly
$1 billion in letters of credit.
The potential exposure to loss
on the $3 billion of off-balance sheet claims was staggering.
The
FDIC is prohibited by law from arranging a merger unless it
determines that the cost of the merger will likely be less than
a payoff of insured depositors.
The existence of the tremendous
volume of potential off-balance sheet claims made that finding
impossible.
We were under a great deal of pressure that fateful July 4th
weekend to arrange a merger.
The financial institutions that had
purchased loan participations and had uninsured funds at Penn
Square urged the FDIC to help bail them out of their problems.
If we had done so -- if we had tried to bail out these institutions
in a situation as egregious as Penn Square -- the long-range con­
sequences to our free-enterprise banking system would have been
devastating.
Others have
expenses of the
them against the
quite simple: we

asked why the FDIC does not absorb all of the
liquidation of Penn Square rather than charging
receivership's collections.
The answer is again
have no choice.

It would be completely inappropriate for the FDIC to divert
the resources of the deposit insurance fund, which is maintained
solely for the benefit of insured depositors, to grant a subsidy
to uninsured depositors and other general creditors of a receiver­
ship.
The FDIC's policies at Penn Square are the same as those
followed in more than 730 bank failures handled throughout our
51-year history; we simply cannot alter them for the benefit of
the creditors of a single bank.
Moreover, the National Bank Act
expressly
provides
that
the
expenses
of
a national
bank
receivership shall be deducted before any distributions are made
to creditors and stockholders.




It is important to bear in mind a couple of important facts.
First, the FDIC, because it has paid off the insured depositors,
is the major creditor of the Penn Square receivership.
This means
that for every dollar of expense charged to the receivership, the
FDIC absorbs over 50 cents of the cost.
Second, holders of the
vast majority of the remaining receivership claims are not the
completely innocent victims of Penn Square that some would have
you believe.
They are the financial institutions that helped make
the Penn Square fiasco possible by supplying the funding for its
reckless lending activities.
Finally, some have questioned whether our liquidation expenses
are too high.
While the size and complexity of the Penn Square
loan portfolio and litigation have resulted in higher than normal
liquidation costs, the FDIC has kept those expenses to an absolute
minimum.
Liquidation expenses at Penn Square represent less than
4 percent of total collections.
By comparison, collection costs
in the typical corporate bankruptcy often run in the 20 percent
range.
Moreover, in reporting on the Penn Square expenses, some
people conveniently overlook the fact that the receivership's in­
terest income of $73.6 million far exceeds its expenses, which
total only $21.8 million.
To be completely candid, though,^ I
should note, as we have from the beginning, that as the liquidation
progresses and the quality of remaining assets declines, our ratio
of expenses to collections will increase significantly.
In sum, I have not the slightest reservations about the per­
formance of our people at Penn Square.
Have we made any mistakes
or errors?
Yes, we have.
But they have been minor and readily
understandable in view of the circumstances under which we have
been forced to operate.
Have some innocent people been hurt at
Penn Square?
Unfortunately they have, and nobody regrets that
more than I. I have met with some of those people, I share their
pain and we are doing everything possible to alleviate their hard­
ship.
But I take great comfort from the knowledge that the FDIC
is not the source of their problems but part of the solution.
Now let's turn to your questions.