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O
STATEMENT ON

PROPOSED REGULATION OF BROKERED DEPOSITS
IN FINANCIAL DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS,
)
PRESENTED TO

A

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER, AND MONETARY AFFAIRS k
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES




0

BY

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a

'

WILLIAM M. ISAAC, CHAIRMAN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

1:00 p.m.
Wednesday, "March 14, 1984ยป
Room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building

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V7

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate this opportunity to address the issue
of brokered deposits and the insurance proposal made jointly by the FDIC
and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.

We commend you and your colleagues

on the Subcommittee for holding hearings on this important subject.
I am mystified by the reaction to the proposal in some quarters.
The proposed rule has been attacked, by people who profess allegiance
to the free enterprise system, as being a "giant step backward" and a
"sledgehammer."

We have been told that instead of permitting the

marketplace to operate by limiting the federal guaranty on brokered
funds, we should attempt to solve the admittedly serious problems we
face through the regulation of brokers and of banks who utilize their
services.

Mr. Chairman, that may be the way the special interest groups

and others force the issue to be resolved, but the FDIC believes it
would be a mistake.
Federal deposit insurance was born out of the banking collapse of
the 1930s.

During the first four years of the Great Depression, nearly

10,000 banks -- one-third of all banks -- failed as anxious depositors
panicked and withdrew their funds.

A banking holiday was declared and

the financial system lay in ruins.
Despite the chaotic conditions, deposit insurance was opposed by
the banking industry, the President and key members of Congress.

It

was felt the system would be too expensive and would undermine market
discipline by forcing well-managed banks to subsidize the marginal,
high-risk operators.

Despite these concerns, a compromise measure was

agreed upon which would reassure smaller depositors while maintaining
the essential ingredients of a free enterprise banking system.
insurance was initially set at $2,500 per depositor.




Deposit

2

Over the years, the scope of insurance has been expanded many fold,
reaching $100,000 coverage in 1980.

Moreover, in practice the system

has moved toward 100 percent coverage as deposit payoffs have been
eschewed in favor of mergers of failed banks that bailed out all
depositors.

When coupled with deposit interest rate decontrol, the

worst fears of the opponents of deposit insurance have been reinforced.
It is against this backdrop that deposit brokerage must be viewed.
At issue are the type of financial system we desire -- free enterprise
or government controlled -- and the viability of the deposit insurance
funds.
We are not against brokered deposits or deposit brokers.
not deny brokered deposits to any individual or institution.

We would
Our rule

would, however, require banks and thrifts to compete for funds on some
basis other than simply interest rate.

Capital adequacy, asset quality,

the competence of management, the degree of insider lending and the
convenience of branch locations would be among the factors considered
in placing funds.
The brokering of deposits has been an important issue since the
1960s.

However, the problems attendant to brokered deposits at that

time were isolated and could be handled on a supervisory level.
During the past several years, the problem has become more acute
and widespread.

The increase in the insurance limit to $100,000 in

1980, deposit interest rate decontrol (coupled with action by the DIDC
to permit the payment of fees on brokered funds), new computer technology
and the manner in which the Penn Square Bank failure was handled have
contributed to the substantial increase in deposit brokering.




3

The Penn Square situation involved massive abuses and imprudent
banking practices on the part of a number of financial organizations
around the country.

It was determined, due to our statutory cost test,

that insured deposits should be paid off rather than a merger arranged.
This action was also intended to restore an element of discipline to the
financial system.

Unfortunately, many deposit brokers and their investor

clients responded to that failure not by taking care to place their
funds in sound institutions but by exploiting the federal guaranty.

The

cost of that guaranty is not shared by deposit brokers, but is purchased
and paid for by every well-run insured bank and thrift in terms of both
increased premiums and lost business opportunities.
Since the failure of Penn Square Bank, brokered deposits have been
found in a high and growing proportion of failed banks.
commercial banks failed; 9 held brokered deposits.

In 1982, 32

Of the 45 commercial

banks that failed in 1983, 29 -- or nearly two-thirds -- held brokered
deposits ranging as high as 76 percent of total deposits.

So far in

1984, 11 commercial banks have failed; 6 of those held brokered deposits
ranging as high as 53 percent of total deposits.
Poorly-rated banks tend to use brokered funds more frequently and
more extensively than well-rated banks.

Whether the use of brokered

funds contributes to a less than satisfactory condition or whether this
condition provides the occasion and need for brokered deposits is not
the question.

It is some of both.

Unchecked, the abuses will lead to

increased failures and inpose massive costs on the insurance funds.




4

Recently a small nonproblem bank in South Dakota and another related
bank in Wyoming borrowed extensively, virtually overnight, from deposit
brokers and invested the proceeds in insurance annuities.
subsequently failed, costing the FDIC millions.

The banks

Is this what Congress

intended when it adopted the deposit insurance scheme?
A large thrift sells its long-term CDs throughout the nation through
underwritten offerings by a major brokerage house.
denominations of $5,000 and are fully insured.

The CDs are sold in

What other business in

the nation has its borrowings backed by the federal government in this
fashion?
Opponents of the proposed rule contend that brokers facilitate the
flow of funds from credit-surplus to credit-deficient areas.

The fact

is that this funds flow has occurred quite efficiently for decades
through the interbank market and will continue with or without brokers.
But the funds in the interbank market are at risk and are placed based
on considerations of soundness, not simply the rate paid.
Others argue that the proposed rule penalizes small savers who
prefer the convenience of dealing through a broker.

We do not believe

deposit insurance was ever intended to cover investors seeking the
highest yields in national money markets.

If Congress wishes to make

this service available, the answer is to dismantle the Glass-Steagall
Act.
These are the issues that face us.

We have raised them in every

possible forum for the past couple of years, including our deposit
insurance study, testimony, speeches, our advance notice of rulemaking
and the proposed rule.