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STATEMENT ON

. R. 5568, THE "HOME MORTGAGE CAPITAL STABILITY ACT"




PRESENTED TO
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY

WILLIAM M. ISAAC, CHAIRMAN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

MARCH 24,

1982

9:30 a .m .
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
ROOM 2128

Mr. Chairman,

I appreciate this opportunity to present the

views of the Federal
embodied

Deposit

Insurance Corporation,

in H. R. 5568, the Home Mortgage Capital

The thrift
difficulties.

Stability Act.

.

industry currently is experiencing unprecedented
Government policies,

competitive factors in financial
comings

on the plan

economic

conditions,

markets and management short-

have all contributed to the difficulties.

The problems

-- whatever their origin -- are real, and we commend you for your
efforts to address them.
Assuming funds can be allocated to this endeavor without
increasing upward pressures on interest rates, the FDIC could
accept a wel 1 - structured program of temporary
assistance to distressed- financial
such a measure,

however,

high interest rates a r e a

financial

institutions.

In considering

we should recognize that persistent
basic cause of widespread economic

troubles and a major cause of the problems of thrift institutions.
A program of financial

assistance for depository institutions,

if not approached within the context

of an overall

that exerts downward pressure on interest

strategy

rates, is, likely to

be self-defeating.
Morever, we believe a program of financial

assistance ought

to be accompanied by other measures that, together,

form a well-

rounded program for the revitalization of our depository




12-|
institutions.

Very briefly, we believe that program should

include:
1.

enactment of the Regulators'

Bill;

2.

provision of new asset powers

3.

federal

for thrift institutions;

legislation to preempt

state usury

statutes

and prohibitions on enforcement of due-on-sale clauses;
4.

comparatively

swift deregulation of liabilities with

emphasis on a short-term instrument that can compete with
money-market
5.

instruments;

and

possibly some soundly-conceived

changes

in accounting

practices -- a matter we are currently working on.
Given such a program, stronger thrifts could begin to
diversify their asset structure and return to profitability.
Within that context,
vide the means
Without

a program of financial

for many institutions to weather the transition.

a comprehensive

program, however, we are simply gambling

that economic conditions will
considered

assistance could pro­

return to what has always been

"normal" and that thrifts will then be able to

profitably return to the old ways of doing business.
We believe

such a course would be imprudent.

The m a r k e t ­

place has served periodic notice over the past 20 years that our
system of mandatory
rate controls,

specialization, accompanied

is no longer viable.

heed to those warnings
thrifts

by rigid interest

We have not paid adequate

and, as a result, the problems of our

have grown steadily worse.

If we have learned anything from the present plight of the
thrift industry,




it is that private financial

institutions

-3cannot afford to subsidize
willing to do so.

housing finance and savers are not

If we wish to provide

a special

housing finance, it ought to come from general
paid to any lender as an inducement to make

subsidy for

revenues and be

housing loans at

below market rates or directly to home buyers to permit them
to better afford the market rate.
Having said that,
program of financial
our ideas about

let me turn to the question at hand -- a

assistance.

'First, we would

like to offer

how such a program should be structured.

Our first tenet is that the assistance should be available
only on a selective basis.

Inept management

should not be

subsidized with funds intended to provide temporary relief to
victims of unexpected and unprecedented
When the Regulators'

Bill was before this Committee

you thought we were too restrictive
our authority to provide financial
of our Act.

economic conditions.
last year,

in our request to redefine
assistance under Sec. 13(c)

As a result, you broadened that authority

we have endorsed your language -- but you were careful
us discretion to distinguish between those

institutions

could really benefit from assistance and those

-- and
to leave
that

for which it

would be a waste of money.
Second, we believe an assistance program should be
structured to be economically sound and to create options and
incentives for the recipients to correct
of the difficulties,




the underlying causes

principally the interest

rate mismatch

-4between assets and liabilities.*

Even within the existing

framework of law, there is room for some of this,

but we cannot

overemphasize the need for broader asset powers and deposit
deregulation to enable thrift institutions to grow out of their
current difficulties by competing effectively and increasing
earni n g s .
We must be frank and tell you that nothing concerns us more
than the bill's

requirement that 50 percent

be invested in one-to-four family mortgages

of net new deposits
for first time

home buyers at an interest rate 1 percent above the institutions'
average

cost of funds.

Much of the present thrift dilemma is

attributable to the mismatch between
and short-term,

long-term,

high rate liabilities.

fixed-rate assets

The bill's provisos would

perpetuate and even compound these problems.
Without

a short-term deposit

instrument to allow depository

institutions to compete effectively in current markets,
certain there will

not be much

we feel

in the way of net new deposits.

Even assuming such an instrument is authorized and new funds are
attracted at current market
current average costs.

rates, their costs could be well

Under the bill's

provision

above

requiring that

loans be made at 1 percent over average costs, the result could
be to lock the institutions

into a continuing loss position.

* It is essential that a limitation-- providing that no ext r a ­
ordinary gains or losses shall be included for purposes of
qualification for the program or for quarterly payments -- be
imposed to keep the program from becoming a buyout for all the
unprofitable assets on the institutions' books.
Moreover, any
advances under the program should be required to be paid back
with interest out of future earnings.




-5Unless the assisted institutions were able to invest the other
50 percent of their net new deposits at very high returns,

it

seems highly unlikely that any institution could strengthen
its situation under this scenario.
Third, there should be some discipline over management and
management practices exacted as a price for financial
On previous occasions this Committee

assistance.

has enacted financial

assistance programs for Lockheed, New York City and'Chrysler
Corporation.

In each instance disciplines

as a price for the taxpayers'
for such requirements

support.

have been imposed

There is no less reason

in the measure now before you.

We would urge that any bill

grant the regulators clear

authority and direction to impose sanctions

against management.

We have in mind authority to enforce a decrease or prohibit any
increase in the compensation of officers, trustees, or directors
so long as assistance funds

remain outstanding and the authority

to require management changes in assisted institutions when
believed necessary to achieve operating improvements.
We believe the bill should also grant the regulators
authority and direction to place operating controls on the
activities

of assisted institutions while the assistance remains

outstanding.

We do not believe that an institution should

receive taxpayer funds and then simply continue to do business

as usual.
There should also be clear authority and direction for
the regulators to terminate payments to those institutions
which are clearly on the path to failure.




It makes little

-

6-

economic-sense to dissipate the taxpayers'
payments to institutions
despite the federal
The bill

money by continued

that continue on a down

hill path

assistance.

does not address one serious problem we wish to

call to your attention.

Some states and localities,

most

particularly the States of New York and Massachusetts and the
City of New York,

levy a franchise tax on mutual

savings banks.

The tax is based on the volume of deposits without
whether a bank is making or losing money.
if you were to enact this bill

regard to

The result is that

a large percentage of the

assistance payments would flow directly through the troubled
institutions

to the local

burdensome tax.
should include

imposing this unjust and

We believe this is undesirable and that you
in the legislation a proviso which would require

that any state or local
to waive

governments

government with such a tax would have

it for institutions being assisted under the Act until

repayment is effected.
Mr. Chairman, we understand that

it is the Subcommittee's

intention to make major modifications to H. R. 5568.
reason we
we feel

have confined our comments to the general

principles

should be considered in your ultimate package.

be happy to answer any questions
render whatever technical




For this

I would

and our staff is available to

assistance you may desire.