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FEDERAL DEPOSIT IN SU R AN CE CO R PO R ATIO N

PR-51-85 (4—29—85)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FACTS AND FALLACIES ABOUT DEREGULATION

by

William M. Isaac
Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Washington, D.C.

presented to the

Annual Meeting of the Association of
Reserve City Bankers

Boca Raton, Florida
Monday, April 29, 1985
10:30 a.m.

F E D E R A L DEPO SIT IN S U R A N C E CO RP O R A TIO N , 550 Seventeenth St.



N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429

202-389-

This is a particularly opportune time to address such
a distinguished group of leaders from the banking industry.
We are in the midst of a national debate on the nature and
causes of the banking industry’s current problems, the desira­
bility of product and geographic deregulation and the need
for deposit insurance and regulatory reforms.
We read and hear a great deal of commentary on these
subjects from regulators, elected officials, financial leaders,
media representatives and others.
Some of it is intelligent
and thoughtful, some of it misguided.
I will use the brief
time allotted to me today to try to clear the air about deregu­
lation — to separate the facts from the fallacies.
A.
The Condition of the Banking Industry. The problems
in the banking industry have been receiving considerable atten­
tion in Congress and the media.
It is indisputable that there
are more problems in the financial system than in any period
since the Depression.
There are, for example, more than 900
banks on our problem list, which is significantly higher than
the
previous peak of 385 banks in 1976.
During my tenure
as Chairman, the FDIC has handled over 200 bank failures with
assets totaling nearly $30 billion, excluding Continental
Illinois, and our losses have exceeded $4 billion.
During
the FDIC’s first 47 years, the failures totalled only $9 billion
and our losses were a negligible $500 million.
Problems in
the thrift industry, agriculture, energy,
real estate and
in the international debt arena continue to plague us.
That is the bad news. The good news is that the problems
are, for the most part, being handled well, and the vast major­
ity of banks are in remarkably good shape.
Problem banks
still constitute a small percentage of the total, and the
failure rate of about h of 136 per year remains well below
that of any other industry. Earnings have held up well, despite
large loan losses, and banks, particularly
the larger ones,
have added substantial sums to their capital base.
The FDIC insurance fund has never been stronger.
When
I became Chairman, it stood at $11 billion.After absorbing
losses of $4 billion during the past four years, it now totals
$18 billion.
It is exceptionally liquid, with an average
maturity in its investment portfolio of about 2%. years and
no market depreciation.
Not only has the fund grown dramati­
cally in aggregate dollars, it has increased as a percentage
of insured deposits during the past four years, reversing
a long-standing decline.
Some people, particularly in Congress
and in competing
financial services businesses, contend that
the problems in
the banking industry demonstrate that bankers are inept and
are incapable of handling deregulation.
They could not be
more wrong.




The current problems in the industry are not the result
of deregulation.
The fact is there has been virtually no
deregulation in banking apart from deposit interest rate deregu­
lation, which has been handled exceptionally well by most
banks and has been enormously beneficial not only to the banking
industry but to consumers and smaller businesses throughout
the nation.
The banking industry's problems are the direct result
of years of mismanagement of fiscal policy at the federal
level. We suffered more than a decade of accelerating inflation
causing
serious
distortions
in investment and credit
decisions —
followed by high and volatile interest rates,
two back-to-back recessions and then deflation in sectors
such as energy and agriculture.
Frankly, I cringe when I hear elected officials criticize
the quality of management in banking while the federal govern­
ment is running a $200 billion budget deficit.
The federal
budget deficit is easily the number one threat to financial
stability in our country and even the world. There is virtually
no problem in the banking system today that would not be greatly
alleviated by a substantial reduction in the deficit.
B.
The Need for Deregulation. That leads me more gener­
ally into the subject of deregulation.
I recently spoke at
one of my alma maters and was asked what I would do in the
deregulation area, politics aside, if I had it within my power
to legislate any changes I thought desirable.
I responded
that I would phase out geographic restraints, repeal the GlassSteagall Act, repeal the Bank Holding Company Act and greatly
strengthen the antitrust laws.
The result would be a far
stronger, more competitive and responsive financial system.
Some people contend that there is a long-standing AngloAmerican tradition favoring the separation of banking and
commerce and that this separation is necessary to protect
against unsound banking practices.
I believe this view is
erroneous on all counts.
As for Anglo-American tradition, England does not have
a Glass-Steagall law and does not prohibit the ownership of
banks by nonfinancial firms. The United States did not concern
itself with the ownership of banks by nonfinancial firms until
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and the amendments of
1970.
Though we are a comparatively young nation, 15 years
or even 29 years can hardly be characterized as a tradition.
Moreover, the Bank Holding Company Act was not adopted
out of any concern about unsound banking practices. The father
of the Bank Holding Company Act, Marriner Eccles, Chairman
of the Federal Reserve, was concerned about the Transamerica




-3financial empire being assembled throughout the western states
by A.P. Giannini, which others were beginning to emulate.
The
Bank Holding Company Act was intended to guard against undue
concentration of economic power, not to correct any safety
and soundness problems.
The wall between banking and commerce remains rather
porous even today.
Real estate developers, auto dealers,
insurance agents and others from all walks of economic life
own and operate banks throughout the nation.
They are prohib­
ited only from placing their banks and other business interests
under a common corporate umbrella.
Some of our strongest
savings and loan associations have been owned by nonfinancial
firms for many years.
The FDIC insures numerous industrial
banks owned by far-flung commercial enterprises.
The FDIC
has permitted a number of nonbanking firms to acquire nonbank
banks since 1969 . Not one FDIC-insured industrial bank or
nonbank bank has ever been designated a problem bank, much
less failed.
Under the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970,
the Federal Reserve is directed to review the operations of
any grandfathered company whose bank exceeds $60 million in
size, and the agency is permitted to order divestiture if
it finds any conflicts of interest or unsound practices.
Over
100 situations have been reviewed by the Federal Reserve without
divestiture being ordered.
My point is that we do not have a complete wall between
banking and commerce and do not need one to promote safety
and soundness.
Banks are special, and we do not want them
to fail.
We want banks to be operated only by people with
integrity, managerial acumen and financial strength. ' I do
not believe bankers have a monopoly on these traits; indeed,
the banking and thrift industries could no doubt be strengthened
by allowing companies like IBM, Sears and thousands of other
smaller commercial firms to bring their considerable managerial
and financial resources to bear.
The Change of Bank Control
Act and our examination and enforcement powers give us the
tools we need to keep undesirable people out of banking.
Nor do we want the resources of a bank to be tapped
to support, or transfer a competitive advantage to, an affil­
iated company.
Rather than prohibit the affiliation, however,
we would require that the commercial activities be conducted
in a separately capitalized and funded company and would impose
stringent limitations on intercompany transactions.
Stronger
laws against tying practices could be enacted if that were
believed desirable.
Neither American tradition nor modern-day reality requires
the separation of banking and commerce to
promote soundness
and stability in banking. It is American
tradition to fear,
even loathe, concentrations of economic and political power.




-4We do not need a Bank Holding Company Act or a Glass-Steagall
Act to avoid such concentrations.
These laws are poor and
inefficient
substitutes for strong and effective antitrust
enforcement.
C. Conclusion. My purpose in raising the Bank Holding
Company Act
issue is not to suggest that there is a serious
prospect for repeal any time soon.
Clearly there is not.
My objective is to help raise the level of the debate on deregu­
lation to a higher intellectual plane.
Misinformation and
myths abound and they are impeding sensible, long
overdue
reform.
At
the very least Congress ought to move
quickly
to permit banks and other financial firms to compete head-tohead across the full spectrum of financial-services activities.
To do otherwise will only perpetuate an inequitable system
that is harmful to both the industry and consumers.
Nor do I want to leave the impression that deregulation
does not present potentially serious challenges for bank super­
visors.
Clearly it does.
Interest rate deregulation has
already demonstrated the need for more effective examinations
and more vigorous enforcement efforts.
It has also made
stronger the case for deposit insurance reforms such as
risk-related premiums.
Finally, it has been an important
factor in our efforts to improve capital ratios and to find
ways to enhance marketplace discipline.
Approached sensibly in this fashion, broad-based deregula­
tion will foster a stronger and more responsive and competitive
financial system than America has ever known.
The banking
industry and the American public deserve no less.
I urge
you not to settle for less in the upcoming legislative battles.




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