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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
4:00 P.M., Moscow (8:00 A.M. EDT)
September 4, 1989

Paper presented by

Wayne D . Ange11

Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

at

The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada

Moscow, U.S.S.R.
September 4, 1989

Monetary Policy in a Centrally Planned Economy
Restructuring Toward a Market-Oriented Socialist System
by Wayne D. Angell

It is a pleasure to be here.
welcome and hospitality.

I appreciate very much your warm

In many respects, the Soviet Union and the

United States are entering a new era of partnership.

We are both

involved in world leadership, we share a quest for better standards of
living for our citizens, and we share a desire to promote global harmony
and economic wellbeing.

We are also geologically very much alike as

relatively resource rich countries, although your country is
approximately twice as large with correspondingly more resources.

So I

welcome the opportunity to participate first-hand in discussions about
the Soviet economy and learn of your views on its future direction.

I

also would like to share with you my own thoughts on how monetary policy
might be conducted in what I call "market-oriented socialist economy" -a term that I think captures the spirit of the ideas presently under
consideration in the Soviet Union.
These are interesting and exciting times in your country.
President Mikhail Gorbachev and the reforms that he has advocated have
captured the attention and imagination of the West.

In the United

States, perestroika and glasnost have become household words.

Western

economists have become particularly interested in the efforts to
restructure the Soviet economy and to increase its interaction with the
rest of the world.

For Soviet policy makers this restructuring is indeed

a daunting task, but one well worth undertaking.

Not only can it

significantly enhance the material wellbeing of Soviet citizens, it can

- 2 -

redound to the benefit and prosperity of the world at large.

The

U.S.S.R. is a unique and sizable geographic region which can reap
substantial benefits from expanding various industries in which it has
comparative advantage.

This, in turn, can promote global wellbeing

through a more efficient allocation of worldwide resources.
I am certainly not an expert on the Soviet economy.

Therefore,

it might be best if my remarks are understood as pertaining to a
hypothetical centrally planned economy in transition toward a marketoriented socialist system.

It seems to me that there is more widespread

interest in application of the discipline of the market place to
realizing the diverse goals of "social" economies.

But in the West, the

market mechanism is also complemented by appropriate institutional
arrangements facilitating the play of market forces.

In particular, the

role of the monetary system and the framework for the conduct of monetary
policy have been crucial.
In my view, regardless of its goals, an economy requires a
monetary policy regime that has price stability as its ultimate
objective; price stability, in the sense that prices on average are
stable while prices of individual goods and services respond freely to
reflect relative scarcity.

In strictly planned economies, in principle

prices are administratively set, so that price movements, relative or
general, may not be directly observed.

But the phenomena of relative and

general price movements manifest themselves in quantity adjustments.
Severe shortages of particular commodities and a condition of generalized
scarcity are a planned economy's counterpart to relative and general
price movements in market economies.

- 3 -

Particular problems with respect to price stability arise in a
planned economy restructuring to permit a greater role for market
incentives.

The bulk of my remarks today will be directed toward

achieving that goal in the context of a Soviet economy in which economic
agents -- households and enterprises, including farms -- are encouraged
to respond to market signals and incentives.
Recent Developments in the Soviet Union
Lively debate continues regarding the various proposals for
reform of the Soviet economy and several issues have come to the fore.
It is useful to list some that are most significant from my perspective.
First is the redirection of production priorities toward socially
approved consumer goods.

Second is the basic reforms of the price-

setting mechanisms, with focus on the increased use of market-like
mechanisms and decentralized decision making; that is, an emphasis on
profits and other market incentives, self-financing for enterprises,
long-term leasing of agricultural land, and greater decentralization of
cooperatives.

Third is the decision to enter the global arena to reap

the benefits of comparative advantage through increased international
trade, to utilize world capital markets, and to acquire leading
technologies through joint ventures.

Fourth is the consideration of

ruble auctions and discussions concerning alternative timetables for
ruble convertibility.
At the same time, there are concerns about the current
macroeconomic environment as a backdrop for microeconomic reform.
Particularly worrisome is the existence of a substantial "monetary
overhang", reflecting accumulated involuntary savings.

Present prospects

of an inflationary surge are exacerbated by a significant government

- 4 -

budget deficit financed principally by monetary creation.

In addition,

recent attempts to limit beverage alcohol production seem to have
encountered obstacles much like the frustrating efforts to control the
flow of illegal drugs in the United States.

Both of our countries seem

to have found limits as to our ability to make social choices coincide
with private wants.
The operative themes in the Soviet economic reform process appear
to be modernization, efficiency, and technology.

In these respects, it

is most useful to look at the experience of the Western market economies.
Some of our ways have been highly successful and some have been discarded
over time as unworkable.

Through it all, we have relied for the most

part on a market-based system -- one in which price signals and market
incentives direct the allocation of resources.

The result is a dynamic,

innovative, and constantly evolving economy in which supply and demand
for most products self equilibrate.
Furthermore, we have found that the vibrancy and dynamism of the
markets lead naturally to greater institutional responsiveness and
innovation. Quite often we have to reliberate this process from state
bureaucratic tendencies.

However, I want to be the first to admit that

even in the United States we have sometimes used state intervention
rather than relying on market forces.

Frankly our experiments in these

areas have often engendered waste and fraud.

Particularly noteworthy are

present inefficiencies in water use that will increasingly call for a
change as our scarce water resources approach a crisis stage.

Hopefully,

the public gains from decontrolling energy prices will encourage the use
of market pricing for water resources.

- 5 -

The productive power of a market economy is further enhanced
when it is opened to world trade.

The additional discipline of world

competition promotes further efficiency by preventing the perpetuation of
aging, non-competitive industries and domestic monopolies.

Without free

trade, private gain- seeking may more likely be misdirected away from
general economic welfare.

In this regard, we in the United States

continue to benefit from the competitive vibrancy coming from the
prosperity of Japan, West Germany, Taiwan, South Korea, and many others.
If the U.S.S.R. fully enters this arena you will both benefit from and
contribute to rising wellbeing of the people of the world.
In my experience as a economist, I have had less exposure to
economic developments in the Soviet Union than in some other countries
such as China, India, and Indonesia.

Hence, it is difficult for me to

prognosticate with great insight what will be the outcome of the
ambitious Soviet reform efforts.

However, I would like to address a few

issues -- among the many raised by the proposed economic reform -- that I
believe are key to the conduct of monetary policy in a market-oriented
socialist economy.
The Primary Contribution of Monetary Policy
In a market economy, relative prices provide the information and
incentives on which producers and consumers base their decisions.

A

relative price is defined as the price of one good or service -- be it a
factor of production, an intermediate good, or a final product -relative to that of another.

In most economies relative prices are free

to change with shifting economic circumstances.

This flexibility of

relative prices creates prospects for gain, thereby providing incentives
for economic agents to respond.

As agents act on such incentives, for

- 6 -

instance, by supplying more of a certain consumer good, its relative
price falls and excess profits are competed away.
But this allocating role of relative prices works efficiently
only when agents are not misled by changes in prices that reflect general
price pressures rather than fundamental supply and demand conditions.
Consequently, it is important to keep the general level of prices steady
so that price movements can be interpreted as relative changes.

During

periods of accelerating inflation, supplying agents may not be motivated
to produce more in response to higher prices, as they interpret the
higher price as merely a diminution of the purchasing power of money.
Such a condition may even lead to socially undesirable behavior as
suppliers hoard goods.

Similarly, consumers may respond to general

higher prices by accelerating their purchases in order to avoid the loss
of purchasing power of their money holdings.

A rapidly inflating

currency mutes the incentive and conservation effects of a market system.
Thus, the primary contribution of monetary policy to increased
efficiency is to keep the general price level or the average level of
prices stable.

I am less optimistic about the benefits of a market

system with accelerating inflation.

In such an environment, absent

monetary restraint, price controls are more likely to be chosen as a
policy vehicle.

Price controls, of course, prevent allocative

efficiency.
While in a market economy changes in relative prices serve as
signals for economic adjustment, in a liberalizing socialist economy
additional complications arise.

The initial structure of prices is more

likely to be one which has been determined by social and collective
decisions, and hence, is apt to be far removed from the underlying supply

- 7 -

and demand conditions.

The first step in moving toward market-determined

resource allocation then involves a realignment of relative prices to
reflect relative scarcities.

Such a move may entail rather dramatic

price adjustments for many commodities.
How can an economy gain the benefits of flexible relative prices
while maintaining general price stability?

In market economies, where

money serves multiple roles as a unit of account, a medium of exchange,
and a store of value, this essentially is the task of monetary policy.
General price stability is also essential if money is to perform its
multiple functions effectively.

But often monetary authorities are

tempted to trade off the achievement of the price stability goal against
other short-run objectives.

In my opinion this is a very unwise course,

and would be especially so in any economy for which there is little
historical basis for central bank credibility.

It could fuel

inflationary expectations and result in calls for additional monetary
ease.

Lack of monetary restraint can lead to accelerating inflation and,

therefore, to rising nominal rates of interest.

It is a decidedly

superior course to exercise monetary restraint yielding, say, 2 percent
inflation and a 6 percent nominal rate of interest than to wait until
inflation is at 50 percent and nominal interest rates are at 60 or 70
percent to achieve the same constraint on inflation.

Raising inflation

above expectations stimulates economic growth temporarily because
expectations are revised upward, which, in turn, could lead to an upward
price spiral.

Monetary authorities should never loose site of their main

goal -- a zero rate of inflation.
But in planned economies the role of money is more or less
confined to that of a unit of account, and central bank functions are

primarily focussed on ensuring the legality of various transactions and
payments.

Money supply provisions are made in line with the production

plan, and deviations of actual outcomes from plan result in involuntary
accumulation of money balances.

Spending opportunities for these

balances are limited, thereby preventing money from fully serving its
medium of exchange and store of value functions.

Clearly, if market-

oriented reforms make headway, fundamental changes will be necessary in
the Soviet monetary management.
The Need for a Monetary Anchor
In order for monetary policy to hold down the general level of
price increases while preserving the flexibility of relative prices,
monetary discipline is essential.

Some mechanism is required to

constrain the expansion of the money supply so that it is consistent with
general price stability.
"anchor11.

I will refer to this as a need for a monetary

Experience and economic theory suggest several alternatives.

Targeting the rate of growth of one or more monetary aggregates
has been a popular choice in the West and has been used with varying
degrees of commitment and success in recent years.

Much can be said for

including money growth rates, at least as an information variable, in
monetary policy deliberations.

However, it would be necessary to have

stable functions, especially for the demand for money, in order to let
money growth targets determine monetary policy

For a planned economy in

transition toward a more market-oriented system, where money does not as
yet truly serve as a medium of exchange and a store of value, such
targeting would be particularly problematic.

If the initial stock of

money is inconsistent with a stable price level and there exists a

- 9 -

substantial monetary overhang when administered prices are replaced by
market prices, then a money growth target would be of little use.
Another alternative that central banks have at times used is to
peg the price of gold in terms of their own currency by standing ready to
buy or sell gold for a fixed amount of currency.

Such a strategy

provides strict monetary discipline by requiring the authorities to limit
the creation of money to an amount that can be redeemed by drawing down
their gold reserves.

As long as supply and demand conditions for gold

are stable, a gold standard can be expected to produce a reasonable
degree of price stability.
Another monetary policy strategy that has been advocated from
time to time is that of a commodity standard, that is, pegging the
nominal price of a bundle of basic commodities.

However, one can imagine

a sort of commodity standard in which there was no commitment actually to
exchange commodities for money at a set price; rather, the monetary
authorities target a certain level of prices for commodities and conduct
monetary policy in an effort to hit their target.

Such a commodity

standard is like a conventional monetary aggregates targeting regime,
with commodity prices substituting for the money growth target.
One concern that is often expressed about a commodity standard
is that a major change in the price of the bundle of commodities relative
to those of other goods and services can create problems of monetary
instability and generalized inflation or deflation, if the authorities
stick to their target.

However, this supposed disadvantage must be

weighed against the alternatives, including the damaging runaway
inflation that is often observed in the real world.

- 10 -

An advantage of commodity prices over a more general price index
as a target is that commodity prices react quickly to changes in the
scarcity of money and are immediately observable.
to

I think it is useful

distinguish between commodity standards or commodity price targets

and the use of commodity prices as a monetary policy indicator.

I have

been an advocate -- and a practitioner -- of the use of commodity prices
as an indicator of inflationary pressure and of the effective stance of
monetary policy in the United States.

This approach amounts to taking

into account the considerable and timely information conveyed by the
"auction markets" on which commodities trade when making decisions
regarding monetary growth.^

It is quite different from a commodity

standard or commodity price targeting, and the objective is general price
level stability, rather than commodity price stability.
Another potential monetary anchor is a nominal exchange rate or
index of nominal exchange rates.

If the monetary authorities choose to

peg the exchange rate between their currency and some other currency or
basket of currencies, they, in effect, are "importing" another country's
monetary anchor.
anchor".

Such a policy regime can be called an "external

The resulting inflation rate in the country that imports its

monetary anchor is about the same as that in the country exporting the
anchor, under certain conditions pertaining to the openness of the
economy.

Some countries have employed this technique with a degree of

success.

For example, Austria has pursued for some time now a "hard

1. A detailed presentation of my views is contained in my recent paper
presented to the Virginia Association of Economists.
Some of the recent
research on commodity prices and monetary policy is reported in that
paper as well. Two classic references on commodity prices and the nature
of "auction markets" are studies by Irving Fisher and Arthur Okun.

- 11 -

schilling" policy in which it pegs its currency (the schilling) to the
German mark.

Recent experience of France and Germany in the European

Monetary System is another example.
Such a monetary policy is not without its potential pitfalls.
For one, the "importing" country is at risk should policy in the
"exporting" country become unstable and inflationary.

In addition, the

importing country runs the risk of having an economically unjustified
realignment of its real exchange rate vis-a-vis third countries if the
exporting country's currency becomes realigned.

Furthermore, the

uncertainty surrounding a country's long-run commitment to a particular
exchange rate peg will be reflected in the interest rate.

For instance,

Mexico has chosen to let the peso depreciate against the dollar at a rate
of 1 peso per day.

If this policy is not credible, it may lead to an

unnecessarily high interest rate premium.
In light of the uncertainties involved, it is important to have a
way of monitoring inflation developments independent of the exchange
rate.

Very few countries would be willing to fix unalterably their

exchange rate to the political winds in another country.

But domestic

policy flexibility comes at a price, since any explicit acknowledgment of
an "escape clause" reduces the credibility of the authorities' commitment
to the policy.

It is not clear to me that this exchange rate credibility

problem is avoidable in any case, since it is difficult to imagine any
way of eliminating entirely the authorities' ability to abandon the
pegged exchange rate.

Some degree of policy discretion would seem to be

inherent in the very concept of national sovereignty.

- 12 -

A Monetary Anchor for the Soviet Union
I would like to explore further the potential role for a gold
standard in formulating an appropriate monetary policy during a
transition period in economic liberalization in the Soviet Union.

There

would appear to be two unique features of the Soviet situation that might
make the gold standard a suitable means of providing monetary discipline.
First, the transition from a centrally controlled economy to a marketoriented one would involve a dramatic change in the institutional
structure.

During this transition, and probably for a considerable time

thereafter, there would be a great deal of uncertainty about policy and
even about the exact nature of the fundamental economic relationships.

A

monetary anchor of gold, with its implied discipline and historical
association with long-run price stability, might reduce these
uncertainties markedly.
During transition, one area of concern to monetary authorities
might be the initial strength of demand resulting from any "monetary
overhang" and its price level implications.
would address these concerns in two ways.

A gold convertible ruble
First, gold-based rubles and

ruble-denominated financial instruments would appear to be desirable
savings vehicles, thereby serving to absorb part of the initial monetary
overhang and possibly encourage more savings.

Second, any one-time

upward price pressure resulting from pent-up consumer demand would be
less likely to shake market confidence under a gold-ruble standard, as
any general upward movement in prices would be perceived as temporary.
The second feature that makes the Soviet situation unique is the
country's prominent position in the world gold market in terms of
reserves as well as volume of production.

This position would seem to

- 13 -

impart extra credibility to the ruble-gold convertibility.

Moreover, it

would be in the country's best interest to seek stability in the world
gold market.
Thus, because of the Soviet Union's unique situation, a gold
standard could provide credible monetary discipline and ease some of the
transition problems I have mentioned.

Although, under a gold standard,

disruptions in the world gold market could potentially lead to some
monetary instability, this would likely be far less than the potential
for instability under alternative arrangements.
Under an external peg regime relying on gold as described above
the ruble would be immediately convertible, arbitraged by the world
dollar gold market.

The effective exchange rate would provide relevant

price information for the domestic economy.

An external anchor and

currency convertibility mean that the Soviet monetary authorities would
supply only as many rubles as are demanded by the market (foreign and
domestic) at the pegged exchange rate.

By freely buying and selling gold

at the fixed gold-ruble rate, monetary discipline is automatic.
It is important to emphasize that the stage to which economic
reform has progressed is crucial to the successful use of an external
anchor such as gold to guide monetary policy.

Adopting an external

anchor requires relative prices that correspond to market conditions;
otherwise, goods arbitrage would lead to resource losses as foreigners
reap the benefits of domestic subsidies and low prices.
A hard currency and market-determined prices are necessary for
making rational economic calculations and decisions.
confers other benefits as well:

A hard currency

monetary discipline and access to world

- 14

capital markets.

In these circumstances, the Soviet authorities might

consider the adoption of currency convertibility as soon as possible.
The essential features of a gold standard for the U.S.S.R. imply
that the ruble be defined in terms of gold, i.e., that precise unit of
account equivalencies be established.

These parities would have to be

backed by full convertibility, that is, a promise to buy and sell gold at
the fixed rate.

Full convertibility will require particular care in

establishing the initial parity.

This implies a transition problem,

similar to that faced in adopting an alternative external anchor.

If the

Soviet Union were to adopt the gold standard or an alternative external
anchor it will be necessary to devote careful attention to the criteria
for establishing an initial parity.
If the Soviet Union were to adopt a gold standard arrangement,
an ancillary feature that would yield benefits to the Soviet Union would
be that all U.S.S.R. bonds would be gold bonds, with promise to pay
interest and principal in gold.

After the gold promise is fully accepted

by international capital markets, there would be little to be gained from
relying on gold bonds as ruble bonds would be equivalent.
Deficits and Financing
One implication of the gold monetary policy regime that I have
described is that government budget deficits would not be financed by
money creation.

A given budget shortfall would have to be funded by some

combination of tax increases, spending cuts, and government borrowing on
foreign or domestic financial markets, unless the public's demand for
rubles at the pegged gold price or exchange rate increased sufficiently.
The Government borrowing option is quite different in an inflationary
environment than in a non-inflationary environment.

- 15 -

Another likely implication of the policy regime that I have
described, if it were accompanied by liberalized foreign trade and a
considerable amount of unsatisfied domestic demand, would be a deficit in
the foreign trade balance.
Both the government budget deficit and the country's trade
deficit must be financed; how could this be accomplished in a transition
period?

Fortunately, adoption of a convertible ruble linked credibly to

gold and the special circumstances of the Soviet Union could mean, in my
opinion, that financing the two deficits would not be difficult.
One would expect that government promises to pay rubles in the
future that were fixed in terms of gold would be an attractive savings
vehicle (assuming a competitive rate of interest) for the Soviet
household and enterprise sectors and even for foreigners.

Thus, the

anchor for monetary policy that I have sketched here could facilitate the
(non-inflationary) financing of the government budget deficit through the
issuance of gold bonds.

As an added bonus, the probable one-time surge

in demand for such bonds following their initial introduction would be an
effective way of "sterilizing" some of the accumulated buying power and
inflation potential represented by any "monetary overhang". Any
remaining "overhang" would be likely to reflect a pent-up demand for
traded goods, and probably would result in a trade deficit that would be
offset by a capital inflow.
A trade deficit not offset by a service account surplus would
reflect capital flows into the Soviet Union.

Capital inflows are

appropriate for a country undergoing significant economic restructuring.
However, capital must be invested productively -- that is, it must be
used to finance projects that yield a rate of return well in excess of

- 16 -

the cost of capital.

The investment must be economically efficient and

be able to pass a market test.

Inefficient use of foreign capital can

lead a country to be impoverished by debt.

The objective, however, is

productive investment that follows from obtaining funds at the lowest
interest rate possible and directing them to projects with the highest
rates of return possible.

Furthermore, at least in most cases, the

foreign capital should be "additional" in the sense that the capital adds
to domestic investment and does not just substitute foreign saving for
domestic saving at a given level of domestic investment.
How would a restructured centrally planned economy attract
capital flows from abroad?
ways:

Capital can flow into a country in two basic

financial investment and direct investment.

The latter has the

added benefit of being typically accompanied by a transfer of foreign
technology and know-how.

As I understand the situation at present, steps

have been taken toward facilitating direct foreign investment in various
joint-venture schemes in the Soviet Union.

One impediment to such

ventures would be the difficulty of repatriating ruble profits.

A

convertible ruble, of course, alleviates this impediment and does not put
export programs ahead of domestic projects.
Thus, in the regime that I have described, direct investment by
residents of other countries probably could be relied on more heavily as
a source of external finance.

Moreover, as I stated earlier, a ruble

convertible at fixed terms into gold would make ruble bonds more
attractive to portfolio investors in other countries, thereby increasing
the amount of funding to be expected from foreign financial investment
also.

The better the international standing of the ruble, the lower will

be ruble interest rates and the better bargain will be real capital

- 17 -

formation.

The ruble-gold interest rate should approach a real rate

around 2 percent.

If so by adopting a gold standard, the Soviet Union

will likely attract captial at a most favorable rate.
The special circumstances of the Soviet Union suggest the
possible use of an additional enhancement to financial instruments issued
by the Soviet Union under a policy regime based on such an anchor:

the

convertible ruble bonds could be explicitly backed by gold, which the
Soviet Union has in ample quantities so that the guarantee would have
considerable credibility.

I would not be surprised if there were a large

latent world market for such gold-backed Soviet "development bonds".

Nor

would I be surprised if the market rate of interest on such bonds turned
out to be quite low.
Concluding Remarks
I have tried in my remarks to be constructively provocative -not necessarily politically realistic -- in the spirit of glasnost!

The

course of economic liberalization in the Soviet Union is an internal
Soviet matter, and, along with its implications for policy management, it
must be decided by the Soviet political process.
In my remarks, I have discussed some monetary policy arrangements
that I believe could be sensible and responsible methods of conducting
monetary policy in a significant transition period.

A major theme of my

remarks is the necessity of monetary policy discipline.

Without monetary

discipline, the inevitable result is inflation -- creeping, galloping, or
something in between.

I have presented some ideas on how the Soviet

Union might institute the necessary monetary discipline.

While I have

made a case for the Soviet Union to adopt a gold standard arrangement as
its monetary anchor, other ways might be considered.

The essential

- 18 -

objective of any alternative selected is to constrain excessive monetary
creation -- i.e., monetary discipline.
The Soviet policy process must choose among alternative monetary
anchors.

But I urge you to make sure that some system for providing

monetary discipline is chosen, and that the system decided upon be
adequate for the task; otherwise, the full benefits of a restructured
economy will not be forthcoming.

- 19 -

References
Angell, Wayne D., "Commodity Prices and Monetary Policy: Empirical and
Theoretical Considerations," paper presented at the Sixteenth Annual
Meeting of the Virginia Association of Economists, Charlottesville,
Virginia, March 16, 1989.

Cooper, Richard N . , "The Gold Standard: Historical Facts and Future
Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1982, 1-45.

Fisher, Irving, Why the Dollar Is Shrinking. 1914.

Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
United States: 1867-1960. 1963.

Hallman, Jeffrey J., Richard D. Porter, and David H. Small, "M2 per Unit
of Potential GNP as an Anchor for the Price Level," Federal Reserve
Board Staff Study. No. 157, April 1989.

Hayek, F.A. , "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review.
September 1945, 35, 519-530.

Okun, Arthur M . , "Inflation: Its Mechanics and Welfare Costs," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity. 2:1975, 351-390.