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For release on delivery
10 a.m. EDT
October 19, 1993

Statement by
Thomas C. Melzer
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

before the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
United States House of Representatives

October 19, 1993




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I am pleased to appear before the Committee today to testify on Section 4 of the Federal
Reserve System Accountability Act of 1993, entitled "Prompt Public Disclosure of Open
Market Committee Meetings." As a creation of Congress, the Federal Reserve System is
fully accountable to the public for its monetary policy actions. One way the Federal
Reserve ensures this accountability is by releasing information about its policy decisions.
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) provides a full accounting of its actions in
its "Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee" (Minutes).
The Minutes contain all important information about FOMC decisions, including the
policy directive agreed upon by the majority and the reasons underlying policy decisions.
Any significant differences among those voting with the majority, as well as the views of
any dissenting members, are included in the document. The Minutes are released upon
their approval by Committee members at the next FOMC meeting. The public record thus
contains the outcome of FOMC deliberations and the policy views of each member of the
committee.
I am not in favor of producing a further detailed account of FOMC deliberations, either in
the form of an edited transcript, such as the "memorandum of discussion," verbatim
minutes, or an audio or videotape. Such a release would impede the deliberative process
and thereby impair policymaking.

Arriving at appropriate policy often involves

considerable give and take, consensus-building and debate of alternative actions. Because
of the possibility that a particular statement might be misunderstood or taken out of
context, FOMC members would be reticent to engage in the kind of open discussion that
leads to good policymaking if they knew that all of their statements would be in the public
record. Furthermore, the release of verbatim minutes or any other detailed record of
deliberations would discourage other parties from supplying the FOMC with confidential
information that is useful in determining appropriate policy.




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Turning to the timing of the release of the FOMC policy directive, I believe that immediate
release of the outcome of FOMC deliberations would interfere with the deliberative
process and would lessen the flexibility with which the Federal Reserve can respond to
changing economic conditions. If directives were released immediately, the FOMC might
be reluctant, even if economic conditions warranted, to take a timely subsequent action
because of concern that such action would add to the uncertainty in financial markets. In
addition, the FOMC would be less inclined to bias its directives toward ease or restraint, in
effect limiting its policy options.

Consequently, reaching a consensus among FOMC

members would be difficult, which might delay policy actions and add uncertainty to
financial markets.
Finally, let me turn to the specific questions that I was asked to address in my statement.
•

In response to your inquiry about my own notes or records, I usually take some
notes at FOMC meetings for my personal use. They are not typed, copied or
shared with anyone else and are maintained in a locked file cabinet in my office.

•

Your second question concerns my knowledge of notes or records that others have
made at FOMC meetings. Though others who attend FOMC meetings sometimes
appear to take notes, I am unaware of their content, disposition or location.

•

In response to your third query, I have no knowledge about the release of
information on FOMC meetings prior to its official release by the Federal Reserve.

To sum up, the Federal Open Market Committee is committed to informing the public of
its policies, which ultimately must be judged by their results. The "Minutes of the Federal
Open Market Committee'' convey fully the relevant information about FOMC decisions
and do so in a timely way. Thus, in my view, there is little to be gained by providing
detailed minutes or mechanical reproduction of FOMC deliberations, while the adverse




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consequences of doing so are potentially very great. In addition, the benefits of immediate
release of the policy directive would not seem to outweigh the potential costs of doing so.
By inhibiting the frank exchange of views and possibly reducing the willingness of the
FOMC to take timdy actions, public rdease of the details of committee deliberations or
immediate rdease of the policy directive could harm the policymaking process. Though
intending to increase the accountability of FOMC members, the proposed changes
specified in HR 28 may thus impede monetary policy performance.
Thank you.