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From Maverick to Mainstream: The Evolution
of Monetarist Thought in Monetary Policymaking
Remarks by Thomas C. Melzer
University of Missouri-St. Louis Accountant's Roundtable
June 4, 1992

I would like to take this opportunity to give you a
status report on the monetarist approach to macroeconomics
and monetary

policy—an

approach

that has

long

been

associated with the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

As

you may know, our Bank has played a prominent role in the
famous monetarist/Keynesian debate that began roughly 35
years ago.

Today, I would like to emphasize the extent to

which this debate has been replaced by a new landscape of
ideas—a landscape in which many of the controversial views
of the original monetarists are now taken for granted.

This

changing world view, among both economists and policymakers,
helps explain why monetarism today is less of a renegade
force and more of a common bond in macroeconomics.
Many

once-heretical

widespread acceptance.

monetarist

ideas

now

enjoy

Monetary aggregates, for instance,

now play an important role in Federal Reserve policymaking
and in the policymaking of virtually all central banks
worldwide.

Monetary aggregates played virtually no role in

policymaking 2 0 or 3 0 years ago.

Likewise,

the idea that

money growth and inflation are related in the long run, once
an outside view, now dominates discussions in academic and
policymaking circles.

Doubts about the effectiveness of

economic stabilization policy, long held by the research
staff at the Bank,



have crept into the views of many

economists and participants in the policymaking process.

In

short, once-radical ideas spawned by the early monetarists
now seem mundane.

Let me take a few minutes to outline how

this metamorphosis occurred.
Monetarist views are often associated with the work of
Allan Meltzer, Anna Schwartz, the late Karl Brunner, and
Nobel laureate Milton Friedman,

to name a few.

These

economists began emphasizing the role of money and monetary
policy in the macroeconomy during the late 1950s and early
1960s.

At about this same time, monetarist ideas began to

catch on with the research staff of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis.
In 1968, the late Leonall Andersen and Jerry Jordan,
then on the research staff at the Bank, published a famous
paper in the Bank's Review.

Jordan is now the president of

the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
Equation,"

as

it became

known,

The "St. Louis

documented

statistical relationship between Ml growth,
inflation.

a

close

output and

It established the short-run effects of monetary

policy on economic activity, while preserving the long-run
relationship between money and inflation.
Jordan

work

provided

a key

The Andersen and

contribution

to

the

monetarist/Keynesian debate.
But

skepticism

about

monetarist

views

especially within the Federal Reserve System.

reigned,

Policymaking

at the time relied not on monetary aggregates,
subjective




but on

feelings about the "tone and feel" of the

2

financial markets.

Instead of looking at the total reserves

held by banks as a measure of the thrust of monetary policy,
members of the Federal Open Market Committee, or FOMC, the
Fed's principal monetary policymaking body, tended to look
at free reserves—that is, reserves in excess of those
required by law less those borrowed from the Fed's discount
window.

This was so even after Brunner and Meltzer

published a 1964 paper showing that free reserves could give
misleading signals about policy.
Money was so under-appreciated in the System that it
was not even mentioned in a FOMC directive until 1970, more
than 50 years after the Fed's founding.

The Federal Reserve

published no statistics on money on a regular basis until
1944, and only began publishing monetary data based on daily
averages in 1960.
In the 1970s, monetarist views began to gain wider
acceptance, and the Federal Reserve System began to show
more interest in money and monetary aggregates.

The Federal

Reserve Board published data on M2 and M3 for the first time
in 1971.

As the 1970s progressed, discussions of money

began to play a greater role in the making of monetary
policy, particularly when other approaches failed to control
steadily rising inflation.

Late in the 1970s, as a result

of the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, the
Fed was required to set target ranges for growth in certain
monetary aggregates.

And in 1979, the Board finally began

publishing data on the monetary base, 11 years after our




3

Bank first published similar data.

In all of these changes,

the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis played an influential
role.
But monetarist ideas were not confined solely to money.
Monetarist thought encompassed a much broader world view.
In the early 1970s, several authors, writing in scholarly
journals, tried to define the distinguishing features of the
monetarist viewpoint.

I would like to briefly

characterize

four themes that were emphasized in these writings.

In my

opinion, these ideas have withstood the test of time rather
well.
One theme is that monetarists tend to believe in market
mechanisms.

Capitalist

systems

allocate

resources

effectively and, when possible, the government should stay
out

of

the

private

sector.

This

view

has

gained

considerable currency in the U.S. since the 1960s.

Global

events of the last few years, like the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union, suggest that
market systems are on the ascent internationally as well.

A

fortuitous result of these events is that the intellectual
climate

has

shifted

favorably

toward

the

monetarist

viewpoint.
A second theme

is that monetarists emphasize the

long-run relationship between money and prices.

As I have

already mentioned, this relationship is now widely accepted
in academia as well as in policymaking halls.

Cross-country

evidence collected since the early 1960s broadly supports




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this view.

Countries with high inflation rates over long

periods of time tend to have high rates of money growth,
while countries with low inflation rates tend to have low
rates of money growth.

The United

States, for instance,

experienced an average annual rate of inflation of 5.4
percent in the 1980s, while money grew at an average annual
rate

of 7.5

percent.

Iceland,

on the other

hand,

experienced a 32 percent average annual inflation rate over
the same period, and an average money growth rate of 38
percent.

Mexico had 50 percent average annual inflation,

along with money growth of 46 percent.

These

figures bear

out the notion that a central bank can keep inflation
by

keeping

monetarists

money
were

growth
right

modest

and

that

in emphasizing

the

the

low

early

long-run

relationship between money and prices.
A third

theme in monetarist thought is an emphasis on

quantifiable measures

of the thrust of monetary policy.

The writers in the early '70s felt that, if monetarists had
been in charge, they

would have insisted on using reserves

as the measure of policy thrust and a monetary aggregate as
the intermediate target of policy.

The Federal Reserve Bank

of St. Louis has argued both of these positions repeatedly.
At times, our research staff has proposed targeting Ml, and
for a while, the FOMC implemented a version of that plan.
Unfortunately, although Ml targeting made us famous, it
ultimately was less successful than we had hoped.
early 1980s,




In the

the empirical relationship between Ml and

5

nominal GNP broke down, and Ml targeting was abandoned by
the FOMC.
I

hesitate to write off this theme in monetarist

thought, however.

While targeting monetary aggregates has

turned out to be more difficult than we once thought, the
emphasis on quantifiable measures of the thrust of policy is
still a good characterization of the monetarist viewpoint.
The Federal Reserve takes action merely by adding or
draining reserves from the banking system.

Policymakers

must pay close attention to reserves or quantities closely
related to reserves if they are to keep a handle on the
effects of their policy actions.

There is simply no excuse

for ignoring quantities closely related to actions actually
taken by the Fed.
The fourth

theme is that monetarists deny there is a

long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment.

In

other words, there is no permanent advantage to be gained by
continually easing monetary policy.
argue with this view today.

Few economists would

The catch, of course, is that

you may be able to gain a temporary advantage by easing, in
terms of greater real output for a time,
sometimes

enough

to

persuade

and this is

policymakers

to

pursue

countercyclical policy.
I hope that by emphasizing some themes of monetarist
thought,

I have

been able to convey

how much

the

policymaking environment has changed in the last 2 0 or 3 0
years.




But I want to expand on this last theme, as it plays

6

an important role in policy discussions. Few economists
today would argue that there is a permanent
between inflation and unemployment.

trade-off

But many support the

notion that there is a temporary trade-off.

An easing of

monetary policy today, so the story goes, will raise real
output growth and lower unemployment a few quarters in the
future.

Sooner or later, of course, that rise in real

output growth must be followed by a fall in real output
growth,

so that the total long-run effect on the real

economy is zero and the economy remains stable.

But if

monetary policy can have such temporary real effects, one
might be tempted to offset particularly severe bouts of
unemployment using this mechanism.
Monetarists have argued against such fine-tuning,
largely on practical grounds.

For one thing,

it is

difficult to forecast well enough to know when to take
action.

Given the state of economic forecasting today, I

don't see how the FOMC is supposed to know when particularly
bad times are ahead for the economy six months to a year
before

they

happen.

forecast — made
economists—failed

by

For
a

example,

consensus

the
of

50

Blue

Chip

leading

to predict during the most

recent

recession that real output growth would be negative for the
fourth quarter of 1990 until we were actually in the middle
of that quarter.
In addition, unless the increased monetary stimulus is
eventually reversed, there will be a residual impact on




7

prices, which will tend to rise.

But because these price

effects are typically felt only after long lags—two or more
years—it

is tempting to continue with countercyclical

policies once you start.

Why not?

You can reap the

supposed benefits now and worry about paying the bill later.
To some extent, the impetus for fine-tuning is due to
multiple

goals

legislated.

for policy,

which

unfortunately

are

The monetary policy process in this country

would be greatly enhanced if policymakers were given a
single goal that could be achieved with the tools we have in
hand.

In my judgment, that single goal should be long-term

price stability.

A central bank can best contribute to

long-run real economic growth, which is what we all really
care about,

by providing a stable price backdrop that

induces saving and investment.
Without such a clarification of goals, however, we need
some indicator of the thrust of monetary policy at any point
in time and a notion of constraining behavior at extremes.
The traditional monetarist approach suggests that one should
measure the thrust of policy by reserve growth or quantities
closely

related

to reserves.

The quantity

measures

currently in use, M2 and M3, are in my opinion too far
removed from reserves to be helpful. M2 and M3 are subject
to so many nonpolicy disturbances that their movements are
virtually impossible to interpret.

This leaves policymakers

without a good quantity measure of their actions and no
notion of how much is enough in one direction




8

or the other.

As things stand, monetary policy can actually contribute to
instability in the economy and create a need for a sharp
policy reversal despite the best intentions of policymakers.
Let me conclude by saying that it has been a welcome
development for the St. Louis Fed to see its monetarist
ideas generally accepted in academic and policy circles.
After all, no one wants to be a maverick forever.
does mean a changing role for the Bank.

But it

Where once we were

viewed as renegades with outspoken views,

we are now

sometimes confused with our critics.
Clearly, the monetarist approach at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis is adapting to changing circumstances, and
these circumstances have changed largely for the better in
the past 20 or 30 years.
by economic observers.

Several lessons have been learned
There is now substantial agreement

that money and prices are related in the long-run.

Talk

about long-run inflation-unemployment tradeoffs is a thing
of the past.

And the idea of smoothly functioning markets

is also viewed more favorably.

Partly because of these

changes, monetary policy in recent years has been relatively
good; policymakers have laid a base that holds out the
promise of a sustainable reduction in the rate of inflation
from that of the late 1980s.

But this battle is far from

won, and there are ample challenges for the St. Louis Fed
and its distinctive approach to monetary policymaking as we
move further into the 1990s.

I am confident that we will be

up to them.




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