View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

EMBARGOED UNTIL 9:15 a.m., CDT
Wednesday, June 4, 1997




"CREDIBLE MONETARY POLICY TO SUSTAIN GROWTH"

Remarks by
Thomas C. Melzer
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The Arkansas State Bank Department's
Day With The Commissioner
and
The Arkansas Bankers Association's
Bank Directors Conference
Hot Springs, Arkansas

June 4, 1997

Introduction
This spring, policymakers at the Fed have been criticized for moving preemptively against inflation. This criticism is somewhat surprising given the recent track
record of the U.S. economy. In the past year, our economy has grown 4 percent, about
as fast as it has grown in any four-quarter period since 1984. Jobs have been plentiful,
and job growth on a nonfarm payroll basis has averaged 228,000 per month, well above
long-run trends in labor force growth. Meanwhile, unemployment continues to fall,
hitting 4.9 percent in April. And inflation has remained relatively low and stable at
about 3 percent.
By the standards of postwar U.S. economic history, one could hardly ask for
better performance. And yet, in the middle of this success, we hear calls for a return
to the failed monetary policy prescriptions of the past. Many are asking the Fed to
reconsider its successful tack and replace it with the stop-and-go approach of the 1960s
and 1970s, policies that proved very costly for this country in terms of lost jobs and
lower living standards.
Today, I want to address some of this criticism and set the record straight
regarding what we have learned about monetary policymaking in recent times. First, I
want to stress that economic growth does not cause inflation. A country can grow
rapidly based on real factors without any consequences for inflation. Second, and closely
related, I want to point out that the Fed is not against jobs and growth; on the contrary,
it is following policies intended to allow the maximum sustainable levels of real activity
and employment. And finally, I want to discuss ways in which we can work to keep
inflation low by maintaining a credible monetary policy. By credibility I mean that the




2

Fed sets and announces clearly defined goals, and we take action, when necessary, to
achieve those goals.

Economic growth does not cause inflation.
Let me start with a simple idea: Economic growth does not cause inflation. If all
we know about a particular economy is that it is growing rapidly, we really do not know
anything about its rate of inflation. The main determinants of economic growth are real
factors like the growth rate of productivity or the growth rate of the labor force. In
times of rapid technological change, for instance, we tend to see productivity
improvements that allow greater output per worker. This can lead to rapid growth in
real output in an economy regardless of the inflation rate. In the late 19th century, for
example, the U.S. was rapidly industrializing and, indeed, was on the road to world
power status. Yet the average rate of inflation during that time was negative—about a
one percent rate of deflation. If growth caused inflation, we would have observed
sharply rising prices during this era. Instead, rapid economic growth was associated with
deflation because money growth was constrained by the gold standard.
Of course, the 19th century is far in the past; but the idea that growth does not
cause inflation is borne out in modern economies as well. If you look around the world,
you will see that since World War II, high-inflation countries have grown no faster than
low-inflation countries. If anything, they have grown more slowly on average. And
even a slightly slower average rate of economic growth can have a large effect on living
standards. Suppose, for example, that every 3 percentage points of additional inflation
reduces the average growth rate of the economy by .075 percentage points, a rule of




3

thumb consistent with recent empirical estimates. Let's imagine two economies, one with
zero inflation growing at three percent per year, and an identical second economy with
three percent inflation, which, by our rule of thumb, grows at only 2.925 percent per
year because of the higher inflation. It doesn't sound like these economies are very
different.

But if we follow them for 30 years, we find that living standards in the

economy with higher inflation have been eroded by more than 2 percent. Is this a large
number? I think it is. In terms of national income in the U.S. economy today, it would
be about $170 billion, or just under $1,250 for every worker currently in the civilian
labor force.
In fact, the idea that growth does not cause inflation has been widely recognized
in economics since the 18th century economist and philosopher David Hume wrote his
famous tract, "Of Money," more than 200 years ago. Hume's reasoning was fairly
straightforward. All of economic theory is based on relative prices: People trade off
apples against oranges and computers against cars. The decisions that they make are
based on the nature of these tradeoffs. Prices are expressed in the relative form, how
much chicken do I have to give up to buy a steak?
In fact, the idea of inflation, a general rise in the level of prices, does not even
enter into the standard theory. Why? Because relative prices cannot all increase at the
same time. It is only the introduction of money, a common medium of transactions, that
creates the possibility of inflation. If, for convenience, all prices are expressed in terms
of a paper currency as they are today, then the money prices of goods and services can
all rise at once if the amount of currency in circulation is expanded enough. Thus,
monetary systems can produce inflation. This is the basis for the assertion that inflation




4

is a monetary phenomenon.

The logic, re-examined repeatedly by generations of

economists, seems to me to be ironclad.
But ironclad logic does not always translate into simple policy prescriptions. The
exact connections between money growth and inflation are hard to trace. There are
numerous problems in measuring what we mean by money, and for that matter what we
mean by inflation. In part because of these measurement problems, we do not fully
understand how short-term monetary growth rates get translated into short-term price
movements. For longer-run price movements, however, the evidence across countries
is clear: Persistently high rates of money growth, however you define them, translate into
persistently high rates of inflation. This longer-run evidence is comforting in that it
helps validate the monetary theory of inflation, but it is not that helpful in deciding what
monetary policy actions should be taken this month or the next. Still, problems in
identifying exact connections between money growth and inflation over relatively short
periods of time should not cause us to neglect the fundamentals of inflation.
It follows from my discussion that any effects of the real economy on inflation
must be temporary. But temporary inflation is by its very definition less of a concern
to monetary policymakers—if it is temporary, it will dissipate of its own accord and
requires no policy action. It is monetary inflation that policymakers must worry about,
because it is monetary inflation that is caused by the central bank and can be eliminated
only by the central bank.
Certainly many countries around the world have had serious problems with
monetary inflation, quite independent of anything occurring on the real side of their
economies. Some countries in Latin America have had average inflation rates in the




5

postwar era well in excess of 50 percent per year; many countries in Europe and
elsewhere have struggled with double-digit inflation for decades. These persistent
inflation rates are no accident. They are a matter of a fairly simple policy choice by the
central banks of these countries~the choice to tolerate a high inflation rate. In contrast
to these countries, we in the U.S. are lucky: We have had inflation of around 3 percent
for nearly the whole of the current expansion. But this 3 percent is an entrenched,
monetarily-induced inflation which is not going to go away unless the Fed takes specific
action to eliminate it.

The Fed is not "against jobs and growth."
Of course, taking action to move the monetary inflation rate lower is
controversial. Many are concerned that we will restrain the economy from its full
growth potential if we move to a lower inflation rate. Indeed, a surprise attack on
inflation-a "slam-on-the-brakes" disinflation policy-might well have such an effect. But
an organized, well-publicized and fully expected policy move toward a stable price
environment should pose no danger to the real economy. Such a change would allow
markets, consumers and businesses to plan for the new environment well in advance.
In fact, planning ahead and announcing intentions allows markets to act in ways that
reinforce the announced plans. For instance, a credible policy announcement today that
we plan to lower inflation by a certain amount over a certain time period might enter into
tomorrow's labor negotiations or government budgetary planning, allowing those
processes themselves to help bring about the lower inflation. Most macroeconomists
agree with this position: It is the unanticipated or surprise component of a change in




6

policy that causes economic turmoil, not the deliberate, well-publicized effort I have in
mind.
Far from being against jobs and growth, the Fed's inflation-fighting policy
maximizes our living standards over the long run. What I am suggesting is that the Fed
do its utmost to provide a stable price backdrop for the economy, allowing the price
system to work as efficiently as possible. After all, we want the prices in the economy
to reflect fundamental economic value. This allows people and businesses to accurately
assess the economic opportunities they face and make the best economic decisions.
There is no reason to confound the purpose of the price system by introducing inflation.
Otherwise, price changes in goods and services always have to be examined from two
sides: "How much of the price change is due to inflation, and how much is a real signal
about a change in economic value?" Inflation merely complicates the signals sent by the
price system.
Taking the risk of higher inflation is not just a matter of confusing price signals.
Higher inflation interacts with our nominally based tax system, especially with taxes on
capital, to create large distortions. Higher inflation also causes people and businesses
to waste resources trying to economize on their money holdings. A good deal of
research suggests that these costs are substantial. And to make matters worse, the risk
of higher inflation creates uncertainty, which also exacts costs, including an inflation risk
premium in interest rates.
A simple decomposition of interest rates on government securities will help
illustrate the problem. The return on a government debt instrument of a given maturity
can be thought of as having three components. First, there is a real component, which




7

compensates investors for the use of their money. Second, there is an expected inflation
component, which compensates investors for the loss of purchasing power of their money
over the time period involved. And finally, there is an inflation risk premium, which
compensates investors for taking the risk that inflation might be higher than they expected
at the time of purchase.
Attempting to estimate the size of these three components requires sophisticated
econometric analysis and, even in the best of circumstances, involves substantial
imprecision. But it is useful to consider two periods during the postwar era in the United
States when inflation was comparatively low and stable. The first period extended from
1960 through 1965. During these years, inflation was between \lh and 2 percent, and
the 10-year Treasury note was trading to yield around 4 percent. Most analysts think
monetary policy had considerable credibility at that time, so inflation risk was not a large
factor in interest rates. To the extent investors expected inflation to continue at \xh to
2 percent per year, the notes were priced for a real yield of 2 to 2xh percent.
Now contrast this with the years 1991 through the present. Inflation has been
near 3 percent during this period, and according to surveys, investors expect it to stay
at about that level. But the 10-year Treasury note has traded in a range between 6 and
8 percent. If the notes are priced to yield a real return of 2 to 2Vi percent, the inflation
risk premium may be anywhere from Vi to 2Vi percentage points. This is substantial,
and I think it is well worth our time to consider ways to eliminate it.
A lower inflation risk premium is possible if we follow a disciplined policy to
move inflation lower and keep it lower in a credible way. But, particularly against the
backdrop of external pressure, financial markets rightly worry that the Fed will instead




8

allow inflation to move higher, as it did in the 1970s~that we will allow the inflation
genie out of the bottle, so to speak. And if that happens, it may be a difficult and
painful process to get inflation back to where it is today.

Credibility: How to keep inflation low.
Our critics notwithstanding, I think most economists and policymakers agree with
the assessment of inflation that I have given so far. Because there has been widespread
consensus since the early 1980s that the U.S. inflation rate should not be allowed to
accelerate, we have had a fairly successful run of policy. This is especially the case in
the current six-year-old expansion, during which inflation has been extraordinarily low
and stable. U.S. monetary policy in the last 15 years is essentially a success story. We
have made great strides against inflation since the early 1980s, mostly to wide acclaim.
I think it is important to remember it hasn't always been this way.
I am afraid the Fed, and many other central banks, got into a trap in the 1960s
and 1970s. Beginning in the early '60s, the Fed sought to encourage a higher level of
economic activity by keeping interest rates artificially low. For a time, output rose while
inflation stayed low. The money supply, however, began to grow at an accelerating rate,
and by 1965 inflation had begun to rise. In response, the Fed tapped on the brake,
causing the money supply growth rate to drop sharply and the inflation rate to dip. But
tight money increased interest rates and reduced the flow of credit. The Fed responded
by releasing the brake and pushing down on the accelerator once more. As a result, the
money supply expanded sharply and inflation accelerated. This stop-and-go cycle was
repeated once again toward the end of the '60s and became a well-entrenched pattern in




9

the '70s. The economy lurched from recession to recession, and each recession was
followed by an expansion with a higher rate of inflation—and a higher rate of
unemployment-than the previous one.
I suspect that many of you have painful memories of the late '70s and early '80s.
It was a dark period for our economy. High inflation, 20 percent interest rates, and a
steep recession bankrupted many farmers and business people and sowed the seeds of the
S&L debacle. The experience surely showed the danger of letting inflation get out of
hand. The policy failures of the 1970s sprang from the mistaken notion that monetary
policy can be used to effectively manipulate growth in output. However, the view that
monetary policy could "fine-tune" economic activity turned out to be a mirage.
Arguably, such fine-tuning made things worse. An erratic monetary policy—one that
steps on the gas today only to brake tomorrow-seems as likely to exacerbate fluctuations
in real output as it is to reduce them.
The more successful policy involves watching inflation trends carefully and acting
pre-emptively to stave off incipient inflationary pressures. Many of the Fed's critics
dryly comment that the Fed has been "excessively" concerned about inflation during the
current expansion. But they're missing the point: The success of the FOMC's policy
has been that the Fed has moved with enough agility to keep inflation at bay. Low and
stable inflation is no accident; indeed, it is the result of good policy. One cannot analyze
the inflation outcomes independently of the policy regime that produced those outcomes.
In addition, I am happy to report, low and stable inflation has turned out to be perfectly
compatible with relatively strong growth in output and low unemployment. I am not
saying this can go on forever-I am sure that the business cycle will continue to buffet




10

our economy-but to those who argue that low inflation has been constraining growth or
raising unemployment, I beg to differ.
The forward-looking aspect of Fed policymaking has been essential to the success
we have enjoyed. The pre-emptive policy moves we have taken during the current
expansion have marked an important departure from the backward-looking policies that
got us in hot water in the past. Simply put, the FOMC must, over time, keep monetary
expansion in line with real growth to maintain stable prices.

Let's have a more informed debate.
I have tried to emphasize some of the hard lessons we have learned about
monetary policy over the postwar era: Inflation is not a road to prosperity. Economic
growth is ultimately determined by real factors outside the control of monetary policy.
Backward-looking, stop-and-go policies cause economic pain without generating any
offsetting economic gain.
I think many will agree with me that these have been important lessons. But
perhaps in this era of good times, it is tempting to think of the Fed as excessively
worried about the reemergence of inflation. The temptation is to imagine that because
inflation is relatively low and stable, it has no potential to rise again, even if we return
to the policies of the past. In short, the temptation is to forget which policy regime has
been successful in providing the backdrop for our relatively prosperous situation today.
In my view, these temptations represent dangerous thinking for U.S. monetary
policy. Critics who suggest the Fed is "against jobs and growth" are not helping to
make better monetary policy or improve U.S. economic performance. A nation cannot




11

inflate its way to prosperity. Creating nominal assets~in effect, printing more moneydoes nothing to improve living standards or create jobs, and in fact simply feeds
inflation, which must then be undone at a later date.
I recommend that we stick with the policies that helped bring us to the current
point of prosperity. The Fed needs to make careful inflation forecasts and act preemptively when necessary to head off inflationary pressures. The benefits of a forwardlooking, anti-inflation policy are clear, and such policies will contribute to continued
economic success. Indeed, a stable price backdrop is the best contribution monetary
policy can make to the U.S. economy.