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DEREGULATION: THE CHALLENGE TO
BANK MANAGEMENT"

Address by
Theodore H. Roberts
President
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Before the
93rd Annual Arkansas Bankers Association Convention
Excelsior Hotel
Little Rock, Arkansas
May 17, 1983

I am very pleased and proud to be back in my native state
today to speak to this large gathering of Arkansas bankers.
Thank you for making it possible for me to "come home again" to
participate in your convention.
Someone once noted that, "when a man is about to be
hanged, it concentrates his mind wonderfully]" Perhaps if you
will think carefully about the possibilities for bank
management under deregulation, you will also find it easy to
concentrate on the subject.

In discussing the challenge posed

by deregulation, it is important to understand why deregulation
has been happening, where it is going, and what you can do to
cope with it.
If any of you are old enough to have experienced the
terrible times of the early thirties in banking, you know that
most of the laws, regulations, and regulatory structure
governing banks came out of that economic crisis when the
overriding consideration was preservation of the nation's
payments system.

With a focus on bank safety, regulations have

always served to create barriers to competition.

This takes

the form of restrictions on entry, limitations on locations,
ceilings on interest rates that may be paid on deposits or
charged on loans, and restrictions on permissible activities.
However, as Robert Frost has noted, "something there is
that doesn't love a wall, that wants to tear it down."
Certainly the walls that regulated banking don't exist any
more.




Tidal waves of financial innovations have overwhelmed

the regulators and regulated alike; while many of the old laws
are still in place, the walls they were intended to create have
long since crumbled.

How did this happen?

The accelerating inflation of the seventies brought much
higher interest rates than had been known since the twenties.
As market interest rates climbed through deposit ceilings,
"disintermediation" became widespread.

It was one thing for a

savings depositor to ignore a small premium rate over what he
was paid by his bank when inflation was nominal, but quite
another situation when inflation had soared to double digits
and market interest rates were more than twice his return on a
regulated bank deposit.

You might say depositor

self-preservation was the driving force behind his move to
marketable securities and money market mutual funds.
Naturally, banks and other depository financial
institutions had to obtain relief from regulated interest
ceilings to survive.

The evidence can be found in everything

from T-Bill Certificates and NOW accounts to the newest Money
Market Deposit Accounts.

Not only have banks found a way to

pay market interest rates, but they are even paying them on
checking accounts!

So much for deposit interest rate

ceilings. -With some important assistance from the federal
level and some heavy battles on the home front, usury ceilings
on loan interest have also been generally eased or eliminated.
But, I don't think I have to recount that struggle to you
Arkansas Bankers 1



Only a few years ago, it was inconceivable that banks
could branch across state lines.

Out-of-state and foreign

banks were (to paraphrase Mark Twain) as out of place as a
Presbyterian in Purgatory.
everywhere.

Now, Presbyterians are popping up

Citicorp and Security-Pacific are buying banks in

South Dakota, Bank of Boston is acquiring one in Maine, Rainier
is moving into Alaska, Bank of America has a deal set to take
over the largest bank in Washington, Morgan, Chase,
Manufacturers Hanover and others are establishing banks in
Delaware, which is fast becoming our "Little Switzerland11 in
the United States.

Northern Trust and NCNB have capitalized on

a grandfather clause in the Florida banking law to enter
banking in that state.

Chemical has an option to purchase a

large Florida bank "when permissible.11

Add to these

illustrations, the nationwide proliferation of loan production
offices, subsidiaries for (among other things) leasing,
mortgage banking, consumer loans, commercial finance,
investment counseling, discount brokerage, data processing,
futures commission merchant, international banking, and export
trading, and you can see that the walls intended to contain
geographical expansion are more like a sieve.
Furthermore, until recently only depository institutions
could engage in "banking" activities.

Now the lines between

banks, thrifts, and financial service firms have become so
blurred that most customers find it difficult to distinguish
the differences any more.



A case in point would be

Merril 1-Lynch's cash management account, which offers a
customer securities trading and safekeeping, an interest-paying
money market mutual fund with checking privileges, and a charge
card with a line of credit.

An innovative management, together

with advancing computer and communications technology,.made
this attractive consumer product possible.
Concurrently, an amalgamation of financial service firms
and some non-financial companies is taking place.

Insurance

companies (such as Prudential) are buying banks in order for
their investment brokerage subsidiaries to have I.R.A. and
other "deposit products" to retail nationally through their
branch system.

In a variation on the theme, Merrill Lynch is

buying a savings and loan association.

Citicorp and National

Steel are already there -- they own savings and loans with
statewide branching powers in California that are expected to
spread their retail deposit gathering system nationwide in
time.

We mustn't forget Sears and Penney.

The former owns a

California savings and loan, a large investment banking and
brokerage company, a big mortgage banking and real estate
brokerage operation—not to mention a major insurance company.
The latter just agreed to acquire a Delaware bank and has
announced plans to enter the home banking market.

On another

front, money management firms such as Dreyfus Corporation have
discovered a way to make a "non-bank" out of a bank by limiting
its function to deposit taking with no commercial loans.




Clearly, the regulatory walls intended to contain banking

- 5 -

prices, restrict geographical presence, and limit entry to
supervised participants are tumbling down.

Like Humpty Dumpty,

I doubt that they can ever be put back together again.

The

question in my mind is whether all this is truly in the public
interest.

I am a great believer in the principle that*the

least regulation is the best regulation, consistent with the
public interest.

I also firmly believe that the free market is

the best way to allocate scarce resources--financial or
otherwise.

Having said that, however, I think we may be

experiencing a distorting effect here of the interaction of old
laws and regulations, and the innovative techniques for
circumventing them.

Is it really desirable to have

deposit-like instruments spring up overnight to hold 3200
billion of personal financial assets without the protection of
federal deposit insurance or supervision?

Are we possibly

dooming our traditional banking system by requiring it to
maintain minimum capital, while new forms of banking with no
such standards develop outside the system?

Is it really in the

public interest to allow individual states to determine which
services banks will be able to offer on a nationwide basis,
even when in direct conflict with established federal policy?
The-conclusion that I draw from all this is that it is
high time for a critical review of existing federal policies as
reflected in our banking laws, in order to determine what the
public interest really is.

Are we getting too far from safety

and soundness with respect to liquid savings?



Could we

- 6 -

possibly be jeopardizing the viability of the payments system?
Do we really want a merging of financial and non-financial
businesses in this country?

Is the risk of economic

concentration being properly considered?
Meanwhile, how do you as managers of banks cope with the
de facto situation of a deregulating banking system?

It may be

constructive to look at two other major industries that have
been subject to substantial deregulation in recent years:
securities firms and airlines.

In those industries, we saw

that deregulation resulted in weak firms becoming weaker much
faster than strong firms got stronger.

The most profitable

products came under severe price pressure as competition
focused on them.

There was an industry-wide profit squeeze

that forced rapid cost-cutting, particularly staff reductions.
This impacted both large and small firms as competition
intensified from new entrants.
In the brokerage business, the public has turned
increasingly to discount brokers who offer to execute
transactions at cut-rate prices.

Without the overhead of

"ful1-service" companies, this leaves them room for profit
while making the established companies unprofitable in this
line of business.

Incidentally, banks are the principal new

entrants to this business currently.
The airline industry provides additional evidence for the
gains that deregulation provides.

Not only is flying generally

much cheaper than it would otherwise have been, there is



considerably more competition in the industry.

Prior to the

recent deregulation, virtually no new airline had been
chartered for about 40 years, and route competition among
existing airlines was severely restricted; since deregulation,
more than 30 new airlines have appeared.

Moreover, competition

in the major markets has widened considerably as existing
airlines have moved in to compete head-to-head.

Of course,

competition has been reduced in some of the lesser markets
lacking profit potential, and prices have risen there while
service has been limited.

No wonder we hear concern in the

banking business about our equivalent of the 599 coast-to-coast
fare.
Although it is generally conceded that the increased
competition associated with deregulation has benefitted the
users of financial services, there have been warnings that our
ability to conduct monetary policy has been severely impaired.
As you know, it has been said by some that deregulation has
produced such a multitude of money substitutes that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to know what money is or how much
there is of it.

Thus, it is argued that any attempt to affect

the economy by increasing or decreasing some seemingly
arbitraril-y-defined money measure may be futile.
I don't believe that this is valid.

Spendable money

consists of currency and checkable deposits; the best empirical
evidence still suggests that this measure of money is
predictably related to economic activity.



If some changes do

occur, policy can be changed, and indeed, will be changed to
accommodate them.

There is no reason, however, to believe that

such changes are necessary at this time.
It is further alleged that since a sizable proportion of
checkable deposits now essentially yield market interest rates,
monetary control will fall apart.

This argument is predicated

on the assumption that Federal Reserve actions operate only
through changes in interest rates.

That is, when the Fed

supplies less reserves, market interest rates rise and induce a
flow of funds from checkable deposits into other money market
instruments.

This then causes a decline in the money stock. I

don't believe that this is the sole transmission mechanism for
monetary policy.

If the Fed contracts reserves, financial

institutions must contract their reservable liabilities,
irrespective of what happens to interest rates.

This is

nothing more than a straightforward accounting exercise as long
as reserves must be held against checkable deposits.
Thus, on net, it does not seem that deregulation has
adversely affected our ability to conduct policy.

But, what of

the consequences of deregulation on the financial institutions
themselves?

What can you do about deregulation?

Well-, first of all, you might consider re-regulating the
industry, thereby attempting to turn back the calendar to a
simpler era.

Those who seriously think that this is a feasible

option are much like generals who try to win the current war by
fighting the last one over again.



Old strategies and outmoded

plans are unlikely to prevail; as some philosopher once noted,
it is our future, not our past, that lays down the law of our
today.
Second, you might try to slow down the impact of
deregulation and give yourselves more time to adjust te it.
The recent moratorium imposed on the further creation of
"non-bank banks" is one example of such action.

Certainly,

such a period of R and R would be helpful if it is used
creatively and if it could be guaranteed.

The major problem

with attempts to slow down the pace of innovation and market
deregulation is that such pressures are not alleviated, they
are merely shunted from one area to another.

Unlike the boy

who saved the dam by plugging a hole with his thumb, every hole
in the regulatory dam that is plugged, even temporarily, will
simply produce new holes.

Even an octopus who was all thumbs

would be ineffective under such conditions.
So what will deregulation do to banks?

The final demise

of price controls, product controls and geographical
restrictions will affect banks in the same way that
deregulation has affected every other industry.

Again, we can

look at the securities industry and the airlines to get a
preview of what is in store for banks and other financial
institutions as deregulation advances on all fronts.

In the

securities industry, there have been a number of firms that
just disappeared; some went under and some merged with others
to survive as commissions fell when the minimum commission



s t r u c t u r e was deregulated.

Some have found i t t o t h e i r

advantage t o become associated w i t h banks:

Bank America Corp,

Chase Manhattan, C i t i c o r p , and S e c u r i t y P a c i f i c are j u s t the
b e t t e r known examples.

A recent r e p o r t estimates t h a t there

are some 600 d e p o s i t o r y i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t o f f e r some form of
discount brokerage s e r v i c e s .
What about the a i r l i n e s ?
B r a n i f f and Laker.

You know what happened t o

Look a t the earnings o f the major a i r l i n e s

as a group; d e r e g u l a t i o n has not been e s p e c i a l l y kind t o them.
On the other hand, as I mentioned e a r l i e r , a large number of
new f i r m s have entered the i n d u s t r y and some of these are doing
r e l a t i v e l y w e l l ; i t appears t h a t they w i l l

survive.

In the face o f ongoing d e r e g u l a t i o n , banks w i l l continue
t o f i n d themselves s u b j e c t t o c o n t i n u i n g pressure on margins,
greater earnings v a r i a b i l i t y and excessive f i x e d c a p i t a l
(compared t o t h e i r n o n - f i n a n c i a l c o m p e t i t o r s ) .

There w i l l be

greater divergence i n the earnings performances and f u r t h e r
c o n s o l i d a t i o n — b o t h among banks and between banks and other
f i n a n c i a l and n o n - f i n a n c i a l f i r m s .
U.S. commercial banks.
10,000?

5,000?

There are now about 14,000

How many o f them w i l l

survive?

There i s no way t o come up w i t h the d e f i n i t i v e

answer a t t h i s t i m e .

What i s c l e a r , however, i s t h a t there

w i l l be considerably fewer banks around when the competitive
dust f i n a l l y c l e a r s .




Which banks will survive?

Analysis of deregulation in

other industries suggests that there are three different types
of banks that will survive.

First, there will be those banks

that will offer the full range of financial services worldwide;
these will be the international distributors of financial
services.

Second, there will be the boutique banks, those that

specialize on specific financial services and markets that are
not highly price sensitive.

Finally, some new, lower cost,

banks will be successful simply because they are not burdened
down by the major structural costs that tend to build up in
regulated industries.

These banks will focus on the highly

price-sensitive segment of financial services.
Management of financial institutions will have to
undertake a different attitude.

Instead of attempting to

deliver the best service at the lowest price in a narrow
product line in some specifically prescribed geographical area,
it will have to decide which services to offer and in which
locations.

In other words, the range of alternative options

will increase very substantially and the number of decisions to
be made will increase in geometric proportion to the options
available.

All of that, with a probably narrower spread

between revenues and costs. While in the past managers of
financial institutions were able to specialize in a relatively
narrow line of endeavors, they will have to become much broader
in their scope of knowledge and much more entrepreneurial in
their actions.



Although, many banks will disappear, I do not believe
that this means that it will be the small institutions that
will fail and the large ones will prosper. Small institutions
may excel in specific product lines and specific geographical
areas.

The failures will be dominated by those who make the

wrong choices at the outset.

Typically these will be

institutions that attempt to blindly follow all actions of
their competitors, that seek to provide services for which they
have neither expertise nor experience, and that venture
foolishly into localities and markets where they are unknown
and likely to remain so.

These failures will probably be

equally distributed among the large and small institutions. On
the other hand, those who make the right choices now and
develop comparative advantage, will be on a much stronger
footing than they are now.
There is one final confusion that surrounds the issue of
deregulation.

Some people are concerned that deregulation is

the same as "no regulations."

This is clearly not the case.

Financial institutions will continue to be subject to important
and effective regulation.

Financial institutions are different

from other business firms in some \/ery fundamental ways.

Some

financial institutions create money; that power affects
everyone in society, not just the customers of the individual
institutions.

Control over this aspect must remain.

Others

provide the payments mechanism in our society and the integrity
of this mechanism must be protected.



Still others enter into

involuntary very long term contractual obligations, such as
pension funds, and the risk of default on such obligations must
be minimized.
Many regulations will therefore remain.

Deregulation

will remove only those that were standing in the way of
increased efficiency in the provision of financial services.
Also falling by the wayside will be regulations and
restrictions that are no longer relevant to the new competition
that deregulation is fostering among financial services firms.
A good example of this is the potential re-shaping of deposit
insurance that is now taking place.

Insured banks and thrifts

pay the same insurance "premium11 to obtain deposit insurance
regardless of their own risk characteristics and
circumstances.

In the good old days, there may not have been a

great difference between the riskiness associated with one bank
and another.

After all, banks were restricted to severely

limited activities, and were generally protected from the
vicissitudes of competition by the regulatory barriers
surrounding them.

But, no longer.

As opportunities have

opened up, competition has heated up, and, as interest spreads
have narrowed, there has also been increased risk and greater
divergence* among banks in their asset and liability
strategies. Some recognition of this will almost surely show
up in deposit insurance rates for banks and thrifts. This is
just one example of how deregulation will affect the remaining
regulatory structure.



The fact that deregulation of financial services w i l l
provide great social benefits and greater overall efficiency
doesn't make i t s impact on you, as bankers, any less
problemmatical.

The challenge you face is enormous.

Yet i t is

no greater than that faced by any entrepreneur who has*some
resources, decides where and how to use them, and who bears the
risks and rewards of his decisions.

Indeed, the problem that

you now face i s similar to that of the two men who were hiking
in the wilderness and found themselves suddenly face-to-face
with an enraged g r i z z l y bear.

As the bear prepared to charge

at them, one of the men quickly kicked o f f his hiking shoes and
started to lace on some running shoes that he was carrying in
his pack.
that bear."

"You're crazy" the other man said, "you can't outrun
" I don't have to outrun the bear," the f i r s t man

r e p l i e d , " I only have to outrun you."
Don't expect to outrun deregulation.
have t o outrun your competition.

To survive, y o u ' l l

I f you haven't already done

so, now would be a good time to s t a r t lacing up your running
shoes.