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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time,
Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

“Parsing the Pandemic’s Effects on
Labor Markets”
Susan M. Collins
President & Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Opening Remarks
at the Bank’s 66th Economic Conference,
“Labor Markets During and After the Pandemic”
November 18, 2022

The views expressed today are my own, not necessarily those of my colleagues on the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors or the Federal Open Market Committee.

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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time, Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

Key Takeaways
1. The Fed’s focus on the U.S. labor market is grounded in its dual mandate
to achieve price stability and maximum employment. Restoring price
stability remains our current imperative as monetary policymakers, and it is
clear there is more work to do. Understanding how the pandemic is
affecting employment in the short and longer term, while challenging, is
essential for that effort.
2. There has been a significant amount of work on COVID-19 and the labor
market among academic economists as well as researchers within the
Federal Reserve System. This conference brings together leading experts
on the topic, enabling us to benefit from their perspectives and learn about
remaining questions to be answered.
3. Answering key questions about the pandemic’s effects on labor demand
and labor supply is important for calibrating monetary policy and reducing
inflation back to 2 percent. By raising rates, we are aiming to slow the
economy and bring labor demand into better balance with supply. I remain
optimistic that there is a pathway to re-establishing labor market balance
with only a modest rise in the unemployment rate – while remaining realistic
about the risks of a larger downturn.
4. Potentially long-lasting effects of the pandemic on the labor market, such
as increased remote work and accelerated automation of service-sector
jobs, are likely to have differential effects across the workforce.
Understanding these differences is important for achieving the Fed’s
mission of a vibrant, inclusive economy in the wake of COVID-19.

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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time, Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

Good morning. It is my great pleasure to welcome everyone to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston. We are also pleased to be joined by those watching on the
public livestream.
This is the 66th economic conference organized by the Boston Fed. And while it
is my first conference as the Bank’s president, it is wonderful to be reconnecting with
many friends and colleagues attending today to explore some very important issues.
I’m delighted to now be part of the Boston Fed’s long conference series. These
meetings foster analysis and discussion – among a diverse set of researchers, central
bankers, and other policymakers. They focus on complex issues where the work
presented and discussed can inform, and make a difference – consistent with the Fed’s
goal to support a vibrant, resilient, and inclusive economy. Our conference this year is a
prime example, and I want to commend our economic research team – led by our
Director of Research Geoff Tootell – for designing such a timely and impactful agenda.
Before beginning, I note as always that the views I share today are my own. I am
not speaking for colleagues at the other Reserve Banks or the Board in Washington.
Context: Maximum Employment and Price Stability
Let me start with some context. At the Fed, policy-relevant discussions are
rooted in the dual mandate assigned to us by Congress – maximum employment and
price stability. We define price stability as 2 percent inflation. Maximum employment is
less specifically defined; but I see it as a broad, inclusive goal of job opportunities for all.
I’ve noted in past remarks that these two mandates are intertwined. Price stability
is key for achieving sustained maximum employment – meaning, only when inflation is
low and stable can the economy in general, and the labor market in particular, work well
for all Americans. Labor market conditions also influence inflation dynamics, as we have
seen recently with very tight labor markets contributing to high inflation.
At the Fed we approach our mandate with the utmost seriousness, and
conferences like this help in achieving our goals – by providing insights, challenging
assumptions, and exploring central questions about the economy. And coming out of
the acute phase of the pandemic, there are many relevant questions about the U.S.
labor market to explore. For instance:



How has the pandemic affected job opportunities, and how is labor supply
responding to those changes?
Which recent changes in the labor market reflect transient, cyclical conditions;
and which reflect developments in long-run, structural forces that monetary
policy has little influence over?

These sets of questions are important for the key task the Fed faces today:
lowering inflation back to 2 percent. By raising rates, we are aiming to slow the
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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time, Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

economy and bring labor demand into better balance with supply. The intent is not a
significant downturn. But restoring price stability remains the current imperative and it is
clear that there is more work to do. I expect this will require additional increases in the
federal funds rate, followed by a period of holding rates at a sufficiently restrictive level
for some time. The latest data have not reduced my sense of what sufficiently restrictive
may mean, nor my resolve. Still, despite being realistic about the risks, I look at current
conditions1 and remain optimistic that there is a pathway to reestablishing price stability
with a labor market slowdown that entails only a modest rise in the unemployment rate.
In my remarks today, I will begin with the issue of structural versus cyclical labor
market developments, then touch on aspects of the labor market that are especially
salient for the current conduct of monetary policy, and finally consider some longer-run
issues related to full employment in an inclusive economy.
Structural Trends Versus Cyclical Movements
Distinguishing long-run trends from temporary cyclical movements in the
economy and labor market is challenging. And it is vital for calibrating monetary policy,
so as to ensure we restore price stability in a reasonable timeframe without slowing real
activity more than necessary.
Changes in the labor market are typically driven by a combination of structural
and cyclical forces, and parsing their relative impact is complex. For example,
manufacturing employment is highly cyclical, but the two recessions in the decade from
2000 to 2010 likely brought forward some of the longer-run declines in factory jobs that
would have happened anyway, from increased automation and globalization. In other
words, structural change can be concentrated in recessionary periods.2,3
Of course, structural influences have not prevented the job market’s return to a
healthy state during ensuing economic recoveries. That was the case after the COVID19 recession, as the unemployment rate quickly returned to low, pre-pandemic levels.
Even so, there are potentially many long-lasting implications of the COVID-19
recession for the labor market. It is quite possible that COVID-19 brought significant

1
For example, it appears many firms are still “catching up” to fill staffing vacancies even as demand
slows. In addition, strong household balance sheets should help support consumer spending.
2
See for example “Why does structural change accelerate in recessions? The credit reallocation channel”
by Cooper Howes, in the Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 144, Issue 3, June 2022, pgs. 933-952.
3
More generally, fears of increased structural unemployment have often followed recessions, going back
at least to the early 1960s. In 2011 the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) discussed whether a
significant amount of the high unemployment that remained after the Great Recession was structural.
See, for example, a now-public memo on structural unemployment presented to the FOMC in 2011.

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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time, Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

changes that bear directly, and over the long term, on the Fed’s goal of a thriving,
inclusive economy.
Consider that in addition to a significant decline in aggregate demand, the
COVID-19 recession also saw large changes in aggregate supply as firms shut down
early in the pandemic. Firms have re-opened, but pandemic-related adjustments like
increased remote work and the accelerated automation of service-sector jobs have the
potential to affect aggregate supply in the longer run.
And these trends will probably have differential impacts on workers with different
characteristics. This is important because the Fed’s mandate is to support a healthy
economy characterized by price stability and maximum employment – for everyone. To
do so, policymakers must assess which of the labor market changes originating in, or
altered by, the pandemic are likely to last. For example, there have long been troubling
gaps in the rate of unemployment for Black and Hispanic workers relative to national
averages. Beyond their human toll, these gaps reflect underutilization of our country’s
labor resources, and adversely affect productivity and prosperity. It is important to
understand the factors behind these gaps in general, and how (and for how long) they
are affected by labor market disruptions like Covid-19.

Parsing the Pandemic’s Effects
One way the COVID-19 recession’s aftermath has played out differently than that
of past recessions involves the relationship between the unemployment rate and other
labor market variables. In contrast with recent recoveries, unemployment returned quite
quickly to its prior rate after the COVID-19 recession and has remained between 3.5
and 3.7 percent since March.
However, other indicators are now quite different than they were pre-pandemic. A
challenge for current monetary policy is determining whether the changes in the
relationship between the unemployment rate and other labor market variables stem
from temporary effects of the pandemic, or from longer-lasting labor market trends that
the pandemic might have influenced.
In particular, both price and wage inflation are now much higher than before the
pandemic, even though the unemployment rate is back to pre-pandemic levels.
One explanation for a higher inflation rate coinciding with the pre-pandemic
unemployment rate has to do with the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation as
captured by the Phillips Curve. More specifically, the Phillips Curve may be steeper at
unemployment rates near 3.5 percent.4

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Demand pressures appear much more pronounced now than before the pandemic. With a much steeper
Phillips Curve at low unemployment rates, these additional demand pressures would result in much
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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
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A key question for monetary policy is whether relationships at this low
unemployment rate are symmetric. If true, this would raise the likelihood of a similarly
rapid decline in inflation associated with modest increases in unemployment, as tight
monetary policy eases demand pressures. But we cannot rule out other explanations
that would point to a less favorable tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, such
as an increase in inflation expectations relevant for wage and price setting.
The pandemic has also highlighted challenges in measuring labor market slack.
Vacancies relative to the unemployment rate, as captured by the so-called Beveridge
Curve, are now at historically high levels. One reason could be that firms are struggling
to replace workers who move from job to job to obtain higher wages. Alternatively, the
recent increase in vacancies could signal a longer-lasting increase in frictional
unemployment, and therefore in the natural rate of unemployment.5
These alternative explanations for the recent observed vacancy-tounemployment relationship matter for monetary policy, and how we think about labor
market slack. If the substantial increase in vacancies mostly reflects temporary factors,
then a slowdown in labor demand could work primarily through lower vacancies, rather
than higher unemployment. This scenario for the Beveridge Curve would be consistent
with a steeper Phillips Curve at low unemployment rates – the possibility I just
mentioned.
Longer-Run Issues Affecting the Labor Market
The increase in remote work is just one example of longer-term trends that the
pandemic may have accelerated, or in other cases slowed. These trends are relevant
because they affect our understanding of the cyclical position of the economy, and also
because they matter for what the Fed considers to be maximum sustainable
employment. Moreover, trends affected by COVID-19 could have disparate effects on
different groups in the labor force.
I’ll briefly highlight three key trends that we will explore in more detail over the
next day and a half – remote work, education, and automation.
First, remote work, while not an option for all jobs, could alter employment
opportunities at the individual, sectoral, and regional levels. Given all the considerations
for employees and employers, these changes are unlikely to apply uniformly across
workers and firms. Nevertheless, at the individual level, the ability to work remotely

higher inflation, with little further reduction in the unemployment rate. In this view, the pandemic has
traced out a portion of the Phillips Curve that may have always existed but was not empirically relevant in
recent decades.
5
For example, workers may not live in areas of increased labor demand due to a lack adequate housing
in those places. Although housing markets may eventually adjust, restoring regional balance between
labor demand and supply may take a long time.
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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time, Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

could help people with family responsibilities or physical limitations participate in the
labor force to a greater degree. At the regional level, the ability to work in remote
locations could help spread the population more widely and limit the disproportionate
growth of job opportunities in high cost, “superstar” cities.6
However, remote work may not ameliorate troublesome geographic disparities.
Rather than repopulating cities that had lost manufacturing jobs, remote workers may
instead flock to places with relatively high consumption amenities, which may worsen
the housing shortages in those places. And given that higher-income, college-educated
workers were more often able to work from home during the pandemic, they may be
more likely than others to benefit from a long-run shift toward remote work.
Second, we need to parse the pandemic’s effects on education – a topic near
and dear to me, and very important to the labor market. College enrollment was 6.8
percent lower for students graduating from high school in 2020 than in the previous
year.7 This unprecedented decline could reduce the lifetime college attainment rate for
the affected cohort – and was more pronounced among students from disadvantaged
high schools.
Third, automation may well extend beyond assembly-line and clerical jobs, which
have been disproportionately automated during the last several decades, to encompass
more jobs in the service sector. The push for additional automation may be fueled in
part by limited labor supply in the service sector following the pandemic. In general,
economists view favorably the application of new technologies to production since
productivity growth is the ultimate source of rising living standards. But economists also
recognize that there are often winners and losers from automation. Increased
automation of service-sector jobs could exacerbate wage inequality.
Concluding Observations
The sessions at this conference will address critical labor-market issues –
including the effect of COVID-19 on labor supply, the future of remote work, the effects
of automation, retirement trends, immigration, short-time compensation, and new firm
formation. The analysis and discussion will help illuminate COVID-19’s implications.

6
A few months before the pandemic began, the Boston Fed hosted a conference on regional disparities.
The growth of remote education and work has the potential to ameliorate some problems the conference
highlighted.
7
A March 2021 report from the National Student Clearinghouse Research Center (NSCRC) documents
COVID-19’s effect on college enrollment among students graduating from high school in 2020. The report
notes that the pandemic “disproportionately affected graduates of low-income, high-poverty, and highminority high schools, with their enrollments dropping more steeply than their more advantaged
counterparts. For instance, enrollment declines are 2.3 times steeper for low-income high schools
compared to higher income schools.”

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Remarks as Prepared for Delivery
EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:40 A.M. U.S. Eastern Time, Friday, November 18, 2022 – OR UPON DELIVERY

While fascinating in their own right, the conference sessions are highly relevant
for monetary policy given the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate. At the Fed we are
committed to returning inflation to the 2 percent target in a reasonable amount of time.
Only when inflation is low and stable can the economy in general — and the labor
market in particular — work well for all Americans.
Clearly, policymaking benefits from careful, ongoing study of all the ways the
pandemic has changed the labor market. So it is a fitting time to gather, and deepen our
understand of the labor market during and after the pandemic.
Thank you again for being here. Now we’ll move into the first session. This
mornings’ sessions will be moderated by Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes from the University
of California, Merced.

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