View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY




STATEMENT BY

STEPHEN S. GARDNER, VICE CHAIRMAN

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TAXATION AND DEBT
MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

FEBRUARY 6, 1978

Under the Congressional budget procedures adopted in 1974,
increases in the Federal debt ceiling have become essentially a
reflection of the Federal budget totals Congress sets with the help
of its new budget committees.

Debt ceiling hearings, nevertheless,

provide an opportunity for review and reassessment of the broader
economic implications of a large and rapidly growing Federal debt.
My testimony today will, therefore, focus as requested on some of the
financial implications of an expanding public debt.
The Federal budget document recently sent to Congress
provides projections of expected increases in the Federal debt
subject to ceiling, along with estimates of the likely dimensions
of needed changes in the debt ceiling itself.

While the outstanding

Federal debt is expected to remain below the present temporary
ceiling of $752 billion during the next two months, this temporary
leeway expires on March 31.

Since the permanent debt ceiling is

still set at $400 billion, a new temporary ceiling will obviously be
needed by that date.
The Budget Document estimates that a new temporary ceiling
of $781 billion will be needed to accommodate prospective Federal
borrowing requirements through the end of the current fiscal year.
Of this $29 billion increase, about $10 billion is needed to cover
expected growth in agency holdings of Government debt, chiefly to




-

2

-

fund future Civil Service retirement liabilities and unemployment
compensation.

A further increase in the ceiling to $871 billion is

estimated to be needed to cover requirements through

fiscal 1979,

with about $15 billion of the $90 billion increase allotted to agency
fund growth.
The projected need for a higher debt ceiling also reflects
the Administration's estimate that the Treasury will have to borrow
$66 billion from the public during the current fiscal year, and then
another $73 billion during fiscal 1979.

These estimates include

borrowing to finance so-called "off-budget" needs as well as regular
budget requirements.

Since "off-budget" needs add to Federal demands

on financial markets, a borrowing figure that covers both types of
operations provides a more comprehensive measure of the financial
pressures being exerted by Federal requirements.

It should be noted

that the $66 and $73 billion figures relate only to net cash borrowing
from the public.

Gross borrowing to refinance public holdings of

maturing Federal debt will be several times the volume of net
borrowi ng.
Successive fiscal-year cash borrowing totals of $66 and
$73 billion are obviously large.

However, their likely impact on

conditions in financial markets will depend on the aggregate volume
of savings available in the economy and the accumulated demand
for funds from other types of borrowers.




Moreover, the significance

-

3

-

of given absolute dollar totals of Federal deficit financing must
be kept in perspective, by also considering the growth in the overall
level of economic activity.
In fiscal Year 1976, net Federal borrowing from the public
totaled over $83 billion, substantially more than the annual figures
now being projected for the current fiscal year and for fiscal 1979.
However, with the economy in fiscal 1976 still in the early stages
of recovery from the serious 1974-75 recession, demands for funds
from other nonfinancial sectors were relatively moderate.

Businesses

were making sizable net repayments of short-term loans at commercial
banks, and demands for funds to finance multi-family housing and
commercial properties remained slack.

As a result, net borrowing

by the Federal government and other nonfinancial sectors, combined,
amounted to about 15 per cent of GNP--a reasonable total under the
circumstances of the recovery taking place that year.

Moreover, with

credit demands moderate, commercial banks and other institutions
were still actively rebuilding liquidity in the aftermath of the
1973-74 financial strains.

Consequently, there was a strong demand

for U. S. Government securities, and the unusually large net Federal
borrowing need was readily accommodated at declining interest rates.




- 4 -

In the fiscal year 1977— which ended last September— net
funds raised by sectors other than the Federal Government were
more than $100 billion above the fiscal 1976 level.

Even

though Federal cash borrowing was about $30 billion lower, total
borrowing by all sectors still showed a large increase and rose as
a percentage of GNP.

In bond and mortgage markets financing outside

the Federal sector rose by roughly 60 per cent; consumer credit
expanded sharply; and bank lending to businesses showed a marked
recovery from the earlier cyclical slackness.
As their customers' demands for loans expanded, commercial
banks sharply curtailed their acquisitions of Treasury securities;
then during the final quarter of the fiscal year they became sizable
net sellers of such issues.

Nonfinancial corporations were also

sellers of Treasury debt on balance over the year as a whole.
Thus, changes on both the demand and supply sides of
financial markets contributed to upward pressures on market interest
rates during the latter half of fiscal 1977 as the economy continued
to expand.

Short-term interest rates rose the most, but some

increases also developed in note and bond markets, particularly those
for intermediate-term Treasury debt which absorbed a sizable volume
of new offerings.

Open-market operations undertaken by the Federal

Reserve to counter the excessively rapid monetary growth that developed




- 5 -

in the April and July quarters of 1977 contributed to the rise in
short-term rates, although reserves available to the banking system
expanded significantly during fiscal 1977 after remaining essentially
unchanged in fiscal 1976.
Since the end of fiscal 1977, the current

and prospective

near-term volume of Federal deficit financing has expanded consider­
ably.

Pressures on Federal financing costs stemming from this

expanded borrowing might have been greater had it not been for two
special types of demands for Treasury debt that became particularly
strong in this period.

Foreign investors--chiefly central banks and

other official institutions--invested a substantial part of their
sharply increased holdings of U. S. dollars in Treasury debt.

Also,

State and local governments continued to acquire a large volume of
special Treasury arbitrage bonds, and thus limited the volume of new
debt the Treasury had to sell to other investors.
The Treasury has projected net Federal cash needs in the
current quarter not too different from the large volume borrowed in
the January quarter of fiscal 1976.

During the May-June period,

however, it expects the weight of Federal borrowing on fianncial
markets to slacken— with some seasonal debt repayment.

During the

July-September quarter, although the Treasury is again likely to
face a sizable deficit, net borrowing will probably be less than in




- 6 -

the current quarter and possibly little different from the comparable
perod a year ago.
In general, the net impact of the Treasury's future
borrowing requirements on financial markets will depend in large
measure on the weight of other credit demands at the time.

If

rising Federal deficits occur in combination with a general
strengthening of other demands, this might very well lead to further
upward pressure on interest rates, particularly if inflationary
increases in the monetary aggregates are to be avoided.

In order

to encourage the capital spending by businesses that is needed to
maintain our nation's economic growth and international competitive­
ness, it is, therefore, important to ensure that the Federal govern­
ment does not unduly impinge on the financial and real resources that
need to be channeled into business expansion.
Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer two
comments of a strictly operational character.

First, I think the

early timing of this hearing in relation to the expiration date of
the debt ceiling is all to the good, since it should help to avoid
the unfortunate disruption of efficient debt management that invariably
develops when the ceiling reverts back to its permanent level--even
for a few days.

Second, the Federal Reserve hopes that your actions

will continue to provide the Treasury with the requisite statutory
............




’

...........

l i b r a r y

tturity sector of the