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For release on delivery
10:15 a.m. EDT (8:15 a.m. MDT)
August 21, 2016

Remarks on the U.S. Economy

by
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
“Program on the World Economy”
a conference sponsored by
The Aspen Institute
Aspen, Colorado

August 21, 2016

The Fed’s dual mandate aims for maximum sustainable employment and an
inflation rate of 2 percent, as measured by the price index for personal consumption
expenditures (PCE). Employment has increased impressively over the past six years
since its low point in early 2010, and the unemployment rate has hovered near 5 percent
since August of last year, close to most estimates of the full-employment rate of
unemployment. The economy has done less well in reaching the 2 percent inflation rate.
Although total PCE inflation was less than 1 percent over the 12 months ending in June,
core PCE inflation, at 1.6 percent, is within hailing distance of 2 percent--and the core
consumer price index inflation rate is currently above 2 percent. 1
So we are close to our targets. Not only that, the behavior of employment has
been remarkably resilient. During the past two years we have been concerned at various
stages by the possible negative effects on the U.S. economy of the Greek debt crisis, by
the 20 percent appreciation of the trade-weighted dollar, by the Chinese growth
slowdown and accompanying exchange rate uncertainties, by the financial market
turbulence during the first six weeks of this year, by the dismaying pothole in job growth
this May, and by Brexit--among other shocks. Yet, even amid these shocks, the labor
market continued to improve: Employment has continued to increase, and the
unemployment rate is currently close to most estimates of the natural rate.
During that period, the decline in the price of oil changed from being regarded as
a simple reduction in the cost of living of almost all households--and thus an unmitigated
blessing--to also being a source of concern, as it was understood that the decline in

1

I am grateful to Christopher Nekarda, Joseph Gruber, David Lebow, and Stacey Tevlin of the Federal
Reserve Board staff for their assistance. Views expressed are mine and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.

-2investment in the production and installation of drilling equipment mitigated the blessing,
as did the decline in U.S. oil production.
And there have been other issues of concern to those particularly interested in
monetary and macroeconomic policy, though probably of less explicit concern to the
public: The decline in estimates of r*--the neutral interest rate that neither boosts nor
slows the economy--which is related to the fear that we are facing a prolonged period of
secular stagnation; the associated concerns that (a) the short-term interest rate will be
constrained by its effective lower bound a greater percentage of time in the future than in
the past, and (b) that the U.S. economy could find itself having to contend at some point
with negative interest rates--something that the Fed has no plans to introduce; the fear
that very low interest rates present a threat to financial stability; and concerns that low
rates of real wage growth are increasing inequality in the distribution of income.
Primarily, I believe it is a remarkable, and perhaps underappreciated, achievement
that the economy has returned to near-full employment in a relatively short time after the
Great Recession, given the historical experience following a financial crisis. 2 To be sure,
it was a slow and difficult time for many, in part because growth in real gross domestic
product (GDP) has been slow by historical standards. As can be seen in table 1, part of
the slower output growth was due to smaller increases in aggregate hours worked,
primarily reflecting demographic factors such as the aging of the baby-boom generation.
But, as shown in table 2, there was also a major decline in the rate of productivity
growth--to which I will return shortly.

2

See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of
Financial Folly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).

-3Turning briefly to recent developments, the pattern of high employment growth
and low productivity growth that we have seen in recent years has continued this year.
So far in 2016, nonfarm payroll gains have averaged about 185,000 per month--down
from last year’s pace of 230,000, but still more than enough to represent a continued
improvement in labor market conditions. Estimates of monthly job gains needed to keep
the unemployment rate steady range widely, from around 75,000 per month to 150,000
per month, depending on what happens to labor force participation among other things.
Output growth has been much less impressive. Over the four quarters ending this
spring, real GDP is now estimated to have increased only 1-1/4 percent. This pace likely
understates the underlying momentum in aggregate demand, in part because of a sizable
inventory correction that began early last year; even so, GDP growth has been mediocre
at best.
The combination of strong job gains and mediocre GDP growth has resulted in
exceptionally slow labor productivity growth. Most recently, business-sector
productivity is reported to have declined for the past three quarters, its worst performance
since 1979. Granted, productivity growth is often quite volatile from quarter to quarter,
both because of difficulties in measuring output and hours and because other transitory
factors may affect productivity. But looking at the past decade, productivity growth has
been lackluster by post-World War II standards. Output per hour increased only
1-1/4 percent per year on average from 2006 to 2015, compared with its long-run average
of 2-1/2 percent from 1949 to 2005. A 1-1/4 percentage point slowdown in productivity
growth is a massive change, one that, if it were to persist, would have wide-ranging
consequences for employment, wage growth, and economic policy more broadly. For

-4example, the frustratingly slow pace of real wage gains seen during the recent expansion
likely partly reflects the slow growth in productivity. 3
Let me highlight a few topics from the growing volume of research on this topic.
The first is that the productivity slowdown reflects mismeasurement, because the official
statistics have failed to capture new and better products or properly account for changes
in prices over time. 4 Given how often we meet new technologies in our daily activities,
even in classes of products that have been in operation for many years--from driving an
automobile, to flying, to medicines and medical equipment, to our communications, and
far more--it is easy to persuade ourselves that technological advances play a major part in
improving our lives. However, some of these gains are conceptually outside the scope of
GDP, and most recent research suggests that mismeasurement of output cannot account
for much of the productivity slowdown. 5
Another explanation is that business investment has been relatively modest during
the current expansion, and so increases in capital per worker have been smaller than in
previous decades. Part of the modest pace of investment is likely because the effective

3

An alternative explanation is that productivity growth has been slow because wage growth has been slow;
that is, faced with only tepid rises in labor costs, firms have had less incentive to invest in labor-saving
technologies.
4
See, for example, David Byrne and Carol Corrado (2016), “ICT Prices and ICT Services: What Do They
Tell Us about Productivity and Technology?” Economics Program Working Paper Series 16-05 (New
York: Conference Board, May; revised July 2016), https://www.conferenceboard.org/pdf_free/workingpapers/EPWP1605.pdf; and David Byrne and Eugenio Pinto (2015), “The
Recent Slowdown in High-Tech Equipment Price Declines and Some Implications for Business Investment
and Labor Productivity,” FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
March 26), www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2015/recent-slowdown-in-high-techequipment-price-declines-some-implications-for-business-investment-labor-productivity-20150326.html.
5
See, for example, Chad Syverson (2016), “Challenges to Mismeasurement Explanations for the U.S.
Productivity Slowdown,” NBER Working Paper Series 21974 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of
Economic Research, February), www.nber.org/papers/w21974; and David M. Byrne, John G. Fernald, and
Marshall B. Reinsdorf (2016), “Does the United States Have a Productivity Slowdown or a Measurement
Problem?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 109-82, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/byrnetextspring16bpea.pdf.

-5labor force that will use this new capital has been expanding much less rapidly than in
previous decades, but it is also possible that investment has been restrained by the
subdued outlook for growth and profits, thereby generating less demand for expanding
productive capacity. 6
However the slow growth in capital per worker has been quantitatively less
important--accounting for only one-fourth of the slowdown in productivity compared
with its long-run average--than the decline in the growth rate of total factor productivity
(TFP), the portion of productivity that is not accounted for by measurable inputs to
production. Indeed, TFP growth has averaged less than 1/2 percent per year in the past
10 years, well below its long-run average of 1-1/4 percent. Pinning down the exact
causes of this slowdown is difficult, and there are many possibilities. For instance, it may
reflect a slowdown in technological innovations, which may be persistent, as some have
argued, or may be a temporary phenomenon, as I am inclined to believe. 7
Low-to-middling TFP growth might also reflect the downward trend in business
dynamism, as evidenced by a notable slowdown in gross job creation and destruction.
Diminished dynamism has been linked to a marked slowdown in the reallocation of labor
and capital from low-productivity establishments and firms to high-productivity ones,

6

Eugenio Pinto and Stacey Tevlin (2014), “Perspectives on the Recent Weakness in Investment,” FEDS
Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 21),
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2014/perspectives-on-the-recent-weakness-ininvestments-20140521.html.
7
For example, Robert Gordon (2016) argues forcefully in his recent book, The Rise and Fall of American
Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press),
that slow productivity growth is likely to persist.

-6especially in innovative sectors like high tech. 8 Both phenomena are closely related to
the declining trend in new business creation. 9
Are we doomed to slow productivity growth for the foreseeable future? We don’t
know. 10 On the encouraging side, the technological frontier appears to be advancing
rapidly in some sectors, and there are hints that the firm start-up rate is improving. 11 On
the more discouraging side, investment continues to disappoint--and so the current capital
stock is smaller and embodies fewer frontier technologies than might otherwise be the
case--and the productivity slowdown is a global phenomenon, suggesting that it may not
be easily or quickly remedied.
Let me conclude by mentioning briefly one aspect of the low interest rate and low
productivity growth problems--the fact that the Fed has been close to being “the only
game in town,” as Mohamed El-Erian and others have described it. 12 At least one part of

8

See Ryan A. Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier Miranda (2016), “Changing Business
Dynamism: Volatility of Shocks vs. Responsiveness to Shocks?” unpublished paper, April, available at
https://bfi.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/research/DHJM_4_14_2016.pdf.
9
See Ryan A. Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier Miranda (2016), “Declining Business
Dynamism: Implications for Productivity?” unpublished paper, August; and Francois Gourio, Todd
Messer, and Michael Siemer (2016), “Firm Entry and Macroeconomic Dynamics: A State-Level Analysis,”
Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-043 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, February), http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.043.
10
There is no shortage of views on this issue among economists, but the views to some extent appear to
depend on whether the economist making the prediction is an optimist or a pessimist. For the record, I note
(a) that looking ahead, I expect GDP growth to pick up in coming quarters, as investment recovers from a
surprisingly weak patch and the drag from past dollar appreciation diminishes, and (b) that I am an
optimist.
11
See Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, and Peter N. Gal (2015), “Frontier Firms, Technology Diffusion
and Public Policy: Micro Evidence from OECD Countries,” OECD Productivity Working Papers Series
2015-02 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, November),
www.oecd.org/eco/growth/Frontier-firms-technology-diffusion-and-public-policy-OECD-productivityworking-papers.pdf.
12
See Mohamed El-Erian (2016), The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the
Next Collapse (New York: Random House).
David Mericle and Avisha Thakkar (2016) recently noted that, in the seven years since the Great
Recession and Global Financial Crisis, U.S. monetary policy was somewhat more supportive--and fiscal
policy less supportive--compared with the average policy response in previous large advanced-economy
financial crises (see “The Crisis and Its Aftermath: Back to the Future,” Goldman Sachs, Economics
Research, U.S. Economics Analyst, August 12).

-7the solution can be found in the observation that overall macroeconomic policy does not
have to be confined solely to monetary policy. In particular, monetary policy is not well
equipped to address long-term issues like the slowdown in productivity growth. Rather,
the key to boosting productivity growth, and the long-run potential of the economy, is
more likely to be found in effective fiscal and regulatory policies. 13 While there is
disagreement about what the most effective policies would be, some combination of
improved public infrastructure, better education, more encouragement for private
investment, and more-effective regulation all likely have a role to play in promoting
faster growth of productivity and living standards--and also in reducing the probability
that the economy and particularly the central bank will in the future have to contend more
than is necessary with the zero lower bound.

13

One related hypothesis, identified with Mancur Olson, is that, absent major shakeups of the institutional
structure of the economy, the gradual accretion of the barnacles produced by the political process slows the
vitality of the economy until eventually the public is willing to face the difficulties attending the structural
reforms needed to restore that vitality.

-8Supplementary materials for
Remarks on the U.S. Economy
by
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
August 21, 2016

Table 1: GDP and Aggregate Hours
(average annualized percent change*)

GDP
Aggregate hours
Population
Labor force participation
Employment rate
Hours per person

1949–2005
3.4
1.4
1.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2

2006–2015
1.4
0.4
1.0
-0.5
0.0
-0.1

Memo:
1996–2003
3.4
1.1
1.4
-0.1
0.0
-0.1

* Percent change from fourth quarter of preceding period to fourth quarter of period
indicated. GDP is gross domestic product.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Table 2: Growth of Output, Hours, and Productivity in the Private Business Sector
(average annualized percent change*)

Output
Labor input
Productivity
Labor composition
Capital deepening
Total factor productivity

1949–2005
3.6
1.1
2.5
0.2
0.9
1.3

2006–2015
1.6
0.4
1.2
0.3
0.6
0.3

Memo:
1996–2003
3.9
0.6
3.3
0.3
1.3
1.7

* Percent change from fourth quarter of preceding period to fourth quarter of period
indicated.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and John Fernald (2012),
“A Quarterly, Utilization-Adjusted Series on Total Factor Productivity,” Working Paper
Series 2012-19 (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, revised April 2014),
www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp12-19bk.pdf.