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For release on delivery
9:30 a.m. EDT
June 1, 2015

What have we learned from the crises of the last 20 years?

Remarks by
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
the International Monetary Conference
Toronto, Ontario

June 1, 2015

There have been many economic and financial crises since the Mexican crisis that
began in December 1994. Michel Camdessus, then Managing Director of the IMF, called
the Mexican crisis “the first economic crisis of the twenty first century” – by which he
meant that it was the first emerging market country crisis whose immediate roots were
more in the capital account than in the current account of the balance of payments.
The Mexican crisis was followed by the crises of East Asia, including Thailand,
Indonesia and Korea that started in the second half of 1997. The crisis also affected
Malaysia, which by imposing capital controls and other measures avoided having to enter
an IMF program. The current Japanese crisis began in the 1990s, but was not then seen
as a possible forerunner of crises among the industrialized countries of North America
and Europe.
The problems of East Asia were followed by crises in Russia, Brazil, Turkey and
Argentina. All these took place during the Great Moderation, the moderation being the
decline in inflation and greater stability of output that occurred in much of the
industrialized world. The Great Moderation was ascribed primarily to the switch in many
countries to an inflation targeting approach to monetary policy.
The Mexican crisis began within four months of my joining the IMF. I left the Fund
at the end of August 2001, and a few months later the string of crises seemed to be
drawing to its close after Argentina abandoned the peg of its peso to the dollar. For a few
years it seemed that whatever measures had been put in place to deal with the myriad
crises had been successful, as the frequency and intensity of crises declined in the first
half of the aughts.

-2And then, in 2008, came the Great Recession and the Great Financial Crisis in the
United States – a once-in-a-century event (one hopes), with deep worldwide
repercussions. Nearly seven years after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the economies of
the United States, Japan, countries within the Euro zone and other European countries
who continue to use their own currencies, among them the United Kingdom, are still
struggling to return to sustained growth, two percent inflation rates, and positive real
central bank interest rates, and thus to leave behind the imprint of the Great Recession.

I. Learning from Crises
Folk wisdom, policymakers and researchers see opportunities in crises. Everyone is
familiar with the notion that one should never waste a crisis. Jean Monnet, among the
founders of the European Union, said that “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be
the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.”1 European Union and EMU decisionmakers have made similar statements in each of their crises, including the present one.
And when talking about the present situation, they often conclude by saying “And we
will emerge stronger this time too.”
Policy economists seek to learn from crises, so that they can do better next time.
During the thirty years from 1985 to 2015, I have been involved in a variety of roles in
the management of crises, starting from the successful Israeli stabilization program of
1985, during which I was part of a small team advising then Secretary of State, George
Shultz, and through the ongoing management of monetary policy in the United States

1

See Jean Monnet (1976), Memoires, (Paris: Fayard).

-3today, where we are engaged in managing the expected exit from the policies adopted by
the Fed to deal with the Great Recession.
This morning I want to talk about major lessons learned from the economic crises of
the last twenty years, many of them crises in which I was involved. I draw on three
papers on lessons of crises that I wrote at different stages during that period. The three
papers were written in 1999 (when I was at the IMF), 2011 (when I was Governor of the
Bank of Israel), and 2014 (when I had been nominated but not yet confirmed as ViceChairman of the Fed.)
The ten lessons presented in each paper are summarized in Table 1. Each lesson is
numbered, and each bears a letter: F for the 1999 paper (written when I was at the IMF);
B for the 2011 paper, when I was at the Bank of Israel; and S for SIEPR2, where the 2014
paper was presented.
Each of the lists reflects the concerns of the times and circumstances in which it was
written. The 1999 paper was written at a time when the IMF was under criticism for its
handling of the many crises with which it had been confronted since 1994. It was a time
of far less transparency than today. For instance, in May of 1997 when I paid a secret
visit to Thailand to try to gauge the seriousness of their situation, and asked for data on
their international reserves, I was told that I could get them – on condition I not pass them
on to anyone else in the Fund. This was an offer I had no difficulty in refusing.
In addition to lessons in the 1999 paper relating to the Fund, it is clear from the
conclusions presented in F5 (Keynesianism), F6 (bank and debt restructuring) and F7
(exchange rates) that the Fund had drawn the correct critical lessons on several of the

2

Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

-4central issues of economic policy. It is also clear from F8 that we were surprised –
pleasantly so – that despite the pessimism of many that the Asian crisis spelled the
beginning of the end of globalization, we had already concluded that very few countries,
if any, intended to withdraw from the international economic system.
The 2011 paper reflects lessons both about policy – especially the critical role of the
exchange rate for small open economies – and about crisis management, some of which I
learned from my experience as Governor of the Bank of Israel. Both B9 (don’t panic in a
crisis) and B10 are rules of behavior for those managing economic crises, or indeed any
crisis. I included B10, “Never say never” because in a crisis a decision-maker may
sometimes find him- or herself having to undertake a policy action that they were sure
they would never do and which, furthermore, they dislike doing.
The 2014 paper was written while I was focusing on joining the Fed, and thus
includes in S5 and S7 issues that remain on the agenda today. I will return to the issues
of moral hazard and too big to fail as I turn next to five major lessons that we should
draw from the experiences that lie behind the three columns of Table 1.

II. The Main Lessons.
I will focus on five major issues, leaving the most important – lessons relating to the
financial system and its regulation and supervision – to the last.3
Lesson T1: Monetary policy at the Zero Lower Bound.4 Before the Great Recession,
textbooks used to say that once the central bank interest rate had reached zero, monetary
policy could not be made more expansionary – otherwise known as the liquidity trap.
3
4

The lesson numbers in this paper are preceded by the letter “T” for Toronto.
This appears in Table 1 as B1 and S2.

-5The argument was that the central bank could not reduce the interest rate below zero,
since at a zero interest rate people could hold currency, on which the nominal interest rate
is zero – which implies that the nominal interest rate could not decline below zero.
Almost immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Fed began to
undertake policies of Quantitative Easing (QE), in two forms: first, by buying assets of
longer duration on a large scale, thus lowering longer term rates and making monetary
policy effectively more expansionary; and second, by operating as market maker of last
resort in markets that in the panic had seemed to stop working – for example, the
commercial paper market.
Did these policies work? The econometric evidence says yes. So does the evidence
of one’s eyes. For instance, the recent inauguration of the ECB’s QE policy seemed to
have an immediate effect not only on European interest rates, but also on longer-term
rates in the United States.
More recently, policymakers in several jurisdictions have discovered that zero is not
the lower bound on interest rates. The reason is that it is not costless to hold currency:
there are costs of storage, and insurance costs to cover the potential for theft of or damage
to the currency. We do not know how low the interest rate can go – but do know that it
can go below zero. Whether it can be reduced much below minus one percent remains to
be seen – and many would prefer that we don’t go there.5

5

There are fascinating issues about how a hypothetical monetary system without currency would operate,
and what interest rates the central bank should attempt to control in such a situation – but we will have to
leave those issues for another occasion.

-6Lesson T2: Monetary policy in normal times.6 In normal times, monetary policy
should continue to be targeted at inflation and at output or employment.7 Typically,
central bank laws also include some mention of financial stability as a responsibility of
the central bank. At this stage the institutional arrangements under which different
central banks exercise their financial stability mandate vary across countries, and depend
to a considerable extent on the tools that the central bank has at its command. It will take
time for the advantages and disadvantages of different arrangements to be evaluated and
recommendations on what works best to be developed. On paper, the British approach of
setting up nearly parallel committees for monetary policy and for macroprudential
financial supervision and regulation appears to be a leading model.
Another issue that remains to be settled is that of the possible use of monetary policy,
i.e. the interest rate, to deal with financial stability. For instance, for some time several
economists – including those working at the BIS – have been urging an increase in the
interest rate to restore risk premia to more normal levels. Most central bankers say they
would prefer to use macroprudential tools rather than the interest rate for this purpose.
While such tools would have the advantage of being directly targeted at the problem that
is to be solved, it is not clear that there are sufficiently strong macroprudential tools to
deal with all financial instability problems, and it would make sense not to rule out the

6

7

This is topic B8 in Table 1.

In most modern central bank laws, the central bank’s policy goals include both inflation and a measure of
economic activity, although more often than not, the inflation goal is defined as more important than the
output or employment goal. By contrast, the Fed has a dual mandate that gives equal weight to both
inflation and employment. I believe that in practice almost all central banks give approximately equal
weight to their inflation and employment or output goals.

-7possible use of the interest rate for this purpose, particularly when other tools appear to
be lacking.
Lesson T3: Active fiscal policy.8 There is a great deal of evidence that fiscal policy
works well, almost everywhere, perhaps especially well when the interest rate is at its
effective lower bound. Because the lags with which fiscal policy affects the economy
may be relatively long (particularly the “decision lag”, the lag between a situation
developing in which fiscal policy should become more expansionary and the decision to
undertake such a policy), automatic stabilizers can play an important stabilizing role.
Another important fiscal policy discussion is currently taking place in the United
States. Infrastructure in the United States has been deteriorating, and government
borrowing costs are exceptionally low. Many economists argue that this is a time at
which fiscal policy can be made more expansionary at low real cost, by borrowing to
finance a program to strengthen the physical infrastructure of the American economy.
This would mean a temporary increase in the budget deficit while the spending takes
place. That spending would have positive benefits – both an increase in aggregate
demand as the infrastructure is built, and later an increase in aggregate supply as the
positive impact of the increase in the capital stock due to the investment in infrastructure
comes into effect – that under current circumstances would outweigh the costs of its
financing.
More generally, the case for more expansionary fiscal policy has always to take into
account the consequences of greater debt on future interest rates and on the flexibility of
future fiscal policy. In this regard, government intervention to save banks has in some

8

This issue appears in Table 1 as S1 and F5.

-8countries resulted in massive increases in the size of the government debt as a share of
GDP, as in Ireland at the start of the Great Financial Crisis, when the Irish government
stepped in to guarantee bank liabilities. This process is aptly known as a “doom loop”.
Lesson T4: The lender of last resort, TBTF, and moral hazard.9 The role of the
central bank as lender of last resort is a central theme in Walter Bagehot’s 1873 classic on
central banking, Lombard Street. The case for the central bank to be the lender of last
resort is clear in the case of a liquidity crisis – one that arises from a temporary shortage
of liquidity, typically in a financial panic – but less so in the case of solvency crises.10
In principle the distinction between liquidity and solvency problems should guide the
actions of the central bank and the government in a financial crisis. But in a crisis, the
distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is rarely clear-cut – and whether a
company goes bankrupt will depend on how the authorities respond to the crisis.
Further, one has to be clear about which aspects of government actions are critical in
this regard. If a firm is bankrupt, it may well be optimal for the firm to continue to
operate while being reorganized, as typically happens in bankruptcies. In such a case, in
which the firm’s capital is negative, the ownership of the bankrupt firm should be
changed – unless the owners succeed in mobilizing more capital, in which case the
company was probably not bankrupt.
If the government is dealing with a bank, or other financial institution, with an
extremely large balance sheet and multiple interactions with the rest of the financial
system, putting the firm into bankruptcy without a plan to continue its most important

9

These issues are discussed in S5, S7 and B5.
I am quoting here from my 2011 paper, “Central bank lessons from the global crisis.”
(http://www.bis.org/review/r110414f.pdf)
10

-9activities from the viewpoint of the financial system and the economy, may induce a
financial and economic crisis of the order of magnitude that followed the Lehman
bankruptcy.
This is where the moral hazard issue arises. If the owners of a company are saved by
official actions in circumstances where the company would otherwise have gone
bankrupt, it will appear that the government is saving Wall Street at the expense of Main
Street. One may argue that saving financial institutions would be good for Main Street.
The lender of last resort may well be producing a result that is better for everyone in the
economy when it intervenes in a financial crisis. But since the counterfactuals are
difficult to establish, and the moral hazard argument is easy to deploy, the public sector
may shy away from acting as lender of last resort except in extremis.
Hence the phenomenon of too big to fail. If policymakers reach a point at which they
confront a choice between allowing a large and/or systemically interconnected bank to
fail without their having reasonable assurance that its essential activities will continue,
they may well step in to “save” the financial institution. By “save”, I mean, allow the
bank to continue to exist and to carry out the functions that are needed to prevent a
financial crisis. It is essential to emphasize that this requires a resolution process that
does not, and should not, preclude actions to ensure that equity and bond holders lose all
or most of the value of their assets, to an extent that depends on circumstances. And the
ability to do this depends on the resolution processes for insolvent financial
institutions. In this context, the progress that has been made since 2008 in developing
effective resolution mechanisms will play a key role in dealing with the too big to fail
problem by significantly reducing the probability of a bank being too big to fail.

- 10 This is a good point at which to turn to the regulation and supervision of the financial
system.
Lesson T5: Regulation and supervision of the financial system.11 The natural and
sensible reaction to the problem that the central bank and the government face when the
dark clouds of a massive financial crisis appear on the horizon, is to make two sets of
decisions. The first relates to its immediate actions and the short run, where the goal
should be to intervene in a way that prevents the massive crisis, at minimum future cost
to the economy and the society. The second is for the longer run, to rebuild the financial
system in such a way that the probability of having to confront such a situation again is
reduced to a very low level. Hence regulations should be strengthened, essentially as
they have been recently, through the activities of governments, legislators, and regulators
in most countries. In the case of the United States, most of the important changes have
been introduced though the Dodd-Frank Act, and they have been supplemented by
decisions of the regulators and the supervisors.

We are now at a difficult point. Regulations have been strengthened and the bankers’
backlash is both evident and making headway. Of course, there should be feedback from
the regulated to the regulators, and the regulated have the right to appeal to their
legislators. But often when bankers complain about regulations, they give the impression
that financial crises are now a thing of the past, and furthermore in many cases, that they
played no role in the previous crisis.

11

These issues are discussed in S3, S4, S6, B2, B3, and F6.

- 11 We should not make the mistake of believing that we have put an end to financial
crises. We can strengthen the financial system, and reduce the frequency and the severity
of financial crises. But we lack the capacity of imagining, anticipating and preventing all
future financial sector problems and crises. That given, we need to build a financial
system that is strong enough to withstand the type of financial crisis we continue to
battle. We can take some comfort – but not much – from the fact that this crisis was
handled much better than the financial crisis of the Great Depression. But it still imposed
massive costs on the people of the United States and those of other countries that were
badly hit by the crisis.
No-one should underestimate the costs of the financial crisis to the United States and
the world economies. We are in the seventh year of dealing with the consequences of
that crisis, and the world economy is still growing very slowly. Confidence in the
financial system and the growth of the economy has been profoundly shaken. There is a
lively discussion going on at present as to whether we have entered a period of secular
stagnation as Larry Summers argues, or whether we are seeing a more frequent
phenomenon – that recessions accompanied by financial crises are typically deep and
long, as Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff’s research implies. Ken Rogoff calls this a
“debt supercycle”.
It may take many years until we know the answer to the question of whether we are in
a situation of secular stagnation or a debt supercycle. Either way, there is now growing
evidence that recessions lead not only to a lower level of future output, but also to a
persistently lower growth rate. Some argue that it was the growth slowdown that caused

- 12 the financial crisis. This is a hard position to accept for anyone who has looked closely at
the behavior of the financial system in the middle of the last decade.
We need to remind ourselves that the principle underlying Basel II was that the
private sector would manage risk efficiently and effectively, since the last thing a bank
would want would be to fail. That did not work out as predicted. A possible reason is
that incentives are misaligned. One sees massive fines being imposed on banks. One
does not see the individuals who were responsible for some of the worst aspects of bank
behavior, for example in the Libor and foreign exchange scandals, being punished
severely. Individuals should be punished for any misconduct they personally engaged in.
One reason we should worry about future crises is that successful reforms can breed
complacency about risks. To the extent that the new regulatory and supervisory
framework succeeds in making the financial system more stable, participants in the
system will begin to believe that the world is more stable, that we suffered a once in a
century crisis, and that the problems that led to it have been solved. And that will cause
them to take more risks, to exercise less caution, and eventually, to forget the seriousness
of the problems we are confronting today and will confront in the future.
This is a process that will one day lead to an unhappy result. You, the regulated, and
we, the regulators, will have to work very hard, for a very long time, and then keep on
working hard, to reduce the frequency and magnitude of those future crises.

Thank you.

Table 1. Lessons from the Crises, 1985-2014
Lessons from Crises, 19852014

Central Bank Lessons from the
Global Crisis

10 Tentative Conclusions from
the Past 3 Years

Fischer, 2014 (SIEPR) 1

Fischer, 2011 (Bank of Israel) 2

Fischer, 1999 (IMF) 3

S1. Fiscal policy also matters
macroeconomically.

B1: Reaching the zero interest
lower bound is not the end of
expansionary monetary policy

F1: It is very difficult to predict
an economic crisis.

S2. Reaching the zero lower
bound is not the end of
expansionary monetary policy.
S3. The critical importance of
having a strong and robust
financial system.

B2: The critical importance of
having a strong and robust
financial system
B3: The need for
macroprudential supervision

S4. The strategy of going fast
on bank restructuring and corp
debt restructuring is much better
than regulatory forbearance.

B4: Dealing with bubbles

S5. It is critical to develop now
the tools needed to deal with
potential future crises without
injecting public funds.

B6: The importance of the
exchange rate for a small open
economy

S6. The need for
macroprudential supervision.

B5: The lender of last resort,
and too big to fail

B7: The eternal verities –
lessons from the IMF
B8: Target inflation, flexibly

S7. The best time to deal with
moral hazard is in designing the
system, not in the midst of a
crisis.

B9: In a crisis, you do not panic
B10: “Never say never”

S8. Don’t overestimate the
benefits of waiting for the
situation to clarify.

F2: It is hard to get countries to
act even when you do see a
crisis coming.
F3: It is hard to have a program
implemented when the
government you are dealing
with is divided and weak, and,
accordingly, it is difficult to
decide whether to help.
F4: There is little understanding
of the IMF’s system of internal
governance and accountability
to its member governments.
F5: Keynesianism is alive.
F6: The strategy of going fast on
bank restructuring and corp debt
restructuring is much better than
regulatory forbearance.
F7: Pegged exchange rate
systems are crisis prone; crisis
is more likely avoided if the rate
floats.
F8: Globalization is here to stay.
F9: The need to involve the
private sector in the solution of
international crises is probably
the most difficult issue in the
international financial
architecture.

S9. Never forget the eternal
verities---lessons from the IMF.
S10. “Never say never.”

F10: The IMF is here to stay.
1

Lecture delivered at Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy
Research, March 14, 2014.
(http://siepr.stanford.edu/system/
files/shared/events/FischerSpeech.
pdf)

3
2

Lecture delivered at the Bank of
Israel, March 31, 2011.
(http://www.bis.org/review/r110414f.
pdf)

Comments made at Trilateral
Commission meeting.
(http://www.iie.com/Fischer/pdf/F
ischer115.pdf)