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A Perspective on Monetary Policy :: January 18, 2005 :: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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Home > For the Public > News and Media > Speeches > 2005 > A Perspective on Monetary Policy

A Perspective on Monetary Policy
Additional Information

Introduction
Since I became president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
two years ago, I have made a point of getting out to various
communities within our region on a regular basis to talk with
businesspeople—to hear w hat’s on their minds and where they think
the regional economy is heading. It is important to bring that
regional input with me in my role as national monetary policymaker.
I have just completed my second year on the Federal Open Market
Committee, or FOMC, which is the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policymaking group. We meet eight times a year in Washington, D.C.;
in fact, our next meeting is coming up in just a couple of weeks. The
voting members of the FOMC include the seven members of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four of the other eleven
Reserve Bank presidents. All of the presidents participate in the
policy discussions, but my voting responsibility on the FOMC
alternates each year with the president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago. In 2004, I had a vote, and this year Michael Moskow, the
Chicago president, votes on FOMC policy actions.

Sandra Pianalto
President and CEO,
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Remarks to the Association for
Corporate Growth
Pittsburgh, PA
January 18, 2005

And that brings me to what I would like to cover in my remarks to
you today—a brief perspective on monetary policy. First, I will
describe the FOMC’s goals in setting monetary policy. Next, I will talk
about why we are moving the federal funds rate up from
exceptionally low levels. Finally, I will explain why, as we adjust to a
more normal economic environment, we need to pay close attention
to the risks for higher inflation.
The views that I express today are mine alone. I do not presume to
speak for any of my FOMC colleagues.

I. Monetary Policy Goals
Let me begin by telling you that conducting monetary policy is more
complex than it might appear at first glance. Economic conditions can
be unpredictable, so we need to find out which policy choices have
the best chance of moving us toward our goals, given the changing
environment around us.
Through the Federal Reserve Act, Congress has instructed the Federal
Reserve to conduct monetary policy in support of the nation’s
economic goals. Specifically, Congress requires the FOMC "to promote
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and
moderate long-term interest rates." In our press releases, we refer to
these requirements in shorthand as “price stability and sustainable
growth.”
You will notice that there are no precise numerical definitions here.

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A Perspective on Monetary Policy :: January 18, 2005 :: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Even so, if we want to be successful in realizing these goals, we have
to make them more concrete for operational purposes.
For the price stability goal, the FOMC tends to focus on the growth
rate of the core Personal Consumption Expenditure price index, or
PCE price index. The core PCE price index is a measure of average
consumer prices, excluding the food and energy components, which
tend to fluctuate quite a lot. It appears that the core PCE price index
will come in at about 1 / percent for 2004, and most forecasters
suggest that pace will continue in 2005. Inflation around 1 / percent,
if sustained, appears close to what several countries have chosen as
their working definition of price stability.
For the sustainable growth goal, the approach is not quite as precise.
The general idea is that monetary policy should do what it can to
support the expansion of gross domestic product, or GDP, near its
“potential.” The tricky part is that the economy’s potential growth
rate can change over time. Some changes are temporary —such as
when we have oil price shocks. But some changes are more
permanent—for instance, when there are major upward shifts in
productivity. These changes can make it difficult to measure
potential GDP.
Although we have more than one goal, I believe that in the long run,
maintaining price stability is the unique contribution that the Federal
Reserve can make to promoting maximum employment and moderate
long-term interest rates. In many, if not most, cases this is true in
the short run as well. The bottom line is that you cannot have
maximum employment and moderate long-term interest rates
without price stability.
II. Moving from Unusual Levels of Policy Accommodation
Now that I’ve discussed our goals, let me turn to the primary policy
tool we use—the federal funds rate. When you boil down monetary
policy, you find out that the Federal Reserve supplies the banking
system with a highly liquid form of money, which banks hold as
balances on deposit with us. Banks can buy and sell these funds in
the money market, but since we control the supply, we essentially
set the price. That price is the federal funds rate, the interest rate
that banks pay for overnight funds.
By targeting a specific federal funds rate, the FOMC influences the
level of other interest rates and the quantity of bank lending.
Changes in the federal funds rate trigger a chain of events that
affect other short-term interest rates, foreign exchange rates, long­
term interest rates, and the amount of money and credit. Ultimately,
interest rate changes affect a range of economic variables, including
employment, output, and prices of goods and services.
Since last June, the FOMC has increased its target federal funds rate
from an extremely low level of 1 percent to its current level of 2.25
percent. We have increased that rate by 25 basis points at each of
our last five meetings, and the federal funds futures market shows a
95 percent probability that the FOMC will increase the federal funds
rate target by another 25 basis points at our next meeting on
February 2.
I’d like to give you a bit of history of how we got to the low level of
1 percent, and explain why the federal funds rate is trending up.
We had a brief and mild recession in 2001, followed by a slow and
prolonged recovery period. By early 2003, the economy was being
confronted by an unusual combination of forces: The nation was
launching the war in Iraq, energy markets were volatile, and business
confidence was low. At the same time, productivity growth stayed
strong, adding to forces that were keeping inflation at low levels. It

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A Perspective on Monetary Policy :: January 18, 2005 :: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
almost seemed like a perfect storm of uncertainty in how economic
conditions would unfold.
Soon, though, we had enough information to conclude that we faced
a remote but unacceptable risk - the risk of “an unwelcome fall in
inflation.” With interest rates already low and the economy
struggling to regain its momentum, it seemed possible that short­
term interest rates could fall to zero and that we could experience
an outright deflation. This possibility was unprecedented in our
recent experience. Economists may disagree about the potential
effects of deflation on spending, production, and investment, but we
know that actual deflations are rare and we think they are best
avoided.
By June of 2003, the FOMC had cut the federal funds rate target to 1
percent--the lowest level it had reached since the late 1950s. We
wanted to head off further disinflation. I think that by focusing on
our price stability goal—in this case not letting the price level
actually decline—our actions also promoted sustained economic
growth.
We did not have the data to confirm it at the time, but it turns out
that the economy had already begun to improve. It strengthened
more in the second half of 2003.
Employment growth remained sluggish, but investment spending
jumped. In turn, market interest rates rose sharply, and did not
retreat for the balance of the year.
The Committee still took a cautionary stance. Although we judged the
probability of an unwelcome disinflation as fairly small by the end of
2003, we decided to keep the funds rate target low—or, as we stated
in our press release, keep monetary policy accommodative—to
support the ongoing economic expansion. Strong productivity growth
provided some extra confidence that inflation would remain benign.
By the first half of 2004, the expansion seemed to be on firmer
ground. Growth was solid, investment was largely holding up, and at
long last employment growth appeared to be on the rebound. At the
same time, we had to begin to consider the possibility that
inflationary pressures could rise if monetary policy did not respond
appropriately. After all, the deflation concern had now passed and
our policy was still highly accommodative. So last June, we began
moving the federal funds rate up.
It all boils down to changing economic circumstances. In 2003, the
FOMC faced an unusual situation that caused us to adopt a highly
accommodative policy—meaning that we wanted to provide plenty of
liquidity at a low price. Since the middle of last year, we have been
removing that accommodation gradually, causing an increase in short­
term interest rates. How far will we go? That all depends on how the
economy evolves.

III. Moving to a More Normal Environment
As the new year begins, I expect to find the economy growing on a
more sustained path. The FOMC is adjusting to this more normal
environment. I believe we are moving toward a more “neutral”
monetary policy, one that is neither accommodative nor restrictive.
My way of thinking about neutral does not imply a particular
numerical resting place for our policy target. I want to emphasize
that our knowledge of the economy is not precise enough to
encourage me to latch onto a specific number for the federal funds
rate. If the economy strengthens further this year—and I hope it will
—market interest rates are likely to rise as business and consumer

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A Perspective on Monetary Policy :: January 18, 2005 :: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
confidence takes hold, and spending will increase along with growing
production and employment. Under these circumstances, maintaining
the same policy stance will probably mean that the federal funds rate
will have to rise, too. In other words, interest rates can go up
without changing the stance of monetary policy.
Of course, there are differences of opinion on how much rates will
need to rise at any given time. Over time, central bankers have
learned some important lessons—namely, that there is a lot of inertia
in the inflation process, and that we cannot underestimate the
possibility of inflation creeping in. And once an inflationary
psychology takes hold, it can be difficult and costly to reverse.
I recognize that on the surface, some of the recent price statistics
might seem to present little cause for alarm. For example, even
though the overall PCE price index increased by 2.6% during the past
12 months, the core PCE price index increased by only 1.5%. As I
mentioned earlier, this is roughly consistent with a working definition
of price stability. We also see few signs that labor costs are
increasing significantly faster than productivity, a development that
often can signal a step-up in inflationary pressures.
But in my opinion, the momentum in the inflationary process has
clearly shifted away from disinflation. And, unfortunately, it is not
always possible to distinguish short-term movements in the price
indexes from the emergence of an inflationary trend until after the
fact.
We know that as the expansion lengthens, and rates of resource
utilization tighten, the demand for credit tends to increase, which
pushes real interest rates up. This is just a normal cyclical
phenomenon. In these circumstances, monetary policy makers have
to anticipate the potential for inflation to creep up over time if the
policy rate does not move up as well—in other words, if policy
unintentionally becomes accommodative.
The minutes from our December FOMC meeting reflect this thinking.
Even though we have been moving rates higher at a measured pace
during the past six months, we still see signs that the current level of
the real federal funds rate target remains below the level that is
most likely needed to keep inflation stable and economic output at
its potential.
Business cycle developments are not the only factors that can affect
real interest rates. Looking ahead, I see the potential for additional
pressures on market interest rates coming from two other sources.
One variable is our federal budget deficit. It is too simplistic to claim
that fiscal deficits necessarily lead to higher interest rates. The
economic impact of any given deficit almost certainly depends on the
spending and tax policies that give rise to the budget shortfall - the
fine print beneath the red ink, as it were. But it would not be
shocking to find that there might be some interest-rate pressure
from this source, at least in the short run.
The foreign sector provides another potential source of real interest
rate pressure. Capital flows from abroad have helped to hold market
interest rates in check. Imports have been meeting domestic demand
that would otherwise have to be satisfied out of U.S. production. If
foreign sources for financing our consumption and investment shrink,
then it would be logical to see greater upward pressures on interest
rates in the financial markets, as long as overall economic growth
remains solid.
Regardless of the source, upward pressure on real interest rates will
change the stance of monetary policy unless our nominal monetary
policy targets are adjusted higher as well. Recognizing how difficult it

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A Perspective on Monetary Policy :: January 18, 2005 :: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
is to know when policy is truly neutral, I think it is prudent to move
the federal funds rate up to a position that gives me more confidence
that monetary policy is no longer accommodative. I would prefer this
strategy to finding out the hard way—for example, through a
deterioration in inflation expectations or in the inflation picture itself
—that we had maintained an overly accommodative stance for too
long.

Conclusion
This afternoon, I have explained why the federal funds rate is
trending up and how the FOMC has kept its focus on our fundamental
policy goals. Economic trends are notoriously difficult to predict, and
there are always surprises. I know that during my two years as a
member of the FOMC, I have seen more than a few twists and turns
in the path. But in every sense, the Federal Reserve begins with the
end in mind—to maintain price stability and promote sustainable
economic growth.

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