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Morris Plan Bankers Assn. annual
convention, Sea Island, Ga., Nov.3-5. 19^1•

Credit Control
GOVERNOR
RONALD
RANSOM:
Mr.
President, Ladies and Gentlemen :
I only wish that I deserved a small part of the
very kind introduction of my friend, Mr. Morris.
I have not made it a rule to accept invitations to
address various meetings since I have been a member of the Board; quite otherwise. In this particular instance I did not feel that I could possibly
decline the invitation. When we were faced with
the difficulties inherent in Regulation W and we
called on the various trades involved to come in
and discuss the matter with us, we had no finer
cooperation, no better response, than from Mr.
Morris and the officials of your Association, who
accepted every invitation we extended and responded in the most friendly and cooperative manner, and I thought it was as little as I could do to
come here this morning and express to you our real
appreciation of the help you people have given us.
Also, I was influenced somewhat, of course, by the
fact that I was being invited back to Georgia. If
you men don't want a Georgian to visit Georgia,
you'd better not ask him. As a matter of fact, I
have felt from the beginning of our struggles with
this situation that we had much to learn from the
Morris Plan bankers. Mr. McFadden gave some
slightly astronomical figures this morning, but Mr.
Morris tells me that you have had on your books
at various times during your existence twenty-four
million accounts. That is a large number and
means that you have had many contacts and that
you have considered the consumer and the customer. I n this matter of regulating consumer and
installment credit, it becomes absolutely necessary
that we should know something not only about
the people who represent the trades involved, but
about the man whose affairs we arc, after all, regulating—the consumer, the purchaser, the borrower.
I have found that I could learn much in contacts
with you people.
Mr. President, I would like this morning, if I
may, to try to put Regulation W in its true perspective. It has a background; it did not come
about overnight; it is not just a spontaneous effort
on the part of the Government to extend the field
of regulation. I listened with great interest to
Professor Sly's very astute, very profound analysis
of the situation facing this country today. I appreciate the fact that he gave you a background
against which I would like to have you consider
Regulation W .
I think we must first remember that the Republic is faced with the greatest crisis in its history.
The dangers that beset our future are tremendous.
The difficulties are great. Unquestionably we are
engaged in an all-out effort. No longer are wars

declared; they come about. W e are in one not of
our making. W e are faced with a hostile theory of
government. There is not room in the small world
of today—a world in which distance and time have
been eliminated—for the Nazi theory of government and our own theory to live at one time. H o w
long that effort will be, none of us knows. The
choice seems to me to lie between a long and a
short effort. If the destruction of all that the present Nazi Government stands for and all that is
inimical to democratic government is to be achieved
within any reasonable time, it requires an all-out
effort in every sense. I do not believe it probable
that many of our citizens would have believed a
few years ago that we were so close to such an
effort, and I believe that until recently there has
been little realization of what this will require. If
it is to be a long effort, and it may have to be, our
whole economy will be involved, and I agree with
Professor Sly that, whatever the nature of the war,
so far as we are concerned, so far as our economy
is concerned, we are already into it, way into it,
and we will be a long time getting out. The advantage obviously lies in making it as short an
effort as possible, because the further we go, the
greater the difficulties that will develop.
How
short we can make it, only time will tell.
As one of the problems facing us today, we must
consider inflation. Historically, inflations usually
have followed wars. In the six years that I have
been in Washington, I have never found all the
agencies of the Government so completely united in
any cause as they are today in their determination
to prevent inflation, if it is humanly possible to
prevent it. Again we have no way of knowing
whether that can be done. Of course we are going to try every possible device that might prevent it, because its cost to our country, to our
economy, to our standard of living, will be disastrous if it comes upon us. It not only will greatly
increase the cost of the defense effort in what the
Government will have to pay for what it must buy,
but it will completely demoralize our economic
system. W e must remember that the tremendous
governmental expenditures incidental to the defense
effort, creating jobs and raising the national income, is resulting in a rapidly increasing demand
and ability to pay for a diminishing supply of
things the people want to buy. If that won't run
up prices, I don't know what will. They are
already rising rapidly. There would be no problem
if we could increase civilian production to take care
of a rising national income, but after all our plant
facilities are limited; the supply of steel and labor,
especially skilled labor, is limited, and we are in an
all-out effort, a great defense effort; therefore we
cannot hope for many years to see civilian production increased to a point where there will be adequate goods to meet a demand that is so rapidly
increasing. In such a situation, the Government

ZFrllC

must not overlook any possible means to the end
both of the defense effort and of preventing inflation. In such an atmosphere and at such a time,
Government becomes an increasingly important factor, with which all must deal.
It is rather interesting and might repay your
study, if you will look at what has been recently
done in Canada about consumer and installment
credit. Their statements, their press releases and
their regulations reflect some of the experiences we
have already had, but I think you will be impressed, as I have been impressed, with the idea
that Canada has gone much faster, much further in
this regulation than we have done. This again, to
my mind, illustrates the increasing role of Government as a country gets further into a war effort,
because Canada is further into it than we are, and
therefore when Canada attacks the problem of consumer installment credit, it moves much more rapidly.
Now why are you people concerned with any part
of the problem that I have stated? You are concerned with it because, as part of this anti-inflationary effort, our Government is attempting to
regulate consumer credit, and, as Mr. Morris said,
you gentlemen are the founders, the originators
in large part, of the idea of consumer credit, and
therefore you have a great stake in what is done.
There are three obvious reasons for regulating
installment and consumer credit. I am using those
two terms rather interchangeably, because they are
so closely related that it is impossible to use one
term in connection with this regulation without at
times meaning both. The first reason is the most
obvious of all: The Government wants to curb the
demand for these consumer durable goods, the
materials of which are essential for the defense
program. The second is that there must be an
effort to dampen consumer demand to prevent inflationary price rises. The third reason for doing
anything at all about consumer and installment
credit is the effort to create a backlog of purchasing power that can come into action when the postdefense period is reached. This was an important
reason for Regulation W , and undoubtedly we will
find in the course of time that this has been accomplished.
It seems to me that ultimately we are faced
with decisions which the Board has not made, and
I would like at this point to say something I might
have said earlier. The Board is never bound by
anything that any one member says. It only speaks
as a Board, so that any one of us is free to say
what he individually pleases, but we express our individual views when we speak, and no one of the
members of the Board is ever bound by what some
other member says, unless he is quoting what the
Board has already done. It seems to me that ultimately we face these decisions: Should the volume
of consumer and installment credit be held at its
present level? Should the total be reduced? Should

the present total be allowed to increase somewhat
in relation to a rising economy? I think that
finally, at some point along the line, decisions on
these questions will have to be made. It must be
borne in mind that in the whole field of credit control, action can be taken predicated on the most
careful research, the most careful consideration of
available statistics, after conference with the people
involved, and with reasonable assurance that the
action will produce a certain result, and such action may well produce wholly unpredictable psychological effects. Therefore, I am inclined to believe that as of today, what has already been done
may have produced more results than might have
been anticipated at the time the regulation was
promulgated. I do not know that we have adequate statistics on which to base a conclusion as
yet, but I am inclined to believe that, as you move
into any field of credit control, there are certain
imponderables, certain intangible factors involved
which you cannot prejudge accurately. Human
nature reacts to what Government does, at times,
somewhat beyond the exact letter of the regulation, so that I think when ultimately we come
to consider what are our major objectives, what we
want to accomplish, there will always be before us
the question: Is the present volume of consumer
and installment credit too large, not large enough
or just about right? That has not been a part as
yet of the consideration of this problem.
Now why, if it was necessary in the opinion of
the Government to regulate installment purchases,
should we have stepped over and attempted to regulate consumer credit? I rather imagine that all of
you know the answer. In the first place, the volume of consumer credit is an important factor in
inflationary periods. In the second place, if you
regulate installment selling very strictly, unquestionably the man who would otherwise have bought
on the installment plan will step over somewhere
to some lending agency and borrow the money on
the installment plan and go out and purchase the
article with the cash resulting from his loan. Mr.
Morris was very kind in what he said about the
conferences we had in Washington with the trades
involved. On the other hand, I think we have obtained extraordinarily fine cooperation from all
those trades. I do not believe that the cooperation
would have been half as effective as it has been
had the vendor not believed that the lender would
be put under the some restriction, under the same
regulation, and that both would be treated fairly.
Lending and vending arc too inseparably connected
to be divorced in this regulation. Again, the reason for regulating consumer installment credit is
that history teaches us that, as the national income increases, as people have more money to
spend, they incur more debt. On the face of it,
that would not seem probable, but, if the records
are at all credible, that has been the case, so that
9

this regulation is an effort to curtail and curb
spending at a time when too large a volume of
installment buying or consumer credit is not desirable in the public interest.
While there was a reason for putting a check
rein on borrowing, I do not want any of you
to have the impression that we had any exaggerated idea as to what this regulation can
do in the way of preventing inflation. At best,
it is but little. It is necessary to implement other
efforts of the Government. If inflation is to be
prevented, there are other methods that the Government must use and use promptly and wisely:
Taxation, of course; priorities; allocations—perhaps, at a point, rationing; price control; a fiscal
policy adapted to the existing difficulties of the
present situation. All of these things supersede
the regulation of installment and consumer credit
as implements in the hands of the Government to
do this particular job. But it was felt, if there
were to be price controls, allocations and priorities
along with an increasing public income, creating
greater demand for the things to be sold, that without some regulation of this type of credit, there
would be a tremendous increase in such credit, and
that undoubtedly is not now desirable.
There is another point that should be made. This
is not an effort in any sense to prohibit installment
or consumer credit. That type of credit has served
a tremendously useful purpose in our country.
Properly used, properly timed, I know of nothing
that can contribute more to the standard of living
than that type of credit. But timing is most important, and therefore there is that additional reason for the Government's stepping in at this point.
It may have occurred to some of you gentlemen
to wonder why the Federal Reserve System was
picked to administer this regulation. It was felt
by those who had to make the final decision that
they should use an existing agency having primary responsibility with respect to the determination and administration of credit policy. There was
some advantage in using an agency with some
twenty-five years' experience in the credit field.
The Federal Reserve System, like every other living organism, is always developing; it is not static;
it has to be dynamic to go on, and there has been
a slow but sure evolutionary process in its entire
history, until today we find that from the results
of experience it is recognized that the System has
a major responsibility to contribute to the formation of a national credit policy. That, perhaps,
really is its principal reason for being just at the
present time. Therefore, it was felt that, if this
type of credit had to be regulated, it would be
desirable to turn it over to an agency already at
work in the broad field of credit.
There are three types of credit control, and I
think you gentlemen, as bankers, have a great stake
in considering what is to be the final form of that

control. The first and oldest is the general or
over-all system of influencing the volume of credit
—the use by the System of the discount rate, open
market operations and reserve requirements. These
are controls that operate on the whole banking
system, where banks are members of the Federal
Reserve System, and are components of a general
functional method of credit control. Every one is
affected alike by what you do. If you gentlemen
have a feeling at the present time that we may be
curtailing your expansion of credit, I would like to
remind you that we have at present tied up in
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System something over nine billion dollars in required reserves, which would be subject to quite a
substantial expansion if these banks were free to use
these reserves and if the demand existed for their
use. We have only recently reduced the expansive
power of reserve funds from about twenty-nine billions to nineteen billions. W e have done that
since we formulated Regulation W , so we arc not
operating alone on you, but we are restraining
credit to the member banks of the System by this
over-all method.
The second method of regulating credit by the
Government is known as the direct method, where
you go into the individual bank and through the
processes of supervision attempt to tell that bank
what it may do. That is seldom used and is not
particularly effective in the over-all picture.
The third, the one under which Regulation W
comes, has become known as the selective method;
that is, you select some particular type of credit
and attempt to restrict the volume of that particular
type of credit. One of the early instances of such
control in our country came about when Congress
directed the Federal Reserve to regulate margin
requirements on stock market collateral. The Morris Plan banks, so far as they extend credit on
stock market collateral, are under that regulation
and have been for some time. Somewhere between
1024 and 1929, looking at the expansion of credit
in the stock market field, the Government commenced to think that some selective form of credit
control would have to be applied, and our Regulations T and U are the outcome of that. I also have
a feeling that perhaps this power to differentiate in
the selection of methods of credit control may have
implications that deserve the type of study suggested this morning by Professor Sly. It may be
that you would find in such a study that a selective
method may be not only the most effective but perhaps the most acceptable. That, I do not know.
That is certainly an open question. It appears perplexing; is intensely interesting and is going to affect the whole banking system in the course of the
next few years, and just such a study as he suggested would be a help to those in Government
who have the responsibility for what is done. Those
decisions will have to be made and preference will
10

have to be expressed between these different methods of controlling credit over a period of many
years. Men like Clark, Nugent and Riefier devoted
a great deal of time and study to consumer credit.
Their studies have been invaluable to us in the
present emergency.
We were giving study to the subject of selective
controls before the present emergency. A resolution was approved by the Senate on August 4, 1939,
looking to an over-all study of the whole problem
of banking, and we were considering all of the
questions involved in such a study following the
passage of this resolution. One of the questions
that had to be considered was the necessity or desirability of some form of regulation of consumer
and installment credit, so we had some background
of the problem before we found ourselves faced
with the task of formulating a regulation under the
Presidential Order. The President's Order of
August 9, 1941, necessitated a regulation, and we
only had a brief period in which to formulate this
regulation, but we did have some advantage in that
we had been giving the problem study in an academic sense for quite a few years.
As speedily as possible we formulated a regulation, but before issuing it we called upon all the
trades that would come under the regulation to send
representatives to Washington to discuss the matter with us. W e realized that time was short, but
it never would have done to have let the President's Order stand without a regulation, because of the situation that might have developed in the interim. This meeting with the trades
was most satisfactory to us.
We put the
regulation before these groups. They were frank
and helpful in their discussion, and out of that grew
the final form of the regulation as first promulgated.
One question came up that has never been settled
to my satisfaction. We knew we had to reach the
trades. We did reach them, as I say, but what
were we to do about the consumer—the buyer of
these goods—the housewives, who are the principal
users of installment credit? We could never quite
find out how to reach that group of people. This
group represents many millions, almost as many as
Mr. McFaddeti says you gentlemen deal with.
(Laughter). A professional consumer group was
not exactly what we wanted. It is an obvious conclusion that we are all consumers and the best
way to reach the people of this country is to give
the matter the widest possible publicity, and therefore we turned the regulation over to the press
at the time we first presented it to the trades and
before it was actually issued, and they kindly gave
it wide distribution and gave us an opportunity,
through this means, to get some response from the
consumer group, though never enough to satisfy
me. Actually we have not had enough direct contact with consumers to satisfy me. The only hope

I have that we can finally establish and maintain
the right sort of public relations with this enormous group is based on the fact that the administration of the regulation is decentralized in the twelve
Federal Reserve Banks and their twenty-four
Branches. This gives us a nation-wide coverage
of thirty-six institutions actually administering the
regulation, and it is possible for them to reach an
enormous number of people and find out whether
the regulation is fair and just, not only to the businesses involved but to the people with whom those
businesses are dealing, and I think that only in that
way can we hope to get as wide a knowledge of
what are the rights of the people, whose buying
and borrowing we are regulating, as I would like.
We announced at the first meeting that the
regulation was subject to amendment whenever we
found out that it was not doing what we wanted it
to do. We have already amended it several times.
We propose to amend the regulation constantly
during its experimental period, seeking always to
carry out the objectives of the President's order and
trying at all times to be as fair as possible to the
consumer and trades involved. We do not seek to
upset existing trade practices. In that connection,
as Mr. Morris knows and several of you gentlemen present at these meetings know, we took the
position from the beginning and still adhere to it
that we are not engaged in writing fair trade practice codcs, and I hope we never try. In the first
place, it is difficult to regulate consumer installment
credit. In my opinion, it would be utterly impossible for us to assume that we will clean up
bad practices in the trades involved under this
regulation. You gentlemen are fully capable of
doing that, each in your own trade, and if we once
became involved in such an undertaking, we would
be lost in a bypath, out of which I do not see any
way that we could escape.
Again, I would like to say that we are proceeding on the trial and error method. We have
nothing else on which to proceed. We will make
mistakes. We have made them. W e will correct
them whenever you can satisfy us that they need
correction. We also need tremendous additional
research in this field. We need better, more accurate, fuller statistics than we yet have had. We
have done an administrative job, but we have a research job that is just as important, because, as
Dr. Sly told you, only on sound research can you
base sound administration; that is absolutely necessary. With your help and the help of the other
people involved, we hope to get to that before long.
Finally, the decisions regarding this regulation
are decisions made by a Board, not by an individual. At present, the five members of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System must
reach, by a majority decision, a conclusion on any
policy involving the administration of this regulation. It is not an administration of any one man.
11

It is administration by a Board aided by its staff
and by the staffs of the thirty-six institutions composing the Federal Reserve Banks and their
Branches. Again, I thank your Association, your
officers and your members for the very great help
you have given us in our difficult task.
(The members arose and applauded.)
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : W e arc thankful to
Governor Ransom for that message, giving us the
background of the regulation which has become so
much a part of our daily lives. W e are not only
gratified to have that message and have it from
the source from which it came, but we are honored
by his presence with us. W e know from past experience that when you get into the cross fire of
question and answer, you arc likely to get into
trouble. On more than one occasion I have been
on the receiving end, where dodging the problem
requires quick thinking. There is no limit to the
time to which such a discussion may run, but I am
going to interrupt the program for announcements
to be made at this time.
Is there any announcement from the Golf Committee? I have a telegram from the chairman of
that committee, Mr. Braun, regretting his inability
to attend.
I regret exceedingly my inability to be
with you due to a severe cold. It was
very difficult for me to cancel my plans as
this is the first Morris Plan national convention I have missed since 1915. Please
extend my best regards to all present and
convey my sincere wishes for a most successful meeting.

FRANK J . BRAUN.

I know we are all sorry indeed that lie cannot be
with us, and since he cannot and he was going to
handle the golf tournaments, he turned over his
plans and ideas to John Ilollenbeck. Have you
any announcement to make, Mr. Ilollenbeck?
MR. J O H N
HOLLENBECK
(Springfield,
Ohio) : No, I have not. W e will have some tomorrow.
PRESIDENT
S T O U T : Is there any announcement from the News and Publicity Committee?
MR. R A Y M O N D W. H A R T L E Y
(Providence) : I have nothing to say at all except that
the situation is well in hand.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : Mr. Small?
M R . H A R R Y E. S M A L L
(Cleveland): I
would like a meeting of the Nominations Committee at 6 o'clock in the Band Room.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : Resolutions Committee, M r . Wise.
M R . R A Y E. W I S E (Dayton) : I would like
to meet with my committee tonight at 6 o'clock.
PRESIDENT
S T O U T : Sectional
Associations; Mr. Kenney. ( N o announcement.)
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : Entertainment Committee.

MR. R O Y D E N
C. B R Y A N
(Wilmington,
Del.) : Those who have not made any reservations
for the historical tour, will please see me. The
hotel provides transportation for eighteen or twenty
people; if there are some others who have their
cars and will drive them or permit us to put some
passengers in them or find some one who can drive
them, we will be very glad to have three or four
more cars. The tour will leave the hotel at 2:30.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : I am asked by the
management of the hotel to announce that all those
who are not traveling by private automobiles and
have not completed the transportation arrangements
for their departure, will please do so as soon as
possible. These arrangements should be made at
the transportation desk in the hotel.
Immediately following this meeting, we will have
the official convention photograph on the steps.
The Board of Governors meeting will be held
at luncheon in the private dining room. That is a
very important meeting and I hope that everybody will be there.
Now, with apologies to our next speaker for that
interruption, I want to introduce to you Air. W .
Pollard Turman, who has graciously come here
from the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, of which
he is counsel, to answer your questions, and, as I
said before, God be with him if lie gets some of
those that have been thrown at me. W e are glad
to have you here, Mr. Turman. (Applause).
Questions and Answers on Regulation W
M R . W . P O L L A R D T U R M A N : Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I feel tremendously
honored to have this opportunity of meeting with
you today. I have attended one or two of the
group meetings of the Morris Plan Bank and have
enjoyed them very much. I realize, of course, as
your President has stated, that I am a marked
man, but I am sure that the shots will not be
vitally aimed, as Mr. McFadden was discussing
the subject earlier today. A friend of mine, a practising attorney in Atlanta, saw me on the street
just after the regulation was originally issued, and
he said, " I have got a client that is subject to that
W business; will you send me a copy of it?" I
said, " O f course I will be glad to," and when I
got back to the office I sent him one. I got a very
nice letter next day in which he said, " I appreciate
your sending me a copy of regulation W , but you
failed to include the Rosetta Stone with it."
(Laughter).
I am sure that it would be imposing on you to
discuss the provisions of the original regulation.
I think you would be interested, however, in a brief
review of the recent amendments that become effective December 1, and so if you have no objection, I would like to outline them briefly, and then
go into a forum discussion of any problem which
you might have.
12

Amendment No. 2, effective December 1, includes
in the definition of installment loan credit, installment loans that are for §1,500 or less rather than
$1,000 or less, as originally prescribed. In addition, the minimum down payment that might be
required, if it is
or below, need not be obtained.
The minimum monthly payment of §5, as set out
in Section 4 (e) and 5 (c) has been omitted. Installment loans, as I stated, of $1,500 or less, and
obtained for the purpose of purchasing listed articles, are subject to the same restriction as loans
secured by listed articles; that is, the amount may
be only the maximum credit value of those listed
articles and not more than eighteen months' maturity. After January 1, 1942, a purpose statement
is required for all installment loans of $1,500 or
less. Between December 1 and until January 1,
when the Board of Governors will place in your
hands the purpose statements, you may use any
statement that contains that information as set out
in Section 5 (d) of the amended declaration. Section 5 (f) now provides that installment loans for
the purpose of making down payments are prohibited. That probably closes up a possible injustice that might have existed in the original regulation. Section 6 (a) was further amended so that
loans to finance construction or purchase entire
residential or other structures are exempt along
with those loans that arc secured by first mortgages
on real estate.
Section 6 (1) now exempts business loans for
operation purposes, not for the purpose of purchasing listed articles. Section 8, which deals with
revisions or renewals and consolidations, has been
the section that probably you have had the most
difficulty with thus far. That was to have been
effective November 1. Under Amendment No. 2
the effective date has been postponed until December 1, 1941. An amended section, 8 (b) takes carc
of the question of add-ons, so that now add-ons
may be treated in one of two ways: the add-ons
may be considered as a separate transaction or consolidated so that the re-payments are at least as
large as the original credit and that the credit will
be repaid within fifteen months from the time of
the consolidation. A statement of necessity still
may be obtained—in good faith—to prevent undue
hardship, and the maturity in that event is eighteen
months from the date the statement of necessity is
obtained. That, of course, is the same as was
originally stipulated, though the section has been
revised as to wording. Section 9 (f) is a new
section regarding loans to farmers, and it stipulates
that they may be obtained in any manner if the
loan conforms to the amount and to the maximum
maturity and at least one-half of the loan is to be
repaid within one-half of the maximum maturity
applicable.
Those are the high lights of the amendment
No. 2, effective December 1. I thought you would

be interested in having me mention them briefly.
If there arc any questions on those, of course they
will be in order and if there are any questions on
the original regulation, I will be pleased to attempt
to answer them.
P R E S I D E N T STOUT : I know there are a lot
of questions floating around here because we get
something like twenty-three or twenty-four a day.
Now you have the final authority right here in
front of you.
M R . T U R M A N : Not the final authority. I
have a. good backing here, undoubtedly, but remember that Air. Ransom said that what the speaker said personally did not bind the Board. I will
say this, the banks are attempting to give these
interpretations: first, those that have been issued
by the Board of Governors, and upon official ruling. They number some hundred and six. We
have also attempted to assist in interpreting provisions, although they have not been ruled upon
by the Board, if we feel that we arc reasonably
correct in doing so, and I would say that if there
has been a ruling by the Board of Governors, I
will attempt to call your attention to it and quote
it, and if it has not been ruled upon by the Board,
I will attempt to explain it if I feel that I am not
over my head, and if I am over my head I will get
the Board of Governors to clarify it for us. Don't
you think that is a fair statement?
P E S I D E N T S T O U T : Do you think you can
quote a hundred and six rulings? (Laughter).
M R . T U R M A N : I saw several people looking
at that brief case when I brought it up here. No,
I am not going to read a hundred and six rulings.
M R . E. G. B R E E D L O V E (Jacksonville): I
would like to ask a question in regard to installment buying and add-ons. Do you mean to say
that a man who had an account, five months, of restricted items and made purchases and bought
something else, that from that date on his revision was set up for fifteen months? But from that
date on it would make the contract run for fifteen
months regardless of the length of time it had run
before ?
M R . T U R M A N : Yes, provided the amount of
the monthly payments was not decreased by the
consolidation.
MR. B R E E D L O V E : The next question is in
regard to these outstanding items; in other words,
a man comes into our bank and has a loan with
another bank, and this is subsequent to September
1; lie has had it for five months and he wants to
borrow from our bank; what would be the proper
handling of that particular loan? The customary
time with our bank is twelve months and he has an
eighteen months loan at the time.
M R . T U R M A N : You can make any negotiation with your customer that you see fit to make,
if the maturity is less than the regulation would require; your problem is covered under Section
13

8 (c), which says that "Any extension of installment credit, the proceeds of which a registrant
knows or has reason to know will be used in
whole or in part to reduce or retire any extension
of installment sale credit or installment loan credit
not held by such registrant, shall be subject to the
requirements of Section 8 (a) or 8 (b), includin the provisos thereof, to the same extent as if
the obligation being reduced or retired were held
by the registrant." So you might then revise his
obligation in any manner that you could revise it
under the regulations if you had made that original
extension of credit. Now if you have an extension of credit that is held elsewhere by your customer, that is, a twelve months contract, I take it
you would be permitted to advance him the money
to retire that credit elsewhere and you could then
set it up in any way that you wanted to, so long as
it did not go beyond the eighteen months period
from the original extension of credit.
M R . W I L L I A M A. D E W E E S (Waterloo):
Taking advantage of Amendment No. I, if a man
were to renew a loan held by his own institution
or another institution and made it for fifteen
months, and then subsequently wanted to add on
and make another loan, could he continuously do
that, if he did not make the maturity date exceed
fifteen months, that is, carry it on to the second
and third generation?
M R . T U R M A N : If the obligation is taken
over by your bank and the obligation elsewhere
is retired, then you would have the eighteen months
period from the original extension of credit by the
other bank, within which to make any revision
you see fit. When you come to the question of consolidation under option 2 of section 8 (b), you
might reorganize and consolidate that obligation
with a new advance provided the monthly payments were not less than the original obligation
stipulated and they were set up in such a way that
the entire consolidated obligation is paid out within
a fifteen months period.
M R . D E W E L S : If you go beyond that, let us
say at the end of ten months you wanted to renew
that and then add more to it, could you take that
for another fifteen months?
M R . T U R M A N : Your consolidation? Yes sir,
you follow the same standard you did at the time
of the first consolidation.
M R . D E W E E S : And you can do that a third
time?
M R . T U R M A N : Yes, sir, but I believe you
will find that it will work out practically because
of the amount of the monthly payments that will
be required.
M R . J E S S E F. S T R E N G (Louisville): Installment loan credit under §1,500 is limited to
eighteen months; therefore if a man wanted to purchase unrestricted articles, the credit could not extend beyond eighteen months; would there be any

restriction in installment sale terms in the purchase of that article if it is under $1,500, extending
over eighteen months? Is there any restriction on
installment credit?
M R . T U R M A N : All installment sales secured
by a listed article—
M R . S T R E N G : I mean an unrestricted article.
M R . T U R M A N : I do not think the regulation
covers the sale of an unlisted article.
M R . S T R E N G : It would cover the installment
loan credit.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : The point he is making is that the lender would be handicapped by the
regulation but the borrower would not, on unlisted articles. Is that correct, or not?
MR. T U R M A N : Well, I think that is correct.
The purpose statement is to take care of just that
situation. Is not that correct, Mr. Ransom?
M R . R A N S O M : The purpose statement is desirable for several reasons. If there be a change
in the installment terms; suppose that instead of
eighteen months an automobile must be bought on
fifteen months, then cash lending, in order to conform, would have to be on the same terms. As
I understand your question, however, you ask if
unlisted articles could be sold on any terms that
the seller chose to sell them. Yes, because that
type of call is not regulated.
M R . S T R E N G : It would affect the lender
but not the borrower.
M R . R A N S O M : Yes. Your point is this, that
if the borrower came to you and said, "I am buying unlisted articles; can I get as long terms from
you as I could from the merchants?" Your answer
would be no, if the vendor's terms exceeded terms
required for listed articles. That is a problem with
which we may have to deal in the future.
M R . S T R E N G : There is a movement, an
intensive movement in the local groups and the
I'TIA for the rehabilitation of old property; does
an exception have to be asked for each individual
application?
M R . T U R M A N : The provision for defense
housing is found in Section 6 (e).
M R . S T R E N G : They are starting a mass
movement, groups coining to Washington from
F H A to try to induce people to cooperate in this
movement. I want to know if, in each case, you
have to get an exemption from Washington?
MR. T U R M A N : I think that that matter has
been placed in the hands of the Regional office of
the Defense Housing Coordinator.
M R . R A N S O M : If the field representative
of the Defense Coordinator certifies that it is a
definite modernization housing project, necessary
for the defense program, that clears it up, as I
recall.
MR. T U R M A N : But I do not know of any
general over-all authorization that has been issued, so that each specific case would have to be
14

presented.
M R . R A N S O M : The Defense Coordinator
has indicated in advance the defense areas within
which specific exemptions will be granted.
M R . S T R E N G : This is not a defense area.
M R . R A L P H W . P I T M A N (Philadelphia):
I would like to ask Governor Ransom a question.
In Philadelphia, Wanamaker's have what is called
a revolving credit; if you go into their store, they
will approve your credit let us say, for four
hundred dollars. If, during the next month, you
reduce that §400; supposing you have used up
your $400 credit, you reduce it, let's say §30, you
may then go in and buy $30 more of merchandise.
I am talking about non-listed articles. They call
it a revolving credit. The result is that they are
i" the banking business in a big way, so that
it is a loan that is never paid off. It certainly
has possibilities, in my opinion. They are much
more dangerous than a lot of other extensions of
credit; they have hundreds of thousands of dollars
tied up that they will never get back on that basis.
I would like to ask if there is any intention, on the
part of the Federal Reserve Board, to regulate
that sort of credit?
M R . R A N S O M : It is not now subject to
Regulation W . Of course it is possible that, in the
light of future developments, it may become necessary to regulate book accounts, but it is not now
under consideration. In the particular instance
cited—that of a man with a revolving credit of
$400 who wanted to buy a refrigerator, the transaction might actually be an installment sale. If so,
it would be subject to regulation. The facts of the
case would determine that. The Canadian list
is very much longer than ours. It lists many times
the number of articles that we do. One reason
why we started with a small list was because we
felt experience was needed before we got into too
wide an area. W e took those articles most obviously within the defense program. It is possible that
finally the list may be longer and possibly even
include some regulation of book accounts. Naturally we don't want to start widening the area any
sooner than we have to and only in the light of
experience and changing conditions.
M R . W . G. A V E R Y (Schenectady) : Suppose
a banker makes a three months loan with no definite understanding about re-payment at the end
of three months; you know in your heart that he
is not going to pay that off at the end of three
months; is not that contract an installment loan?
M R . T U R M A N : I knew that question was
coming. The Board has issued a ruling on that
point. That is W 47. If there is a loan made
payable at a fixed date and there is an agreement
or understanding between the lender and the borrower that it will be paid in fact in installments,
that is regarded as an installment loan, subject to
the regulations; but if there is no agreement or

understanding and there might subsequently take
place renewals, it is not necessarily subject to the
regulation. It is however a very delicate question.
M R . R A N S O M : It seems to me that one of
the amendments regulating loans for business purposes may take care of some of the questions now
perplexing commercial bankers. I would not have
had any difficulty at all in determining, if a man
came in to make a thirty, sixty or ninety day loan,
whether it came under this regulation. Most of
such loans are renewed, certainly in part, but
there is seldom any preliminary agreement or
understanding that they will be renewed; if there
is, it would come under the installment regulation,
but I think the exemption of loans for business
purposes by this new amendment may get rid of
a great many of the cases in the commercial banks.
While the amendment may not be so helpful to you
people, as I understand most of your loans are not
for business purposes, I believe that any banker
making a loan of that type can determine it to his
own satisfaction.
A M E M B E R : I was wondering if there were
some liberal interpretations?
M R . R A N S O M : The final answer may depend
on the volume of loans shifted from installment
lending to the banking basis of 30, 60 and 90 day
paper.
MR. M A L C O L M
C. E N G S T R O M
(Richmond) : In Virginia we have had some little
experience with these defense housing loans, and
we secured from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond a series of the forms that have to be
completed by both the borrower and the lending
institution, and our instructions are to have those
executed by the borrower and the lender and sent
to the Federal Reserve Bank, and if they are in
order they can be returned to us and the loan can
be made without resort to Section 16. I think
the few we have had took just about a week to
get completed and returned.
AIR. T U R M A N : It would require that action
be taken in each specific case.
M R . E N G S T R O M : Yes, action has to be
taken in each specific case. The regulation itself
refers to the fact that no given area will be named
as a defense area, but each specific loan or account
has to be designated as a part of the defense housing program.
M R . R A N S O M : The reason for that was that
it immediately became apparent that the entire
United States was going to become a defense area.
Actually one of the difficulties we have encountered
and continue to encounter is the necessity for forms
under this regulation. W e are very reluctant to
give anybody additional burdens in the way of
filling out forms. On the other hand, we arc
administering a statute; the penalties under it are
severe; therefore the language in the regulation
does have to be legal and clear; it has to be as
15

precise as we can make it; the forms must he
complete enough to protect the lender and the
vendor as well as the customer. That is a necessity. There is not any way to get out of it and we
are trying to do the best job we can in making
the forms as few, as short and as simple as we can.
We liave under consideration the problem of a registration form. It has to be issued soon and we
have been working continuously and have advanced
that form from a very alarming looking document
when I first saw it, and one I would have approached with a good deal of fear and trembling
had I been on the filling-out end, to one which
at the present time is very much shorter and I
think simpler. It probably will be improved, but
that is one thing you cannot escape under regulations of this kind—imposing on those subject to
regulations. I didn't know before that it took
four forms to declare a housing project in the
defense area, but if the Richmond bank tells you
that, I am sure they are correct.
M R . E N G S T R O M : In Section 5 (d) we
come to the famous statement of borrower, a form
prepared and prescribed by the Board. I have been
informed somewhere that, while the regulation
itself does not indicate that a copy of that statement must be given to the borrower, nevertheless
the statement itself will carry a certification from
the borrower that he has received a copy of it.
Do you know whether or not the lending institutions will be required to give a copy of the statement to the borrower?
M R . R A N S O M : I do not know whether or
not that will be required. Some state statutes may
require it. There is a question I would like to ask
you gentlemen. The form of the purpose test can
either be negative or positive; it can state as a
fact that the purpose of the loan is not to purchase
or make a payment on any of the listed articles;
it can be positive in stating the purpose for which
the money is borrowed, leaving the lender and the
government to determine whether or not the purpose is one which comes under the regulation.
The form can be mandatory in that it lias to be
a form prepared by us and used by the lender in
each instance. Now my own personal preference
would be for a permissive, negative form of purpose
test. I may be the only man connected with the
Federal Reserve System who feels that way about
it; I do not know. Probably therefore that is not
what you are going to get. At the same time there
are very difficult questions involved, and I think
that we will benefit from a good deal of consultation before we finally reach a conclusion on that
point. It seems to me, however, that the borrower is entitled to a copy of whatever he signs
if he wants it. I should think you would want
that for your own protection, because if he certifies that he has received a copy of it, then lie is
on notice. Of course it might be possible, under

this regulation—this is a legal question and I only
suggest it as possibility, maybe Mr. Turman will
tell me that I am wrong—it might be possible to
put the entire responsibility on the lender, exonerating the borrower from any responsibility other
than what he may owe to the lender for making a
false statement; in other words, instead of involving many millions of people in making a statement
about which they may have some uncertainty,
we may just say to the lender, "You have got to be
sure that the man makes a correct statement." All
those measures are still under consideration, but
I would like to ask you people what form of statement you would like to have used? Now Mr.
Morris and I have discussed this on other occasions, and I think I know his views pretty well.
I would like to ask specifically which form of
statement you would like to use? Would you
prefer a negative or a positive statement?
M R . E N G S T R O M : That is a little difficult to
answer. My only point about giving the borrower
a copy of the statement is primarily a practical
one; it will be necessary that our loan officers
keep a carbon there on the desk, and it would be
a very cumbersome arrangement. As to the responsibility of the borrower and the certificate
that he receives a copy, I would like to say that
when a borrower signs a note he does not get a
copy of the note he signs.
M R . T U R M A N : He does not often read the
note.
A M E M B E R : If lie did, he wouldn't sign it.
(Laughter).
M R . R A N S O M : The difficulty of course is
that in the instance of the note he generally knows
what he is signing. He is not incurring the liability of a fine and possible imprisonment; he does not
read the note but he can have a copy of it if he
wants it. Someone says if he did read it, he might
not sign it, but this is a somewhat different problem ; the man who signs that statement is incurring
responsibility under a Federal statute. Therefore
I rather think that good relations, so far as we
are concerned and so far as you people arc concerned, might be on safer ground if, by any device
whatever, we could say to the borrower, "You are
under no legal responsibility in the matter, we
are relying on the lender. You think the borrower
is a responsible party or you would not be lending
him money. I do not know whether it is possible
to let the borrower escape entirely any responsibility in the matter of this statement, but if he is
to face the possibility of fine and imprisonment,
he certainly is entitled to go off with a copy of
what he has signed if he wants it.
M R . E N G S T R O M : I can see that all right.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : You have him facing
that already, haven't you, Governor, under the
statute against obtaining money under false pretenses?
16

M R . R A N S O M : If he makes a false statement.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : I know my first reaction is that you are right, you are going to have
to follow this to a conclusion. As it is, I am going
to attempt to answer, insofar as the conferees who
met in Washington are concerned, the inquiries you
make. We selected the positive form as outpreference.
A M E M B E R : So as to he in a hopeless
minority.
M R . G E O R G E M. C L A R K (Chattanooga) :
It seems perfectly apparent that the confusion
which is in evidence about this regulation may
grow. In diversified operations, we have to have a
Vice President in charge of interpretation and
regulation, and if I have to be the operating head
of my bank, I will have to give up. I do not have
the close daily touch with our diversified type of
lending to keep up, I am afraid, and so, for myself,
I would like to have counsel who would always
be available, and it may become worse. I think
we are fortunate in having approached this very
commendable government agency, but I wonder if
there is any feeling on the part of the Federal
Reserve Board that allocations and priorities arc
going to settle this thing to such an extent that
all regulation is a tempest in a teapot? If we
cannot get cars, as may happen, then why any
kind of regulation as to how they are financed?
Is there any feeling that allocations and priorities
will solve this whole problem and eliminate the
necessity for such regulation?
M R . R A . N S O M : May I try to answer that
one? The original suggestion of this regulation
came from a very important section of the automobile industry. Those people felt that instead of
having priorities, allocations and a limited number
of cars to be manufactured, that the whole problem
could be controlled by regulating the credit extended on automobiles. I was skeptical about credit
regulation producing such a result. If no new
ears were manufactured at all, there would be a
tremendous demand for cars already in existence
and wouldn't there be great pressure to buy those
cars at whatever price somebody might put on
them? Now if you can limit that demand by

curtailing credit you certainly are indirectly affecting the price structure, which is part of what
we are dealing with. If you answer that by saying
that the price administrator could fix a price and
that more could not be paid, then you would still
have a question of credit, because under the existing scheme of things there is a considerable profit
in the financing of automobiles. The tendency
would be to stretch those payments out indefinitely,
because the seller would gain a profit on the
financing that he might not gain under price control. So I do not see how it is possible, under the
scheme of things under which we are living today,
to hope to escape this type of regulation, but when
you speak of perplexities, you simply point out
what I tried to say a while ago; namely, there
may finally be a choice between some method of
over-all credit control and a series of highly selective controls.
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : I am loath to bring
this meeting to a close, but we must do it. I want
to express to you, Mr. Turman, our frank and
sincere hope that you can stay over and be with us
during the rest of the convention, and particularly
that you and Governor Ransom will be with us
tonight when we get into a round table discussion
which will inevitably head back to Regulation W .
It goes without saying that a similar invitation is
extended to the other speakers.
M R . T U R M A N : I have attended several
forums on Regulation W and I have never been
able to shift the responsibility of them over before.
It was unintentionally done, but I have enjoyed
this discussion more than any of the other discussions I have ever had. (Applause).
P R E S I D E N T S T O U T : I think it is only
fair to say at this point what I had intended to
say in the presidential address. With it I am
sure you will agree after listening to these two
gentlemen; that is, that if we must be under the
control or semi-control of a governmental body,
thank God it is in the hands of these intelligent,
understanding and cooperative gentlemen. (Applause).
. . . After attention had been called to the
Board of Governors luncheon and the Round
Table Discussion the session adjourned . . .