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At the International Banking and Financial Systems Conference, Bank of Italy, Rome,
Italy
March 9, 2001

Understanding Financial Consolidation
Good afternoon. It is my pleasure to speak to you today, and I thank Governor Antonio
Fazio of Bank of Italy for inviting me to participate in this conference.
Consolidation of all types of business activities has been a prominent feature of the
economic landscape for at least the past decade. The financial sector has participated
actively in this development. Indeed, the last few years have witnessed an acceleration of
consolidation among financial institutions. Thus, your choice of topics for this afternoon's
session is a timely one.
In recognition of the importance of this marketplace evolution, and especially its potential
effects on a wide range of public policies, the finance ministers and central bank governors
of the Group of Ten nations in September 1999 commissioned a major study of the possible
effects of financial consolidation on matters of policy concern to central banks and finance
ministries in the G-10. This study, which I was privileged to direct, was released to the public
late last month. Today I would like to discuss the study's major findings and their
implications.
The G-10 Study of Financial Consolidation
The G-10 study had two primary objectives. It attempted to isolate the effects of
consolidation from those of other powerful forces transforming our financial systems and to
identify key areas in which financial consolidation requires new or accelerated policy
development. The diversity of the economies involved--even among the G-10, Australia, and
Spain--and the interdependent nature of many of the forces affecting our financial systems
made achieving these objectives difficult, to say the least. However, I believe the study was
a success.
Patterns and Causes
With a study of the depth, breadth, and quite frankly, the length of this one, it is always
potentially dangerous and even possibly misleading to summarize the key points in a few
words. However, I believe that policymakers should communicate to a wide audience their
thinking on important policy concerns, and thereby stimulate and contribute to dialogues in
the public and private sectors. Thus, despite the risks, I would like to highlight what are, in
my judgment, the study's key findings and policy implications.
The report documents that, in the nations studied, a high level of merger and acquisition
activity occurred during the 1990s among financial firms, defined to include depository
institutions, securities firms, and insurance companies. During the decade, approximately
7,500 transactions, valued at roughly $1.6 trillion, were consummated. Moreover, the pace

of consolidation increased over time, including a noticeable acceleration in the last three
years of the decade. For example, the annual number of deals increased threefold during the
1990s, and the total value of deals increased almost tenfold. In Europe, roughly two-thirds of
merger and acquisition activity, as measured by the value of the European firm acquired,
occurred during the decade's last three years. Using a variety of measures, the United States
accounted for about 55 percent of M&A activity, partly because of our historically large
number of relatively small financial firms. However, it is also true that many very large U.S.
banking institutions expanded their geographic footprint by acquiring other very large banks,
especially later in the decade.
Most of the last decade's merger and acquisition activity in the financial sector involved
banking organizations. Acquisitions of banking firms accounted for 60 percent of all
financial mergers and 70 percent of the value of those mergers in the nations studied. In
addition, most M&A transactions involved firms competing in the same segment of the
financial services industry within the same country, while domestic mergers involving firms
in different segments of the overall financial services industry were the second most
common type of transaction. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions were less frequent,
especially those involving firms in different industry segments. Still, all types of mergers and
acquisitions, whether within one country or cross-border and whether within one industry
segment or across segments, increased in frequency and value during the 1990s.
Joint ventures and strategic alliances provide an interesting contrast with some of the
patterns in outright mergers and acquisitions. As with M&A activity, the number of joint
ventures and strategic alliances increased during the 1990s, with especially large increases in
the last two years. In the United States, which accounted for nearly half of all joint ventures
and strategic alliances, the arrangements were overwhelmingly domestic. However, in the
other twelve countries studied, cross-border joint ventures and strategic alliances overall
exceeded domestic deals.
Our research shows that financial consolidation substantially decreased the number of
banking firms during the 1990s in almost every nation studied, and measures of the national
concentration of the banking industry have tended to rise. Still, at the national level, the
structure of the banking industry continues to differ greatly, ranging from very
unconcentrated in a few nations--the United States and Germany--to highly concentrated in
about half of the nations in our study. In contrast to banking, there are no consistent patterns
across countries in changes in the number of insurance firms or concentration in the
insurance industry during the 1990s. Within the securities industry, several specific
activities, such as certain types of underwriting, are dominated by a small number of leading
institutions. It is unclear, however, whether this pattern changed much over the 1990s.
One of the most important conclusions of our study is that financial consolidation has helped
to create a significant number of large, and in some cases increasingly complex, financial
institutions. In addition, these firms increasingly operate across national borders and are
subject to a wide range of regulatory regimes. These observations have several important
implications that I shall return to in a moment.
Our work finds that the most important forces encouraging financial consolidation are
improvements in information technology, financial deregulation, globalization of financial
and nonfinancial markets, and increased shareholder pressure for financial performance.
Because we expect these forces to continue, we expect financial consolidation to continue
as well, even though the pace may be interrupted by swings in the macroeconomic cycle and

other factors. The study considers few possible future scenarios but concludes that the
likelihood of specific future developments is impossible to assess with confidence. My own
guess is that various patterns will emerge. Globally active universal financial service
providers will continue to emerge. We should also see the further development of firms
specialized in the production of particular components of financial services or in the
distribution to end-users of products obtained from specialized providers--providers that may
exist within or outside the traditional financial services industry. I fully expect a large
number of efficient and profitable small and medium-sized financial institutions to remain
important players in the United States. I would guess this will also be the case in many other
nations. In addition, the uncertainties of successful post-merger integration may well favor
more use of looser forms of consolidation, such as joint ventures and strategic alliances.
Monetary Policy
One of our more important policy concerns in designing the study was the potential effect of
financial consolidation on the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy. The study finds,
however, that financial consolidation has not significantly affected the ability of central
banks to achieve the objectives of monetary policy. Why is this? Although the answer is
somewhat complex, let me try to explain briefly.
As part of our research, we asked central banks in all the study nations about their
experiences with consolidation and monetary policy. Virtually all reported that they had
experienced at most minor effects, and those that had experienced somewhat stronger
effects had been able to adjust with little difficulty. A key reason for this finding is that even
with the substantial consolidation we have observed, the financial markets important for
monetary policy have generally remained highly competitive. Even in those nations where
consolidation has been considerable, competitive behavior has generally been sustained by
the possibility that new firms could enter the markets at relatively low cost. It is also well
worth noting that our work suggests that the development of the euro has been particularly
helpful in maintaining competition in Europe. The euro has encouraged development of
European money and capital markets, thus making the number of participants in a particular
nation's markets less relevant.
Consolidation could, at least in theory, affect the way changes in monetary policy are
transmitted to the real economy. For example, consolidation could potentially alter the way
banks adjust the availability and pricing of credit to their customers as the central bank
changes the stance of monetary policy. However, central banks generally indicated that such
effects had not been observed. Moreover, frequent reviews of the data should allow central
banks to take account of any future changes when setting policy.
On balance, and despite these quite positive results, our study recommends that central
banks should remain alert to the implications of any future reductions in the competitiveness
of the markets most important for monetary policy implementation. Similarly, we suggest
that central banks ought to monitor potential future effects on the transmission mechanisms
for monetary policy. Monetary policy is simply too important to the health of all our
economies to do otherwise.
Financial Risk
Financial consolidation can affect the risks to both individual financial institutions and the
financial system as a whole. Importantly, our study concludes that existing policies appear
adequate to contain individual firm and systemic risks now and in the intermediate term.
However, looking further ahead, the study identifies several topics that deserve careful

attention by policymakers.
For example, we conclude that the potential effects of financial consolidation on the risk of
individual financial institutions are mixed and that the net result is impossible to generalize.
Thus, we must evaluate individual firm risk on a case-by-case basis. Consolidation seems
most likely to reduce risk through diversification gains, although even here the possibilities
are complex. On the one hand, diversification gains seem likely from consolidation across
regions of a given nation and across national borders. On the other hand, after consolidation
some firms shift toward riskier asset portfolios, and consolidation may increase operating
risks and managerial complexities for those firms. Diversification gains may also result from
consolidation across financial products and services, although research suggests that the
potential benefits may be fairly limited.
In part because the net impact of consolidation on individual firm risk is unclear, the net
impact of consolidation on systemic risk is also uncertain. However, as I noted consolidation
clearly has encouraged the creation of a number of large and increasingly complex financial
institutions. Our study suggests that if such an institution became seriously distressed,
consolidation and any attendant complexity might increase the chance that winding down
the organization would be difficult or disorderly.
We recommend that the risks to individual firms and to the financial system could be
reduced by stepped-up efforts to understand the implications of working out a large and
complex financial institution. Because no institution is too big to fail, I believe that
regulators should develop a clearer understanding of, for example, the administration of
bankruptcy laws and conventions across borders; the coordination of supervisory policies
within and across borders; the treatment of over-the-counter derivatives, foreign exchange,
and other "market" activities in distress situations; the roles and responsibilities of managers
and boards of directors; and the administration of the lender-of-last-resort function. I say
stepped-up discussions are needed in some of these areas because considering adverse
developments is or should be a normal activity in all countries. Our study helped to clarify
the need for international attention to this topic.
Consolidation, and especially any resulting increased complexity of financial institutions,
appears to have increased both the demand by market participants for and the supply by
institutions of information regarding a firm's financial condition. The resulting rise in
disclosures has probably improved firm transparency and encouraged market discipline and
has thus lowered individual firm risk and perhaps increased financial stability. However, the
increased complexity of firms has also made them more opaque, and their increased size has
the potential to augment moral hazard. Thus, the net effect of consolidation on firm
transparency and market discipline is unclear. Indeed, we conclude that there appears to be
considerable room for improvement in disclosures by financial institutions.
Our study suggests that both crisis prevention and crisis management could be improved by
additional communication and cooperation among central banks, finance ministries, and
other financial supervisors, domestically and internationally. Indeed, the study strongly
supports existing efforts in these areas. In our view, the most important initiatives include
proposals to improve the risk sensitivity of the international Basel Capital Accord and bank
supervision and efforts aimed at improving market discipline. A critical element of improved
risk-based supervision is risk-based capital standards that are tied more closely to economic
risk. Capital standards provide an anchor for virtually all other supervisory and regulatory
actions and can support and improve both supervisory and market discipline. For example,

early intervention policies triggered by more accurate capital standards could prove to be
important in crisis prevention.
Payment and Settlement Systems
Financial consolidation is affecting the market structures for payment and securities
settlement as well as banks' internal systems and procedures for payment and back-office
activities. Our study concludes that, on balance, financial consolidation has led to a greater
concentration of payment and settlement flows among fewer parties. Fortunately, our
analysis indicates that the greater concentration of payment flows does not appear to have
decreased competition in markets for payment and settlement services. However, we suggest
that it would be advisable for government authorities to continue to monitor competition in
the payment system.
In contrast, our work indicates we should closely monitor the risk implications of
consolidation in payment and settlement systems. On the one hand, consolidation may help
to improve the effectiveness of institutions' credit and liquidity risk controls. For example,
increased concentration of payment flows may allow institutions to get a more
comprehensive picture of settlement exposures or create a greater ability to net internal
payment flows. In addition, central banks have made major efforts over recent decades to
contain and reduce systemic risk by operating and promoting real-time gross settlement
systems and by insisting on the implementation of risk control measures in net settlement
systems. On the other hand, consolidation may lead to a significant shift of risk from
interbank settlement systems, where risk management may be more robust and transparent,
to customer banks and third-party service providers, where risk management practices may
be harder for users to discern. In addition, to the extent that consolidation results in a greater
concentration of payment flows, the potential effects of an operational problem may
increase.
These and other developments imply that central bank oversight of the risks in interbank
payment systems is becoming more closely linked with traditional supervision of individual
institution safety and soundness. As a result, we conclude that increasing cooperation and
communication between banking supervisors and payment system overseers may be
necessary both domestically and internationally.
Efficiency, Competition, and Credit Flows
Our study concludes with an extensive evaluation of the potential effects of financial
consolidation on the efficiency of financial institutions, competition among such firms, and
credit flows to households and small businesses. The study determines that although
consolidation has some potential to improve operating efficiency, and has done so in some
cases, the overall evidence in favor of efficiency gains is weak. Thus, we suggest that
policymakers should carefully examine claims of substantial efficiency gains in proposed
consolidations, especially in cases where a merger could raise significant issues of market
power.
Our work also attempts to shed some light on why academic researchers are less optimistic
than business practitioners regarding the potential for consolidation to lead to efficiency
gains. We suggest four possible reasons, which are not mutually exclusive. First,
practitioners may consider cost reductions or revenue increases per se to be a success,
without also taking into account independent industry trends as a benchmark. Second,
managers may focus on absolute cost savings rather than on efficiency measures that
compare costs to some other variable such as assets or revenues. Third, research finds little

or no efficiency improvements on average, but this also means that some institutions may
improve efficiency while some suffer from lower efficiency. Managers with inside
knowledge of their firm may be justified in believing that their institution might be among
those improving efficiency through a merger or acquisition. Lastly, past M&As may have
suffered from regulations that reduced the benefits, and such regulations may not exist in the
future.
The effects of consolidation on competition and credit flows are case-specific and depend on
the nature of markets for individual products and services. Some markets, such as those for
wholesale financial services, generally show few problems. Others, such as those for retail
products and services, sometimes experience problems from consolidation. Thus, as with
other issues addressed by our study, a case-by-case evaluation of the relevant facts is
required.
Conclusion
In conclusion, financial consolidation clearly is a powerful force that is deeply affecting the
evolution of the financial system of the United States and many other nations. A thorough
understanding of this force and its potential effects is critical for prudent decision-making in
both the public and the private sectors. I believe the study that I have just summarized takes
some major steps toward that understanding, and I hope that my remarks have helped you to
comprehend our study's findings and implications. Still, all of us have much to learn, and
much of what we know today will almost surely change in the future. I commend the
organizers of this conference for seeking to advance our knowledge, and I again thank you
for inviting me to contribute.

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