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At Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee
February 5, 2003

September 11, the Federal Reserve, and the Financial System
Thank you for the invitation to speak, and thank you all for being here. Certainly most of
you have heard of the Federal Reserve and understand that it plays a role in the maintenance
of our domestic economy. But that is not what I am here to discuss. I was invited here to
speak to you about the actions of the Federal Reserve after the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001.
As the central bank of the United States, the Federal Reserve seeks to establish through the
implementation of monetary policy, an economic environment that encourages stable prices
over time, a high level of employment, and moderate long-term interest rates. Additionally,
the Fed shares, with a few other regulatory bodies, the duty of overseeing the banking
industry. In a broader context, the Federal Reserve also shares the responsibility of
maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risks that may arise
in financial markets. And in carrying out that responsibility, we have never been confronted
with a situation remotely resembling the grave reality of September 11, 2001.
On that morning, sitting in my office in Washington, I watched television with horror as the
second plane crashed into the World Trade Center. Not long after, I could see thick smoke
billowing above the trees in the direction of the Pentagon.
As events were unfolding, one could easily envision the risks that confronted the United
States--and especially the risks to which the Federal Reserve, as the nation's central bank,
would have to respond. It was clear that the loss of so many key resources at the core of the
financial capital of the United States would strain markets. If allowed to mount, those strains
could prompt a chain reaction drying up liquidity, which, unchecked, could lead to real
economic activity seizing-up. The shocks to the financial system and the economy that were
possible could have been disastrous to the confidence of businesses and households in our
country and, to a significant degree, the rest of the world.
Besides these very visible external risks, the Federal Reserve System had to cope effectively
in a threatening environment. The employees of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
being a few blocks away from "ground zero," had the exceedingly difficult challenge of
maintaining operations in the midst of terrifying and chaotic surroundings. All parts of the
Fed System, wherever located, faced the challenge of maintaining ongoing operations,
including discount window lending and check clearing, in the period of heightened
uncertainty that followed those horrific attacks.
In short, on the morning of September 11, the Fed, as monetary authority, as payment
system operator, as banking supervisor, and as employer, faced an unfolding crisis, and the
risks were all to the downside. The outlook was at best uncertain, and potentially quite

bleak.
Against this background, the Federal Reserve System organized a response that emphasized
three objectives. First, as central bank we needed to provide sufficient liquidity through as
many means as possible to maintain stability. In doing so, we would further our obligation to
the broader citizenry to maintain public confidence so that the crisis in New York and
Washington, D.C. would not spread across the country. Second, as operator and overseer of
key payment systems we had to ensure that our systems, as well as those in the private
sector, were operational. Third, we worked with critical public- and private-sector
participants to keep markets open or, if circumstances forced them to close, to return them
quickly to normal operations. Obviously, we had to balance the need to perform these public
functions with the need to be a sensitive and responsible employer.
Recognizing these multiple challenges, we responded in several ways. We attempted to
maintain confidence by indicating through our public statement that the Federal Reserve was
open and operating and that we were ready to provide liquidity. We issued this statement
after consultation with the Reserve Bank presidents, so that it represented a statement of the
entire System.
Why were we so concerned about maintaining liquidity in the financial system? Liquidity, as
you know, serves as the oil lubricating the engine of capitalism to keep it from burning itself
out. The efficiency of our financial system at maintaining adequate liquidity is often taken
for granted. But on September 11, it could not be taken for granted. The bottlenecks in the
pipeline became so severe that the Federal Reserve stepped in to ensure that the financial
system remained adequately liquid. In other words, our massive provision of reserves made
sure that the engine of finance did not run out of oil and seize up.
The massive damage to property and communications systems at the hub of financial
activity in this country made it more difficult, and in some cases impossible, for many banks
to execute payments to one another. The failure of some banks to make payments also
disrupted the payments coordination by which banks use incoming payments to fund their
own transfers to other banks. Once a number of banks began to be short of incoming
payments, some became more reluctant to send out payments themselves. In effect, banks
were collectively growing short of liquidity.
We recognized this disturbing trend toward illiquidity in the pattern of funds movement
among the accounts held by commercial banks at the Federal Reserve. Before September
11, banks held approximately $13 billion in their Fed accounts. In the days after September
11, these balances ballooned to more than $120 billion because some banks could not move
funds out of their accounts. The large buildup of Federal Reserve account balances was
limited to only a few banks, but it meant that a number of other banks were running huge
negative positions in their Federal Reserve accounts and needed to find other sources of
liquidity before the close of business.
Further evidence of disruption in the flow of payments among banks at this time is quite
clear from data for the Federal Reserve's large-value electronic payment system, known as
Fedwire. Banks use Fedwire to make payments to one another to settle their customers' as
well as their own transactions. Just before September 11, the number of transfers sent over
Fedwire on a normal day was around 430,000, with a total value of $1.6 trillion. On
September 11, the number of transfers was down more than 40 percent, with fewer than
250,000 transfers being sent over Fedwire, and the total value was down 25 percent.

If liquidity had continued to dry up, both business and consumer confidence could have
been severely affected. Imagine businesses unable to promptly withdraw funds from checks
deposited in their banks, even though those checks paid for goods or services already
provided. Imagine international banks running out of dollars, a serious impediment to
international trade and finance. As we know now, the situation never reached those extreme
conditions because, fortunately, the Federal Reserve System has numerous means providing
liquidity.
One tool used to provide needed liquidity was the discount window, through which the Fed
lends in certain circumstances to help banks maintain smooth day-to-day operations. In
essence, in more normal times the discount window serves a function similar to that of a
pressure valve. During the crisis, as the volume of borrowing requests increased
dramatically, the discount window served as something closer to the floodgates of a great
dam. On September 12, lending to banks through the discount window totaled about $46
billion, more than two hundred times the daily average for the previous month. The flood of
funds released into the banking system reduced the immediate need for banks to rely on
payments from other banks to make the payments they themselves owed others.
Open market operations were a second tool at our disposal for pumping additional liquidity
into the system. Indeed, as you may know, open market operations are the chief tool
employed by the Federal Reserve to affect the global supply of dollars in circulation. In
these operations, our trading desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York enters the
market daily to buy or sell Treasury securities. Contrary to one of the early fears, most of
our counterparties in these transactions, the community of primary dealers, were generally
functioning starting on September 12. Our trading desk in New York met all propositions at
the intended funds rate from September 12 through September 17, and the System engaged
in a record level of open market operations through overnight repurchase agreements. To
accommodate these demands, the trading desk operated later in the day than normal, giving
dealers an opportunity to assess their financing needs. Also, the Fed's securities lending
program expanded its provision of securities to the marketplace, and those securities in turn
could be used as the collateral for private-sector liquidity arrangements. The staff of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, having evacuated its main site and gone to its backup
facility, performed heroically in running the open market operations.
Despite the increased liquidity resulting from discount window lending and open market
operations, some institutions still had difficulty exchanging payments and lending or
borrowing funds because of connectivity problems and the closure of key markets. As a
result, many depository institutions incurred larger-than-usual daylight overdrafts on their
accounts at the Federal Reserve. To help in this situation, the Federal Reserve waived the
overdraft fees it normally charges. Between September 11 and September 21, peak and
average daylight overdrafts incurred by depository institutions were approximately 35
percent and 30 percent higher than normal levels, respectively. On September 14, daylight
overdrafts peaked at $150 billion, more than 60 percent higher than usual, despite Federal
Reserve opening account balances of slightly more than $120 billion.
The destruction of infrastructure in Lower Manhattan meant that some foreign financial
institutions might not be able to provide sufficient collateral to underpin funding from their
usual counterparties and correspondent banks. These foreign firms turned to their national
central banks for dollar-based liquidity. The Federal Reserve arranged for the availability of
reciprocal currency facilities of up to $50 billion with the European Central Bank and $30

billion with the Bank of England, both in the form of thirty-day swaps. We also lifted the
ceiling of a preexisting swap with the Bank of Canada to $10 billion.
The Federal Reserve's role as a provider of check collection services presented another
opportunity for providing liquidity. Check collection relies on a fleet of airplanes to fly
checks all around the country so that the checks can be presented to their home bank for
payment. Though U.S. airspace was closed for several days after the attacks, the Federal
Reserve Banks continued to provide credit for checks on the usual availability schedules.
This accommodation allowed businesses and consumers that depended on the prompt
availability of their check deposits to withdraw the proceeds of these check deposits as they
expected.
With other regulators and supervisors, the Federal Reserve issued a statement on Friday,
September 14, encouraging state member banks and bank holding companies to work with
customers affected by the events of September 11. The Board has a long-standing policy of
encouraging bankers to work flexibly with customers affected by disasters. That policy
recognizes the need for taking prudent steps to make credit available to sound borrowers and
for adjusting terms and conditions of loans and transactions to take account of the stresses
during a crisis. I am sure that several Reserve Bank Presidents and Directors of Supervision
communicated this message directly to commercial bankers in their Districts. We also
recognized that the banks' balance sheets might expand as businesses and consumers turned
to banks for funding. Through an interagency statement, we invited banks that experienced
such an expansion of their balance sheets to contact their regulator to discuss ways to
respond.
Ultimately, to further increase liquidity, on the morning of September 17, the policymaking
body of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Open Market Committee, met by
teleconference and then publicly announced a 50 basis point decrease in the intended
federal funds rate from 3.5 percent to 3.0 percent.
The Federal Reserve also worked with other regulators through the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets to monitor developments in financial markets. As you know, the
government securities market postponed settlements for a few days, the commercial paper
market experienced significant problems, and the New York Stock Exchange remained
closed until September 17. We supported fully restoring financial markets to normal
operations as soon as practical. However, in working with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Department of the Treasury, market participants, and other stakeholders to
reopen these markets, we had to balance the benefit of a prompt return to business against
the risk that the supporting infrastructure would be unable to handle what would certainly be
a record volume of trades. Paramount in that consideration was the safety of the men and
women working in Lower Manhattan. The SEC and the New York Federal Reserve Bank,
along with the leaders in these various markets, deserve a great deal of credit for ably
managing the process of reopening, making judgments that allowed all markets to return to
normal functioning quickly and effectively.
As I look back, I am comforted that the financial and monetary effects of the horrible and
tragic events on that day were less severe than one might have imagined. The aftershocks
were less sizable than one might have feared they might be, largely because of the action
taken by major market participants and the regulatory community, including the Federal
Reserve System.

The incidents of September 11 taught us many lessons relating to central banking and
financial stability. First and foremost, they reinforced the importance of the Federal
Reserve's role as lender of last resort. Second, we again saw that the multiple roles the
Federal Reserve plays--in this instance, central bank, supervisor and regulator, and payment
systems operator--give us many tools to apply during a crisis. While I have been a member
of the Board, I have from time to time heard some question the wisdom of our central bank's
being involved in supervision and regulation and continuing to provide payment services,
particularly retail payment services. To my mind the events of September 11 should put such
question to rest. From our experience, we should recognize the benefits of a central bank
that can influence the economy and enhance financial stability through several mutually
reinforcing tools.
A third lesson is that having diversified forms of risk intermediation makes the financial
system more robust. In this instance, having markets and banks that performed similar
financial intermediation roles accounted for much of our financial system's ability to
withstand the shock of September 11.
Fourth, the attacks remind us that operational risk, which is hard to quantify with any model,
may at times be the paramount risk. We recognized this in the abstract in our planning for
the Y2K century-date change. Now we have seen the real results of a massive disruption in
infrastructure. Fortunately, the preparations for Y2K helped the financial system of our
country withstand the September 11 crisis. Even now, financial institutions are working hard
to update their contingency plans on the basis of a new understanding of the risks that
confront our country. Having layers of redundancy, each calibrated to a different level of
emergency need, is one potentially successful strategy.
A fifth lesson is the importance of ongoing communication and, when required, coordination
among domestic authorities and across borders. The ability to communicate seamlessly with
other members of the President's Working Group and with fellow central bankers, in both
cases on the basis of trust developed in the course of pre-existing relationships, proved to be
very helpful. Obviously, even without those well-established relationships, we would still
have reached decisions. The decisions may not have come as quickly nor been as well
informed, however. The amount of trust needed to successfully coordinate in the midst of
stressful situations is high, and coordinating with familiar colleagues is much easier than
working with relative strangers.
Finally, in the wake of those events, we must address the possibility of major disruptions in
areas in which financial markets or operational centers are concentrated. We will not
accomplish our task if one or two organizations strengthen their resilience and others do not.
Instead, we need to work hard to adopt consistent strategies for reducing risks that together
address prevention, management, and testing.
In conclusion, I must admit that the farther we move away in time from the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, the more the lessons come into focus. We in the United States are very
fortunate to have created, through the efforts of private industry at times pushed by
regulators, the most robust, most efficient financial system in the world. But at the same
time, it is clear that the events should remind us to redouble our efforts to make our financial
system even stronger.
It has been a pleasure to address you all this afternoon. Thank you.

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2003 Speeches

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