View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Fiscal and Mone tary Developments
for the Balance of 1971
Remarks of Mr. Robert P. Mayo
President of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago
at a meeting of the
Indianapolis Chapter of the
Administrative Management Society
Indianapolis, Indiana
April 14, 1971
In his invitation to me, Mr. Little indicated that the theme
of your meetings for this year was "Managing Change."

I could not have

hoped for a more relevant theme for my remarks this evening.

Managing

change is what economic policy has been all about over the past two
years--managing the change from an economy of stubborn inflationary
excesses to one of greater stability in prices and employment with
healthy, sustainable growth.
It hasn't been an easy job to manage this change.
of managing it is far from over.

And the job

But given the management tools avail-

able to us we have, I think, taken the essential steps needed for suecess.
This is a huge and complex economy.

Public and quasi-public

officials alike manage within the appropriate constraint that we must
not only maintain but help to revitalize the free economic society of
which we are so justifiably proud.

So managing change for our economy

does not mean authoritative directions.

It means management to accorn-

plish the changes desired by millions of decision makers.
As a result, the slowness of change is frequently disturbing to
some.

Economic policymakers are typically criticized for failing to

move far enou gh and fast enough.
of this over the last year or so.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

We have certainly seen ample evidence

-2But economic management is succeeding in its objective of
reaching sustainable economic growth for this country.

We are con-

tinuing to manage with that chan ge clearly in mind, even though it is
taking longer than many of us foresaw two years ago.
With the first quarter of the new year now behind us, the signs
continue to point to an economy in the recovery phase.

I would certainly

agree that there is little evidence of a vigorous business upturn.

I admit that prices are still rising.

And

But the forces for recovery and

for some cooling of price increases have been set in motion.

We are

seeing progress on both fronts.
Too much unemployment, too many unused facilities and an uneasy
feeling that inflation really hasn't been licked are causing some to say
that we have to rethink our basic position.

I don't see that anything

as drastic as might be implied by "rethinking our position" is required.
The pace of mon t ry and er di t growth ovl=!r

h~ pa

ye

r

been large enough to restore most of the economy's lost liquidity.

s
Our

policies have established a sound foundation for the growth of real
output at a rate consistent with holding onto and enlarging the gains
we've made in restraining inflationary pressures.
What will be necessary for managing change over the rest of
this year--the kinds of fiscal and monetary developments in store for
us--is suggested by the foundation that has already been laid.

As you

know, there were some significant distortions of credit flows in 1969
as we moved to a period of pronounced fiscal and monetary tightness.
These distortions were largely corrected in 1970.

In 1969, commercial

banks supplied only about one-seventh of the total funds advanced in
the economy--far below their historic share.
about one-third of the funds advanced.

But in 1970, banks supplied

Nonfinancial businesses, house-

holds and state and local governments supplied a whopping 44 percent

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

-3-

-of total funds in 1969 but only 8 percent in 1970.
Commercial banks were able to play an e xpande d role as a source
of funds in 1970 only because of the immense increase in their resource s.

As measured by the net increases in their deposits and other liabilities,
these resources rose by nearly $40 billion last year, compare d with $18
billion in 1969.

While the rise in demand deposits was about the same

in both years, the dissimilarity in increases in time deposits was tremendous.

In 1969, comme rcial banks lost almost $10 billion in time

deposits, but in 1970, bank time deposits vaulted by $38 billion, with
$15 billion of the increase going into certificates of deposits--the
instrume nt that had born the brunt of the 1969 outflow.

What happened

was that in 1970 interest rates offered by banks (particularly on CDs
with maturities of less than 90 days - -after ceilings were suspended
at midyear) again became compe titive with rapidly declining market
yields, and banks gaine

fun's .

The sharp tun1c:11.ou1d in deposit -lows

is an accurate barometer of the contrasting posture of moneta ry policy
in the two years.
Bank assets grew by $42 billion last year, twice the amount for
1969.

But unlike 1969, when banks liquidated $9 1/2 billion of U.S.

Government securities and funneled the money into loans, in 1970 a vast
majority of bank funds went into investments:

a $20 billion expansion

in investments and a modest $5 billion increase in loans.

Commercial

banks also did something else with their newly found resources last
year.

They reduced liabilities to their foreign branches by $6 billion.

These liabilities mainly Eurodollar borrowings, increased by $7 billion
in 1969 during the period when U.S. banks were out beating the bushes
in a search for frmds to expand loans as domestic deposits shrank almost
daily.

The extent of these borrowin gs is made startlingly clear when

we realize they accounted for nearly 40 percent of the n e t increase in
 bank liabilities
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

in 1969.

-4What all of this tells us, really, is that commercial banks
today are in a much better position to meet the financial needs of our
economy than they were just a few months ago--and without any radical
revisions in national monetary policies.

'
If monetary conditions are favorable, how does the economy
appear to be stacking up for the year?

As you know, the majority of

the forecasts are for moderate expansion in 1971.
forecast rounds off at $1,050 billion GNP.

The so-called consensus

And I'm sure everyone here

has heard of the Administration's $1,065 billion GNP target.
Most economists feel the official target is very optimistic
as a forecast.

It certainly is too optimistic if its achievement is

forced through increased budget spending and ove rly easy credit
availability--inflationa ry steps we would surely regret later on.

And

yet we cannot say that the Administration's target is outside the range
uf our experi ence wiU pos twar reco veri es in general.

l e isn t.

In

fact, what is striking is that even the optimistic goal implies a relatively sluggish performance of our economy compared with past recoveries.
Even a cursory review of past cycles indicates that this is a different
business cycle.
By all measures, the 1969-70 recession was the mildest of the
postwar recessions.

The decline in real output from its peak in the

third quarter of 1969 to its 1970 low was not large compared with the
magnitude of the earlier contractions.

The duration of decline--a low

in the second quarter after the peak--was comparable to that for the
1948-49 and 1957-58 recessions, but the decline in percentage terms
was half of that for 1948-49 and a quarter of the 1957-58 decline.
Shallow it may be, but the 1969-70 recession is the most stubborn
we have encountered.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

If we assume that the first quarter of 1971 has shown a

-5fairly hefty increase in output as auto product i on resumed and steel
str ike hedge buyin g incre ased , we may have recovered by now to the
third quarter 1969 peak.
forme r peak.

This is a six-quarter span to reach the

All of the postwar recessions excep t for 1953-54 have

shown quicker recovery to the former peak.

But even realization of

the optimistic administration forecast for 1971 would make the current
cycle the most stubborn of the postwar period, with 1953-54 (after the
Korean War) as the runner-up.
There is little ques tion that the deterioration of psychology
in 1970, following the euphoria of the long inflationary boom of the lateSixties, must be given he avy weight in explaining the present low profile
of recovery.

The balloon of endless expansion inflated in the 1965-68

period burst.

The drop in the stock market, the Penn Central failure,

defense spending cutback repercussions and problems in the securities
buoiness didn't add to c.c~ fid e nce .

Cu

1C

rn about • nc me prospE:c LS e ·en

by individuals who previously had thought themselves immune to economic
downturns, concern about inflation, anti-consumerism and disenchantment
with the ultimate goals and structure of the society have all weakened
consumer demands on a broad front.
Buffeted by both economic and noneconomic forces, uncertain
consumers and investors have altered their patterns of spending and
investment decisions.

To a large extent the changed psychology and

attitudes are not adequately incorporated in either our econometric or
our judgmental models.

As a result, our projections may be faulty--or

at least more uncertain than usual.

Approaches to forecasting rely on

a comparability of experience, a similarity of response that permits us
to judge the effect of the underlying forces.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

But when our experience

-6-

is new, when there are no real good measures for so many factors, projections of the future course become more varied and uncertain.

Recall, for

example, how long you have been hearing that the consumer is the key to
economic recovery.

He is.

He has the income, the savings, the liquid

'
assets and · readily available consumer credit.
large.

The potential to spend is

But everyone is having great difficulty in projecting when he will

get his hands out of his pockets.
But what is even more unusual about the current recovery is the
behavior of prices and labor costs.

There are striking differences here

that give this cycle its peculiar character.

The GNP price deflater

has not always h ad the upward bias of recent years during recessions.
It declined 2.8 percent from a high in the third quarter of 1948 to a
low in the first quarter of 1950 before starting upward sharply in the
Korean War.

Average prices did not decline in the 1953-54 recession,

but the price defl to

was ~tabl

f

rr the fourth quar er of 195 2 to the

fourth quarter of 1953 . . The price deflater rose through the 1957-58 recession, a developme nt that caused much concern at the time.

Price infla-

tion continued in the 1960-61 recession, but at a reduced rate.

The

acceleration of price inflation in the 1969-70 downturn was, however, a
unique development--or at best, a distinct worsening of the trend of a
stubborn upward price bias.
Labor cost per unit of output in manufactuFing declined significantly in 1950-51, 1954-55, 1958-59 and in 1961 after activity started
to recover.
precedented.

The acceleration in labor cost increases in 1970 was unProductivity gains were small or nonexistent in 1969-70.

A large increase is expected in 1971.

But even an increase of 4 to 5

percent (w~th a long-term average of about 3.5 percent) would fall far
short of average increases in worker compensation that now range from
6 to 15 percent per year.

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

-7Where does this examination leave us?
about a different kind of a business cycle.

Clearly we are talking
In broad terms we are

viewing a cycle composed of a mild decline in output with an inordinately
slow recovery constrained by adverse price and labor cost developments.
Obviously this pattern has and will continue to influence our economic
policies.

We cannot react as though we were faced with a traditional

cycle.
I have no basis for disagreeing at this juncture with the view
that the expansion will be moderate.

Develo pme nts, for example, in the

consumer and business areas may prove me incorrect if confidence is rejuvenated much more rapidly than now seems likely.

I would be happy

to be shown wrong on these grounds--but most unhappy to be proved wrong
because we moved to higher figures because of short-sighted highly stimulative economic policies.

This is the kind of cycle in which more expansive

monetary actions now wi ll buy us little or not .ing in t-he ., D.Y of L cr as d
0

real output in the near term but will buy us much in the way of inflation
troubles in the longer run.
The easier monetary policies that have been pursued during the
past year have not yet accomplished their purpose.

The fact that there

are lags between monetary policy actions and their effects is well
known.

The lags apparently are even longer this time.

there is no such thing as "instant" monetary policy.

To my knowledge,
But disappointment

with the results of monetary policy thus far must not lead to incautious
excesses that may be harmful rather than beneficial to economic recovery.
The available funds are there today.
Federal Reserve credit has increased over the past 12 months
at a substantial pace.

The rate of change in the narrowly defined money

stock (currency and demand deposits)--frequently used as a symbol of the
overall thrust of monetary policy--expanded in the past year by 6

https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

-8percent--a rate of expansion well above the average of about 3 to 3 1/2
percent over the last 20 years.

This rate of growth has been exceeded

very few times and then in only years of intense inflation.

However, with

unusual liquidity needs and the sluggishness of the economy, a 6 percent
rate of monetary expansion thus far seems quite appropriate.
The recent pace of monetary expansion has been accompanied
by a significant decline in rates.

The rate on three-month Treasury

bills, the nearest market approximation to a "pure" interest rate, was
at an all time hi gh of 8 percent at the start of 1970.
bill rate is below 4 percent.

Current ly, the

The drop in the federal funds rate--the

rate banks pay to borrow each other's excess reserves --was even sharper;
from 9 percent to 4 percent.

Yields on new issues of high-grade corporate

bonds declined from a high of more than 9 percent in 1970 to about 6 3/4
percent in late January and around 7 1/4 percent now--a remarkable drop
considering the record volume of nei co rporar e bonds floa t ed in r c nt
months.
The spread between short- and long-term rates remains very large.
And the spread be tween U. S. and foreign interest rates is also large-with the result that short-term capital flows abroad have accelerated.

In

one form this is represented by repayment by U. S. banks of Eurodollars
obtained through their foreign branches.

With the continuing decline of

interest rates in this country, many banks decided the differential in
that cost of funds was too large.

As a result, Eurodollar liabilities

were paid down so that, as of March 1971 outstanding amounts owed by
U.S. banks to foreign branches totaled $3 billion compared to $14 1/2
billion in January 1970.
What happens to these outflows of short-term capital?

They

become reserves in foreign central banks, and the U.S. balance-of-payments


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

-9deficit, measured on the official transaction basis, grows accordingly.
In 1970, this deficit amounted to $10.7 billion, and the decline in
liabilities to fore ign central banks, including branches of U.S. banks,
accounted for three-fifths of this total.

On the whole, foreign central

banks have indicated they are willing to hold a large amount of dollars
in their international reserves.

But it is unrealistic to assume they

will watch their dollar holdings grow so rapidly without some pressure
to turn excess dollars into asse ts such as gold, or special drawing rights
from the International Monetary Fund.

In the months ahead, these de-

velopme nts will undoubtedly continue to be watched carefully by our
economic decision makers.
What seems to be making the current business cycle particularly
resist an t to a faster rate of economic growth is that both business and
consumers seem r eluctant to step up their rate of spending for goods
and se r ices .

Thi s i s the k y to increased production , ri ~i n

and more efficient use of plant capacity.

0

employmen t

But consumers are pessimistic

about future employme nt prospects and re a l control of inflation.

Busi-

nesses are caught in a profit squeeze, .and are faced with excess plant
capacity.

They see very little reason to increase spending on new plant

and equipment further than they are now doing.
If sluggish output and high unemployment should persist it might
be necessary to give additional consideration to fiscal policy.
Congressional actions are tending in this direction.

Recent

The 10 percent

boost in Social Security benefits and the simultaneous postponing for
a year of an increase in payroll taxes to finance them should increase
disposable personal income by $1. 4 billion this year and reduce business
costs somewhat.

Further, if the personal federal income tax exemptions

and standard deductions scheduled to increase in 1972 were to become


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

-10effective in 1971, an additional $2 1/2 billion in consumer income might
be realized this ye ar.
Other plans have been put forward to improve the rate of fixed
investment.

The move to liberalize depreciation guidelines for business

'
equipment will yield a stimulus of about $3 billion in 1970.

If Congress

should act to restore the investment tax credit that was repealed two years
ago, the short-run result on after-tax profits-- and therefore, on funds
availa ble for investment- - mi ght be around $2 1/2 billion.

In addition,

we are getting closer to an incomes policy which should have some restraining effect on wa ges and prices, as a supplement to--not a substitute for-fiscal and monetary policies.
Whatever steps are taken, and whatever instruments are employe d
in the months ahead, must not be allowed to thre a ten our long-run objective of sound economic growth consist ent with re asonable price stability.
With appro priate mone tary and fiscal polici e s ·\ o king hannoni • usly to gether--and with responsible union and management policies in industry-there is every reason to believe we can continue to "manage change"
effectively.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis