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WELCOMING REMARKS
Remarks by Robert P. Forrestal
President and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Delegation of Chinese Bankers
August 8, 1994

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta this
morning. This November, I will have the equivalent pleasure of visiting your
exciting city.
I will travel to Shanghai to be a speaker at the Fifth International Economics
Conference on China. This conference is co-sponsored by the American
Committee on Asian Economic Studies and a number of Shanghai organizations,
including the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.
One of the topics for discussion will be the Shanghai-Pudong Development
Project. I am sure that many of you here today could give me some insight into
that project.
I see from your schedule that you have already visited a number of commercial
banks. Today, you are visiting a different kind of bank. We are part of the central
bank of the United States. Its formal name is the Federal Reserve System.
You will be hearing from three of our Bank officers. They will talk about monetary




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policy, current banking and regulatory issues, and the operation of our Bank. I
sincerely hope that the information discussed here today will be useful to you. And
if any of these talks is "ma ma hoo hoo"

However, before I turn the program over to the next speaker, I would like to say
a few words about the importance of an independent central bank.
In my view, the key to long-term, stable growth in China depends on a strong
financial structure. And a strong financial structure requires an independent central
bank or something that serves the same purpose. It does not matter what it is
called. The most important point is that this central bank must be independent from
the government.
Why is such a structure so critical? First, because a strong and independent
central bank would take steps to hold inflation down.




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The most immediate benefit of a central bank would be relief from hyperinflation.
That is because with a central bank in place, the government could no longer print
money to pay its debts.
Second, because countries that do not have a sound financial structure cannot be
equal partners with those countries that do have a sound financial structure. Free
and open trade, for instance, depends on a strong banking system--not only in the
United States but also in each of our trading partners. That means there must not
be only strong U.S., European, and Japanese banks but also strong Chinese
banks.
A central bank should be independent from the government. It should administer
monetary policy. It should oversee the payments system. And it should supervise
the banking industry. I believe that an independent central bank is the best way
to create an environment for an economy to grow at a stable rate.
In addition, technology now joins countries in the world more closely. This means
that unsound banking practices create problems in more than the home country.
The collapse of BCCI is an example of unsafe banking practices that have the
potential to harm global banking. In order to keep the international banking system
safe, it is important that all countries have an independent supervisory authority.
Also comprehensive and consolidated examinations must be carried out at all




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financial institutions.
Besides appropriate supervision, another important part of any financial structure
is the payments system. For instance, financial markets in every country depend
on a reliable payments system to ensure their liquidity and efficiency. Central
banks usually oversee the payments system for two reasons: because they have
account relationships with commercial banks and because they supervise these
same banks.
During bank examinations, the central bank gets advance warning of potential
major problems for the payments system. That is why it is extremely important for
a central bank or a supervisor to be able to conduct comprehensive and
consolidated examinations of commercial banks.
I do not wish to get overly technical, but this issue has become more intense since
the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act. This
act governs whether the Federal Reserve can accept an application for an
international bank to do business in the United States. Our judgment is based
largely on whether the bank is subject to comprehensive supervision and
regulation in its home country.
I believe the rules of the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act are sensible.




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I also believe, however, that countries should overhaul their banking laws not
merely because of this U.S. law. Rather, they should recognize that creating a
strong financial structure simply is an excellent idea-whether or not there is a U.S.
law.
In conclusion, I see from your schedule that you are a little more than halfway
through the Training Program. My best wishes to you as you leave the Southeast
to travel to New York City and Los Angeles before leaving for home.
Now let me turn you over to Sheila Tschinkel, our senior vice president and
director of research. She will be speaking with you about the Federal Reserve and
the role it plays with monetary policy.