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THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR THE U.S.
AND THE SOUTHEAST
AND COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES
Remarks by Robert P. Forrestal, President
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
To the First National Bank in Palm Beach
April 3, 1991
Good afternoon!

I am pleased and honored by your

invitation to return to Palm Beach and meet with the officers
and guests of the First National Bank. I would like to use
this opportunity to talk about a fairly broad issue—namely,
our excessively short-term focus as a nation and how that is
now beginning to haunt us. In the process of discussing this
issue, I will be reviewing several more specific areas of
concern including banking reform, the federal budget deficit,
and inflation. Before I do so, however, let me provide a
context for my views on these issues by sharing with you my
economic outlook for the nation and the Southeast in the year
ahead.




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The U.S. Outlook
Even though the Gulf war has come to a remarkably
gratifying conclusion, some of the uncertainty it brought to
economic forecasting will last a while longer. Specifically, my
outlook depends to a considerable extent on the price of oil.
The conflict in the Middle East caused a significant adverse
supply shock which has affected both prices and production.
This fact has been evident in the weaker economic
performance of recent months and has led to forecasts for
slower growth in the year ahead.

Lately we have seen

relatively low oil prices for several reasons.

The

fundamentals, especially greatly increased output from oil
producers other than Iraq and Kuwait, suggest that current
supply shortages are being met for the most part. In the long
run, however, there is a limit to the decline in prices because
non-OPEC production is falling off, and growth in demand



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has been only temporarily slowed by the price shock and the
economic slowdown. Thus, the residual effects of the conflict
in the Middle East continue to increase the uncertainty in the
economic outlook.

With that caution in mind, allow me to give you just a
few numbers. Even though we have little tangible evidence
that the recession is abating, the conditions are in place for
expansion in real gross national product (GNP) to resume by
the second half of 1991. Thus, I believe the rate of change in
GNP will be positive for the year, averaging about 1/2
percent. Since employment lags behind GNP, I think the
unemployment rate will be slightly above 6 1/2 percent at
year’s end. I look for inflation to abate, however, and drop
back to 4 or 4 1/2 percent as an annual average.




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Let me elaborate briefly on the sources of strengths and
weaknesses underlying these projections. Given continuing
pressures from the energy sector, I feel that the strongest
components of the economy will be exports and the personal
consumption

of

services.

Weaker

sectors

include

construction, business investment, and other consumers’
purchases, especially of durable goods.

Government will

likely be a positive factor on balance, although the scale of its
contribution remains to be determined.

One sector lending momentum to the U.S. economy in
the year ahead will be services, which represents half of all
personal consumption expenditures. Net exports should also
remain a source of strength. In spite of recessions in Canada
and the United Kingdom, Japan and several of our West
European trading partners are experiencing relatively strong



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expansion. Also adding impetus to growth are the Federal
Reserve’s earlier easing moves,

which should make

themselves felt over time.

I am sure that you are all familiar with the weaknesses
in the economy.

The construction industry suffers from

lingering excess supplies due to past overbuilding as well as
hesitancy among many lenders to finance new projects.
Again in 1991, as in 1990, the aging of the population should
dampen the demand for first-time home purchases. Thus,
the construction industry is not likely to provide support to
growth in the year ahead.

I believe, however, that the

downturn in construction is probably near the bottom and
that the industry is not as likely to exert as much of a drag
this year. Consumption of durable and nondurable goods
should likewise remain weak this year. In addition to this



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slump in consumer demand, many in the business sector are
encountering tighter lending standards at many banks. Thus,
it does not look as if capital spending by businesses on new
plant, offices, or equipment will lend support to the economy.

The Gulf war’s impact will probably make fiscal policy
a positive factor in this year’s economy. However, the degree
of stimulus provided by government spending will depend
upon how long we maintain a presence in the Persian Gulf
and what decisions are made on replacing the inventory of
weapons and other material consumed in the fighting.
Neither of these outcomes can be predicted at this point. In
sum, I look for services and exports to lead economic growth
in 1991 while construction, consumption of durable goods,
and investment to remain weak.




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Southeast Outlook
As for the Southeast, I feel the region’s economy will
probably track the nation’s performance rather closely. Both
are subject to the same general conditions coming into the
year.

Slowing consumer spending, sluggish construction,

decelerating business investment, and weaker government
spending at all levels will keep the region’s economy from
outpacing the nation as it typically has in the past decade. In
part, this reflects the increased resemblance between the
national and regional economies that has occurred as the
Southeast’s economic structure has matured and become
more diversified. Equally important is the fact that at least
one of the region’s major structural advantages—the number
of new residents likely to move here--has diminished during
the past decade.

Moreover, in many places the region’s

infrastructure is being taxed by its booming population. This



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problem has become quite acute in Florida, but it is cropping
up in Atlanta and certain other places around the region.
For all of these reasons, there is little cause to believe that
employment growth in the year ahead will outperform the
nation as it has in seven of the past ten years.

Some areas will benefit more than others from such
changes in economic patterns, however. As is usually the
case, Florida promises to outperform the region and the
nation on average in terms of employment growth.

Port

activity, tourism, and bright prospects for agriculture lend
strength to the state’s outlook. However, Florida’s growth
rate is likely to continue slowing in concert with subdued
business activity nationally and moderating in-migration.
While I expect retirees to continue coming to Florida in 1991,
their numbers should be diminished somewhat.



The

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weakening national economy seems likely to make it
somewhat more difficult for people to sell their homes in
other parts of the country. Less stimulus from in-migration
will probably be reflected in slower service-sector growth
here in the year ahead.

Construction, coming off an

especially weak year in 1990, should also remain soft in 1991
because of slower population growth and the overbuilding of
the 1980s.

Perspective from the First Year of the 1990s
While I believe that the U.S. economy will rebound by
year’s end, there is little likelihood in the near term that we
will return to the kind of performance we enjoyed in the mid1980s. A primary reason is that we achieved that growth by
borrowing against future expansion and put off action on
several longer term issues in the bargain. This afternoon, I



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would like to talk about the consequences of that failure to
adopt a longer term perspective in three vital areas. These
are financial services industry restructuring, the federal
budget deficit, and inflation.

Let me begin with the issue of hanking reform. We took
a significant step toward evolving a coherent plan for the
industry’s future when the Treasury Department released its
proposal for a major overhaul earlier this year. For too long,
though, we have addressed the problems faced by the
financial services industry with short-term palliatives and
policy measures more oriented to symptoms than to
underlying causes of strain. Thus, it is urgent to take a more
systematic approach toward strengthening our banking
system, and I think we should do this in four fundamental
ways.



First, deposit insurance protection must be well

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defined and strictly limited in scope, thereby eliminating
incentives for excessive risk-taking. Deposit insurance has
allowed us to take the safety of our personal transaction
balances for granted, and this has served well to prevent
bank runs on solvent institutions.

However, the present

system has frequently protected far more than just individual
accounts and thus has inadvertently created incentives for
excessive risk-taking. These incentives must be eliminated.
Second, capital levels need to be raised to increase incentives
for prudent management.

Other measures should be

adopted, as practical, to increase the role of market
discipline. Third, we need a structural change in regulatory
oversight capable of forcing institutions to take immediate
steps, including liquidation when necessary, if their capital
ratios fall below established thresholds.

Policies must be

designed so that prompt corrective action and sufficient



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capital cushions minimize the costs of the collapse and
liquidation of the largest banks. This expectation should be
enforced in ways that prevent the possibility of a contagious
loss of confidence in the financial system.

Fourth, after

reducing the deposit insurance subsidy and bolstering banks’
capital, we should allow a general expansion of bank powers.
If policymakers can address these four concerns, I believe
U.S. banks will be better suited to handle future cyclical
swings in our own economy as well as the competition posed
by foreign institutions in the expanding global market.

As for our fiscal deficit, in the 1980s our approach to
financing the federal government’s substantial consumption
expenditures could well be described as "buy now-pay later."
Last fall’s lengthy budget-reduction debate carried with it the
message that the "later date" to which payment had been



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deferred is now at hand. Not only will greater tax revenues
be required, but as a nation we must devote a growing
portion of any expansion we might experience to servicing our
debt, which is now held to a greater extent than in the past
by foreign creditors. Thus, many Americans are confronting
the painful reality that our standard of living is not
increasing as rapidly as in the past even though we are
working just as hard, if not harder, than ever and producing
more than before. This is the case because too little of our
borrowing was used for productivity-enhancing investment.

Another, though more subtle, assault on our standard of
living is coming from inflation. Recent events in the Middle
East have reminded many of us of the inflationary spiral that
was a front-page story in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Actually, however, today’s price pressures stem largely from



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the fact that fewer people are entering the workforce than in
the past two decades.

This is part of a long-term

demographic trend that will exert consistent upward pressure
on labor costs for the foreseeable future. Despite the ample
warning we have had regarding this population shift, we have
not done enough to prepare for its effects. Most importantly,
as a nation we have not adjusted the balance between our
saving and consumption in a way that could finance
investment in education to boost the productivity of our
human capital. Now we find that many new workers are
unprepared for the demands of contemporary factories and
offices, not to mention international competition. Thus, we
have deferred essential changes that could have helped
cushioned the economy against the inflationary implications
of labor shortages.




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As a policymaker, I have mixed feelings on the subject
of inflation. Current price pressures suggest we need to take
decisive action.

On the other hand, traditional monetary

policy tools like open market operations are not well suited to
address the fundamental cause of the type of price pressure
we are facing in the labor force. Moreover, other factors
make today’s inflation especially difficult to address.

For example, services have come to dominate our picture
of inflation, accounting for over 50 percent of the total
consumer price index, as opposed to about 38 percent 10
years ago. Services have not lent themselves as readily as
manufacturing to productivity enhancements. At the same
time, our changing life style in this country necessitates the
purchase of more services. For example, the growth of twoincome families has contributed to increased demand for



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support services like child care. Another complicating factor
is the difficulty we have in measuring inflation in services.
When a visit to a physician costs more than it did twenty
years ago, all of the increase has been registered as inflation.
Yet none of us would choose a doctor who used only the same
methods available in 1971.

Nor are we likely to forego

available technologies that can save or enhance human life,
regardless of their cost.

Because of these considerations, we may need to tolerate
slower progress against inflation than we had earlier hoped
for. At the same time, we must balance our approach to this
matter carefully. Historically it has always been tempting for
nations in debt to look to inflation, especially those that have
difficulty agreeing on more direct forms of taxation. It is not
that anyone today is seriously advocating monetization of our



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debts as a general macroeconomic policy strategy. Instead,
concern over the need to service and repay creditors works
more insidiously by making each of us less concerned about
inflation than we would otherwise be. Given our tendency to
want growth in the near term as well as the seductive lure
that inflation holds for a debtor nation, we must prevent
ourselves from succumbing to yet another temptation to
sacrifice the long run for the short run. It is important to do
a better job of educating people that growth obtained at the
expense of inflation is illusory and brings no real
improvement in our standard of living.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we have before us a full agenda of thorny
issues.

All of these have arisen to some extent from our

penchant for deferring difficult choices. We have waited too



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long to resolve the deposit insurance question, bring down the
federal budget deficit, and make the investments in education
and productivity that would help us combat inflationary
pressures and foster true prosperity. I believe we will avoid
a sustained economic downturn in the year ahead, and return
to better growth in the U.S. and the Southeast during the
latter half of the year. Still, we can no longer afford to delay
bringing more balance to our economic priorities. It is time-indeed, it is past time~to replace the short-term fascination
of the 1980s with a long-term perspective more in keeping
with the realities of the 1990s.