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CHALLENGES OF THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
Remarks by Robert P. Forrestal, President
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
To the Conference Board's Mid-year Business Outlook
April 14, 1988

Good morning!
conference.

It is a certainly an honor to be involved in this business outlook

My task this morning is to place the U.S. economic outlook in the context of

the global marketplace. The first thing we need to note is that although our economy has
always operated within that global context, it has never before been integrated with
outside economies

to

the

extent that it is today.

Advances in technology and

communications allow business transactions in New York to make their effects fe lt in
London and Tokyo almost immediately. The worldwide stock market crash on October 19
o f last year perhaps brought this message home more clearly than any event in recent
history.

It also underscored the fact

that

while the global marketplace offers

unprecedented opportunities for profit, it presents us with risks that we cannot fully
anticipate.

Some degree o f uncertainty pervades every business decision, of course, but

the spectrum of variables we face today often seems overwhelming. In order to reduce
the risk associated with these variables, we must carefully anticipate and manage those
challenges that we can foresee.

I intend to look at three such foreseeable challenges this morning. One is presented
by pressures from some quarters to return to a policy of exchange-rate coordination. A
second challenge is the absolute necessity to forego protectionism as a substitute for
market forces.

The third is to address the problem o f our long-term competitiveness in

the global market. In order to set the stage for discussing those challenges, I will begin
by briefly reviewing my outlook for the international economy.

The International Economic Outlook
I look for the economy of the United States to grow at around 2.5 percent in 1988.




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The rest o f the world’s advanced economies should continue to grow at a slightly slower
pace o f about 2 percent on average. Inflation in the United States w ill probably average
between 4 and 4.5 percent this year as measured by the Consumer Price Index.
Unemployment dropped to 5.6 percent in March, its lowest point in eight years, and I
expect it to hover between 5.5 and 6 percent through the end o f the year.

The most important dynamic underlying this forecast is a fundamental structural
transition under way in most o f the world's industrialized economies. On one hand, the
United States is in the midst o f a transition from an economy driven by domestic
consumption to one which w ill rely upon exports for a great share o f its growth.
Meanwhile, the mirror image o f this process—that is, a shift to domestic demand and
away from exports as the main source o f growth—is taking place among our major
trading partners.

Since the last quarter o f 1986, the United States has seen the effects

o f the dollar's depreciation on foreign currency markets show up in steady improvements
in real net exports.

This stimulus from our export position is helping to revive sectors

like manufacturing and agriculture, which had languished when the dollar was high, and
should bring more balance to our economy in general.
adjustment process w ill probably not be as smooth.

For our trading partners, the

Their growth is likely to be slower

than in the United States because consumption fueled by domestic demand has not been
taking up all the slack le ft by waning exports in these countries.

In Germany, fo r example, the export sector is shrinking, but domestic demand is
not accelerating enough to compensate for the loss o f income. The German government
has done relatively little to stimulate growth even though recently there has been some
monetary relaxation. As a result, last year's sluggish 1.5 percent pace is likely to persist
in 1988.

Similar prospects hold for other European countries, largely because o f their

economic and monetary integration with Germany.

Japan should do considerably better. As its current account surplus contracts, the




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stimulus package implemented by the Japanese government is fostering fairly strong
spending by the domestic components o f its economy—consumers and government
especially. Growth there next year will probably be around 3.75 percent. Nonetheless, I
believe there is more potential for expansion in Japan's domestic demand.

As U.S. exports pick up and those o f Europe and Japan decrease, the impact on
workers there will be as great in scope as any in recent memory. It has been suggested
that several million manufacturing jobs could be lost in those countries, and such
dislocations will obviously require substantial adjustments. Even though Japan has begun
increasing imports and reducing exports, its surplus with the United States remains high,
suggesting more needs to be done. Still, the Japanese are beginning from a base o f low
unemployment, and I expect them to weather this transition in reasonably good condition.

Europe, on the other hand, is starting its adjustment with unemployment in the
double-digit range despite the strength o f their exports in recent years.

The primary

reason seems to have been that the profits from their export boom did not go as much
into the job creation that comes from building new factories or creating new services.
Instead, profits were translated into higher wages for those already employed and
purchases o f machinery, much o f which was labor-saving equipment.

If unemployment

grows larger in Europe, we may see political tensions as a result. In particular, it may
strengthen the tendency toward protectionism that is already distorting trade between
Europe and the rest o f the world.

While some in the United States, particularly manufacturers and farmers, should
benefit from the global economic transition, we w ill by no means be getting a free ride.
A ll o f us as consumers can expect to pay more for our purchases as the depreciation o f
the dollar against foreign currencies pushes up the prices o f imports. We may also have
to accept slower rates o f growth in our standard o f living.

We have been on a

considerable buying spree as a nation, and we borrowed heavily from foreigners to




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finance our purchases. Now we must export more goods to provide the foreign exchange
necessary to repay that debt.

The Problem of Policy Coordination
Having outlined the current economic outlook and highlighted the transition that
will be shaping the world's economy with gathering force as time goes on, I now turn to
three challenges posed by the global marketplace.

A ll three~the challenges o f

exchange-rate policy coordination, protectionism, and American com petitiveness~are
related to some extent to the transition I have described.

With reference to policy

coordination, for example, we might well ask why we do not try to work more closely
with our trading partners to keep currencies in line. Isn't it possible to avoid the kinds o f
swings in exchange rate values that have set the stage fo r adjustments like the ones we
are all experiencing?

Joint policy measures by the countries with the world's advanced

economies might seem especially appropriate given the fa ct that those economies seem
to have plenty o f excess capacity.

The high unemployment in much o f Europe suggests

that there is room for stimulus. Meanwhile, inflation is almost nonexistent in Germany,
although in countries like the United States and Italy prices are rising in the range o f 5
percent annually.

We must acknowledge that the world has changed since 1985 when the leaders o f
the industrialized nations sat down and agreed on a policy o f bringing the world's
currencies into better alignment.

It is now much more difficult to coordinate policies.

We cannot expect to speed up business activity by doing more o f what we did two and a
half years ago.

In fact, the strategy o f currency alignment is reaching the point o f

diminishing returns, in my judgment.

There are limits to how far we can go toward

targeting particular exchange rates unless the values chosen are consistent with
underlying conditions and domestic economic policies. Targets must also be sustainable
in financial markets.




Money and capital markets are simply too interconnected, as we

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saw during the October stock market crash, fo r governments to maintain artificial
exchange rates.

Those who point to the era o f fixed exchange rates as a model fo r policy
coordination tend to forget that there were no significant differences in inflation rates
at that time. Such differences do exist now and confound attempts even in the Common
Market countries to maintain some sort o f constancy among currencies. Moreover, there
was more widespread international agreement on policy objectives during the time when
exchange rates were fixed.

When that consensus diminished in the 1970s, the system o f

pegged exchange rates no longer worked. This divergence o f policy objectives is the crux
o f our current problem.

Recent history has shown quite clearly that the German public

will tolerate far more unemployment and far less inflation than will Americans, for
example. Disparities o f this nature tend to move our exchange rates continuously out o f
line. They also make it more complex for the leaders o f Germany, the United States, and
other advanced economies to agree on the advisability o f a course o f action like domestic
stimulus in Germany as a catalyst to faster growth there, in the rest o f Europe, and
ultimately the entire world.

The Challenge of Protectionism
I would prefer that we leave the question o f relative exchange rates to market
dynamics and concentrate our efforts at policy coordination on our second global
challenge.

That is the challenge o f protectionism.

We simply cannot yield to the

pressure that is mounting not only in the United States but also in Europe to distort
markets with artificial barriers against the products and services o f others.

A ll

countries—including our own--already have protective mechanisms in place. Rather than
adding to them, our goal should be to bring down every protectionist wall in the interest
o f ever freer and more open trade.




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In agriculture, as just one example, all kinds o f subsidies distort trade flows and
cost governments, taxpayers, and consumers considerable amounts o f money, yet we tend
to be oblivious to such trade barriers.

For this reason, we have given all too little

attention to the recent round o f G ATT talks begun in Uruguay. On the surface it might
seem that this avenue o f negotiation will prove no more fruitful than the other forms o f
policy coordination whose complexities I have just outlined.

However, I am optimistic

that as the world's economies become more closely entwined, not only through trade
flows but also through the proliferation o f direct investments in other countries, people
will become more aware o f the advantages of free and open economic transactions
among nations.

Several areas o f our country have already benefited in terms o f employment and
income

from

the establishment o f

foreign-owned

manufacturing facilities.

Such

operations often introduce new technologies and management styles that can be adopted
by local businesses with beneficial effects on their productivity and profitability. State
and local leaders in many areas—and particularly in my own region, the Southeast—have
recognized this benefit and actively recruit foreign firms.

Since the dollar's decline is

making foreign direct investment in the United States relatively more attractive than
exporting to this country, I expect to see more o f such activity. This leads me to hope
that popular attitudes will change, not just in the United States but in other countries
too.

In this way, the groundwork could be laid for more policy coordination to reduce

protectionism at the national level.

If, on the other hand, we do not accept the challenge o f free and open markets but
opt instead fo r greater protectionism, the outcome w ill be fairly certain.
protected producers will profit temporarily at the expense o f everyone else.

A few
Because

protective barriers reduce competition, the rest o f us will face higher prices and few er
choices. We will see foreign countries retaliate with measures o f their own that will cut




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down our exports to them. Americans will lose jobs. Finally, as more and more countries
protect and retaliate, we will encounter the kind o f gridlock the world brought upon
itself in the 1930s when international trade stagnated because o f outrageous tariffs.
When we have come this far toward a worldwide agreement to compete peacefully in the
marketplace, one may ask why we would we choose to make the kinds o f mistakes that
once brought about a disaster in world trade and in world affairs.

The Challenge of Competitiveness
What protectionism is, o f course, is an attempt to avoid confronting the third major
challenge o f the global marketplace—the challenge o f competitiveness.

The more we

have become aware o f our own difficulties in competing against the goods o f foreign
producers, the louder the demands for protectionist measures have grown.

Protective

barriers might temporarily rig the market fo r certain goods and give us a price
advantage, but any such advantage would be quickly balanced by losses in other product
areas.

Another way o f gaining a temporary price advantage would be to accept the
counsel o f those who would like to see the dollar pushed considerably lower on foreign
exchange markets.

While this would make our products cheaper, I fe e l that we are

reaching the point o f diminishing returns from the currency realignment we have already
experienced.

We have returned to the levels from which the dollar began its ascent in

the early 1980s and have seen our exports revive in response. However, we probably have
more to lose than to gain from further rapid depreciation. If the pattern o f precipitous
decline resumed, it would increase the likelihood o f inflation and the probability o f
economic downturns in those foreign economies to whom we hope to export more.
Alternatively, defensive maneuvers on the part o f our trading partners could lead to a
series o f com petitive devaluations and trade wars.




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Since protectionist and exchange-rate strategies w ill fa il to deliver re lie f in price
competitiveness, we must reassess the way we go about producing goods and identify
where improvement is needed in the other basic determinants o f com petitivenessproductivity and quality.

To increase productivity we need to invest more in both our

physical and human capital.

We cannot expect to squeeze much more out o f labor

costs. I do not deny that we have made considerable productivity gains in manufacturing
during the 1980s, largely in response to heightened foreign competition. Unfortunately,
much o f our recent investment has not been directed to resource-saving equipment or
new factories but rather has been sunk into hotels, offices, and the like—perhaps so we
can spend more time meeting to discuss productivity!

In addition to spending more on new equipment, research, and so on, we must also
invest more in our public infrastructure—roads, mass transit, and the like. We must also
pay particular attention to building up human capital.
educated, they w ill be unable to use new technologies.

Unless U.S. workers are better
Moreover, they will lack the

flexibility to make the necessary adjustments, not only to technologically advanced
production processes or ways o f providing services, but also to another fundamental
change we must make—toward higher quality.

It is quite clear that in the eyes o f foreign consumers and o f many Americans, too,
a good number o f American products in recent years have not measured up to comparable
foreign goods in quality. In the past, Americans have tended to make standard, massproduced goods especially fo r our large home market. We made the Ford fam ily sedans
and the Kodak Instamatics and let others turn out specialized, high-quality products—
Mercedes and Leicas—for a variety o f markets.

Again, the arrival o f much lower cost

producers has meant that we can no longer hope to survive by concentrating on low-end
goods.

As we rethink our production objectives and move into the better quality niches,




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U.S. business leaders and workers alike will be called on to change old habits and ways o f
thinking. This shift w ill require a better educated work force at all levels. In particular,
we need managers who can think analytically and creatively, who have the vision to see
market opportunities in the far corners o f the world.

Clearly, our competitors in the

global marketplace have taken the trouble to learn how to sell us their products
effectively.

We can no longer afford to know less about our competitors than they know

about us.

Conclusion
The correct response to all three o f the challenges I have outlined this morning is
to reaffirm the principles and responsibilities o f the free market and to let our actions be
guided by them.

The transition from consumption to exports in our economy and the

corresponding shifts in other economies may bring with them some discomfort, but they
will also bring greater balance. That balance will, I hope, help to mute the more strident
calls for spurious solutions to current imbalances like exchange-rate targeting and
protectionism. It should also provide us a breathing space that we can use to determine
how best to direct our energies toward addressing the problems o f productivity and
quality and improving our competitiveness.

Let me remind you that the world's advanced economies are likely to grow by
2 percent on average this year—certainly a respectable rate and by any standard better
than a recession.

For all the challenges we face, as global market participants we are

still progressing.

The longer we continue, the brighter the prospects for less developed

countries to be pulled along by our expansion.

I hope this level o f growth w ill give us

breathing space to agree on the kind o f coordination that will bring the greatest benefit
to the global marketplace. That is the dismantling o f all the protectionist barriers that
cripple the functioning o f free and open markets.