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SIXTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.
THE INNER SECRETS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY DISCLOSED FOR
annex portions
Balkans.
THE FIRST TIME TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.
of Germany, and expand its power in the
The foreign office of France in like manner was a very old
and venerable institution, with employees who had spent their
How European Diplomacy Affects American Welfare— N o lives in the service and who had the ambition and fixed purpose
Foundation Whatever for Canceling the Debts Due Amer- to increase the power, financial and commercial, territorial and
ica—American Prices and Taxes: The Payment of a Bonus political, of “ France ”— that is, the Government of France_
Seriously Affected by European Instability Due to Secret throughout the world.
Under the constitution of 1875, the President of France
European Diplomacy.
has a right to make a secret treaty on his sole authority with
out the advice or consent of the French Senate or the French
Parliament.
SPEECH
Joseph Barthelemy, French professor of political scieuce,
OF
in “ Democracy and Foreign Policy, 1917,” page 102, makes
the following statement o f the principles of the French con
stitution of 1875:
HON.
ROBERT
O F
In
t h e
S
e n a t e
L.
OWEN,
O K L A H O M A ,
o f
t h e
U
n i t e d
The
S
t a t e s
,
December 18, 1928.
Mr. OWEN. Mr. President, the interest of the American people
is affected in many ways by the present instability in Europe.
Until the nations are stable they can not repay the loans due
the United States, and we can not reduce taxes as we should be
able to do. The European demand for American goods, the
ability to pay for such products, the internal effect on the
prices of agricultural products and manufactures all depend on
European stability, as well as the equally important matter of
world peace and international good will.
If American ideals were accepted by the statesmen of Europe—
the ideals of international understanding and good will, o f in
ternational justice and helpfulness— the European nations could
disarm, balance their budgets, stabilize their currency, go into
maximum production, and into an era of prosperity and peace.
Under those conditions America could afford to make loans
to Europe sufficient to assist them meet such objects.
Europe is still suffering somewhat from the old ideals which
formerly dominated their respective foreign policies in which
commercial imperialism sought by bayonets and intrigue to
expand the power and prestige of each nation.
Previous to 1914 Russia, Pra.nce, Great Britain, and Germany
conspicuously were seeking to expand their control or hege
mony over large areas of the earth’s surface in Africa, Asia,
and elsewhere, occupied by the unenlightened and ignorant peo
ples of the earth, as well as in Europe.
Great Britain, through its foreign office, its military and
naval power, during many generations had established under
such a policy great colonies throughout the world until its rule
governed 440.000,000 people.
' Russia occupied and ruled under a like policy about onesixth of the entire surface of the land of the world and had
under its Government 150,000,000 people speaking many lan
guages and dialects.
France, with its colonies, controlled 90,000,000, and had its co
lonial claims in Asia, Africa, South America, and the islands of
the sea. At one time France controlled the lands now occupied
by the United States west of the Mississippi River, including
Louisiana, and claimed eastern Canada. When we were in the
great Civil War the French Government took part in sending
and backing Emperor Maximilian in Mexico, and was com
pelled by the United States to withdraw by show o f military
force.
Belgium has its Congo, Holland its Java, and Germany had
secured portions of Asia, large colonies in Africa, and various
islands of the sea.
These ancient Governments controlled their foreign relations
through a very compact, powerful, and, to all intents and pur
poses, imperial government. Old Russia was an absolute mon
archy, with a foreign office pursuing what they called a “ his
toric mission,” having ever in view the acquisition o f larger
territory, greater power, trading with the great powers and
coercing the smaller powers, planning to get parts of Manchuria
and China and Persia, laying covetous eyes on Sweden and
Finland, determined on controlling the Dardanelles, desiring to
7 6 8 7 6 — -1 1
c o n s titu tio n
a b o u t,
am ong
m o n a r c h is t
lic a n
d id
r ig h t
in
upon
th is
H ere
not
be
F ir s t,
th e
in
b assad ors
th a t
a
of
c o n d itio n s
to
a ll
p o in t
is
to
of
a
w h ic h
a
e s ta b lis h
th e
a
tr a n s a c tio n
m on arch y
fu n d a m e n ta l
tr a n s a c tio n a l
con cern ed
r6su m 4
c o n s id e r
th e
fo r e ig n
fo r e ig n
d ors o f F ra n ce
sp eak
ture
th a t
he
th e ju r id ic a l
is
of
fo r c e
th e
of
d ir e c tio n
th e
to g eth e r
and
th e
c o n s ti
is ,
w hat
fo r e ig n
a rra n g em e n ts
w ith
repu b
of
th a t
of
it
a ffa ir s .
w h ic h
general
a
a
p r o b le m s
s o lu tio n ;
brough t
b etw ee n
s h o u ld
r u le s
of
th e
r e g im e .
in
of
r e s u lt
th e
u n a b le
p r in c ip le ,
n a tio n
th e
by
a d o p te d
fo r g o tte n
p a r lia m e n ta r y
w as
U nder
it
n o ta b ly
1875
th in g s ,
m a jo r ity
m in o r ity .
tu tio n a l
of
o th e r
he
P r e s id e n t
a ffa ir s ;
p ow ers;
it
is
it
of
is
in
th e
alone
R e p u b lic
to him a r e
his name in
w h ic h
; he
co n d u c ts th e n e g o t ia tio n s ; it
th e
c o u n try
b in d s
in
rep rese n ts
a c c r e d ite d
in te r n a tio n a l
is
th e
th e
am
am b assa
l>y his signa
tr e a tie s
of
w h ic h
a u th o r.
On page 105:
The
p r in c ip le
e x p r e s s ly
set
fo rth
by
A r tic le
16th o f J u l y , 1 8 7 5 , i s t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t o f
and ratifies treaties upon his sole authority.
8
th e
of
th e
la w
of
th e
negotiates
R e p u b lic
On page 109:
A lm o s t
tu rn in g
a ll
th o se
F ran ce,
fie d
in
by
of
of
w h ic h
are
th e
th e
to
th e
great
our
have
of
of
8
of
p a r lia m e n ta r y
tr e a tie s ,
th e
p o lic ie s
e x e r c is e d
w ork
a r t ic le
in te r n a tio n a l
fo r e ig n
P r e s id e n t
e ffe c t t h a t
s u b m it
th e
a ll
p o in t
great
th e
th e
th e
a c ts
w h ic h
d u r in g
th e
a d e c is iv e
in flu e n c e
G overnm en t
a lo n e
R e p u b lic
la w
approval
p o litic a l
on
and
m ark ed
c e n tu ry ,
th e
1 6 th
m ost
tr e a tie s
and
of
J u ly ,
im p o r ta n t
th e
d e s tin ie s
have
been
1875,
of
of
r a ti
It
does
p erh aps
tr e a tie s
th e
a lm o s t
upon his sole authority.
o f th e
th e
have
h a lf
of
is
not
a ll
a llia n c e .
It was under this authority that the secret treaty between
Russia and France of 1892 contemplating military operations
against Germany was executed and withheld from the French
Parliament. It was under this authority that the secret treaties
of 1916-17 to divide German and Austrian territory between
France and Russia were entered into.
Great Britain’s foreign affairs are directed in like fashion by
the British foreign office, No. 10 Downing Street, without being
directed by or disclosed to the British Parliament.
Sir Edward Grey, in his agreements with the Governments of
France and Russia contemplating military and naval coopera
tion between Russia, France, and Great Britain along the lines
worked out by the military and naval staffs of Great Britain,
France, and Russia, was able to do so in absolute secrecy. He
did not submit these records to parliament until after the war
had been entered into by Great Britain. Six times the British
Parliament was advised there were no commitments made. (Ex
hibits 11 and 12— How Diplomats Make War, Neilson; Entente
Diplomacy and the W orld; Un Livre Noir, etc.).
It is of supreme international importance that the world
should understand the structure of these foreign offices and
what they did in bringing about the World War. How they
subsidized and controlled the press, how they formed public
opinion through such means, and taught the people to fear and
hate each other and build up armies to the limit of their taxing
capacity.
Until these methods are thoroughly understood by the world
and corrected, the American ideals of international understand
ing and international good will is impossible of accomplishment.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
2
Until these methods are understood, the great mass of the
people who pay taxes and die on the battle field will never be
able to realize that their hatred o f each other is completely
artificial and a result o f the ambition and pride of their
leaders in charge of foreign affairs. It is necessary to stop
the malignant criticism of one people by another people through
the press and by public men if war is to end.
and imposed an Indemnity o f a billion dollars on France which
left a terrible grievance in the heart of patriotic French iieople,
which was revenged in the W orld War. And while during 41
years o f the life o f the German Empire it did not make war on
its neighbors, it continually advocated the doctrine o f might.
The German leaders taught the value o f military preparedness
to the utmost limit o f their capacity, and they are Jointly re
sponsible with the other nations of Europe for the evil conse
T H E P E O P L E T H E M S E L V E S NO T R E S P O N S IB L E FOR W AR .
quences which have resulted from this false doctrine and a
Many men now think of Germany as composed of bad structure o f government irresponsible to the people.
people o f criminal intent who wickedly and with malice pre
America has believed, on the contrary, in the homely but wise
pense assailed the Innocent, unsuspecting good people o f Bel doctrine o f Abraham Lincoln, who believed In a government
gium and France. The people of Germany and o f France are of the people, by the people, and for the people, and who
equally good.
grandly said:
Of the present population of Germany charged with the
L e t u s h a v e t h e f a i t h to b e lie v e t h a t r ig h t m a k e s m ig h t .
payment of reparations, about 20 per cent in 1914 were unborn
Mr. President, the Ilohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, who
bubes; about 80 per cent of the German people living in 1914
trusted alone to the sword, and the Romanoffs, who relied
were women and children without knowledge and without
alone on brute power, have been punished and we need not re
political power and absolutely innocent of any wrongful pur
proach them. Nicholas and ills family are all dead. The Aus
pose. There is no adequate moral basis upon which they can trian Emperor and his successor are dead. The Hohenzollerna
be charged with the responsibility of the war.
were compelled to leave Germany and relinquish all power.
About 10 per cent o f the population o f Germany were men
With the destruction o f the Russian dynasty the secret
capable of bearing arms, about 5 per cent capable o f some archives o f the Russian foreign office were exposed and printed
slight service, and about 10 per cent engaged in other services by the Revolutionary Government A portion o f them have
as noncombatants, and these groups are intermingled.
been translated into French under the title “ Un Llvre Noir,”
The 10 per cent fit for service had no option whatever and the former secretary o f the Russian Embassy at London.
about answering the call o f mobilization. If any German had B. I)e Siebert, has also published 858 secret documents dis
dared to do so, such a rebel under the military dynasty o f closing the policy o f the Russian Government and o f France
Germany then in control would have faced a drum-head court- and Great Britain In relation to this war and In relation to
martial, a firing squad, an ignominious death, and an odious the world, under the title, “ Entente Diplomacy and the W orld ”
memory as a coward and a traitor to his country.
by De Siebert. It is a “ Matrix o f the History o f Europe
The same thing is perfectly true with regard to the men of 1909-1914,” which every student o f government should reud
France, of Russia, o f Great Britain, of Belgium, as the case until he knows the inner secrets o f entente diplomacy.
might be.
In like manner the secret archives o f Germany have been
The people themselves were not responsible for war. If disclosed to view, and o f Belgium, and some o f the English
they had been responsible they have certainly paid a terrible records have come to light.
penalty, for 8,538,315 o f these men were killed or died from
These revelations of European diplomacy and of the Euro
wounds, over 21,000,000 of them were wounded, over 7,000,000 pean methods o f conducting foreign affairs should be un
were missing, most o f whom died without record. The un derstood by the American people. Perhaps when the world
recorded women and children who died number many millions
understands what these records disclose it may become possi
more.
ble for “ the common people, who pay the taxes and who die
I f the German and Austrian people were responsible for the upon the battle field,” to exercise a larger influence with their
war they have been punished; 2,972,000 of them were killed.
Government leaders and bring about a larger recognition o f
7,186,000 were wounded, 3,252,000 were missing.
the importance o f international understanding, international
The total number o f killed, wounded and missing in the good will, international peace and prosperity.
war was 37,494,000 men and probably half as many women
SO M E S E C R E T S OF EU R O PE A N D IP L O M A C Y .
and children died from war and exposure and famine.
The records to which I have called the attention o f the
The cost o f this was over two hundred and eight thousand
million dollars ($208,000,000,000) at a low estimate. (E x Senate appear to demonstrate that the German militaristic
rulers did not will the war, tried to avoid the war, and
hibits 22, 23, 24.)
The people of these countries did not will their own death only went into war because o f their conviction that the
and destruction. This war was brought on by a few’ men persistent mobilizations o f Russia and France meant a deter
In charge o f government, responsible for government, pur mination on war and were secretly intended ns a declaration
suing policies w liich probably for the most part they thought o f war by Russia and France against Germany. The records
’
wdse and necessary to advance what they vainly Imagined to show that the Russian and French leaders were determined
be the “ glory ” and “ honor ” o f their owrn respective nations. on war, and intended the mobilizations as the beginning o f a
It Is futile to denounce the leaders who brought this great war which had for many years been deliberately prepared and
war on, but it is essential to the future o f mankind to under worked out by the complete plans o f campaign through annual
stand what happened and how7 it happened to prevent again military conferences.
In 1892 Russia and France entered into the following trea ty:
the crucifixion o f the world by secret diplomacy.
There are certain noble and splendid qualities which were
E X H IB IT
I.
common to the Russians, the Germans, the French, the British,
A p p e n d i x C.
the Italians, the Belgians, and others. They were all splen
T H E F R A N C O -R U S S IA N A L L IA N C E OF 1892.
didly brave, magnificently loyal and patriotic o f heart. They
T h e F r e n c h is s u e d a f t e r th e w a r , w h e n t h e y fir s t d is c lo s e d th e t e r m s
followed their leaders believing that they were defending the o f t h i s a g r e e m e n t , a s p e c i a l Y e l l o w B o o k u p o n t h i s s u b j e c t . T h e e s s e n
best interests of their country.
t i a l t e r m s o f i t c a n b e fo u n d in
th e p a m p h le t o f M a r c h , 1 9 1 9 , N o .
When detached America went into the war it did so with a 1 3 0 , o f t h e A m e r i c a n A s s o c i a t i o n f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n . ’ T h e
clearer vision. We were not fighting the German people as b o d y o f t h e e n g a g e m e n t s i s a s f o l l o w s :
such. We were fighting a military despotism which ruled the
D R A F T OF M IL IT A R Y C O N V E N T IO N .
German people and had persistently made war on us. We were
F r a n c e a n d R u s s ia , a n im a t e d b y a c o m m o n d e s ir e t o p r e s e r v e th e
fighting for liberty and justice as w’ e understood it. We had
p e a c e , a n d h a v i n g n o o t h e r e n d in m i n d t h a n t o w a r d o f f t h e n e c e s s i t i e s
not a single doubt that the German rulers were exclusively
o f a d e fe n s iv e w a r , p r o v o k e d by a n a tta c k o f th e fo r c e s o f th e T r ip le
responsible for the war. We had seen them refuse In The
A llia n c e
a g a in s t
e ith e r
of
th e m ,
have
agreed
upon
th e
fo llo w in g
Hague conferences to agree to the principle o f arbitration and p r o v i s i o n s :
of disarmament. We heard much o f their wonderful army,
1. I f
F r a n c e is
a tta c k e d
by G erm an y, or by
Ita ly
su p p o rte d
by
of their annual maneuvers, o f their officers drinking the
silent toast to “ Der Tag.” We heard about their invading G e r m a n y , R u s s i a s h a l l e m p l o y a l l I t s a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s t o f i g h t G e r m a n y .
“ 2 . In
case
th e
fo r c e s o f
th e T r ip le
A llia n c e ,
or o f on e
of
th e
unprepared and unsuspecting Belgium and France and Russia.
p o w e r s w h ic h a r e a p a r t y to it , s h o u ld b e m o b iliz e d , F r a n c e a n d R u s s ia ,
We heard of their poison gas and their atrocities in battle.
a t t h e fir s t J u d ic a tio n o f t h e e v e n t , a n d w i t h o u t a p r e v io u s a g r e e m e n t
And now. Mr. President, there has come out o f hiding a great b e i n g n e c e s s a r y , s h a l l m o b i l i z e a l l t h e i r f o r c e s I m m e d i a t e l y a n d s i m u l
mass of evidence previously unknown, previously unsuspected, to t a n e o u s l y , a n d s h a l l t r a n s p o r t t h e m a s n e a r t o t h e i r f r o n t i e r s a s
which we shall be compelled to give attention and which dis p o s s i b l e .
close that the German leaders, bad as they were, were not
“ 3 . T h e a v a ila b le fo r c e s w h ic h m u s t b e e m p lo y e d a g a in s t G e r m a n y
exclusively responsible for the World War. They were cer s h a l l b e : F o r F t a n c e , 1 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ; f o r R u s s i a , f r o m 700 OOO t o
tainly responsible for having seized Alsace-Lorraine in 1870 8 0 0 , O f IP m e n .
7 (1 8 7 (1 —
11
-------J§»—
a.
r
I
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
“ T h ese
p a tc h ,
east
4.
“
of
th a t
and
p la n
fo r c e s
so
In
th e
The
in
th e
s ta ffs
s h a ll
and
"5 .
In to ,
"
to
a c tio n
to
fig h t
w ith
th e
th e
sam e
at
g rea test
tim e
d is
and
to
th e
in
and
R u s s ia .
and
th e
tw o
fo r
c o u n tr ie s
and
s h a ll
fa c ilita te
c o n s ta n tly
th e
th e
each
o th e r,
of
th e
in
tim e
T r ip le
of
peace,
A llia n c e
a ll
in
w h ic h
is
in ,
in
tim e
of
s h a ll
w ar
s h a ll
A ll
not
c o n c lu d e
have
a
sep a ra te
th e
sam e
peace.
c la u s e s
as
th e
e n u m era ted
above
s h a ll
be
kept
a b s o lu te ly
An
exO on ge
w ho
of
co n d u cted
Tw o
P r e s id e n t a t
A
to
A ll
12 th
a
th a t
v is it
w ill
w h ic h
te c tio n .
to
1899,
to
by
and
of
B o is d e ffr e ,
F rench
F ren ch
in
u n im p o r ta n t
th e
8t.
arm y
fo r
com m ent
R u s s ia n
F o r e ig n
to
M in is te r
The
d o cu m e n ts
th e
a
fo llo w in g
M in is te r
Is
of
has
w as
D e lc a s s e ’s
F o r e ig n
up
to
of
rep ort
th e
report
In
to
w hat
of
to
th e
rep ort
R e p u b lic ,
he
th is
T r ip le
su p p osed
A ffa ir s ,
in
F ren ch
s tr e n g th e n in g
d is s o lu tio n
arran gem en t
th e
on
of
th e
c o n sid e r s,
a llia n c e ,
a
J u s t ifia b le
D
M -
of
to
S t.
P etersb u rg .
k in d s —
a
g en era l
A u gu st
9,
21,
h e lm .
and
c o n s id e r
d ip lo m a tic
1891,
R ib o t,
in
E urope
in
and
and
concert
any
t o January, 189k,
w h ic h
th e
th e
d u r a tio n
f>«<
of
o f th e
tch a t
o th e rw is e
q u e s tio n
concern s
T r ip le
th e
an
R u s s ia
expressed
1891,
th a t
and
th e
by
of
G ie r s ,
th e
tw o
of
p u ttin g
a g g r e s s iv e
are
in
s ig n e d
c a p a b le
A llia n c e ,
if
tw o
le tte r s
G o v e rn m e n ts
th e
of
M oh ren w ill
peace
of
o f D e c e m b e r S3, 1893,
act
w h ose
on
th e
part
d u r a tio n
is
of
one
lim ite d
to
v o litio n
of
T r ip le
a ll
its
A llia n c e
e h o u ld d i s s o lv e
i f , f o r e x a m p le ,
m em bers;
In
our
s ia n
th e
b a la n c e
m ore,
In
a
b etw ee n
w o u ld
com m on
N ow ,
tio n
it
it
tr o u b le d
J ust
m e
and
It
fu l
been
have
s u p p o rt.
a lw a y s
In
I
th e
on
of
stu d y .
in
situ a tio n .
th e
of
in
A u g u st,
In stru m e n t
sam e
to
be
how
of
a ls o
th a t
th e
w ill
s u r e ly
P r e s id e n t
The
a n x io u s
o f
our
r e c e iv e
th e
em peror
to
76876—
tw o
a ll
th a t
to
th e
F ren ch
assu red
one
lo n g
th e se
c o n fir m a tio n
of
of
me
in to
th e
as a
Your
th o se
me
th a t
su ch
in
th e
w as
p a th
h is
C e n tra l
w ar.
Ju st
E uro
d ip lo m a tic
h is
id e a
m a je s ty ’s
th e
e x is te d
r e m a in
of
b etw ee n
b a s is
of
w h ic h
a b s o lu te ly
le tte r s
ex
req u est,
fu n d a m e n ta l
a rra n g e m e n t,
w as
secret,
Count
W edn esd ay
done
w h ic h
m orn -
elcasse
.
c a lls
it,
in to
sta ff
th a t
as
th e
G erm an
fr o m
th e ir
and
w ar
of
seek
to
a
assu ran ce
c o u ld
th e
“ to
o ffe n s iv e
d ip lo m a t ic a lly
sh e
fo r c e s —
m u st
th a t
p in c e r s
as
by
L ord
th e
be
th ey
a t
knew
str ik in g
L orebu rn
F ren ch
c o n c e n tra te
ta k e
of
sh ow s
R u s s ia n s — w h ic h
see
th e
con
R u s
a g g r e s s io n —
Im m en se
how
of
It
m ilita r y
c o r r id o r ,”
A rm y
th e
G erm an
W e
a v o id
B r itis h
began.
c a m o u fla g e d
w est.
a p o s itio n
in
p a la c e
ta b le
(m in im u m )
“ B e lg ia n
F ren ch
in
a
th e
G erm an y ;
o b serve th e
th e
w as
th a t
p ic tu r e
h enchm en
years
peace;
W e
th en )
and
r e c k o n in g u p
w o u ld
th e
fo r
be
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
and
w itn
le g e n d
F ren ch
th e
d is c u s s in g
east
“ The
c h ie f o f
r a p id ly
o ffe n s iv e
th e
as
a g a in s t
w ith th e h elp o f th e B r itis h A r m y on its l e f t fla n k .”
G erm an y,
T u rn
u s in g
F ran ce.
(e v e n
th e
d e a lin g
w ro te :
e x c lu s iv e ly
over
s h o u ld
th e m
we
v ic tim s
th e n
and
for
r e v e a ls
b e fo r e
o v e r w h e lm in g
on
G erm an y
F ran ce,
w as
b e lo w
th e
D e s t r o y s ,”
w ar,
p la n s
S ta te s,
see
th a t
th e
years
w h ic h
F rench P retared
and
1911.)
fo r
even
W e
fo r
w e ll t h a t
at
II.
P o is o n
w ar
th re e
F ren ch
s im u lt a n e o u s ly
r a p id ly
(IN
“ The
th e ir
P ow ers
a v a ila b le
be
ta ck e d
to
fr o m
a
la te r ; F ran ce
E urope
p re d a to ry
s u d d e n ly
le g io n s .
th e
sta te m e n ts
h un dred
and
w ere
of
us
th e
rep ose
by
m in is te r s
w ar
d r e a m in g
her
caught
to
w hen
R u s s ia
out
a ll
m ade
p la tfo r m s
Im p e r ia l
s t a r tle d
“ W e
w o r ld
ev en ts
agreem en t
does
not
w h ic h
th e
by
out
naught
of
broke
but
th e
u n prepared ”
K a is e r ’s
(M r .
L lo y d -
fe e lin g ;
th e
sort
you
th e
not
of
th in k
C arnot
th e
new
he
w as
th a t
by
th e
H ou se
w h ic h
lic
•
*
B r itis h
* ”
*
m ent
are
T h is
no
1 9 1 1 ),
secret
o th e r p o w e r ”
w as
th e
is
of
no
secret
and
and
fu lly
th e
‘‘A s
to
d e c e p tio n
F rench
The
of
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
M E E T IN G S
a r m ie s
F rench
p o in ts
of
c o n v e n tio n
la tio n s h ip .
by
th e
w ith
A u gu st
OF
THE
m ilita r y
th e
1892,
w as
c o n fe rr in g
been
has
ren d er
fo r e ig n
any
pub
sta te d
G overn
m ilita r y
p r a c tic e d
m ilita r y
FRENCH
or
naval
upon
th e
B r itis h
th e
1
of
a r t ic le
heads
of
a tt a c h e
s in c e
kept
w as
(th is
1892, had
secret
p a r tie s ,
and
p resen t
re fe r s
to
been
as
th e
1920)
gave
r ise
to
R U S S IA N
4
of
th e
of
m ilita r y
th e
A u gu st
con
R u s s ia n
18
secreta ry .
(3 1 ),
The
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
b a sis
of
w ere
s u c c e s s iv e ly
th e
OF
C H IE F S
( 8 1 ) , 1911.
s ta ffs
th e
u n til
c o n fe re n c e .
AN D
c o n fe re n c e a t K r a s n o e -S e lo
c o n v e n tio n
w h ic h ,
It
p aragrap h
17,
m e t in
of
th e
1 9 1 1 ).
S T A F F AT K R A S N O B -S B U O , AU G U ST 18
accord an ce
to
any
th e
sp eech es
arran gem en t
w ith
(D e ce m b e r,
“ w ith
A s q u it h ’s
d is c lo s e d
a g a in ,
o b lig a t io n s
o ffe n s iv e
M r.
A f f a i r s .)
sev en th
THE
any
e x te n t
F o r e ig n
th e
O ff
us
F rench
e n g a g e m e n ts
upon
any
th e
fla n k ” — a t
T h ere
e n ta il
(E d .
M IN U T E S
“
le ft
d is c lo s e d
(N o v e m b e r ,
e s tim a te
N a tio n .
been
about
its
to
a s s is ta n c e
And
not
th e re
th a t
read
on
C om m ons :
has
*
•
of
you
A rm y
and
1911.
v a r io u s
m ilita r y
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
fo llo w in g
re
e x a m in e d
exch ange
of
v ie w s : .
P re a m b le .
perm an en t
P r e s id e n t
and
Your
is
have
and
in d ic a te d
in
g la n c e — w h e n
of
In
very
our
do
Then
h e lp
v e n tio n
R e p u b lic ? ”
e s s e n tia lly
th e
th e
a lr e a d y
fo rm
R ussians
W ar.
u np rep ared n ess
u n prepared
w o u ld
had
s h o u ld
M a je s ty
h is
on
s h o u ld
That
to
ex p ressed
at
new
th e
d o c u m e n t p u b lis h e d
(m in im u m )
had
and
of
th e
in
u n p rep ared n ess
“ d e fe n s iv e ”
c r is is
th a t
and
m y s e lf
th a t
the
ow
m o n th ,
1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0
w h ic h
general
1894,
and
general
d u r a tio n .
had
w hom ,
e x is te n c e
R u s s ia — w e re
and
F ran ce
gen eral
s o lid a r y ;
poor
a g a in s t
m a je s tie s
a p p r e h e n s io n
e ffe c tiv e ,
III
H
d is c u s s in g
and
me
estee m
w hat
“ S in c e
th e
p a id
to o k
th e
have
e v e n in g ,
th e ir
q u e s tio n s ,
as
A le x a n d e r
he
p r o b le m s
of
fr ie n d ly
F r id a y
b etw ee n
c o n v e n tio n
r e m a in
E m p eror
me
and
fo rm e d :
im p o r ta n t
as
a
over
pow er
w h ic h
r e v ie w e d
case
to
a
v ie w s
F r a n c o -E n g lis h
b e lie f
agreem ent
say,
te ll
has
A ffa ir s ,
w h ose
w ith
r e la tio n s
m y
in
m ilita r y
N ic h o la s
em peror
d iffe r e n t
w as
n a tio n s
of
c o n tin u e
11
is
th e
it
to
and
w h ic h
m a k in g
w ork
year
d isa r m e d
of
th e
d u r a tio n — th a t
in te re sts
th e
th e
T r ip le
w h ic h
p a tr io tis m
v is it
sam e
I
to
exch ange.
C z a r — e x a c t ly
F ran ce
conven
th e
F o r e ig n
P etersb u rg
la s t
em peror
ex ec u te
th a t
fo r
th e
th e
of
o p p o r tu n ity
b r e a k fa st
th e
a p p r o a c h in g
v ie w
1891,
th in k
th e
over
of
S t.
en ou gh
d u r in g
no
pru d en t
b r e a k fa st
good
ran
cou rse
w o u ld
a r is e
M a je s ty
th e
r e v e a le d
a llia n c e
s h o u ld
w as
u n ite d
m ilita r y
of
E m peror
to
th e
fu r th e r
o n ly
d e fic ie n c y
M o u r a v ie ff,
m in e ,
In
in v ite d
A fte r
W e
T hen,
1
w as
conduct
h im .
d u r in g
R u s s ia ,
I
he
w ith
a
n e g le c t
Count
A r r iv in g
s
th e
G e o rg e ).
born
M in is te r
and
fr o m
to
accord
P e te r h o f.
m y
arou sed
a r is e n
p e r fe c t
F ir s t
to
not
th e
e x is t;
T hat
lo ft y
r e c e iv in g
retu rn
O c to b e r.
at
ap proval
of
your
u p s e ttin g
s itu a tio n ,
R u s s ia
w hen
to
becam e
of
e x e c u tio n ?
m om ent
it.
I
and
w hat
and
its
cease
r e s o lv e
in
to
A u g u st,
Sunday
h is
in
fir m
And
fo r
w o u ld
w ith
peace
F ran ce
even
sin c e
fo u n d
Sure
la s t
4th
my
fo r c e s?
fin d
p r e c ise
it
v a n is h
d e c id e d
been
P a r i6
th e
c o n s ta n tly
I
w e lc o m e ,
at
to
read y
th a t
w o u ld
has
it.
but
w ork
A llia n c e ,
E u ropean
d eserv e
p la n
is
s h o u ld
com e
th e
m ore
general
very
a llie d
The
g e n e r a ls
th re e
th e
of
but
G overn
S t. P etersb u rg .
la s t
and
R u s s ia n
m ore
c o m p r o m is in g
le ft
th a t
u n d e n ia b ly
w o u ld
a llie d
F ren ch
and
of
I
a r tic le
a lle g e d
E m p e r o r F r a n c is J o s e p h , w h o s e e m s a t t i m e s t h e o n l y b o n d b e t w e e n
r iv * l a n d e v e n e n e m y r a c e s , s h o u l d s u d d e n ly d is a p p e a r ; i f A u s tr ia
w e r e t h r e a te n e d by a d is m e m b e r m e n t, w h ic h p e r h a p s is , a f t e r a ll,
d e e ir a b le , w h ic h p er h a p s m ig h t b e c o u n te n a n c e d , a nd w h ic h , in a n y
c a s e , o n e m ig h t b ecom e a n x io u s to tu rn to a c c o u n t f
W h a t c o u ld b e
c a p a b le
th e
th a t
th e m s e lv e s
b etw ee n
c o n v e n tio n
th e
E X H IB IT
p e r fe c t ly
th e
I
s u m p t i o n .”
A llia n c e .
happen
by
27,
s tip u la te d
T r ip le
w o u ld
th a n
15,
w ith
a nd a m ilita r y c o n v e n tio n
Jeopardy;
p ow ers
a g r e e m e n t,
and
it
and
d e c id e d
th e
T he G reat F raud
of
a rra n g em e n ts
A u gu st
w h ic h
of
th e
Our
tw o
D
th e
R e p u b lic . 1
to
up
c o n fir m e d ,
th e
concern
u n d e r s ta n d in g
A ffa ir s
I.
P r e s id e n t
P r e s i d e n t : Y o u r e x c e lle n c y k n o w s w i t h w h a t id e a in m in d
ear
w ent
w as
e s ta b lis h e d
day
An
F o r e ig n
p ro
P a r i s , A u g u s t IS, 1899.
I
1891
b a la n c e
F ran ce
In pursuance o f this troaty the military staffs of France and
Russia entered into a military conference, August 81, 1911,
printed by Foreign Affairs, in London, September, 1922, under
the title, “ The Great Fraud,’.’ is as follow s:
th e
F rench
of
to
th in k
fu ll:
L o u b e t,
th e
of
draw n
m a in te n a n c e
m ilita r y
M o u r a v ie ff,
d e c la r a t io n .
and
th e
to
Count
It
be
th e
assu res
so
A llia n c e , a g a in s t
be
had
s o le m n ly
s h o u ld
of
good
su b m ittin g
fo r F o r e ig n
A ffa ir s .
su m m ed
of
D e lc a s s e
P e te rsb u rg ,
even
are
P r e s id e n t
p la n
seem ed
c o n te n ts
In g ,
is
th e
of
I
in
fo r
a tta c h in g
p la n .
s h o u ld
P e r le r ,
1891
th ey
m a in te n a n c e
com m on
lib e r ty
w h ile
o n ly
c a lle d
M o u r a v ie ff
C a s lm lr
th e
w h ic h
of
e x te n d e d ;
th a t
th is
th e
th e
th e
r e p r e s e n ta tiv e
P etersb u rg .
am bassad or,
M o u r a v ie ff,
M in is te r
w hen
8t.
o r ig in a l
(D e lc a s s e ,
th e
T *o u b et,
o u tliv e
th e
one
F ren ch
in te r m e d ia te
A u g u st,
It
fo r
de
D e lc a s s e .
h im s e lf
of
tra n s m is s io n
M o n te b e llo ,
P a r is , a n d
th ese
a fte r
fro m
by
of
G en eral
a ffa ir
D e lc n s s e ,
r e p ly
D e lc a s s e
by
th e
le tte r s
A ffa ir s ,
le tte r s
docu m ent
d e c la r a tio n
arran gem en t
“ th e
by
M in is te r
of
th i«
H e
read
th e
th e
to o k
a n x ie ty
em peror
a c tly .
■ e c r e t .”
upon
sh o rt,
The
d u r a tio n
a
fo r
I
f o r c e s .”
In
I
th e
w ith
fo r g e d
p r o v id e s
p la n
arran gem en t
s h a ll
of
th e
ex p ressed
be
bonds
m om ent
s in g u la r ly
my
pean
c o r r e s p o n d in g
c o n v e n tio n
it
is
m u ch
th e
th a t
d ra ft
In
scop e
as
advance.
R u s s ia
A t
peace,
th e
p o s s e s s io n .
of
c lo s e r
th e
m o r n in g .
e x e c u tio n
A llia n c e .
7.
draw
m e n ts
to
a r m ie s
m eans
p resen t
of
prepare
above.
th e
t h e ir
and
F ran ce
The
a r m ie s
fo r th
arran ged
“ 6.
T r ip le
th e
ord er
c o m m u n ic a te
w ays
s tu d ie d
of
r e g a r d in g
com e
have
em peror
set
s h a ll
“ The
c o m p le te
w ill
in
m easu res
In fo r m a tio n
b e g in
w est.
concert
“ They
or
s h a ll
G erm an y
3
h is
fa th e r
T h e tw o c h ie fs o f s ta ff d e c la r e , b y co m m o n a c c o r d , th a t th e w ord s
“ d e f e n s i v e w a r ” m u st n o t be i n te r p r e te d in th e s e n s e o f a w a r w h ich
w o u ld b e c o n d u c te d d e fe n s i v e ly .
T h e y affirm , on th e c o n tr a r y , th e a b
s o lu t e n e c e s s i t y fo r th e R u ssia n a n d F r e n c h a rm ies to a d o p t a v ig o ro u s
o ff e n s i v e , a nd a s fa r as p o s s ib le a s im u lta n e o u s o n e , in c o n fo r m it y w ith
t h e t e x t o f a r t i c l e 3 o f th e c o n v e n ti o n , w h o se te r m s p r o v id e th a t u the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
forcea
speed.
the two contracting pow ert thall com e into full action with all
of
(T L ie
“ d e fe n s iv e ”
w ar
w as
s tr ic tly
fo r
d ip lo m a tic
pu rp oses
It w ill b e o b s e r v e d .)
( L e t forces dct deux puissances cont>actuates
e'engagent & fond et en toute diligence.)
S a m e o b s e r v a tio n s
tw o
as
o f 1 9 1 0 , r e a d in g a s
th e
e n tir e ly
In
accord on
th e
p o in t
very
fo llo w s :
v ie w p o in t o f p r e c e d in g
th e
In d e e d ,
c o n fe r
the defeat of the German
armies remains, w hatever the circumstances mag b e , the first and princi
pal object o f the allied arm ies.”
en ces, a re
p la c o
th a t
The
“ The
r iv e d
th a t
to
c o n fe r r in g
at
In
th e
th e
fir s t
p a r tie s
new s
th e
n ecessary ; but
A u s tr ia
or
p e n s a b le
of
Ita ly
to
to
a ttra c te d
th e
and
in
be
w ith o u t
th is
T hey
good
8
a
to
a ll
th e ir
I),
and
F ran ce
upon
u n d e r s ta n d in g
general
in v ite
th is
ar
Chap.
ap pears
In d is
r e s p e c tiv e
w h ic h
has
of
G ov
a lr e a d y
t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s ."
S h a r in g
on
th e
o p in io n
of
th e ir
p red ecessors,
th e
c o n fe rr in g
p a r tie s ,
e a ste rn
o b je c t ,
G e n e ra l D u b a il p o in ts
in
th e
n etw o rk
th e
recen t
o f w estern
fo r tific a tio n s
The
F ren ch
ou t th a t n ew
Im p ro v e m e n ts
r a ilw a y s — op en
ere cted
c h ie f
of
on
a rg u m e n ts
u n d erta k e n
lin e s , sh e d s ,
th e F re n c h
fo r th is
by
th e
v ie w
are
to be
in
th e ir
G erm an s
la n d in g p la c e s — a n d
by
In
th e
s ta ff th e re u p o n
s u b m its
of
th e se
fo llo w in g
th e ir
th e
G erm an
A t
in v a s io n
th a t
th a n
su rp r is e
w ith
th e
enem y
p r o v id e d
fo r
to
red u ce th e
th e
by
F rench
a r tic le
a
o r d e r t o im p o s e fr o m
o b ta in
F ren ch
th u s be
th e
G o v e rn m e n ts
le a r n e d
to
th e
p o s itio n
to
of
8
A rm y
w ill
be
o f th e
th e
c o n v e n tio n .
t h a t th e G e r m a n s w ill c o n d u c t h o s tilit ie s w ith
and
in
a llie d
of
m en
th e 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0
stre n g th
e s t p o s s ib le e n e r g y , in
th e
th e
from the fifteenth to the eighteenth d ay.”
o f B e lg iu m )
m om ent
I t Is b e lie v e d
w h ic h
th e
d e c is io n
d e fe n s iv e .
tu rn
th e
s ta ff
has
th e
th e
(?))
event o f
g r e a te r p o r tio n
or
at
su ccess
of
th e ir
le a s t
th ey
fo r c e s
to
w o u ld
a g a in s t
R u s s ia n s .
The
c h ie f
c ir c u m s ta n c e s
nor
It a ly
(A u g u s t,
w o u ld
th a t
( prendre
g iv e n
w ill
fo llo w
th e
la t te r
to
D u b a il,
F ren ch
be
if
w ar
in
th e
a c tu a l
n e ith e r
A u s tr ia
o n ly
com e
out
of
in
w ith
g r a titu d e
and
th e
th e
fo r
o th e r
G erm an s
th e
su p p ort
H e r z e g o v in a .
e x p o s itio n ,
in d ic a te s
on
gen eral
lin e s
c o n c e n tr a tio n .
H e show s that the French A rm y concentrates as rapidly as the Ger
man A r m y, and that as from the tw elfth day i t fa i n a position to take
the offensive against G erm any, with the help o f the B ritish A rm y on its
left flank.
(In
a c c o r d a n c e w ith
th e s e c r e t a r r a n g e m e n t b etw ee n
th e
B r itis h
and
d e c is io n
and
L ord
F rench
of L ord
even
fro m
a r t ic le
is
8
assu red
g e n e r a l s ta ffs ,
G rey
th e
H a ld a n e
F ran ce
and
have
th e
L ord
C a b in e t
read y
m ilita r y
to
M r.
su ccess,
it
is
n ecessary
e ffe c tiv e
a s s is ta n c e
of
but
of
1900,
by
c o n c e a le d fr o m
an d — so
th e
th e
L ord
J o in t
n a tio n
G rey
and
M in is t e r ).)
in
th e
sen se
1892.
th a t
th e
Janu ary,
A s q u ith
P r im e
m arch
c o n v e n tio n
of
In
H a ld a n e ,
(e x c e p t
and
neous
begun
a ffir m e d — t h e
th e re fo r e
of
of
sh e
s tr ic tly
H ow ever,
s h o u ld
R u s s ia n
in d ic a te d
In
order
r e c e iv e
th e
by
to
be
s im u lta
fr o m
G eneral
th e
to
and
tim e
in
in te r v e n tio n
fr o n tie r
w as
in d ic a te d
as
ta k in g
once
m ore
th e
o p in io n
put
fo r w a r d
a r m ie s s h o u ld
th e
g re a te st
p u rsu e
th e
p o s s ib le
o b je c t
num ber
of
very
b a s is
of
th e
c o n v e n tio n
m ilita r y
of
th e
it
th e
F ran ce,
w ill
th e
F ren ch
R u ssia n
o ffe n siv e
e ig h te e n th
th e
a d m itte d
th e
(o f
th e
b e in g
G erm an s
day.
by
com m on
d ir e c t
c h ie f
th e
of
th e
P erh aps
r e c e n t im p r o v e m e n ts
by
m ass
sta ff e x p r e sse s
a r m ie s )
w ith
accord
p r in c ip a l
s h o u ld ,
Achrlon
fir s t
even
as
th is
in tr o d u c e d
as
(b o d y
of
m ig h t
d e la y
in to
th e
fa r
be
th e
R u s s ia n
c o n c e n tr a tio n .
D u b a il
of
c lo s e s
v a r io u s
h is
e x p o s itio n
m o tiv e s
by
w h ic h
r e m a r k in g
have
th a t
c o m p e lle d
he
is
R u s s ia
not
to
un
r e v ise
th e d is p o s itio n o f h e r tr o o p s u p o n h e r te r r ito r y in t im e o f p e a c e .
He
renders a sincere homage to the efforts made during the last three years
by Russia to reinforce her m ilitary pow er, and he is happy to note the
im p rovem ent produced, as a w hole, in the friendly and allied a rm y by
the latest modifications introduced into the m obilization.
lie ,
G ilin s k y
fir s t
of
th e re u p o n
a ll,
fu lfill
d e v e lo p s
e m p h a t ic a lly
s c r u p u lo u s ly
th e R u s s ia n
a ffir m s
th e
th e
w ill
o b lig a tio n s
p o in t o f v ie w .
of
th e
im p o s e d
Im p e r ia l
upon
it
G overn
by
th e
con
v e n tio n .
G e n e r a l D u b a il h a s t e n s to d e c la r e t h a t h e fu lly
of
th is
t io n
th e
d e c la r a t io n
w ith
at
M oroccan
tru e
d u ty
of
th e
m anner
th e
R u s s ia n
a
m om ent
a ffa ir s
in te n tio n s
and
w hen
w hen
o f G erm an y
G e n e r a l G ilin s k y
adds
t h a t in
R u s s ia n
The
F ren ch
it is
m ay
are
a r is in g
n o t p o s s ib le
to
lo y a lty
In
connec
e s tim a te
w hat
be.
v ie w
o f th e
h e a d q u a rte rs
la t te r
M a n c h u r ia
began
in
is
p u r s u in g
1 9 0 8 — th a t
in
its
a c tu a l
sta ff
is
on
th e
is
to
w ay
R u s s ia n
su p p o rte d
by
say,
A rm y
e q u ip m e n t
G eneral
W a r ),
but
th rea ts
of
a
c o n flic t
e n lig h te n
to
in
a
p r e c is e
fo u r
years
in
is
w ill
o n ly
1914, and
la c k in g
G ilin s k y
be
ago.
A
th e
th e
great
c o m p le t e
new
c o n d itio n
la r g e r
g iv e s d e ta ile d
o n ly
h eavy
p o r tio n s
of
im
a r tille r y
of
on
In
g rea test
m u n itio n s
in d ic a tio n s
th e
r e a lly
num ber
u s in g th e
lu
in fa n tr y
of
c a m p a ig n
tr a n s fo r m a tio n
o u t, b u t, ev en
in
fo r
a c tu a l
fo llo w in g
th is
o f b e in g c a r r ie d
lig h t a r tille r y
r e g im e n ts .
s ta ff
r e o r g a n iz a tio n
(R u s s o -J a p a n e s e
d ilig e n c e , t h e
1913,
h ea d q u a rters
a p p r e c ia te s th e
d iffic u ltie s
A rm y.
in
th e
in
1910.
reserve
th ese
p o in ts ,
fig u re s.
H e adds that, when the Russian A rm y will have com pleted its re
organization, it w ill put into line forces very superior to the 800,000
men provided for by the convention.
But
fr o m
It
is
th e
th a t
of
fr o n tie r .
th e
n ecessary
m ilita r y
th e
In
w o u ld
be
d e stin e d
to
p o in t
R u s s ia n
rem ark
of
A rm y,
and
h ea d q u a rters
in
a
to
p o s itio n
fa c e
th a t
v ie w .
c o n tr a d is tin c tio n
R u s s iu n
its
to
th e
is
ta k e
has
s itu a tio n
o ffe n s iv e
is
great
now
ta k e s
to
p la c e
a d m it
b e fo r e
th e
p rogress
as
p r e v a ilin g
c o n s tr a in e d
th e
m ade
m o b iliz a tio n
c o n c e n tr a tio n
w ith
sta ff
A u s tr ia
H er
r a p id
nearer
up
t ill
th a t
as
th e
now .
A u s tr ia
R u s s ia n
tro o p s
h er.
In these circum stances Russia does not appear to be in a condition
to sustain, for tw o years at least ( t h a t i s t o s a y , n o t b e f o r e 1 9 1 3 .
By
th e
s p r in g
r e a d in e s s
against
A rm y.
th e
R u s s ia n
and
ta k in g
M oreover,
B o s n ia
h is
and
th a t
n o t, b u t th in k s , on
to
In
c o n tin u in g
b e lie v e
provoked
w o u ld
c o m p e lle d
A u s tr ia
m o b iliz a t io n
to
h er.
It a ly
fait et cause p ou r),
by
reason s
if G erm an y
agrees th a t
A u s tr ia
G eneral
th e
1911)
im m e d ia te ly
G e n e ra l G ilin s k y
hand,
of
th e
d is p o s itio n
p ro v em e n ts are by
F rench
peace
day.
m a in ta in
th a t
a g a in s t
th e
as
aw are
th e
th e g r e a t
fir s t d a y t h e ir w ill u p o n
(in itia tiv e
In
g rea ter
w as
p a r tie s
a llo w
m e n t to
sh ock ed
in
p rom p t
be a tta in e d
fo r c e s
th a t
p o s s ib le ,
c o n s id e r a
“ From what is known of the German mobilization and concentration,
one mag conclude that the first great encounters will probably take
place in Lorraine, Luxem burg, and Belgium ( s o v a n i s h e s t h e l e g e n d o f
of
c o n fir m
to
c ir c u m s ta n c e s ,
G eneral
th e
of
fr o n tie r .
w h ic h
o n ly
c o n fe r r in g
d e s ir e
fr o n tie r .
tio n s :
tro o p s
v ie w
by the offensive.
The effect of this offensive will be the m ore certain insomuch as it
will take place sooner, will be carried out with greater stren gth , and
will take a m ore dangerous direction for the enem y.
In
think that G erm any will direct a greater portion of her
forces against France and will only leave a minimum of troops against
Russia.
fo u n d
G erm an y
her
of
in the course o f the preceding conferences.
o c c a s io n s
red u ced , th a n k s
accord ,
o n ly
R u s s ia n
c a m p a ig n .
tw e n tie th
sta ff can
of
p o in t
th e
th e
m o b iliz a tio n
com m on
of
p a s s in g
f a r a s I t Is c o n c e r n e d , t h e
tro o p s)
ARTICLE 8.
th e
to w a rd
1 8 9 2 , can
b e in g
m o b iliz a tio n
th e ir
p o in t,
th e
fro m
th e
c o m p e llin g
T h is
accord,
of
fo r c e s
u n d e r s ta n d in g
to
s e t t le
2
c o m p e ls R u s s ia
or even
agree
fo llo w s :
com m on
(p a r .
p r e lim in a r y
(p r e lim in a r y )
th e re fo r e
of
th e ir
1900
A rm y
a p a r tia l
enough
a tte n tio n
m ore
(2 1 ),
s im u lt a n e o u s ly
case o f
a lo n e
th em .
ern m e n ts
and
event
th a t
once
April
of
th e G e rm a n y
Im m e d ia te ly
of
express
c o n fe re n c e
m o b iliz a tio n
m o b iliz e
th e c o n fe re n c e o f 1 9 1 0 , r e a d in g a s
d is p o s itio n
1910
F rench
fo r c e s
a s In
new
com m encem ent
several
As
th e
d iffic u ltie s
in
o n ly
upou
of
ARTICLE >.
S a m e o b s e r v a tio n s
th a t
c e r ta in
at
In t h e c o n f e r e n c e
c h ie f o f s ta ff, c o n fir m in g
It seem s
v o lv e s
ARTICLE 1.
‘‘ T h e
In 1908, responding to the sam e considerations, i t envisaged the means
adopted i n order to give the Germ ans, from the v e ry beginning of war,
the grea test possible a n xiety on their eastern flank.
(Id em .)
b e in
of
1914,
th ro u g h
R u s s ia ’s
th e
G erm any with
a p o s itio n
In a word, it is essential that G erm any shall be attacked at the same
tim e on the w est and on the east.
(J u s t a b o u t th e tim e t h is c o n fe re n c e
w a s h e l d C o l o n e l R e p i n g t o n , m i l i t a r y c o r r e s p o n d e n t o f The Tim es, w a s
p r e p a r a tio n
of
a certa in ty
w ard
c h ie fs
th e
p u b lic ly
R u s s ia n
of
w ar
success.
announced
She
o ff b lo w s , b u t p e r h a p s le s s
th e ir
a war
m in is te r ),
w o u ld
a b le
to
c e r ta in ly
g iv e d e c is iv e
b lo w s .
s a y in g
to
m ilita r y
organ
in
th a t jo u r n a l: “ T h e
n ig h tm a r e
R u s s ia
is
of
n o t lik e ly
In
G erm an
h ue been
v ie w
to
of
s tr a te g is ts ,
b u ild in g
be
th e
soon
p o s s ib ility
up
her
c o n ju r e d
p r o fo u n d
and,
fie ld
of
to
As
of
a lw a y s
fr o m
v ie w ,
an
p r o v id e
id e a l n o t a c tu a lly
1 9 0 0 , th e R u s s ia n
u n d erto o k
ichelon
(b o d y
G erm an
A rm y
of
70870— 11
to
R u s s i a I)
th e
pace
th e
is
at
th e
w h ic h
n ig h tm a r e
fo r
on
by
e x is t
in
th is
th e
g e o g r a p h ic a l,
n a tio n s ,
s im u lta n e o u s
t h e d iffi
a c tio n
w h ic h
r e a liz a b le .
th e
s u ffic ie n t
su p p o rte d
fro n ts
1905,
o f th e a llie d
to
N e v e r th e le s s ,
q u a rte rs
p o s s ib le
c o n fo r m ity
e ig h te e n th
engage
a c e r ta in
a c tiv e
th e
sta ff
th e
day
w ith
v ic to r io u s ly
num ber
of
th is
w ith
p o in t
th e
fiv e
reserve
or
fir s t
s ix
d iv is io n s .
d e c la r e s
d e sir e s
e ffo r ts
fo r
w ill
m ay
R u ssia n
G ilin s k y
fifte e n th
th a t
w h a te v e r
o f th e
arm y
w a itin g
g e n e r a l s t a f f, in
a tta c k
tro o p s),
corps
tP o o r u n p rep ared
been
tw o
G eneral
w h ic h
c u lty
to
sin c e
on
a w a y .” )
d iffe r e n c e s
m ilita r y s itu a tio n
has
w ar
c o n s id e r in g
a r m ie s
e c o n o m ic , p o lit ic a l, a n d
resp on ds
a
It
is
n o ta b ly
by
to
be
th e
above,
m ade
to
French
th a t
th e ir
ta k e
w h ic h
w ill
th e
of
th e
sp e c ifie d
fr ie n d ly
s a tis fy
th e
th e e x c e p tio n
w ill
d raw backs
w ar,
d e c la r e s
c o m p le te d
d a y , w ith
th e
fo r
ready
expressed
have
be
A rm y
in
th e
th e
g rea test
m o b iliz e d
th e la s t
o ffe n s iv e
be
on
fro m
m easu re
tro o p s
of
fr o n tie r
th e
on
con voys, and
th a t
on
th e
head
s ta ff.
th e
tr a in s a n d
c o m p le te
in
a llie d
h e a d q u a rte rs
c o n c e n tr a tio n
o n ly
above
and
day,
th e
w ith o u t
tw e n tie th
day.
G en eral
G ilin s k y
h ea d q u a rter
sta ff
arm y
on
corps
h ea d q u a rters
e stim a te d
w ill
th e ir
s t a f f ’s
com pel
e a ste rn
dem and.
th a t
th e
th e
fr o n tie r ,
H e
m easu res
G erm an s
a ls o
in
to
ta k e n
le a v e
at
accord an ce
g iv e s
d e t a ile d
by
th e
le a s t
w ith
R u s s ia n
fiv e
th e
in d ic a tio n s
or
six
F ren ch
of
th e
(iHODaa 'ivNOissaaotfoo
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
m o b iliz a tio n
of
and
p r e p a r a tio n ,
G eneral
c o n c e n tr a tio n
general
D u b a il
th a n k s
on
p la n a tio n s
a c tu a l s ta te
th e
of
th e
d is p o s itio n ,
G eneral
v
5
R u s s ia n
and
A rm y
(e ffe c tiv e s ,
d a te s
c o n c e n tr a tio n ).
G ilin s k y
fo r
o f p r e p a r a tio n
th e
s in c e r ity
o f th e
of
R u s s ia n
h is
ex
A rm y,
and
h i m s e l f f u l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h an offensive which w ill begin im
m ediately a fter the fifteenth day, and which would be o f a nature
calculated to retain at least five or a i r German arm y corps on the
frontiers o f eastern Prussia.
d e c la r e s
Similar conferences will be found in Un Livre Noir, pages
425 to 437, inclusive, on July 13, 1912, and August, 1913, aa
follows.
Foreign Affairs prints an English translation of the 1912
conference with its comments, as follow s:
(T h e
e ig h th
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
T he G reat F raud—
The
c h ie fs
of
of
th e
sta ff
rep rod u ce
o b s e r v a tio n s
w ith o u t
c o n c e r n in g
a lte r a tio n
a r tic le
4
th e
in
six
fir s t
(I I .
para
W e
con ference o f
th e
tex ts
1910,
r e a d in g
The
as
fo llo w s :
c o n fe r r in g
p a r tie s
agree,
by
com m on
accord ,
on
th e
fo llo w in g
of
are
“ (1 )
and,
C o n fe r e n c e s
in
p r in c ip le ,
"(2 )
M oreover,
h ea d q u a rters
b etw ee n
th e
tw o
c h ie fs
of
sta ff
w ill
be
p e r io d ic a l
a n n u a l.
s ta ffs
has
w ill
ta k e
expressed
a
p la c e
d e s ir e
each
tim e
th a t
one
of
th o
th e re fo r .
• • ( 8 ) The minutes o f the con ferences will be subm itted to the ap
proval o f the Governm ent of each cou n try, and a v is 4 o f the minister of
war and o f the prime minister will be attached th ereto , so that the
chiefs o f staffs of the allied armies m ay refer to this docum ent in the
realization o f desirable im provem ents.
"(4 )
th e
m ore
c o n tin u o u s
and
e x c h n n g e o f in fo r m a tio n
In
of
A
p a r tic u la r ,
th e
p o in ts
b e fo r e
w h ic h
it
each
is
c o m p le t e
b etw ee n
fo rm
th e
c o n fe re n c e ,
p rop osed
to
w ill
th u s
h e a d q u a rte rs
regards
fe r r in g
ro u tes
p a r tie s
lin e ,
en d s.
It
m eans of
agreed
th a t
h ow ever,
w ith
s y s te m a tic
The
F a r is -B o b r o u is k ,
is ,
fu r n is h e d
an
agenda
be
g iv e n
fo r
draw n
up
sta tio n
navy,
to
r u p tio n
B la c k
fo r
Sea,
The
of
corresp on d en ce
w ill
in
be
in
th a t
s ta tio n
b e lo n g s
ow n
s o le ly
In
th e
peace
th a t
is
order
e.,
of
to
to
w h ic h
be
to
“ In
t lie
fir s t
at
b o th
w ay
s h o u ld
be
w ar
r e g u la r ly .
it
e s ta b lis h
op p ose
The
over
r
on
to
w ith o u t
th e
In te r
borders
a n o th e r
th e
of
s ta tio n
w ill
s in c e
be
1910.
p r o b a b ly
read y
a
c o n fe r r in g
O c to b e r
th e
s h o u ld
te c h n ic a l
a s s e m b le
d e ta il
to
he
and
n g a in
ta k e n ,
B is e r ta ,
c o m m is s io n
th e
(1 )
as
order
th a t
of
to
th e
be
th a t
th e
at
on
th e
s ta tio n s ,
a
p o s itio n
w ill
h o ld " it s
and
a fte r w a r d s
at
p r o v id e d
P a r is
and
th e
b e g in n in g
F r a n c o R u s s ia n
stu d y
fo u r
in
te c h n ic ia n s
th e
to
spot
next
C o m m is s io n
th e
m easu res
B o b r o u is k ,
carry
of
P a r is ,
out
th e
th a t
th is
b etw ee n
B e lg iu m
c o m m u n ic a tio n
s h a ll
be
th e n
fo r
to
“ xhe
by
th e
via
S ta te s
and
D enm ark.
c a r r ie d
out
It
via
h is
in
now
E n g la n d
and
th e
M e d ite r r a n e a n
The
id e a
of
as
th e
and
a
a ls o
and
th e
P a c ific
O cean,
or
c a b le
th e
b etw ee n
of
F ran ce
c a r r ie r
and
R u s s ia
has
been
th e
in
c o n fe re n c e
observation s a s i n the con ference o f 1 910, reading as f o l l o w s :
“ The conferring parties are agreed that article 5 com pels the con
tracting parties not only n ot to make peace but also n ot to cease oper
ations in order to conclude an arm istice individually.”
A R T IC L E 8.
In
In
th e
of
p o in ts
J u ly
as
th e
th ey
1899,
(J u n e
w h ic h
(?))
2
d ip lo m a tic
fo rm
th e
th e
w as
to
d ip lo m a tic
te x t
w ill
be
in
re fe rre d
June
19,
to
1900,
in
C h a p ter
th e
I
of
c o n v e n tio n
of
th e
th e
m o n th
c o n fe re n c e
w ill
la s t
as
as
w ill
th e
and
accord
be
in
p o s s ib le ,
to
a c tu a lly
in
e x is te n c e ,
and
of
c o m p le m e n t,
s e r v a tio n s
o b s e r v a tio n s .
(S ig n e d )
J.
G
il in s k y
,
The Chief of the General Headquarters Staff
of the Russian A rm y.
The Chief of the Staff of the French A rm y.
(V ls S d )
F o r e ig n
w ith
In
(s p e lle d
M e s s im i,
p r e s u m a b ly
in
e r r o r ),
The M inister o f W ar,
7tJ870— 11
of
th e
J u ly
1
conven
c h ie f
of
general
(1 3 ),
C u r iS r e s
C ount
r ise
w ere
to
sta ff
s ta ff
of
1912.
de
C a s te ln a u ,
a tta c h ^
Ig n a tie f,
la tte r
m ilita r y
o ffic e r s
s u c c e s s iv e ly
th e
fo llo w in g
o b s e r v a t io n
p a r tie s
in te g r a lly
a
in
w ere
e x a m in e d
exch ange
of
of
of
th e
back
one
p r e c e d in g
p resen t
m a r g in
r e fe r e n c e
th a t every
change
th e
th e
have
.
d e c id e
w ith o u t
in
th e
w ill
com m ent
th e
1911
w ith o u t
as
th e
new
c o n fe re n c e ,
tex ts
th e
th ey
m in u te s .
a d v a n ta g e
to
tim e
m ore
or
A
w h ic h
th e
sp e c ia l
are
th u s
of
of
tex t
d isp e n sin g ,
th e
as
p r e c e d in g
by
th e
c o n fe r r in g
c o n fe re n c e .
See
2,
The
in
com m ent
th e
1911
c o m m e n ts
la s t
1911
th e tw o
as
by
c o n fe r r in g
See
sen ten c e
in
th e
p.
th e
fo llo w s :
in te r p r e ta tio n
57,
(s e e
th e
and
of
of
th e n
goes
J o ffre
v ie w
of
c h ie f
of
"
fir s t,
W ith
I ta ly
of
“ ‘A
of
(S a m e
ob
is s u e
of
in
th is
end
Is
v ie w ,
at
w ar
and
c o n c e n tr a tio n
stric t
r e s e r v e , is
m in im u m
le ft
on
of
th e
on
of
1 9 1 1 .”
F o r e ig n
c o n fe re n c e
has
been
(S e e
A f f a i r s .)
d iffe r s
ap proved
w ith
th e
and
by
th e
s ig n a tu r e
of
c o n fe r e n c e o f A u g u s t, 1 9 1 1 .”
III.
fir st
new
th e
p aragrap h
5 7 ).
of
A r tic le
n etw o rk
by
upon
th e
1911
con
o f th e
III
1912
c a p ita l
th e
its e lf
of
th a t
it
is
A llie s
on
In
th e
r e g io n .
s e p a r a t e ly
th e
(o p e n
ta k en
The
In
th e
a g a in s t
m u st
b o th
s id e s
be,
at
th e
on
p resen t
th e
sta ff
s itu a tio n
r e la tio n
has
of
th a t
e s ta b lis h e d
its
bases:
com p osed
th e
upon
and
F ren ch
fo llo w in g
tro o p s,
fr o n tie r
of
th is
e ffo r t.
T u rks,
th e
and
of
G erm an s
r a ilw a y s
E iffe l
p o in t
p la n
th e
r e c e n tly
s im u lta n e o u s ly
b a s in g
R u s s ia ,
th e
The
a tta c k
su pport
w estern
s u c c e s s iv e ly
c o m b in e d
and
in
w h ic h
In t h e
n o ta b ly
R u s s ia .
w ith
of
th e m e a su re s
th e
o p e ra te
to
a rg u m e n ts
im p r o v e m e n ts
fr o n tie r ,
a g a in s t
in
F ran ce
th a t
and
endeavor
m a x im u m
w h ic h
w ith
th e n
to
the
A ffa ir s , p .
in
in s is ts
to
1912
and
of
accordan ce
th e
th e ir
F rench
sta ff
1910
fo llo w s .
out
in
G erm an e
and
th e
as
p la c e s ),
th e
co n tra ry ,
w ith
pow er
th e
on
be fo u n d
m a k in g
of
w ith
F o r e ig n
p o in ts
a r e ' to
n e ig h b o r h o o d
once
ob
is s u e
S e p te m b e r
issu e
th e
m in u te s o f
id e n tic a l
s h e d s , la n d in g
th e
p a r t ie s .”
57,
of
c o n v e n tio n
F ran ce
th e
to
S e p te m b e r
c o n t in u a lly
on
(S a m e
S e p te m b e r
II.
S ep te m b e r
m in u te s
of
o f R u s s ia
paragrap h
fe r e n c e
lin e s
p.
c o n fe re n c e s
A R T IC L E
are
p a r t ie s .”
57,
I.
th e
c o n fe re n c e .
in
c o n fe re n c e ,
G o v e rn m e n ts
F ir s t
of
p.
A f f a i r s .)
“ Sam e
p la n
M k s s im t
o*
H u itlD m e
m ilita r y
G ilin s k y ,
The
c o n v e n tio n
gave
m in u te s
p r o c e e d in g
w ith o u t
as
s e r v a tio n s
in
D u b a il ^
P a r is
A R T IC L E
F ran ce
No
(E d .
A f f a i r s .)
in te re s t
A R T IC L E 7.
p u b lis h
1918.
PREAM BLE.
“ A cc e p ted
of
w h ic h
o f th e
c h ie f
P a r is .
accept
th e
in sc r ib e d
T h is
F rench
a rra n g em e n ts
s h a ll
in
tak en
m in u t e s .”
p o in t
lo n g
4
C o lo n e l
in
c o n fe rr in g
reproduced
reproduced.
fa r
in
(aH6nas)
c o n fe re n c e
arran gem en t
we
and
w ere
se c r e ta r ie s .
p a r tie s
p la c e th e
th e m s e lv e s
“ G eneral
w ith
our
T h ese
F ran ce
C o n fe re n c e ” —
G eneral de
R u s s ia ;
E m b assy
c a p a c ity
fir st
paragraphs
a b ro g a ted .
c o n fo r m ity
A u g u st,
at
p resen t:
in
R u s s ia n
th e
G o v e rn m e n ts
Sam e
5 7 -5 9 .
s ta ffs
G eneral
J o ffr e ,
p r e l im in a r y
“
read s as
“ T h is
p ig e o n s .
A R T IC L E 5.
R e m a in s
o f a r t ic le
G eneral
E m b assy
fo llo w in g
a rt.
s e r v ic e
s im i
r e fe r rin g
th e y
m o n th
tw o
s im ila r
th e
v ie w s ” :
by
T u rkey.
d ir e c t
has
U n ite d
N ext
are
th a t
th a t
th e
pre
i n s c r i b e d .)
A R T IC L E
T e le g r a p h y
abandoned,
I
and
w ar
is
and
th e
e x c e lle n c y
w e r e a ls o
c o n fe rr in g
F o r e ig n
c o r r e s p o n d in g
pages
c o n te n tio n
w ar
th e w o r d s “ E ig h th
D enm ark.
(2 )
th e
fo r
b etw ee n
P aragrap h
A rm y,
F rench
“ A cce p ted
p ly in g
of
A ffa ir s ,
“ c o n s p i r a c y .”
1892,
A rm y, m et
in
s e r v ic e s .
B is e r ta .
o r g a n iz e d
tex t,
p r e p a r in g
c o n te n ts
us
The
th e s a m e
F o r e ig n
th e
1912.
In d ic a te
of
of
J u ly ,
c h ie fs
b e fo r e
th e re fo r e
B la c k
m e e tin g s a t B o b r o u is k ,
and
of
in
now
n ot rep rod u ce
m in u te s
w ith
fo llo w in g
a tta c h e
fo llo w s :
M essen gers
p rop osed
m em bers
In
so
agreed
m eans
o th e r
are
are
s h o u ld
of
C r im e a ,
The
tim e
p a r tie s
P arD
o r ig in a l
M bbtinob of the F rench and R ubbian Chiefs
Staff at F aris in J uly , 1912.
17,
R u s s ia n
r e fe r e n c e
The
have
(th e
R u s s ia n
W e
a b s u r d ity
th e
In
W e
and
deal
c o n fe re n c e
o f th e
A u gu st
F rench
to
w h ic h
G eneral
F ren ch
fir s t s u b c h ie f o f th e s t a ff o f th e a r m y ; C o lo n e l M a t t o n , m ilit a r y
R u s s ia n
e n tir e ly
a lm o s t
fu n c tio n in g
tim e
in
1 9 1 2 .)
m in u te s
good
Issu e
not
1911.
h e ld
a
th e
th e
m in u te s .
do
G erm an
th e
accordan ce
th e
fin d
in
a
of the
p resen t
s u c c e s s fu lly
arm y.
code
th e
of
JU LY,
of
for
A f f a i r s .)
of
th e
m e ssa g e s).
S e b a s to p o l,
been
and
and
w ere
of
A u g u st,
1911
S e p te m b e r
by
th e h ead
tio n
ta k e
m o n th .
in
(A t
of
B o b r o u isk
handed
absorbs
th a n
has
th e
sh ow
m in u te s
M inuter
con
m u st
of
th e
w o r k in g
Is
and
of
R u s s ia
F o r e ig n
th e
s a tisfa c to r y
not
o th e r
tim e
th e
in
(t.
a
It
and
se r v ic e ,
p la c e
to
th e
a p p a ra tu s
th a t
c o n fe re n c e
th e
s u r p r is e
tim e ,
w ar
t e le g r a p h y
brouillage )
d e c la r e s
som e
sta te s
(
S eb a sto p o l
It
Its
in
code
D u b a il
up
sta ff
w h ic h
b e lo n g
The
to
In
OF
tex t
m e e tin g s
c o n fe re n c e
w h e r e St e x i s t s
d o cu m e n ts
(h e
s im ila r
th is
Im p e r ia l
th e
fu ll
C o n fe r e n c e — a r e
w o r k in g
is
a
w o r d in g
read ers
by
of
e x a m in e .
w ir e le s s
d e s ir a b le
stro n g e r
m ix in g
h e a d q u a rte rs
Sea,
of
th e
F rench)
th e
F rench Prepared
and
CO N F E R E N C E
m o n th
K r a s n o e -S e lo
of
“ The
p la c e .
The
w ill
are
and
to
P A R IS
la s t
s ta ffs .
The chiefs o f staffs particularly in sist that the m inutes of the con
ferences shall be submitted to the tw o G overnm ents fo r ratification.
As
a m b le
la r it y
m e e tin g s
in
s ta ff a t
m in u te s
p o in ts :
THE
rep rod uced
c o n f e r e n c e .)
III.
R ussians
W ar .
the
H ow
A R T IC L E 4.
graphs
m ilita r y
E X H IB IT
A lp s
m ore
tc
e s p e c ia lly
d e fe n d
th e
of
p asses
u n its
of
fo o t
by
6
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
fo o t.
The
w h o le
b e g in n in g
ou
1 ,3 0 0 .0 0 0
m en
(T h e
m u ss
th e
of
th e
th e
n etw o rk
one
or
th e
of
tw o
an
of
by
(in
Is
c o n c e n tra te d
to ta l
8
w ill
of
C o n v e n tio n ,
th e
fro m
th e
th e
exceed
g r e a tly
th e
read y,
arm y.
c o n v e n tio n
w h ic h
w as
th e
of
1892.
s p in a l
at
Is
m a k in g
su ch
new
c o m p a n ie s
c o n c e n tr a tio n ,
upon
m ar
th e
as
and
im p r o v e m e n ts
w ill
a llo w ,
w ith in
G erm an
one
p resen t
m om ent
in
su pp ort
of
b e in g
fro m
E le v e n
d ev o ted
to
th is
w h ic h
is
set
out
“ G eneral
th e
He
to
to
v ery
" On
tio n ,
w o u ld
th a t
“ On
th e
adopt
an
hand,
e x p e cta n t
m om ent
on
to -d a y .
la tte r
th e
le a v e
in F i n l a n d
w as
A s ia
and
of
M in o r
and
s t ill
th e
e n a b le
fo r c e s
th e
T u rks
on
to
sh e
m ilita r y
The
h er
fo r c e s
p r o b a b ly
any
at
and
th e
r a ilw a y s
n e c e ssity
th e
G erm an y
le a s t,
e ffe c tiv e s
th e
ev en t,
a fte r
to
m o b iliz a tio n
to
d is s ip a te
“ It
be
J o ffr e
and
is
a ll
R u ssia n
at
d e v e lo p m e n t
to
r a ilw a y
th e
a ll
of
lin e s
w ere
th e
of
of
th e
it
of
by
th e
of
th e
fo r c e s
(a )
of
r u p lin g
th e
of
lin e s
is
th e
r u p lin g
la t t e r
of
of
tow n
m ay
re fe r
fr o m
S t.
to
th e
r ie s — o n e
p a n ic s .
th a t
b e lo n g in g
a b le .
They
to
In
th e secon d
d ir e c t
and
are
ta k in g
does
gau ges.
e ay
w ith
The
fro m
3 e “ e» « L ® l l i n s k y
7 6 8 7 6 — 11
enem y
gauges
th e
o th e r
on
fr o m
J o ffr e
F.
fo r
s ia n
and
F rench
th e
(i.
S ta te
w h ic h
go
d o u b le
e„
c u rv e )
its
th e
S ta te
has
a c q u ir e d
and
fr o m
W arsaw
tra n s fo r m in g
tra n sp o rt
w ill
th e
E m p ir e
to
th e
r e c a lls
th e
gen eral
reason s
th u s
th e m
be
w estern
w h ic h
th e
d ir e c tio n
le ft
c a r r ie d
to
n e c e s s ity
of
th ese
w h ic h
of
w ill
A lle n s t e ln
or
a tte m p s
of
bank
out
a tte m p ts
th e
h is
to
V is tu la
c o n c e n tr a tio n
le a v e
th a t
b ase
to
to
th e
fo r
has
a lr e a d y
arm y
its e lf
m is s io n
been
of
th e
To
to
w ir e le s s s t a t io n
to
by
is
be
a lr e a d y
it
fo r
tw o
p.
in
s p e c ia l
to
R u s s ia
stu d y
in
b etw ee n
not
th e
c o n fe re n c e .
p.
in
1911
c o n fe re n c e .
in su r e d
fr o n tie r .
in te r v e n e
C r im e a ,
and
up
to
th e
th a t
a lr e a d y
F ran ce
of
and
u tiliz in g
q u e s tio n
and
has
s ta ff.
From
o ffic e r s
p o s s ib ility
it
T ran s
R u s s ia
b e tw ee n
to
If
F rench
c o u n tr ie s
T h is
or
F ran ce.
th e
sa t
s u ffic e
w ill
R u s s ia n
th e
g iv e
gen eral
1911
c o n fe re n c e .
S e p te m b e r Issu e
of
F o r e ig n
S e p te m b e r is s u e
of
F o r e ig n
S e p te m b e r Issu e
of
F o r e ig n
J.
(S e e
A R T IC L E
Sam e
is
in
A ffa ir s , p . 5 9 .)
,
V II.
(S e e
(S ig n e d )
G
il in s k y
The Chief of Staff o f the Russian A rm y.
J.
J
offre
,
The C hief of Staff of the French A rm y.
A. M illerand,
The M inister of
E X H IB IT
T F o r.
IV .
L ibrary
of
Congress ,
L egisla tive R eferen ce Service.
( T r a n s la t i o n .)
St
(D n
L iv r e
N o is ,
D ip lo m a tic
d 'a v a n t g u e r r e .
P a r is ,
1923
4 3 1 -4 3 7 1 )
t
n in t h
conference
vol
2
’
(a d
odst
of
s e c tio n
,
a r tic le
4
pp
of
th e
’
m s).
w iti
n orm a
w ith o u l
F in a lly
to
w ill
V.
(S e e
an
T h ori
in to
m u st
5 9 .)
th .
e x e r c is e
w h ic h
w ir e le s s ,
A R T IC L E V I.
as
th e
am
and
to
crea te
of
F ren ch
in
in te n d s
5 9 .)
d iffic u lt
to w a rd
th e
corre
to
s p e c ia l
N orw ay.
com
lin e
lin e s
by
th e
b e in g
of
a ll s e c u rity .
H,
o th ers
th e
th e
and
c o m m is s io n ,
F ran ce
c o m m u n ic a tio n
up
In d i
are
s ta ff
fo r
S c a n d in a v ia n
th e
N everth eless
th e
d ilig e n c e
R u s
draw n
sy ste m
B iz e r ta
s ta tio n
of
th e
peace
th e
cod es,
th is
in
b etw een
th e
to
1911
c a te g o
p o s itio n
at
fo r
in
w h ic h
S eb a sto p o l
sta tio n s
p o sts
d e te r m in e
general
of
s ta tio n
A R T IC L E
as
and
p r iv a te
to
be
th e
a lo n g
been
satisfactory.
c a n b e u s e d in
o th e r
C racow
have
by
th ro u g h
la t e r
d e p o s ite d
th a t
w ill
in
fo u r
tim e
s e r v ic e
R u s s ia n
w ar
d ic tio n a r ie s
and
corresp on d en ce
e s ta b lis h e d
c o m m u n ic a tio n s
peace
The
new
of
fo r m u la te d
m om ent
in
th e
s ta tio n
R u ssia n
a d v is a b le
tim e
N ik o la ie ff.
b e tte r
th e
r a tific a
s t a f fs .”
A ffa ir s ,
or
th e
c a r r ie d
s till
of
fo r
c o n f e r e n c e .)
in
Code
up
p rove
th e
th ro u g h
are
in su r e
m in u te s
w is h e s
s ta tio n s ,
and
F rench
a
para
c o m m u n ic a tio n s
m essen gers
sen t
1912
p resen t
th e
near
w ith
c rea te
is s u e
fo llo w in g
th e
In s tr u c tio n s
tim e
c o m m u n ic a tio n s
m ig h t
th e
th e
The
of
tw o
r e o r g a n iz e d
code
to
of
fu r th e r ,
u se
S e p te m b e r
G o v e rn m e n ts
th e
draw n
r e g u la r
p resen t
d isp a tc h e s
it
1910,
fo llo w s :
w ar.
s ta tio n
d is p a tc h e s
a p p o in te d .
r ise
s o le
th e
boon
of
concern ed
w ith
fr o m
At
p resen t
s till
corresp ond en ce
R u s s ia
fir s t
of
th e
th a t
tw o
r e c o n n a is s a n c e ,
th e
It
n ecessary
th e
six
(s e e
of
c o m m u n ic a tio n
c h ie fs .
s p e c ia l
th a t
p o in t w h e r e
p o in t
th e
c o n fe re n c e
1911
c o r r e s p o n d in g
w o r k in g
fo r
at
been
r e c e n tly
The
th e
th e
a
c o m m u n ic a te
be
th e
in s is t
th e
as
fo r
have
t h o r o u g h ly
navy
th e
w ill
a lte r a tio n
at
B lz e r t a -S o b a s to p o l.
tim e
im p r o v e
fo r
is fy
4
e x c e p tio n
a c c o r d in g
a llo w
se c tio n
is
to
d is a p p e a r s
m in is tr ie s
exch anged
order
IV.
th e
c o n fe r e n c e .
s ig n a ls
th e
sp on d en ce
th is
c o m in g
u tiliz a t io n
can
a r m ie s
g r a v ity
P r u s s ia
th e
w ith o u t
r e so u r c e s a v a il
to
m ake
w ar
h ours
of
Sam e
to
th e
and
th e
on
of
c o n d itio n s
th e
c o n fe re n c e o f
c o n tin u e s
P n r is -B o b r u is k ,
quad
r a ilw a y s
fo r m e r
w ith
he
p a r tic u la r ly
M oscow
u sed
to
in
e a ste rn
by
a r tic le
w ith
m easures
1911
and
fix
in
tr a n s la t io n
In to
in
has
if
s u b m itte d
(w ir e le s s )
tim e
A ffa ir s ,
a ttr ib u tin g
b e lo n g in g
sta ff
be
c o m p le te d
th e
S.
lin e s
of
and
and
Sam e
th e
on
on
in
enem y
or
4 o f th e
paragraph
of
is
A ffa ir s ]
be
tb s
p r e p a ra to ry
R u s s ia n
G ilin s k y
c e n te r
fo rc es
o ffe n s iv e
fo r c e
th e
r a ilw a y s ,
in
d iv id e d
quad
u sed
b r in g
B o lo g n e
th e
reproduce
5 8 ),
th e re u p o n
cou rse
advanc
to
(d )
th e
s h o u ld
u se fu l
e c c e n tr ic
of
one
F o r e ig n
th e
of
h eart
to
fro m
r a ilw a y s
u se
a llo w
re fe r
a c c u ra te
an
a
w ord
w o u ld
be
fr o n tie r s ,
in te n tio n
of
c o m in g ,
accordan ce
The
m ay
d e v e lo p m e n t . o f
seem
o f p r iv a te
In flu e n c e .
c o n tin u ity
th e
not
w h ose
be
L o u n in e tz -
w ill
The
r e s p e c tiv e ly ,
p la c e
s t a ff on
(c )
be
and
th e
in
w h ic h
it
a p p ly
can
or
p o r tio n s
c o u ld
w h ic h
not
th e
C row n,
th e
c a te g o ry
or
G en eral
to
th e
lin e s ,
F rench
th in k s,
con
On
c e r ta in
th e
B r ia n s k -G o m e l,
(voie russe)
r a ilw a y s
if
th e
to w a rd
The
s in g le
B r e s t -L it o v s k ;
W arsaw ,
th a t
d e la y e d .
R r e s t-L ito v s k ;
t r o o p s .— E d .
w ith
lin e s .
th e
even
The
e s s e n tia l
tra n sp o rte d
if
he
th e
rem arks
tr a n s la tio n .
m ay
s id e ,
th e
it
of
c o e r c iv e
C racow
of
one
agrees
( anorm alee)
abn orm al
and
m ay
w ill b e r e a liz e d
n e ig h b o r h o o d
by
at
It
fr o m
P e te r s b u r g -R ig a -K o c h e d a r y ,
th e
of
P e t e r s b u r g -T a p s -W a lk -R ig a -
A ffa ir s ]
jo in
[th is
R u s s ia
N e v e r th e le s s ,
S t.
r a ilw a y s ,
a lig n m e n t
to
be
of
th e
m aneuver
th e
s ta ff
p.
s h a ll
th e
d u tie s
m o b iliz a t io n
of
th e
th e
as
I v a n g o r o d .”
a r tic le
m eans
c a tio n s
m u st
m in im u m .
d o u b le
ou t by
s e c tio n s
F o r e ig n
th e
Im p ro v e m e n ts
p r o je c t e d .
th e
th e
im p o r ta n c e
in
lin e s
a
in e v ita b ly
and
a c c u ra te
b o d ie s
on
d ir e c te d
s tr a te g ic
to
c a r r ie d
W arsaw
to
lin e s
R u s s ia n
be
to
one
a c c e le r a t e d
been
"c o u r a n t .”
G ilin s k y
out
“ The
p e r fe c te d
to
im m e d i
w h ic h
of
in
to
o b se r v a tio n s
c h ie fs
tex t
T.
of
in
(T h is
The
to
day
a ttitu d e
fo rc e s
J o ffr e
a ll
S ie d le t s -W a r s a w ,
a d v a n c in g
are
“ C R m eral
h ig h e s t
tw o
is
not
th u s
to
O r e l,
s e c tio n s
th e
tro o p s
are
th e
an
Ed.
fr o m
u sed
lin e s w h ic h
T h orn.
p o in ts
a p p ly
P etersb u rg ,
F in a lly ,
w ill
th e
d e la y s
J a b in k a -B r e s t -L it o v s k ,
m ay
tro o p s.
G en eral
im p r o v e m e n ts ,
to
n ot be
th e
w ord
(b )
th e
redu ced
d o u b le d ,
d o u b lin g
lin e
be
R u s s ia n
T h ese
s e c tio n s
o th e r
The
by
G erm an
c o n s titu te s
e m p ir e
w ere
m ay
Jt
b o d ie s
and
t i o n .’
of
d e c id e d
fifte e n th
G erm an y
b e in s p ir e d
th e
s u b je c t,
h a s a lr e a d y
O rel
th e
[th is
"c o u r a n t ."
in g
of
o b je c t,
s e r io u s ly
lin e s ,
by
of
m u st
w o u ld
be
M o u r a v ie w o -K o c k e d a r y ;
tw o
m ig h t
o b v io u s ly
th a t
r a ilw a y s .
a p p lie d
J a b in k a ,
d e fe a t
th is
a r m ie s
On
w o u ld
s in g le
n a tio n a l
W ith
th e
end.
q u a d r u p le d , a s
fu lly
w h ic h
a n n ih ila tio n
c o sts.
p o r tio n
hand,
s e c tio n s
th e
u tiliz e d
w estern
o th e r
fe a r s
r a ilw a y s
th a t
c e n tr a tio n
th e
th e
if
or
A ffa ir s ,
c o n fe re n c e s
of
a grou p
Tu rkey.
c o n c e n tr a tio n
fa c to r s
th a t
tim e
fo llo w s ” :
ns
o f F o r lg n
graph :
a llo w
th e
th e re fo r e
p u rsu ed
and
ob serves
ta k e
T h o r n -P o s e n .
and
as
“ Sam e
d a lly
“ G en eral
b u lk
or
B e r lin
c h ie fs
r e n d in g
jo in
R u s s ia
of
th e ir
of
always
are
sam e
lin e s
G en «yal
so u th
ARTICLE
s itu a tio n
com pel
fu tu re
to
o p p o rtu n e
th e
c o n s id e r a b le
a g a in s t
fe lt
an
w o u ld
m a in
w ith
th e
p resen t
W arsaw
" T h e
in te n
p resen t,
c o n s tr u c tio n
In
m en
a r m ie s
at
not
w o u ld
th e
on
r a ilw a y s
th e
grou pm ent
th e
th e
m o b iliz a t io n .
Sw eden
m arch
seem
s id e .
th e
is
a c c e le r a t e
in
sid e .
8 0 0 ,0 0 0
her
d ev o te
h e r s e lf
m ore
c o n c e n ta te
her
of
not
o ffe n s iv e
to
is
on
its
th e
at
of
accord
to
W arsaw ,
r e g io n
“ ‘ Thp
up
That
th e
le a d
th a t
of
of
fin d
F in a lly ,
to
fig u r e
a c tio n
to
s c a le s .
G erm an y,
m ay
m arch
th e
in
tow ard
e ith e r
on
in
Is
d is p o s e
enem y
paragraphs
A u s tr ia n
th e re fo r e
th e
on
and
F ran ce
m o b iliz e d
G erm an y.
to
th e m ,
debouch
G erm an y.
P etersb u rg
th e
T h is
th e
c o n s id e r a tio n
S t.
re s o lv e d
o ffe n s iv e
by
in d ic a te d .
la r g e r
c o n ta in in g
m ake
arou nd
w o u ld
g e n e r a l s t a f f is
on
th e
T h is
c o n c e n tr a tio n .
m a in ta in in g
fo rc e s
le d
R u s s ia .
p r e c e d e n tly
th e ir
a t e ly
e n a b le
d e v e lo p s
d ir e c tin g
and
in
be
G erm an y.
does
o b v io u s
an
on
tim e ly
h o s tilit ie s .
appeared,
order
of
of
m u st
had
of
su b je c t
d e v e lo p e d
ns
on
c h ie f
th e
a g a in s t
th e
w ith
She
in
s id e
on
c ir c u m s ta n c e s
check
m ap
concordant and
g r e a t ly
tim e
Sw eden
and
a g a in s t
a
sam e
fa v o r a b le
th an
in
a r m ie s ,
to
c o n c e n tr a tio n
J o ffr e
fr a n k ly
W h ils t
have
G ilin s k y
G en eral
of
th e y
a g a in s t
to
w th
a r m ie s
o p e n in g
has
a ffo r d
of
a llie d
r a ilw a y s ,
a ttitu d e ,
In s tig a te d
th e
A u s tr ia
th e
p r in c ip le
ex p ressed
th e
a
c o n c e n tr a tio n .
in
p resen t
d is a s tr o u s .
at
o th e r
at
h er
not
be
pow er
tw o
under
le a s t
hand,
can
th e
e x p la n a tio n s ,
n e c e s s ity
o p in io n
a c tio n
at
th e
h is
fo r
accord
on
of
th e
im p r o v e d
R u s s ia
in
A rm y
b u lk
w h o se
has
e ffe c t
fa c e
th e
d is p o s itio n s
fu lly
w ith
o th e r
sh e
and
m oral
Is
p r e s s in g ,
th e
pow er;
F ren ch
F rench
agrees
A rm y,
be
to
tiie
d ir e c t
a ls o
It a lia n
th e
G ilin s k y
sta ff o f
e ffo rts
e x h ib its ,
c o n c e n tr a tio n .
R u s s ia
of
d ir e c te d
if
J o ffr e
in
G eneral
s h o r t ly ,
yenr
c o n c e n tr a tio n .
th e
in
w o r k .'
“ G en eral
R u s s ia n
m easu res
r a ilw a y
on
tim e )
are
a r t ic le
sta ff
v a r io u s
advance
fo r c e s
The
A llia n c e .]
F rench
fr a n c s
F ren ch
M ilita r y
th e
d ays'
advance
m illio n s
fo r
F r a n c o -Itu s s ia n
“ ‘ M oreover,
now
th e
fr o n tie r .
p r o v id e d
F r a n c o -R u s s la n
row
of
G erm an
d e la v
J
In
accordan ce
m ilita r y
sk y,
c h ie f
c o n v e n tio n
c h ie f o f
of
w ith
th e
th e
th e
of
A u gu st
general
gen eral
S t. P e te rsb u rg a n d
o f A u g u st, 1 9 1 3 .
at
p r o v is io n s
17,
sta ff o f
sta ff
of
1892,
th e
th e
K r a s n o e -S e lo
1
of
H is
E x c e lle n c y
R u s s ia n
A rm y, and
F ren ch
A rm y,
a t d iffe r e n t
m et
in
G eneral
G eneral
G llin J o ffr e
c o n fe re n c e
tim e s d u r in g
th e
at
n o n tfc
t
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
Others present were General de L agu’ che, military attachd o f the
French Embassy in R u s s ia ; Colonel Count Ignaticf, m ilitary attachd
of the Russian Embassy in Paris ; Colonel Berthelot, commander of the
Ninety-fourth Infantry Regiment, aide major general d6sigt\6 of the
French Arm y.
The various points e f the agreement were successively considered by
the conferees and the following views exchanged :
P R E L IM IN A R Y
REM ARK.
First of all the conferees decide that whenever they agree to accept
without change one or more paragraphs o f the procfcs-verbal o f the
preceding conference the text o f It shall be reproduced in its entirety
in the present proctis-verbai.
A special note will be inscribed on the margin o f the texts thus re
produced.
This method of procedure dispenses with the necessity for referring
back to the text o f the preceding report as much as possible.
Preamble (accepted w ithout com m ent by the conferees) : The two
chiefs o f general staff agree that the words “ defensive war ’ ’ should
not be interpreted in the sense o f “ war to be conducted defensively.”
They assert, on the contrary, the absolute necessity for the Russian and
French arm ies to take a vigorous offensive and ns far as possible sim ul
taneously, in compliance with the text of article 3 o f the agreement,
according to which " the forces of the two contracting powers shall all
comp into nction with the least delay.”
F i r s t A r t i c l e . Same remarks as in t h e conferences of 1 9 1 0 a n d
the follow ing ones, which rend as follo w s:
“ The two chiefs of general staff, confirming the point o f view o f tho
previous conferences, agree fully on this point, that the defeat of the
German Arm ies remains under all circumstances the first and prin
cipal aim o f the allied arm ies.”
Completed as fo llo w s :
“ And this even more so than form erly on account of the considerable
growth o f the relative m ilitary power o f Germany in the triple alliance.”
A r t . 2 . Same remarks a s in the conferences o f 1 9 10, 1911, a n d 1 9 1 2 .
However, the Russian and French Governments having approved the
interpretation of the two chiefs of general stuff by signing the proc^sverbaux of the conferences o f A ugust and July, 1 9 1 2 , these remarks
should read as follow s :
“ A s r e c o g n i z e d by the Russian a n d French Governm ents in 1 9 1 1 and
1 9 1 2 , Germ an mobilization w ill compel Russia and France to mobilize
all their forces im m ediately and sim ultaneously as soon as it becomes
known without the need of a previous agreement. The same icill apply
to e v er y act of w ar o f the German A rm y against either o f the allied
pow ers.
But in case of partial or even general m obilization o f A ustria
o r Ita ly alone, such agreement is required.’'
The sentence underlined was added to provide for the possibility of a
sudden attack with forces under cover preceding mobilization, for the
purpose of gaining an important strategic point.
A r t . 3. Sharing the opinion o f their predecessors, the conferees
agree that Germ any will direct the greatest part o f its forces again st
F rance and w ill only leave minimum of forces against Russia.
The principal result of the enforcement of the German m ilitary law
o f 1913 w ill be to hasten the mobilization of the German A rm y. T his
arm y can then have more time than in the past to operate against
France before turning against Russia.
The plan o f the Allies should then be to try to attack both sides
sim ultaneously, exerting the maximum o f combined efforts.
General Joffre declares th at France w ill engage on its northeast
frontier alm ost all her forces, the number of which w ill exceed that
provided for in the text o f the convention by more than 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 men ;
th a t the concentration of the fighting elements on this frontier w ill be
com pleted, for the most part, on the tenth clay of m obilization, and that
t h e offensive operations o f this group of forces w ill commence from
t h e m orning o f the eleventh day.
General Gilinsky declares that R ussia w ill engage against Germ any
a group of forces consisting of at least 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 men and the concen
tration o f the fighting element on the Russian-Germ an frontier w ill be
completed, for the m ost part, on the fifteenth day o f m obilization, and
th a t the offensive operations of that group of forces w ill commence
im m ediately afte r the fifteenth day.
B y the end o f 1 9 1 4 , the end of
the concentration w ill be advanced about two clays.
The conferees outline briefly the arrangements made for the con
centration and grouping of the French and Russian Arm ies directed
ag ain st Germ any.
They agree upon the need o f directing the offensive against the heart
o f the enemy c o u n tr y ; upon the advisability o f concentrating the
forces in such a way as to be able to either combat the forces of the
enemy concentrated in eastern Prussia or to march to. Berlin by s ta r t
ing operations in the south of that province if the German forces are
concentiatrd on the left bank of the Vistula.
A lth ough aware of the need for Russia to m aintain large forces
again st A ustria and Sweden, General Joffre thinks that the defeat of
G erm any w ill greatly facilitate the operations which the Russian
Ansiy shall direct against the other enemy powers.
Annihilation of
7 6 8 7 6 — 11
7
the German forces, therefore, must be pushed at any cost, and this
from the start.
For this purpose delays in mobilization and concen
tration of the allied armies should be reduced to a minimum.
To this end the development of the railroad system is an essential
fa c t o r ; General Gillusky states that the construction work recom
mended in the preceding conference has been carried out as fo llo w s :
The sections Briansk-Gomel and Lounlnetz-Jabinka o f the line from
Orel to Varsovia have been double tracked.
The section Jablnka-Brest-Lltovsk has been quadruple tracked.
A s to the quadrupling o f Siedletz-Varsovia the difficulties of its exe
cution are too great, and a better result w ill be obtained by construct
ing a new line with double tracks starting from RIazan and Toula
and ending at Varsovia.
General Joffre agrees on this point.
An examination of the railroad map leads the two chiefs o f general
staff to conclude that a marked increase in the rapidity of concen
tration would be obtained by constructing certain railroad lines con
necting eastern Russia with the region o f Varsovia, such as
1. Doubling the line Batrakl-Fensa-Riajsk-Bogoiavlcnsk-SoukbinitchiS m o le n s k .
2. Doubling the line Rovno-Sarny Louninletz-Barnnovitchi.
8. Doubling the line L ozovain-Poltnva-K lev-Sarny-Kovel, construct
ing the line Grichlno-Kovel.
Offensive operations will also be facilitated by adopting the standard
gauge on the Russian railroads on the left bank of the V istula, as well
as by increasing the means of crossing the river In the region of
Varsovia.
L astly , it seems thut in order to obtain the service required of the
railroads the rolling stock (cars and especially locomotives of great
power) should be greatly increased.
W ith respect to the conduct of operations it is quite necessary for
the allied armies to obtain a decisive success as quickly as possible. A
check of the French armies at the beginning of the war would permit
Germany to transfer to Its eastern frontier a part of the forces which
would have fought at first against France.
Ir, on the contrary, the
French armies quickly obtain a success against the German forces
facing them, this success will facilitate to that extent the operations
o f the Russian armies, since the forces brought by Germany to her
western frontier w ill be unable to be transferred to the east.
It Is therefore essential that the French armies should have a
marked numerical superiority over the German forces of the west.
These conditions w ill he easily realized If Germany is obliged to pro
tect herself with larger forces on her eastern frontier.
General Joffre states that, in this connection, it would be advan
tageous for both armies to have the Russian forces so grouped I d the
governm ent of Varsovia, even in peace time, that they constitute a
direct menace to Germany.
General Gllinsky states that the new plan o f reorganization of the
Russian Arm y provides for the establishment of an army corps in the
region o f Varsovia.
A r t . 4 . The chiefs of general staff reproduce w ithout change the
first three paragraphs of the observations concerning article 4 in the
conference o f 1 9 12, which read as follows :
“ 1. The two chiefs of general staff shall hold periodic and, in prin
ciple, annual conferences.
“ 2. Furthermore, a conference shall be held whenever a general staff
shall deem one necessary.”
Paragraph 3 could be simplified as follows :
“ 3. The procfes-verbal o f the conference shall be submitted for ap
proval to the government of each country so that the chiefs of general
staff of the allied armies may rely on this document for the realiza
tion o f desirable Improvements.”
Paragraph 4 shall read as follows :
“ 4. The exchange of inform ation between the allied armies, being of
utm ost value, w ill continue regularly and frequently.”
Before each conference the points which it Is proposed to consider
shall be m utually made known.
The w ays and means o f correspondence in time of war have been
perfected according to the wishes expressed in the course of the con
ference of 1911 and 1912.
The wireless stations o f Paris-Bobrouisk and of Blzerte-Sebastopol
are functioning well.
The station at Bizerte has been reinforced by
France ; a powerful station is being constructed in Russia near the
Black Sea, so that communications may be as easy by day as by night.
F ollow ing the attem pts at communicating between the Eiffel Tower
and the Russian naval station at Sveaborg, It Is desirable to see the
latter station reinforced.
Telegraphic communications can be exchanged between the French
ami Russian chiefs of general staff by British cables and with the
aid of Great Britain.
T he conventions with London have ju st been concluded, all ar
rangements have been made, and operations can start.
Cablegrams pass by way of America, A ustralia, and Zanzibar or by
way o f South Africa and Zanzibar to reach Odessa.
8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
Governm ent In the telegram o f February 24, 1910. No. 948, to the
Communications by emissaries are organized by the French chief of
effect that “ while allowing France nnd Englnnd complete liberty in
general staff for the transm ission of dispatches from France to Rus
delim iting the w estern frontiers of Germany we expect that the Allies
sia.
It would be advisable for the Russian chief of general staff to
on their part w ill give us equal liberty In delimiting our frontiers with
organize communications by emissaries on the same plan.
A rt . 5. The Russian and French Governments having accepted the i Germ any and Austria-H ungary.”
Hence the Impending exchange o f notes on the question raised by
interpretation given since 1910 to article 6, said Interpretation could
Doumergue will Justify us in asking the French Government sim ul
read as fo llo w s :
taneously to confirm Its assent to allowing Russia freedom of action in
“ The Russian and French Governments have respectively recognized
drawing up her future frontiers In the w est. Exact data on the ques
that article 5 obliges the contracting parties not to stop operations
tion w ill be supplied by us in due course to the French cabinet.
or conclude an arm istice separately.”
In addition we deem it necessary to stipulate for the assent of
A r t . 6. (Accepted w ithout remarks by the conferees.)
France to the removal at the termination o f the war of the disqualifi
Article 6 is repealed as heretofore.
Please explain the above to
In conformity w ith the diplom atic agreement o f August, 1 8 99, men cations resting on the Aland Islands.
Briand nnd wire the results.
tioned in chapter 1 o f the conference o f July 2, 1 9 00, the convention
will la st as long as the diplom atic agreements now In force which It 1
supplements.
(Translated b> Lottie M. Manross, December 13, 1 9 2 3 .)
A telegram from the Russian ambassador in Paris to M. Pokrovsky,
In 1916 France and Russia entered into a secret treaty to January 31 (February 1 3 ), 1 9 1 7 :
divide German and Austrian territory between Russia and
France, as follow s:
F X H IR IT V.
A r r r .x n ix D.
Secret agreement o f tMS—n between France and Russia for the disposi
tion o f German and Austrian territory.
I.
The Russian M inister of Foreign Affairs (M . Sazonoff) to the Rus
sian am bassador at Paris.
February 24 (M arch 9 ) , 1 9 1 0 :
(N o. 9 4 8 .)
P etrograd.
Please refer to my telegram No. 6063 o f 1915.
A t the forth
coming conference you may be guided by the following general
principles:
“ The political agreements concluded between the Allies during the
war m ust remain intact, and are not subject to revision. They include
the agreement, with France and England on Constantinople, the Straits,
Syria, and Asia M inor, and also the London treaty with Ita ly. A ll sug
gestions for the future delimitation of central Europe are at present
premature, but in general one m ust bear in mind that w e are prepared
to allow France and England com plete freedom in drawing up the
w estern frontiers of G erm any, in the expectation that the Allies on
their part would allow us equal freedom in drawing up our frontiers
with G erm any and Austria.
“ It is particularly necessary to insist on the exclusion of the Polish
question from the subject o f international discussion and on the elimi
nation o f all a ttem pts to place the future of Poland under the guar
antee and the control o f the Pow ers.
“ W ith regard to the Scandanavian States, it is necessary to en
deavor to keep back Sweden from any action hostile to us and at the
same time to examine betimes measures for attracting Norway on our
side in case It should prove impossible to prevent a war w ith'S w ed en.
" Rumania has already been offered all the political advantages
which could induce her to take up arms, and therefore It would be per
fectly futile to search for new baits in this respect.
“ The question o f pushing out the Germans from the Chinese market,
is of very great im portance, but Its solution Is Impossible w ithout the
participation of Japan. It is preferable to examine it at the economic
conference, where the representatives of Japan w ill be present.
T his
does not exclude the desirability of a preliminary exchange o f views
on the subject between Russia and England by diplom atic m eans.”
Sazonoff.
II.
(N o. 8 8 .)
Copy to London. Referring to your telegram No. 50 7 . confidentially,
I immediately communicated in writing its contents to Briand. who
told me that toe would not fall to give me an official reply o f the
French Government, but that he could at once declare, on his own
behalf, th a t the satisfaction of the wishes contained in your telegrnm
w ill meet with no difficulties.
IsvonsKT.
IV.
On February 1 ( 1 4 ) , 1917, the Russian foreign m inister addressed
the follow ing note to the French ambassador at P e tro g ra d :
“ In your note of to-day’s date your excellency w as good enough
to inform the Imperial Government th a t the Governm ent o f the Repub
lic w as contem plating the inclusion In the terms of peace to be offered
to Germ any the following demands and guaranties of a territorial
n a tu r e :
“ 1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.
“ 2. The frontiers are to be extended at least up to the lim its o f
the form er principality of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up a t the
discretion o f the French Government so as to provide tor the stra tegic
needs and for the inclusion in French territory of the entire iron
district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of the Faar V alley.
“ 3. The rest of the territories situated on the left bank o f the
Rhine, which now form part of the German Empire, are to be en tirely
separated from G erm any and freed from all political and economic de
pendence upon her.
“ 4. The territories of the left bank o f the Rhine outside French
territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, and
are to be occupied by French troops until such time as the enemy
States have completely satisfied all the conditions and guaranties
indicated In the treaty o f peace.
“ Your excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would
be happy to be able to rely upon the support o f the Im perial G o v e r n
ment for the carrying out of Its plans.
B y order o f H is Im perial
M a jesty , m y m ost august m aster, I have the honor, in the name o f the
Russian G overnm ent, to inform your excellency b y the p resen t note
that the G overnm ent of the Republic m ay rely upon th e support o f
the Im perial G overnm ent f w the carrying out of its plans as set out
a b o ve."
V.
F inally, on February 26 (M arch 1 1 ) , 1917, the Russian am bassador
at P aris sent the follow ing telegram to M. Pekrovsky :
(N o. 1 68.)
Confidential telegram from M . Pokrovsky, M. Sazonoff’s second sue- |
See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Governm ent o f the
cessor ns foreign m inister, to the Russian ambassador a t Paris, JanuFrench Republic, anxious to confirm the importance o f the treaties
ary 80 (February 1 2 ) , 1917.
concluded w ith the Russian Governm ent in 1 9 15, for the settlem ent
(No. 5 0 2 .)
on the term ination o f the war of the question of Constantinople and
the S traits in accordance w ith R ussia's aspirations, anxious, on the
P etrograd.
Copy to London confidentially. A t an audience w ith the m ost high, j other hand, to secure for its ally in m ilitary and Industrial respects
M . Doumergue submitted to the Em peror the desire of France to secure ! all the guaranties desirable for the safety and the economic develop
for herself at the end of the present war the restoration o f Alsacement of the Em pire, recognize Russia’s com plete liberty is establishing
Lorraine and a special position In the valley o f the River Saar as well
her w estern frontiers.
as to attain the political separation from Germany o f her transISVObSKY.
Rhenish districts and their organization on a separate basis, in order
Bailsman sa y s:
that in future the River Rhine m ight form a permanent strategical
On the very next day (M arch 12 ) the Russian Revolution took
frontier against a Germanic invasion.
Doumergue expressed the hope
place, and on M arch 1 5 the T sar abdicated.
that the Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw
*p its assent to those suggestions in a form al manner.
T H E P R E S E N T P O S IT IO N (B A C S M A N ).
His Imperial M ajesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, in
Apparently the design of driving Germany back to the left bank o f
consequence o f which I requested Doumergue, after communicating with
the Rhine has now been abandoned by the French Government, although
his Government, to let me have the d raft of an agreement, which
there has been no official statem ent to this effect.
would then be given a form al sanction by an exchange of notes between
M r. Balfour, in the House of Commons, on December 19, 1917, saia
the French am bassador and m yself.
o f this p la n :
Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our ally, I nevertheless con
“ W e have never expressed our approval of It, nor do I believe it
sider it my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by the Imperial
presents the policy o f successive French Government who have held
16876— 11
traooan ayNLoissaHOKOO
8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
9
•ffice daring the war.
Never did we desire and never did we en
courage the idea that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the
parent State and erected into some kind of,
• • *
independent
Government on the left bank of the Rhine. His M ajesty’ s Governm ent
were never aware that was seriously entertained by any French
statesm an.”
It must be noted in this connection that by the declaration o f Sep
tember 5, 1 914, the Allies undertook to make peace in common.
Any
arrangement between France and Russia therefore equally affects G reat
Britain.
In the light of these treaties and these military c o n f e r
ences, 1 call attention to chapter 12 of “ Entente Diplomacy and
the World.” giving the dispatches showing the Entente prepara
tions for war. Exhibit 0.
And the Falsification of the Russian Orange Book.
In lOOtJ Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of the British Govern
ment, entered Into an agreement with France which in 1912
he reduced to writing, as follow s:
E X H IB IT S
VIII
A N D
IX.
(L e tte r Sir Edward Grey to French Am bassador Cambon, Nov.
*
22, 1912.)
M r D e a r A m b a s s a d o r : From time to time in recent years the
French and British military and naval experts huve consulted to
gether.
It has always been understood that such consultation docs
not restrict the freedom of either Governm ent to decide at any future
time whether or not to assist the other by armed force.
W e have
agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be
regarded as an engagement that com m its either Governm ent to action
in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise.
The
disposition, for instance, of the French and B ritish fleets, respec
tively, a t the present moment is not based upon an engagement to
cooperate in war.
You hove, however, pointed out that if either Governm ent have
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it
m ight become essential to know w hether it could in that event depend
upon the armed assistance of the other.
1 agree th a t if either Government v
'-".d grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the
general peace, it should immediately discuss w ith the other whether
both Governm ents should act together to prevent aggression and to
preserve peace, and, if so, w bat measures they would be prepared to
take in common.
I f these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs
would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governm ents would
then decide what effect should be given to them.
iT h e last vital paragraph was not read to Parliament by G rey,
although afterw ards published in the W hite Book.]
(H ow D iplom ats
Make W a r , 3 0 3 .)
The French ambassador, Camdon, immediately replied In
the following letter;
F
rench
London,
D bar
S ib
E
dw ahd
E
m bassy
N ovem ber
,
23, 1912.
: You reminded me in your letter o f yesterday,
November 22, that during the last few years the m ilitary and naval
authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each
oth er from time to t i m e ; that it had always been understood that
these consultations should not restrict the liberty o f either Govern
ment to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the
support o f their armed forces ; that on either side these consultations
between experts were not and should not be considered us engagements
binding our Governm ents to take action in certain e v e n tu a litie s;
that, however, I had remarked to you that If one or other of the two
Governm ents had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the
part of a third power it would become essential to know w hether It
could count on the armed support o f the other.
Y our letter answers that p o i n t ; and I am authorized to state that
in the event o f one of our tw o Governments having grave reasons
to fear either an attack from a third power or some event threaten
ing the general peace, that Government would immediately examine
w ith the other the question whether both Governments should act
together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace.
I f so,
the two Governm ents would deliberate aa to the measures which
they would be prepared to take in common.
I f those measures in
volved action, the tw o Governments would take into immediate con
sideration the plans o f their general staffs and would then decide as
to the effect to be given to those plans.
Y ours, etc.,
P aul Cam bon .
(H o w Diplom ats Make W ar, 2 7 9 .)
In 1914 Sir Edward Grey delivered copies o f these letters
exchanged between him and the French ambassador to the
Russian ambassador as a basis for an entente between Great
7 0 8 7 6 — 11-------- 2
Britain and Russia (see ch, 12, Entente Diplomacy and the
World, p. 709), under which a plan of naval cooperation be
tween Great Britain, Russia, and France was worked out.
When the German rulers ordered a German mobilization,
5 p. m., Saturday afternoon, August 1, it was followed imme
diately by the marching of regiments through London equipped
for war the following morning, Sunday, August 2. 1914. (How
Diplomats Make War, Neilson, p. 295.)
French troops invaded German soil Sunday, August 2, 1914.
(Reflections o f the World War, p. 145.)
On Saturday, the 1st day of August, the German border was
crossed in four places by Russian patrols. (Preparation and
Conduct o f the World War, Von Kuhl, pp. 7 9 -SO.)
Germany declared a state o f war existing with Russia, be
cause o f Russian acts, on August 1, 1914, 7.10 p. m .; with
France, August 3, 1914; Belgium, August 4, 1914. (Scott Docu
ments on World War, p. 1877.)
France declared war against
rman.v on August 3, 1914;
Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914 ; Russia against
Germany. August 7. 1914. The evidence appears to show that it
was the Russian policy to invade Germany without a declara
tion of war and to make its mobilization complete under the
camouflage of peaceful negotiations
(Von Kuhl, pp. 70-80.)
In the Russian Czar’s orders for mobilization, 30th of Sep
tember, 1912, Chancellor Von Bethinann-Hollwcg quotes the
following language:
It Is the Em peror's order that (ho notification of the mobilization
should be equivalent to the notification of a sla te of war with
Germany.
In other words, the Russian mobilization 'order was to lie
regarded as a secret declaration of war.
Hollweg further states that the Russian instruction for the
troops on the German front w*is:
As soon as concentration is completed we shall proceed to advance
against the armed forces of Germany with the object of carrying the
war on to their own territory.
(Reflection on the W orld W ar, p. 132.)
This was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian treaty of
1892 and the military conferences of 1911, 1912, and 1913.
It will be observed that under the Franco-Russian secret
treaty of 1892, section 1, it was provided that in case of war
Russia should employ all Its available forces to fight Germany
and that the military and naval staffs, in the military con
ference above quoted, expressly contemplated that the German
Army should be obliged to attack France through Belgium,
and stipulated:
The French Arm y could concentrate as rapidly as the German
Arm y, and that as from the tw elfth day it is in a position to take the
offensive against Germany with the help of the British Arm y on its
left flank.
And thus clearly outlines the cooperation agreed upon be
tween Russia, France, and Great Britain.
The conference states :
It Is essential that Germany
on the east and on the west.
shall be attacked
at the same time
But the most important light is thrown upon the matter by
the preamble in the minutes o f the meetings of the French
and Russian chiefs of staffs, as follow s:
pream ble
.
T he two chiefs o f staff declare, by common accord, that the words
“ defensive w ar ” must not be interpreted in the sense of a war which
would be conducted defensively.
They aflirm, on the contrary, the
absolute necessity for the Russian and French armies to adopt a vigor
ous offensive, and, as far as possible, a simultaneous one, in conformity
w ith the text of article 3 of the convention, whose terms provide that
the forces of the two contracting powers shall com e into full action
w ith all speed /
The Franco-Russian treaty, 1892, provided “ In case the forces
o f the triple alliance or o f one of the powers which are a
party to i t ” [for example, Austria] “ should be mobilized,
France and Russia, at the first indication o f the event and
without a previous agreement being necessary shall mobilize
all their forces immediately and simultaneously and shall trans
port them as near to their frontiers as possible.” * * *
“ These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest
dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time
in the east and In the west.”
Therefore when Austria partially mobilized in Ignorance of
the terms o f this secret Franco-Russian treaty of 1892, Russia
and France were under a secret contract to immediately mobi
lize and attack Germany with all their forces. This was a
secret declaration o f war on Germany as of the date o f th«
Austrian mobilization, July 28, 1914.
J
10
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
The Russian and French mobilizntions, which were begun
under the treaty o f 1802. must be interpreted in the light o f that
treaty and the annual military conferences from 1903 to 1918 of
the general staffs of the Russian and French Armies.
R U S S IA N
PR K P A R A T IO N S .
The manner in which the Russian military und railway prep
arations and mobilization had been worked out is set forth in
tlie work o f Von Eggeling, The Russian Mobilization and the
Outbreak o f the War, and by Gen. H. von Kuhl in his work,
The German General Staff in Preparation and Conduct of the
World War, an abstract o f which is submitted. Exhibit X.
All the military authorities in Europe knew and recognized,
as a matter o f military strategy, that in a war between Germany,
Russia, and France, the German troops would be compelled to
enter France through Belgium, as the French frontier otherwise
was absolutely Impregnable because of the gigantic forts and
prepared military defenses.
Further the military strategists were all agreed that Ger
many’s only chance to win in such a military struggle was by
speed and efficiency, conquering France first, and then meeting
Russia.
Germany claimed that while Belgium had never collaborated
with Germany to preserve Belgium's neutrality against France
and Great Britain, Belgium had a positive understanding with
Great Britain and France as to cooperation in a war o f France
and Great Britain with Germany. See Belgian documents in
facsimile in German White Book [pp. 837 to 860, Diplomatic
Documents Relating to Outbreak o f the European War. Scott].
The secret documents exhibited in “ Entente Diplomacy and
tlie W orld,” S58” in number, demonstrate beyond the shadow
of a doubt that it was the fixed policy of the Russian Govern
ment to control the Dardanelles and expand its power in the
Balkan States where there were millions o f Slavs in Serbia
and in Austria, and that this could only be done by means of a
general European war. It was therefore necessary for the
carrying out o f the Russian policy to bring about a general
European war and at the same time to put the moral responsi
bility o f such a war on others. These secret documents show
that It was tlie design of the Russian Government to do this,
and that the means o f accomplishing this end lay through the
Slavs of Serbia and their intrigues with the so-called “ unllberated Slavs o f Austria.”
The Serbian intrigues through a period of years were financed
by Russia and the Austrian Government was so seriously dis
turbed by these Intrigues that they w
rere compelled at huge ex
pense and great internal inconvenience to mobilize in 1912,
and again In 1913, and again in 1914, wdien the Crown Prince
of Austria and his consort were murdered by a Serb believed
to have been instigated by a malignant press campaign car
ried on in Serbia and alleged to have been directly arranged
by the Pan Slav “ Black Hand,” fostered by the Russian min
ister at Belgrade.
In Professor’s Sloan’s work, ‘‘ The Balkans,” page 193, May,
1914, he says:
A t Belgrade the trade of politics has been on a level unknown else
where, unless It be at Constantinople. The overthrow of one king and
the setting up of another was a m atter of money, and it was the Rus
sian ambassador who provided the funds.
The whole conspiracy has
been traced to Its so u rc e ; there is not a step for which tlie docu
mentary evidence can not be produced.
Nitti, in ids book “ Peaceless Europe,” pages 12, 83, 84, 87,
says:
Under the treaty o f 1892 France had financed Russia to the
extent o f about $7,000,000,009 to enable Russia to baNi up u
gigantic army and to build military railways to tlie Gernmu
frontier (Lex Talionis).
The assassination of tlie Crown Prince (June 28. 1914)
caused tlie Austrinn Government to demand immediate satis
faction o f the Serbian Government on July 23.
On July 24 Serbia mobilized, but accepted the Austrinn de
mands, except one or two affecting the question of sovereignty,
which they proposed to arbitrate. Austria ordered a partial
mobilization against Serbia. The same day the Russian Gov
ernment authorized a mobilization, and the Russian Minister
o f War, Sukhomlinoff, made it a general mobilization and
afterwards made the Czar believe it was a partial mobilization,
which the Czar made u general mobilization on July 30. Tlie
army o f Belgium was mobilized ns of this day, July 24. Tlie
Britisli fleet was completely mobilized and ready for war as of
July 24. The French Government took preliminary steps, can
celing leaves o f absence, and so forth.
Ren6 Viviana, president of the council, August 4, 1914, in
the French Chamber o f Deputies, in commenting on the Aus
trian notice to Serbia o f July 23 aud subsequent events, said:
A s these events unfolded them selves, the Governm ent, watchful
and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the
measures of precaution which the situation required— the general mo
bilization of our forces on land and sea was ordered.
Under the secret 1892 treaty the Austrian mobilization re
quired the immediate mobilization o f all the Russian and
French forces and the speediest possible simultaneous attack
on Germany east and west.
William II was in Scandinavia on a summer cruise, returning
on Sunday, July 26. Upon his return he directed tlie German
chancellor to urge on Austria the acceptance of the Serbian
reply and the acceptance of a method o f adjustment acceptable
to the entente powers. Austria yielded to this demand, de
clared that the demand on Serbia was not intended as an ulti
matum, that Austria was willing to have the matter adjusted
by an International cr ..fi- ar.ee,
it had no designs on
Serbian territory, that it had only made a partial mobilization
against Serbia, and that it only sought its own internal peace
against Serbian intrigue.
The secret Russian records show that the Russian Govern
ment was determined on war, that the French Government was
determined on war, that the French Government refused to
attempt to moderate the attitude of Russia, and that the Brit
ish Government refused to attempt to exercise a moderating
j influence with tlie Russian Government, and that the Russian
Government rejected in advance any attempt to exercise a mod
erating influence with the Russian Government.
These secret documents show that it was a part o f the policy
of the French and Russian Governments to put the odium o f the
World War upon the German Government.
The German chancellor, Von Bellimann-Hollweg, states that:
The German m inister of war thought it a mistake to declare w ar
on Russia, not because he considered that war could be avoided after
Russia had mobilized, but because he feared that the p olitical effect
would be prejudicial.
But that the chief o f the general staff favored declaring w a r:
Because our hope of success against the enormous superiority iu num
bers was dependent on the extreme rapidity of our movements.
And this opinion prevailed. (Reflections of tlie World War,
138J
Because Germany declared war on Russia and mobilized at
5 p. m., Saturday, August 1. 1914, public opinion throughout
the world has largely accepted tlie view that the German lead
ers were responsible for the war. This has been emphasized
In 1908 the Czar had assured Paschitch, the Serbian minis and made more effective by propaganda and by tlie excitement
ter, that the Bosnia-Herzegovinian question would be decided and hostility o f war.
A fter August 1, 1914, Russia and the various powers issued
by war alone, for which meantime they could preserve a calm
attitude with military preparations. (Bogitsevitch quoted in Orange Books, White Books. Yellow Books, etc., eacli o f which
was intended to prove an alibi and show that each of the sev
Diplomatic Revelations, p. 101.)
In the German White Book, 1919, Part II, page 53, is an account eral Governments wras innocent of the responsibility for the
pending gigantic catastrophe.
of a visit of the Serbian Prime Minister to the Czar of Russia
The Russian Foreign Office issued an Orange Book to show
February 2, 1914, and his report that he requested of the Czar
120,000 rifles and munitions, and so forth ; that the Czar said the innocence o f tlie Russian Government. Out of 60 dis
that Russia was doing as much as it could to arm. He asked patches in the Foreign Office for the few days preceding the
how many soldiers Serbia could muster. Tlie minister an W orld War, it appears that 50 of them were falsified by
swered a half million well-clothed, well-armed soldiers. The omissions, deletion or insertion. (Exhibit 7.)
This document shows by its forgeries iu suppressing the vital
Czar replied:
dispatches a fixed policy to exculpate the Russian aud French
r hat Is satisfactory ; i t is no small m atter and one can accomplish
i
statesmen and make it possible to cast the odium of the war on
much by m e n u o f it.
tlie German statesmen.
70870— 1J
Russia alone promoted and kept alive the agitation In Serbia and of
the Slavs in Austria.
It was on account of Russia that the Serbian
Government was a perpetual cause o f disturbance, a perpetual threat to
Austria-H ungary. The Russian policy In Serbia was really criminal.
aaooaa r
ivKoissaaoNOD
01
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
G P. Gooch appears to be justified (Falsification o f the Rus
sian Orange Rook) In stating:
It
Is
1.
That
fr o m
th e
R u s s ia n
m ade
2.
now
e s ta b lis h e d
That
in
by
g iv in g
3.
th a t
sh e
4.
on
to
That
v .u s c o n s i d e r e d
(T e le g r a m s
o n ly
to
222,
a
e ffo r t
in
th e
sh e
in flu e n c e
R u s s ia n
w ill
to
in
w ar
su p p o rt.
in fo r m e d
N o.
and
lia d
w ar
216
fr o m
th a t
F ran ce
V ie n n a
m o d e r a tin g
w ar
r e g a r d in g
225,
on w ard s
u n c o n d itio n a l
p u b lic
b e tte r
218,
N os.
of
r e fr a in e d
be
in
stre n g th en ed
upon
to
G e r m a n y 's
h e r s e lf
(T e le g r a m
regard
quarrel
ow n.
to
c o n tra ry ,
d e c is io n
th e
or
fro m
peace
G erm an y
in
P e te rsb u rg
had
been
to
appar
P a r is .)
d e c la r in g
o p in io n
w ar
F ran ce
s h o u ld
a g a in s t
and
appear
G erm an y,
E n g la n d ,
th e
it
aggressor.
2 2 6 .)
Any evidence from Russian or French sources favoruble to
the German Government obviously Is entitled to great weight,
while self-serving evidence of the Russian statesmen must be
taken with reserve.
T H K O RAN O K BOOK AS CORRECTED FROM U N L IV R E N O IR .
Telegram 18-4 (Falsification o f the Russian Orange Rook,
p. ID), the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonoff, on
July 24, states:
G erm any
a rdently
desired
In te r fe r e n c e
of
m u st
in c a lc u la b le
had
have
an
any
on
th e
con sequ en ces.
grou n d
*
*
of
conflict,
as
th e
im p r e s s io n
am b n ssn d or
e x is tin g
tre a tie s
K x M in is te r
*
P ic h o n
w h ic h
th e
A u s tr ia n
the
intend
g a in e d
th e
of
A ustria-H ungary did not
her step to be regarded as an unconditional ultim atum .
a ls o
w ith
pow er
localisation
fr o m
he
In te r v ie w
o th e r
the
t o -d a y ,
th a t
Telegram 18G, from the Russian representative at Paris to
Sazonoff, Petrograd, on July 25, said that the action of the
German ambassador—
ila s
to
som e
In d ic a tio n
e x te n t
reassu red
th e
fo r e ig n
m in is tr y
as
b e in g
G erm any does not seek for war in a ny case.
th a t
•
•
an
*
That the German Ambassador had pointed out-~That
A ustrian note has not the character o f an u ltim a tu m ;
t h e German step had only for its object the localiza
tion o f the Austro-Serbian conflict;
•
*
•
t h a t th e a b se n c e o f th e
•
•
the
*
th a t
P r e s id e n t
of
th e
R e p u b lic
and
of
th e
M in is te r
P r e s id e n t
(V iv ia n !)
prevents the foreign office for the m om ent from expressing its opinion
definitely regarding present events.
P O IN C A R E
AN D
V IV IA N I
W ERE
EN
ROUTE
FR O M
ST.
PETERSBU RG
TO P A R IS .
Telegram 187, July 26, from the Russian representative at
Paris to Sazonoff, Petrograd, states that the German ambas
sador had advised the French Minister for Foreign A ffa irs:
A ustria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial gains
and does n o t threaten the in tegrity of Serbia.
H er sole object is to
secure her ow n peace and to maintain order.
Telegram 188, July 26, from the Paris Russian representative
to Sazonoff says that Bertbelot, the director o f the political
department o f France, inclines to the opinion—
That G erm any and A ustria do n ot desire war in any case.
Telegram 1521, July 27, Sazonoff, Russian foreign minister,
to Izvolski, Russian ambassador in P a ris:
I f there is a question of exercising a m oderating influence in
P etersb u rg , w e reject it in advance, as w e have adopted a standpoint
from the o u tset which w e can in no w ay alter.
*
*
*
Telegram 194, Izvolski wired that Poincare will return to
Paris on Wednesday, July 29 (five days after Belgium
mobilization, four days after Russian general mobilization had
begun, and on the next night, Juiy 30, the French Minister of
W ar told the Russian military attach^ the French Govern
ment toas determined on war, telegram 216).
Telegram 195, July 27th, the German Ambassador is shown
urging a new proposal for the intervention o f France and
Germany between Russia and Austria, which was not ac
cepted. Izvolski says in this rega rd :
*
w as
s u r p r is e d
at
th e
correct
u n d e r s ta n d in g
of
th e
s itu a tio n
s e e how
firm and tranquil th ey w ere in their determ ination to extend to w s
their fullest support a n d t o a v o i d t h e s l i g h t e s t a p p e a r a n c e o f a n y l a c k
m a n ife s te d
o f u n ity
by
th e
b e tw e e n
a c tin g
m in is te r
and
h is
a s s is ta n t
and
to
Cam bon
(F r e n c h
in
r e p ly
toward
76876— 11
would
im m ediately
rep ly
by
attacking
In consequence o f A ustria-H ungary’s declaration of war against
Serbia, we shall announce tom orrow a m obilization of the Odessa,
K leff, Moscow, and Kazan military districts. In bringing this to the
notice o f the German G overnm ent repeat that Russia has no aggres
sive intentions against Germ any.
M eanw hile our ambassador in
Vienna Is not being recalled.
Sukhomllnoff had already issued a general mobilization order
o f the Russian Army, He “ lied to the C za r” as to its being
a general mobilization ( “ Eggerling ” ), said it was partial,
and pretended that he had stopped the mobilization, although
he did not do so. The Czar, however, July 30, authorized the
general mobilization. (Let France Explain, p. 201.)
Telegram 198, July 28, Izvolski to Sazonoff:
I deem it my duty to make clear that, as results from my conver
sation yesterday at the Qua! d'Orsay, the acting French M inister for
Foreign Affairs did not for a m oment admit the possibility of exercis
ing a moderating influence in Petersburg,
*
*
• A s a result
o f his conversation with Baron Sclion, the minister declined to accept
the German proposal.”
Germany was exercising strenuously u moderating influence
on Vienna In favor of peace.
Telegram 201, July 28, Izvolski to Sazonoff, states that the
Gerruuu Ambassador had again visited the French Foreign
Minister and told him that:
G erm any ardently desired to work with France for the maintenance
o f peace.
*
*
• That Germ any was ready to cooperate w ith the
other powers for the maintenance of peace.
Telegram 1544, Sazonoff to Izvolski, July 29:
The German Am bassador informed me on behalf o f the Imperial
Chancellor that Germany had not ceased and will not cease to ex
ercise a moderating influence in Vienna, and would continue to do so
despite the declaration o f war. Up to this m orning no news has been
received of the crossing of Austrian troops on to Serbian territory.
Telegram 1551, July 29, Sazonoff to Izvolski:
The German ambassador has communicated to me to-day the de
cision of his Government to mobolize if Russia does not stop her
m ilitary preparation.
• *
*
A s we can not accede to Germany’s
wish, nothing remains for us but to hasten our ow n warlike prepa
rations and to reckon w ith the probable inevita bility o f war. In
form the French G overnm ent o f this, and at the sam e tim e thank it
fo r its declaration made in its name by the French ambassador that
w e can fully rely upon the support of our ally France.
Under present
circum stances this declaration is especially valuable for us.
It is
v e ry desirable that England also w ithout loss of tim e should associate
herself w ith France and R ussia, as it is only thus that she can suocecd in preventing a dangerous alteration in the European balance.
London telegraphed to In like terms.
Of course, England could not stand for the control of West
ern Europe by the military machine o f Germany. Sazonoff
knew this and could count on British help. The association
of Great Britain with Russia and France would guarantee the
safety of attack by Russia on Germany.
Telegram 304, July 29, Sazonoff to Izvolski:
I urgently request you to communicate to the French foreign min
Ister the follow ing telegram from the French am bassador In Peters
b u r g : The German ambassador has ju st Informed Sazonoff that if
Russia does not stop her m ilitary preparations the German A rm y
w ill be ordered to mobilize.
*
*
*
Telegram 202, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff:
Bienvenu-M artin, the acting foreign minister, told me that this
morning the German ambassador made a com m unication to him, em
ploying practically the following expressions: G erm any is continu
ing her endeavors in Vienna to cause Austria to agree to a friendly
exchange of opinions which should indicate the object and the extent
o f the steps undertaken by her and concerning which Germany has
not so far been exactly informed.
The declaration o f war will not
stand in the way o f this exchange of opinions.
G erm any hopes to
receive during the course of these negotiations exp la n a t^n s which
will s a tisfy Russia.
F inally, Baron Schon again protested against the
assertion that Germany was encouraging Austria to be unyielding.
am b assad or
in
B e r lin )
te le g r a p h s
•
*
Germany
*
*
•
declares that as w e have received the
assurance that A ustria seeks no territorial gains, the maintenance of
peace entirely depends on Russia because it turns upon (lie necessity
for localizing the Austre-Serbian a ffa ir ; that is, the punishment of
Serbia for her former policy and the giving of guaranties for the
future.
• *
•
•
fro m
B e r lin
to
b is
q u e s tio n
as
to what attitude Germ any would
a partial mobilization by Russia, J a g o w ( G e r m a n s e c
r e t a r y o f s t a t e f o r f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ) r e p l i e d t h a t a m o b i l i z a t i o n o f that
kind w o u l d n o t r e s u l t i n G e r m a n m o b i l i z a t i o n , b u t that i f Russia
th a t
adopt
Germ any
Telegram 203, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff:
u s.
Telegram 197, July 27, Izvolski to Sazonoff:
M .
Austria,
Telegram 1539, July 28, Sazonoff to Izvolski:
p r o o f:
of
her
exert
d e c id e d
a
F ran ce
v ie w
co n tra st
assu ra n ces
th ere.
h a v in g
d o c a m e n ta ry
of
to
th e
had
b e fo r e
com e
b ecau se,
re fu se d
b u t,
e ffe c t
e n t ly
p o in t
r e p e a te d
That
by
com m encem ent
c o m p le te
c a te g o r ic a lly
P e te rsb u rg ,
th e
attacked
Russia.
11
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
12
order m obilization.
T o my query as to w hether this was equivalent
to a declaration o f w ar, the am bassador replied that it was not, but
added that tor w ir e v ery near to war.
He states:
That France and England p ositively could not exercise any m oderat
ing influence in Russia.
*
• •
On Saturday, August 1, 5 p. m., Germany issued a general
order o f mobilization; at 7.10 p. m. the German ambassador
notified Sazonoff Germany accepted the war challenge of Rus
sia. The negotiation with Austria and Germany for the preser
vation of peace appears to have been used as a camouflage for
a predetermined tear.
Telegram 208, July 30, from Izvolskl to Sazonoff assured
h im :
Telegram 204, July 29, Wednesday, Izvolskl to Sazonoff:
The firm attitude taken up by the French press continues.
It
passes severe Judgment upon the Austrian attack uml upon G erm any’s
manifest share of blame for it, and unhesitatingly declares that this
touches us, and that tee can not remain unsym pathetic. A s regards
solidarity w ith u s, this question Is not once discussed, but is tnken
as a m atter of course. E v e r y journalist expresses him self in this
sense, including such prominent personages belonging to the most diverse
parties as I’ lehon, Clenienceau, and even Jaures, and also Ilerve, the
father of anti m ilitarism.
The press reilected the French Government’s wishes.
gram 210.)
Telegram 206, July 29, Izvolskl to Sazonoff:
(Tele
W hen the President returned to Paris, he was received at the m ilway station and in the streets with sym pathetic demonstrations from
the assembled crowd.
Margerie (political director in the French
foreign office) told me that the President, from his conversations
during his Journey with prefects and politicians, had become con
vinced o f the firm, energetic, and at the same time calm sta te of public
opinion, which plainly form ed a correct estim ate o f the true signifi
cance of even ts.
The sam e attitude reigned am ong a large section
of the Radical Socialists.
The Government attaches no Importance
to the antim ilitary demonstrations of the revoluntlonary party, and
Intends to take energetic measures against it.
Our m ilitary attachd
reports in detail regarding the preparatory m ilitary measures. Feeling
tuns high in m ilitary circles and in the chief command.
I report re
garding the press in a special telegram.
Telegram 207, July 29, Izvolskl to Sazonoff shows further
efforts on the part of Germany to get an adjustment and states:
Finally Baron Schon complained of France’ s m ilitary preparations,
and said that in this case Germ any would be compelled to adopt sim i
lar precautions.
Vivianl, on his part, declared th a t France honestly
desired peace, but at 'th e same time was firmly determ ined to act in
full agreement w ith her allies, aud Baron Schon could convince him self
that this decision was finding the liveliest support in the country.
This evening Viviani has forbidden a projected anti-war m eeting o f the
revolutionary party.
It was the night of the next day that the French minister of
war told the military attache that the French Government was
determined on war.
Telegram 1554, Sazonoff to Izvolskl, states that if Austria
would admit that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed the
character o f a European question and would declare a readi
ness to eliminate from her ultimatum those points which vio
late the sovereign right of Serbia, Russia undertakes to sus
pend her military preparations.
These preparations had been going on for at least five days.
The Russian policy was to use diplomatic negotiations to con
ceal the war measures, and the Russian policy fixed in 1912
was to cross the German border without a declaration o f war.
(Von Kuhl, p. 79, 80.)
Telegram 1555, July 30, Sazonoff wires Izvolskl:
Until we receive a thoroughly satisfactory reply from Austria through
the German Government, w e shall continue our m ilitary preparations.
This is communicated to you very confidentially.
Tlie word “ thoroughly ” is interesting.
That very night, at 1 a. m., Izvolskl telegraphed to Sazonoff,
telegram 216:
From m ilitary a tta c M to war m inister, 1 a. m.
The French war m inister inform ed me in earnest, hea rty tones (sin
cerity Cnthusiastique) that the G overnm ent is firmly decided upon
tear, and requested me to confirm the hope o f the French general staff
that all our efforts will be directed against G erm any, and that Austria
will be treated as a quantity negligeable.
This attitude was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian
secret treaty o f 1892 and the military plans worked out by the
French and Russian general staffs in annual conferences and
frequent intercommunications.
So that the French Government gave Austria no time to make
“ a thoroughly satisfactory ” reply to Russia or any other
kind o f reply.
On August 1, telegram 1601, Sazonoff wired Izvolskl:
At midnight the German ambassador informed me on behalf of his
Government that if within 12 hours— that is, befibre midday on Satur
day— w e do not begin to dem obilize, not only as against G erm any, but
also us against A ustria, ths German Governm ent will be compelled to
7 6 8 7 6 -1 1
1
The French G overnm ent is ready to fulfill all its obligations as an
ally.
It is o f opinion, however, that at the present m om ent, wheu
negotiations are still In progress between the less Interested powers,
It would be to the purpose that R ussia, so far as the m easures o f a
d efen sive and precautionary nature which it has deemed necessary to
adopt w ill permit, should not take any direct step s which would serve
G erm any as a p retex t for ordering the general or partial mobilization
o f her forces.
j
The term “ defensive” had already been defined by the
French and Russian staffs, with the approval of the French aud
Russian Governments as "o ffe n s iv e ” in their annual confer
ences.
The significance of tills suppressed telegram is revealed In
combination with telegram 1551 o f July 29 and suppressed tele
grams 209 and 210 and 216 from Paris on July 30.
The French Government (July 30) having determined on
wmr does not wish Germany to mobilize yet, but to gradually
discover a situation so dangerous Germany shall declare tvar
as a military necessity.
Telegram 1551, on July 29, from Sazonoff to Izvolski, stated:
N othing remains fo r us but to hasten our own warlike preparations
and to reckon w ith the probable inevita bility of war.
In fo rm the,
French G overnm ent o f this and at the same time thank it for its
declaration
*
• * that w e can fully rely upon the support o f our
a lly, France.
This was two days before the German Government demanded
that the Russian mobilization should stop under a penalty o f
German mobilization and three days before the German Em
peror, by the German ambassador at Petersburg, accepted a
state o f war as forced on the German Government. It was not
a German declaration of war. It was a German acceptance o f
a state o f war.
Telegram 209, of July 30, Izvolski to Sazonoff, states that the
French ambassador in L ondon:
W a s instructed to confer w ith G rey as to the fixing o f the com bined
attitu de of France and England concerning which these tw o powers,
in consequence of the general understanding existing betw een them ,
have to deliberate whenever a period of political tension arises.
The time “ to deliberate ” had nearly arrived.
This proposed conference was based on the notes exchanged
between Gambon and Grey on the 22d and 23d o f November,
1912 (Exhibits 8 and 9, How Diplomats Make W a r), and the
war plans of the military and naval staffs of Great Britain,
France, and Russia, already completely matured.
Telegram 210, of July 30, from Izvolski to Sazonoff, referring
to the French war minister, said that the French tear minister
had said to the Russian military attach4:
* *
* that w e could declare that in the higher interests of peace
w e are ready tem porarily to delay our preparations for m obilization,
since this would not preven t us from continuing our preparations and
indeed from intensifyin g them, but w e should have to refrain from the
possible greater m ovem ents of troops.
These suppressed telegrams indicate that both in Petersburg
and in Paris the negotiations for the maintenance of peace were
“ a ruse de guerre ” and being used as a screen for a war
already fully determined on both in Paris and in Petersburg.
Telegram 216 of July 31, Izvolski to Sazonoff, expressed a
fixed war determination ( l a . m. of July 31 was the night of
Thursday, July 30) :
From m ilitary attach^ to war minister. 1 a. m.
T he French war m inister informed me in earnest,
cerity enthuslastique) that the G overnm ent is firmly
and requested me to confirm the hope o f the French
all our efforts will be directed against G erm any,
w ill be treated as a quantity negligeable.
hearty tones (sin
decided upon war,
general staff that
and that Austria
Tiiis was equal to n secret declaration o f war on Germany, in
view of the Franco-Russian treaty and military plans agreed on.
It was 23 hours before the German Government demanded a
cessation o f the Russian mobilization and two days before Ger
many declared a state of war existing.
kvji
K)m A.n/j.nt n o }
kii
Aj .u tb
Xui
ox
'u o f j m i j f y o u t j j p . i o
:«
cmooaa ’iVN TSsaaoN
O
oo
C O N G R E SSIO N A L
On the same day, July 31, telegram 215 from Izvolski to
Pazonnff discloses that Enron Schfin asked Vivlani what atti
tude France would adopt in the event of an armed collision
l>etween Russia and Germany. Viviani declined to answer.
Earon Schhn requested arrangements for passports.
On August 1 the German ambassador again visited Viviani,
and the latter expressed his “ astonishment” to Baron Schcin
at his action yesterday, “ which was not justified by the rela
tions between France and Germany.” although, as above, the
French Government had already decided upon war and advised
Russia to attack Germany with all its forces— and Viviani knew
it as premier.
Izvolski to Sazonoff, August 1, telegram 219, states that the
German ambassador had visited Viviani for the second time.
That Viviani informed him that the President o f the Republic,
Poincare, had signed a decree ordering French mobilization.
(It may be remembered that the order of Belgian mobilization
was issued July 31 also, although the army had been mobilized
on and before July 24.) Viviani expressed his astonishment
that Germany should have adopted such a measure as demanding
that Russia demobilize under penalty o f a German mobiliza
tion—
When a friendly erchanyt of view* was In progress between Russia, A u s
tria, and the other powers.
Here Is the refinement o f high-class diplomacy where two
nations have fully prepared themselves for war, are determined
on war against a neighbor, and the Premier of France assures
the ambassador of Germany that a friendly exchange o f views
between the powers forbids Germany to prepare for defense.
And the same day, August 1, Izvolski wires Sazonoff:
Poincare declared to me in the m ost categorical manner that both
he him self and the whole cabinet are firm ly determ ined fu lly to carry
out the obligations laid upon us by the term s o f our alliance.
The French general mobilization and an immediate offensive
on Germany was required by the secret Russian agreement o f
1892.
Izvolski, Russian ambassador, wires Sazonoff the same day,
August 1, 1914, telegram 223. as follow s:
Poincare told me that during the last few days the A ustrian
ambassador had energetically assured him and Viviani that A ustria
had declared to us ( R u ssia ) her readiness not only to respect the
territorial integrity o f Serbia but also her sovereign rights, but that
we ( R u ssia ) had intentionally concealed those assurances.
To m y
remark that this was a com plete He, Poincare replied that similar sta te
m ents had been made in London by A ustria, w here th ey might create
a very dangerous impression, and therefore ought to be denied there as
well.
That Austria did make these representations is shown by
telegram 195: by a verbal declaration o f Count Pourtales,
French ambassador in St. Petersburg; and by Sazonoff’s an
swer contained in the first two sentences from St. Petersburg
of telegram 1554 and by many other records.
The attitude of Italy is shown by telegram 220 of August 1,
from Izvolski to Sazonoff, as follow s:
Mnrgerie told me that according to information from n v ery
secret source Ita ly apparently intends, in reliance upon the manner
In which the conflict has arisen, to remain neutral at first, and then
to com e to one decision or another in accordance w ith the course
o f even ts.
13
the guilt upon all three Russian heads, Sazonoff,
and Jaunuschkevitch. He states that at dinner
linoff, then minister o f war, when he received a
Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia
heard the war minister exclaim—
i
F O I8
an
o r
RECORD.
“ CETTB
04 H) S
NOUS
Sukhomlinaff,
with Sukhomtelegram that
(July 25), he
M ARCHERONS! *
that Is, “ This time we shall march.”
(Ibid., July 24, 1920,
132.)
(This rneaut under the treaty, 1892, and military and
naval conventions with France Russia would attack Germany.)
Baron Rosen states that the intelligencia and military party
of Russia were for war. (Ibid., August 21, 1920.) (They con
trolled the Government.)
Baron Rosen further tells that Sazonoff and Jaunuschkevitch
stopped the dispatch of the Czar’s aide to Berlin and secured
on Thursday, July 30, a reorder of the general mobilization
(Ibid., August 21, 1920.)
It was in this condition o f affairs, with Russia having an
army o f over 2,000.000 men on the East, who had been prac
ticing mobilization since spring and actually had been In
process of mobilizing at least since the 25th of July' (Czar’s
telegram), that the German Government demanded the rm billznllon stopped under the alleged necessity o f regarding It as
u declaration of war by Russia.
It was well understood by the military strategists of France
and Russia and of Europe that Germany’s only chance in such
a war as this was by lightning speed and efficiency, striking
France through Belgium. (See French and Russian military
conferences.) The dispatches show that Germany tried to se
cure French neutrality* and failed, tried to obtain British neu
trality and failed, tried to induce Belgium to submit to an
unopposed passage and failed. (Morel, Truth and the War.
How Diplomats Make War, Neilson.) (Diplom atic Documents,
World War, Scott.)
SO M E
EV ID E N C E F RO M B E R L IN .
It was the policy of Germany to support Austria in rebuking
Serbia, as far as could be done through diplomacy, but even
if the diplomatic effort should fail, Germany did not intend to
be drawn into a war.
On Sunday, the 26th o f July, the Kaiser returned from his
Scandinavian cruise. On Monday a rapid fire of telegrams
took place from Berlin to Vienna, under the instruction of the
Kaiser, demanding a peaceful adjustment, Berlin assuming
that the purpose of the Entente was not necessarily hostile or
determined on war, and that the negotiations for a peaceful
settlement was really sincere, put great pressure on the Aus
trian Government, as appears, through the following telegrams:
[From
the
German
Chancellor to the German am bassador, Vienna,
July 27.]
W e can not reject the rdle of mediator and m ust place the English
proposal before the Vienna cabinet for consideration.
Request C o u D t
Berchtold’s opinion o n the British proposal, as well as on SazonotTs
wish to negotiate directly with Vienna.
(Die Deutscheu Dokumento,
No. 396 .)
On July 28 he sent this dispatch:
The refusal of every exchange of views with Fetrograd would be a
serious mistake if it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference,
which Austria is primarily interested in avoiding.
W e are ready, to
be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but m ust refuse to allow
ourselves to be draten by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously
and in disregard o f our advice. Please say tliis to Count Berchtold at
once w ith all emphasis and w ith great seriousness.
(Ibid. No. 800 .)
The entente had already weakened Italy’s attachment to Ger
many by concessions in Africa and elsewhere.
On July 29 he sent this dispatch:
The chief of the German general staff, Von Moltke’s memo
I regard the attitude o f the Austrian Government and Its unparal
randum o f 1012, showed that the Germans did not count upon
Italy. (E xhibit 11.) That Germany could not compete on the leled procedure toward the various Governments with Increasing as
ocean with Britain or on land with R ussia; that Germany had tonishment * * *. It leaves us wholly in the dark as to its pro
gram
• *
*.
I must conclude that the Austrian Government
but little hope in a war with Russia and France.
Austria accepted the proposed mediation as between herself is harboring plans which it sees fit to conceal from us In order to
and Serbia as two sovereign Governments (Austrian Red Book assure herself in all events of German support and avoid the refusal
which might result from a frank statem ent.
(Ibid. No. 39 6 , p. 3 8 1 ).
III, p. 65), but it availed nothing.
Petrograd knew o f Austria’s acceptance o f mediation which
He sent five warning telegrams on the 29th and 30th to
was disclosed to Grey in London on the 1st o f August. (British Vienna. (Ibid.)
White Book, 133.)
The Kaiser had informed Foreign Minister Jagow on seeing
Sazonoff, former Russian minister of foreign affairs seven the Serbian reply accepting the Austrian conditions and agree
years later, November 15, 1921 in La Revue de France, tells that ing to mediation that—
the Czar received a telegram from the Kaiser begging the Czar,
Now, no cause f o r war any longer exists.
notwithstanding the declaration o f war, to keep the troops from
On July 30 the German Chancellor sent the following tele
the German frontier, and that the German Emperor was nearly
gram :
frantic.
If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a con
Baron Rosen in “ Forty Years o f Diplomatic Life,” Saturday
Evening Post, August 21, 1020, page S5, gives it as ills opinion flagration in which England will be against us. Rumania and Ita ly,
that the Russian mobilization necessarily led to war. He places according to all indications, will not be fo r us, and we shall stand two
76870— 11
14
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
against four power*.
Through England's opposition the main blow
will fall on Germ any. A ustria’ s political prestige, the military honor
of her army, as well as her Just claim s against Serbia, can be ade
quately satisfied by hep occupation of Belgrade or other places.
Through her hum iliation of Serbia she will make her position in the
Balkans, as well ns In her relation to Russia, strong again.
Tender
these circumstances, we m ust urgently and em phatically press upon
the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation In
accordance with the above honorable conditions.
The responsibility
tor the consequences which would otherwise follow wotild be for
Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one.
(Germnn W hite Book,
p. 8 0 5 .)
In Oman’s Outbreak o f the War, pages 01, 08, 00, 77, 70.
88. and 89, will be found the exchange of telegrams between
William II and Nicholas, as follow s:
J uly 28— 10 45 P. M.
I have heard with the greatest nnxiety of the impression which Is
caused by the action of Austro-H ungary against Serbia.
The un
scrupulous agitation which had been going on for years in Serbia has
led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has
become a victim . The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own
King and his consort still dominates that country.
Doubtless you will
agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sov
ereigns, have a common Interest to insist that all those who arc
responsible for this horrible murder shall sutfer their deserved punish
ment.
On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered
by you and your Governm ent to stem the tide of public opinion.
In
view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long
time with firm ties, I shall use m y entire influence to induce AustriaH ungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding w ith Russia.
I hope confidently that you will support me in m y efforts to overcome
all difficulties which m ay y e t arise.
Your most sincere and devoted
friend and cousin.
W il h e l m .
G overnm en t
tion,
has
m o b iliz e d
R u s s ia ,
of
N ich olas .
as
your
th e
J u ly
2 9 — 6 .3 0 f . m .
I have received your telegram and Ishare your desire for the con
servation of peace.
However,I can not— as I told you
In my first
telegram— consider the action of Austria-H ungary ns an “ Ignominious
w ar.”
Austria-H ungary knows from experience that the promises of
Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely unreliable.
According to my opinion the action o f Austria-H ungary Is to be con
sidered as an attem pt to receive full guaranty that the promises of
Serbia are effectively translated into deeds.
In this opinion T am
strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that AustriaHungary intended no territorial gain nt the expense of Serbia.
I am
therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain
a spectator in the Austro-Serbinn W a r without drawing Europe Into
the most terrible war It has ever seen.
I believe that a direct under
standing is possible and desirable between 1’ our Government and
Vienna, an understanding w hich, as I have already telegraphed you,
m y G overnm ent endeavors to aid with all possible effort.
Naturally,
military measures by Russia, which m ight be construed as a menace
by Austria-H ungary, would accelerate a calam ity which both of us
desire to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which,
upon your appeal to my friendship and aid, I w illingly accepted.
(O m an’s Outbreak of the W ar, p. 6 8 .)
W
il h e l m
.
It was the very next night that the French minister of war
Bald the French Government was determined on war.— (Tele
gram 216.)
P
eterhok
P
alace
,
July 29.
Thanks for your telegram, which Is conciliatory, while the official
message presented by your ambnssador to my foreign minister was
conveyed iti a very different tone.
I beg you to explain the difference.
It would be right to give over the Aitstro-Sorbian problem to The
Hogue Conference.
I trust in your wisdom and friendship.
(O m an's Outbreak of the W ar, p. 69 .)
N
ic h o l a s
.
th e
in s tr u c tio n s
d angers
o n ly
seem s
a g a in s t
to
be
G o v e rn m e n t,
m e d ia to r ,
m anner
and
w h ic h
I
have
th e
a.
30— 1
a tte n tio n
m
of
.
your
serious consequences of a m o b i / t m m y last telegram.
A u s tr ia H u n g a ry
S e r b ia , a n d o n ly a p a r t o f h e r a r m y .
If
th e
w h ic h
d ir e c t
and
<n
case,
m o b iliz e s
w ith
to
a c c o r d in g
a g a in st
you
have
a c ce p ted
to
your
A u s tr ia
In tr u ste d
upon
your
a d v ic e
H u ngary,
me
In
ex p ress
and
th e
th a t
p art
su ch
of
fr ie n d ly
d e s ir e ,
Is
th rea t
The entire w eight o f decision note
rests upon yo u r sh ould ers; you have to bear the responsibility o f war
or peace.
ened,
If
not
m ade
im p o s s ib le .
W ilh el m .
(O m a n ’s
O u tb re a k
of
th e
W ar,
p.
7 7 .)
This was the day the Tsar reordered Russian mobilization
and the French minister advised Russia “ the French Govern*
ruent was determined on war.”
th a n k
you
fro m
T atlsch eff
to n ig h t
my
h eart
(R u s s ia n
fo r
your
honorary
q u ic k
a id
SO ISO
—
July
I’ ETERHOF,
I
r e p ly .
to
th e
I
m.
p.
am
s e n d in g
K a is e r )
w ith
In
The m ilitary measures now taking form w ere decided upon
five days ago, a n d f o r t h e r e a s o n o f d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s
s tr u c tlo n s .
of
A u s tr ln .
in fiu e u e e
very
an
I
In
hope
any
h ig h ly .
w ith
a ll
m anner
W e
u n d e r s ta n d in g
my
your
n eed
your
can
be
h eart
th a t
p o s itio n
stro n g
a r r iv e d
as
th e se
p ressu re
at
w ith
m easu res
m e d ia to r ,
w h ic h
upon
w ill
T
not
s p p r n ls *
A u s tr ia
so
th a t
u s.
N ic h o l a s .
(G e r m a n
W h ite
B ook.
1915,
2 3 -A .)
Then Nicholas reorders Russian mobilization.
J u l y 31,
I
th a n k
you
c o r d ia lly
fo r
your
m e d ia tio n ,
w h ic h
p e r m its
1914.
th e
hope
I t is technically im possible
to discontinue our m ilitary preparations, whioh have b e e n made neces
sa ry by the Austrian mobilisation.
I t is f a r fr o m u s to w a n t w a r .
As
th a t
e v e r y th in g
as
th e
w ill
yet
end
n e g o tia tio n s
th ereon .
hope
fo r
our
m ay
u n d e rta k e
w ord
th e
c o u n tr ie s
1
no
c o n fid e
su ccess
and
of
th e
p e a c e a b ly .
b etw ee n
A u s tr ia
p r o v o c a tiv e
w ith
your
peace
a ll
my
fa ith
m e d ia tio n
of
and
a c tio n .
In
in
S e r b ia
1
g iv e
th e
c o n tin u e ,
you
m y
grace
V ie n n a
of
fo r
th e
G od.
O u tb re a k
of
th e
my
s o le m n
and
w e lfa r e
I
of
E u rop e.
N
(O m a n ’s
W ar,
p.
ic h o l a s
.
8 8 .)
Under the 1892 treaty a partial Austrian mobilization re
quired Russia and France to attack Germany. The AustrianSerbian negotiations could end when Nicholas said the word
and Russia was ready to enter Germany.
J uly 31— 2 p . m .
fo r m y a id , I
hare engaged in mediation beticecn yo u r G overnm ent and the G o vern
m ent of A ustria-H un gary.
W hile this action was taking place you r
troops were being mobilised a g a i n s t m y a l l y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , w h e r e b y ,
U pon
(Om an’ s Outbreak of the W ar. p. 6 1 .)
to
has
l have told you the same
tro o p s
I ’ e t e r h o f P a l a c e , J u ly 29— 1 p m.
I am glad that you are back in Germany.
In this serious moment T
ask you earnestly to help me. An Ignominious war has been declared
against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I fully
share, is tremendous.
I fear that very soon I shall he unable to
resist the pressure exercised upon m e, and that I shall be forced to
take measures which will lead
to war. To prevent such a calamity
as a European war would be,
I urge you in the name of our old
friendship to do all In your power to restrain your ally from going
too far.
am b assad or
lo n g
(O m an’s Outbreak of the W ar, p. 6 1 .)
76870— 11
J uly
M y
as
I
your
have
appeal
a lr e a d y
to
my
fr ie n d s h ip
c o m m u n ic a te d
to
and
you,
your
m y
requ est
m e d ia tio n
has
becom e
I n ow receive
reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on m y
eastern frontier.
The responsibility fo r the secu rity o f m y co u n try
fo rm s me to m easures of defense.
I hare gone to the extrem e limit
o f the possible in m y efforts for the preservation of the peace o f the
world.
It is not I who bear Hie responsibility fo r the m isfortu ne
which now threatens the entire civilised world.
It rests in you r hand
to avert it.
No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia, w h i c h
m i g h t w e l l h a v e a w a i t e d t h e s u c c e s s o f in .v m e d i a t i o n .
The friendship
fo r you a n d your cou ntry, bequeathed to me by m y grandfather on his
deathbed, has alw ays been sacred to me, a n d I have stood fa ith fully by
Russia while it teas in serious affliction, especially during its last war.
T h e p e a c e o f E u r o p e c a n s t i l l b e p r e s e r v e d b y y o u if Russia decides
to discontinue those m ilitary preparations w h i c h m e n a c e G e r m a n y a n d
a lm o s t illu s o r y .
Tn s p i t e o f t h i s
I
have
c o n tin u e d
it, an d
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y .
W
(O m a n ’s
O u tb re a k
of
th e
W ar,
il h e l m .
p. 8 9 . )
No reply. Wilhelm, at midnight Friday, gave notice the Ger
man Army would mobilize if by noon Saturday Russian mobili
zation did not stop. At 5 p. m. Saturday, August J, German
mobilization was issued. At 7.10 p. m. German ambassador
at Petrograd advised the Russian Government that Germany
accepted the Russian challenge and the state of war forced on
Germany.
It will be observed in this exchange of telegrams that Nicho•
las was under a pressure he feared he should be unable to r e
sist. On the very day that the Kaiser advised him that he
would have to bear the responsibility o f war or peace if he
ordered a general mobilization, he reordered the mobilization
which had been begun by his own statement on July 25, and on
July 31, having the day before ordered the general mobilization.
•CIHOM?! IVNOISSaHOxVOO
pi
RECORD.
15
C O N G R E SSIO N A L
he advises the Kaiser it was impossible to discontinue the mili
tary preparations, and lie gives his solemn word that the Rus
sian troops will undertake no provocative action, although they
cross the German border in four places the next day. (Kuhl
79-30.)
The German leaders, getting daily reports from Paris, Lon
don, Brussels, and Petersburg, accepted what they had become
convinced was now absolutely unavoidable, and on Saturday,
5 p. m., August 1, ordered a general mobilization.
(N o te
A u gu st
The
at
7 .1 0
Im p e r ia l
b ig in n in g
of
p lia n c e
th e
B r ita in .
a
a
ta ry
of
but
R u s s ia ,
n
fa ile d
m ent
to
of
c o m p ly
dem and,
a c tio n
H is
w ith
p e r il,
e x iste n c e
to
of
od
m ake
c o n s id e r e d
h a v in g
sh ow n
d ir e c te d
my
by
a g a in s t
th e
E m peror,
a c ce p ts
th e
to
in fo r m
my
th e
I
au gu st
and
con
m ili
to
am i
(this
G overn
th e
to
G overn
in s is t
h a v in g
to
In
her
th e
as
th e
c o n s id e r s
th is
th a t
on
E x c e lle n c y
in
fo llo w s :
nam e
of
h im s e lf
th e
at
w ar
R u s s ia .
POCRTALES.
The
w ord s
th a t
tw o
th e y
w ere
in
p a re n th e se s
v a r ia tio n s
b o th
hnd
occur
been
In serted
in
In
th e
prepared
th e
o r ig in a l.
In
It
m u st
advance, and
be su p p osed
th a t
by
m is ta k e
n o te .
R E L A T IV E E N T E N T E AN D G E R M A N P R E P A R A T I O N S .
General Von Moltke, in the summary above referred to, says
that Germany would he obliged in the event o f war—
to
ta k e
s till
th e
fie ld
w ith
ta ck e d
a
in
a g a in s t
s lig h t
th e
rear
F ran ce
w ith
s u p e r io r ity
by
in
an
In fe r io r ity
a r tille r y ),
in
and
in fa n tr y
w ill
(th o u g h
fu r th e r
be
a t
R u s s ia .
And he says:
In
tio n
v ie w
of
Is
Ju st
u
la n d
a
sen
of
her
as
th e
army
en orm ou s
sh e
w ill
im p o s s ib le
pow er
as
it
fo r
is
su m s
he
R u s s ia
stro n g e r
G erm an y
fo r
h er
to
is
s p e n d in g on
w ith
to
try
a tte m p t
every
and
to
th e
year
c o m p ete
c a tc h
r e o r g a n iz a
th a t
up
p asses.
w ith
It
R u s s ia
as
E n g la n d
w ith
In spite of the fact that Vienna was ready to enter into direct con
versation with Petersburg on the Serbian issue.
In spite o f the fact that Vienna had accepted the Grey mediation.
In spite of the fact that Vienna hnd given assurances as to the
integrity of Serbia.
In spite of the fact that Vienna was prepared not to go beyond such
a temporary occupation of a part of Serbian territory as England Itself
had considered acceptable.
F inally, in spite of the fact that Austria had only mobilized
again st Serbia and that Germany had not yet mobilized at all.
Former Chancellor Hollweg then says:
Consequently, when the telegraph brought us news of the mobili
zation on the morning of the 31st of July, we could not be other than
convinced that Russia desired tear under all conditions.
It appears that neither Germany nor Austria knew the terms
o f the treaty of 1892 requiring Russia and France to attack
Germany if Austria mobilized.
upon
an sw er)
h on or,
Hollweg points out that Russia mobilized because it desired
\v:ir. It refused to suspend mobilization.
SOME
r e fu se d
a ttitu d e )
th e
w as
c o m p r o m ise d
G erm an
n ecessary
so v e r e ig n .
c h a lle n g e
In
any
G overnm en t
have
R u s s ia
have
S t.
E m p ir e
The
Your
and
proceeded
sea.
G erm an
of
G reat
G erm an
% v o u ld
re fu sa l
w ith
V ie n n a
aD d
th e
com
E m p eror
r e s u lt ,
R u s H ia s
it
In
by
th e
a c ts.
G erm an y,
G o v e rn m e n t,
E m p ir e ,
th is
of
r e p r e s e n ta tio n s
E m p ero r o f A ll
sin c e
ju s tiile d
th e
th ey
th e
con cert
la n d
G erm an y.
h a y in g
(n o t
in
not
If
e ffo r t
M a je s ty
on
w as
m ilita r y
th e
M a je s ty
P e te rsb u rg
s e ttle m e n t.
any
G erm an y,
th is
every
fo r
dan ger.
th e
of
S t.
c a b in e ts
b o th
w h ic h
a fo r e sa id
and
w as
G erm an
fo r c e s
of
o b lig e d
th e
of
w ith
s tr u c tio n s
very
H is
w a itin g
step ,
part
u sed
p e a c e fu l
by
M a je s ty
c e s s a tio n
at
u n d erta k e n ,
b etw een
h er
a g a in s t
th e
a
h im
im m in e n t
th e re fo r e ,
B is
of
th e
and
gu ard
and
w ere,
m ent
on
grave
to
w ith o u t
th r e a te n in g
have
about
had
m e d ia to r
m o b J Iiz n tio i!
th is
s a fe ty
b r in g
E m peror
p r o c e e d in g s
by
am bassad or
G overn m en t
to
p art
of
th e
to
c r is is
expressed
th e
had
a
G erm an
w is h
gen eral
fa c e d
G erm an
G erm an
P ete rsb u rg ;
seq u en ce
th e
p . m .)
th e
w ith
R u s s ia ,
to
by
p resen ted
1,
distrust, im perialistic ideals, and a patriotism restricted to material
national instincts respectively worked each other np without its ever
being possible to say that any particular nation had contributed most
to the general tendency of the world.
(Ibid. 169.)
as
pow er.
BE L G IA N
EVID E N C E .
In the reports from the Belgian ministers and charges
d ’affaires at Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs in Brussels, printed by E. S. Mitler & Sons,
Berlin, will he found 200 pages o f evidence going to show the
attitude of Quai d'Orsa.v, o f London, and o f Berlin to the
general effect that the Berlin Government was very desirous of
maintaining peace, that the French Government became increas
ingly disposed to war as the war powers of Russia and France
were expanded and the Entente with Great Britain became
dependable.
For example, the Belgian minister at Berlin to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs o f Belgium says, page 184:
Everyone in England, and France considers the E n ten te Cordiale
to be a defensive and offensive alliance against G erm any.
*
*
•
I t is the E n ten te Cordiale which has reawakened in France an idea
of ravanche, which up to then had slumbered.
It is also the E nten te
Cordiale which is responsible for the state of uneasiness and unrest
prevailing in Europe for the last seven years.
*
*
* F or the
present it must therefore be considered as approved that the plan of
assisting France in a w ar against G erm any by landing an army of
150,000 English troops was discussed in London.
There is nothing In
this 'calculated to surprise us. I t is the continuation of the singular
proposals made some years ago by Colonel Barnardston to General
Ducarne.
The Belgian minister, Guillaume, at Paris to the Belgian
In chapter 10 (let France explain) Bausman points out the
preparedness of the entente allies— Russia, France, and Eng Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 16. 1914, says:
land— and that in 1914 the expenditures of Russia. France,
I already had the honor of inform ing you that it is M M . I'oinearS
and England for war purposes made a total of $1,337,259,735, Dolcasso, Millernnd, and their friends who hare inaugurated and pur
while Germany and Austria expended in 1914 $420,133,850, so sued the nationalistic, m ilitaristic, and Chauvinistic policy, the renas
that the entente allies expended $917,000,000 more in 1014 than cence of which w e witnessed, Such a policy con stitutes a danger for
Germany and Austria, and this does not include Belgium or Europe— and also for Belgium. 1 see in it the greatest peril threat
Italy.
ening to-day the peace of Europe.
*
*
*
The attitude adopted by
The number of men available for immediate action o f Ilus- I Barthou has provoked a recrudescence of m ilitarism in Germ any.
sia, France. England, and Italy was 2,663,003. The total for | (Ibid. p. 169.)
Germany and Austria was 1,176,741.
The Belgian minister at Berlin in a long letter on February
General B uat’s figures give the German active army 870,000
men, the French active army 910.000 men. General Joffre in 20, 1914, quotes the French ambassador at Berlin, as follow s:
The m ajority of the Germ ans and of the French undoubtedly wish to
Franco-Russian conferences o f 1913 said he would have 200,000
live in peace. But in both countries there is a pow erful minority dream
more men than agreed to.
Of course, Great Britain, France, and Russia controlled the ing solely of battles, of wars o f conquest, or ravanche. Herein lies the
sea through the giant navy o f Great Britain, and therefore d a n g e r; it is like a powder barrel which any rash act may set on fire.
Germany was cut off from supplies throughout the world, while (Ibid. p. 173.)
the Entente Allies had the whole world to draw from.
On May 8, 1914, the Belgian Minister Guillaume at Paris to
When the war ended Germany with approximately 67,000,000 the Belgian foreign office quotes an “ experienced and highly
people was facing nearly the whole world, or over 1,400,000,000 placed diplom at” as stating:
people against the German Government.
If a serious incident should arise one o f these days between France
Chancellor Hollweg states that—
The
su p p o s itio n
th a t
G erm an y
th a t
pow er
is
in
e n tire
ab sen ce
an
to
th e
a s s u m p tio n
an
so
s illy
w o r ld
of
any
a sc r ib e s
opponent
in
th e
to
%
He says:
The
gram
co n tro v ersy
of
an ces
gen eral
w ill
p r o b a b ly
76870—
11
as
to
never
th e
of
w h ic h
arm am en t
be
le t
and
lo o s e
h is to r in n
o th e r
us
heat
a
w ar
w o u ld
e x p la n a tio n
sort
of
p o lit ic a l
p a rty
to
fo u g h t
a
to
fo lly
out
at
th e
p e r v e rs io n
a
fin is h .
fir s t
of
m ere
ta k e
a ll.
th a t
c o n tro v ersy .
gave
of
o n ly
*
is
It
lu s t
*
o n ly
*
Such
a ttr ib u te d
(H o llw e g ,
im p u ls e
th e
of
s e r io u s ly
to
p o lic y
Im m e a s u r a b le
1 0 3 .)
a
pro
of
a lli
m u tu a l
and Germany, the statesm en of the two countries will have to arrive
at a peaceful solution of the m atter w ithin three days or else there
will be war.
One of the most dangerous elements of the present situation is the
return of France to the three yea rs’ ser v ic e ; the latter has been lncon
siderately imposed by the m ilitary party, and the country is unable to
stand It, Before two years have elapsed Franco w ill be placed before
the alternative either o f abrogating the three-yea rs' aot or o f going to
war.
*
*
*
The press in both countries is blam ew orthy.
The
campaign pursued in G erm any against the Foreign Legion is exceedingly
a u o D 'i u
LI
iy m o is
sa a w jv u ^
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
10
c l u m s t , and the tone o j the French new spaper* is invariably a crim on ious
and augresaivc. ( I b i d . p . 1 8 1 . )
Mr. Neilson points out (p. 205) :
i
N ew s
had
reach ed
On .Tune 0, 1914. Guillaume wires the Belgian foreign office 1 2 4 a m o b i l i z a t i o n
b a s s a d o r s w h ic h
from Paris as follow s:
Ile r lin
th n t
c ir c u la r ,
and
c o n ta in e d
th e
Ile lg lu m
an
hnd
u n d a te d
is s u e d
as
In str u c tio n
In fo r m a tio n
th e y
e a r ly
aa
to
to
w ere
g iv e
J u ly
B e lg ia n
am
to
th e
the p ress campaign <n fa v o r o f the p r in c h a n c e l l o r s a s t o h e r " s tr e n g t h e n e d p e a ce fo o ti n g .”
The Belgian circular o f July 24 (day Austria made demand
ciple o f the t h r ee y e a r s ’ s e r v i c e has been ex trem ely violent. A l l s o r t s
Serbia) announced that the Belgian Army hnd already
o f m o a n s h a v e b o r n a d o p t e d w i t h a v i e w t o i n f l u e n c i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n . ; on
D u r in g
th e
la s t
The
n ew sp apers
W e
have
a ls o
co n tra ry
to
fe w
have
seen
a ll
fla y s
not
th e
h e s ita te d
F ren ch
to
c o m p r o m is e
am bassad or
p re c e d e n ts— nn
in itia tiv e
in
even
S t.
w h ic h
G en eral
.T o ft r p .
P etersb u rg
m ay
p rove
been mobilized and forts near Germany put in order for wnr.
In the circular o f the Belgian Foreign Office to its ambassa
dors, dated Jvly 2-). was the inolosnre heretofore referred to,
without date, but necessarily either o f that date or o f nn earlier
date, which states:
i
ta k e—
d angerous
Is it true, that th e St. P ete rs b u rg cabin et
p led g ed France to adopt the th r ee -y ea r s ’ s e r v i c e and that the fo r m e r
is to-day brin ging all its influence to bear in or d er to p re v e n t the abro
g ation o f the law in questionT * * * W e m u s t t h e r e f o r e a s k o u r
fo r
th e
s e lv e s
fu tu re
if
th e
of
F ran ce.
a ttftu d e
of
th e
S t.
P e te rsb u rg
c a b in e t
is
based
on
p.
th a t
j ch osen
a
A n o th e r
th ree
c r itic is m
years'
w h ic h
s e r v ic e
in
can
be
F ran ce
le v e le d
is
th a t
a g a in s t
th e
c h a m p io n s
of
th e
p e rp e tu a lly d ra g g in g Russia
of
into the d iscussion — I t u s s i a w h o s e p o l i t i c a l a l m s r e m a i n a m y s t e r y ,
w h o utilises the dual allian ce s o lely fo r her own benefit a n d w h o l i k e
w i s e , a l t h o u g h s h e i s lti n o w a y s t h r e a t e n e d b y G e r m a n y , in creases her
arm am ents in alarm in g proportion. ( I b i d . p . 1 8 6 . )
SOM E
E V ID E N C E
FROM
LONDON.
Tn great detail and with innumerable quotations, Francis
Neilson, a member of the English Parliament, in his work.
How Diplomats Make War, substantially confirms from Eng
lish records what has been disclosed in the telegrams above
quoted; that Is, that there was in effect an understanding be
tween Russia, France, and Great Britain with the military and
naval details all worked out. by repeated conferences of their
general staffs and the understanding that Great Britain would
cooperate with France in the event of a war with Germany.
For exam ple:
In
London,
C arson ,
and
w o r ld .
on
M r.
(H o w
S a tu rd a y ,
B onar
A u gu st
Law
D ip lo m a ts
1,
h a ste n e d
M ake
W ar.
L ord
L an sd ow n e,
to
th e
p.
2 0 3 .)
c e n te r
of
S ir
tlie
G erm an y
sta te
and
secu re
In su re
resp ect
of
B e lg ia n
n e u t r a lit y
h are
The llrlgian Army has
taking up such s t r a t e g i c position s a s h a v e b e e n
is
th e
The
to
tak en
hy
th e
d e fe n s e
fo rta
of
G o v e rn m e n t.
of
th e
A n tw erp
c o u n try
and
on
and
th e
th e
M eu se
resp ect
of
Its
h a r e been put
In
o f d e fe n se .
There is no manner o f doubt what the Grey-Oaiubon letters
meant. The complete plan of naval and military strategy was
worked out between the French and British naval and army
officers, and on Sunday morning, the very next morning, the
\ time Germany ordered her mobilization Saturday nfternoon.
and con
| and accepted the state of war intended by Russia
templated by the mobilization and the Gear’s secret order to
the staff, British regiments were marching through London to
the front fully equipped for war. (H ow Diplomats Make War,
p. 295.)
A number o f the members of the British Cabinet resigned
when they discovered tills secret diplomacy, including Lord
Mprley and the famous patriot, John Burns.
The French Government immediately offered Belgium mili
tary support (Ibid., 810). and the following dispatch from the
French ambassador at Brussels to the French Government ex
plains tlie relations between France and Belgium. The tele
gram follow s:
The
th e
of
r h lr f
F ren ch
and
of
th e
c a b in e t
m ilita r y
co n ta ct
r e s u lts
E d w ard
of
th e
of
th e
F ren ch
appeal
tro o p s
to
B e lg ia n
M in is tr y
to p re p a r e at o n ce
a tta c h *)
th e
w ith
th e
B e lg ia n
g u a r a n te e in g
of
fo r
pow ers
W ar
th e
A rm y
now
has
ask ed
c o o p e r a tio n
p e n d in g
b e in g
th e
m ade.
Orders h a re t h e r e f o r e been g iv e n to Belgian pro vin cial g o v e r n o r s not
to re g a rd m o v em en ts o f F rench troops as a violation o f the fr o n tier .
d ip lo m a tic
had
to
step s
been
n e u tr a lity .
1 8 2 .)
( “ Events are imminent” means “ war is near.” )
The Belgian minister, Eryens, at Berlin, June 12. 1914, in a
dispatch to the Belgian foreign office, says:
n ecessary
been mobilized
th e
e v e n t s are im m in ent w h ich will perm it of Russia makin g use o f the in stru m en t placed by h er in the hand o f h e r ally. ( I b i d .
c o n v ic tio n
A ll
n e v e r t h e le s s
issu e d
The British troops took their place on the left wing o f the
French under the plans long since worked out.
th e K in g d o m t h o u s a n d s o f fe e t tra m p e d C h a n n e lw a r d s . r e g im e n t a ft e r j
The mobilization of the Belgian army was completed at least
r e g i m e n t w i t h f u l l k i t w o u n d t h r o u g h L o n d o n s t r e e t s a s t h e b e l l s f r o m ; the day before the genera} mobilization of the Russian army
t o w e r a n d s t e e p le c a lle d t h e fo lk to p r a y e r .
M in is te r s w e n t to a c a b in e t
begun under Sukhomlinoff s order. .July 25, about which “ he
m e e t in g th e r e a n d y ie ld e d u p t o t h e F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r s o m e to k e n o f !
lie d ” to tlie Russian Czar (see Sukhomlinoffs trial) when he
B r i t i s h fr ie n d s h ip )
represented to the Russian Czar that it was a partial mobiliza
tion. but which was reordered as a general mobilization by the
The German mobilization was ordered 5 p. m. Saturday.
The English regiments were on the March Sunday morning i Russian Czar on July 30.
In the trial of Sukhomlinoff. Minister of War. at St. Peters
armed for war.
On August 1 Sir Edward Grey told the German ambassador burg. by the revolutionary government of Russia, Bailsman
that Great Britain would not engage to remain neutral, that— sa y s:
o rd ers fo r
th e g e n e r a l
to
be
m o b iliz a tio n
th e
S a b b a th ,
th e
fir s t
ic e
must keep our hands free.
o f her a rm y
day.
T h rough
(H o w
and
th e
n a v y ; th e next
lo n g
D ip lo m a ts
S a b b a th
M ake
a ll
W ar,
day,
over
S u U h o m lin o lT
290 )
The fact was Grey was not really free but fully committed,
both by the real intent of the agreement with France, but far
more by the interests of Great Britain, and Great Britain
instantly carried out the commitment under the agreements
with France and with Russia.
Telegram 148 from the British Foreign Office, August 2. 1914:
A fte r
lo w in g
th e
C a b in e t
m e e tin g
th is
m o r n in g ,
gave
M .
O nm bon
th e
fo l-
a u th o r iz e d
to
g iv e nn a s s u r a n c e
th a t
into Ihe Channel o r th r o u g h the North Sea
a g a in s t
F ren ch
coast
or
s h ip p in g ,
if the German fleet c o m cs
to
u n d e rta k e
h o s tile
op era
th e British fleet will give,
all the p ro tection in its pow er.
“ T h is
assu ra n ce
G overn m en t
is ,
r e c e iv in g
of
cou rse,
th e
j
j
i
s u b je c t
of
to
th e
p o lic y
P a r lia m e n t ,
of
and
H is
M a j e s t y 's
m u st
not
be
c o n fe s s e d
th e
K a is e r
th n t
th e
a fte r
C zn r
th e
c a lle d
C zar
th e
hnd
r e c e iv e d
M in is te r
of
th e se
W nr
t e le
up
by
told him to stop the mobilization. At that tim e the
Czar th o u g h t th e mobilization w a s o n l y partial. It w as r e a l l y a l r e a d y
g en e ra l, a p r o c e d u r e f o r w h i c h t h e d i r e c t a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C z a r w ; s
n ecessary
and
hnd
not
been
g iv e n .
S u k h o m lin o tT
c o n fe sse d
th a t
in
making the mobilization g en e ra l h e had c o n ce a le d this from the Czar;
n a y , m o r e , t h a t hr did not revea l it tn him in t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n b y t e l e
phone.
H e n e x t a d m i t t e d t h a t he vrom isetl th e Czar to stop th e f u r t h e r
mobilization a n d not to issue a g en e ra l mobilization. Hr h ung up the
t ele p h o n e w ilh a false prom ise t o t h e C z a r , a n d , h e s a y s, w e n t on with
the mobilization. H i s f e l l o w r o g u e , J a u n u S t d i k e v f t c h , f l o u n d e r i n g i n h i s
te s tim o n y
sta n d
su p p ort
fro m
te le p h o n e
m em oran du m :
“ I am
tio n s
I
gram s
2 0 0 ;
In
a ls o
and
and
th e
c o n fr o n te d
sam e
O m a n 's
at
d is g u s tin g
O u tb re a k
of
a ll
and
th e
tim e s
w ith
h u m ilia tin g
W ar,
c o n tr a d ic tio n s ,
c o n d itio n .
le ft
th e
(B a ils m a n ,
6 8 .)
If tlie democracies or peoples of the world continue to permit
t a k e n a s b i n d i n g H i s M a j e s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t t o t a k e a n y a c t i o n until
secret diplomacy with its ambitious intrigue, militarism, com
the above co n t i n g e n c y of action by the German fleet takes pla ce.”
mercial imperialism, this World War will not he the last
So that the enteute was iv f,»ct effective, after all, on the cer
The greatest of the English papers, the Ivondon Times, c o r
tain contingency o f action by the German fleet, and Parlia rectly states the true position with regard to this mailer of
ment was committed by its own Government’s acts. This ac British participation in the Triple Entente, as follows (How
tion was equal to agreeing to attack Germany as an ally of Diplomats Slake War. 330) :
France. The interests of Great Britain, however, made it nec
[F r o m t h e L o n d o n T im e s . M a r c h 1 5 , 1 9 1 5 .)
essary when a war actually came between France and Ger
T h e r e a r e s t i l l s o m e E n g l i s h m e n a n d E n g l i s h w o m e n w h o g r e a t l y err
many that Great Britain should fight the military rulers of the a s t o t h e r e a s o n s t h a t h a v e f o r c e d E n g l a n d t o d r a w t h e s w o r d . T h e y
German people who would have been dangerous to British in k n o w t h a t I t w a s G e r m a n y ' s f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n o f B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y
terests If they had conquered France and dominated western w h i c h f i l l e d t h e c u p o f h e r I n d i g n a t i o n a n d m a d e h e r p e o p l e I n s i s t
Europe (w hether they were responsible for the war or not).
on w a r
(s ic ).
T h e y d o n o t r e f l e c t t h a t ou r h on or and ou r in te re st
7*8876— 11
UH03HU I V
rMOrSS3JI!')iV03
91
RECORD.
17
C O N G R E S S IO N A L
m u tt h a v e co m p elle d us to join F ian ce and Russia
had
s c r u p u lo u s ly
sou gh t
to
back
resp ected
her
w ay
th e
in to
r ig h ts
F ran ce
of
her
s m a ll
th r o u g h
th e
even
If
G erm an y
n e ig h b o r s ,
e a ste rn
and
had
fo rtre sse s.
Great Britain was led into the war on tlie theory that British
interests required cooperation icith France and Russia, for
which Sir Edward Grey had laid the ground by years of naval
and military conferences in which every detail of a war on Ger
many had been carefully outlined.
In Entente Diplomacy and tlie World, Documents S47 and
850 (Exhibit V II), will be found the Britisli-Russian Entente
plans.
*
These dispatches demonstrate beyond a possibility o f doubt
that there were secret conventions thoroughly worked out and
planned between Russia, France, and Great Britain as to how
war should be made on Germany, involving Great Britain send
ing empty ships into the Baltic Sea for Russia’s use against
Germany just before the war of 1914 was declared; (Doc.
850) that England should be prepared to fetter the German
fleet in the North S ea ; arrangements in the Mediterranean
were to lie made, and especial authority to the Russian ships
to use French and English porta to establish a complete working
plan between the nuvies and the armies o f the three countries—
Great Britain, Russia, and France. The limit of discussion
makes It Inexpedient to quote these innumerable documents.
It should be nuflicient to enll the attention of the Senate to
these documents and of their convincing character.
The Russian ambassador, Ixindon, June 25, 1914, telegraphs
to Sazonoff (Doc. 855, p. 730, Ibid.) :
m e t o - d a y t h a t h e w a s g r e a tly alarm ed b y t h e f a l s e r u m o r s
circu la tin g in the German press co n c e r n in g the c o n te n ts o f
th e a lle g e d naval co n v e n tio n between England e n d R ussia _ • • *
Grey a s su re d the German am bassador * * * that b e tw e e n England,
on th e o n e hand, a n d F rance and Russia th e re ex isted n e i t h e r an alli
a n ce n o r a con ven tion • • • t h a t t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s h a d n e v e r
assu m ed a c h a r a c t e r d ir e ct ed again st Germ any n o r had t h e y a n y r e f e r
e n c e to th e so-called “ e n cir clin g p o licy .’’
G rey
w h ic h
to ld
w ore
On the face of the Cambou-Grey letters was an express dis
claimer of either Government being bound by them, but the
actual intent and true, common interest against the German
Imperial Government is quite clear.
The English honor and interest were both Involved. It cer
tainly appears that France. Russia, and Great Britain did have
secret conventions; the conventions were directed against Ger
many, worked out in detail then in process of execution and
they were in pursuance of “ the encircling policy,” and were
carried out on the battle fields and at sea within G days.
O
Three days later Ilusso-Serbian intrigues led to the murder
o f Archduke Ferdinand, and the grand drama, with stage
fully set, opened to the astonishment and grief of the poor,
little common people who die and pay taxes.
The secret entente agreements with France and Russia were
repeatedly denied by the British foreign office in Parliament
by its representatives asserting that there was no commitment
o f the British Government to support the French Government
in case o f a war with Germany.
On March 10 o f the following year, 1913, Mr. Asquith, re
plying to a question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil,
denied that England was under an—
o b lig a tio n
cou rse
of
of
th is
a r is in g
o w in g
d ip lo m a tic
c o u n try
to
to
an
assu ran ce
n e g o tia tio n s
o p era te
in
to
sen d
g iv e n
a
by
v ery
th e
la r g e
no
E urop ean
q u e s tio n
we
to
in te rfe r e
any
to
ta k e
B r itis h
up
G overnm en t
arm s
in
a
w o u ld
fo r e ig n
a
b ig
be
q u arrel
so
is
g u ilty
m ore
to w a rd
th a n
I
our
can
c o u n try
b e lie v e .
as
very
G erm an y
not
life
is
m e r e ly
and
by
to
th e
e x is te n c e o f
in d e p e n d e n c e
o th e r
n a tio n s ,
of
th e
each
(D a ily
of
th e G e rm a n
n a tio n
w h ic h
C h r o n ic le ,
Its e lf,
p ossesses
Janu ary
1,
is
read y
and
hopes
th a t
Fran ce
is
ready.
(B o u r se
G a z e t t e .)
This article appears to have been inspired by Sukhomlinoff,
minister of war. This paper goes on to state that the Russian
Army Is now 2,320,000 men. (Bausman, 31.)
This paper (supra) further said;
W e
have
p r o je c te d
r a ilw a y s
to
A p p e n d ix
and
begun
c o n c e n tra te
th e
to
b u ild
arm y
THE
as
a
w h o le
q u ic k ly
EUROPEAN
as
n etw o rk
of
p o s s ib le .
str a te g ic
G .)
(B a u s m a n ,
PRESS.
The press o f Russia, France, Germany, und Serbia in 1914
was a press largely controlled by subsidies.
The journals were not supported by advertisements as in
America. They relied upon subsidies from governments, politichins, and from commercial and financial interests.
Through this agency the people o f Germany, France, and
Russia were taught to hate each other. The death o f the crown
prince of Austria was attributed by the Government of Aus
tria to the Serbian press propaganda financed by the Russian
Government through the Russian mfnister at Belgrade with
the connivance of the Serbian Government. In Livre Noir,
which discloses the secret archives of the Russian foreign
office, are many dispatches showing the manner in which the
Russian Government subsidized and directed the press.
On page 208, Livre Noir, for example, in telegram 591, De
cember 18, 1913, Isvolsky, the Russian ambassador at Paris,
speaking o f the Paris press, says:
The
papers
w h ic h
are
in s tr u c tio n s ,
and
haps
th e m s e lv e s
en gage
if
we
d ev o ted
do
not
w ith
to
u s,
as
g iv e
fa ls e
a
Le
th e m
M a tin ,
r e ly
d ir e c tio n s
on
th ey
me
fo r
m ig h t
per
v ie w .
On page 213 (Ibid.) Isvolsky says:
It
is
m ore
have
p a r tic u la r ly
im p o r ta n t
O th e r w is e
p ress.
it
m ay
th a t
it
th a n
in
su re
v ie w
o n ly
th e ir
h ere,
engage
is
at
its e lf
su ch
w ith
c o n t in u a lly
ow n
s p e c ia l
a
a
m oved
m o m e n t,
fa ls e
to
co n tro l
b e s id e s
fin a n c ia l
by
v ie w ;
th e
it
c ir c le s
is
w ho
In te re sts.
On page 271 of Livre Noir Isvolsky w rites:
E n d e a v o r in g
w ith
th e
p ress
to
of
m a in ta in
th e
at
th e
sam e
th a n k s
to
th e
m easures
o b ta in e d .
of
I
As
th e
ta k e
is ,
you
it
su ch
as
th e
to
a ttitu d e s
but
I
and
do
th is
M in is te r
in
th e
tim e ,
not
e ffic a c io u s
Journ al
p ress.
in te rv e n e
d is tr ib u tio n
of
F o r e ig n
and
des
are
In
th e
D e b a ts,
I
W ith
am
in
w h ic h
th e
its
and
in
have
th e
us
m y
v ie w ,
been
d is tr ib u
F rench
th e
en d s.
fo r
d o in g
th is
r e s u lt s
d ir e c tly
A ffa ir s
o b ta in s
d e s ifk b le
w o r ld ,
c o n s id e r a b le
to in flu e n c e p e r s o n a lly
T em p s,
w h ic h
p o litic a l
in flu e n c e
tak en
know ,
ap pears,
exert every d ay
P a r is ,
tim e
s u b sid ie s,
p a rt,
th e
G overn m en t
u tm o st
t io n
On April 28, 1914, and again on June 11. Sir Edward Grey
confirmed in the House o f Commons Mr. Asquith’s assertion,
7 0 8 7 0 — 11------- 8
R u s s ia
iste r s
w ith
is v it a l
th e
The French Army was much more powerful than the German
(conferences above quoted).
The semiofficial paper Birshewija Wjedomasti, of Petrograd,
on June 13, 1914, before the Serajevo tragedy, stated:
F in a n c e ,
concern ed
A rm y
to
1 9 1 4 .)
th e
Ou July 1 Lord Loreburu, Lord Chancellor from 1906 to 1912,
said—
as
but
about as p o w e r fu l as h e r own.
arm s
out
arm y.
th a t
G erm an
su rrou n d ed
in
E urope.
w ere
The
E m p ir e ,
fo r c e
m in is tr y
arm ed
On March 24 he made similar denials in reply to questions
from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King.
On April 14 Mr. llunciman, in n speech at Birkenhead,
denied “ in the most categorical way ” the existence of a secret
understanding with any foreign power.
On May 3 the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, de
clared that he “ could conceive no circumstances in which con
tinental operations would not be a crime against the people o J
this country.”
On June 28 the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr
Acland, declared publicly that—
In
made March 11 and 24, 1913, o f British freedom from engage
ments with continental powers. (See Neilson How Diplomats
Make W a r; Morel Truth and the War, etc.)
These disclosures justify America in receiving the assurances
of European diplomats with some reserve.
Lloyd George five months before the war sa id :
m in
M in is te r
F rom
my
m o s t im p o r t a n t jo u r n a ls
L ’E c h o
de
of
s id e
of
P a r is .
The manner in which the press responds to such stimulation
has heretofore been shown In the dispatches which I have
quoted, showing that they were instrumentalities in moving the
French people to war and in moving the Russian people to war.
From these disclosures it will appear how extremely signifi
cant to the German rulers was the attitude of the French press
in Paris in July, 1914, where they were denouncing Germany
and Austria and demanding the support of Russia, and it is
worth while to recall the declaration of the Nouvelle Revue
that France was determined on war, and of the Petrograd
press that Russia was determined on war, and that France and
Russia were prepared.
In the American press a few weeks ago was an item announc
ing that the French Government requested 8,000.000 francs
to he used with the press without disclosing the details.
I have Just received by mail as a Senator of the United
States a book o f 112 pages o f press clippings strenuously sup
porting the French policy in the Ruhr. It is obviously paid
a a o o a a
61
18
’i v N
o i s s a a o N
o o
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
propaganda. The first article declares, among other things, In
I’egard to the W orld W ar:
W hat
G erm an y
m an eu ver.
A r m is tic e
It, w a s
She
D ay
th e
c o u ld
has
a
h o llo w
fir s t
to
not
do
broken
In
th e
m ockery.
fa lte r .
L ast
b a ttle
u n ity
of
sh e
Is
th e
A llie s
A m e ric a ,
in
und
th e
we
d o in g
fie ld ,
by
and
h is to r y
w ere
e v a sio n
has
and
m ade
of
m u st
th e
so
w r ite
fir st
to
le a v e .
This unfair Imputation was printed in an American news
paper and purports to be written by an American editor.
The fact is, America, and history must so write it, won the
war, and only left when the military dynasties had been
destroyed in battle.
When the Allies were sending delegation after delegation
Imploring our help, telling us that the British and Belgian
troops had their backs to the wall, and that the French troops
were bled white, America sent 2,000.000 o f the ablest and brav
est men on earth to the battle line and drove the Germans
back, and the American President by diplomacy presented terms
the German people accepted as a basis o f armistice. See the
dispatch of June 3, 1918, of General Foch, Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, Ministers of Great Britain, France, and
Italy, beseeching our assistance immediately (Exhibit 13) and
urgently declaring tliat'without American help the war was lost
and victory impossible.
Until the great mass o f European people understand how
they are ruled and led into war by a few leaders there can
be little hope o f permanent peace in the woi'ld. I f a few
diplomats having access to the national purse are permitted
by propaganda, through a subsidized press, to teach the people
to hate each other, permanent peace is impossible.
The peoples ought to be taught to understand each other,
to respect each other and promote friendly commercial rela
tions with each other.
There is no possible reason why the farmers and laborers
of France should be led to kill the farmers and laborers of
Germany, and there is no just cause why the mechanics, clerks,
and domestics o f Germany should be taught to hate and kill
the mechanics, clerks, and domestics of France. They are all
alike entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
But their peace depends on the intelligence, power, and initia
tive of the people themselves expressed through their proper
parliaments elected by the suffrage of the people. This is a
matter that the people o f Europe themselves must work out.
They can not be advised from America. Possibly the seeds
we sow in feeding their famishing may finally lead their states
men to realize that the American ideals o f international under
standing and good will is the better policy.
The Belgian minister at Berlin, Baron Beyens, speaks about
the French inflammatory discourses which place Belgium in
so dangerous a position and which interfere with those trying
to preserve the peace between France and Germany.
Baron Guillaume, the Belgian ambassador at Paris, wrote
his home office, May 8, that Frenchmen were proclaiming a
certain victory over Germany. (Dip. Rev., p. 288.)
The Russian ambassador at Berlin advises his Government
March 12, 1914, that Germany “ is trying to appear not afraid.”
Isvolsky, the Russian ambassador at Paris, on September 12,
1912, reports a conversation with Poincare assuring 1dm of the
French loyalty to Russia, as fo llo w s:
a
c o n flic t
w ith
v e n tio n ,
If
F ran ce
w ill
not
a m in ute
lo s e
A u s tr ia
at
In
on ce
s h o u ld
int'olve
r e c o g n iz e
it
as
fulfilling her p le d g e s
G erm an y’s
a
to
arm ed
casus fo e d e ris
R u s s ia .
in te r
and
(P ra v d a ,
will
19 19 ;
A
B a u s m a n , 3 4 .)
On December 23, 1920, Lloyd-George expresses the opinion—
That
th in g
no
In to
one
at
w h ic h
th e
th ey
head
of
g lid e d ,
or
a ffa ir s
ra th e r
q u ite
m eant
sta g g ere d
w ar.
and
It
w as
som e
s tu m b le d .
This view is very charitable but comes a little late.
It is worth while to remember that Germany had over 4,500
miles o f frontier to protect and no natural boundaries to pro
tect her on the east or the west or the south and that their
authorities naturally were apprehensive.
Frederick Bausman, former member of the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington, in Let France Explain, thoroughly
documented (London, George Allen & Unwin), believes that the
Government o f France under Poincare was also to blame for
the world catastrophe, and he lays down the following propo
sitions :
First. That the alliance of France and Russia was unneces
sary to the safety of France and was hostile to the peace o f
Europe by its inviting into western Europe an overwhelming
mass led by irresponsible men who aimed at extending there
an Irresponsible government and a shameful despotism.
TO870— 11
Second. That France deliberately and continually armed Rus
sia and encouraged her aggressiveness against Germ any; that
French policy was continuously directed to creating a favorable
opportunity for war upon Germany to regain her lost Provluces,
disintegrate Germany as she had kept her disintegrated In
previous centuries, and resume her old pluee at the head of
European affairs.
Third. That the German armaments were, beyond all ques
tion, made necessary by the enormous and wholly unnecessary
increases In Russian armaments.
Fourth. That the Serbians were amon?; the most ruthless
people In E urope; that Russia had no regard for Serbia other
than to extend her own empire Into the Balkans; and that
Russia desired to break up, through Serbia, the Austro-Hun
garian Empire, a result that would have left Germany helpless
against Russia later.
Fifth. That the war sprang out of Russian ambition in the
Balkans and in nothing vital to the French whatsoever, and
that France could have stopped Russia at the outset by telling
her that she would not support her Balkan ambitions, because
Russia would not have gone into the war unless supported by
France, which country immediately udvised her that she would
support her.
Sixth. That Germany did everything possible to avert the
war after discovering that Russia actually would go to war
and France support Russian ambitions in the Balkans, the
chancellor imperatively and repeatedly requesting Austria to
acquiesce, and the Kaiser personally imploring the Tsar to
stop, and that England, though embarrassed by previous rela
tions with the French and Russians, also exerted herself to
prevent war, but that the French Government did nothing
whatever to restrain Russia.
^ Seventh. That the Russians, finding themselves certain of
French support and possibly of English support, too, pushed,
at first by stealth and then openly, a general m obilization; that
they brought 2,000,000 of well-equipped troops toward the Ger
man frontier and refused, after reasonable notice from Ger
many, to stop the m obilization; that France and Russia knew
that they could ultimately drive England into the war, because
England could not risk the conquest of France by Germany
under any circumstances, and that Italy would not aid Ger
many at all.
Eighth. That Russia wanted a war, that France knew that
Russia wanted a war, and that the Government o f Poincare
did all that was possible to lash up the people o f France against
Germany before the war because his Government believed that
the combined forces o f France and Russia, especially If aided
by England, were invincible.
Ninth. That the French and Russians, neither o f them sur
prised but on the contrary long prepared, went into the war
at the height of their overwhelming strength, the French
Army being alone equal to that o f Germany and the fully
equipped part of the Russian much larger.
Tenth. That if the war had ended successfully for Russia,
the best part of central Europe would have been absorbed by
h e r; that France during the war actually made a secret treaty
to that effect; that the Germans were compelled to resist with
enormous loss the spread of the Slavs into western Europe
and have contributed to its protection; and that the English,
compelled by sheer military necessity to save France from de
feat. have suffered incalculably in life, trade, and wealth.
And sa y s:
s in g le
have
t e le g r a m
p re v e n te d
w o u ld
th is
th e
w as
not
even
m o b iliz e d
su ch
m essage,
a tta c k e d
th e
v e n tu re
F ran ce
R u s s ia n
in to
a g a in s t
I
e x p la in ,
th e
p.
w ar
w o u ld
3 6 .)
u n le s s
C e n tra l
G erm an y
G overnm en t at
th is
G overnm en t
te le g r a m
have
th e
(B r itis h
had
o u tse t
of
W h ite
th e
P ow ers,
saved
“ secu re
to
w a r n in g
c o n flic t c o n c e r n in g
by
h er.
re p e a t,
F ren ch
s im p le
n o t s u p p o r t h e r in a
h e r s e lf
fo r
fro m
w ar, a
not
th e
had
F ran ce
B a lk a n s w h e n
R u s s ia
n e ith e r
of
m o b iliz e d
sta te d
su p p ort
P aper
w o u ld
th a t
c iv iliz a tio n
th e
R u s s ia n
R u s s ia
its
th a t
of
w h ic h
at
had
a ll.
One
c a ta stro p h e ,
it
w o u ld
F r a n c e .”
not
(L e t
1 7 .)
In order to comprehend what took place in Europe, one should
remember that the Governments o f Europe are in the hands of
a comparatively few men.
The record shows, o f course, that the Czarist Russian Govern
ment was a military dynasty, controlled by the Czar, Grand
Dukes, and their military satellites. The French Government,
the record shows, entered into a secret written treaty with this
military monarchy whose views of government were diametri
cally opposed to the supposed principles of the Republic of
France.
The British Foreign Office entered into a secret agreement
with France and Russia without the knowledge of Parliament,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
and thus stimulated and made aggressive the militarism o f the
French leaders, and all the more made aggressive the leaders
of Russia whose objects were entirely at variance with those
of the British people or of the French people. The French
leaders had some reason to fear the possible aggression o f the
German military dynasty and by making an alliance with
Russia and England were able to make the German military
authorities afraid to attack France, but the policy fatally en
couraged Russia to attack Germany. Russia had a far more
important and different purpose to serve. The Russian Gov
ernment had long had a determined policy to control the Dar
danelles, to have free access to the Mediterranean from the
Black Sea. It was impossible for Russia to get this advantage
except as the result of a general European war, and the way
to provoke a general European war was precisely the means
employed by Russia with its intrigues in Serbia, where the
Slavs of Serbia were stimulated and financed to carry on secret
intrigues against the Austrian Government through the Slav
population o f Austria. It was only necessary to compel Austria
to partially mobilize, whereupon the Franco-Russian agree
ment to attack Germany came into effect automatically, and
France and Germany must instantly mobilize and attack Ger
many at the same time on the east and on the west with all
their forces.
These Serbian intrigues compelled Austria to mobilize in
1912. (Russia not quite ready.)
Again compelled Austria to mobilize in 1913. (Russia not
quite ready.)
In 1914, when they led to the murder o f the Crown Prince of
Austria and his consort, the court at Vienna in extreme anger
delivered a 4S-hour demand for satisfaction and mobilized
against Serbia.
A pretext for the Russian mobilization had been created by
Russia and instantly SazonolT said, “ This time we shall march.”
This was the precise situation which the Russian clique, led
by Sazonof and Sukhomlinoff, seems to have desired to accom
plish and the war was on.
F K E N C II
E V ID E N C E .
Colonel Boucher, of the French general staff, issued in 1910
to 1913 three books— one France Victorious in To-morrow’s
Wars, one the Offensive Against Germany, and another Ger
many in Peril.
In the latter he says:
G e r m a n y la m en a ced on a ll fr o n tie r s , a n d s itu a te d t h a t s h e c a n n o t
fe e l s e c u r e o f h e r fu t u r e a g a in s t a ll h er a d v e rs a rie s , w it h o u t fin d in g
s om e w a y to e lim in a t e us
*
*
• m en a ce d on th e n o r th b y E n g
la n d . on th e w e s t by F ra n c e , o n th e ea st by R u s sia , a n d t o -d a y e q u a lly
ou t h e s o u th
*
•
*
In d a n g e r o f p a n sla v is m .
S he m ust ra ise her
fo r c e s to th e s u p re m e degree.
General Buat, o f the French general staff, showed that the
mobile forces of France were in active army of 910,000 men
with reserves o f 1,325,000.
O n e ca n s a y th en t h a t w it h o u t ta k in g a n y a c c o u n t o f th e B e lg ia n
a r m y o r o f th e fo u r B r itis h d iv is io n s , F ra n c e a lo n e w a s a t t h e b e g in
n in g , at le a s t, e q u a l, i f n o t s u p e rio r, to h e r fo r m id a b le a d v e r s a r y in
th e n u m b e r o f th e p r in c ip a l u n its .
( L ’ A rm ee A lle m a n d e , p p . 1 - 9 . )
The French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Paleologue, in the
early part o f 1914 was warned by Vlviani that war would soon
break out (Revue des deux Mondes, January, 1921) ; but
Viviani, in his opening speech to the French Parliament after
the German declaration of war, complained o f its being “ unex
pected.”
Lord French tells us that the preparations with France were
on a complete and mutual understanding ( “ 1914,” p. 8) and
that England was to put 160,000 men at a point near Belgium
on 12 days’ notice.
Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador to London, s a id :
W h e n I r e c a ll C a m b o n ’ s c o n v e r s a tio n s w it h m e, th e w o r d s e x c h a n g e d
a n d a d d th e a tt it u d e o f P o in c a r e , th e t h o u g h t co m e s t o m e as a c o n
v i c t i o n t h a t o f a ll th e p o w e r s F r a n c e is t h e o n ly o n e w h ic h n o t t o say
t h a t i t w is h e s w a r w o u ld y e t lo o k u p on i t w it h o u t g r e a t re g re t.
(G e r
m an W h it e B o o k , p t. 2, p. 7 5 .)
Many notable French men have issued protests and accusa
tions against Poincare, such as De Martial, Henri Barbusse,
Anatole France, Ernest Renauld, etc.
Renauld, a distinguished historical writer, engaged Poincare
In an argument and s a id :
T h e E n t e n t e w a n te d t h e w a r as m u ch as W illia m I I , a n d y o u , M r.
P r e s id e n t , an d y o u r g r o u p o f fr ie n d s w a n ted it m o re th a n a ll.
(B a u s
m an , p
2 9 .)
76876— 11
19
Sukhomlinoff, Russian Foreign Minister, August, 1912, after
one o f Poincare’s visits sent a circular to his Russian diplomats
saying:
W hen
th e
be m o st
c r itic a l
d e s ir a b le
P o in c a r e
h im s e lf,
c h a ra c te r
F ren ch
and
have
at
w ho
P r im e
in
m om en t
to
at
le a s t
has
a
as
M in is te r .
in te r n a tio n a l
th e
head o f
th e
p e r s o n a lity
little
fe a r
(E n te n te
r e la tio n s
a llie d
w ho
of
has
th e
sam e
r e s p o n s ib ility
D ip lo m a c y ,
it
a r r iv e s,
g o v e rn m e n ts,
pp.
as
w ill
if
not
e n e r g e tic
th e
p resen t
6 5 2 -6 5 5 .)
In Poincare-a-t-il-Voulu-la-Gerre the warlike course of the
French Government is attributed to Poincare from his coming
into office in 1912. The work o f Peve les Responsables de la
Guerre places the responsibility on Poincare. (Bausman.)
Poincare assured the extra session of the French Parliament
August 4, 1914, that France—
w a s prepared and
(F r e n c h
our enem y
Y e llo w
Book,
p.
w ill m e e t on
th e ir
p a th
our
v a lia n t
tro o p s
1 5 8 .)
The attitude of the French war party may be appreciated
from the quotation o f Mr. Buxton, in the foreign office de
bate o f July, 1912, taken from the “ Nouvelle Revue,” one of
the most prominent of Paris Review's:
W e
we
in te n d
can
at
F ren ch
revue
s tr ik e ,
w ill
and
not
*
*
p.
4
*
or
th e
p a rty ,
w ill
N avy
w ar.
u tte r
in
have
in to
th e ir
not
com e,
in
•
*
a
*
40
w ith
*
•
*
r e m a in s
(H o w
ago,
*
and
of
sh e
th e
a t
th e
th e ir
fle e t
w h o le
D ip lo m a ts
a
to
d iv e r g e n t
W e,
th a t
of
ready
annual
E n g la n d
th e
is
years
th e
peace
read ers
F ran ce
to
c o u n try .
arm ed
se r io u s
•
ready
w a te rs.
h e a v ily
th e
o w in g
each
G erm an
of
•
arran ged
fo llo w e d
th e
w as
to
ra te
have
years
w ith o u t
sh oes.
sh e
years
b ir th
40
o p in io n
ub
5
w ill
A fte r
th is
conqu er,
in
of
tacking
have
s h a k in g
to
be
n u m bers
m nn
to
le a s t
oer-
M ake
W ar,
2 0 6 .)
M. Poincar6 has not escaped the criticism o f representatives
of the people o f France in the French Chamber o f Deputies.
On July 5, 1922, while M. Poincar6 was presiding over the
Chamber of Deputies as its President, M. Vaillant-Couturier
( p . 2337-2338, Journal Official) declared “ upon his conscience
as an old soldier ” that he was convinced o f the responsibility
o f Raymond Poincare for the World War because o f his policy
in the Balkans and his unwarrantable support of Russian am
bitions and Russian policies. He declared that the war was
desired by a group o f important rank in the Court of Russia
and that Poincar6 did not do what he could have done to deter
the war, that Poincare’s culpability would be exposed by the
records and he accused him on the floor of the Chamber of
Deputies to have been responsible for building up in France
by Russian propaganda public opinion among the French people
favorable to the Russian intervention in Balkan affairs.
That he had contributed to the war by allowing chances for
peace to pass.
M. Vaillant-Coutourier in the course of a long speech said:
W e
accu se
liz e d
th e
F ren ch
hoped
accu se
p u b lic a tio n
W e
m is e d
he
h a v in g
been
revenge
on
of
W e
w o u ld
h im
accu se
R u s s ia n
m ig h t
of
fo r
n a tio n a lis ts .
J aurd s
W e
h im
d e s ir e
of
th e
not
of
and
w is h e s
h im
th e
W Te
of
•
of
F ran ce
r e a c tio n
in to
h im
d e s tin ie s
at
th a t
or
of
of
w h ic h
of
tex ts
w ar.
in
th e
*.
accu se
th e
c r y s ta l
tu r b u le n t
been
o m is s io n s
*
w as
m ost
h a v in g
c e r ta in
G erm an y
w hom
th e
p r e s id e n t
th ro w n
1914
about
of
of
a r c h iv e s
h a v in g
th e
m an
part
p ass
p rovok ed .
1912
been
be,
le t
d ip lo m a tic
h im
b etw een
have
accu se
h a v in g
m o b iliz a tio n
th e
th e
a
of
th a t
w ar
of
w h ic h
h a v in g
Fran ce,
tim e —
th e
c o m p i 'o w h a te v e r
*
*
*
and stated that the “ stillborn treaty of the peace of Ver
sailles,” which “ they all condemn more or less,” stood between
a peaceable future and the French people, and said :
For
to
us
M.
produ ce
T o -d a y
h is
P o in c a r S
of
a
rep rese n ts
fu n e r e a l
p o lic y
le a d s
a ll
c h a ra c te r
us
to
th a t
n a tio n a lis m
b e fo r e ,
is o la tio n ,
d u r in g ,
to
and
fa ilu r e ,
and
has
been
a b le
a fte r
th e
w ar.
to
new
w ars.
On January 15, 1914, Izvolski, in a “ very confidential ”
letter (Livre Noir, 230) says:
If
th e
w ith in
P o in c a r S
sev eral
in c id e n t
th e
c o n tin u e s
scop e
of
expressed
tim e s ,
“ It
th e
h im s e lf
is
w e ll
to
d e v e lo p ,
a llia n c e .
e x a c tly
u n d e r sto o d
In
th e
a
th e
th a t
q u e s tio n
m ig h t
c o n v e r s a tio n
sam e,
w e
by
sh a ll
put
w ith
r e p e a tin g
su sta in
its e lf
m e,
M.
to
me
y o u ."
I respectfully call the attention of the Senate to the secret
telegrams from Izvolski, in Livre Noir, pages 14, 19, 20, In
which Izvolski, on January 29, 1913, over a year before the
World War, sa ys:
I h a v e Juet had a lo n g c o n v e r s a tio n w ith P o in ca ird , w h o has d e cla re d
to m e In his c a p a c ity as P r e s id e n t o f th e R e p u b lic he w ill h ave a bu n
d a n t p o s s ib ility o f d ir e c t ly In flu e n cin g th e fo r e ig n p o lic y o f F ra n ce
• • •. A c c o r d in g to him i t is o f th e h ig h e st im p o r ta n c e fo r th e
16
V I U V /L /U
11
X
T
4
20
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
F ren ch
lic
G overnm en t
o p in io n
B a lk a n s .
as
•
to
•
b e a b le
a
to
w ar
In
advance
w h ic h
to
c o u ld
ta k e
a r is e
p art
in
in
th e
d ir e c tin g p u b
m a tte r
of
th e
•
And on January 30, 1913, page 19:
The
en ergy,
appear
th e
as
th e
th e
R e p u b lic
he
lic r e s — w ith
a
d e c o r a tiv e ,
tim e s
That
is
m ent
•
and
M .
he
th e
k n o w le d g e
of
th e
of
and
and,
if
it
fo r
m ig h t
of
years
we
at
th e
p erson s
as
to
r e p ly ,
head
ex p resses
to
it.
th e
every
*
no
*
M.
at
*
be
C r u p p i,
to
o p in io n
a ll
•
•
c o m p le t e ly
F ren ch
day
of
F a l-
expressed ,
and
a ffa ir s .
can
C a lla lu r ,
com e
so
m eans
of
P o in c a ir #
P r e sid e n t
be
fo r e ig n
sev en
M .
as
e x a m p le ,
d o m a in
c o n tin u e s
c o n se n ts
of
c a p a c ity
every
next
no
c h a ra c te r
h ie
by
th e
su ch
In
in flu e n c e
ap pearan ce
m akes
It
in
e n tir e
h im s e lf— a s ,
p a ssiv e
w o u ld
P o in c a ir S
Jonn ert
th e
w h ic h
co n ten t
p o lic y
d ip lo m a c y
M .
and
th a t
not
d u r in g
a g a in s t
*
of
p u r e ly
th a t
F ren ch
and
*
r O le
why
assu red
w ill
but
th e
d e c is io n ,
g u a ra n ty
G overn
N o n is ,
th e
e tc .
m in is tr y ,
w ith o u t
he
has
*
And page 20:
The
F rench
o b lig a tio n
a ll
th e
a
is
e x a c t ly
gen eral
A ls o
w ar.
rest
doubt
it
in
R u s s ia
th e
m ost
nor
case
th e
fo r e s e e n
and
of
w hen
th e
does
concern s
th e
d ip lo m a tic
R u s s ia n
*
d e p r iv e
R u s s ia
S ta te s.
in
arm s
c o n v e n tio n
a s s is ta n c e
in
and
not
th e
of
o b lig a tio n s
B a lk a n
su p p ort
G overnm en t
sw ord
•
m oral
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
e ffe c tiv e
th e
th e
e n te rta in
to
th e
on
F ran ce
c o n v e n tio n
*
w is h
com
th e
draw
its
w ith
a c tu a l
s h o u ld
m in is tr y
not
th e
m ilita r y
th e
o n ly
of
us
and
of
F ran ce
doubt
tow ard
p a r tic ip a tio n
h e s ita tio n .
in
fu lfill
k n o w le d g e
r e s u lt
th e
F ren ch
put
not
by
fin a l
of
to
fu ll
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
w h ic h
count
w ith
th e
s lig h te s t
th a t
can
e n e r g e tic
(th e
t lip
to
d e c id e d
n e c e ssity
m om ent
by
nor
e n te r p r is e s
th e
th a t
th e
G overnm en t
a c tio n ,
upon
q e n tly
it
The
F ren ch
of
fir m ly
a d m its
n ecessary
fo r
u n d e r s ta n d in g
th e
lib e r ty
be
is
it
and
d e te r m in e d
th e
s lig h te s t
a lly ,
b lo o d
can
in
in
an
c o ld
p lic a tio n s
under
G overnm en t
as
but
(o f
F ran ce
upon
Fran ce)
fa v o r
of
its
w h ic h
C on se-
of
sa id
th e
in
Polncarfe insisted on having Grey announce the Entente avow
edly as u means o f preventing Germany from declaring war.
Grey was unwilling, probably because it would have stimulated
Russia to war if every element o f doubt of British support were
removed.
Grey did not wish war, but had no option but to support
France if it came.
On the night of July 29, the British ambassador at Berlin
wired Sir Edward Grey that the German Chancellor had told
him (the British nmbassador in Berlin) that—
a ll
S ta te s
B a lk a n s ).
As
(a )
T hat
s ta n d in g
(b )
th e
w ith
That
(c )
T bat
(d )
w ar
in g
T hat
and
it
(e )
to
p.
th e
th e
b ecau se th e
(p .
had
e ffo rts
to
com e
to
a
good
u n der
a
r e v isio n ,
w h ic h
he
m is q u o te s ,
of
th e
5 6 ).
a lw a y s
in
m in d
th e
recovery
of
th e
lo s t
2 5 ).
th a t
That
r e p e a te d
2 5 ).
m ade
tre a ty
F ran ce
(p .
m ade
(p .
D e lc a s s e
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
P r o v in c e s
K a is e r
F ran ce
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
V iv ia n i,
w ith
a
tre a ty
copy
never
d is c lo s e d
h is
p o ck e t,
re fr a in e d
w as
in
w as
r e c a lle d
b e fo r e
fr o m
th e
read
P a r lia m e n t .
th e
p a c ific
G eorges
L o u is
R u s s ia n s w a n te d a d iffe r e n t s o r t, e tc .
fr o m
(L e t
S t.
P etersb u rg
F ran ce
E x p la in ,
2 2 9 .)
PoincnrG’s defense will be found in the Living Age, Saturday,
August 2G, 1922, page 503, in which he says that Saaonoff was
a “ pacifist,” that—
th e
and
th o u g h t
of
c r u s h in g
S e r b ia
d o m in a te d
th e
w h o le
p o lic y
of
A u s tr ia
G erm an y.
That when lie and Viviani (July 29, 1914) —
reach ed
fa r
of
fro m
P a r is
we
w ere
r e c e iv e d
w is h in g
w ar,
w as
F ran ce,
a lth o u g h
fir m ly
by
a
s t a r tle d
o v e r w h e lm e d
r e so lv e d
upon
and
w ith
any
t r o u b le d
s o lic itu d e
s a c r ific e s
n a tio n
fo r
to
th e
th a t,
sa fe ty
d e fe n d
th e
fa th e rla n d .
It will be observed that Poincarg returned to Paris on July
29, and that it was on the night of the next day— July 30— that
the French minister of war told the military attach^ o f the
Russian Embassy with “ enthusiastic sincerity ” that the
Government is firmly decided upon war and requested the Rus
sian Embassy to confirm the hope o f the French general staff
that all the Russian efforts should be directed against Germany.
(Telegram 216.)
Poincar6 states that with the consent o f the ministry he
wrote a letter to King George on July 81, 1914, informing the
King that France would do all in her power to maintain peace.
This letter to King George is not consistent with telegram 216,
nor with the secret military treaty and the secret conferences
of the Russian and French general staffs of 1911, of 1912,
of 1913, to mobilize and attack Germany in the event of an
Austrian mobilization, but was extremely serviceable in con
vincing British public opinion of the peaceful attitude of the
French Government and of the guilt of the German Govern
ment in willing the war.
76876— 11
as
he
w as
a b le
to
Judge
th e
m a in
p r in c ip le
w h ic h
govern ed
Great Britain w
ould never stand by and allow
France to be crushed In any conflict there m
ight be. ( H o w D i p l o m a t s
M ake
p o lic y
W ar,
w as
th a t
2 6 3 .)
So that it is clear that the German Government expected
Great Britain to support France in the event o f war. The
fact that Great Britain would support France fully justified
the Russian war party and the French war party in their deter
mination on war.
Moreover, Sir Edward Grey told the French ambassador at
London, Cambon (British White Paper, 87), that he meant
to tell the German ambassador that day, Wednesday, July 29,
that he must not be misled from the friendly tone o f their
conversation that Britain would stand aside, so that both
Germany and France knew that Britain would not stand aside.
On Friday, July 31, the British ambassador to Berlin, Sir
Edward Goghem, wired Sir Edward Grey that the German
chancellor said he had done everything possible to attain his
object at Vienna, b u t he could not leave his country defense
less—
w h ile
tim e
le a r n s
is
w as
b e in g
u tiliz e d
by
o th e r
p ow ers;
and
if,
as
be
m
ilitary m
easures are now being taken by R
ussia
against G any also, I t w be im
erm
ill
possible for h i m to rem quiet.
ain
(Ib id .
Poincar6 undertook his own defense by writing a book
“ Les Origines de la G uerre” (Cassie) in 1921, in English
1922, an analysis o f which appears in “ I^et France Explain,”
Chapter XIV. He wholly omits the Russian mobilization and
does not contradict the Belgian minister’s charge against him as
bringing on the war. He omits the vital record o f the Falsifi
cation of the Russian Orange Book, but admits—-
fa r
B r itis h
th e
case,
2 8 1 .)
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British ambassador at
St. Petersburg that he did not see how Russia could be urged
to suspend military preparations unless some limit were put
by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia. (Ibid.
2S2.)
In other words, he did not exercise an effective moderating
influence on St. Petersburg; he justified their military prep
arations.
The whole story is set forth quite fully by Neilson, a member
o f the British Parliament, in chapter 12 of How Diplomats
Make War. The chapter is entitled “ A Game of Chess.”
Without doubt patriotism In the form o f intense nationalism
moved most o f the European leaders, who thought In terms of
military strategy alone.
It is futile to reproach Individuals in the foreign office of
Petersburg, o f Paris, of London, of Vienna, or Berlin. These
men were produced by their environment in an atmosphere of
secret diplomacy, believing in the power of might first, last,
and all the time, but nevertheless also believing it necessary
to subsidize the press and direct public opinion so as to have
the support as far as possible of their own nationals.
A profound distrust was everywhere evident between the
leaders of the different nations.
These foreign offices were controlled by a consuming desire
for further political power over other people and over other
territory. Their whole diplomacy in foreign relations largely
consisted of trading with each other, giving and taking “ com
pensations.” The prime moving force was commercialized im
perialism.
The Entente Allies should have conquered Germany and
Austria within a few months considering the enormous prepon
derance of power in favor of the Entente Allies. It should have
been a profitable war in the matter of colonial possessions, an
nexations, and indemnities; but its prolongation for four years
was very unexpected and costly. The collapse of the Russian
armies, probably due largely to the hate o f the Russian people
of the Romanoff Governmeut, proved a blessing in disguise to
the whole world, includiug the French, British, and Russian
people.
The overthrow of the German military government will prob
ably prove a blessing to the world, especially to the German
people, notwithstanding the severe suffering which has tem
porarily taken place since the armistice.
Tn due time no doubt the British, French, and Belgian people
will correct the defects in the Government o f their own fo r
eign offices, and the extent to which commercialized government
has gone in the past will probably be abated in the future.
I f the principles o f the League of Nations shall become the
rule governing the relation of nations to each other, the evils
v
I
I
i
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
o f the past will be entirely abated and international understand
ing, good will, and cooperation will become the rule o f inter
national intercourse.
In the light o f the disclosures which are made ®f the secret
diplomacy o f Europe, It is clear that a profound national
humiliation was put upon the German people by article 231 of
the treaty o f Versailles in violation o f the evidence now known
to the world. Article 231 is as follow s:
21
America was not Informed with regard to the secret intrigues
of Europe, nor o f its commercialized imperialistic aims.
America declared a state of war with Germany because the
military rulers of Germany committed one act o f war after
another on America in violation of accepted international law,
and America did not lay down the sword until that Government
was annihilated and the Hohenzollerns driven from power.
It cost America forty-two billions of dollars and hundreds of
A k t . 2 3 1 . T h e a l l i e d a n d associated Governm
ents a
ffirm a n d G any thousands o f men and a huge future tax of pensions. Happily
erm
accepts the responsibility o f G e r m a n y a n d h e r a l l i e s f o r causing all the for the freedom o f mankind the war resulted in the destruction
loss and dam t o w h i c h t h e a l l i e d a n d a s s o c i a t e d G o v e r n m e n t s a n d o f the three great military dynasties— of the Hohenzollerns of
age
t h e i r n a t i o n a l s h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t e d a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the war im
Germany, the Hapsburgs of Austria, and the Romanoffs of
Russia— and has promoted the cause o f democracy and the free
posed upon them by the aggression of G any a n d h e r a l l i e s .
erm
dom o f mankind.
This article makes the German Republic, representing a free
But the record which I have disclosed, Mr. President, that the
people, accept the responsibility of having imposed upon the British foreign office did not dare to disclose to the British peo
Allies the W orld War by the aggression o f the Imperial Ger ple in their Parliament the truth of the secret Intrigue with the
man Government of 1014, which was the master o f the subject French and Russian Governments, thereby giving the highest
German people.
testimony to America that British public opinion, like American
The German people feel a profound bitterness over this public opinion, will not consciously support international intrigue.
article and its consequences, and it will be well for the world It Is for American statesmen to consider now how far these
to consider whether a reconciliation between the peoples of secret forces are in control o f the British and French Govern
Germany, France, and Great Britain Is possible so long as the ments, and the extent to which they are in control must be
German people are unjustly charged with this great wrong.
read in the light o f the actions o f these Governments, not
In the Memoirs o f IzvolskI is narrated a personal attempt, merely by their words or official public communications.
o f William II, In 1003, to establish permanent peace between
The purposes o f America in fighting this war were expressed
Russia, Germany, and France in the so-called Treaty o f Rjorkoe, with great force in the address o f the President of the United
as fo llo w s :
States, January 8, 1918, and subsequent explanatory addresses
T h e i r Im p e r ia l M a je s t ie s , th e E m p e r o r o f a ll th e R u s s ia s , o f t h e o n e
in which he voiced the declared purposes o f the Entente Allies
p a r t, a n d th e E m p e r o r o f G e r m a n y , o f th e o th e r p a r t, w it h th e o b je c t
and conditions on which they were willing to make peace, and
of
a ssu rin g
th e
peace
of
E urope,
have
agreed
upon
th e
fo llo w in g
which they, after nine days’ discussion at the Trianon, Ver
p o in t s o f Ih e t r e a t y h e r e in a fte r r e la te d , w ith r e fe r e n c e to a d e fe n s iv e
sailles, formally accepted November 4, 1918. They then and
a llia n c e :
there pledged themselves to these conditions as the basis upon
“ A r t ic l e I . I f a n y E u r o p e a n S ta t e s h a ll a t ta c k e it h e r o f th e tw o
which the German Republic directed Its military commanders
E m p ir e s , t h e a lli e d p a r t y e n g a g e s to a id h is c o c o n t r a c t o r w it h a ll h is
to sign the terms of an armistice and practically surrendered.
fo r c e s o n la n d a n d o n s e a .
The German Republic accepted the terms and directed their
“ A r t . I I . T h e h ig h c o n t r a c t in g p a r tie s a g r e e n o t to c o n c lu d e a s e p
military commanders to accept the terms o f the armistice.
a r a te p ea ce w ith a n y e n em y w h a tso e v e r .
The pledges made to the German Republic through the Presi
" A r t . I I I . T h e p r e s e n t t r e a ty s h a ll b e in fo r c e fr o m th e m o m e n t o f
dent o f the United States by the Allies was in effect—
t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f p e a c e b e t w e e n R u s s i a a 'n cf J a p a n
and
m a y o n ly
be
(a ) The end o f secret diplomacy.
c a n c e le d b y a y e a r ’ s p r e v io u s n o tic e .
(b ) The removal o f economic barriers and equality of trade.
" A r t. IV . W h en
th is tr e a ty
g o e s in to e ffe c t, R u s s ia w ill t a k e
th e
(c ) Impartial adjustment o f colonial claims.
n e c e s s a r y s t e p s to m a k e Its t e r m s k n o w n to F r a n c e a n d in v ite h e r t o
(d ) Association of nations in a League o f Nations, having in
s u b s c r ib e to it a s a n a lly .”
mind the protection of every nation, o f its territorial integrity,
N ic h o l a s .
and political independence.
.
W il l ia m .
(e ) A just and stable peace; that Germany should—
The hostility o f France to this treaty caused its cancella a c c e p t a p l a c e o f e q u a l i t y a m o n g t h e p e o p l e s o f t h e e a r t h * * •
tion.
i n s t e a d o f a p l a c e of m a s t e r y .
The records to which I have above referred show in many
( f ) The right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety of
ways the efforts of the German Government to effect a rap
prochement with France and with Great Britain, all o f which all nations.
(g ) The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that
were unavailing.
One o f the most learned men in Europe, E. D. Morel, a mem can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the
ber o f the British Parliament, has written several works ex peace of the world.
(h ) The consent o f all nations to be governed in their con
plaining this unfortunate condition of European diplomacy,
such as Truth and the War. Diplomacy Revealed.
Ten duct toward each other by the same principles o f honor and of
Tears o f Secret Diplomacy, in which these processes are ex respect for the common law of civilized society that governs the
plained in great detail and fully confirm what the records to Individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with
which I have above referred e x h ib it; and the underlying policy one another.
(i) The impartial justice meted out must involve no dis
o f the diplomacy of the foreign office of the European nations
is set forth by Leonard W olf in a little work called “ Economic crimination between those to whom we wish to be just and
Imperialism,” showing the substantial fact that governments those to whom we do not wish to be just.
( j ) No special or separate interest of any single nation, or
had been employed for money making purposes in the exploita
tion o f the ignorant and unenlightened races; that under this any group o f nations, can be made the basis of any part of the
settlement which is not consistent with the common interest
policy all o f A frica had been divided up and other parts o f the
world seized for similar purposes, to make rich the industrial o f all.
(k ) No leagues or alliances or special covenants or under
ists of the nation which annexes and controls such territories.
The covenant of the League of Nations is bringing before the standings within the general or common fam ily of the League
world a new conception o f international relationship In which of Nations.
(l) No special, selfish economic combinations within the
international justice, understanding, and good will is being
league.
made increasingly possible.
(m ) All international agreements and treaties of every kind
America is now concerned In judging from the past the prob
abilities of stability in Europe. Unless Europe shall have stable must be made known in their entirety to the rest o f the world.
(n ) No punitive damages, no annexations, no indemnities,
government, America can not afford to extend any large credits
to Europe which it might be desirable to do to help the people but an honorable and a just peace.
The German Republic accepted and instructed its military
o f France and the people of Germany to again get back Into
officials. Then the Entente military command imposed the mili
full production.
W e all desire truly to see <he French protected. I favored tary terms on the German generals, as shown In Exhibit 14.
The manner in which the British, French, and Belgian Gov
the treaty guaranteeing France protection and fully supported
France during the war, hut the Ruhr invasion is indefensible ernments carried out these pledges is set forth in the treaty of
Versailles and analyzed with great care by Warren Hills in
from any standpoint.
“ Lex Talionis ” and by J. Maynard Keynes in ‘‘ Economic
A M E R IC A J U S T I F I E D IN E N T E R IN G T H E W A R .
Consequences o f the Peace.”
They show the Entente statesmen entirely violated the
America was justified In entering the war regardless o f who
was responsible for willing the war and putting it in motion. pledges made, and the United States has been put by them In
76876— 11
C6
U
22
a U
i J i l d
1
> i v v / i o o
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
the false position o f having betrayed the German people with
fulse promises to induce their surrender. The United Stntes
should not be content to rest under this unjust imputation
without proper protest.
The English people are becoming
impatient with these conditions.
The terrible anxiety of France, Great Britain, and Italy, which
led them to fully accept American terms, is shown by Exhibit 13,
in which Foch, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando im
plored American aid June 3, 1918, ns necessary to avoid entente
defeat.
E X H IB IT
(A c tio n
The
in g
P r im e
at
of
V e r s a ille s ,
th e
U n ite d
“ W e
th e
at
one
tim e
p ast
g r a v ity ,
in
and
d an ger
to
p o s s ib le
sp ect
th e
s h o u ld
J u ly
avert
sen ts
e s ta b lis h
q u ir e d
th is
c a m p a ig n
to
of
n eed s
U n ite d
th a n
le v ie s ,
m o n th , w ith
th a t
th e
we
do
im m e d ia te
regard s
of
th e
as
to
and
c o n tra ry
is
th a t
a
grea t
of
th e
in
th e
m a x i
w h ic h
m ost
in
re
m arked,
th e
in
th o se
rep re
u n le ss
th e
A llie s
to
fo r c e
re
A m e ric a n
u rges
of
he
war
th e
th e
o p in io n ,
and
p resen t
b e fo r e
fu tu re ,
en a b le
to ta l
w ho
is
c o n tin u o u s
s h o u ld
not
w h o se
m ilita r y
th a t
can
to
not
p roceed
u ltim a te
th e
w ith
as
soon
in
th e
th e
th e
of
th e
and
th e
w ar
c o n tin u o u s
p o s s ib le
of
(F ro m
A lu m n i,
th e
“ The
1920,
th e
A llie d
G reat
V o l.
V I,
1 8 7 .)
And the Allies solemnly declared to the Germans, November
4, 1918:
T h e ir
w illin g n e s s
on
th e
te rm s o f
on
Janu ary,
su bseq u en t
to
peace
1918,
m ake
la id
and
peace
dow n
th e
in
w ith
th e
p r in c ip le s
th e
G overnm en t
P r e s id e n t’ s
of
of
ad dress
s e t t le m e n t
G erm an y
to
C on gress
e n u n c ia te d
in
h is
ad d resses.
Under these terms the Allies—
U n d e rsta n d
to
th a t c o m p e n sa tio n
age
done
th e
th e
a g g r e ssio n
c iv ilia n
of
w ill
p o p u la tio n
G erm an y
by
be
of
m ade
th e
la n d , b y
by
G erm an y
sea ,
and
fo r
and
A llie s
p r o p e r ty
th e ir
fro m
th e
a ll d a m
by
a ir .
On November 11, 1918, the President of the United States, In
speaking of the military autocracies of Europe, declared that—
The
great
u n ite d
in
lo n g in g
a
n a tio n s
com m on
of
th e
th in g
th a t
w o r ld
su prem e
r e s o lu tio n
th e
assu red
is p o s s ib le
w ith
fo o d
th e ir
v e ry liv e s .
and
to
in
m ous
and
a s s o c ia te d
w h o le
r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s
m ad n ess
w h ic h
p u rp ose
a ll
*
th e
th e m s e lv e s
su ch
w ar
c o u n c il
th e
c ir c u m s ta n c e s
*
u g ly
d is tr e s s
a
d is in te r e s te d
p e o p le s
th e
*
fo r
up
th e
in
r e lie v e
set
of
th e
H u n ger does
at
so
be
done
b reed
d e fin ite ly
s a tis fy
*
*
have
E m p ir e s
m any
m ake
now
w ill
*
V e r s a ille s
w ill
not
th a t
as
ju s tic e .
C e n tra l
t h a t is in
d is te m p e r s
have
peace
to
by u n a n i
th a t
every
s u p p ly
th em
p la c e s t h r e a t e n in g
r e fo r m , b u t it
an
th e
T h e ir
o r d e r ly
life
b reeds
im p o s
s ib le .
The Government of Great Britain, immediately after the dis
armament of the Germans, the taking of their warships, and o f
their mercantile marine, established by an Order in Council a
blockade not only not supplying the food the German people
required, but cutting off the food they might have secured for
themselves, even cutting off fish supply from the Baltic Sea
find using the pressure of famine to coerce the German Republic
to accept the terms o f the treaty o f Versailles. The Entente
76876—
11
H 'S E O . W J U U r ?
FOB
IS O
THE
W O K T .t*
WAB.
A r t . 2 3 1 . T h e a lli e d a n d a s s o c ia t e d G o v e r n m e n t s a ffir m a n d G e r m a n y
a cce p ts
m eet
to
as
C h ie f
v ic t o r y .”
N a tio n a l
b o th
M O B AT
The moral responsibility for willing the World W ar has been
definitely fixed upon Germany by article 231, as follow s:
we
G overn m en t
done,
p r o v id e
p resen t
o v e r e stim a tin g
th e
be
th e
ju d g m e n t
THE
be
p o s s ib ly be d o n e .
c o n d u c tin g
C om m ander
by
th e
h is
d iv i
B r itis h
m o n th s o f J u n e
a s th is c a n
th a t
th e
p u b lis h e d
in
c o n fid e n t
to
e s s e n tia l
W a r ,”
th e
on
and
w h ic h
as
th e
th e
Is
e x h a u ste d
to
enem y
in fir m ity
d e fea t
r e lia n c e , is
s itu a tio n
s t ill
to e s ta b lis h in g a t o ta l A m e ric a n
and
c a lc u la te d
le v ie s
s u p e r io r ity
E v e n ts
fe e l
th e
w ill
Foch,
e v e r y th in g
in
th e
th ere
v ic to r y
a d a te
a b s o lu te
d u r in g
G erm an
gu n n ers,
a llie d
d iv is io n s
a b ilit y
fo r
w hat
a d v e n t o f A m er ic a n
u ltim a te
p la c e s
of
(o n
A llie s
lo o k in g
a v ie w
of
A llie s
of
in s is te n c e
th e
an
w h ic h ,
G eneral
m ost
and
w ill
A r m ie s
p.
le s s
th e
a rm y
an
100
a
fr e sh
n u m e r ic a l
fo r e se e
su ch
lie
case,
th e
of
to
by
b e in g
and
no
p la c e
th e
of
r a is in g
reserves
th is ,
c o n su m m a te
S ta te s
needs
to
of
of
W ils o n
h ow ever,
200
n u m e r ic a l
A m e ric a
su p erio rity.
s a tis fie d
w ith
c o n tin u e
fro m
th e
u p ),
m a c h in e
s id e
to
c ris is ,
d iv is io n s
u tm o st
dan ger
d iv is io n s a t a s e a r ly
are
m e et
P r e s id e n t
excess
p o s s ib ility
th e m
th e
and
in
su p e r io r ity
no
th e ir
th e
P r e s id e n t
op pose
p o s s ib le
th e
a llie d
A m e ric a n
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
fo rc e o f 1 0 0
on
p ro v id e
at
fre sh
le s s th a n
“ W e
to
as
is
keep
u n le s s
w ith
m en
th e
of
to
in fa n tr y
b e s h ip p e d
u ltim a te
of
of
im p o ssib le
a b le
fo r
now
th e
us a sta te m e n t o f th e u tm o st
now
th e re
r a p id ly
a d d itio n
it is
is
1 9 1 8 .)
B r ita in ,
a id
The
n u m e r ic a l
as
lo st
im m e d ia te
to
In
th a t
r a is in g
to
th e
to
ren d ered
to
d iv is io n s
num ber
u rges
of
th e
o w in g
enem y.
A m er ic a
as
been
em ergen cy.
s tr a its
b e in g
sh o rta g e
c a m p a ig n
th e
th e
num ber
c o n tin u e
to
2,
m essn ge to
A m e ric a n
p resen ted
th a t,
e x tre m e
war
has
th a t
and
th e re fo r e
m um
has
a llie d
b e r e m e d ie d
He
tro o p s.
and
G reat
th a n k s
w h ic h
great
out
1G 2
in c r e a s in g
th e
A llie s c a n
1
and
fo llo w in g
w arm est
w ith
a
Foch
heavy,
put
of
June
Ita ly ,
th e
p r a c tic a b le
p o in ts
w h ere
very
are
sen d
our
m eet
G eneral
F rench
th ey
to
express
to
w h ic h
is
c o n fe re n c e
F ran ce,
p ro m p tn e ss
seem ed
F ran ce,
s io n s ,
d e s ir e
to
m o n th
c o n tin u e s .
at
of
S ta te s :
d e s ir e
r e m a r k a b le
th e
ta k e n
M in is te r s
X III.
Allies established a reparation eommlaslon, controlled by
France, Belgium, Italy, nnd Groat Britain, who llxed the
reparations regardless o f the promises made the German people
by the allied governments on November 4, 1918.
The Entente Allies in writing the treaty of Versailles took
all the German colonies, took away from German territory a
large part o f east nnd west Prussia, of Poland nnd Silesia,
and the entire left bank o f the Rhine was occupied from Swit
zerland to Holland, 50 kilometers on the right bank were held
subject to military control, the coal fields of the Suar Valley
were taken by France.
Morosnet, Eupen, and Malmedy were given to Belgium, Schles
wig added to Denmark, the German Republic not permitted to
enter the League, and all overtures from the German Govern
ment treated with indifference or contempt.
French officials took an active part In the political disin
tegration of the German Republic by promoting a movement for
an independent Rhine State, an independent Bavaria, an inde
pendent Saxony, seized the industrial heart of Germany in the
Ruhr, and made such strenuous demands upon the German Gov
ernment for instant reparations that that Government is now
absolutely bankrupt, unemployment breaking down the indus
trial life of the German people and threatening them with
famine. German statisticians estimate that less than 5 per
cent o f the German coal has been left the German Govern
ment’s con trol; that Germany has lost 14 per cent o f its aren%
10 per cent o f its population, 70 per cent o f Its zinc and iron
ore, 20 per cent o f the potato land, 18 per cent of the wheat
ana rye land, and the cost o f the occupation from 1918 to 1922
is put at four and one-half billion dollars or more than sixteen
times as much as the cost o f German occupation o f France In
1870-1873.
The reparations bill which is estimated by Andre Tardieu
in December, 1918, after the armistice, at nine billions, is now
fixed at thirty-three billions by the employees o f the proposed
beneficiaries, and credits are refused which the Germans esti
mate at approximately twenty-five billions. The details of
these claims and counterclaims I submit ns Exhibits 15 and 16.
lo s s
th e
r e s p o n s ib ility
and
th e ir
dam age
n a tio n a ls
im p o s e d
upon
to
of
have
th e m
G erm an y
w h ic h
by
been
th e
th e
and
a llie s
su b je c te d
a g g r e s s io n
h er
and
as
of
a llie s
fo r
a s s o c ia te d
a
c a u s in g
con sequ en ce
G erm an y
a ll
G o v e rn m e n ts
and
h er
of
th e
a llie s .
This necessarily means the aggression o f the German Gov
ernment o f August 1, 1914, under William II, a military autoc
racy, controlling without their consent the German people with
a rod of iron.
The German people of August 1, 1914, can not be held re
sponsible for the decision of William II. They were a subject
people. 80 per cent of them were women and children without
political capacity, about 10 per cent were men engaged in pro
duction and distribution, about 10 per cent were called to arms
by an order o f mobilization which could not be disobeyed
under penalty of immediate death. Something over 10 per
cent of these Germans took up arms under penalty o f d ea th ;
1,773,780 were killed, 4,216,056 were wounded, 1,152,800 were
prisoners or missing, a total o f 7,142,558. Hardly a man
escaped.
But the penalties o f the moral responsibility of willing the
war is being visited on the German people of to-day, 20 per
cent o f whom were unborn babes August 1. 1914. 50 per cent
were then infants, 16 per cent were then women, leaving about
14 per cent of men now living who were then either combatants
or noncombatants.
I f William II was exclusively and entirely responsible for
this war, the Entente Allies have allowed him to go in peace
with his property, and they are imposing the penalties o f this
wrong upon people who can not be charged with the moral
responsibility o f the war and in violation o f the conditions of
the armistice.
But, it will be said, who then shall be responsible for
reparations?
The reparations agreed to— that is, compensation for dam
ages clone the civilian population of the Entente Allies by the
German troops on land and sea and air— was accepted by the
German Republic, representing the German people, and this
reparation they are legally and morally bound by, hut it should
he established In honor and justice by disinterested judges and
experts, not by the beneficiaries or representatives moved by
the old principles o f European diplomacy that led directly to
this war.
66
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
If the old principles o f commercialized imperialism moving
In profound secrecy is to fix the policy o f international relation
ship, we have no just reason to hope for the restoration of
peace and prosperity in Europe.
The conditions laid down for the armistice by the President
o f the United States, accepted by the Allies, and then accepted
bj- the German Republic, can not be flagrantly dishonored with
impunity. Such evil seeds sown will bring a harvest of hate
and future wars. It is not yet entirely too late to correct this
great wrong to the German people.
The fundamental condition of peace is good faith, absolute
Justice arrived at by Just processes.
Then international understanding and good will becomes
possible. Then we can hope for the actual reduction of arma
ments to the limit o f domestic requirements for police and
good order.
Then we can hope to see the budgets balanced.
Then we can hope to see European currencies stabilized, put
on a gold basis, and people given a currency medium with
which they can make contracts safely.
Then European bonds could be sold throughout the world to
the fullest extent o f their legitimate needs. Then the safety
o f France will be assured, as ull the world desires.
Then America will he Justified in cooperating with the new
world conducted along the lines o f International Justice, Inter
national good will, and sincere international commercial and
financial cooperation.
Mr. President, the great masses of the people in France de
serve the warmest admiration. They ure a great people, very
brave, very loyal, very intelligent, Industrious, and th r ifty ;
their lunguage, their architecture, their sculpture, their paint
ings, their productions are unsurpassed in beauty. I am con
vinced that these people in their hearts desire to live at peace
with the world, to live their own lives, raise their children, and
enjoy social intercourse with each other, and that they would
commend international policies which would lead to this result.
And when this has been said, the same thing can be said
with equal truth and with equal force o f the German people,
o f the Italian people, and o f the British people.
Mr. President, I have discharged an irksome, painful duty.
Senators will find the complete record referred to in the biblio
graphy which I present and will find quotations so abundantly
made that there remains no reason why any Senator should
not be perfectly informed with regard to what has taken place
and what caused the W orld War. It was caused at last by
fear of each other, by ambition, by pride of a fe\v men in a
few chanceries who were doubtless doing what they believed
to be for the welfare and “ glory ” o f their own country, but
whose error o f judgment has crucified the world. We do not
wish a repetition of it.
During the World War I favored the French in every pos
sible way with money, credit, supplies, ships, and men. I was
one o f those who favored a treaty to guarantee the French
people against future German aggression, and I favor now
whatever is necessary to protect the French people against the
future aggression of Germany, but I do not favor the breach
o f agreement of the armistice conditions on which the peace
o f France and the lives of Frenchmen were saved on the battle
field by the cessation o f battle through the armistice contract
o f November 4. 1918.
The preservation of the w'hlte civilization of Europe demands
that the statesmen of the world realize the importance o f pur
suing processes which will really and in truth establish inter
national understanding, good will, and cooperation.
Open diplomacy and the orderly rule o f the people by the
peaceful processes of democratic or republican government is
the true remedy.
It is probably the only remedy, and the people alone can make
It effective in each of the several Nations. America can set a
good example. The success financially and commercially o f this
doctrine in America should encourage the people o f other coun
tries as they advance in the practice of democratic government'.
Let us still pray with our immortal Lincoln that government
o f the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish
from the earth.
E x h ib it
5 .— F r n n c o -R u s s ia n
E x h ib it
6 .— C h a p t e r
R u s s ia n
llH T K IT R
TO
SPEECH
OF
MR.
OW EN,
UNITW D
STATES
SE N A T O R
E x h ib it
E x h ib it
E x h ib it
E x h ib it
[E x h ib it s n ot q u o te d In sp eech a re a d d e d h e r e .]
1.— F r a n c o -R u s s la n tr e a ty , 1892.
2.— F r a n c o -R u s s la n m ilit a r y co n fe r e n c e , 1911.
8.— F ra n c o -K u s s ia n m ilit a r y c o n fe re n ce s , 1912.
4 .— F r a n c o -R u s s la n m ilit a r y co n fe r e n c e s , 1918.
78876— 11
FRO M
1 9 1 8 -1 7 .
E n te n te
E x h ib it 7 .—
F a ls ific a tio n — R u s s ia n
E x h ib it
8 .—
L e tte r ,
E x h ib it
9 .—
L e tte r ,
B r itis h
en ten te
G rey
O ran ge
E x h ib it
1 2 .— G e r m a n
E x h ib it
1 3 .— D is p a t c h ,
3,
M o lt k e
to
G rey,
1918,
dem and
on
p r a y in g
1 5 .—
W hat
term s
E x h ib it
1 6 .—
IIo w
E x h ib it
1 7 .—
K ille d
and
E x h ib it
1 8 .—
U n ite d
S ta te s
E x h ib it
1 9 .— C o s ts
of
E x h ib it
2 0 .— B o o k s
2 1 .— A b s t r a c t
sp eedy
has
has
E n te n te
te leg ra m ,
to
th e
was
of
P
th e
a r m is tic e
and
I
you
th e
rort
1918.
in
W o r ld
W ar.
of
N ovem ber
at
Jagow
of
S ie b c r t.
W
uropean
ar.
S n z o n o ff.
L e tte r,
J anu ary
1 9 1 4 .)
a tte n tio n
t e le g r a p h
d e c la r e d
of
your
agency
in
stea d ily
th e
E
tu b
to
18,
G erm an
b etw een
1918.
1 9 1 4 .)
th e
had
th e
W ar— D e
for
B e r lin
w ere
4,
V I.
W o r ld
R u s s ia n
r e la tio n s
r e la tio n s
are
a w a re,
G erm an
ce p ta b le
p osa l
to
has
E n g lish
not
fo r
h ere
th e
e x c e lle n c y
in
B e r lin ,
B ud get
im p r o v in g .
naval
and
th e
ic ith
th e
te
th a t
C o m m issio n
In
m in ister
E n g lish
th e
b etw een
lu te ly
no
sa m e
r e fe r en c e
G erm an
n a v ie s,
(Q u ite
a
m is s io n ”
n o u g h ts
a re
has
of
th e
m en
out
of
sm a ll
th e
th e
th e
a ll
th e
London
in
to ld
m e
le ss
in
of
th is
th is
th e
th e
of
be
cam e
C am bon
fleet
of
th e
la n d
c h ie fly
Thus
n a u g h t,
very
as
m u ch
of
rapproch em en t
fr o m
begu n
ceed
to
to
c e r ta in
ob serve
but
of
I
do
th e
not
r e g u la te
m ore
th e ir
th e
a lso
effo r ts
I
of
la c k
sh a re
in
th e
th e
th e se
p o litica l
G erm an
w o u ld
w o u ld
w o u ld
case
m ake
d e v o te d
fu tu r e
an
had
no
t»
c o n flic ts ,
im p o s s ib le
d is a r m a m e n t
c o n sta n t
he
tw o
fe a rs ,
and
in
rum ors
a grees
th a t
c o u n tr ie s
I
can
not
E n g la n d ,
A fr ic a ,
m ig h t
q u e stio n s.
From
G overn m en t
of
in
be
[R a th e r
fr o m
su sp en d
G osch en
c o u ld
G erm an y
w h ich
p o ssib ility
to
p ow ers
o p in io n
of
ta k en
A part
s u ffic e
case
be
n u m erou s
p ro
e x p e c t e d .]
sin ce
in terests
n eg o tia tio n s,
th e
great
was
w ork
be th r o w n
e a sily
re q u ir e s.
he
id e a
th e
case
b u ild
a d v e r tis e d
th ese
G erm an y
ec o n o m ic
to
w h ich
th ese
b etw een
a ll
a
as
h ow ever,
th is
c o u ld
th a t
in
is,
th a t
su ch
w h ose
sta te ,
sin ce
o th er
p e o p le
G er
w a r s h ip s
h ow ever,
fo r
w ho
not
F ran ce.
m uch
w h ic h
no
had,
w o u ld
and,
to
b u ild
G osch en ,
sh ip b u ild in g
a g a in st
by
m y
dread
he,
in
r e p lie d
r e la tio n s,
th a t
im p o r ta n t
a greem en t
cou rse,
fu lly
th o u g h t
it
a rm y;
w o r r ie d
A n g lo -G e r m a n
1 6 :1 0 ,
of
C a n a d ia n
of
c o n sta n tly
r e a s o n a b le
(n
had
fa c ts,
ord er
sa v in g s
th e
and
se c re ta ry
w orkm en
in
of
to
G erm an y
C a m b o n ],
th e
a bso
R u s s ia
a m ba ssa d or
w o u ld
y e a r ,"
d ir ec te d
to
is
A lth o u g h
be
in te r e sts
w h ic h
th e
Jagow ,
G e r m a n y — a ll
a ll
had
c o n fid e n c e ,
ya rd s
in te r r u p tio n
in
tir ely
p la c e
B e r lin
r e la tio n
th e
to
added,
im p a sse .
s i t u a t i o n ___ u n
p o s a ls
in
ra pproch em ent
so m eth in g
E n g lish
E n g lish
E n g lish
and
a
w ith
sou n d
ya rd s
th e
“ exem pt
th e
stren g th en in g
w o u ld
a
b etw een
in
th a t
of
a cc e p ta b le
a m ba ssa d or
id e a , sin ce
con seq u en ce
th e
th e
in v o lu n ta r ily,
r a ilw a y
p roposal
str ict
s h ip b u ild in g
E n g la n d
r eg a rd in g
to
The
sh ip b u ild in g
w h ich
th e
accordan ce
an sw er.
he
B r itish
sh ip b u ild in g
a pprove
of
occu rred
d e s i r e s . ’ *)
p r o p o r tio n ,
to
a lso h a v e to d o t h e s a m e .
M y
F ren ch
c o lle a g u e
[J u le s
a sk ed
S t.
m y
a ssu ra n ces
and
a ssu m p tio n
in
a ll
o p in io n s
e s ta b lis h
e x p la n a tio n s
not
by
p r iv a te
sh ip s
th is,
to
m y
em p lo ym en t, w h erea s
by
of
ta k in g
to
pro
a sk ed
I
th is,
w ere
on e q u a rter
“ d ip lo m a tic
As
are
G erm an
and
th is
as
and
th e
c a b in e t
had
ac
th is
a ssu ra n ces
lea d
th a t
of
e c o n o m ic
lo c a lit y
or
e v a s iv e
o p in io n ,
of
over
m e,
an
m u tu a l
fr o m
in s tr u c te d
u n r e lia b le
fin a lly
exch a n ge
a gree.
year,
t o ld
h im
n a m ely,
a ffir m e d
sc a r c e ly
w h o le
been
th e
fo r
n eg o tia tio n s
E ?ig lish
e n tir e ly
p r o p o sitio n s.
e x p la in e d ,
u su a l,
th e
p rop osa l
ex c lu d e d
c o u ld
g iv e n
th a t
th e
y e a r ,"
im p r o v e m e n t
m ig h t
as
re m o te
c o lle a g u e
a
be
of
was
exem pt
rec u r r in g
an
c o n sta n t
to
C h u r c h ill’s
E n g lish
fo r
su ch
w h ich
th a t
lim ite d
“ h is to r ic
G osch en
to
“
d ecla res
no
th a t
r e la tio n
C h u r c h ill,
an
c o n sta n tly
w ere
th a t
of
Jagow
e ffe ct
was
and
A fr ic a .
m any
id e a
th e
by
c o u n tr ie s.
v a lu e
to
th e
a dvanced
B erlin
th a t
p rop osed
to
th e
th e
re p ly
was
A s
h ow
and
London
no
as
a cc ep ted .
th o u g h t
b o th
G o sc h e n ’s
A s
re la tio n s
London
rem a rk ed
1 6 :1 0 ,
p resen t
to
A n g lo -G e r m a n
tw een
be
th e
c o lle a g u e
sta te sm e n
provoked
T ir p itz
fle e t,
G erm an y.
c o u ld
J am es
in
14,
sta te m e n ts.
W ar.
c o n d itio n s
th e
c a lle d
th e
d e c la r a tio n
m u tu a l
N ovem ber
w ounded
r e p a r a t io n s
19
of
S ta te
O r
m e n tio n e d .
A s
to
N o.
A n g lo -G e r m a n
Foeh
W o r ld
and
3 1 -F e b r u a r y
t e le g r a m
C le m e n c e a u ,
s u p p o rt.
W ar.
A m b n ssa d or
c o m m u n ic a tio n
p assage.
q u o ted .
ntbn tb
R u s s ia n
of
F ran eo-
p a id — K e y n e s .
in
( F e b r u a r y —J u l y ,
th a t
1912.
(B a ils m a n ),
fo r
by
G erm an y
k ille d
d ip lo m a c y
E
urth er
S ec r e ta r y
23,
A m e ric a n
E X H IB IT
m y
1914.
p a id — c o m p a r a tiv e
w ounded
W o r ld
E x h ib it
The
of
L lo y d -G e o r g e ,
im p o s e d
G erm an y
m uch
Focb,
fo r
1 4 .— A r m i s t i c e
In
W o r ld -s e c r e t
(B a u sm a n ).
B e lg iu m
G eneral
E x h ib it
th e
th e
22, 1912.
N ovem ber
p r e p a r a tio n s
su m m ary
E x h ib it
(8 8 7 .
Book
C am bon. N ovem ber
m ilita r y
1 1 .— V o n
June
to
C am bon
E x h ib it
F
and
m em o.
E x h i b i t 1 0 .— R u s s ia n
la n d o ,
D ip lo m a c y
d o cu m e n ts.
p o ssib ility
OKLAH OM A.
tre a ty ,
X IT .
provem ent
A P P E N D IC E S .
23
ju d g in g
to
in
free
once
W ill
p le a se
what
I
an
im
th e r e
th e
is
th ey
tim e
th e
en
have
pro
to
»
a b le
to
le a d
am
a
fu tu r e.
m y se lf
in
fin a lly
h ere
of
B r itish ;
im p r e ssio n
th ese
aaooaa
£3
t v k o is s s h d m o j
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
24
efforts make upon leading cir cle s in England.
[T h e y
m ade
very
(8 4 1 .
little
The
R u s s ia n
am b assad or
ruary
I m p r e s s i o n .]
(8 3 8 .
The
sam e
to
th e
nam e.
C o n fid e n tia l
12.
•
•
•
g r o w in g
A c c o r d in g
m ilita r y
to
w h o lly
stre n g th
rep o rt,
c o n fid e n tia l
of
F ebru ary
2 7 -M a r c h
Yonr
1 9 1 4 .)
R u s s ia
la
rep o rts
c a u s in g
r e a c h in g
ever
m e,
m ore
th e
a n x ie ty
th e
c a ta stro p h e
Is a x io m a t ic
(8 3 9 .
The
In
e ith e r
o f th e
sam e
a
p o lic y
to
th e
m ilita r y
of
th e
or an
e c o n o m ic
w ay,
th e
C o n fid e n tia l
le tte r ,
M arch
2 7 -A p r il
9,
1 9 1 4 .)
The
u n fr ie n d ly
a ttitu d e
ever
s in c e
th e
has
m u ch
Im p ro v e d
upon
R u s s ia ,
th a t
fa c t
b e g in n in g
of
no
to
d is to r tio n s .
T h is
c ite m e n t
dow n.
s t a n t ly
ta ry
d ie
fro m
a
is
m en
and
T h is
m a n y’s
fe a r
a re
by
th is
or
S o u th
la te r
p r o b a b ly
com e
th ro u g h
cou rse,
I
due
ary
even
th e
le a s t,
th e
ren ew al
w h ic h ,
fo r c e
12,
is
of
to
th is
is
m u ch
of
our
to
G er
T h ey
b etw een
p r e p a r a tio n s
a b ilit y
a
of
c o n flic t
th e
m u st
h ere.
A u s tr ia .
rep o rted
p e r s o n a lly ;
d is tu r b e d
our
arm y
c o n v ic tio n .
is
even
Our
th is
perh aps
is
w o u ld
by
of
m ore
m a n i
c o m p a tr io ts
fe e lin g
th e ir
to
t a lc s
w ho
m e.
are
to
have
le tt e r
Of
m u ch
d o u b t,
th e
of
in
R u s s ia
p rep ared n
m ay
th e
e x is tin g
so,
F ebru
fu r th e r m o r e ,
w h ic h
m in d
of
ta k e n
m ilita r y
1917,
th e
my
m easu res
no
in
upon
In
our
is
tre a ty
p r e y in g
p r e fe r
th e
and
T h ere
c o m m e r c ia l
G erm an y,
lo n g
fr e q u e n t ly
w a r lik e
p ow er.
th e
In
m ili
m u s t c o n ta in so m e k e rn e l o f tr u th ; a ll th e m o r e
my
p r o b a b ly ,
as
of
test
in c re a se
su ch
fa v o r a b le
in flu e n c e
th e
c o n flic t
su ch
R u s s ia
G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t, a s I rep o rted
2 7 -M a r c h
to w a rd
A t
th e
n o t d o u b te d
to w a rd
have
on
That
h o s tilit y
a
ex
con
o p in io n
th e ir
m ilita ry
e n t ir e ly
th e
h ear
m a n ife stly
fo r
or
s e r io u s
le t
I
p u b lic
of
th is
or
so
ec o n o m ic
our
a tta c k s
w h e r e in
due
and
R u s s ia .]
a p p a r e n tly
and
m om en t
[D e p e n d in g
d a lly
not
secret
is
sin ce
th e
e x a g g era ted , b u t th e y
6 in c e
fa v o r a b le
n eig h b o r ,
to
no
m ilita r y
th is
to
not
our
lo a n s
is
here
can
of
c o m p le te .
G erm an y
fe st,
m ake
does
R u s s ia ,
fe e lin g
m ost
m ake
a p p a re n t,
w in te r ,
p u b lis h in g
h ow ever,
a g a in s t
w a r lik e
ea ste r n
to
o n ly
n o tic e a b le
la s t
in v e n tio n s
p ress
q u ie t,
its
of
fr e e
G erm an
ever
becam e
ceased
m is s e d
Ju n k ers
and
th e
m ea n s
com e soon er
In
is
has
Is
m o s tly
is
as
w h ic h
S a n d e r s e p is o d e
p ress
th e
sou rce,
in c rea se
h er
banks
of
P r u s s ia n
th e
and
no
F rench
th e
von
c o m p a r a tiv e
arou sed
ex c ite m e n t
of
th a t
G erm an y
as
The
R u s s ia ,
T h is
r e lia b le
R u s s ia ,
L im a n
o p p o rtu n ity
a ttitu d e
s till
m ood.
th in k
th e
la te .
a lth o u g h
u n fa v o r a b le
G erm an y
to w a rd
of
p rove
B e r lin
tre a ty
ss.
th a t
le s s
c a b in e t,
r e m a in
in
a s p o s s ib le .
N e v e r th e le s s
I
am
of
th e
o p in io n ,
in
w h ic h
I
am
c o n fir m e d
by
th e
the Berlin cabinet dors not
share th e vie w s of th e bellicose e lem en ts o f Germany, which p r o fe s s to
desire an im m ediate arm ed conflict w ith Russia. The German Gov
ern m en t p re fe r s to try all p e a ce fu l m ean s tow ard reco n cilia tio n b efore
taking an y d e c i s i v e step. A m o n g t h e s e m e a n s o n e o f t h e m o s t i m
secret
in fo r m a tio n s
p o rta n t
is
th e
in c id e n ta l
fu lly
c o m m e r c ia l
n e g o tia tio n s
d r a fte d
(8 4 0 .
m e n tio n e d
S a zo n o ff
la c k
th e
to
to
th e
R u s s ia n
ire
fr e q u e n tly
w h ic h
an
w o u ld
organ
su ch
been
u n ite
as
The
corresp on d en ce
la y s
w h ic h
have
an
to
th e
c a b in e t d o e s
not
we
th e ir
v ie w s .
a re
th a t
m e r e ly
I
to
at
th e
h ere
lin e s
fo r
of
London.
N o.
a
th e
care
T e le g r a m .
11
th e
enough
to
in
G rey
in st r u ctio n s
in
[a t
in
as
th e
to
th re e
of
th is
of
lo s e s
as
m a tter.
a c tio n
in
not
are
e x a g g e r a tio n ],
soon
as
to
m ore
you r
of
T e le g r a m ,
Feb
r e c e iv e d .
b y t e le g r a p h ic
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w o u ld
in s ta n c e d
I
d e c is io n s
case
th e
of
o f th e
be a v o id e d
th re e p o w e rs
A lb a n ia ,
w h ith e r
and
w o u ld
th e
th e
In flu e n c e
be en h an ced .
P r in c e
of
W ie d
w as
to
Grey r e
p lied th a t in the ca s e m en tion ed by m e the Triple Alliance had th e ad
v a n t a g e o f being able to a c t , w h ile th e Triple E ntente cou ld o n ly d e fe n d
i t s e l f again st en cr o a ch m e n ts. H ow ever, Grey raised no o b je c t i o n to
y o u r proposal, and told me that hr was plea sed to a c c e p t it. and s u g
g e s t e d that I should m e et him to-m orrow , Thursday. He has a lr ea d y
in fo rm ed Cambon o f this, w ho has m ade a sim ilar s ta t e m e n t to him
this m orning.
proceed,
(8 4 2 .
b e fo r e
v a r io u s
S a z o n o ff to
th e
im p o r ta n t
R u s s ia n
M arch
q u e s tio n s
had
am bassad or at
2 0 -A p r il
2,
1914.
been
P a r is .
N o.
s o lv e d .
C o n fid e n tia l le tt e r ,
2 3 .)
In y o u r le t t e r o f March 6-18 you m en tion ed t h e question o f a c lo s e r
union b etw een Russia and England and expressed th e w ish to a scer ta in
m y vie w s upon this s u b je ct ( I s w o l s k y ' s i n q u i r y w a s p r o b a b l y t h e r e s u l t
of
F ren ch
r e a c tio n
to
S a zo n o ff’s
regret
th a t
th ere
w as
“ la c k ”
of
an
th e m o r e so s i n c e t h e r e
w as a possibility that this question w ould be to u ch e d u pon by th e
lea d ers o f French and English fo r eig n p o licy d u rin g th e im p e n d in g H a d
o f K in g G eorge to Paris. I th e r e fo r e co n s id e r it m y d u ty to in fo rm y o u
that a fu r t h e r r e i n fo r c e m e n t and d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e so c a lled Triple
Entente, and, if possible, its tra n sfo rm a tio n into a n ew trip le allian ce
appears to m e to be a dem and o f the p r e s en t hour. Whilst th o r o u g h l y
in su rin g th e in tern ation al position of France, Russia, and England, an
a llian ce o f this n a tu re would, beca u se o f its lack o f any t h o u g h t o f c o n
q u e s t o n the part o f th e p o w ers m e n t i o n e d , t h r e o t e n n o o n e , b u t s i g n i f y
the best g u a r a n ty f o r th e p re s erv a tio n o f th e p e a c e o f Europe. ( W o u l d
organ
have
fa c ilita tin g
done
th a t
S a z o n o f f 's
In te rc o u rse
by
of
s ta b iliz in g
s o lic it u d e
fo r
th e
E n te n te ),
In te r n a tio n a l
th e
peace
of
r e la tio n s .
E urope
A t
th e
c o u ld
sam e
not
be
tim e
ta k e n
i t s arridre p e n s ie.)
Certain step s h a v e alrea d y been undertaken by France, and England
w ith r e g a rd to w ork in g out a plan fo r th e m ost u n ifo rm a ctio n possible
and f o r a m o r e p r e c i s e definition of m utual obligation s. O b v i o u s l y , w o
s e r io u s ly ; It h a d
to o
m u st
w ork
q u e s tio n s
fo r
in
m ig h t
th e
be
sam e
jo in e d
d is c u s s io n — s u b je c ts
lis h
in te r e s ts
In
d ir e c tio n ,
to
n
w h ic h
n u m erou s
w h o le
w hereby
s e r ie s
im p in g e
of
h e a v ily
a
num ber
s u b je c ts
upon
of
in c id e n ta l
w h ic h
R u s s ia n
are
r ip e
and
Eng
fie ld s .
As y ou a rc aw are, t h e in n er situ ation o f England is at p r e s e n t su ch
that it w h o lly absorbs th e a tte n tio n o f the R oyal G overn m en t an d of
th e public. ( D i s t u r b a n c e s i n I r e l a n d a n d l a b o r q u e s t i o n s . ) Under t h e se
c i r cu m s ta n ce s th e soil fo r in tern a tion a l a g r e em en ts , c o n c e r n in g w h ich
the English, in a cco r d a n ce w ith th e ir n atu re, are so s e n s i t i v e , is m o s t
u nfa vora b le, and w e m ust, th e r e fo r e, n o l e n s v o l e n s , pu rsue this o b je c t
w ith the g re a te st caution.
In spite, o f this, I sh a re y ou r opinion that it w ou td not prove, inex
p e d ien t if Poincarfi and D oum crgue ( F r e n c h m i n i s t e r o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ) ,
on th e occasion o f th e m e etin g unth K ing George, and his m i n i s t e r ( S i r
F . d w a r d G r e y ) , w ou ld in con fid en ce in d ica te to them that a c lo s e r a g r e e
m ent b e tw e e n Russia and England w ould also be hailed in France, as
an au sp iciou s e v e n t, w h ich w ould p r o v e equ ally desirable to all th r ee
p a r tn er s in th e Triple Entente. T h e e s t a b l i s h i n g o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s
upon
w h ic h
n a tu r a lly
a p o lit ic a l c o n v e n tio n
have
to
be
th e
of
su b je c t
and
tio n
or
London ;
has
it
c o n s is te n tly
t r e a t y .)
sim ila r
but
T h is
th is
of
c o n v e n tio n
b etw ee n
is
s o r t m ig h t be c o n c lu d e d
d ir e c t
p o s s ib le
d e n ie d
m ig h t
de
o b je c t
s h o u ld
of
a ctin g
and
its
(8 4 3 .
The
R u s s ia n
th e n
R u s s ia
am b assad or
th e
c o m m u n ity
grou p
of
As
E n te n te
th e
w e
c o n fe re n c e
w ill
S a z o n o ff.
3 9 .)
n e g o tia tio n s
w o u ld
b etw ee n
th a t
th a t
th e re
R crve
and
th e
S t.
ns
a
F ren ch
w as
b a sis
a
p o litic a l
fo r
conven
w o r k in g
out
a
E n g la n d .
London
a ffa ir s .
th e
still
th a t
le a d s
year’s
la s t
o p p o s ite
s lig h t
sen se
th is
of
e s t a b lis h
th ereb y
la c k
perh aps
pow ers
th e
a
c o n fer e n c e
p rogress
G rey
com m on
th is
convene
London
le a s t
to
fro m
but
pow ers
its e lf,
th e
a m b a ssa d o ria l
it,
th e
and
o u r se lv e s
to
N o.
G overn m en t
w ou ld co n sid e r it u se fu l to p ropose to Grey to com m u n ica te to us <r»
co m m o n th e co n te n ts o f th e political co n v e n tio n w h ich you speak o f as
h a v in g been co n clu d ed b etw een England and France. ( T h e B r i t i s h
2 3 2 .)
c o n v in c e
v iew s
a g a in
upon
le a s t
to
r e s u lt in g
d e s ir e
in s is t
w h ile
sp ea k
le a g u e r e c e i v e s
76870—
not
d e lib e r a tin g
w ea k
you
at
1914.
a b le
e ffe c t on
r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s
F or
coh eren ce,
beg
in ju r io u s
fu r th e r
p rop osa l
th ro u g h
th e ir
12,
th e
th e
yea r.
s h a ll
p r e p a r in g
a lo n g
252
w e ig h t o f th e
G overnm en t
have
organ
p ow ers,
London
are
am b assad or
3 0 -F e b r u a r y
la st
we
th ey
en ergy
P a r is .
la te
an
so
s p e c ia l
and
P e te rsb u rg
Janu ary
Of
tre a ty ,
w ith
th a t
p la n .
*
Copy
above,
cau sed
j
e x p r e s s io n
E n t e n t e .]
sam e.
N o.
London
1914.
Cambon r e c e iv e d t h e n e ce s s a r y in stru ction s y e s te r d a y , a r i d 7 i n
f o r m e d Grey to-day o f y o u r proposal.
I told him that, co n s id e r in g the
w a n t o f an adequate organ, such as last y e a r ’s ambassador ial c o n f e r
e n ce, you t h o u g h t it n e c e s s a r y to a rra n ge fo r o n ex chan ge o f v ie w s on
th e p e n d in g question s, in ord er to a rr iv e i n this w a y at a p relim in a ry
a g r e e m e n t b etw een th e th r ee e n t e n t e pow ers. I n t h i s w a y t h e d e l a y s
s e r io u s
a t B e r lin .
In th e opinion o f German G overn m en t circles, the
n ew h ea v y s ie g e a r t ille r y in Russia trill he finished by 1916, and from
that m om en t Russia will step into th e lists as a m ost form idable fo e
w ith w h om G ermany toill h a v e to cr o ss arms.
No w o n d e r that in v i e w o f such con sideration s the Germans are
stra in in g e v e r y n e r v e to be re a d y fo r w a r wi'.'i us, and no w o n d e r that
t h e y try to in tim id a te us, so as to a v ert the suspicion that Germ any
is afraid o f Russia. N everth eless it is m y co n v ictio n that b etw een all
the lines p rin ted about Russo-German relations in th e German n e w s
papers o f late on e m a y a lw ays read fe a r o f Russia. [ R e f e r s t o t h e
cry
o f t h e G e r m a n s : Die ru s s is ch e
Gefahr — t h e R u s s i a n p e r i l . ] In
con clu sion , let me express th e h o p e that t h e y are not in erro r about
this at Berlin, and th a t w e are a ctu a lly taking all m easu res fo r
s tr e n g t h e n in g our m ilitary p o w er, w h i c h m u s t co m p e l Germany to
h es ita te b e fo r e no m ea su res so as to b r i n g h er p re p a r ed n ess fo r w a r
to the h ig h e s t pitch. [ S w e r b e i e f f , k n o w i n g t h a t t h i s w o u l d b r i n g o n
te le g r a m
at
6 -1 8 ,
our
fo rc e.
F ren ch
c o l
at
P a r is
A p r il
A fte r
u se
of
sa tio n
th e
th e
in
r e c e ip t
fir st
of
your
o p p o r tu n ity
regard
to
th e
S a zo n o ff.
M arch
m ore
q u e s tio n
L e tte r,
M arch
27-
1 9 1 4 .)
of
le tte r
once
to
9,
of
to
a
2 0 -A p r il
en gage
c lo s e r
2,
N o.
D ou m ergu e
23,
in
u n d e r s ta n d in g
I
m ade
conver
b e tw e e n
D ou m ergue con firm ed to me in th e m ost d e cis iv e
m a n n er his in ten tion o f speaking to Grey, d u rin g th e im pendin g m eetin g ,
to th e e ffe c t that an a g r e e m e n t o f this n a tu re w as h ig h ly desirable. He
b e liev es that it w ill p r o v e v e r y e a s y to bring fo r th co n v i n c i n g a rg u m e n ts
in fa v o r o f this th o u g h t, because it is most obvious that, in asm u ch as
F ran ce has s p ecia l m ilitary and n aval u n d ersta n d in g s with Russia and
R u s s ia
and
E n g la n d .
u u o ;x -m T V N O is s a a o N O D
rs
RECORD.
C O N G R E S S IO N A L
25
England, this system m ust be coordina ted and com p lem en ted by co r r e
spondin g u n d erstan din gs between Russia and England. D oumergue be
lieves that th e Russo-English a g reem en t would h a v e to be in the form
o f a naval con ven tion , and that this would re n d er n e c e s s a r y t ech n ica l
co n su lta tio n s between the three staffs o f admiralty. (Russian. F r e n c h ,
the v i e w s y ou r e x cellen cy entertain ed re g a rd in g th e n e c e s s i t y o f a still
c lo s e r union b etw een th e Triple Entente, a c co r d in g to w h ich e v e n r*
allian ce a ft e r th e p a ttern of th e t h r ee o t h e r p o w ers was n ot excluded.
■ nd
a llia n c e .
B r i t i s h .)
T T ff/r r e g a r d to the political co m p a ct betw een England and France,
w hich is to be com m un icated to us a f t e r con su lta tion w ith Qrey, Doum e rg u e assu red me that France and England w e r e n ot bound by p o s itiv e
p olitical obligations, but that, should th e cou rse o f eiwnts lead to c o m
mon a ction on th e part o f both p ow ers, they w ou ld ad h ere to th e t e c h
n ical a r r a n g e m e n t s worked out by the g en era l staffs. ( Q u i t e t h e w o r s t
fo rm
of
‘‘ a llia n c e ”
ad versary
th e
and
p o litic a l
th e re
le a v e s
opponent
Is,
becau se
It
casus fo e d e r is
th e
can
not
d e fin e
conveys
no
w a r n in g
d e te r m in a b le
to
h im s e lf, a s
by
he
to
th e
c ir c u m s ta n c e s
can
e a s ily
do
In
D oumcrguc added that he did not
r e m e m b e r w h e th e r the fo r eg o in g was expressed in a definite form ula,
but h e p ro m ised to look up th e docu m en ts in the a rch iv es o f the m in
istry , and to bear in mind the w ish es w h ich w e h ave expressed.
case
of
Up
“ d e fe n s iv e ”
to
th e
p resen t
c o n v e r s a tio n
I
s h a ll
cu ss
(8 4 4 .
w ith
m ake
w ith
an
h im
The
a lli a n c e s .)
I
have
P o in c a r ^
e ffo r t
th e
to
upon
see
c o n te n ts
R u s s ia n
not
had
th is
h im
at
m e,
E d w a rd
to ld
G rey
me
th a t
o p p o r tu n ity
of
dor,
had
w h ic h
m anner
h is
how
v is it.
req u ested
s in c e
s e e in g
not
me
He
w ho
had
to ld
p erson al
save
hnd
me
th a t
ta k e n
part
In
he
th e
s t ill
h is
at
E re.
retu rn
and
my
But
to
d is
S a ro n o ff.
h im ,
P a r is
p resen ce
to
th e
L e tte r,
not
d e s c r ib e
th in k
th o se
A p ril
upon
had
th e
to
had
F rench
me
in
r e c e iv in g
no
o th e r
am b assa
a
v e r ita b le
w h ic h h e h a d r e c e iv e d o n
he
of
and,
he
of
im p r e s s io n
a ls o
th e
w as
m e r e ly
K in g
and
g iv in g
of
a ll
th e n
th ere
corded
bore
had
w as
T h e ir
th e
v is it.
“ c r is is ”
M a je s tie s
as
d e e p ly
in
upon
a
any
T h a t,
on
o f sin c e r e
It rested
of
R u s s i a .)
a ll
sort
Id
in
th a t
th e
F ran ce
as
E urope;
a d d itio n
o c c a s io n s
sy m p a th y .
t h e c o n c lu s io n
root
o f th is
to
sta m p
d raw n
ta k e n
no
w ent
to
and
From
p a r tic u la r ly
th is
E n g la n d ,
fir m
s h o r tly
th is ,
th e
w h erever
fu n d a m e n ta l
in
and
th ey
th e
B r itis h
Id e a
o f th e
and
th a t
e n d u r in g
a fte r w a r d s
r e c e p tio n
in
ac
appeared
G overnm en t
E n te n te
had
con sequ en ce
b a s is .
On this o cca s io n Grey spoke w ith a w arm th w h ich is n ot usual w ith
him and w h ich p r o v e d that h e m ade his d e d u ctio n s from firm ly
g r o u n d e d ju d g m e n t. The intention by w h ich he w as g o v e r n e d in asking
m e to c o m e and s ee him, in order to make such a com m u n ication to me,
is e n t i r e ly clear. He w is h ed to a n n o u n ce to me the b egin n ing o f a
ph ase o f a still clo s e r ra p p roch em en t to France. This in ten tion beca m e
still m ore obvious to m e upon his rem arking to me w ith o u t an y prelim i
n aries, th a t I w as d o u b tlessly in form ed about th e c o n v e rs a tio n w h ich he
had had w ith D ou m ergue on the s u b ject o f Russia. He told m e that
it had been im possib le fo r him in Paris, being at a d ista n ce from his
co ll e a g u e s , to do m ore than express his p ersonal a s se n t to the plan, a c
c o r d i n g to w h ich th e G overn m en ts o f England and F rance w e r e to
in fo rm th e Russian G overn m en t o f all m ilitary c o n v e n ti o n s existing
b e tw e e n England and France. ( T h e R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d d e s i r e d
th a t
on
fo r m e r
o c c a s io n s ,
w ith o u t
su ccess,
G rey
to
U ls te r
to ld
me
convene
q u e s tio n
th a t,
th e
to
h is
c a b in e t
and
th e
great
fo r
re g re t,
th is
budget
it
p u rp ose
dem anded
had
not
d u r in g
th e
been
th is
e n tir e
p o s s ib le
fir st
fo r
w eek ; th e
a tte n tio n
of
th e
7 said o n ly a f e w w o r d s in rep ly .
I thanked Sir Edward Grey fo r
his co m m u n ica tio n and told h i m that I knew h o w to ap p recia te its
sig n ifica n ce to its full extent. [ B e n c k e n d o r f f r e a l i z e d t h a t a n a v a l o r
c o n v e n tio n
fa r -r e a c h in g
in g
tio n
of
of
o n la n c e
su ch
h is
a
e ffe c ts
w ith
upon
a g ree m e n ts
ow n
l i t t l e in
e ffo r ts
G reat
th e
w o u ld
W e
g la d s o m e
B r ita in ,
or
in te r n a tio n a l
hnve
fin d ,
been
th e n ,
a n tic ip a tio n
b o th
of
s itu a tio n .
a
m ost
th a t
o f th e
th is
th ese,
w o u ld
B e s id e s ,
s a tisfa c to r y
san e
m an
p r o m is e d
sta te
th e
have
m ak
c u lm in a
lo s e s
h is
o f a ffa ir s
w h e n e v e r h e w r ite s o f I t .)
7 su m m ed up the situation to the e ffect
that if th e two g o v e r n m e n t s should communicate, to us their m ilitary
c o n v e n t i o n s [ g o i n g a s t e p f u r t h e r , B e n c k e n d o r f f w a n t e d n o t o n l y a naval
b u t a l s o a m ilita ry c o n v e n t i o n ) , th e Russian G overnm ent would r e s e r v e
th e p r i v i le g e o f m a k i n g a c o r re sp o n d in g proposal upon a n analogous
basis to th e British Government, I told him that I assum ed h e knew
76876— 11------- 4
yon
to o
th a t,
A
as
d e fin ite
an
dent
in
In
h im
th e
fin d
to
and
th e
an
a llia n c e
as
p o s s ib le .
d iffic u ltie s
th e
even
r e a liz e
tie d
of
su ch
to
m ake
T u rkey,
th e
and
n e c e s s ity
w ith
th a t
dow n
h o s tile
R u s s ia
th e
an
by
of
F ran ce
N o rth
p o s s ib le
of
R u s s ia
N one
to
of
fin d
th e se
term s
A fr ic a .
becau se
a lm o s t t o t a l a b s e n c e
in v e stm e n ts.
b etw ee n
o f d e fin ite
and
w as
a g ree m e n ts;
co n ta ct
a llia n c e
B a lk a n s ,
[F r e n c h
im p e r ia lis m
d e fin ite
p o in ts
an
Fran ce.
B r itis h
of
of
c o llid in g
c a p ita l
fa c to rs
and
w ere
of
e v i
r e l a t i o n s .)
to
th a t
he
th e
sam e.
in fo r m s
he
had
F ren ch
th e
be
m any
R u s s ia
am bassad or
w h ic h
a fte r
to -d a y
to
G erm an y, on
sam e
u n d ersta n d
to
to o
p r o fita b le
The
an sw er
fa ile d
b etw ee n
a v e rsio n
F rench
nam e
a llia n c e
C h in a ,
A n g lo -R u s s ia n
to
c o n s id e r
conceded
no
P e r s ia ,
(8 4 5 .
The
not
had
w ere
a llia n c e
to
d id
a ls o
in s titu tio n
in te r e s ts ,
F ran ce
he
F ra n ce, and
com m on
c o lo n ia l
have
th e re
B r ita in ,
th e ir
we
la r g e
p o s s ib le ,
th a t
p e r s o n a lly
sta te sm e n
In d e e d ,
G reat
I
added :
see,
w as
had
g iv e n
M.
M ay
th a t
s u b m itte d
m in is te r
R u ssia n
L e tte r,
me
to
m ode
G overn m en t
of
th e
e v e n in g
m in is te r ia l
in
c le a r
1 9 1 4 .)
la s t
th e
D ou m ergue
hnd
3 -1 6 ,
G rey
P a r is
to
h im
in
th e
gave
c o u n c il
h is
ow n
e x p e d ie n c y
corresp on d en ce
w h ic h
had
order
that the lit. P e te rs b u rg cabinet m ig h t begin n eg o tia tio n s to con clu de
an a g r e e m e n t on t h e same basis r e g a rd in g th e e v e n tu a l cooperation
o f the Russian and English navies. Sir Edward had remarked, in addi
tion, that the m inisterial cou n cil had a pproved o f this answ er. He
(G r e y )
r e s e r v e d th e rig h t o f in fo rm in g me o f t h i s ; but as the pro
posal had o r ig in a ted with D oum ergue h e co n sid e re d it n ece s s a r y first to
in fo rm him o f the d ecision o f the B ritish cabinet.
ta k e n
p la c e
b e tw e e n
A c c o r d in g
be
as
to
S ir
th e
F rench
E d w a r d ’s
and
v ie w ,
th e
th e
E n g lis h
course
G o v e r n m e n ts,
of
th e
in
p r o c e e d in g s
m ig h t
fo llo w s :
A fter authorization by his G overnm ent, Cambon w ou ld in form me
o f th e ex chan ge o f n otes, w h ilst at th e sam e tim e iflr Edward, on his
part, w ou ld co m m u n ica t e the sa m e to me in o r d e r that I m ay in form
th e Russian G overnm ent. J u s t as th e a g r e e m e n ts e n t e r e d in to with
F rance provide, in th e e v e n t o f a casus belli, first of all fo r the coop era
tion o f the arm ies, so, a cco r d in g to Fir Edward Grey, th e n atu re o f
thin gs dem ands that the even tu a l a greem etits w ith Russia should rela te
to th e navy. The n eg otia tion s w ou ld, in co n se q u e n c e, h a ve to be ca r
ried on betw een th e Russian and English staffs o f admiralty. The
n egotiation s w ith F rance took p la ce at the tim e in London, and the
F ren ch m ilitary and naval a tta ch e s in London t ra v e le d to P aris in order
to obtain the in stru ctio n s w h ich o cca sion re n d e r e d n ece ss a ry . Finally,
P rin ce Louis o f B a tr cn b erg tcent to Paris quite inofficially in o r d er to
co o r d in a te th e a g re em en ts . [ F i r s t L o r d o f t h e A d m i r a l t y , b u t b y n o
m eans
of
a
a n av a l e x p e rt, so
p o litic a l
Cam bon
in g s .
th e
w as
H e
th a t
th e
c o o r d in a tio n
in
q u e stio n
w a s p r o b a b ly
c h a r a c t e r .)
c o m m u n ic a te d
to ld
of
it
th e
o p in io n
w o u ld
me
n e g o tia tio n s
be
th a t,
m ig h t
th a t
a fte r
n ecessary
a c c o r d in g
to
to
be c o n d u c ted
th e
corresp on d en ce
d e te r m in e
th e
o p in io n
p r e c is e ly
th e
of
as
in
had
fu rth e r
S ir
th e
been
p roceed
E d w a rd
case o f
G rey,
F ia n c e ,
i. c . , that our n aval a t ta c h 6 in London w ou ld be e m p o w e r e d to e n ter
into n egotia tion s w ith the B ritish adm iralty staff, a f t e r he had been
g i v e n in stru ction s in St. P etersb u rg, fo r e v e n re p e a te d jo u r n e y s on th e
part o f th e naval a t ta ch 6 would in no w is e aro u se pu blic attention,
w h erea s the arrival o f m ore prom inen t Russian naval officers in London
would s u r ely b e co m e known and m ig h t lead to u ndesirable co m m en ts
(a n d
th u s
In fo r m
(8 4 6 .
U pon
G rey
in
Ms
m et
ow n
th e
nam e.
had
tio n s
fo r
London
h im
G rey
of
not yet
or
10
T r ip le
added,
th e
fo u n d
of
d ays.
w hat
he
A llia n c e ).
L e tte r,
fr o m
M ay
P a r is
had
th a t
it p o s s ib le
day,
He
G rey,
had
to
w h ic h
been
In
5 -1 8 ,
C am bon
to ld
s in c e
d iffic u ltie s
th e
c o n v e r s a tio n s .
8
th e
sam e.
to
q u e stio n s
P a r is
to
of
th e
to
because
Im p o rta n t
m em bers
sam e
c o n fir m e d
d a ily ,
th a t he
th e
The
retu rn
my
bad
P o in c a r S
h is
retu rn
I r e la n d
ta k e up
re fe r re d
o b lig e d
h ow ever, had
and
th e
and
w ith
to
to
1 9 1 4 .)
In fo rm e d
fo r e ig n
to
had
b u d g e t,
so
c o lle a g u e s
p o stp o n e
rep o rted
th a t
C a b in e t
th e
h is
me
D ou m ergue
a ffa ir s
th e se
A sq u ith
th e
and
qu es
on
h is
Asquith had an
s w e r e d that he saw no in su rm oun table difficulties a g a in st c a r r y in g out
th e plan p ro p osed in Paris. Since then Asquith has re p e a te d this to
Cambon him self. The la tter has been able to establish th e fa ct that
th e p rim e m in ister is v e r y fa v ora b ly d isposed to plans o f th a t kind.
T hese re fe r , con seq u en tly , to e v e n tu a l m ilita ry c o n v e n tio n s betw een
Russia and England an alogou s to th ose w h ich exist b etw een F rance and
England. The la tter w ou ld be com m u n ica ted to u s in con fidence, w h e r e
upon th e Russian G overnm ent w ou ld h a v e to make an alogou s proposals
to t h e B ritish G overnm ent, w h ich , a cco r d in g to the nature o f things,
w ou ld r e f e r m ore to th e n a v y than to the army.
I t is n ot to be a ssu m ed that all m em b ers o t the Cabinet w ill g iv e
t h eir sanction to this beforeh an d and w ith o u t opposition. [ F e e l i n g
jo u r n e y .
m in is te r s .
m ilita r y
He
R u s s ia n
h o w e v e r .)
He w a s able to .in form m e to-day th a t he had spoken o f this to th e
p rim e m i n i s t e r im m e d ia t ely u pon his re tu rn to L o n d o n ; th e la t te r
s h a r ed his opinion and had no o b je ct io n s to make again st the plan
p roposed. The w h o le affair was, h o w e v e r , ess en tia lly o f su ch importnnee th a t it cou ld n ot b e d e cid ed upon w ith o u t th e a s se n t o f th e
ca b in et-cou n cil.
h im
“ A s
r e p lie d
th a t
and
h is
th o se
Orey told me that t h e se im pression s had ex ceed ed his ex pectation s by
far, and that he cou ld not sufficiently c o n g r a lu la t e h im s elf upon the
recep tion by the P resid en t o f the Republic and by D oumergue, w ith
w h o m a p e r fe c t u n d ersta n d in g had been a ch iev ed r e g a r d in g all cu rre n t
q uestion s an d the g e n e r a l p olitical situation. ( I t s o h a p p e n e d t h a t J u s t
P o ln c a r ^
E d w a rd
retu rn ed
o f in fo r m in g
to
upon
fro m
th e
d id
but
Is
r e n e w in g
1 9 1 4 .)
c a ll
h im
been
im p r e s s io n s ,
12,
fo
In
he
a fte r
London
retu rn
p e r m itte d
p r o fo u n d
ow n
h is
me
s u b je c t ;
of
le tt e r .
at
2 9 —M a y
S ir
p o s s ib ility
once
of your
am b assad or
th e
8 ir
I
th a t
v ie w .
so
W ith o u t
lo n g
The
b in d in g
d e la y e d
s o u n d in g
a
of
th e
C a b in e t
c o n v e n tio n
G rey
by
w ith
to
th e
p resen t,
R u s s ia
had
B e n c k e n d o r ff
had
a
d e fin ite
been
a
o b je c t
in
c o n tin u o u s
i v J X U V S S iia tfM O iJ
u a u L fin a
2(5
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
p e rfo rm a n c e ,
so
th a t
an
em ergen cy
w o u ld
be
d e te c te d
b e h in d
G rey 8
N ev erth e
less, the firm d eterm in a tio n o f th e rea l leaders o f the Cabinet will ca r r y
the. day. a» I do not doubt in the least, and th en th e real n eg otia tion s
may begin.
After the r e s u lt s w h ich h a ve fu st been d escrib ed will h a ve been
ach iev ed we, as 1 b elieve, will h ave attain ed the main o b ject in view ,
namely, to s u b s titu te fo r the h ith e rto fa r too t h e o re tica l and pea cea b le
basic idea o f the e n t e n te s o m e th in g m ore tangible. My s ojou rn i n
Paris and th e s p e c t a c l e w h ich I th e re w i t n e ss e d h a ve a n ew substan
tiated m y opinion, that an alliance o r an y o t h e r form o f public a g r e e
m ent is im possible, and that, e v e n if the B ritish G overnm ent should
permit its e lf to a g r e e to this, th e re su lts w ould be quite d ifferent from
t h ose expected. T h e r e c e p t i o n w h i c h w a s a c c o r d e d t h e K i n g a n d t h e
w illin g n e s s
Q ueen
to
w as
approach
no
doubt
H u sa in
an
c lo s e r
in
a
e x tr a o r d in a r ily
m ilita r y
s e n s e .]
h e a rty
one,
m uch
fo rm e r
E n g lis h
h e a r tie r ,
I
Fir Edward em phasized the, fa ct that, w ith ou t s o m e su ch p revio u s
a g r e e m e n t, an im m ed ia te coo p era tio n , e v e n w ith the best o f will* and
in s p ite o f t h e c lo s e p olitical e n t e n t e b e tw e e n both G overnm ent*, w ould
e n c o u n t e r s erio u * t ech n ic a l difficulties. [ H a r d l y t h e c a s e . T h e B r i t i s h
G overnm en t
te c h n ic a l
or
not
an
a llia n c e
it
to
an
One
have
In
to
so
fa r
h is
w hat
spite o f this, th e im possib ility o f co n clu d in g a form a l alliance b etw een
England and F rance has been recogn ized, th en this w ill i n a still
g r e a te r d e g r e e be th e c a s e b etw een Russia and England. [ N a t u r a l l y ,
sam e
G reat
E n g lis h
t o ld
th e re ,
th a n
B r ita in ’s
w ere
reason s
id e n tic a l
R u s s ia .
w o r ld
The
w as
to
fo r
th ose
B r itis h
th e
case
not
th a t
r e a lly
to
p in y
fr ie n d s
a ll
w h ile
m a k in g
argu ed
G overnm en t
p o lit ic s — a s t h o s e o f a n y
n ecessary
w ith
S ta te s
a ll
d e fin ite a llia n c e
a g a in s t
w as
o th e r
at
a
d e fin ite
le a s t
tru e
E m p ir e — w e r e
a g a in s t
w ere
a
one
p o te n tia l
v is its .
a n o th e r,
w ith
in
F ran ce
a llia n c e
w ith
su ch
If,
w ith
it s e lf.
Its
th a t it b eca m e
w h ic h
none
w ere
e n e m ie s .]
I doubt w h e t h e r a m ore p o w erfu l g u a ra n ty fo r com m on m ilitary o p er
ations could be fou n d in t h e e v e n t o f w a r [ a l l t o o t r u e ] than this spirit
o f th e e n t en te , as it re v e a ls its e lf at p resen t, r e i n fo r c e d by the existent
m ilitary co n ven tio n s.
I f w e r e v i e w th e va riou s ph ases o f the e n ten te it can not be denied
that England has n e v e r h es ita ted in th r ea ten in g m om en ts to pla ce h er
s e lf on the sid e o f F r a n c e ; the sa m e holds g ood fo r R u s s i a on e v e r y
occasion on w h ich English and Russian i n te re sts w e r e sim u ltan eou sly
affected, and this, d e sp ite the difficulty o f r e co n cilin g th e p olicies o f
both cou n tries in question s that arise day a ft e r day, and desp ite those
reasons, w h ich it w ou ld lead too fa r to discuss here, but w h ich explain
cle a rly w h y th e e n t e n t e betw een Russia and England has n ot taken
ro o t so d eep ly as that b e tw e e n F rance and England. [ T h e s e p o l i c i e s
and
reason s
w as
averse
a r e o u tlin e d
to
in
th e
fo o tn o te s
e x p la in in g
w hy
G reat
B r ita in
is : G e r m a n y
th is
w h ic h
w o u ld
G rey
have
to
ju s t
a v o id
w hat
a.s
is
to
ex p e ct,
sh ow n
by
and
th e
it is
p r e c is e ly
To reca p itu la te in brief, I w ou ld like to s a y that e v e n th o s e English
m en w ho are firm ly co n v i n c e d that s oon er or later a conflict w ith Ger
m an y w ill p ro v e in ev ita b le w o u l d b e f r i g h t e n e d b y t h e i d e a o f b i n d i n g
E n g la n d
by
o b lig a tio n s
as
yet
be
m eans
upon
of
h er,
d e c is iv e
th e
F ren ch
c o n fir m e d
to
approved
h is
The
E d w ard
my
ow n
and
a llia n c e
w h ic h
con sequ en ces
w o u ld
im p o s e
o f w h ic h
can
not
of
to
y e ste rd a y
c o lle a g u e
me
th e
nam e
th e
had
London
L e tte r ,
th a t
a lr e a d y
th a t
w h ic h
w it,
at
sam e.
re q u ested
fa c t
an sw er
[to
th e
he
w ith o u t
th e
g iv e n
con sen t
1 0 -2 3 ,
and
m e, th e
E n g lis h
had
S a z o n o f f .)
M ay
C am bon
in fo r m e d
th e
to
I
c a ll
D o u in e r g u e
of
th e
of
h im .
S ta te
C o u n c il
in
had
P a r is
C a b in e t
in
c o u n c il],
a ft e r the F ren ch m in ister had spoken o f the relations b e tw e e n Russia
and England and had in d ica ted h o w usefu l, u n d er certa in co n tin g en cie s,
previo u s m ilita ry co n v e n tio n s b etw een th e G overn m en ts w o u ld prove.
The first s te p to be con sid ered w as to co m m u n ica te to th e Russian
G overnment, on th e part o f F rance and England, th e tw o con fidential
and s e c r e t d o cu m en ts, w h ich had been ex chan ged b etw e e n th e F ren ch
and B ritish G overn m en ts in th e y e a r 191t.
S ir
E d w a rd
d o cu m e n ts
la id
s p e c ia l
sh ow ed
th a t
stre ss
no
upon
a llia n c e
th e
w as
p o in t,
th a t
c o n c lu d e d
th e
te x t
b etw ee n
o f th e se
th e
tw o
T hey fulfilled th e p u rpose ra th er o f p u ttin g th e su b sta n ce o f
the m ilitary a g r e e m e n ts in th e p ro p er ligh t, a g r e e m e n ts w h ioh had
been e n t e r e d in to b e tw e e n th e a rm y and n a v y au th orities fo r the
e v e n t u a lit y that it should becom e n e ce s s a r y fo r th e British and French
naval and land f o r c e s to co o p e r a t e actively. [ T h e e v e n t u a l i t y d i f f e r s
fr o m
t h e r e g u l a r casu s foederis o f d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e s i n s o f a r a s i t
p ow ers.
m akes
< * * < p e r a tio n
s e le c tiv e
p o in t
and
and
con sen t
of
of
c o n d itio n s
p r e c is e
m a n n e r .]
76876— 11
th e
th e
of
arm ed
s u b s c r ib in g
fo r c e s
c o n tin g e n t
G o v e rn m e n ts,
“ o p e r a tiv e n e s s ”
of
th e
upon
en tered
had
th e
m u tu a l
in s te a d
of
fix in g
a llia n c e
in
a
th e
d e fin ite
th e
had
in
in to
and
fn c t
and
th a t
R u s s ia n
to
c o n c lu d e d
th e
lim its
w as
w illin g
argu m en t
G reat
agreem en t
th e
fo r
B r it a in .]
b e tw e e n
b etw ee n
and
m u st
G o v e rn m e n ts
good
an
le ft
p a r tic i
R u s s ia
G rey
w ith
o b je c tio n s
fo r
beyond
a
corresp on d en ce
F rom
G overnm en t
fa r
o ffe r in g
o f a llia n c e
no
th e
th e
No
w h e th e r
c o n v e n tio n
“ n e c e s s ity ”
s o v e r e ig n ty .
as
of
d e s ir a b le .
a
B r itis h
French
m u ch
and
B r ita in
and
a llia n c e .
in
th e
C am bon
R u s s ia n
and
and
th e
on
copy
th e
of
fo llo w in g
to
E d w ard
to
h is
th e
p art
r e p ly
G rey
gave
F rench
gave
w h ic h
m e,
he
me
a
copy
am b assad or
on
th e
had
on
of
a u th o r ity
d ir e c te d
th e
docum ent
N ovem ber
to
of
S ir
22,
h is
w h ic h
1912,
and
G o v e r n m e n t,
E d w a rd
G rey
on
a
th e
day.
resp on se
e x p e d ie n t
don
A d m ir a lty .
S ir
handed
Cam bon
In
of
to
th in g
p la c e
my
to
q u e s tio n ,
do
w o u ld
h im s e lf
in
S ir
be
to
E d w a rd
a u th o r iz e
c o m m u n ic a tio n
d e c la r e d
our
w ith
th a t
naval
th e
th e
a tta c h e
B r itis h
m ost
in
sta ff
Lon
of
Ad
The first Lord o f Admiralty, as w ell a* t h e B ritish m in isters,
w e r e in s t r u cte d as to our plans. The B ritish sta ff o f Adm iralty is in
p o ssession o f th e c o n v e n tio n s r e g a r d i n g th e n a v y w h ich w e r e w ork ed
out in com m on by F rance and England. As to th e r e m a in in g a g r e e
m en ts, F rance, w h o w as allied w ith us, m ig h t use th e m as s h e d e e m e d
n ecessa ry .
m ir a lty .
s e lf
(h a n k in g
to
d o cu m e n ts
to ld
S ir
E d w ard
r e m a r k in g
me
(8 4 8 .
to
th a t
your
w hen
I
L e tte r
fo r
fro m
th e
S ir
h is
w o u ld
e x c e lle n c y
h a n d in g
fr ie n d ly
at
and
once
s e n tim e n ts ,
tr a n s m it
rep ort
to
you
th e
I
c o n fin e d
c o p ie s
e x a c tly
m y
of
w hat
b o th
he
had
copy.
E d w ard
A m b assad or
at
G rey
to
London.
M.
Paul
N ov.
22,
Cam bon,
th e
F rench
1 9 1 2 .‘ )
“ From tim e to time, du rin g th e co u r s e o f the last j e w y e a r s
seem
to
deal
and
C am bon
* fr o m
of
h ere
G rey
tim e
th e
C a m b o n . it
c o n ta in e d
N ovem ber
is
b road
its
of
a c tiv ity
to
proper
of
th is ,
of
b e n e fit
th e
n e g o tia tio n s .
le tte r s
u n d e r s ta n d in g
by
th e
tex t
is
In
in
B r itis h ,
th e
no
th a t
and,
one,
su ch
th e
m ilita r y
case,
th e se
b e in g
a
and
fa c ts ,
and
of
th e
th e
a
have
con
w as
in
on.
S in c e
and
naval
G rey
and
c o n v e n tio n
as
R u s s ia n s
to
w ere
n o n r e s p o n s ib ility ,
very
b e g in n in g
v a lu e
screen
naval
th a t
e x p e r ts
c o n d itio n s
The
w r it
as
s im p ly
m ilita r y
b e tw e e n
F r a n c o -R u s s ia n
e x a cted
says
th e
fu rth e r
le tte r s
s tip u la tio n s
th e ir
of
sh ow n
[w e
b etw ee n
c o n v e n tio n
B r itis h
th e
but
years,
a u th o r itie s
u n d e r s ta n d in g .
w as
lig h t
great
m ade
th e
1912,
fe w
th e
be
and
th a t
c e r ta in
of
23,
naval
w ill
of
corresp on d en ce
la s t
w ord s,
F ren ch
assu m e
and
th e
and
o th e r
exch ange
to
The
22
of
scope, a s
e ffe c tiv e n e s s
in fo r m e d
cou rse
m ilita r y
in
r e a s o n a b le
in
th e
B r itis h
th is
th e
Cam bon
in c o n s is te n c y .
d a te d
a n te rio r
q u e stio n
an
a n o t h e r '— in
very
of
w as
is
and
one
and
p e r io d
a g e n ts
w ith
tim e , d u r in g
F rench
w ith
e x is te n c e ,
th e
to
th e
upon
S ec reta ry
M in is te r ia l
to
E n g la n d
fo r
1 9 1 4 .)
and
so
by
th e
G reat
w a n t— tr e a tie s
ex p ressed
s ta ffs
H ereu p on ,
he
never
am b assad or
sam e
fa r th e r ,
of
an
m a tter
p e r ju r y ;
th e
stru ck
w ith
a
d e s ir e d
r e c o g n iz e
h on or”
a ll
In a c o n v e n tio n o f this kind he s a w th e
sa m e p ra ctica l advantage* w h i c h r e s u lt from th e c o n v e n t i o n w ith
F rance. He told u s t h a t h e w a s thinking o f a n aval co n v e n tio n , be
ca u se this, in v i e w o f the cir c u m s ta n c e s , was the m o s t suitable, and
b eca u se h e w as, m o r eo v e r, d is p o se d to b e liev e that this w ou ld also be
in a cco r d a n ce w ith th e w ish es o f th e Im perial G overnm ent.
th e
(R u s s ia n
As
c o n d itio n s
of
fo r e se e n .
(8 4 7 .
S ir
tre a tie s
w as
w h im
re je c te d
w as
w ith o u t
b e in g
th e
w ith o u t
d id
th a t
h im s e lf , b e in g
s u lte d
d o c u m e n t s .]
no
r e a lly
as
to
e n te n te s
v ie w s
added
escap e
“ n a tio n a l
and
s p ir it
In
know n
w a n te d
th e y
H e
“ a lli a n c e s .” ]
The rea son fo r this is to be s o u g h t in the t a c t that e v e n a m ost c a r e
fu l but public allian ce w ou ld m e et w ith s tr o n g and u n d isguised opposi
tion in England, and that not o n ly on the part o f th e IAberal P arty,
and that a g r e a t p a r t o f th e p olitical e ffec t in te n d e d w ou ld be fr u s tr a te d
by it. I believ e th a t u n d er su ch cir cu m s ta n ce s an alliance w ou ld not
b e w o rth much.
It w ou ld m erely , in a v e r y s lig h t d e gr ee , in cre a se the
g u a ra n ties w h ich are offered to F rance and Russia by England, and it
would, on the o t h e r hand, offer a fa r m ore fe r t i le soil f o r a g ita tion in
fa v o r o f Germany, s o m e th in g upon w h ich Germ any p la ces m o r e w e i g h t
than ever. [ S o m e w h a t f a r - f e t c h e d . W h a t a n a l l i a n c e w o u l d h a v e d o n e
by
to
or
It
c o n v e n tio n
im p o s s ib le
b o w in g
th e ir
set
a cce p ted
a
w as
can. not
v a lu e d
go
or
a c ce p ted
in v o lv e d .
G overnm en t
th u s
o r d in a r ily
e ith e r
w ere
retrea t
B r itis h
p a tio n .
F ran ce
have
a llia n c e
th e
in
w as
w o u ld
d iffic u ltie s
of
fo r
th e
th e
of
G reya c tu a l
c o o p e r a tio n
w ith
the experts o f the F rench and English m ilita ry and
n aval a u th orities h ave co n su lted with on e another. I t w a s c o n s t a n tly
a g r e e d that s u ch discu ssion s w e r e n ot to r e s t r i c t th e fr e e d o m o f decision
o f the tw o G o vern m en ts as to w h e t h e r the one w a s to su p p or t the o th e r
w ith arms or not. W e assu m ed in this that su ch co n su lta tio n s by ex
p e rts r e p r e s e n te d no a g r e em en t, and cou ld n ot be r e g a r d e d as one,
w h e r e b y th e on e G overn m en t or the o t h e r w ou ld be p le d g e d to i n te r c e d e
in an e v e n t u a lit y w h ich had n ot y e t taken pla ce and w h ich m ig h t n e v e r
take place. Thus, fo r in sta n ce, th e p r e s e n t division o f th e fleets o f
F rance and England is n ot based upon an obligation to o p e r a t e in c o m
mon in th e e v e n t o f war.
“ You h a v e in th e m e a n tim e poin ted out that if the on e G o vern m en t or
th e o th e r sh o u ld h a ve w e i g h t y re a s o n s to fe a r an u n p rovo k ed attack
on th e part of a third p ow er, it w o u ld be n e c e s s a r y to know i f it m igh t,
in s u c h a case, co u n t upon th e arm ed a s sis ta n ce o f the oth er, I am
e n t i r e ly o f the opinion that if th e o n e G overn m en t or th e o t h e r should
h a v e w e i g h t y r e a s o n s to fe a r an u nprovok ed attack on th e part o f a
th ir d pow er, o r an y o t h e r th r e a t e n e d distu rb a n ce o f p e a c e , this Gov-
F ran ce
1 T h is
B r itis h
Book ”
p o s s ib le ]
te x t
“ B lu e
text.
d iffe r s
s lig h tly
B o o k ,”
due,
no
fr o m
d o u b t,
th e
to
v e rs io n
su b seq u en t
of
th e
e d itin g
le tte r
ot
th e
In
th e
“ B lu e
_
........_________ ___l
________________________
Oo
(1H0D3H TV MOISSailONOO
RECORD.
C O N G R E S S IO N A L
27
“ It w a s first o f all r ecog n iz ed that our n aval co n v e n tio n with Eng
land. like the Franco-Russian n aval co n ven tio n , w ou ld h a ve to bear in
m ind a ctions of ou r n a v y in c o n ju n ctio n w ith the English Navy w h ich ,
w hile con stitu tin g a ction s a g re ed upon, w ou ld n e v e r th e l e s s be separate.
"As to th e s t r a t e g i c aims, w h ich , fr o m our sta n d p oin t, are to becom e
o p era tive in the e v e n t o f a w a r b etw een th e p o w e r s o f the Triple En
t en te and the p o w ers o f th e Triple Alliance [ a v e r y d a n g e r o u s a n d u n
d i p l o m a t i c a d m i s s i o n ] , on e m u st d is tin gu is h : on th e on e ha?id, b etw een
(8 t P . L e tte r fro m M . F a u l C a m b o n , th e F re n c h A m b a s s a d o r a t L o n d o n ,
th e opera tion s in th e reg ion o f th e B altic and t h e North S e a ; on the
t o S i r E d w a r d G r e y , N o v . 2 3 , 1 9 1 2 .* )
o t h e r hand, the M editerranean. In both w e m u st seek to obtain c o m
You re m in d ed me, t h r o u gh y o u r l e tt e r o f y e s te r d a y , th e tid o f N ovem p en sa tion fr o m England fo r d iv e rtin g a part o f th e German fleet upon
ber, that from tim e to tim e du rin g the co u rse o f th e last fe w y e a r s the ou rselv es. I T h e R u s s i a n s w a n t e d ‘ c o m p e n s a t i o n ’ e v e n w h e n t h e y
ex perts o f the m ilitary and naval au th orities o f F rance and E ngland w e r e t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s . ]
h a v e co n s u lt e d w ith on e an oth er, that it was c o n s t a n tly a g re ed that
" In the n orth ern t h e a te r o f w a r our i n te r e s t s d em an d th a t England
t h e se d iscu ssion s w e r e not to r e s t r i c t th e fr ee d o m o f a n y G overn m en t sh o u ld f e t t e r as g r e a t a portion o f th e German fleet as possible in the
in d e cid in g in th e fu tu re w h e t h e r it w is h ed to g ra n t th e o th e r arm ed North Sea. B y this m ean s th e va st p r e p o n d er a n ce o f the German fleet
a s s i s ta n c e o r n ot, that t h e se con su lta tion s betw een the ex perts fo r m e d o v e r ou r own w ou ld be equalized and perh a p s perm it, in the m ost
no obligation on e it h e r side, and w e r e n ot to be r e g a rd e d as an y w h ich fa v o ra b le circu m s ta n ce s, a landing in P om erania being made. Should
w ou ld co m p el th e tw o G overnm ents to in te r v e n e in ce rta in e v e n tu a lities , it be possible to undertake this operation, its ex ecu tion w ou ld be re n
and that y o u h a ve in the m ean tim e p oin ted out that if on e or th e o t h e r d e re d extraordinarily difficult o ilin g to the lack o f tran sport v e s s e ls in
G o vern m en t sh ould h a ve w e i g h t y re a son s to fe a r an unprovoked attack t h e Baltio. The British G overnm ent m igh t, t h e r e fo r e , assist us co n
on th e part o f a third p o w e r it w ou ld b e im portant to know w h e t h e r it sid era b ly by re n d er in g it possible that a ce rta in n u m ber o f m erch an t
m ig h t co u n t upon the arm ed a s sista n ce o f the other.
v e s s e ls should be sen t to ou r B altic ports b e fo re th e begin n ing o f w a r
Your l e t t e r g i v e s the a n sw er to this point and I a m e m p o w e r e d to like op era tion s so that th e lack o f tra n sp ort v e s s e ls m igh t be made
s ta t e th a t in th e e v e n t o f one o f th e tw o G overnm ents haiAng w e i g h t y g o o d in this way. [ T h i s s h o u l d r e m o v e a l l d o u b t a s a g a i n s t w h o m t h e
g ro u n d s f o r fe a r i n g an attack by a third p o w er or a d istu rban ce o f c o n v e n t i o n w a s d i r e c t e d . T h e casus fo e d e ris m a y h a v e b e e n a b s e n t , b u t
g e n e r a l p ea ce, th e G overnm ent in question ou ght at o n ce to d e cid e in t h e o b j e c t i v e a t l e a s t w a s p l a i n l y I d e n t i f i e d . ]
c o n ju n c t i o n with the oth er, w h e t h e r a p ro ced u re in com m on by th e
“ The situ ation in th e M editerranean also c o n c e r n s o u r in terests m ost
tw o G o vern m en ts w ould be fea sib le to p r e v e n t th e attack or to p r e ess en tia lly , s in ce in th e e v e n t o f t h e Austro-Italian f o r c e s in this sea
s e r v e pea ce. In this ca s e th e tw o G overn m en ts w ou ld d iscuss t h e h a r i n g the u pper hand, an attack by the Austrian fleet in the Black
m e a s u r e s w h i c h w e r e to be taken con jo in tly. Should t h ese m ea su res Sea w ou ld be possible, w h ich w ou ld mean a serio u s blow to us. It is,
make a m ilita ry a ction n ece s s a r y , the tw o G overn m en ts w ou ld at o n ce t h e r e fo r e , fr o m ou r p oin t o f v ie w , e x trem ely im p o r ta n t that a sa fe
c o n s i d e r th e plan s o f their g en e ra l staffs, and a decision w ou ld be m ade p r e p o n d er a n ce o f th e figh tin g fo r c e s o f th e E n tente o v e r t h e AustroItalian Fleet in the M editerranean be establish ed. S in ce t h e Austroa s to h ow fa r t h e s e plans w e r e to be follow ed.
Italian naval f o r c e s are su p e rio r to t h e F ren ch , it is desirable that
(8 5 0 . S a z o n o ff to
th e
R u s s ia n
A m bassad or a t L ondon.
C o n fid e n tia l
England, by sta tio n in g th e req u isite n u m ber o f v e s s e ls in th e M editer
le tte r , M a y
1 5 —2 8 ,
1914.
N o . 4 7 .)
ranean, s e cu r e th e p re p o n d er a n ce o f th e E n tente P ow er s, at least so
The re a d in ess of the B ritish G overn m en t to begin, w ith o u t d e la y lon g as th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f our o w n fleet does n ot p e rm it us to assum e
{th e B r itis h
G o v e r n m e n t w a s in n o h u r r y , a c c o r d i n g t o P r i n c e L o u i s
this duty. It w ou ld also be desirable that E ngland’s co n se n t to our
o f B a t t e n b e r g , w 'b i c h i s t o b e e x p l a i n e d l a r g e l y b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
ships u sin g th e English ports in th e e a ster n M editerranean as bases
R u s s ia n
fle e t b e in g a n e g lig ib le q u a n t i t y J u s t t h e n , G r e a t B r i t a i n a s
be s ecu re d , sim ilar to w h a t is g r a n te d to us by t h e F r en ch naval co n
su m ed
m o s t o f t h e l i a b i l i t i e s ] , n eg o t ia tio n s r e g a r d i n g th e co n clu sio n
ven tion , w h ich p erm its m s to make u se o f th e F ren ch ports in th e
o f an a g r e e m e n t b etw een Russia and England, w h ich w ou ld c o n c e r n w e s t e r n M editerranean.
Joint o p e r a t io n s o f ou r n a va l fo r c e s in the e v e n t o f a com m on m ilita ry
“ Should th e question o f th e Straits
(th e B o s p h o r u s a n d th e D a r
a ction, has been r e c e iv e d on ou r part w ith a fe e li n g o f the g r e a t e s t d a n e l l e s ) be d iscu ssed in c o n n ect io n w ith th e situ ation in th e Mediter
sa tis fa ctio n . Quite apart from th e fa c t th a t s u ch an a g r e e m e n t is ranean, then political questions w e r e n ot to be t o u ch e d u p o n ; but on ly
desira ble fr o m a s p ecia l m ilita ry stan dpoin t w e a t ta ch g re a t im p o r ta n ce tem p o ra ry operations in the Straits, as on e o f ou r s t r a t e g i c m ea su res in
to it in a g e n e r a l p olitical sense.
the e v e n t of war, w e r e to be borne in mind.
In t h e co n clu s io n o f s u ch an a g r e e m e n t w e s ee a n im portan t s te p
“ In addition, th e c o n f e r e n c e reco g n iz e d that it w a s desirable that all
Inward b rin g in g England into c lo s e r union w ith th e F ranco-Russian details o f the re la tion s b etw e e n th e Russian and th e B ritish n avies in
a llia n ce and an e f f e c t i v e m ean s o f r e i n fo r c i n g th e r e co g n itio n o f the th e p r o je c te d n aval co n ve n tio n b e tw e e n o u rs elv es and England should
com m on i n te r e s t s of England and Russia w h ich , w e are co n v in ce d , w ill be established. For this pu rpose it w ill be n e c e s s a r y to co m e to an
fa v o ra b ly in flu en ce all the questions w h ich a ffect B ritish and Russian u n derstan din g as to sign als and sp ecial ciphers, w i r e le s s m e ssa g es, and
in terests. I h a v e ca lled th e a tte n tio n o f our m in istry o f the n a vy , in th e relations b e tw e e n th e B ritish and the Russian n aval staffs.
p a r ticu la r o f ou r n aval a g en t in London, m ost s p ecia lly to th e g r e a t
“ I t is m o r eo v e r n e c e s s a r y that in form ation r e g a r d i n g the navies of
p o litica l sig n ifica n ce o f th e im p e n d in g n eg otia tion s w h i c h t h e la tte r will o th e r p ow ers, as w e ll as on e’s oum n a vy , and in p a r ticu la r w i t h regard
h a v e to c a r r y on w ith th e English staff o f adm iralty. [ A c c o r d i n g t o to tech n ica l details, in stru m en ts, and in ven tion s, be ex chan ged b etw een
G r e y , t h e y w e r e n o t to h a v e “ g r e a t p o li t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ,” a n d t h e r e
th e tw o naval departm en ts.
w a s n o m e n t i o n in t h e C a m b o n l e t t e r s o f “ a c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e i r
“ In the opinion o f th e co n fe r e n ce , it w ou ld also be n e ce s s a r y
to
n a v a l f ig h t in g f o r c e s ,”
w h ic h
te r m , h o w e v e r, S a zo n o ff m a y h a v e c o n
a rra n ge fo r a p eriod ic exchange o f opinion b etw een th e heads of the
s id e r e d a s m e r e ly c ir c u m s c r ib e d .
B e t h is a s it m a y , S a z o n o ff e v in c e s
Russian and th e English adm iralty staffs a cco r d in g to the example o f
a n e a g e r n e s s h a r d ly c o m p a tib le w it h th e d ig n it y o f th e I m p e r ia l R u s
th e Franco-Russian n aval con ven tion .’’ [ A r a t h e r a c c u r a t e t r a n s c r i p t
s ia n
G o v e r n m e n t .]
The p ro p o sa l m ade by t h e B ritish G o vern m en t o f t h e a b o v e d o c u m e n t p a s s e d i n t o t h e h a n d s o f t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n
r e s p e c t i n g t h e form in w h ich th e co n v e n tio n is to be co n clu d e d is m e n t . T h e d e m e n t i s o f t h e B r i t i s h a n d R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t s d i d n o t ,
r e co g n iz e d by us as in e v e r y w a y s u ited to the put p o s e [ s h o w i n g t h a t a n d n a t u r a l l y c o u l d n o t , r e m o v e t h e d e e p i m p r e s s i o n m a d e b y t h e t e r m s
r m m m t o u g h t at on ce to co m e to an u n derstan din g w ith th e o t h e r as
to w h e t h e r both G overn m en ts are to p ro ceed i n com m on in o r d e r to
ward off th e attack and to p r e s er v e p e a ce , and to co n sid e r w h a t
m ea su re s are to be m u tu ally taken. I f t h ese m e a su res co m p rise a
m ilita ry action, then the plans o f the g en e ra l staffs are to be co n
sid ered at on ce, and it w ou ld be the d u ty o f th e G overn m en ts to d e cid e
as to h o w f a r th ese w e r e to be fo llo w e d .”
th e
R u s s ia n
C V overn m en t
w as
not
■very
p a r tic u la r
as
to
q u a lity 1
, and
Captain Volkoff has b e en in s t r u c t e d to e n t e r in to n eg o tia tio n s w i t h t h e
B ritish G overn m en t. T h e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h a r e t o b e c o n s i d e r e d d u r i n g
th e
im p e n d in g
to o k
p la c e
n e g o tia tio n s
on
M ay
1 3 -2 6
have
In
been
th e
th e
o ffic e
o b je c t o f a
of
th e
c o n s u lta tio n
c h ie f
of
th e
w h ic h
s ta ff
of
a d m ir a lty .
For
p assed
p erson al
th is
in fo r m a tio n ,
I
append
a
copy
of
th e
r e s o lu tio n s
c o n fe re n c e .
“ On May 13-26, 1914, a con su ltation took p lace in th e office o f th e
c h i e f o f n a va l staff fo r th e p u rp ose o f an exchange o f opinions r e s p e c t
in g th e im p en d in g n eg o tia tio n s as to a co n v e n tio n b etw een Russia and
England, w h ich c o n ce rn s th e a c t i v e coop era tion s o f t h eir n aval figh tin g
f o r c e s sh o u ld warlike operations, a g re ed upon by Russia and England,
take p la ce w ith the participation o f France. After it had been pri
m arily rem ark ed h ow desirable such a co n v e n tio n w ou ld be from a
sp ecific n-eval stan dpoin t and, a b o v e all, w ith reg a rd to g en e ra l political
co n sid e ra tio n s, the m em bers o f th e c o n fe r e n ce , a ft e r a co m p re h e n s iv e
examination o f the question, ca m e to the fo llo w in g d e cisio n s:
1 See
fir s t
fo o tn o te
76870— 11
th e
a
tr ip
duke
to
p r e c e d in g
d o cu m e n t.
above
in to
c o m m u n ic a tio n .
S c a n d in a v ia n
F r a n c is
(8 5 1 .
The
have
ch ase
fo r
of
th e
th e
th e se
fu n d s
naval
B e fo r e
th a t
th is
my
A rm stro n g
c o u n c il
in
th o u g h
no
have
C h ile
G overnm en t
be
fin a l
ch a n g e o f fron t
fr o m
of
th e
W illia m
w ent
a ss a s s in a tio n
of
on
A rch
h ere
a fte r
not
and
approved
fo u n d
It
a
th e
th e
R u s s ia n
N o.
r e g a r d in g
w ere
in
r a is e d
C h ile ,
it
1 8 2 .)
th e
th e
th e
as
appeared
to
pu r
m arket
n ecessary
w e ll
as
th e
to
th e
he
s a le
c e r ta in
and
th a t
fu tu re .
c o n v e r s a tio n
to
s a le
p o s s ib le
to
agreed
near
r e s u lt s
of
h a v in g
of
1914.
E n g la n d .
fin a lly
th e
c h ie f
6,
T u rkey
P e te rsb u rg
had
fo llo w in g
and
la t te r
w ith
th e
e x c e lle n c y
b e lo n g in g
in
rep o rt:
of
to
th e
w ith
tw o
c o n fir m
th e
A lth o u g h
fir m
th e
d rea d n o u g h ts,
th is
d e c is io n ,
of
naval
th e
even
an sw er
h a s been
g iv e n
on its
p a rt.
This
to be attribu ted e n t ir e ly to the Chilean m inister here.
n e g a tiv e
is
o f th e
S t.
C h ile
to
2 4 -J u n e
your
R u s s ia
c o n c lu d e d
th e
has
has
to
agreem en t
d e p a rtu re
retu rn
I
E m peror
a fte r
London
su b s c r ip tio n ]
c o n d itio n a l
hence
in
[b o th
p o p u la tio n
G overn m en t
m ig h t
agent
r e p o r tin g
dreadnou ght
my
th e
A fte r
of
p o p u la t io n
p r o s p e c tiv e
th a t,
even
S ecret rep o rt, M a y
honor
s h ip s , th e
by
D e s p ite
w a ters
F e r d i n a n d .]
R u s s ia n
s ta ff o f a d m ir a lty .
I
your
at
of
b6
U U O J U U 1 V N O IS S U H D N tO J
28
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
The
la tte r
on ce
tia tio n s, th a t
S in c e
A r m str o n g
s e c u r in g
to
at
in d ic a te
th is
n
us
one
of
la
s till
d o u b tfu l
th is
be
I
req u est
le a s t
h is
to
one
s h a ll
he
to
su b m it
th a t
th e
A fte r
c o n s id e r a tio n s
nnval
c o n v e n tio n
m ea n s
to
grow
of
e s t a b lis h
R a tte n b e rg
w ith
is
upon
The
th e
fo llo w in g
[L o u is,
B r itish
w h ich
w ho
a fte r
had
G overn m en t
in s is ts
upon
fa r
th e
fo r h a ste
so
n e g lig ib le
w h o lly
im p o s s ib le
B a lt ic .]
as
p la n
The
w ith
my
so
c o m in g
K a ra l M in ister
A u g u st,
h im
w ith
h im s e lf fo r
as
and
h a ste, and
U n ite d
S ta te s
and
e x a c tly
I
have
w ith
E n te n te
is
to
to
The
R u s s ia n
n o tifie d
exch ange
n e g o tia tio n s
is
of
in
F ren ch
Your
a
In
c o n tro l
h is
th is
d e p a rtu re
o p in io n ,
are
G rey
am b assad or
at
London
w ill
order
to
ta k e
w ith
th e
to
p la c e
P etersb u rg
and
A d m ir a lt y .
y e ste rd a y
had
G rey
been
of
th a t
th is.
he
On
in d isc r e tio n s
had
th e
G erm an
and
th en
th is
q u e stio n .
r ep ly
to
a
en ter
re la tiv e
to
th e
m ore
th is
th a t
I,
r ep ea ted
Your
E x c e lle n c y
N ovoc
V e r m in
was
m e
to
sh a red
had
very
sen d
a n sw er
cover
th e
h im
to
a
to
see
th e
th e F ir s t
m a tter
he
and
th a t
th e m s e lv e s
be
put
to
tex t.
th o u g h t
of
to
of
as
to
G rey
me
lie
to ld
r e tu r n in g
w e ll
as
w hat
o b lig e d
in.
h im
th e
The
th e
th e
S ir
sam e.
w hat
not
th is,
sam e
to
M ay
to ld
me
d e c la r a tio n s
b e lie v e d
fo r
R u ssia ,
th e
th e
r e p lie d
th a t
of
or
th e
B r itish
th e
T u r k ish
it
seem ed
are
fr o m th is
G rey added
a im
tu r n in g
in te r e sts
b o th
G reat
12,
ta ry
m is s io n
of
th e
N o.
e n tir e ly
G overnm en t w as
so
O tto m a n
th a t
fle e t
p e r m itte d
th e re
S ir E d w a r d
of
and
R u s s ia n s ,
fa lle n
p roposed
and
naval
fin e
la n d ,
been
G overn m en t
N e v e r th e les s,
B r itish
o ffic e r s
th o u g h
T h ese
w ith o u t
w ith o u t
been
sig n e d
w h ic h
your
in
th e
lie
th e
le ft
of
th e m .
m ore
o r d e r in g
le g a l
B r itish
to
The
lo s t
and
a m ba ssa d or
r e p r es en ta tio n s
to
to
exp ress
have,
n o tific a tio n
th e
q u ite
w ith
T u r k is h
beyond
th a t
th e
th e
E.
brou gh t
of
naval
th e
th e
w ar
of
T h ere
J
by
th e
p e r c e p tio n
d isp o sa l
in
to
Eng
oppose
C o n s ta n tin o p le
p o rta ,
in
about
r e s u lt ,
in flu e n c e
c o m p lic a tio n s
w ith
of
M ay
and
th e
co n tra cts
E n g lis h
are
th e
been
1 2 -2 5 ,
o n ly
th e
to
a sa le
day
and
th e
b e fo r e
to
pre
it
H e
Is
K ie l,
w ish
In
to
a m ba ssa d or
h o n o r a b le
w ay
he
th a t
th a t
th ere e x iste d
any
sp ea k
and
b etw een
n eith er an
m a n .” ]
to
is
th e
E n g la n d
h im
of
c o n n e c tio n
w h ere
b etw een
an
1 6 7 .)
ru m ore
c o n te n ts
in
n ecessa ry
to
a ssu red
a n d R u ssia
N o.
fa lse
th e
R u ssia
g o in g
d isc u sse d
not
1914.
by
c o n ce r n in g
G erm an
B ru tu s
d id
th a t
d u rin g
a
H e.
con cea l
fro m
S ir
W .
th e
g iv e n
H ou se
any
and
yea rs
S ir
‘‘ e n c ir c lin g
E d w ard
C om m ons
m em ber
by
of
su ch
G erm an y.
s o -c a lle d
by
of
B y le s ,
naval
G reat
naval
B y le s
ask ed
our
and
th e
any
b etw ee n
agreem ent
B r ita in ,
a g ree m e n t,
R u s s ia
m ake
a ffe c t
th e se
a g a in st
G rey
M r.
to
K in g ,
P a r lia m e n t,
In
c ite d :
a
can
to
th e
w h e th e r
to
of
re fe r en c e
an sw er
by
be
cou rse
d irec ted
any
in
and
th e
ch a ra cter
th e
b etw ee n
he
w ith
arose
G reat
r e la tio n s
r e c e n tly
any
nego
ta k e n
re c e n tly
of
w ith
S ta te
p la c e
fo r
regard
and
w ith
been
w h e th e r
B r ita in .
S ecreta ry
B r ita in
has
and
have
sta te m e n t
G reat
paper.
tio n s
It
arc
have
to
R u s s ia ;
G erm an y,
sin c e
lik e ly
to
m o d ify
q u o te d ,
la id
T hat
th e
It
F o r e ig n
an
how
and
a lle g e d
fa r
w ill
su ch
he
la y
ham per
su ch
be
P r im e
it
w ith
G reat
w as
any
upon,
so
fa r
th a t
M i n i s t e r 's
ns
I
m ade
and
a
g r a in
If
th e
s h o u ld
ago.
w o u ld
year,
th e
n e g o tia
m ake
and
B ut
to
th e
none
if
any
w ith d r a w
w h ic h
th a t
par
on
No
Judge.
su pp ose
agree
G overnm en t
q u e s tio n s
n ecessary
la s t
I
ns
th a t
p rogress,
can
of
be,
of
tb n l
in
It
day,
r e p lie d
B r ita in
year
are
sta te m e n t
o p in io n , to
n
sam e
u n p u b lis h e d
th e
pow er
n e g o tia tio n s
c o n c lu d e d
my
ns
m em ber
th e
no
b o th
q u e s tio n
th e n
fr e e d o m
not
covers
t o -d a y
c o n c lu d e d
th e
or
a
on
M in is te r
w ere
s im ila r
h o n o r a b lo
th e
a ls o
th e re
w h e th e r
tru e
No
In
P r im e
an sw er
e n tered
to
o u g h t,
b e fo r e
as
been
be
or
and
q u e s tio n
pow ers
d e c id e
tru e.
w ere
The
S o m erse t ask ed
fo r c e s ,
s im ila r
r e s lr ic t
to
w ar.
lo s s
agreem ent
or
w o u ld
r e m a in s
sta te m e n t
a
E u rop ean
P a r lia m e n t
a
N o rth
m ilita r y
t o -d a y .
b etw ee n
in
fo r
to
ask ed
done
w h ic h
of
m em ber
regard
S a lfo r d
it
I
have
w o u ld
be,
P a r lia m e n t .”
A n o th er
(8 5 G .
f a ls e h o o d — fla v o r e d
S a zo n o ff
to
th e
w ith
Im m e d ia te ly
you
th a t
to
be
I
of
our
of
fe a rs
and
have
G rey
fe a r e d
la te
c o m in g
of
to
to
a rc,
th e
I
in
as
tru th .
th e
S ir
and
a ll
J
w ere
p o sitio n
g r e a te r
h im
th e
even
G eorge
part
to
rega rd
fo r
m e
th e
q u ite
th is
p resen t
p o ssib le
our
and
m ost
of
c o u r ie r
th e
lik e ly
to
in
it
how
be
d e cisiv e
on,
in
of
ba ck
w ere
th a t
J
In fo r m
B r itish
th e r e
c o o lin g
been
to
once
m y
I
n o tic e
th e
fa c t
m ore
be
a ssu m p tio n
once
m ore
u n fo u n d e d
d e sir ed ,
a
q u e stio n .
tr a c e d
In d ia
to
th e
w ith
had
o p in io n
m y se lf
h a ste n
dan ger
con seq u en ce,
s h o u ld
la te r
I
w h ich
be
p rove
p u b lic
m ost
C o n fid e n tia l
P e r sia n
con ced ed
In
c o n te n te d
th a t
th e
e x c item en t
w h ich
to
se r io u s
of
E n g la n d
th a t,
London.
yesterd a y
th e
B uch an an
and
in
to
accou n t
c o r r e c t.
h in te d
in
to
c a lled
on
a rg u m en ts
G overn m en t
have
I
p e r tu r b a tio n
th e
of
at
1 9 1 4 .)
c o n v e r sa tio n
E n g la n d
E n g la n d
to
1 2 -2 5 ,
d e p a rtu re
lo n g
B r itish
la r a tio n s
I seem s
th e
am b assad or
June
a tte n tio n
to
m a n ife s t.
fo r
fea rs
w h ose
th a t
th e
a n o th e r
r e la tio n s
a ssu m ed
p ea ted
b e fo r e
had
a m b a ssa d or,
th a t
th a t
R u s s ia n
le tt e r ,
a b le
s h ip b u ild in g
G o v e rn m e n t.
G reece
th is
T h e d iffic u lty
o p p o r tu n ity
a la r m e d
p ress
t r u e .]
["A n d
R u s s ia
v ie w
w o u ld
th e
th e sa m e
G o v e rn m e n t,
d ir e c t
not
th ey
to
agreem ent
has
and,
th e m se lv e s
B r itis h
G overn m en t
of
G rey :
tic ip a te
B e n o k e n d o rff
sh ip s
th e
June
E n g la n d
a ssu red
he
m e
fa v o r a b le
is
h im
ask ed
a
a g a in
m e n ts
von
p ro m o ted
su b lim e
m issio n ,
th e
fig u r e
d is c u s s e d
not
to ld
d eem ed
a ssu m ed
to
h o n o r a b le
has
was
h ow ever,
p u rch ase
w h ic h
d e v e lo p m e n t
s p le n d id
in
th e
w hy
G erm an s.
sa le
its
In
L im a n
of
a stu te
h is
th e
at
th e
d ays.
op p osed
had
th a t
o f th e in te llig e n c e
r e la tio n s ”
m ea n s
a re
th e
m ili
p resen ce
th e
to
a r g u m e n t,
reason
th a t
G ov
G erm an
s e r v ic e s
to
T u r k ish
c o n tr a r y
The
is
fe w
who
had
W illia m
A o r th
■ or
every
th e
in t h e
sou nd
o n ly
m o-
in d ir e c tly .
p r e v io u s
o p in io n ,
th e
w h ie n
becau se
T e le g r a m
r e p e a te d ly
la s t
G rey
a
G erm an
e o n n e e .t lo n
put
w h e th e r
year
he
en ter
T u rkey
th e
a p o o r o p in io n
“ c lo s e r
once
th e
no
been
one
C o n sta n tin o p le
b etw ee n
m a k in g
r e ta in
to
g ra n ted
been
a
im p o s s ib le .
w as
had
th e
and
had
c o o p e r a tio n
76879— U
of
to
m ake
m ore
any
any
is
to
d e c la r a t io n s
yards
of
As
have
G rey
w as
sw ay
c o n v e n tio n
in s tr u c te d
sen se,
th is
th e
J u d g m e n t .]
th e
th ese.
under
to
of
N or
p e n d in g
S ir
fo r
dan ger
d u ll
been
have
w a s n o d a n g e r a t a ll
w o u ld
w e re tim e s w h e n
th e
m is s io n
a
its
r e su lte d
[N o t
In
fo r
S a zo n o ff.
he
a ffir m e d
th is
w ith
“ The
G overn m en t
d isa p p r o v a l o f
w o u ld
su cceeded
naval
In
of
b etw een
had
n ever
K in g
j new n aval
agreem ent
fr ie n d ly
p e r m itte d
o n ly
th e
and
s ig n ifie d
been
have
E n g la n d .
a lm o s t
B r itis h
B and ers P a sh a ,
had
w h ich
and
R u s s ia
T u r k is h
th e
w ith
and
of
N avy
has
fo r c e s,
p ap ers.
1914.
B r itish
in d e p e n d e n c e
T u rkey
in
T u rkey
of
th e
m eet
G erm an y,
R u ssia
th e
have
h ow ever,
d e fen d
w o u ld
not
fr a n k
sh o w s d ip lo m a c y
th a t a r e fu sa l w o u ld
to
B r ita in
s in c e
to
your
H ad
naval
1 5 0 .)
have
th e
T e le g r a m
[H a r d ly
d eserv es
now
“ 5.
v ie w .
3 0 -.T u n e
T u r k ish
w o u ld
d ocu m ent
N avy
d e v ia tio n
th e
th e
p erm issio n ,
ern m en t.
G overn m en t
of
o ffic ers
[T h is
N avy.
to
w a s g r e a tly
th e
G rey
P a r lia m e n t,
M r.
A ffa ir s
w ith
e n jo y e d
he
had
of
la s t
a p p r e c ia te d
th e T u r k is h
S in c e th is
e n a b le
h ig h ly
d ev elo p m en t
se r v ic e .
m e n t s .]
he
r e g a r d in g
th a t
T u rk ish
th a t
u nd er
m in ister .
S tr a its ;
S tr a its
hand
tia tio n s ,
w o u ld
p la c e
P a r lia m e n t
th is p o in t
T e le g r a m
an
to
At i s s i s s i p p i ,
L ic h n o w sk y ,
to
j e n te re d In to b etw ee n
a sk ed
w h ich
ta k en
in
th e
t o ld - h i m
1914,
” 8.
v a lu e
of
of
u se
he
c o n v e n tio n .
q u e s tio n s
June,
th e
o u tlin e s
B r itis h
fr o m
th e
aw are
gen era l
had
I
c risie
a ttitu d e
b a r g a in c o u n te r
N o.
I
th e o n e h a n d a n d F r a n c e
[In
m em ber
th a t
th a t
He
in
G o v e r n m e n t .]
m a tte r
h im
E d w a r d .]
w h ic h
London
1914.
m in ister
th e
sam e.
yea rs.
f a ls e h o o d .]
th e
1 4 9 .)
G rey
on
nor a
o th er
[A
th e
c o n v in ce d
P a r lia m e n t, a nd
th e
th e
fiv e
n eg o tia tio n s
to
in d isc r e tio n s,
to ld
was
me
th o se
e x te n t
a n d , th e
tre a t
in
w as
I
[S h o w in g
G rey
v ir tu o u s
th e n
th ese
I
and
d e m e n ti.
th a t
th e
th e th r e e G o v e r n m e n ts h ad g r o w n
so
j h im th a t th e in tim a c y b e tw e e n
i g r e a t d u r i n g t h e s e la s t y e a r s t h a t t h e y h a d o n a ll o c c a s i o n s c o m e to a n
u n d e r s ta n d i n g u p o n a ll q u e s t i o n s j u s t a s th o u g h t h e y w e r e a l l ie s .
On
w ith
w ill
be
L ord
th a t c e r ta in
S ir
(8 5 3 .
of
fo r
m ake
th a t
E m peror.
n ev e r th e le ss,
r e g r e tte d
v iew ,
at
13,
c o n v e n tio n
c o n fid e n c e
th e
th is
fr e q u e n tly ;
of
[T h e
s a tis fie d .
[In d ic a tin g
e x p e d ie n t
to o
p o in t
p u b lish ed
th e
he
c o n fid e n c e
e x tr e m e ly
a ll
th is
n eg o tia tio n s,
F ra n ce.
p a rt,
d e m e n t i s — d e n ia ls — is .]
w e ll
w h ich
our
m y
th e m se lv e s
g o v e rn m e n ta l
and
on
th e
O a u n tle tt,
th e
w h a tso e v e r .
on
th e
c ir cu la tin g
naval
in
R u ssia
to
to -d a y
q u e stio n
th is
| p o l i c y ."
w h ich
of
w ere
w ith
o c c u p ied
w ill
to
h er
and
nt
r e c e iv e d .
sa le
p o ssib le
m e
a lleg ed
th e
as
sam e
a llia n c e
C om m on s.
r e p lie d
w o u ld
S t.
rem a rk ed
sin ce
w h ich
J.
Id a h o
dow n
C h ile a n
he
fr o m
a c q u a in t
in
had
F red
o ffic e d u r i n g
th e
th a t
of
M ay
th a t
any
n e g o tia tio n s
G rey
c o m m itte d
th is,
L e tte r,
1137
fo r e ig n
to
retu rn ed
had
in to
a t once
o c c a sio n
s
knocked
but
to ld
E n g la n d
V o lk o ff
n ew sp a p ers
r e g r e tte d
q u e stio n
to
h ern
o th er
S a zo n o ff.
fa c t
The
w ith
S t.
n e g o tia
1 9 1 4 .)
w o u ld
th is
r e g r e tta b ly
fir st
H e
11,
C a p ta in
in s tr u c te d
r e p lie d
th e A d m i r a l t y
th a t
as
a u g m e n tin g
am b assad or
N o.
th e
m u ch
w h ich
me
in
as
G rey
p rep are
th e se
th e
(8 5 5 .
w ith
ask
in
w ith
R u ssia ,
v a il
d u r in g
q u e stio n
he
in
th e n
to
R u s s ia n
t e le g r a m
yesterd a y
w as
q u ite
of
w ife
to
n eed
fle e t
w ith
agreem en t
no
R u s s ia n
not
lie s
G overn
w as
r o m o r n n la
in
d iscu ss
h is
w h ic h
q u ite
th e
The
w as
to
B e fo r e
2 9 -.T u n e
I
The
C on gress
8 1 -J u n e
agree
R u ssia
a u th o r iz ed
you .
an
F llg h n e s s
fle e t
tra v el
c o n fer
how evoT,
S h o u ld
to c o m e
is p r e p a r e d
to
b a ttle s h ip s
tru sts.
P r in c e
[T h e r e
tro o p s
and
w as
he
C o n s ta n tin o p le .
at London
th ro u g h
S ta te s
been
q u e stio n
(8 5 2 .
of
U n ite d
In
$ 1 2 ,5 3 5 ,2 7 0 .9 8 .]
th e
It is
con cern ed.
n e g o tia tin g ,
to
tio n s .
I
w as
a rm a m e n ts;
d e la y
[T u r k e y
of
F r a n e o -B r ltls h
m a tter.
la n d in g
to
w ith
th is
w ere
th e
he
and
fu r th e r
F ils
no
and
in te n d s
regard
th e
P etersb u rg .
in
B r itis h
lo n g
th e
is
w ith o u t
to
am b assad or
E n g la n d ,
th e
G overn m en t
us
a d o p te d .
th e
her
th e u p p e r h a n d
retu rn ed
has
c o n v e r s a tio n
c o o r d in a te d
e x p e d itin g
q u a n tity
p r in c e
th e
see
be
G reece
su ch
th e
w ith
q u e s tio n
a
to
to
In c re a se
n b lo
b e in g
m e n ts] :
m rn t
a cu te
(8 5 4 .
p r o s p e c tiv e
s h o u ld
w ill k e e p
sta n d in g
p le a se d
upon
our
T u rkey
p ru d en ce
W ir y
be
G rey
if
n ego
E n g la n d .
req u est
d e te r m in e
coun t
th e se
our
to
o n ly
w o u ld
w ill
m ig h t
b o th .
of
o n ly
a m ba ssa d or
G rey
we
not
our
sh ip s
E n g la n d
w h e th e r
If
b e g in n in g
b elie v e s
th a t
case,
v e s s e l.
th e
se ll th e
have
m in ister
th e
to
su p p o rt.
th e
to
C h ile a n
is
It
nt
b efo re
th is,
sh ip
S h o u ld
London
of
a w are
th e
p urchase
a b le
is
le a st
even
it p o s s ib le
to
sa le .
step .
As
rem a rk ed ,
h e c o n sid e r e d
re
a ll
su ch
c o u ld
g iv e
re a ssu r in g
dec
w e
fo r m .
w ith
th e se
c o n n e c tio n
h in ts ;
w ith
yet
our
it
fu r
•>v>oo
p jn o i
>Bq)
is
'a o A O M o q
e i d o u u u u i s u o j U| p u u q ju il d u o q i i l o j q u (M < u u o p ii.n l
s^su n
«q
t s ju o u n m u u
J jq
p in o q a
o bu jjju j
A 'o q j n x
;|
■ y u o iO u x
-o ju
O
of
fiiu o
*d tq s
» H f llJH Of J /Q f u s o u
O fU fliJ
u U q
Jo
xno
vuojjq
n
‘pj)f.iuu4ju souo ujffoj uqj.
uu
js
X i u o o a u lYNLOISSUHOMOD
83
RECORD.
29
C O N G R E S S IO N A L
th e r
of
n eg o tia tio n s, w e
h er
In d ia n
m ig h t
prop ose
as
p o sse ss io n s
to
E n g la n d
to
as
g iv e n
e ffe ctiv e
th a t
g iv e
h er
a g u a ra n tee
h er
by
Japan
in
1902.
th e
p osed
p resen t
naval
sta te m e n t
in
th a t
at
F r a n c is
tim e
th e
a lle g e d
w r itin g
of
th is
w o u ld
of
th e
have
have
p o stp o n e
c io u sly
in
to
tea s
cou ch ed
on
an
and
of
P e r sia n
I
have
your
to
r e c e iv e d
w h ic h
a
is
fe w
as
b etw een
as
at
a r is e s
P e r s ia .
It
S ir
th e re
by
not
tea s
It
to
T h is
n o t,
en d,
in
of
le tt e r
of
G eorge
a
me
w ith
c e r ta in
June
of
w o u ld
m ore
d ir ec t
m a n n er;
I
it
fo llo w s
be
con seq u en ce
as
do
to
r e p ly
a
fe a r s
sh a ll
tw een
tio n
p rove
do
a ll
th a t
th e
B r itish
r e su lt
an
th e
stre ss
p o litica l
of
a ssu m ed
fr o m
th e
to
a
P rin c e
but
to
tio n s
how
e v e n ts
been
have
been
it
know n
th e
as
to
d e n ie d
in
som ew h at
is,
in d eed ,
to
go
on
to
tio n
be
fro m
d id
a
not
76876—
P a ris,
in
still
is
c lo se r .
th e
c o n v in c in g .
see
w a y,
no
to
in
th e
up
th e
if
is
V o lk o ff.
It
is
to
very
me
11
tr u e
it
sa m e
th e
G rey
upon
and
be
lo c a liza tio n
w h e th e r
th e
in
th a t
as
a d v e r s e ly
a llu d e
th a t
of
In te re st
he
bad
B e r lin
very
d u r in g
th e
a
rea ssu red .
to
th e
M in is te r
o ffic ia l
fo r
F o r e ig n
as
an
by
th e
yet
th e
in d isc r e
h a v in g
ever
to
in
of
s ta tin g
be
to ld
(T h e
w h ic h
a
he
by
n eg o tia tio n
e x -M in is te r
to d a y ,
th e
pow ers
B e lg r a d e
In
w h ic h
B e r lin
he
has
A u s tr ia n
th is
s h o u ld
w o u ld
co n sid e r a b le ,
to
J u ly
It
and
be
por
am b assad or
rep ort
no
fe w
to
3 -1 0 ,
you
fu r th e r
d ays.
co n sid e r s
th e
hope
P ic h o n
w h ic h
S e r b ia
not
in ten d
had
an
h er
d id
th a t
not
and
p o in t,
to
th a t
S er b ia .
g a in e d
step
not
lo st
in te r v ie w
a lso
be
w ord s,
am bassad or
on
was
th e
to
o th e r
A u str ia
he
at
w as
The
b etw een
fr o m
d id
if
p ow er
p resen t
In s tr u c tio n s
th a t
fo r
F o r e ig n
A ffa ir s
to
th e
chargd
w ith
th e
be
d ’a ffa ir e s
N o.
im
rega rd ed
in
F r a n c e .)
1 1 /H I
J u ly .
1 4 8 8 .)
th e
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
St .
ta k e
d e m e n ti,
B r itis h
le tt e r ,
no
to n e
oth er
in
d em an d s.
to
d e sir e d
con seq u en ces.
a c tio n
or,
fo llo w
gen eral
any
w as
su m m on s,
had
h is
w ho
w as
th e m
u ltim a tu m .
c o m m u n ic a tio n
1 9 1 4 .)
pow ers
th e
to
N e v e r th e les s,
o u tb rea k
of
th e
fo r
th e
her
tim e
a ffo r d
ter.
th em
In
th e
th e
c e r ta in
th e
term
of
tra ry
speak
to
of
a ll
pow ers
to
th e
u ltim a tu m
e ffe c t
ns
e ffe c t,
w ill
In stru c t
ils
London,
R om e,
and
d e c la r e
w h ic h
th a t
to ' th e
us
a
be
in
G o v e rn m e n t.
d e p r iv e
th e
th e
o th e r
of
r e s u lts
th e
pow ers
to
ta k e n
and
of
th e
a ls o
th e
r e fu sa l
step
to
de
to
m a t
ju s tific a t io n
p o s itio n
A
by
has
ought
c o n c e r n in g
a
th e
a d o p te d
w h ic h
th e
c o n v in c e d
a ll
in d is p e n s a b le
grou n ded,
Judgm ent
to
u n der
a r is e n .
fo r
a c tio n
pow ers
are
to
have
fa te fu l
of
to
u ltim a tu m
to
by
w o u ld
convey
ex te n d
A u stro bo
con
cu sto m .
(R u s s ia n
hoD e
its
r e p r e s e n ta tiv e
B e r lin ,
th e
in
to
,
G overnm en t
A u s t r o -H u n g a r y ,
w o u ld
S e r b ia n
m ode
appears
b e in g
w o u ld
p e r io d
th e
it
th e y
regard s
K u d a sc h e ff
th is
fr o m
fo r m in g
dem ands
of
c o m p lic a tio n s
a c c u s a tio n s
of
th e
h a n d in g
S e r b ia .
h er
etersbu rg
con sequ en ces,
c o m m u n ic a te
In te r n a tio n a l
In str u c t
to
to
to
P
sh ort
G o v e rn m e n t,
w h ic h
a d v ic e
a
th e
r e s u lt
p o s s ib ility
th e
of
a ll
a s id e
g r a n te d
event
o n ly
th e
I n c a lc u la b le
c o u ld
A u s tr ia n
c o r r e sp o n d in g
fo llo w in g
se ttin g
r e a d in e s s
on
by
pow ers
w h ic h
in v e s tig a tio n
th e
day
o b v ia te
a lik e ,
m ade
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
c la r e d
fo r
th e
a n y th in g
o rd e r
a c c r e d ite d
to -d a y .
d is q u ie tin g
on
le a v e s
H u ngary
th e
a
as
of
A u s tr ia ’s
th is
a r d e n tly
in c a lcu la b le
se c tio n ,
I n e v it a b ly
A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y
M in is te r
The
N o t
n eg o tia tio n s.
a
have
A u s tr ia ’s
th a t
m e,
in terferen c e
A u s tr ia
S e r b ia
in
to
s ta tin g
m ilita r y
v ie w
p ow ers
G erm an y
w h e th e r
o n ly
fr o m
se ttle d
u n c o n d itio n a l
th e
and
ta k e
and
th e
read
a ttitu d e
G erm an
th e
th e
Shvastopulo.
very
becom e
of
th e
th a t
issu e
of
p o litic a l
In
a m ba ssa d or
th a t
in te re s t
am b assad or
g a th ered
a lso
A u str ia n
A u str ia
w o u ld
w o u ld
B e r th e lo t
th e
m u st
and
n ecessary,
in
ap
saw
r e p r e s e n tin g
a d e fia n t
if
to d a y ,
a V read y
a r g u m e n ts
by
as
a c tio n
ju s tic e ,
A u s tr ia n
th a t
have
P e te rsb u rg )
a d o p te d
com m u
am b assad or
s e t t le d
tr e a tie s
or
be
of
to
and,
o ffic ia lly
am b assad or
w h ic h
G erm an
concern ed.
u ltim a tu m
r e p ly in g
c o u ld
or
th e
th e
it,
v is it
sta te d
c o n flic t,
of
fo r
th e
w as
A u s tr ia n
m in is te r
d ir e c tly
to
th e
th e
p ressu re
u n c o n d it io n a lly
p r e ssio n
one
su r p r ise .
a la r m
tow a rd
la s t
H e
th e
th e
slig h t
in flu e n c e d
has
d e sir es
re c e iv e d
th e
be
of
v isit,
th a n
e x is te n c e
r6 le
C o n fid e n tia l
Is
to
B e lg r a d e
su b o r d in a te
th ese,
fu r th e r
w ith
th a t
tex ts
in
Text
can
d o c u m e n t s .)
S t.
not
in
to
an
at
by
fo r th
pow ers
th e
th e
w a r lik e
W e
sam e.
p r in t:
1 8 4 .)
la t t e r ’s
w as
w as
d ir e c to r
as
a c q u ie s c e
it
be
e x istin g
ask ed
regard ed
th e
th e
of
th e
As
m oreover,
it
of
in te rv ie w ,
evaded
in
L a ter
exert
en d
to
B e r th e lo t,
n a tu r a l
p ress.
c o n v e r s a tio n
th a t
V II.
N o.
c o m p lia n c e
to
th a t
th e g rou n d
p resen t,
a
has
m e r e ly
(T h e
tim e
w e ll
le a d e r
doubt
e x c e p tio n
o m is s io n s
sam e
rea son s
s e ttin g
s h o u ld
a ffa ir
a ffa ir
w ish es
o n ly
on
and
th e
th e
im p o r ta n t
n o th in g
tim e — a
as
no
te le g r a p h ic
and
th e
F rn nce
handed
d u r in g
th e
th a t
th e
of
in flu e n c e .
th e
by
in
d e ta ile d
r e fu se d
A t
m a tte r
it
p riv a te
p u b lic ,
p a r tic u la r
d iffic u lt
E n g lish
o r ig in a l
G overnm en t
of
o b lig e d
but
w a s,
q u ite
a s s a s s in a tio n
en ters
fin d
G erm an y,
your
th is
th e
E dw ard
he
th e
and
little
to
S ir
w o u ld
y e s ie r d a y
V ie n n a
seem
th a t
fr o m
yea r
th e
no
R om an
w h ic h
F a ls ific a tio n s
n ew sp a p ers.
S e r b ia
out
n e g o tia tio n s
of
I
no
th a t
be
have
e m p lo y e d .
th e
proved
n o te
F rench
th e
be
th is
th e
G overn m en t
m ore
p resen t
ca u se
p r e c e d in g
to
is
w a r lik e
V ie n n a .
to
(B ie n v e n u -M a r tin , F r e n c h
th a t
and
I
be-
in d ic a
eyes
to
depen ds
c o n v e n tio n .
doubt
at
th a t
good
as
c o m m u n ic a tio n
w o u ld
th e
th e
m in is te r
p r o lo n g
b e fo r e
he
w ith
d ’ a ffa ir e s
a d d itio n
in
a
th a t
of
th e
th e
carry
c o n tr a r y ,
th e
la s t
n eg o tia tio n s
I
th e
in to
v isit
m uch
rem a rked
P erh a ps
p a rty,
sam e
but
to ld
it
th e
th is
g la n c e
C a p ta in
F ren ch
no
tow a rd
e v id e n t
have
to
(R e s u ltin g
th a t
ow n
The
fir s t
r e a lity
up
be
a lla y e d
p la y
e x e r c is e
new s
he
to
tr u e
h is
G rey
in
n eg o tia tin g
o b lig e d
th is
I
and
ty p e s
(T e l.
c o m m itte d .
Anglo
g r e a t.
be
at
in
of
m u st
p r e s u m p t i v e .)
(8 5 8 .
w ith
to
le a v e
P a r li a m e n t .)
seem s
very
of
th ere.
B e r lin
d e sir e
th e
was
B ook
O ran ge
h im s e lf.
has
c o m m itte d
w ith s ta n d in g ,
is
copy
con
in
d u r in g
w h ich
th e
p e n etra te
in
un
sta n d p o in t
c o u ld
who
but
sa ys
peacem aker
H is
d u r in g
are
H e
P a r is , I t / t i J u ly .
The
a
fo r
n ec e ssity
of
of
to
lo n g er
d iffe r e n t
p r in t:
Book
ch arge
m easu res.
s till
dragged
d a te
is
assu m e,
has
c ir c u m sta n c e ,
d a te
no
(T e l.
Just
a
any
p r a c tic a l
exact
is
Ita lic
th e
h im
in
a
as
th e
b r in g
w h ic h
n e g o tia tio n s
w h ich
It
(F ro m
have
e n te n te
im p o r ta n c e
to
th e
w h ic h
a
in
on
th a t
L o u is
c ir c u m s ta n c e ,
lik e ly
w ill
th is
th a n
E X H IB IT
fea r
fin d in g ,
G rey
e x p e d ite
b e g in n in g ,
n o th in g
th e
R u s s ia n
O ran ge
d iffe r e n c e ,
I
In d ia
A d m ir a lty .
b e lie v e ,
m a tter
The
N a tu r a lly,
upon
of
R u s s ia n
m in is te r
a g reem en ts,
c le a r
B a tte n b er g
of
c lo se .
w h ic h
p re p a ra to ry
I
very
L o u is
as
h e s ita te s ,
I
in
th e
P rin c e
T here
sees
to
J osef
F e r d in a n d ,
la n g u a g e
c o m p a r iso n
d o cu m e n ts.
p eared
of
our
w ith
is
g re a te r
to
d is p o s e d
h e ir
it
s till
a ttr ib u te d
Im p o rta n ce ,
been
a
he
fix e d .
G rey
a fte r
fo r e ig n
th e
th is
of
p resen t
m ake
B r itish
P a r is.
of
o ffic ia l
to
as
w h ic h ,
th a n
se c u rity
had
p ow er
th e
c o n cern in g
is
in
our
th e
w h ic h
G overn m en t
If
P etersb u rg
One
th e
S h o u ld
th e
by
upon
p o ssib ility
m e r e ly
th e
e n te n te .
to
in fo rm ed
degree
m y
th e
in s tr u c t
been
in
and
upon
G o v ern m en t;
Is
(E x p la n a tio n
in
o p in io n
ex ists.
th rea ten ed
fu r th e r
of
F r a n cis
th e
u n ea sy.
even
was
p la in
b e in g
le s s
th e r e
th em .
The military advance on Germany while Germany was pre
vented from mobilizing by diplomatic negotiations appears from
the dispatches published in “ The Falsification of the Russian
Orange Book.” (Exhibit V II.)
s u p p le m e n te d
h y p o th e s is ,
he
to
have
m a im e r
lie s
B r itish
has
of
a
V o lk o ff
a greed
q u e stio n
in
th a t
C a p ta in
p la n
th is
th is
I
a ctio n ,
very
sin c e
ns
c o n fid e n c e
rev iv a l
la y
th e
ex p ressio n
tco u ld
of
u sed
to
o ld
p u b lic
fu ll
go
not
p r e clu d e
w h ic h
le ss
so
r e str a in
G erm an y
is
F r a n c is
to
The
in
of
e n te n te
be
to
th a t
in
th is
w ith
ap pears
im p o r ta n t
th is
c o n v e r s a tio n s
days
th e
g iv e
yea r
m ore
a b le
E m peror
be
June
1 2 -2 5 .
th e
h ow ever,
w o u ld
m o d ific a tio n s
w h ich
th is
upon
N ic o lso n
th a t
th e
be
H is
not
L e tte r,
B uchanan
r e v iv a l
a
lo n g
th ere
E n g lish
id e a
count
A rchduke
p a rty
ta k e n
le tte r
th e
th e
has
lo n g er
w o u ld
DOCUM ENTS.
is
th e re fo r e
h ow ever,
m u la
The
th e
se lv e s ,
docs
n ec tio n
of
th a t
G rey
gra
C zar
hope
upon
c o m p lic a tio n s
now
G eorge
m ig h t
S a z o n o ff.
G o v ern m en t,
so
en ten te
th e
c ir cu m sta n c e s.
ba sed
no
d a n gerou s,
A f f a i r s .)
m u st,
E n g la n d ,
deal
th e
can
of
T h is
th e
to
w e
a ll
a m ba s
th e
E n g la n d
to
w as
In d ia
fe a rs
an
to
if
of
B r itish
no
to
of
O dbran a
S ir
G eorge.
w ork
in d ic a te d .
fe w
very
w h ich
der
n ic a te d
and
th e
seem s
fe a rs
th e
as
have
o n ly
th a t
th a t
th e
w ord s.
have
W e
q u e stio n .
fo r
as
e le m e n ts
1 9 1 4 .)
by
c o rre c t;
se c u r ity
com e
a g a in s t
B r itish
a u d ie n c e
K in g
and
London
2,
you
th e
exp resses
c o n fid e n tia l
to
E n g la n d
R u ssia
w e ll
e n te n te
ever,
in
th e
in te n tio n s,
th is
in
th a t
a d d itio n a l
E n g la n d ,
our
very
g iv e n
u n d o u b te d ly
In a sm u ch
e n te n te
your
w as
sta te m e n t
In d ia
by
p a ssio n s
fe w
q u e stio n .
1 9 -J u ly
an sw er
and
R u ssia
w hen
M a je s ty
to
th e
assu ran ce
im p o rta n t
m e n tio n
fr o m
becau se
a fte r
N arod n a
H is
sen se
s p e c ia l
term s,
am b assad or
and
w ay
a n tip a th y
is
It
in
A rch d uk e
days
som e
S e r b ia n
w ill
in
m u ch
pro
rounds
th e
th e
G overnm en t
th is
le tte r
of
th e
in te r e s tin g
th e
th ree
needed
th e
I
b etw een
th e
been
a g reem en t,
yesterd a y
out
c r i s i s .]
in
ra th er
su m m er
w as
B r itis h
c lo se ,
frien d ly
R u ssia n
never
h im se lf
r e la tio n s
a ccoun t
The
th is
put
he
B a lk a n
a u to g ra p h
very
th e
he
as
co n clu d e
m a k in g
th a t
S a z o n o ff
th e
To
r e c eiv e d
in
th a t
tr o u b led
of
exp ress
h im
to
had
and
next
p resen ce.
hand
M a je s ty
(8 5 7 .
to
w as
of
secret ”
of
to
[A
p o ssib le .
cou rse
A le x a n d e r
th e
co n clu sio n
m y
B uch an an
su pp ort
n ecessa ry
as
te n d e n c ie s ,
T h ere
P r in c e
m e
“ open
th e
E n g la n d ,
th e
p le a se d
sa d o r
order
In
th e
in
A u s tr ia
p rodu ced
th e
of
le tt e r .
C row n
s h o u ld
of
to
q u ic k ly
th a t
a n ti-S la v
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y
he
appears
as
lig h t
t im e ,
F e r d in a n d
h is
it
c o n fer e n ce
E urop e
is
very
th a t
A t
of
n a tio n a l
th a t
charge
th e
concurrence
in
V ie n n a
B e lg r a d e ,
and
d 'a f f a i r e s
G overnm en t
In
to
our
v ie w s
ta k e
B u ch arest
in
to
V ie n n a )
w h ic h
and
a c tio n
you
to
are
Im m e d ia te ly
a c c o r d in g ly .
in fo r m e d .
S A z O N o r r,
v i u v / k / n u
A
r t v i / 1
lI
a
^ / iv
J
30
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
(T h e
charge
d ’a ffa ir e s
In
F ran ce
to
th e
M in is te r
fo r
F o r e ig n
in
A f f a i r s .)
e ffe c t
a
b assad or
(T e l.
W ilh
r e fe r e n c e
The
my
d e c la r a t io n s
rep rod u ced
E ch o
de
th is
P a r is ,
Is
w ith
saw
m eans
bore
p r e v io u s
d isc u ssio n
“ th e
arrow
d u ty
to
as
ta k e
once
The
an
case.
In
fr o m
th e
to d a y .
G erm an y
in
m a n ded
w h ic h
of
w ith in
S er b ia n
a
th e
R ep u b lic
e v en ts.
p a r tie s,
are
con dem n s
A gen ce
B a ron
of
th e
p erio d .
o n ly
The
fo r
its
fr o m
P u b lic
of
The
th e
P r e sid e n t
and
ex c ited
a ctio n ,
by
th e
p ress,
ev en ts;
th r e a te n s
to
w ere
do
th a t
ca u sed
M in is te r
to
th e
am bassad or
in
by
N o.
I am
te le g r a p h in g
“ T o -d a y
I
had
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
ten
dem ands
th in g
but
a b s o lu te ly
s h o u ld
and
2
c o u ld
S k u p s tc h in a
fillm e n t
even
of
c a ll
and
As
not
to
fo r th
th e
fo r e ig n
of
a d e q u a te
“ in
th e
To
exch ange
d ra ft
of
th e
A u str ia
put
an
end
v ie w s
of
th is
o th e r
hand,
d angerous
of
be
me
to
fin d
c o n ta in e d
a
to
be
to
end
it
her
in
as
s h o u ld
me
a
as
th e
th e
p o s s ib le
very
c e r ta in
fo r
an
su p p o rte d
to
th e
p resen t
of
th e
fr ie n d ly
a
p r iv a te
fin d
re
(2 3 d )
a
of
fo r m u la
A u s tr ia
Speak
of
A u stro -
m u tu a l
1 0 th
to
a ffo r d in g
d em an d s.
a
it
s ta te
th e
in to
m a k in g
to
p ow ers,
th a t
en ter
of
a c c o r d in g
o th e r
p o s s ib le
tim e
London
th e
to
n o te
p rove
sam e
w h ic h ,
d e s ir a b le
A u s tr ia n
and
and
as
p urp ose
im p o r ta n t
B e r lin
peace,
em pow ered
th e
p r o b a b ly
c a u tio u s
a ffa ir s .
of
s in c e r e ly
me
be
in
at
m ost
to
fo r
w o u ld
and
as
soon
seem ed
a r tic le s
it
S e r b ia ,
te le g r a m
fo r e ig n
th e
m a in te n a n c e
s a tisfa c
in
th e
sen se
w ith
m anner
of
th e
m in is te r
in fo r m e d .
charg6
d ’a ffa ir e s
In
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
th e
N o.
M in is te r
fo r
fo r
th e
fo r e ig n
to r ia l
is
how
has
w ords
th e
w ar.
to
p reserve
G erm an y
fo r
proof
and
in
fe e ls
peace,
a
w ith
a p tly
and
tru sts
m o d e r a tin g
do
th a t
th e
S e r b ia
had
g iv e n
of
her
th e n
F ran ce,
th a t
not
ask ed
c o u ld
to
th a t
not
ta k e
th e
step s
in
fo u r
in
th e
no
F ran ce
The
w ill
u se
m in is te r
in
V ie n n a ,
to
h im
be
in
me
w h e th e r
and
c o n fe re n c e
fin d in g
I
In
P etersb u rg
and
of
a
r e p lie d
he
to
A u s tr ia n
t e le g r a m
v iew
of
to
fr o m
com es
to
and
th e
th e
d ip lo m a tic
th e
in
w h o le
o p in io n
v ic to r y ,
but
ex trem es
en e r g e tic
F o r e ig n
d e p a rtm e n t
d id
not
h im
th ey
a c tio n
a
th e
h is
in
very
th e
, 1 3 /1 3
a r is
me
c o n te n ts
had
not
o p in io n
fa v o r a b le
to
A ffa ir s
to
th e
of
th a t
been
of
th e
th e
S e r b ia ’s
G le sl
sa tis fie d
d ir e c to r
of
e ffe c t.
am bassad or
m y
in
F r a n c e .)
to
of
th e
set
th e
m easu res
u rged
and
a
in
tw o
N o.
203
w h ic h
or
of
th e
of
J u ly
fo r
of
I
to
earn est
is
w e
w ay
of
have
A u str ia ’s
had
a ffa ir s
it
and
N o.
we
as
a cc e p ta b le
G erm an y,
crept
a
th a t
F o r e ig n
M in is te r
to
(T e l.
have
to
an
e x p e d itio n
c le a r
of
d is p u te )
q u a r r e l.
The
Ita ly ,
w as
fu rth e r
by
th e
w ord
th e
th e
N o.
N o.
a
m od
c o n s ta n tly
th is
J u ly
28
a lr e a d y
sort
fro m
fr o m
sh ow n
d em a n d s.
and
Ita ly
am b assad or
B aron
th e
(in
a g a in st
c o u ld
w ith
G le s l.
th e
The
b etw ee n
S e r b ia ,
c o n s is t.
we
th e
It
P
etersbu rg
c a b in e t
B ook
, U /2 7
w h ic h
th e
our
to
g iv e
not
B e r lin ,
is
e ffe c te d
R u s s ia n
and
u n d ersta n d
R om e,
th e
a ll
th e w ord
change
do
r e p ly
exceed s
(e x p r e s s e d )
V ie n n a
th e O ra n g e
“ w a r .”
F r a n c e .)
1 5 2 4 .)
r e a d in e s s
U n le s s
in
J u ly .
1521.
a c q u a in te d
d iffe r e n c e
dem ands
s ta n tin o p le
to
and
s a tis fa c tio n .
m akes
G erm an y,
m y s e lf
m o d e r a tio n
te x t fo r
th e
te le g r a m
handed
The
G erm an y
m y
m ade
G overnm en t
its
M a r tin )
of
A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y ,
St.
R e fe r r in g
fu lle s t
th e
S azonoff .
(T h e
by
fo r
in to
sta n d p o in t
have
th e
(S a z a u o ff
a llie s
In flu e n c e
a d o p te d
a lte r ,
w ith
n ecessa ry
of
to
w as
c a lc u la t e d
advance
201
1592
I
ex erc isin g
h is
Is
w as
r e p ly
(B ic n v e n u
of
in
m o d e r a tin g
we
no
p roposal
q u e stio n
te le g r a m
N o.
no
n o te .
n ev e r th e le ss,
he
w h ic h
n e g o tia tio n s
w h ich
as
a
th e
w ith
w h ic h
te le g r a m
of
re
a lr e a d y
n e g o tia te
and
th e
a
had
r e c e iv e d
E n g lis h
r e fe c t
m easu res,
to
fr o m
d ir e c t
a
sh e
in fo r m e d .
I
a
th e
w ith
regard ed
ev en ts,
had
fo r e ig n
e x e r c is e
E n g la n d ,
read y
seen
w a s,
in
a ll
In
be
It
as
to
d is c u s s
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y ,
o th e r
th ere
2 9 ),
In itia tiv e
n e g o tia tio n s
r e d r a ftin g
su p p ressed
can
to
am bassad ors
of
our
r e s u lt.
s h o u ld
we
to
If
If
N o.
ask ed
Ita ly
m ay
w h ic h
w as
cou rse
any
m in ister
th e
and
(V ie n n a
m isu n d ersta n d in g
so rts
fa v o ra b le
is
P etersb u rg ,
C om p are
o u tse t
no
a m ba ssa d or.
G erm an y
V ie n n a .
th e
to
but
c o m b in e d
th is
my
u ltim a tu m
s u p p r e sse d ),
s e ttle m e n t
s u b s titu te
w ith
th a t
a
a sid e
in flu e n c e
th e
a d v ic e ,
la k e
p ow ers
fa v o r a b ly
fu rth e r
w as
s h o u ld
a lth o u g h
r e a d in e s s
th e
accept
le a d
G erm an
e r a tin g
In
p e a c e fu l
d u ly
of
J u ly .
m in e
am b assad or
G erm an y,
fo u r
H /2 7
and
s itu a tio n .
th a t,
T h is
w h ic h
to
th e
in a d m is s ib le ,
It.
r e g a r d in g
c a b in e t
to
r e p ly
a
th a t
187
E n g lis h
F ran ce,
p resen t
h e lp
th e
N o.
E n g la n d
of
begun
G e r m a n y ’s
ready
e ffe c t
V ie n n a
th e
had
as
P e te rsb u rg ,
th e re fo r e
m e
of
r e c o g n iz a b le
to
th a t
ord er
am b assad or
R u s s ia n
p rop osa l
to
in
out
te le g r a m
G o v e rn m e n t,
is a g r e e a b le
r e g a r d in g
p la in ly
fr o m
h is
r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s
S e r b ia
P e te rsb u rg
so
by
th e
w ith
handed
R u s s ia
it
J u ly.
th a t
a sto n is h m e n t
B e lg r a d e )
m u st,
have
M i n i s t e r .)
in fo rm e d
of
conceal
In
S e v a s to p u lo u ’ s
am bassad or
d r a ftin g
of
in flu e n c e
as
P a r is
In te r v e n tio n
in c lin e s
it
th a t
In
1 8 9 .)
in fo r m e d
F o r e ig n
to
w ay
to
c o n c ilia to r y .
V ie n n a ,
N o.
m in is te r
London
p la c e d
E n g la n d ,
as
fo r
th e
a fte r
A u s t r o -S e r b ia n
th e
in
em p h a tic
F ran ce
c o m p la is a n c e
R u s s ia
su m m on
e s p e c ia lly
as
he
if
la
R u s s ia
observed
im p o s s ib le ,
to
her
and
b r illia n t
c o n sid e r s
in
s o le
id e a
th e
her
n o te
secu re
a lth o u g h
p o litic a l
d e p a rtm e n t,
In stru c te d
te r r i
( fa ir e
h ow ever,
upon
a
d e c la r e d
dem arch es
fo llo w in g
H er
ord er
w h ic h ,
F ran ce
p ow ers,
th e
S e r b ia .
it d e p e n d s
d e s ir e
to
of
H e
u ltim a tu m ,
M in is te r
The
m in is te r
seek s
J u ly .
u s e fu l.
th e
r e fe r e n c e
1508.
J u ly .
A u s t r o -G e r m a n
w ith
sam e
seem ed
in te r fe r e
w h e th e r
one
s e n s e .”
m ig h t
r e p lie d
but
o f th is
h e r s e lf a t
h im
sh e
m a in ta in
th e
S e r b ia ,
con sequ en ce
p art
d e te r m in e d
m in is te r
In
h er
am bassad or
w as
c o n flic t
to
, 1 3 /2 6
s u b s titu te
to
th a t
in te g r ity
and
reveal
th e
m ade
R u s s ia
th e
peace
ita lic
v is ite d
a r is
to
to g e th e r ,
a fte r
it.
d ’a ffa ir e s
of
S e r b ia ’s
o u r se lv e s
and
to
th re a te n
ow n
in
G erm an y
P etersb u rg
d e c la r e d
not
her
n e v e r a c c e p t e d .]
d e s ir e
th e
has
does
secu re
h a n d le
to
a g a in
(B ie n v e n u -M a r tin )
[T h e
o b v ia te
In
and
to
p o l i c e .)
am bassad or
“ A u str ia
g a in s
o b je c t
G erm an
a ffa ir s
sta te m e n t:
it.
P a r is
A f f a i r s .)
1 8 7 .)
P
T o -d a y
F o r e ig n
1 3 /2 3
St . P etersburg,
in
“ Saxanoff.”
(T h e
A f f a i r s .)
( T e l. N o . 1 5 2 1 .)
and
h ou se
b a sis
c o u ld
fu l
in te n tio n .
s u b je c t
to
[c o m p a r e
and
ca se,
B e r lin
ch arge
p o litic a l
W ith
th e
th e
royal
A u s t r i a 's
th a t,
d iffic u lt
of
r e s u lt s
th e
F o r e ig n
d e p a rtm e n t,
G erm an
A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y ,
any
th e
th e m
S e r b ia n
th e
m em bers
to
be
th e y
d e s ir e d
w ith
w ay
r e g a r d in g
th is
not
th e
fo r
S eyastopulo .
p o in ts
ap proval
s c a r c e ly
appeared
of
th e
on
a g a in s t
a c c u s a tio n s
a lte r a tio n
in
p o litic a l
fa cts
s tr iv in g
fr o m
and
d ir e c to r
(T h e
G overn
e x a m p le ,
w h ic h
e x tr e m e ly
c o u ld
w o u ld
am b assad or
a c c e p t a b le
t io n
to
som e
In
it
an
to
th e
e ffe c t
1 8 8 .)
any
of
S e r b ia n
For
s h r in k
a ttr ib u ta b le
th is
of
of
J u ly .
a tte m p ts
it
th e
have
th e
th e
M in is te r
s u c c e s s iv e
th e
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
th e
p r o o f.
e s s e n tia l
H u n g a r ia n
fo r
if
w ith o u t
o b ta in e d ;
m ig h t
p o in ts ,
w ord s,
te n s io n .
5
be
fr o m
if
war
th e
Fran ce
th e
som e
th e
N o.
2 6 th ]
and
are
am bassad or,
th e
th a t, a p art
th e m .
a ll
r e p ly
w ith
h im
even
accept
of
J u ly
A u s tr ia n
1 / 6 July.
31
up,
in
th e
F r a n c e .]
P
The
(th e
w ith
draw n
to
(T e l.
w a r.
e x a m in e d
w ere
a s s e m b ly ,
w h ic h
d e ta ils ,
in te re s ts
S za p a ry ’s
w as
and
th ey
to
at
B ook
expressed
2 6 th ,
of
stro n g ly
c o n v e r s a tio n
bad
rem arked
to
out
and
s c a r c e ly
I
fu lfillm e n t ,
c a r r ie d
P a s h itc h ,
o th e r
I
w h ic h
of
p ress
4
A fte r
r e a d in e s s
te r r o r is t
u n d e r s ta n d in g
by
be
th e
p o in ts
a lte r a tio n s
its
fr ie n d ly
ns
J u ly
O ru nge
S bvastopulo .
fo llo w s :
very
S e r b ia ,
In
im p o s s ib le
c o u ld
a g a in s t
to
fo r m
d e c la r e
r e g a r d in g
as
nnd
am bassad or.
a d d ressed
w ere
1
V ie n n a
lo n g
d ex tero u s
m ent
la w s
to
a
th e
p resen t
187.
th e
r e g a rd in g
gen eral
,
of
G erm an y
E n g la n d
N o.
in tim id a te
p ow ers
(T h e
F r a n c e .)
etersbu rg
in
v ie w
of
m in ister
th e
not
th e
1 5 0 8 .)
St . P
to
d e sir e
not
T e l.
d ir e c to r
T a k in g
of
not
w ith
(T e l.
188
in tim id a te
F ran ce
o p in io n
187,
th e se
w ill
Sbvasto pulo .
(F o r e ig n
N o.
as
was
o m itte d
am
F in a lly ,
a
of
J a u rfs
a
N o.
a ttitu d e
A u str o -
th e
in te n d e d
th a t
d istin c tio n
lo o s e
to
In
m y
th e
P e te rsb u rg .
of
of
person al
P a r is ,
de
sta te s
r a r is
h ts
th e
is
th e
d e fin ite ly
le t
d ’a ffa ir e s
B e r th e lo t,
In
any
not
P r e sid e n t
even
se e k in g
w as
The
p o in t.
p roposal
B e r th e lo t
B c r t h e l o t 'a
P a r is ,
A u s tr ia .
th is
P aris ,
her
in
a n sw er
w ith o u t
ch arge
C o n tin u a tio n
m in istry
has
p r e v e n ts
o p in io n
fr o m
and
on
of
It,
by
war
of
G erm an
sen ten c e
(T e l.
n ecessa ry
fu rth er
th e
(V iv ia n i)
th e se
w h ic h
an
th e
weakened
have
w as
R u s s ia
in s tr u c tio n s
Revastopulo.
a c o m m u n ic a tio n
de
of
it
n o te
th a t
E cho
its
g u id e d
lo c a liza tio n
a bsen ce
e x p r e ssin g
o p in io n
e x tr e m e ly
th e
approved
S c h tin s s t a t e m e n t
ann ou ncem en t
o b je c t
rev ela tio n s
to d a y.
m ea ns
G erm an y
(T h e
He
fo r e ig n
A u str ia n
accept
[T h is
w o u ld
of
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,
any
fo r
p u b lish in g
th a t
had
th e
seek
th a t
th e m .
deem ed
is
sen se
M in ister
A u s tr ia ’s
not
to
a b sen t.
t e le g r a m
b etw ee n
la c k
w ords
ex p ressed
be
It
qu arrel
h is
th is
w ith o u t
he
o n ly
has
rea ssu red
does
H avas
but
as
a
to
d e c id e d
was
fo llo w in g
ot
of
c o n v e r sa tio n .
becau se
th e
at
h is
to
G erm an y
c o u ld
ex ten t
G erm an y
th a t
S e r b ia
If,
S ch bn
th e
m om en t
p resen t
som e
to
are
by
c h a ra c te r
a ttr ib u te d
th a t
out
g iv e n
th e
B a ron
fo rm ,
concern ed
in s is te d
n a tu r a lly
in
The
of
th e
to
but
y e ste rd a y
th r e a te n in g
n o te
G erm an y
th a t
m in is te r
p r e sid e n t
exact
m u ch
and
p o in te d
is
B ou rse
and
fo r
B e r lin ,
th a t
th e
h er
th a t
th e
o n ly
c o n flic t.
of
o ffic e
has
th e ir
c h a ra c te r
and
u ltim a tu m ,
step
w h ic h
w ith
E m ba ssy
it
an
G erm an
p a n ic
step
in d ic a tio n
am b assad or
In
m o r n in g
f ly ,"
th e
J u ly .
th is
not
handed
le t
1 2 /2 3
184.
am b assad or,
th is
fa c t
con seq u en ce
ch a ra cter
th e
w as
th is n e w
being
as
It
v ie w ,
Paris,
G erm an
In
The
had
of
of
a lly .
an
lh e
th r e a te n in g
A u s tr ia
p o in t
N o.
c o m m e n ts,
th e
th a t
1 8 6 .)
p erh aps
B e r th e lo t
declared
A u str ia ’s
by
a lt h o u g h
e m p h a s iz e d .
in d is c r e tio n ,
no
te le g r a m
m ade
to d u y ,
step
by
to
N o.
case
a p p e a le d
S e r b ia n
e x p e c ta tio n s
A u s tr ia
se e k in g
fo r
a
th e
pre
“ e x p e d it io n ’ ’ is re
by
th e
of
V ie n n a ,
th is
one
A u s tr ia n
w hat
w ord
v ie w
A u s tr ia ’s
London,
C on
in fo r m e d .
Bazonofp .
7 6 8 7 6 — 11
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x i u o o 'a u ' i v K O i s s a H O N O O
C O N G R E S S IO N A L R E C O R D .
(T h e
ch arge
d 'a f f a i r e s
in
F ran ce
(T e l. N o .
(In
th e
O ran ge
B ook
th e re: “ T h e
d e ta il
t o -d a y
am b assad or
of
th e
G erm an
w ith
th e
s tr o n g ly
m e d ia tio n
or
w h o le
of
of
a
to
th e
F o r e ig n
te le g r a m
of
th e
upon
is
th e
fa ls ifie d ,
situ a tio n
p o lit ic a l
e x c lu d in g
R e fe r r in g
7
A t
to
m y
o ’c lo c k
secon d
and
fin d
sort
c o u ld
h is
tio n
a
ow n.
sh o u ld
been
done
H e
id e a
th e
in s is te d
to
he
as
in
V ie n n a
o b je c t
to
th e
d e ta il
r u lin g
a ll
H e
d id
th a t
G overn m en t
th e
w ish
th a t
a
n eg o tia tio n s
sh ort
sh o u ld
m a in te n a n c e
of
m ake
in
w ay
and
to
th e
F o r e ig n
N o.
th is
The
of
F ren ch
fillin g
as
a m ba ssa d or
th e
p ost
of
in
S w itz e r la n d
R u ssia n
in s is ts
upon
a tt a c h < in
5
m ilita ry
th e
d esir a b ility
S w itz e r la n d
as
soon
Sevastopu
am b assad or
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
N o.
th e
F o r e ig n
a c tin g
te le g r a m
G o v e r n m e n t ’s
th is
n ew s
w as
20
F o r e ig n
te rd a y
w ith
6
h ours
order
H ere
te le g r a m
you
on
th e
to
w ay.
to
V ie n n a
m a in ta in
th e re
is
no
doubt
The
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
N o.
a.
m.
retu rn ed
I
have
an
te le g r a m
w as
of
am b assad or
in
th e
to
th e
N o.
and
P resid en t
of
has
C h r istia n ia
and
d e la y
h ere
on
am b assad or
in
(T e l.
to
N o.
Im m e d ia te ly
out
m in is te r
(T h e
becau se
T h is
th e
fo r
as
is
R u s s ia
one
in
up
h is
of
o m is s io n
d e p r iv e s
p reserve
o b v ia te
th e
F ran ce.
th e
The
was
u n d o u b te d ly
o b je c t
th e
to
F rench
in
th e
to
th is
done
a ll
sh e
upon
R u s s ia
th e
A u str ia n
tfli
G erm an
G o v e r n m e n t,
to
and
not
th e
sta te m e n t
m in is te r
is o la t e
our
to
a lly ,
m a in ta in
Fran ce.
T o -d a y
of
th e
a m ba ssa d or
v isite d
m ade
p rop osa l
11
a n ew
R u ssia
p rop osa l
and
to
at
step
A bel
fo r
end
of
c r o s s in g
of
a
be
to
th e
w hat
had
a
A u s tr iu
h er
not
case
In
c o n s id e r e d
w o u ld
n ecessary
th e se
been
e ith e r
step s
p r e c is e ly
of
an
u lti
of
th e S er b ia n
fr o n tie r .
t e le g r a m
is
as
“ But
S e r b ia n
w a r .”
as
as
he
h ere
w as
a c r o ssin g
th e
d e c la r a tio n
r e p ly
g iv e
query
m ig h t
, 7 4 /2 7 J u l y .
a r is
T u esd ay,
to
th a t
th e
of
rep rese n ted
in
fo llo w s :
fr o n tie r ,
T h e r e fo r e
p a r tic u la r ly
o f an
m eans
it
u ltim a tu m ,
s u b s e q u e n tly
severe
and
to
re p ly
a
Ferry
b e in g
th e
and,
m y
in
A bel
of
F erry
th e
sen se,
re sts
s o le
w ith
th e
M in is te r
N o.
fo r
th e
of
F o r e ig n
la s t
e x e r tin g
o l s k i.
proof
th a t
A f f a i r s .)
1 9 7 .)
in
th e
O ran ge
G e r m a n y ’s
a r is
B ook
a ttitu d e
, 7 4 /2 7
J u ly .
b ecau se
w as
not
h is
in
a ffa ir s)
G erm an
w o u ld
as
m o b iliz a tio n
fo r e ig n
r e su lt
a m ba ssa d or
q u e stio n
to
by
r e p lie d
B e r lin )
it
con
u n c o n d i
th a t
a
w o u ld
( G erm an
se c r e ta r y
Jagow
th a t
by
fr o m
G erm an y
m o b iliz a tio n
but
r e p ly
te le g r a p h s
a ttitu d e
R u ssia ,
m o b iliz a tio n ,
im m e d ia te ly
in
w hat
of
if R u ssia
a tta c k in g
th a t
B er lin
adopt
k in d
a tta c k e d
of
w o u ld
A u str ia ,
R u ssia .
am
t e le g r a p h in g
m y
to
to
th e
N o.
am b assad or
th e
O ran ge
added]
c o u ld
regard s
T h is
I
am
th e
in g
b e in g
p la c e d
ta k e n
w h ic h
th e n
stre n g th en
and
th a t
t u d e .”
a
at
be
very
th e
by
T h is
is
and
w as
in
to
is
say,
th e
a
p a rty
to
G erm an y
of
B e r lin
e n tire
The
im
been
th e
c a b in e t,
c r is is , a p p e a r s
am b assad or
h ere
m ore
th e
me
e x tr e m e ly
any
n ecessary
th e
key
to
th e
c o n n e c tio n
B e r lin ,
p r iv a te
th a t
key
sy m p a th y
crea te
th e
w as
w ith
th e
Is
step s
th e
th a t
to
in
in
in
B e r lin .
of
recom m en d ed
sen ten ce,
c o n s ta n tly
is
in
B e r lin ,
ir r e c o n c ila b le
th e
th e
in s te a d
fir st
s itu a tio n
A u s tr ia ’s
fo u n d
is
corresp on d
F o u r ta l6 s
th e
im p r e s s io n
be
exert
w ord s,
in to
w ith
to
pow er
situ a tio n
put
t a lk s
th e
to
th e se
w ith
are
d is q u ie tin g , a n d
o th e r
step s
rearran gem en t
in
in
to
th a n
tru e
a tti
cause
fo r
B e r li n .]
Sazo n o ff.
(T h e
M in is te r fo r
F o r e ig n
A ffa ir s
(T e l.
N o.
to
th e
am
t e le g r a p h in g
W ith
regard
w ith
to
a
by
tio n s
N o.
196,
le s s .
of
h is
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y
F ran ce
and
th a t
fo r e ig n
am bassad or
in
F r a n c e .)
1 5 3 8 .)
S t . P e t e r s b u r g , 1 5 /2 8
I
have
ta k in g
nam e
r e p lie d
th e
have
th a t
The
a lly .
g a in
s ig n ific a n c e
m o n a r c h y .]
its
I
m ore ”
becom e
to
s y m p to m a tic
th e
upon
a ttitu d e
u n y ie ld in g
and
p r e v io u sly
[T h a t
appears
doubt
“ M y
, 1 5 /2 8 J u l y .
u n s a tis fa c to r y .
B e r lin
im p r e s s io n
am b assad or
d e v e lo p m e n t o f
c le v e r
end
read s :
m y
as
E n g la n d
G erm an y
A u s tr ia ’s
in
W ith o u t
of
th e
etersbu rg
“ m ore
has
th e
to
E n g la n d
u n d erta k e
m eans
to
G e rm a n y ’s
th a t
G erm an
w ords
a ttitu d e .
in flu e n c e
r e p ly
of
in flu e n c e .
[B y
to
to
of
S e r b ia n
th e
G erm an y
as
F r a n c e .)
fo llo w s :
th e
danger
a rrested
o p in io n
p o s itio n
a
sort
a ttitu d e
of
as
have
no
th a t
o p in io n
m u rder
e x e r c is e
w ith
B ook
u n y ie ld in g
A u str ia ’s
as
in
1 5 2 8 .)
d iv e r t
w o u ld
th e
of
to
London
P etersb u rg ,
teleg ra m
th e
w h ic h
to
c o n v e r s a tio n s
[in
S e r a je v o
to
r e s p o n s ib ility
a c tin g
M in is te r
G erm an y
w ar
to
F o r e ig n
persu aded
Fran ce,
in
of
very
G erm an y
of
and
at
in flu e n c e
of
w as
th is
p r io r
in
seek s
S e r b ia .
Sch on
part
event
in
a b s o lu te ly
B aron
a ffa ir s
A bel
H er
s h o u ld
“ in te r v e n tio n
k n o w le d g e
sh e
th e re fo r e
p la c e
o ’c lo c k ,
to
su pp ressed
(F r e n c h
to
p a r tia l
fo r
sh ared
L e ft
general
ap pearan ce,
d e scr ib e d
F ran ce
St . P
G erm an
of
p o in t .)
R u s s ia
th e
in
w as
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y ’s
t e le g r a m s .
th a t
r e p r e s e n ta tio n s
th e
it
o l s k i.
A f f a i r s .)
w a r li k e .]
From
th e
y e ste rd a y
s o lid a r ity
on
n il
A u s tr ia ,”
th e
of
peace,
th e
th e
h is
th e
a ll
It
th e
to
2
tlin t
(T e l.
t e le g r a m .)
in te g r ity
c o n n e c tio n
and
peace
by
in
R u s s ia
of
b etw ee n
w ho,
pre
tak en
I zv o l s k i.
J u ly .
o ffic e .
th is
ta k e n
fo r e ig n
m ake
of
a lte r
a c tio n
d is u n io n
G erm an y,
a m ba ssa d or
th is
fo r
a b o v e -m e n tio n e d
fo r e ig n
Fran ce,
to
, 7 4 /2 7
and
th e
(2 )
as
s a id
a
C am bon
p r e s s io n
B e r th e lo t
h a lf
not
and
th is
F o r e ig n
Iz v
G erm an y
o l s k i.
w ith
sta te m e n t
d is tu r b
In
S e r b ia
w a r, or o f
J u ly .
d is c u s s io n
in fo rm e d
does
t o -m o r r o w ,
C open ha gen
of
assu ra n ces
to
p ro m o te
to
not
em ba ssy.
z v o l s k i.
a
step s
tr a n q u illity .
s e n s e .”
fr o m
c o u ld
b e ttc c c n
b r in g
7687«—
w ay
w ord
a r is
S e v a s to p u lo
h is
G erm an y
G overnm en t
r e s p o n s ib ility
G erm an y
ow n
a c tin g
of
and
th is
d e s ir e
u n d e r lin e d
sta te
J u ly .
M i n i s t e r .)
F rench
th re a te n
A u s tr ia n
(3 )
m o d e r a tin g
th a t
w o u ld
her
w ar.
arden t
and
th e
of
th e
th e
has
6tep s
am b assad or
S e r b ia ’s
m in is te r ’s
but
of
th e
a
u n p le a s a n t
in
I
had
th e
c o n fir m e d
not
I
by
th a t
com pel
th e
A u s tr ia n
th a t
is
s u b s e q u e n tly
secon d
of
you
A u s tr ia
p a r tic u la r ly
in d u c e
S chon
to
does
a
s titu te d
th a t
, 7 4 /2 7
a r is
v isit
F o r e ig n
p resen ce
in
th e
d e ta ils
c o m m u n ic a te d
and
to
in
th e
of
“ (1 )
th e
R u s s ia
m e
in
of
t e le g r a m
J u le s
1 9 5 .)
sta te
g a in s
th e
to
of
B ook
case
(T h e
th e
P a r is
a ffa ir s
fo llo w s :
a p p a r e n t ly
o b je c t
to
s u p p r e s s io n
B aron
te r rito r ia l
[A lth o u g h
it
and
m o r n in g
w r itin g ,
retu rn
fo r e ig n
to r
c o n fir m e d
They
m y
u n d ersecreta ry
of
am b assad or
no
a fte r
w h ic h
th e
M i n i s t e r .)
P
a c tin g
th e
W ed n esd a y.
F ran ce
fo r
P
[T h is
o l s k i.
Izv
(T h e
F erry.
on
, 7 4 /2 7
a r is
conduct
F o r e ig n
g iv e n
r etu rn s
te le g r a m
r e p e lla n t
1 9 6 .)
th e
am b assad or
p o in t,
am b assad or
1 9 4 .)
R ep u b lic
th e
M in is te r
N o.
(T e l.
d e liv e r e d
M i n i s t e r .)
P
The
(T h e
to w a rd
th e
(T e l.
to
th e
th a t
of
ex
th e
F ran ce,
a tte n d in g
to
a ppearan ce
th is
proved
yes
o n ly
in te n tio n a l
F o r e ig n
over
F ran ce
r e p ly
a d e c la r a tio n
a
and
to
th e
b e fo r e
day
I
(T h e
of
of
and
b e a r in g
1 9 3 .)
ta k en
th e
m in is te r
V ie n n a ,
o f,
O ran ge
be
even
S e r b ia n
th e
P
ju st
on
th e
tio n a lly
am b assad or
h a lf
of
a
W ed
a ssista n t
m
th e
Izv
(T h e
to
G o v e rn m e n t,
step s ”
In
e v e n tu a lity
lin e s .
H a v in g
[In
or
B e lg r a d e
p r e s s in g
11
to
know
fr o m
s ta n d p o in t
as
in fo r m e d
m a tu m , o f
, 7 4 /2 7 J u l y .
a r is
not yet
me
at
our
on
u n d e r sta n d in g
h is
slig h te st
it
a ttitu d e
r e c eiv e
P a r is
p r e s s u r e .]
d id
sen t
sen t
to
.
lo
1 9 2 .)
sh ow s th a t
The
M in is te r
th e
o ’c lo c k .
A u s tr ia n
1508
r e p ly .
F rench
at
N o.
F ran ce
fo r e ig n
In
c o n s is t
m ig h t
M i n i s t e r .)
F
Your
in
h is
“ e n e r g e tic
w o u ld
p o ssib le.
(T h e
secon d
su ccess
q u ite
it, and
d e te r m in a tio n
th e
P
by
u n s a tis fa c to r y
, 1 4 /2 7 J u l y .
th e
of
le a v e
not
w o u ld
and
th e ir
becau se
m is tr u s tfu l
p o s s ib ility
(T e l.
ta k e
M i n i s t e r .)
a r is
in
d id
to
correct
a v o id
to
p e r so n a lly
m istr u ste d
he
has
1 9 1 .)
P
th e
th a t
th e
[T h e
B ook
he
he
m in ister
to
u s.
th a t
th a t
p o in t
S ch on
r etu rn ed
at
w ere
and
O ran ge
ju s tifie d
am bassad or
g u a r a n tie s .
(T e l.
th ey
b etw een
th e
he
a ctin g
su pp ort
p u b lish e d
and
Sevastopulo.
F ran ce
th e
me
m o r n in g
w h en
th e
Iz v
fo rm e d
in
th e
to
B a ron
G e r m a n y .]
In str u c te d
c h n r g d d 'a f f a i r e s
in
to ld
S c h o n ’s ;
su r p r ise d
by
tra n q u il
u n ity
advance
(T h e
c o m m u n ic a
in fo r m e d .
(T h e
no
in
P a r is
to d a y.
Ix in d o n
of
in
c lu d e d
was
fu lle st
su pp ressed
in
m ore
th a t
it
be
peace,
and
be
to
it
w h e th e r
or
fir m
th e ir
la c k
any
B a ron
h im
I
us
to
and
m in ister
m a n ife ste d
and
of
rest,
w o u ld
m in iste r
of
te ll
fo r e ig n
th e
w as
try
perhaps
h ow ever,
how
step
to
it
fo r e ig n
n ew
th e
For
see
fo u r
a ctin g
situ a tio n
of
th e
to
p o ssib ility
v iew
n o t,
fo r
p ow ers,
th is
fr o m
ten d
5 o ’ c lo c k .
B e r th e lo t
out
th e
at
m in istry
w ith
h is
w ith
th e
p la c e
th a t
in te n d e d
r e p ly
th e
observed
th e
to
The
m e r e ly
The
p o s s ib ility
, 7 4 /2 7 J u l y .
a r is
to o k
exp ressed
exp ressed
its
cam e
upon
but
F r a n c o -G e r m a n
have
teleg ra m
situ a tio n
o r ig in a te d
F in a lly
r e g a rd in g
w h ich
th e
a d v ic e
th is
th is
o n ly
u n d e r sta n d
to
in
c o n fer e n c e ,
g iv e
w h e th e r
w as
o u t.
of
of
a greed .
reads
a n d in
187.
to
and
n esda y.
a m ba ssa d or
d iscu sse d
w ay
or
E n g la n d
c le u r
G erm an
and
a
m e d ia tio n
N o.
r e fe r r e d
th e
tim e
and
anew
c o n f e r e n c e .")
T e l.
c o n v e r s a tio n
istcr,
d e p a rtm e n t.
any
P
The
M i n i s t e r .)
in te r v e n tio n
d isc u sse d
d ir e c to r
in s is te d
31
1 9 0 .)
th is
am b assad or
oe
is
th e
(T h e
h ere
an
to
d e c la r a tio n
B ook
and
tie s
had
th e
t e le g r a m
th e n
of
resp ect
to
w ar
a g a in s t
S e r b ia ,
ta k e n
fro m
d o u b le
p la c e
am bassad or
read s:
S e r b ia , it is
in te n tio n a l
he
w ith
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
O ran ge
m in -
London
fa ls ific a tio n .
N o.
a ls o
1544
th e
of
my
J u ly .
N o.
1521.
d ir e c t n e g o tia
a p p a r e n t ly
p u rp ose
of
h o s tilit ie s
b etw ee n
th a t
On
t e le g r a m
are
v ie w
n ecessary
[c o m p a re
P etersb u rg
“ In
m y
E n g l a n d ,”
th e
fir s t
J u ly
one
T h ere
no
h o s tili
hand
it a lic iz e d
2 9 ],
etc.
and
sen ten c e
on
th e
in
o th e r
CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD
32
hand
th e
It
la
th e re fo r e
of
d ir e c t
Id e a
sa ry
th a t
E n g la n d
sp eed , a n d
pended
to
th a t
to
“ and
any
p o stp o n e
E u rop ean
c o m m a n d in g
e q u ilib r iu m
m o st o f th e
to
th e
fo r
th e
In
c a p a b le
F o r e ig n
as
to
N o.
th e
am
In
t e l a /r a p h i n g
con sequ en ce
S er b ia ,
K ie ff,
ic e
of
sh a ll
M oscow ,
su pp ressed
In
announce
and
th e
S e r b ia n
and
m ilita r y
m easu res
a lo n e ,
and
R u s s ia n
th a t
th re a te n e d
by
G overn m en t
th e re fo r e
A u s t r i a .)
V ie n n a ,
b ecause
of
B e r lin .
v ie w
In
It
by
b r in g in g
(T h e
so
F r a n c e .)
J u ly .
fa r
In
m ore
no
no
to
sh ow s
n o tic e
V ie n n a
th a t
F o r e ig n
w as
th e
O erm a n
a g a in st
not
b ein g
M in is te r
to
th e
N o.
am b assad or
in
c o m m u n ic a te
G overn m en t
London,
to
w h ich
V ie n n a ,
th e
you
and
c o n te n ts
are
of
rec a lled .
th e
In fo r m in g
n e ith e r
to
ste p s
h im
ta k en
o f
part
F ran ce
(T e l.
I
N o.
(h e
F o r e ig n
an
w h ic h
ear
Your
th e
te leg ra m ,
as
r e su lts
a c tin g
a d m it
Fren ch
th e
rem arks
o n ly
but
A u str ia
to
th e
e x e r tin g
w ith
a
te le g r a m
G erm an
S ch lin ,
a ffa ir s
are
of
a ll
27,
N o.
in
and
as
a
20,
any
A s
th e
case
m u st
a
not
if
d e c lin e d
to
th e
to
th e
London,
so
I
in
P a r is
to
th e
F o r e ig n
(T h is
e n tir e ly
fo r m in g
W ith
a Judgm ent
regard
stro n g
a
to
th e
p ressu re
J u ly
J u ly
su p p ressed
27,
28,
fr o m
fro m
te le g r a m
c o n c e r n in g
d ir e c t
In
G e r m a n y ’s
d e c la r e d
o f th e
th a t
fo u r
tea s
The
b est
to
V ie n n a ,
of
th e
com pare
P etersb u rg ,
and
n o te
th e
a ttitu d e
a
not
beg
th e
a
you
a g a in
n o te
th ere
it
if
appeared
V ie n n a
te n s io n
is
th e
te le g r a m
N o.
in
us
sim ila r
G er
it
to
th e
su p p ressed
t e le g r a m ,
t e le g r a m .
to
R om e,
M in is te r
c o m m u n ic a te
to
a
to
w h ich
m essa ge
to
th e
chan ge
to
good
G erm an
t o -d a y
and
p osa l o f
h im
be
th e
a r d e n tly
d e sir ed
r e p ly
to
a
p r o je c t
th is
th e
fo r
of
r e p lie d
r e p lie d
th a t
o b je c t
ea sy
th e
a
fo r
be
th a t
tr ia .
In
to
G erm an y
of
of
was
u n ju s tly
he
sa id ,
sh e
11
was
o th er
to
fin d
he
to
th e
N o.
th e
th ro w
w h o le
c a lle d
28)
u sed
in
th e
it
Is
n o te.
a
tr u e
th e
c o n feren ce.
to
th e
th a t
th a t
“ V ie n n a ,
w ith
and
to
of
in
m y
exert
in s tig a tin g
G erm an y
in
of
a pproves
advance
G overn m en t
w ith
fo r
m in ister
th e
sa m e
be
s h o u ld
very
a ffo r d
im p a s s e .
p o in t,
on
th e
of
of
c o u ld
e ffe c t
a
r e d r a ftin g
c la r e d
th a t
[T h e
N isc h .
1 6 /2 9 ,
h e r s e lf,
as
it
s u b s ta n tia l
to
th e
am
te leg ra p h in g
a lso
d id
N o.
am b assad or
not
ten d
but
A u s
w as
of
a
th a t
th e
w ay
c risis
su ch
step ,
a
d e n tly
in
exp ressed
A ccord
v e rs a tio n
not
con
in te r -
to
of
at
to
th a t
h om e,
peace
so
so
of
even
th e
I
if it
S e r b i a 's
n ew s
th is
have
a
b lo w
th e
in
th a t
o th er
it
ord er
to
co u n ts
p ow ers
in
th e
of
tex t
in
r e p ly
proved
M o n te n e g r o ’s
th e
en h an ce
ord er
its
at
th a t
of
th e
u s,
but
d e c id e d
its
very
p resen t
n o te .
not
th e
The
w as
so
u n d e r ta k e
in s in c e r ity
w as
e v i
m o b iliz a tio n
and
h is o p i n i o n , t h e r e
fr o m
th is
con
h a s a t p r e s e n t d ecid ed
in flu e n c e
in
G e r m a n y ’s
su pp ort
to
th e
lo c a lize
w ith
th e
arm ed
and
m in ister
im p r e ssio n
G overn m en t
to
c o u n try
co u ld
fo r e ig n
o ffe r
an
not
of
th e
m e a s u r e , w h i c h , in
upon
o n ly
de
w ith
r e p lie d
o p in io n s
d e sir ed ,
The
g a in e d
th e A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n
and
so
fu tu re .
th e
at
of
w o u ld
fr o m
S e r b ia , c o u ld
o p in io n
I
A u s tr ia
c o n n e c tio n
had
com
m on arch y
situ a tio n
of
fu ll
a
fo r
m in is te r
th e
w h ic h
a g a in s t
p u b lic
beca u se
by
fo r e ig n
m anner
g iv e n
n o te .
and
th e
r e s u lt
exch ange
d is c u s s io n
and
of
I
fo llo w s :
r e g a r d in g
d e s ir a b le
th is
of
be
A u s tr ia n
w o u ld
The
as
fr ie n d ly
R u s s ia
in
is
can
you
th e
w ith
G o v e rn m e n t,
a
r e g a r d in g
ju stify .
w h ic h
m easu res
J u ly .
am b assad or
105
very
w as
r e la tio n s
a tte n tio n
fre e
a
w ith
in
r e la tio n s
a
,
azonoff
1 6 /2 9 ,
G erm an
N o.
la
q u e s tio n
s e r io u s n e s s
fr o m
th e
v ie w s
S e r b ia .
a cu te
m ore
of
fu tu re
th e
in to
d istu r b e d
d ea l S er b ia
and
and
of
h is a s t o n is h m e n t
n o th in g
m ove
F r a n c e .)
am b assad or
a r tic le s
h er
G o v er n m e n t,
th e
g r e a tly
was
th e
th e
w ith
sp ok en
th e
E u rope
h arsh
e n te r
p r o m is e s
F ren ch
A u s t r i a ’s
ta k e
th e
of
th e
of
d e r iv e d
becom e
th a t
her
of
fo r
A u s tr ia
and
had
ex c ite d
of
exchange
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
to
th is
to
1544.
[te le g r a m
ju s t
B e r c h to ld ’ s
peace
be
105
have
im p r o v e
c o n s c io u s
to
u n w illin g ly
g iv e
I
som e
w o u ld
N o.
N o.
s o lu tio n
d ir e c te d
a d v a n ta g e s
of
to
1 5 4 8 .)
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
g u a r a n tie s
th e
J u ly .
1544
N o.
c o m m u n ic a tio n
c e r t a in ly
c o n v e r s a tio n
p r iv a te
su ch
fu lly
fo r m
A u str ia .
J u ly .
b etw ee n
p ressu re
.
azon off
F r a n c e .)
te leg ra m
/
a c c r e d ite d .
and
t e le g r a m
la s t
The
c o n flic t
h e r se lf
th is
c o m p la in e d
in fo r m e d
G erm an
on
to
m y
t e le g r a m
1 5 /2 8
he
p eace.
fo r w a r d
th e
in
C o n sta n tin o p le
1 5 4 7 .)
G overnm en t
M in is te r
in y
B e r c h t o ld .
I
w o u ld
fr o m
of
to
The
A u str ia
to
r e c e iv e d
danger
a cc ep ted ,
fo r m
it
e x it
in s tr u c tio n s
of
a lr ea d y
id e n tify
pro
w ith
tim e
not
S e r b ia .
of
u n a cc e p ta b le
and
p o sitio n
th a t
been
The
a
in s is t
G erm an y
not
to
th e
of
a m ba ssa d or
a ccu sed
had
rea dy
had
th e ir
c o u r s e .]
r e fe r e n c e
w h ic h
put
and
“ th e
th e
J u ly
am b assad or
c o n te n ts
are
London
F o r e ig n
G erm an y
step s
th a t
had
or
ta lk
m a in te n a n c e
c o n c ilia to r y
no
a v o id in g
to
a dded
o b je c tio n
to
a
w ish e d
E n g la n d
ta k e
or
of
Ita ly
m ea n s,
had
not
c o n n e c tio n
A u str ia n
A t
had
b lu e d
J u ly .
m in ister
c o m m u n ic a tio n
th e
fo r
and
ra ised
by
th a t
th a t
78878—
1521,
198,
1 5 /2 8
fo r e ig n
H e
th a t
not
G overn m en t
but
th e
d id
o n ly
w h ic h
what
a ctio n ,
ten ts
in
r e p lie d
th is
p r e s s , w h ic h
in g
G erm an
F ra n ce
a r b itr a tio n
a tta in e d
tim e
S ch on
kn ew
of
A u str ia
m ea n s
F ra n ce
it
no
r e c a lle d .
G erm an y
a ctin g
n ev erth eless
o b se r v a tio n
th a t
tr ib u n a l
th e
p ow ers
B a ron
th a t
th e
had
th e
w h ic h
if
cou hl
and
w ith
p r o v id e d
A u str ia
he
b e in g
m in is t e r 's
he
m ake,
w ork
to
v isite d
a lth o u g h
to
of
m e d ia tio n
S ch on
a ctio n ,
a g a in
situ a tio n
in c a p a b le
In
B a ron
th a t
o ffic ia l n a t u r e
r e g a rd in g
w o u ld
N o.
to o
pow er
a m ba ssa d or
d e c la r e d
an
W ith
c r is is .
of
P a r is .)
P a r is ,
The
w ill
fo r
d is p la c e m e n t
of
B u c h a rest,
to
you
S e r b ia n
of
(T h e
regard
N o.
not
s till
sen se.
[T e l.
th e
be
s u b s titu te d
th e
1528
to
u n c e r ta in ty
sh ow ed
is
a tte m p t
as
to
th e
A u s tr iu
s im ila r ly
to
V ie n n a ,
F o r e ig n
G overn m en t
te le g r a m
G erm an y
be
a n il
th e
P etersbu rg ,
I
z v o i .s k i .
d u r in g
by
to
g rea test
Pete rsb u rg ,
e x e r tio n
Is
m e th o d
us
Ita ly ,
w ith
of
r e g a r d in g
“ G erm an y”
(T e l.
con
In
w ith
a d v ic e
R u ssia
F ran ce,
m o m e n ts
2 8 ],
th e
v a lu a b le
la r g e
p o w e r s , w ith
appeared
c o n v e r s a tio n s
th e
p o in ts
H ook
M i n i s t e r .)
e x c e e d in g ly
G e r m a n y 's
Im p o s s ib ilit y
in
Is
The
a
n e g o tia tio n s
if
E n g la n d .
(T e l. N o . 2 0 1 .)
of
S
am b assad or
I
ta k e n .
G erm an y,
S
(T h e
h is
a ccept
th e
A u s tr ia .
p r o p o sa l.
(T h e
of
to
s y m p a th e tic .
c o n c e s s io n s
o th e r
p a c ify in g
N isc h ,
lia s
a g a in s t
d ir e c t
s o lu tio n
p ow ers,
to
G erm an y
th e
a
to
here
in
q u ite
u n d e r s ta n d in g
O ran ge
upon
to
to
year.
an
resp ect
Thus
in
reso rted
to
[In
has
te r ri
th a n k s
m o b iliz a tio n
do
tim e
fr ie n d ly
fo u r
S e r b ia n
com e
pow ers
a
th e
la s t
th e
do
n cto i
R u s s ia
regard
c o n tin u e
sam e
s im u lt a n e o u s
of
of
no
to
to
n o te
done
of
I
to
th a t
th e
cen se
c o m m u n ic a tio n .
d ir e c te d
by
not
lm
2 8 .)
h is
w ith
to
th e
S er b ia n
sin c e r e
of
of
c o n tin u e
o n to
J u ly
J u ly .
fo rm e d .
R u ssia
it
be
r e su lt
of
rny
w ay
read y
appear
to
of
c r is is
th e
P eters
J u ly
was
to
w ere
A t
not
m eans
been
w ith
c lea r
doeH
dur
w ill
m o r n in g
m easu res
e x p la in e d
and
w o u ld
1538,
no
I d /t O
b e h a lf
troop s
convey
In
p roposal
we
c o n c lu d in g
of
F r a n c e .)
m om en t
in
peace.
A rm y.
had
fa c e
in flu e n c e
d ’O rsa y,
C om pare
it
th is
V ie n n a .
m in ister
fo r
and
th a t
in flu e n c e ,
in
th e
not
in flu e n c e
P a r is ,
th a t
m ake
Quai
e m p lo y e d .
a m ba ssa d or
and
to
th e
J u ly .
ton s
of
te le g r a p h in g
th is
to
m easu res
be
V ie n n a .
a ll
r e s p o n s ib ility
1 5 /2 8
d u ty
at
d id
J u ly
fro m
peace,
b e fo r e
m y
m o d er a tin g
1521,
m o d er a tin g
but
B a ron
a
m easu res
N o.
th r e a te n e d
P etersb u rg
v e rsa tio n
m an
su p p ressed
who
of
of
it
yesterd a y
fo r e ig n
e x e r c isin g
P etersb u rg ,
reto rted
in
fo r
so rts
th e
but
o n ly
m in ister
tw o
fr o m
deem
c o n v e r sa tio n
a g a in
in
q u e stio n
m y
of
t e le g r a m
/
1521, r e c e i v e d .
p o ssib ility
[h e r e
bu rg
to
N o.
fr o m
,
In
and
c h a ra c te r
are
to
th a t
In
N o.
to
am
on
cen sed
A u str ia n
m ilita r y
th e se
are
not
I
me
V ie n n a
Vp
of
t e le g r a m
th e
n e g o tia tio n s
a tte n tio n
a r is
us
G erm an y
to
th e
1 » S .)
rega rd s
m a in te n a n c e
1521,
to a c c e p t t h e p r o p o s a l o f a c o n fe r e n c e
u tiliz in g
In
M i n i s t e r .)
as
G erm an y
n m bnssn dor
In fo r m e d
w ar.
a g g r e s s iv e
r e p lie d
prepared
of
fr ie n d ly
A u s tr ia n
d iffic u lt
P
th a t,
to
a m b a ssa d o r’s
e x is tin g
to
th e
th e
N o.
In
am b assad or
th a t
by
th e
th e
V ie n n a
th e
in fo r m e d .
in
n o te
th e
c o n s titu te
p o w e r s .”
am b assad or
fo r
th a t
1 5 4 4 .)
had
c r o ssin g
w ith
d u r in g
J u ly .
15 39,
Sazonoff.
(T h e
N o.
In flu e n c e
th e
h im
G erm an y,
1 5 /2 8
N o.
to
te le g r a m
d e c la r u t lo o
of
a c q u a in te d
p a r a lle l
F r a n c e .)
te leg ra m ,
A ffa ir s
G erm an y
th e
of
a c c r e d ite d .
R om e
th a t
(C o m p a r e
c a b in e t,
m y
p ow ers
am b assad or
m o d e r a tin g
re q u ested
fo u n d
1 5 4 0 .)
St . P e t e r s b u r g ,
can
G erm an
r e c eiv e d
To
in te n tio n s
is
of
th e
in fo r m e d .
(T e l.
You
a
m y
fo r
S e r b ia
she
th a t
is
th e
th a n
a g a in s t
fe e l
a g g r e ssiv e
in
O d essa ,
t e le g r a m
e x te n s iv e
w ay
th e
th e
of
Sazon ofv.
(T h e
F o r e ig n
to
c h a n c e llo r
d e s p ite
I
a g a in st
w h o le
in d is p u t a b ly
th is
has
a m ba ssa d or
R om e
T h e
e x e r c is e
war
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y
c o u ld
R u ssia
our
and
r e fe r e n c e
to ry.
of
m o b iliz a tio n
w ere
e ffe c te d
R u s s ia
th a t
a
d istr ic ts.
m o b iliz a t io n s
M e a n w h ile
London,
B ook
p r e v io u s ly
repeat
G erm an y.
m ilita ry
O ran ge
fo r
c h a n c e llo r
t o -m o r r o io
K asan
M in is te r
W llh
been
d e c la r a tio n
o ilie r
g u a r a n tie s
ST. PETERSBURG,
of
1 5 /2 8
o b ta in
a ffir m e d
a d d i
1 5 3 9 .)
A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y 's
th e
m u tt
a g a in
(T e l.
B e r lin —
to
w ith
A u s tila
th e
In
A u str ia , w h o
a m ba ssa d or
I zvolsk.1.
p e r la l
am b assad or
c o o p era te
(T h e
SA/.ONOFF.
St . P etersburg ,
I
to
th e
fu r th e r .
T h is
w h ic h , In
w ith
F in a lly
q u e s tio n
a
b r u sq u e ly
su s
p retex t
a ffo r d
B a lk a n s . ’
c o n flic t,
be
a
sta te s
o f lo c a liz a t io n .]
A fT a lr s
(T e l.
th e
as
to o
S er b ia .
ready
p o s s ib le
s h o u ld
H ook
s u b s e q u e n tly
neces
Is
u ll
serves
fe r e
r e je c te d
It
w ith
and
O ran ge
p o s itio n
fir s t
S e r b ia
o n ly
q u e s tio n
[T h e
rep resen t
w as
a c tio n
a g a in s t
A u s t r o -S e r b ia n
g rea t p ow ers,
M in is te r
of
w h ic h
onld nets.1
tw o
m e d ia tio n
S e r b ia .
p u rp ose
V ie n n a
th e
a c tio n
s o lu tio n
a
Its
not
m e d ia to r y
m ilita r y
th e
fo r
(T h e
In itia te
sm ash
assu m e
has
and
b etw een
d e la y , o t h e r w is e
c o m p le te ly
to
tio n
s h o u ld
A u s tr ia ’s
w ith o u t
g r e a tly
tim e
P etersb u rg
n e g o tia tio n s
th e
and
c o n f li c t .”
B a lk a n s
th e
lo v e
[ g lin t-
S8
c r a o o a n lY M o i s s a a o N O D
=s
RECORD.
C O N G R E S S IO N A L
la r
te le g r a m s
to
B e r lin ,
P a r is ,
London,
o u r a m b a s s a d o r In A u s t r i a , f r o m
n et
r e fu se s
to
en ter
th is a s s e r tio n
th e
In to
lo c a liz a t io n
o f h e r c o n flic t
w ith
R u ssia
a sse rte d
by
S a z o n o ff,
w ith
1521
of
quence
th e
th e
J u ly
o f v ie w s
d id
not
P etersb u rg
and
le a v e
m ay
deem
R om e,
th e
e x te n d
to
be
B e r lin ,
S e h e b e k o .]
th e
[In
th e
C a b i
o p p o s itio n
th a t
h er
th e
n o te
of
q u e stio n
t e le g r a m
to
to
1 5 9 2 .]
and
and
to
regard s
in
S
M in is te r
to
th e
am bassad or
in
of
azonoff.
v a tio n s
about
F r a n c e .)
m ade
a
N o.
1 5 6 1 .)
The
of
G erm an
h ie
am b assad or
G overnm en t
p r e p a r a tio n s .
begun
not
by
we
but
to
and
rig h t
any
R u s s ia
o n ly
arm y
fo r
to
of
nnd
a
me
t o -d a y
not
does
b ecause
corp s,
m e th o d
w ith o u t
sto p
th e
th e
d e c isio n
pare
sh e
w as
s o lu tio n
of
in
fo r
th u s
th a t
It
su p p ressed
Rnd
a lr e a d y
n o te
ence
e v id e n tly
h er
in
c o n flic t
r e ly
upon
th is
very
su cceed
in
[T h e
S a zo n o ff*s
t e le g r a m s
m ade
c ir c u m s ta n c e s
is
fu lly
d e sir a b le
In
a
fro m
Illu m in a t e d
P a r is
N os.
its
s u p jio r t
range
to ry
a lso
209,
sam e
In
tim e
her
c la im s
R u s s ia
p r o je c t .
b r in g
e a ste rn
so
about
G erm an y
and
210
to
In
lik e
F o r e ig n
am b assad or
In
th e
g rea test
accept
of
in flu e n c in g
in
a c tiv e
seek
of
to
th e
(T e l.
am b assad or
N o.
in
The
.
F r a n c e .)
fir m
u r g e n tly
iste r
th e
reg u est
fo llo w in g
bu rg: T h e
G erm an
d ors
sto p
not
ordered
to
you
a ttitu d e
te leg ra m
h er
m o b iliz e.
by
eig h t
A u str ia n
a rm y
G overn m en t
to
d e stin e d
to
a ct
te le g r a m
N o.
reason
fo r
corps
P o u r ta lfs
a m b assad or’s
of
a lr ea d y
P v U s s ia n
th e
been
th a t
m o b iliz a tio n
c o m m u n ic a tio n
th e
but
to
has
of
not
(3 )
A u s tr ia ’s
fa ct
th e
IS
to
th e
to
N o.
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
th e
of
w ar
to
N o.
th e
F o r e ig n
S ir
R ie n v e n u -M a r tin ,
m o rn in g
th e
th e
G erm an
p r a c tic a lly
en d ea vors
in
th e
o p in io n s
of
u n d e r ta k e n
fa r
been
e x a c tly
of
F in a lly ,
m any
th is
of
H u ron
was
to
g u estio n
su ch
j
w ards
by
th e
F o r e ig n
exch an ge
a g a in s t
S ch on
a g a in
of
to
be
w ill
h opes
a g a in st
to
In
F ran ce
;. n
th e
sta tio n
and
th e
(T e l.
N o.
th e
th is
em
c o n tin u in g
fr ie n d ly
th e
ex
ex ten t
has
of
not
so
sta n d
not
in
re c eiv e
a sse r tio n
d u r in g
R u s s i a .”
th a t
in
th e
w ord
In
m in ls le r
of
has
a n te e s
th e
w h ic h
a r r iv a l
prepared
fo llo w in g
u tiliz e d
th e
a
w ords :
m u rder
of
m ig h t
of
th e
to ld
m e
w ith
th a t
and
at
fo r m e d
[T h e
tru e
sh ort
ex p osA
A u s tr ia ,
th e
w h ic h
arch d u k e
e v e n tu a te
th e re fo r e
of
nnd
d e c la r e s
th a t
te n d e d
to
cut
seek s
aw ay
no
te r r ito r ia l
th e g ro u n d s o f
7 0 8 7 0 — 1 1 --------6
n
S e r b ia n
and
A u str ia
ns
The
sa m e
th e
a ttitu d e
The
as
we
g a in s
th e
p re te x t
of
g e tic
fa
G erm an
th a t
g a rd in g
ta ry
th e
in
c ir c le s
sp e c ia l
th e
m a tter
th is
p a r tie s
as
fa th e r
of
th e
w as
of
in c lu d in g
d iv e r se
s h o r tly
a fte r
su p p ressed
F o r e ig n
te le
and
th e
in
tim e
2 0 0 .)
fr o m
la r g e
Our
th e
of
la y
th e
p u b lic
p a rty
c h ie f com m a n d .
th e
am b assad or
th e
gu ar
is
o m is s io n
argu m en t and
su p
a ssu ra n ce
to
in
ju s tify
have
u r g e n t ly
th a t
to
w id e s t
c o n fid e n c e
m ilita r y
th e
and
1 report
w h ich
F rench
n a tio n
c o n f l i c t .]
r a d ic a l
In ten d s
so c ia l
a n tim ilita r y
to
rep o rts
F e e lin g
h is
fir m ,
e v en ts.
th e
ta k e
in
ru n s
en er
d e ta il
h ig h
r e g a rd in g
in
Fran ce
to
N o.
th e
F o r e ig n
in
re
m ili
th e
p ress
in
c o n fir m e d
net
In
c ir c le s
by
and
p a tr io tic
to
o l s k i.
2 0 7 .)
P e te rsb u rg
mp th e
a
n il
and
repeat
p ow ers
in
as
so m e
my
of
V ie n n a
q u ic k ly
fo r m
p resen ce
or
w ith
r e s o lu tio n
th e
It
as
fe e lin g
of
T h is
h is
a n o th e r.
w ho
th e
retu rn
V lv ia n i
to
su p p o rte d
s o c ia lis ts ,
th a t
h is
to
th e
P a r is ,
a b s o lu te
te le g r a p h e d
to
th e
n e g o tia tio n s
th e
fo r
r e c e iv e d
r e p e a te d
th e F re n c h
r a d ic a l
V iv ia n !
d ir e c t
p rop osa l
of
Is
e x p r e s s io n
o ff o f
Us
, 1 6 /9 9 J u l y .
d e c is io n
in c lu d in g
I n d is p e n s a b le
p o s s ib le
t o -d a y ,
u s.
th e ir g r o u p .
a fte r
a r is
d e te r m in a tio n
g iv in g
b r e a k in g
is
fir m
p a r tie s ,
L o n d o n , im m e d ia te ly
con sequ en ce
in
and
h im
th e
to
agreem en t
handed
sh ouh l
sad or
in
M i n i s t e r .)
P
dem nndng
d u rin g
of
of
th e
to
th e
fo r e ig n
o p in io n ,
th e
of
a tta c h e
m ea su res.
fr o m
A u s t r o S e r b ia n
se c tio n
r a ilw a y
F ren ch
s ig n ific a n c e
fo r
J u ly.
th e
c o n v e r sa tio n s
im p o rta n c e
m ilita ry
m ilita ry
in
tru e
v iz ,
no
rev o lu tio n a ry
th e
th e
th e re fo r e
a
1 6 /t p
at
b eco m e c o n v in c e d
sta te
of
,
a r is
r e c eiv e d
d e m o n str a tio n s
h is
had
cau se,
am ong
it.
lie w a s
d ir e c to r
c a lm
ev en ts
(T e l.
w ho
G erm an y
M i n i s t e r .)
G er
a p p r o x im a t e ly
S e r b ia ’ s
te n d e n tio u s
a
u s,
w ith
te leg ra m .
d is in te g r a tio n ,
rec eiv ed
to u c h e s
sen se,
H erv fi,
JaurA g
p a sses
m a n ife st
Izv
a
by
fo r
quo
,* l y .
It
s o lid a r ity
as
th is
m ost
sy m p a th e tic
a tta c h e s
p r e p a r a to r y
fo r e ig n
of
1 6 /h .
th is
ta k e n
a lso
th e
( p o litic a l
e stim a te
of
a g a in st
R e p u b lic
te r r ito r y .
have
th e
u sed
P a r is
P r e sid e n t
r e ig n e d
d e m o n str a tio n s
m ea su res
to
ap paren t
G overn m en t
G overnm en t
in te r n a l
o c c u p a tio n
N o.
w ith
sa m e
sig n ific a n c e
J u ly .
tn
de
m e d ia
sta tu s
G e r m a n y ’s
M i n i s t e r .)
s itu a tio n
fe a r s
th e
p o r tin g
Yhat
th e
in
c o m m u n ic a tio n s ,
A u s tr ia ,
of
th e
in
th a t
to
a n d p o litic ia n s,
correct
d eeper th a n
is ts .
th e
th e
a
V lv ia n i b a s ju s t
of
v ery
“ g u a r a n t i e s ,”
rega rd s
is
and
‘ ‘e v e n ”
F ran ce
A la r g e r ic
p r e fec ts
m uch
2 0 3 .)
P r e s id e n t
In
th e se
s o u n d .]
retu rn ed
str e e ts
crow d .
P a r i s . 1 6 /1 9
A p rop os
to
J c u r l 's ,
o m in o u s
A s
but
I t Is r e m e m b e r e d
am bassad or
(T h e
F o r e ig n
d ecla res
h im se lf
b e lo n g in g
even
lit tle
a lm o s t
P r e sid e n t
and
u n y ie ld in g .
to
is
G r e y ’s
c o n tin u e s.
and u pon
d iscu sse d
exp resses
IZVO LSKI.
am b assad or
if
M i n i s t e r .)
P
W h en
p la in ly
J u ly .
h im ,
w ill s a t is fy
th e
once
[W h e n
a tta c k
p ress
u n sy m p a th e tic .
(T e l.
o ffic e )
th a t
is
a
and
th e
I z v o l o k i.
jo u r n e y
to
G erm an y
war
G erm an y
p ro tested
to
o b je c t
w h ic h
e x p la n a tio n s w h ic h
A u str ia
azonoff.
m e
G erm an y
agree
th e
d e c la r a tio n
o f o p in io n s .
"
to
c o n ce r n in g
The
n e g o tia tio n s
e n c o u r a g in g
A u str ia
in d ic a te
and
to ld
not
F ren ch
u n h e s ita tin g ly
p erson a g es
m u rdered ,
g a in s
(T h e
G erm an
1 6 /2 9
c o m m u n ic a tio n
e x p r e ssio n s:
sh o u ld
h er
a
is
C ltm c n c ea u ,
a n tim ilita r ism .
gram
and
r e m a in
jo u r n a list
p r o m in e n t
P ic lio n .
it,
not
E very
e n e r g e tic ,
M in ister ,
m ade
ca u se
in fo rm ed .
th ese
(T h e
th e
It
E.
te r r ito r ia l
th e
2 0 2 .)
F o r e ig n
fo llo w in g
w h ich
step s
cou rse
A c tin g
a m ba ssa d or
V ie n n a
th e
th e w a y
and
in
M i n i s t e r .)
Paris ,
change
th is
corps
sta te s
S
am b assad or
fo r
to e c a n
a sse m b le d
(T h e
p r o lo n g
2 0 4 .)
th e
th e A u str ia n
su p p ressed
of
d e c la r a t io n
th a t
to n e
arm y
S a z o n o ff
to n e
be
in
V ie n n a ,
th e R u ssia n
th e
th e
w ill
B e r b i a .]
p lo y in g
b la m e
cou rse.
P eters
if R u ssia
th e
cau sed
n o te
M in
p r e p a r a tio n s
(£ )
m o b iliz ed ;
t e le g r a m
be
(n
arm y
R u ssia n
a ttitu d e ;
m o b iliz a tio n
In
of
th a t
u s,
J u ly .
F o r e ig n
G erm an
[C o m p a re
28.
F ren ch
S a z o n o ff th a t
c o m m u n ic a tio n
A u str ia .
J u ly
th a t
/< 5 /2 9
a m ba ssa d or
th e
u n y ie ld in g
h is
to n ig h t
a g a in st
15”9,
th e
had
m ade
ord er
F ren ch
r e p lie d
A u s t r i a ’s
th e
in fo r m e d
p r e p a r a tio n s
F a z o n o ff
{!)
th e
h as ju st
m ilita ry
o c c a sio n e d
C ount
fr o m
to
,
rg
u by
p
ta k en
upon
and
c o m m u n ic a te
a m ba ssa d or
w ere
w h ic h
to
sh a re
.1 0 4 .)
Petersbu
G er
and
and
to
o b ta in in g
th e
c o n d i
n e g o tia tio n s
in c r e a se .
in
th e
T o -d n y
m easu res,
s u p p o rt, to
p re te x t
a ll
R u s s ia ,
d ila t o r y
in flu
m o d e r a tio n ,
P e te rsb u rg
A u s tr ia
su pp ressed
m o d e r a tin g
a c ce p t.
p u rsu es
F ran ce
(T e l.
te rm s.
M in is te r
con
Com
Izvolski.
(T h e
of
off
w as
w o u ld
been
th e
any
to
chan ge
b r in g
E urope.
s e v e r e ju d g m e n t
(T h e
I
had
P a r is ,
te le g r a p h e d
to
w ord
to
n o te
th e
reser
V ie n n a .
to
h er fu ll
fo r
o p in io n
S e r b ia
a c tio n
th e
(th is
p o s s ib le
a d o p ts
a c tu a l
th re a te n e d
in
b o th
lim ite d
In
c o r r e s p o n d in g ly
u nder
V ie n n a
p u b lic
e x e r c is e
and
In
and
27
id e a
o p e n ly
an
as
th e
I n flu e n c e
m a n ife s te d
th e
g iv e
O th e r w is e ,
can
m ore
P a r is
F ran ce
In
London.
p o sitiv e ly
becau se
G erm an y
w ill
s h o u ld
of w ar
Book
w as
sh e
in
m u st
in
m ove
w h o le
Sazon
th e
b o th
to
th e
not
fo r m e r
sen se
G erm an y
In
m e d ia to r y
A u s tr ia
v a in
m ade
E n g la n d
it
to
in
w ith
H O .]
London
h er
th a t
S im u lta n e o u s ly
th a t
A u s tr ia
a lte r a
e x e r c is in g
to le r a t e d
Iz v o ls k l’ a a n s w e r .
208,
o b je c t
to
w as
th in g s a d v is e d
n o te
s itu a tio n .
s ir a b le
a ll
u n ity
J u ly
her
b o th
d is c u s s
of
de
th e
m o d e r a tin g
r e je c te d
e x e rte d
c o u ld
th e
e n tir e ly
fo r
to
h ith e r to
A u s tr ln n
P etersb u rg .
are
had
a
is
m o d e r a tin g
1521
S e r b ia
be
th e
a
28)
seem s
H ie
p resen t
R u ssia , as
o f th e
above
had
th e
at
N o.
J u ly
sh e
to w a rd
of
of
w h ic h
a lo n e
Is
E n g la n d
and
but
nam e
d an gerou s
by
th e
201
v ie w ,
is
t e le g r a m
lo c a liz in g
fo r
m u st
and
to
peace
re fu sa l
O ran ge
exert
te le g r a m
N o.
in
c lin e s
th is ,
d e c la r a t io n
th a t
p r e v e n tin g
of
to
th is
of
sou gh t
in
of
It
n o te
fu tu re .
h e r d e c la r a tio n
th e
to
R u s s ia ,
th a t
tio n s
ns
w ith
In
th e
F ra n ce
e x tr a o r d in a r y
is
fo r
G overnm en t
d e c la r a t io n
can
reck on
upon
te le g r a m
r e m a in s
to
F rench
a sso c ia te h e r s e lf w ith
can
of
th e
its
we
b a la n c e .
c o m m u n ic a tio n
th e
fo r
p resen t
u s.
sh e
E u ropeon
It
th a t
tim e s h o u ld
n o th in g
p r e p a r a tio n s
In fo r m
th a n k
U nder
v a lu a b le
th e
o f th is
tim e
w ar.
w is h ,
sh ared
S c h iin
h er
F ran ce
In
have
m ilita r y
her
m o b iliz a tio n
b ecause
fr ie n d ly
G e r m a n y 's
w a r lik e
of
am b assad or
lo ss o f
o n ly
J u ly
sam e
to
ow n
Fran ce.
e s p e c ia lly
tio n
our
French
a lly
is
accede
in e v ita b ility
th e
t lie
our
not
h a a trn
at
B ee
th ese
if
m any
can
p r o b a b le
it
of
accept
c o m m u n ic a te d
S e r b ia , a n d
w ar.
th e
s o p h is tr y
p ressu re
A u s tr ia ,
th e
n e c e s s ity
p r e s s u r e in
endeavor
th a t
of
th e
fo r
R u s s ia
sam e
w as
c a lle d
s ta n tly
S e r b ia .
As
by
to
has
m o b iliz e
began
A u str ia
ready
w ith
W e
to
1 6 /1 9 , .J u ly .
on
s o p h is m .”
in
p u n is h m e n t
T h is
B aron
bear
su pp ressed
s c a r c e ly
Petersburg,
by
general
th e
"
to
m a in te n a n c e
upon
th is t h a t
P a r is
The
r e p ly
th e
tu rn s
is ,
e x p r e s s io n
a tte n tio n
o f g u a ra n tee s
to
dem ands
th e
27]
it
fr o m
In
peace.
th e
p r o b a b ly
(T e l.
J u ly
P e te rsb u rg .
in flu e n c e
c a p ita ls
in
in
London.
b r in g
e x c e s s iv e
F o r e ig n
of
because
deduces
e x e r c is e d
of
c a lle d
a ffa ir ; th a t
th e
G erm an y
fo r m e d .
(T h e
on
been
g iv in g
be
N o.
B u ch arest
P a r is
R u s s ia
and
te re sts
C o n s ta n tin o p le ,
has
A u s t r o -S e r b ia n
u se fu l.
N is c h ,
fro m
on
fu rth e r
as
p o lic y
as
con se
as
195
pends
n e g o tia
In
In itia tiv e
te n d e n c y
N o.
un
te le g r a m
e m p lo y m e n t
sam e
to
S e r b ia ,
d ir e c t
to
N o.
th e
re fu sa l
of
n o te
E n g la n d
fr o m
V ie n n a
n e v e r th e le s s s t r o v e fo r
C om pare
to
th e
u s.
and
tex t
to
su pp ressed
c o m p le te ly
w ith
S e r b ia ,
of
C a b in e t.
th e
N ls c h .
th a t A u s tr ia
w ith
r e d r a ftin g
we
sh e
V ie n n a ,
a
27
o f th is
ste p s
change
It m u s t b e e m p h a s i z e d
d erta k e
tio n s
a
and
w h ic h It a p p e a r s t h a t
33
London
m e d ia tio n
th e
G erm an
assu ran ces
as
e ffe c t
b etw ee n
c a b in e t
by
th e
am bas
to
Q er
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
34
m a n y ’s p e a c e fu l I n te n tio n s .
d e sir e s
peace
p r o p o s a ls
th e
u se
th a t
to
fo r
of
it
w as
th a t
w ord
not
In o r d e r
to
In
r e p ly
o u tb r e a k
fro m
220
fr o m
F ran ce
d e te r m in e d
Book
th e
th e
of
te le g r a m s
act
fr o m
th e
c o u n try .
m e e tin g
of
th e
(T h e
agreem en t
are
added
on
th a t
th is
th e
a
E n g lis h
V iv ia n i
r e v o lu tio n a ry
w ith
th e
S e ih ia .
210,
fr o m
c a b in e t
S e r b ia n
B a ron
to
th a t
r e fe r e n c e
tw o
my
215,
had
218,
and
a lr e a d y
210,
304
(1 )
G erm an
sa tis fie d
on
h is
h er
a llie s
(in
T h is
w as
S e r b ia .
I
req u est
of
we
w ere
h im
th e
I
p o s s ib le
a llo w
of
m ake
of
of
fa c t
O rau ge
la t e r
th e
B aron
liv e lie s t
fo r
R u ssia n
F rench
th e
a
fir m ly
th e
and
fo r b id d e n
a d o p ts
tim e .
t e le g r a m
(2 )
I
th is
th is
c h a ra c te r
p o lic y
Sehon
c o u ld
su p p ort
p r o je c te d
In
J u ly
r ig h ts
of
t io n s .”
th a t
a
S e r b ia ,
A u s tr ia
R u s s ia
w h ic h
w ns
London
s h o u ld
The
of
th e
te leg ra m
c o n te n ts
im m e d ia te ly
in s tr u c te d
to
of
and
F ra n ce
quen ce
of
query
and
Is
A t
to
our
q u e stio n
and
w ith
we
of
u rgen t
on
th e
w h ic h
to
b e lo w
G erm an
to
do
we
w hat
can
and
h ere :
not
G erm an y
“ in w h ic h
th is
th e
to
q u e s tio n
d e c la r e s
p o in ts
back
h er
u n a c c e p ta b le
w h ic h
su sp en d
m ade on
G rey
on
fo u n d a tio n
G erm an
T h is
is
In
th e
to
m y
to th e F re n c h
N o.
of
Book
com m encem ent o f
sh a ll
you
very
w ith
th is
G rey
th e
th e
to
and
R u s s ia n
te le g r a m ■ N o .
in
a tta c h ^
at
th e
and
Is
tio n s
it
fo r
teleg ra m
n is h e d
is
tio n s
in
in
h im
P a r is
th is
and
w ith
are
o p in io n ,
still
70878—
11
in
Paul
tw o
te n sio n
w o u ld
d e v e lo p e d
c o u ld
to
not
g r e a te r
th e
F o r e ig n
N o.
th e
c o n d itio n
peace,
are
as
m ade
G r e y ’s
a
our
h ig h e r
c o n tin u in g
in
t e le g r a m
is
R u s s ia
th e
and
in
and
fo r
to
th e
of
in
an
th e
it
The
p eace
co u n c il
fr o m
is
to
th e
am b assad or
M in ister ia l
te leg ra m
and
sen t
in
C o u n c il,
to
th e
m e n tio n e d
(T h e
N o.
J u ly .
1.
The
A u str ia
th ro u g h
p r e p a r a tio n s.
w as
is
su p er
ta k e
th e
F ran ce
to
N o.
th e
F o r e ig n
p r e sid e d
F ren ch
in
m y
F o r e ig n
"W it h
In
E n g lis h
th e
over
by
is
a
fix in g
to
to
th a t
th e
b etw een
th e
tex t
“ F r a n c e ,”
fu lfill
at.
a ll
was
its
th e
p resen t
th e
le ss
our
h eld
th e
and
d isc u ssio n
th e
F ren ch
sen se.
The
in s tr u c tio n s
th e n
sta te s:
o b lig a tio n s
m o m e n t,
in te r e ste d
com
m ilita ry
r o in c a r d ,
a
to
fo llo w in g
of
in
V ie n n a ,
w ere
b e in g
z v o l s k i.
M i n i s t e r .)
N o.
in
,
a r is
T l/S O J u l y .
has
a pproved
P etersb u rg
th e
M in is te r
to
in
w is h
w h ic h
th a t
I
N o.
to
my
I
of
208.
am b assad or
(h e
N o.
London
to
th e
E n g lis h
z v o l s k i.
F r a n c e .)
b t f .r s b u r o
. 1 8 /3 1 J u l y .
1554.
c o m m u n ic a te d
p roposed
a cce p ted
In
1 5 8 3 .)
te le g r a m
th e
of
p r e v io u s
to
me
C a b in e t
G erm an
in
to
tlie
nam e
m ake
A m b assad or
p r o p o s a l,
and
sen d
of
som e
h is
change
y e ste rd a y .
you
th e
I
a lt e r e d
2.
Razonoff.
M in is te r
to
am b assad or
(T e l.
N o.
in
F r a n c e .)
1 5 8 2 .)
P E T E R SB U R G , 1 8 /3 1 J u l y .
w a r.
sen t
b o th
th e
1 7 /3 0 J u l y .
in s ta n c e
im m e d ia te ly
te leg ra m
a p p ro x im a tely
a llu sio n
ready
p rog ress
M e ssim y
w h ic h
see
in
w h ic h
P o in c a r i,
A m b a ssa d or
te leg ra m
A m b assad or
th e
d ra ft
r e p lie d
d r a ft
resp ect
(F o r e ig n
fo r
at
w ill
2 1 2 .)
M i n i s t e r .)
m in ister
in d eed
p la c e
I
th a t
en d eavors
p r e p a r a tio n s
are
sin ce
m a in te n a n c e o f
su pp ressed
regard s
i m m e d i a t e l y , i. e ., a t S a . m .,
th e
and
w e
th e p o ssib le
a fte r w h ic h
p roof
be
war
m o b ilisa tio n ,
P
The
2.
tio n
If
as
w h en
p ow ers,
an
“
P ow ers
th a t
m ay
ta in in g
215
of
o f J u ly
J u ly
31.
| m o r n in g o f J u ly
| A rm y
! s la n
and
31
G overnm en t
and
w hat
to
her
is
th e
s a tis fa c tio n
w ith o u t
by
la s t
e n t ir e ly
th e
su p p ressed
A m b a s s a d o r P a ld o lo g u e
It
had
can
s u r e ly
th e re b y
no
arm y
on
S e r b ia n
becom e a
concedes
S e r b ia
d e tr im e n t
q u es
th a t
a ffo rd
her
r ig h ts
u n d erta k e s
n o t ta k e h is o w n
The
P e te rsb u rg
te le g r a m
at
1 0 .1 0
of
th e
P a r is
in
th e
O ran ge
te le g r a p h e d
th e
can
to
R u s s ia
fo llo w in g :
fr o m
sen ten c e
to h is G o v e r n m e n t :
h er
th e re fo r e
[ T h a t S a z o n o ff d id
e v id e n c e d
by
of
c o n flic t h a s
in d e p e n d e n c e ,
w a s d is p a tc h e d
B ut
w h ic h
a u t h o r iz e d .”
in to
a ttitu d e .
is c le a r ly
th a t th e F re n c h
advance
E urope,
G overn m en t
sta te
31.
th e
fo r
S a zo n o ff’s d r a ft
ev en in g
sto p
A u s t r o -S e r b ia n
e x a m in e
h er w a itin g
p o s a l s e r io u s ly
to
th e
in te r e s t
s o v e re ig n
I p la in
w o u ld
a d m its
general
m a in ta in
fu r
a lly.
agrees
A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n
a
The
n eg o tia
it
th e
as
A u s tr ia
and
of
G reat
to
b a ttle sh ip
how ever,
s h o u ld
a tta c h d ,
of
r e fr a in
G e rm a n y ’s
hut
n eg o tia
p r e p a r a tio n s, a n d
to
G ov
F r a n c e .]
(T e l.
N o.
m y
J u ly .
F ren ch
m ilita ry
ir r e fu ta b le
m ilita r y
th e
p o ssib le .
th e fu r th e r n e g o tia tio n s fo r
fo r
k i.
p r e p a r a tio n s,
in te r e sts
our
have
m in ister ia l
p r o p o s a ls
screen
1 7 /3 0
c o n tin u in g ,
as
p r e p a r a tio n s
A
th a t
s till
to
th e
s h o u ld
tro o p s.
F ran ce
in c lu d in g
served
of
,
a r is
rega rd
c h a ra cter
id e a
in
w e
su p p ressed
in
(T h e
2 0 8 .)
A t
aud
M i n i s t e r .)
m ilita ry
h a v in g
th a t
(a
sa id
our
th ese,
our
but
in
(T e l. N o .
[C o m m e n t
F o r e ig n
th e
E n g la n d
2 1 0 .)
sp ok en ,
sa m e
u s fro m
th em ,
[T h is
V iv ia n i.
lu st
th a t
d e la y
p reven t
P etersb u rg an d
a dem and
1 7 /3 0
m ilita ry
th a t
Cam bon
c o n s titu te d
b etw ee n
p r e sid e n c y o f P o In ca rd , im m e d ia te ly
G overnm en t
as
to
[C a m b o n *
b etw een
w h ic h
con se
have
19 9.
peace
th e
to
m o vem en ts
6 .3 0 u n d e r t h e
N o.
th a t
of
d e c la r e
in te n s ify in g
to
15 5 ).
our
in
th em ,
a r ise s.
exch anged
1912,
was
a ttitu d e
p ow ers,
b etw een
agreem ent
P etersb u rg
C am bon
th e c o m b in e d
th e se
n o te s
N o.
c h a lle n g in g
a m b a s s a d o r .)
te le g r a m
m in ister .
M in ister
a resu lt
G overn m en t
of
of
e x istin g
th e
in te r fe r e
d e sir a b le
te m p o r a r ily
m o b i li z a t i o n .]
to
th e n ig h t, a n d
fo r e ig n
W ar
fro m
w h ic h
F ran ce
have
to
m a in te n a n c e
w e
fr o m
/
w ish
h ig h ly
has
th a t
s e c r e tly
r e c eiv e d .
P etersb u rg
b e g in s
to
F ren ch
as
fix in g
N ovem ber,
te leg ra m
w hom
p u b lic
m in iste r
m y
not
as
s a id
ready
of
w ith
th e
little
n ig h t
im p o r ta n t
gen eral
c o m m u n ic a te d
th e
ftlys6 e,
a m ba ssa d or
It
th e
lik e w ise
V iv ia n i,
1 6 51
it d u rin g
to
n / 3 0 J u ly .
a m b a s s a d o r in
w h ereby
p rep ara
a
P a r is ,
it
th e
p o lit ic o m ilit a r y
am b assad or
d oes
te r r ito r y
r e c eiv e d
F ren ch
p o litic a l
of
23d
so v e r e ig n
th a n
S e r b ia ,
c o n fid e n tia lly .
fo llo w in g
(T e l.
I
to
of
grou nds
Sa zo n o f f .
m u n ic a te d
London,
as
p e r io d
22d
th e
th e
P
c o n tin u e
d e c la r a tio n
(T h e a m b a ssa d o r
Your
to
to
1 5 5 5 .)
Vo.
r i.
M i n i s t e r .)
I z v o i -a
to
n o te
m ilita r y
s a tis fa c to r y r e p ly fr o m
w e
to
c o n n e c tio n
O ran ge
F o r e ig n
2 0 9 .)
u n d e r sta n d in g
a
th e
th e
(T h e
o n ly
V ie n n a .]
te leg ra m
a th o ro u g h ly
G o v e r n m e n t,
o o m m u n ic a tc d
flu o u s .
In
th e
I
M in is te r
refe r
U n til w e r e c e iv e
th e
and
F r a n c e .]
to
r e a d in e s s
th e
Petersburg.
I
20®
In fo r m e d .
F o r e ig n
u rg en t.
and
h as a ssu m ed
her
v io la te
her
u ltim a tu m
fo r
In
29.
P
d ic ta te d
as
A u s tr ia
w ord s
if
th e
r e a d in e s s
q u e s tio n ,
A u s t r o -S e r b ia n
th o se
(T e l.
V ery
r e v e a le d
to s.
c o n c e r n in g
gen eral
w h enever
Sazosoff.
(T h e
N o.
(T e l.
B e r lin
rep rod uced
o f S a z o n o ff’s sig n ifie s n o th in g le s s
V ie n n a
w ith
E n g la n d
th e
d e lib e r a te
rega rd s
in te g r ity
a ttitu d e
a ffo r d
th e
to
N o.
tr a n sm itte d
c o n fer
C o n tin u a tio n
c o n d itio n s
w hat
C om pare
u n d erta k e s
ta k e
n a tu r a lly
and
to
adds
fo r c e s .”
J u ly
I
th e
u ltim a tu m
[T h is fo r m u la
th e
th e
a
as
te le g r a m s , N o a .
su p p ressed
F ran ce
te leg ra m
a n tiw a r
ask ed
p r e p a r a tio n s , 1
of
of
U
of
2 9 .)
E uropean
her
m e,
v io la te th e
s u ffic e .
sta te
m e r e ly
B oob
v is ite d
not
p roof
h er
in
T1/S0 J u l y .
te le g r a p h in g
to
once
of
te le g r a m
P etersb u rg
per
G erm an y
Paris,
F r a n c e .)
c o m m u n ic a tio n
nt
p r e p a r a tio n s *
of
of
fr o m
th e
new
n a tu re
“ I f A u s tr ia a d m its th a t
e lim in a te
d id
s o lu tio n
O ran ge
J u st
m ilita r y
B e r lin
In
m y
ern m en t
not
sh o u ld
our
te le g r a p h
fr ie n d ly
(T h e
207
to
tow ard
a
m ilita ry
No
th a t
to
has
a ssu ra n ce
su sp en d
you
tow ard
th e ir
th is
d is p n tr h
n e g o tia tio n s o f
g a in
th e
to
requ est
G overn m en t
Is
read y
u rgen t
(2 ).
th a t
a m ba ssa d or
s till
fo r
In
r e p lie d
am b assad or
of
w ere
d e v ia ted
w as
done
fo r m
m a tter
p r o m ise
fr o m
lik e w is e
serve
m o b ilisa tio n
su p p ressed
w ill
adopt
3 0 .]
C o n tin u a tio n
th e
220,
part
tim e
1521, 1 am
who
A u str ia ’s
and
J u ly
p a r tia l
1551
(T e l.
com
fo r
1 5 5 4 .)
N o.
am bassad or,
w ith
th is
N o.
would
w h ic h
to
I z v o i -m
(T h e
as
The
be
on
or
nnd
m ea su res o f a d e fen siv e
n ecessa ry
to
(F a I 6 o lo g u e a )
sam e
am b assad or
N o.
t e le g r a m
of
te le g r a m
th e
d eem ed
step s
general
fo llo w in g
P a r is
n o t*
fo llo w s :
c o u ld
a
to
th e
s ig n ific a n c e
w ith
M a r g e r ie .
W ith
d ir ec t
S eh on
r e s p o n s ib ility
PETERSBURG,
as
any
Izvolski.
th e
(T e l.
ta k e
fa r a s
has
su p-
p a rty.
M in is te r
w h o le
i<
w h ich
ea se
fin d in g
has
pow ers
(T h e
a llia n c e )
w as
th e
fr o m
1*» t h i s
o r ig in a l
as
d e c is io n
e v e n in g
F o r e ig n
th a t
o rd etH n g
fo r
[T h e
th a t
th e
h ere.
th e
p r e te x t
c o m b in a tio n
th e
w ith
not
o p in io n
th e
th a t R u ssia , so
n a tu re
m it, s h o u ld
d iffic u lt
B e r lin
sa id
V iv io n i
at
pu rpose
of
F in a lly
1637,
but
th e
be
p r e c a u tio n s.
214,
e f f e c t .)
In d ic a te s
o u tse t
T h is
1554,
n e v e r th e le s s
P a r is
h im s e lf
N os.
rem arked
to
is
b etw ee n
th e
and
G erm n n y
peace
fr ie n d s
fo r
fro m
be
p r e c a u tio n a r y
not
Sehon
m e a n w h ile
p ropagan d a
210.
sam e
fu ll
and
th e
sh ran k
to d em n n d
sim ila r
N os.
and
th e
In
ea sy
E n g la n d s
\ lv ia n l
w o u ld
e x a m in a tio n .
p la c in g on
d e s lr p d
E n g la n d ;
fro m
c o n v in c e
th e
to
w ord s
sa k e
rested
have
h o n e s tly
It
H u ro n
th a t
adopt
m arks
T a r ls
th a t
p r e p a r a tio n s
to
T e le g r a m s
P etersb u rg
th a t
c o m p e lle d
w ar.
v ery
of
A u s tr ia
n e g o tia tio n s
p o in t, b u t
s u b je c t
sen ten c e
and
th e
he
w ith
“ a r b it r a t io n .’
w h a t A u s t r ia in te n d s
m ilita ry
t h e o b je c t o f
of
225,
he
fo r
h e r s e lf
th a t
m e d ia tio n .
w o u ld
th e
s a id
or
w e fr d s
of
th a t
F r a n c e ’s
th is
w ith
it
a s s o c ia te
Sehon
su ccess
on
be
of
of
m enced
228,
th a t
w o u ld
p r e s s lo n
of
fo r m
assu re
w o u ld
G erm an y
q u e stio n
A u str ia
c o m p la in e d
to
B aron
to a s c e r ta in
r e p lie d
In te rro g a te
h a ste n
“ c o n fe re n c e ”
o th e r
Is n e c e s s a r y
V iv lu n t
a
som e
In r e p ly t o V ly ln n l’ s r e m a r k t h a t If G e r m a n y
s h o u ld
m e d ia tio n ,
th e
d e v is e
it
sh e
on
te le g r a m
Book,
a lr e a d y
on
to
p ro
con
th «
N o.
It
is
th e
“ F u l l m o b iliz .n t io n o f t h e R u s s i a n
lo n g e r
ir r e v o c a b ly
be
d is p u te d
d e c id e d
th a t
upon
th e
w ar.
R u sThs
tc
CKIOOSttl IVNOTSSailONOC)
C O N G R E S S IO N A L R E C O R D .
S azon o f f d r a ft a ls o con firm s th e v ie w ex p re sse d in th e n o te to te le g ra m
2 1 0 t h a t a ll fu r th e r n e g o tia t io n s by R u s sia a n d F r a n c e m e re ly
s e rv e d as a c o v e r f o r th e ir fe v e r is h ly co n d u cte d s e c r e t m ilit a r y p r e p a r a
t io n s .]
B e rlin , V ie n n a , L o n d o n , R o m e in fo r m e d .
Bazono f f .
N o.
te le g r a m
bu rg ,
had ju st
d a ted
R u ssia n
been
th is
A rm y,
r e c eiv e d
m o r n in g ,
to
w h ich
fr o m
th e
c o n fir m in g
he
a dd ed n o
in
F ran ce
to
th e
N o.
From
Petersburg,
ern m en t
(a
c o n te n ts
of
tio n ,
and
con du ct
of
In
very
to
th a t
order
S er b ia n
E n g lish
th a t
th a t
an
to
S er b ia .
s h o u ld
w ill
w ill
n eg o tia tio n s
A u str ia
w o u ld
sh a ll
su sp en d
m y
be
ta k e
th e
s a tis fa c
proceed
to
p a r tic ip a t
th e
d ir ec
th a n k s
of
a ll
fa v o r a b ly ,
m ilita ry
it
o p e r a tio n s
te r rito r y .
te le g r a m s
to
London,
B e r lin .
V ie n n a ,
and
H om e.
Sazon
(A m b a ssa d o r
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
F ren ch
h im
to
in g
rega rd
com e
o b lig e d
as
a
to
to
a s,
of
to o ,
of
very
next
day,
su p p ressed )
to
h is
c lo sin g
The
1.
e .,
on
c o m m u n ic a tin g
1
th ey
in
to
m e,
ila rg er ie
of
th e
G erm an
a ll
h er
fo rces.
of
th e
It
is
R u ssia n
n o tew o rth y
th ere
is
A r m y ,”
p r e m a tu r e ly
on
th e
w h ic h
one
m ea su res
part
m any
is
on
e v id e n tly
r e g a r d in g
of
th e
b ility
fo r
th in k s
th e
on
th e
on
th e
th e
o th e r
c o n c lu d in g
th e
of
of
th e
[W ith
a m b a s s a d o r 's
rep ort
F rench
see
[In
of
to
w ar.
In
“
In
n o te
new s
P a r is
w as
by
In
to
p u ttin g
t e le g r a m
th e
m e n d a c ity
w hom
g iv e
b la m e
of
about
a lr e a d y
r e p ly
seek s
a n a lo g o u s
sen ten ce
of
G er
fa ls e
an sw er
P a r is
on
F ran ce
w ith
th e
J u ly
(T e l.
F o r e ig n
N o.
fa c ts .
See
m id n ig h t
th e
th a t
not
ns
ord er
a
do
if
we
B e r lin ,
6 . SO p . m .
A t
th e
nam e
z a tio n
of
of
th e
m ea su res
sa m e
s ia
in
tim e
is
a sk
lisio n
upon
fo r
a ccord a n ce
w ith
s ittin g
th e
and
but
who
has
B a ron
S ch on
w o u ld
adopt
G erm an y.
th e
h im
has
7 6 8 7 5 — 11
fo r
com e
to
of
he
even t
h im
any
th e
R u s
h er r e fu sa l,
an
a rm ed
to
th e
a n sw er.
a t 1 o ’c lo c k
th e
to
th e
d e c la r a tio n
P r e sid e n t
th ese
d e ta ils
a m ba ssa d or
w h ic h
is
of
m ake
a m ba s
T here
to -m o r r o w
to
th e
m e.
n ecessa ry
R ep u b lic.
sla te d
t o -m o r r o w , a s
in ten d ed
w a r.
of
th e
c o l
p r e s e n t a sp e c ia l m in is te r ia l c o u n c il
of
to
A t
lo a s i n s t r u c t e d
of
liste n e d
h im
w a r .”
A t
procedu re,
th e
g iv e
adopt
to
p la c e
M a r g e r ie
on
a dd ed
he
th a t
sees
F ra n ce
th a t
a
210
o l s k i.
is ,
to
on
b e fo r e
o n ly
as
w h e th e r
r e p lie d
, IS J u l y / 1
me
m id d a y
a g a in s t
w ill
th is
th a t
w as
of
on
h is
S a tu r
G erm an y
be
but
c o m p e lle d
to
e q u iv a le n t
w as
it
Aug.
b e h a lf
to
n o t, b u t
added
in fo r m e d .
to
am bassad or
N o.
d e c la r e d
war
In
F r a n c e .)
— .)
a g a in st
F ran ce
to
19 J u l y / i
Aug.
u s.
in
(T e l.
N o.
F o r e ig n
M i n i s t e r .)
2 1 7 .)
P a r is ,
The
of
m ilita ry
G erm an
a tta c h d
fo r c e s
on
U , 1 5 , 16, 3 1 , 8 a n d
td
18
on
th e
tro o p s
M etz
1 9 th
me
to
( 1st
J u ly
in fo r m
fr o m
th e
(C o m p a re
D istr ib u tio n
th e
n o te
of
fr o n tie r
to
corps
te le g r a m
six
fr o n tie r
In crea sed
m ay
Aug.
G r o u p in g
o f 7 , 11 a n d
c o m p le te d ,
d istr ic t
in
19 J u l y / 1
fo llo w s:
The
fr o n t.
a re
as
b y p a rts
h orses
S a a r b u r g -B r u g e s
fiv e
you
A u g u st).
B a v a r ia n , r e in fo r c e d
p rog ress.
or
F ra n ce
req u ests
G e r m a n -L u x e m b o u r g -B e lfo r t
in
m o vem en ts
An
soon
c o m p le te
a tta c k
be
ex p e c te d .
r e a d in e ss
in
F ran ce
to
N o.
F o r e ig n
and
in fo r m e d
te r r ito r ia l
o th e r
am bassad or
h im
th a t
pow ers
yesterd a y,
G erm an
yesterd a y,
but
a lso
m any
as
was
a c c o rd in g
A t
th is
of
th e
a g a in st
th e
to
a m ba ssa d or
was
S ch on
F r a n c e 's
and
see
in te n tio n s
h im
a g a in
a ttitu d e
by
was
at
th is
m o d ifie d
G e r m a n y 's
b e in g
6
s p e c ia l
p ersu aded
h is
th a t
th e .
R u ssia
v isib ly
not
th r e a t
e v en in g .
to d a y ,
th e
m ilita r y
under
by
in
resp ect
im p o rta n t
fo r
m an,
s h o u ld
but
of
F ra n ce
fo r m
Ita ly ,
and
th a t
an
h er
not
h is
m ore,
to
th e
th e
s o -c a lle d
w h ich
m ay
o th er
of
sh o u ld
la tte r .
a
sea
th a t
of
a
lo n g
as
to
V iv ia n i
to
a m ba ssa d or’s
m uch
of
p la c e
d is tu r b e d
fr o n tie r ,
danger
th e
fo r
it
p reced e
T h is
G er
fo rc es.
re p ly
E n g la n d ,
not
(n
A u str ia ,
F rench
hand,
215,
th a t,
fo r c e s,
a sk ed
sta te
be
have
210.
resu lt
fo r
h is
r e p lie d
h er
G erm an
a lo n g
th e
m u st
sea
th e
but
th e
e sp e cia lly
m o b iliz a tio n
a n sw er
A s
dem a n d
ap
at
ex istin g
V iv ia n i
G o v e r n m e n t is
th e
tim e
a g a in st
m o b iliz ed
d ep a rtu re,
m easu res
but
th e
d e c la r a tio n
la n d
w ith
b e a r in g s .
t e le g r a m s , N o s .
su r p r ise d .
of
its
re la tio n s
m ea su res,
I w a r a n a c t u a l m o b i l i z a t i o n i s In p r o g r e s s ,
A r m y in a d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s p o s i t i o n .
On
rea son s
th e
R u ssia n
had
v io la tin g
a sto n ish m en t
as
F ren ch
of
b e fo r e
h is
Aug.
e v e n in g ,
n e g o tia te
a ll
o n ly
A lth o u g h
cover
in
not
repeat
of
to
S e r b ia
a m ba ssa d or’s
en e r g e tic
d id
in te n tio n
“ a s to n is h m e n t”
m o b iliz a tio n ,
h ere
c o n v e r sa tio n , B a ro n
ju stifie d
of
*.
lsk
19 J u l y / 1
y e ste rd a y
read y
V iv ia n i
exp ressed
th e
adopt
in fo r m a tio n
w ith
th e su p p resse d
To
no
a ls o
[ V i v i a n i 's
G erm an y,
V iv ia n i
has
is
v isite d
not
e v id e n t
o n ly
c o n flic t
was
3 1 .]
w ith
but
la tte r
C om pare
and
c o m p e lle d
to
h er
G erm an y.
fe ig n e d .
30
not
S e r b ia ,
th e
w h ic h
w a r.
2 1 8 .)
tw ic e
a m ba ssa d or
and
and
J u ly
of
r e g a r d in g
th e
F ra n ce
w as
A u s tr ia
In te g r ity
In
fo r
M i n i s t e r .)
P a r is ,
A u s tr ia n
of
fro m
N o . 2 1 4 .)
(T e l.
The
corp s,
perhaps
Izvo
(A m b a ssa d o r
con seq u en ce
to
w o u ld
N o.
Sazonoff,
of
d e m o b iliz e .
th a t
th e
Rom e
M in is te r
(A m b a ssa d o r
w h o lly
in
a n tic ip a tio n
c o m m u n ic a te d
re p ly
added
in
etersbu rg
P etersbu rg ,
G erm an y
216,
even t
te le g r a m
F r a n c e .)
G overnm en t
as
(T e l.
been
d e c la r e d
th e
am b assad or,
SlZONOFF.
tw e e n
, I S /S t J u l y .
and
of
u n d ersta n d
w ar.
V ie n n a ,
T o -d a y
in
p r e sid e n cy
ju st
G e r m a n y 's
to
sh a ll
th e
V iv ia n i
d e c lin e d
is
In
in fo rm e d
not
G erm an
am b assad or
to
of
1 0 0 1 .)
h ou rs— th a t
query
to
o b je c t
a c c o u n t .]
am b assad or
N o.
a
th e
r e fe r re d
th e
G erm an
su pp ressed
in to
d e m o b iliz e ,
m y
near
(F o r e ig n
o b lig e d
th e
“ D a n ger
R u ssia
w h i c h , in
th a t he w o u ld
begged
V it ia n i w ill n o t
in
th a t
to
to
12
th e
w a r, th e
London,
“ g e n era l m o b ili
V iv ia n i
G erm an y
e x p r e ssio n
a fte r
f o r h is d e p a r tu r e .
r e s p o n s ib ility
and
S c h o n sa id
u n der
M a r g e r ie ,
tr ic k
F ra n ce
R u ssia
a n sw er,
p r o b a b ly
a
m o b iliz e.
a ttitu d e
c o m m u n ic a tio n ,
B a ron
th e
N a v y ,”
d em a n d ed
h o u r s’ d e la y ,
w ill a lso
a rra n g em en ts
is
12
has
and
to
rega rd
To
very
a c tio n
cam e
th a t, h a v in g
A rm y
b etw een
h is
a m ba ssa d or
R u ssia n
a
what
s a d o r 's
G erm an
G overn m en t
G erm an y
g iv e n
G erm an y
to
th e
h is
to
A u s tr ia ,
of
w ere
th e
o l s k i.
of
m o b iliz a tio n
w ith
fu lly
be
as
to h is d ir e c t q u e s tio n , a n d
th e
am bassad or
w ith in
m o b iliz a tio n .
d e c la r a tio n
th a t
G erm an
b e g in
a g a in s t
th e
2 1 5 .)
a r is
M in is te r
(T e l.
w h ile
M i n i s t e r .)
P
to
on
3 1 .]
to
R u s s ia n
th e
con
w ill
trea ted
p ropagan d a
order
th a t
to
im p o r ta n c e
s w in g ,
to
to n e s
me
Jz v
p o in te d
in
31
day,
ta k e n
J u ly .
effo r ts
be
great
fu ll
in
our
w ill
The
regard
J u ly
be
one
fo r
advanced,
Izv
(A m b a ssa d o r
in
w ith
a ll
general
214.
fo llo w in g
m u st
th e
B ut
a ttitu d e
31
th e
now
is
th a t
h ea rty
req u ested
new s
s u s p ic io n
accordan ce
of
207
to
to
and
A u str ia
and
G erm an y.
th e
o f J u ly
r e s p o n s i
s 'a c c u s e ,”
N o.
215
as
1 8 /3 1
m easu res
th e
th is
fa r
on
l i v i a n i 's
(F o r e ig n
In
r e c e iv e d
F ren ch
of
N o.
th a t
1582
a ls o
m o b iliz a tio n
F ran ce
s’excu se
N o.
s ta ff
regard
h e g a v e n o a n sw e r on
no
fr o m
te le g r a m s
th e
m o b iliz in g
about
m eans
p resen ce
w as
te le g r a m
to
and
ea rn est,
w ar,
rep ort
th a t G er m a n y
c o n c lu d in g
upon
Qui
to
m essa g e
b r in g
b r in g
put
proverb,
m o b iliz a tio n
G erm an
th is
on
w o u ld
general
id e a
a tte m p te d
to
n o te s
of
w a r .” )
F ra n ce
"
to
order
th e
th e
F rench
se n te n c e
n S p H g c a b le .
gen era l
G erm an y,
in
me
upon
arm y
127,
a b le
fo r
H avas
th e
F ren ch
q u a n tity
m ea s
th a t
th e
1 a. m .
m o b iliz a tio n .
im m e d ia te ly
th e
of
th e
w ith
fiv e
N o.
w as
th a t
upon
o f h a v in g
In
in
of
n o te d
t e le g r a m
by
a n o th e r
or
F ra n ce.
31
o u tb re a k
hand
th a t
m o b iliz a tio n
J u ly
in v o lu n ta r ily
one
of
accu sed
added
m e n tio n
be
p repared
A rm y
bord ers
grou nd
R u s s ia n
m o b iliz a tio n
a lso
of
in fo r m e d
o th e rw ise
h eld ,
th e
p r e p a r a to r y
P a r is
“ fu lly
th is
B e r lin
m u st
Pabis,
m in ister .
d ecid ed
a g a in st
know n
o r d e r in g
d e m o b iliz e ,
to
was
of
M i n i s t e r .)
m ea su res,
im m e d ia te ly
P a r is
m o b iliz a tio n
th e
c h a ra cter
it
(s e e
th e
fro m
to
c o m p lete
th e
oth er
and
hav
A r m y ,"
m ea su res
resp ect
a tta c h ^
w ere
hope
fir m ly
d ir ec te d
a ls o
req u ested
G erm an y,
e n ta il
c o u n c il
w ith
corps,
th e
war
P
1 8 /3 1 J u l y .
R u ssia n
m ilita r y
R u ssia
m ost
to
h ere
fir m
to
m in iste r
is
G overnm en t
Jagow
r e g r e t,
th e
fr o n tie r
th em
m ilita r y
th a t
th e
th e
to
great
of
th e
a d o p t,
A u gu st
R u s s ia n
G overnm en t
of
fr o n tie r
th a t
th e m s e lv e s
begs
to
g iv in g
fiv e
h er
m in ister ia l
fr o n tie r ,
th e se
th e
of
G erm an y
d ecid ed
th e
to
se c u r ity
th e
etc.
to
ow n
w h ich
how ever,
regard
th a t,
to u r
F ren ch
day— we
teleg ra p h s
m o b iliz a tio n
and
m o b iliz e.
to
B er lin
sa id
h er
p resid in g ,
w ith o u t,
(W ith
fo r
sie g e ,
in
general
W a r ,”
a d ja c e n t
u res,
and
th e
e x a m p le ,
w ill
P o in c a ir d
corps
“
adopt
fo r
sta te
sh e,
h im ,
to
“ D a n ger
su ch
a m ba ssa d or
a tta c h A
G overn m en t
A t
2 1 4 .)
N o.
P eters
2 1 6 .)
.
off
M in ls le r .)
F o r e ig n
Paris,
The
th e
to
(C o m
p a re n o te s to te le g ra m s N o s . 2 0 9 an d 2 1 0 .
R e g a r d in g th e w illin g n e s s
o f A u s t r i a to e n g a g e In d i r e c t n e g o tia t io n s w it h R u s sia , c o m p a r e
n o t e to te le g r a m N o. 1 5 4 8 o f J u ly 2 9 .
W ith re g a rd to S a z o n o f i " #
dem and
th a t
A u s tria
h ou ld suej>ond m ilit a r y o p e r a t io n s o n S erbian
s o li, c o m p a r e te le g ra m No. 2 1 0 o f J u ly 3 0 .)
s im ita r
m ilita ry
The
G ov
p r e fer a b le
over
th e
h er
h is
r e g a rd in g
P ow ers
earn
J u ly .
th a t
v ieto s
G reat
G overn m en t
1 8 /3 1
m e
exp ressed
it
th e
it
of
I
th a t
a ll
w hereby
th e se
in fo r m e d
exch an ge
London,
d isc u ssio n s,
im p o rta n t
in to
and
a m ba ssa d or
in
th e
m e
h an ded
th e
n eg o tia tio n s
hope
v isite d
en ter
u ltim a tu m
th e se
E u rope.
on
th e
to
rem a rk ed
ir e
tio n
is
prepared
th e
in g .
a m ba ssa d or
F o r e ig n
»
(T e l. N o. 1 5 0 2 .)
in
m o b iliz a tio n
Izvolski.
(A m b a ssa d o r
(T e l.
A u str ia n
a m ba ssa d or
general
ex p la n a tio n .
(F o r e ig n M in is te r to a m b a s s a d o r in F r a n c e .)
The
Fren ch
th e
of
Fren ch
p o litic a l
is
th e
q u e stio n
very
G er
is
at
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
36
p r e te n t
is
b e in g
very
d iscu sse d
p r o b a b le
by
th e
th a t g en era l
m in ister ia l
c o u n c il at
m o b ilisa tio n
tr ill
be
th e
f .l y s d e , a n d
d e c id e d
dared
it
of
upon.
IZVOLHKl.
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
N o.
F o r e ig n
M i n i s t e r .)
bnrg,
r e c e iv in g
in
w h ic h
G erm an
th e
th e
he
of
an nounced
am b assad or
R e p u b lic
t e le g r a m
th e
r e g a r d in g
s ig n e d
th e
th e
F rench
19
m ade
d e c is io n ,
The
G erm an
but
im p a r te d
new ,
but
V lv la n l
d e c la r e d
been
r e c e iv e d .
tio n
decree, and
a d o p te d
v ie w s
[H o w
210,
210,
w ar, and
and
A u s tr ia n
fo r
rep ea ted
“ a b s o lu te ly
a n l 's
w h o le
a lr e a d y
re fe rre d
d ep a rtu re,
[In s te a d
in
w as
in d e e d
fo r
can
can
B aron
u n d o u b te d ly
have
exch ange
o th e r
not
of
as
th e
Y iv l-
yet
in
N os.
ba ron
O ran ge
V ie n n a
r e m a in .”
In
F ran ce
to
S c h b n ’ s d e p a r t u r e .”
N o.
F o r e ig n
to ld
Ita ly
th e
m e
th a t
a p p a ren tly
c o n flic t
one
d ecisio n
s o v e r e ig n
n e c e s s ita te d
th a t
tim e
in
a c c o rd in g
th e
has
a r ise n ,
to
r e m a in
or
a n o th e r
in
a ccord a n ce
n eu tra l
upon
at
w ith
fir st
th e
fr o m
th e
and
a
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
N o.
F o r e ig n
te leg ra m
th e
to
to
of
8 .W
th e
m ilita ry
m.
p.
S erb ia
The
to
ta k e
th e
as
d a te
to
and
th e
to
be
of
tim e
h er
oom e
th a t
C o r p s, S ix th
of
ev en ts.
th e
G u ards
of
to
to
our
For
c o n tin u e s
D en m ark
R eserve
a g a in st
op p osed
th e
be
w as
To
(3 )
in
To
m u st
V a lo n a
th e
S econ d
To
m ove
n ew s
d a ily
in fo r m e d
G erm an y
m ost
d e sir a b le
A c c o r d in g
T w en tieth
C orps
are
R u s s ia ,
at
to
en
n o te
u n s u s ta in a b le ,
to
and
B o o k .)
to
F o r e ig n
th e
to
h er
be m ade
freed o m
of
th e
a b so lu te
be
to
a r i8,
Fren ch
in te n tio n s
to
Ita ly
in
to
A rm y
B u ch a rest
R u m a n ia , w h o
nor
to
p a rtic ip a tio n
of
th e
bear
T ra n sylv a n ia .
d raw
of
A u g u st.
at
P r e sid e n t
The
brou gh t
a c tio n
19 J u l y / 1
m in ister
n eu tra lity
A u str ia .
m u st
p r o m is in g
a lso
and
fr o m
n e ith e r
w ith
M i n i s t e r .)
on
In
over
to
R c p u b lla
R u m a n ia
w ith o u t
P o in c a r d ’s
our
sid e
by
o p in io n ,
p r o m is in g
A lb a n ia .
I r .v o i .8 K i .
have
th e
at
be
th e
s u b je c t
N o . 2 2 4 .)
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
A u g u st.
(1 )
P o s e n -W a r sa w .
and
F ran ce
r eg a rd in g
(A m b a ssa d o r
a g a in st
o ffe n siv e
F ren ch
O ran ge
Ser
m easu res
th e
C om pare
th e re fo r e
th e
Is
w h ile
to
ann ou nced
r ec eiv e
u s.
is
ns
p u n ito r y
and
re
A u str ia
by
fo r m e d
A u s tr ia
to
F o r e ig n
J u st
c o u n c il
fu lfill
th e
com r
of
in te r e sts
h er
b efo re
m en t
o b lig a tio n s
of
b o th
h o s tilitie s
m any
be
tr ill
a tta c k
os
an
a lly.
it
F ran ce
d iffic u lt.
A t
m eet.
at
The
The
once
in
above
d e c isio n
b e tte r
10
th e
to
th a t
sta te m en ts
am bassad or
In
be
to
in
com
r e q u ir e d ,
fe a r
P a r lia
th a t
c o m p letio n
m u st
th a t
to
be
p e r io d
to
ren d er
tn .
th a t
F ra n ce
w o u ld
of
a.
sa id
u n r e se r v e d ly
fo r
c o n tin u e s
order
who
r e c o g n iz e d
days
end
P o in c a r d
A u g u st— 3
R ep u b lic,
c o u n o il
be
p u rp ose
com m enced .
to
th e
th e
w o u ld
w h ic h
IS J u l y / 1
of
c o n fir m e d
A llie s
fo r
su m m on ed
m o b iliz a tio n
lu te ly
th e
are
P r e sid e n t
a g a in
m o b iliz a tio n ,
w ill
th e
m in isters
F r a n c e ’s
p le te
fr o m
M i n i s t e r .)
N o . 2 2 5 .1
P aris ,
w ish :
F ir st, S ev en teen th , and
C orp s,
In
a n x iety
in flu e n c e
by
ev en ts.
, 19 J u l y / 1
th e
(8 )
p r o m p tly .
corps
a r is
th e
to
in te g r ity
above,
h er r e a d in e s s .
a s s e rtio n
M i n i s t e r .)
m o b iliz a tio n
exp ressed
com m en cem en t
fa it
b lo w
fro m
has
m ore
arm y
th e
au
our
in fo r m a tio n
a ct
o ffen siv e
of
G en eral
M in ister
G erm an
k ep t,
d ir ec tio n
to
W a r
th e
r e g a rd in g
a tta c h 6 :
b etw ee n
d e c la r e d
re c eiv e d
n eg o tia tio n s
m e
a tte m p ts
I
P
From
have
fa ls ific a tio n
been
be in c lin e d
com m on
secret
in
has
d isp la y s g r e a t
lo ss
2 2 1 .)
•
by
w o u ld
had
I z v o i .s k i .
(A m b a ssa d o r
to u ch ed
P
A
w h ich
very
to
w ere
(T e l.
is s a id
A u g u st.
th e n
of
fo r
223
is
read er
assu ran ces
g u a ra n tee d
N o.
very
w e ll.
te le g r a m
fo r th e
te r r ito r ia l
m u rder,
I z v o ls k i’s
th e
a
as
I s v o l s k i.
in
m an ner
cou rse
fo r m e r
a c tu a lly
th e
sta te m en ts
th ere
A u s tr ia n
h er
te le g r a m
n e g o tia tio n s
(A m b a s s a d o r
propagan d a
19 J u l y / 1
in fo r m a tio n
w h ic h
to
th e
to
of
Is
nnd
of
c rea te
d e n ie d
It
fro m
P etersb u rg ,
m ig h t
be
w r itte n
195
se n te n c e s
p o r tio n
to
a ls o
th e
N o.
th a t sim ila r
th ey
to
end
re fe rs
or
e ffe c t
n o te
S a r a je v o
1548.
a cco u n ts
sa id
r e lia n c e
th e
N o.
in
th e
d ir e c t
w h ic h
te le g r a m
th is
th e
w h ere
in
lie
c a te g o r ic a l d e
com pare
tw o
r e p lie d
V iv l-
2 2 0 .)
to
in t e n d s , in
of
by
th e
o n ly
r ig h ts
w as
r ig h ts ,
by
re
M i n i s t e r .)
P a r is ,
sh o w n
fir s t
ought
a c o m p le te
a
te le g r a m
th in c a t e g o r i c a l l y . "
d e m e n ti
lu tt e r
A u str ia ,
in
In te g r ity
in te n tio n a lly
was
w ith
P o u r ta lA s
th e
su p p ressed
s o v e r e ig n
th e
in d is p u t a b ly
b i a 's
th is
S e r b ia ’s
Thnt
w h ich
(T e l.
M a r g c r ie
w e ll.
th e
d e n ie d
m a in ta in e d
IzV0I.SK I,
sou rce
w h e th e r
in
had
th is
lie !)
(1 )
Count
th e r e fo r e
“ I
te r r ito r ia l
we
sta te m e n ts,
P o in c a r d
by
and
Book
fo llo w s :
g a r d in g
1 5 5 4 ],
I ,o n d o n
th o t
(th e
P a r is u n d e r
of
tb s
th n t
not
t o .]
(A m b a s s a d o r
O ran ge
as
d e c id e
in
im p r e ssio n ,
it
A u s tr ia n
In
but
rem a rk
c o n ta in e d
N o.
resp ect
sta te s
H a v in g
be
upon
no
had
B ook
th e
g iv e n
j
m ade
gage
m ean
a b so lu te ly
s c a r c e ly
fo u n d e d
of
p ow ers.
te le g r a m s .
te a s
th is , th e
it
m o M liz a -
r e m a in in g
th e r e
P a r is
218,
g ro u n d s e x is t
Is
and
o f a ll
does
[In
had
s h o u ld
been
m y
d e c la r a tio n s
an sw er
to
r ig h ts ,
op pose
th e
S c h tin
t e le g r a m
dan gerou s
hns
th a t
sta te m e n t
P a r is
had
to
to
B aron
o n ly
To
read s: “ l
regard
S a x o n o l t '8
of
not
s o v e r e ig n
a ssu ra n ces.
verb al
P e te rsb u rg
th e
n o th in g
th e
th e
th is
th e
P etersb u rg
and
and
m o b iliz a tio n
am b assad or
a ttitu d e
by
of
fr ie n d ly
A u s tr ia ,
sou rces,
h im
G erm an y
a
by
am b assad or
s ig n in g
w hen
a ls o
su m m on s
to
th e
h er
Book
W ith
P a r is ;
P r e s id e n t
t e le g r a m s
th n t
am b assad or
in
210
th e
th e
a lt e r e d
th a t
R u s s ia n
N os.
no
is
o th e r
added
go.
G erm an
te le g r a m s
of
R u s s ia ,
sen se
S c h O n ’s
to
h im
m om ent
am b assad or
B a ron
“ The
to
th a t
H e
h is t h r e a t
m e r e ly :
gard
2 2 2 .]
a
am ong
th a t ju s t a s th e
th e
grou nd
at
tru e
by,
d e c ip h e r
a s to n is h m e n t
b etw ee n
th e
p la in
and
h is
titn e ,
to
in fo r m e d
p rogress
m nde
secon d
I n a b ilit y
m easu re
c o m p le t e ly
Is
h is
expressed
a
in
th e
V iv ia n i
su ch
w as
a n l’s
fo r
th o se
P eters-
h im
The
Ju st
Aug.
in
to
th e
m o b iliz a tio n .
t h e r e s e r v e s i s b e i n g b e a t e n In t h e s t r e e t s .
v isite d
J u l y /1
am b assad or
c o m m u n ic a tio n
o r d e r in g
.
a r is
r e a d in e ss
a ls o
sta te m e n ts o f
G e r m a n y ’s
d ecree
her
but
O ran ge
n ia l.”
2 1 9 .)
P
A fte r
us
c o n c e a le d
[th e
(A m b a ssa d o r
to
.S e r b i a
G er
of
p reserved
th e
a bso
s e c r e t.
d e ta ile d
I z v o l s k i.
u s.
(F o r e ig n
M in is te r
to
F r a n c e .)
I z v o l s k i.
(A m b a ssa d o r
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
N o.
F o r e ig n
r e c eiv e d
a g a in st
at
11
o ’c lo o k .
of
th e
c o u n c il.
b o th
P o in c a r d
he
carry
h im se lf
out
T h ere
th e
a rose,
q u e stio n s
c o r d in g
sa ry
to
doubt
a
F ren ch
a
to
its
and
but
by
o n ly
b eg in
th e
fir st
be
m ore
rest
p e r m ittin g
d iscu ssio n
he
h er
su m m on
of
th e
to
a ll
m e
is
by
fo r
p ersu a d ed
and
at
a v o id
war
be
born e
th e
A llie s
th a t
G erm an y
w ill
a tta c k
as
th e
to
to
a llia n c e .
p la c e ,
is
ac
n eces
in
F ran ce
d eb a te
th ese
not
N o.
if F ra n ce
m ore
not
by
th a t
th a t
1 0 ),
F ra n ce,
sad or
had
to ld
th a t
e n e r g e tic a lly
76876— 11
me
d a r in g
assu red
th e
h im
1 6 2 7 .)
and
fe w
general
a
a fte r
c o u n c il
dec
w ith o u t
th e
P o in c a r d
te le g r a m
of
brough t
th a t
we
been
have
c o n flic t ,
a r is
V iv ia n i
th e
A u s tr ia n
th a t
A u s tr ia
am b as
had
de-
th a n
Its
a d d itio n :
n eg o tia tio n s
h er se lf
c le a r
th e
a tte n tio n
th e
fr o m
p u rp ose
of
n lr e n d y
The
T zar
p r o v o c a tiv e
A u s tr ia
had
accept
and
w ith
E urop ean
of
w id e
[In
T h is
out
p ow ers
w ere
In
m is r e p r e s e n ta tio n
of
th e
b la m e
fo r
s till
th is
th e
n o te
th e
It
in
tru e
w o u ld
have
c h a ra c te r
is
Is
N o.
fo l
a
tim e
sh e
m ade
to
to o k
q u its
w h ic h
207
G erm an y.
of
m ore
th e
at
c o n te n ts,
to
com
is s u e
and
us
te le g r a m
w ar
w as
su sp en se,
a d d itio n
to
th e
onr
in fin it e ly
on
th e
a ll
w o u ld
th ere
war
w ord
ns
o th e r
d ig n ity
Book
h is
doubt
th a t
w as
A u s tr ia
and
A ny
as
d e cla r e
to
s o lo n g
E uropean
O ran ge
to
in
ow n
sig n ific a n c e ,
th e
r e s p o n s i b i l it y .”
th e
our
d e c id e d
c a lle d
w ay
e q u ilib r iu m ,
G erm an y.
w o r ld
th e
any
th e
th e m s e lv e s .
r ig h t to
in d e p e n d e n c e .
r e v e a ls
te le g r a m
g iv e n
a c tio n
no
G erm an y
tr a n sfe r r in g
a ttr ib u te d
had
in c o m p a t ib le
been
C om pare
and
th e
c o m p lete
Book
g u a ra n ty
J o y fu lly
of
a c tio n
R u s s ia
3 0 .]
any
28.
th e
is
r e g a r d in g
peace, G e rm a n y
fo r
b etw een
h ea vy
of
J u ly
O ran ge
V ie n n a
th is
o c c s s io n .
“ A s
on
th e
h er
if
and
at
th e re
A fte r
d ig n ity
w as
te n d e n tio u s
has
J u ly
ta k e
hegem ony
w h ic h
w h en
, 19 J u l y / 1 A u g u s t .
in
c o n tin u e d .
w o u ld
q u ite
th e
a
of
to
sh a tte r e d
upon
days
d e s ir e
S e r b ia ’s
about
im p o r ta n t
M i n i s t e r .)
out
te le g r a m
tim e ,
w h ile
c a r r ie d
in s e r tio n
th e
210
not
A u s tr ia
R u s s i a ’s
have
lo w in g
w ith
w ith
n a tu r a lly
N o.
K a is e r
n e g o tia tio n s
n eces
in c u r r e d
good
and
"
h y p o th e tic a l
p a tib le
th e
in
In
th e
com
w as
have
Book
a ttitu d e
G erm an
w o u ld
su bseq u en t
s h o u ld
O ran ge
th e
assu ra n ce
fo r
se n te n ce :
th e
of
m o b iliz a tio n ,
th e
th e
to
d e la y
p ro tra c te d
A ug.
fo r
s u p p r e s s io n
m o b iliz a tio n
we
m easu res
rest
p r o o fs
w a it
th e
th e
27]
w h ic h
[In
, to J u l y / l
r e s p o n s ib ility
R u s s ia n
o f J u ly
w ith
it
For
th e
th e
For
th e r e fo r e
o n ly
of
corresp on d s
n e g o tia tio n s
w ere
to
m o b iliz a t io n
C om pare
th e
regard
A u s tr ia n
1854.
e x a c tly
to
to
B e lg r a d e .
to
T h is
197
th e
p r e c a u tio n a r y
h e r s e lf
fa ls ific a tio n
is
2 2 3 .)
la R t
e v id e n t
N o.
th e
b o m b a r d in g
a d d itio n
N o.
etersbu rg
tu rn
[w ith
r e s p o n s ib ility
a ll
lim ite d
to
c h a ra c te r
te le g r a m
ta k e n
to -d a y
advanoed.
w ith o u t
re
g rou n d s,
genera l
Im m e n se
m o b iliz a t io n .”
a lle g e d
te le g r a m
m in ister ia l
P
P o in c a r d
fo llo w in g
no
Im m e d ia te ly
F o r e ig n
tim e
Our
P a r is
had
sam e
has
th e r e su lts.
to
(T e l. N o .
A u str ia
e n d e a v o r in g
“ gen eral ”
th e
not
th e
p u b lic
u s.
th e
had
re
Iz v o n sm ,
(A m b a ssa d o r
we
o p e n ly
to
to
by
a re
m in d
w ill
m o b iliz a tio n .
by
a
and
h er
fu lly
n o te
days
m a d e,
was
th a t
c o m p lic a te d
fir s t
On
in
to
P o in c a r d
( see
w ere
a llu s io n
pare
our
tw o
a llia n c e .
to
Is
on
s ita te d
d ecisio n
le a st
E n g la n d
of
b o th
h er
m e
to
p erson
ru p tu re
m an ner
of
th e
A lth o u g h
m o b iliz a tio n
but
In
war
a m in ister ia l
of
se r ie s
m o b iliz a tio n ,
q u e stio n s
in fo r m
of
con cern
a fte r
c o m p lete
and
p r e fer
F ren ch
term s
a
of
d e te r m in e d
p a r lia m e n ta r y
tr e a ty
fu r th e r
F ra n ce,
th ese
a
d e c la r a tio n
a d v a n ta g eo u s
te a r
of
th e
m u st
th e
P a r lia m e n t.
ch ie fly
th e
by
fir m ly
n a tu re.
w a r,
w o u ld
of
o p e r a tio n s
P o in c a r d
of
of
of
It
day
m ilita ry
la r a tio n
w ill
if
G erm an y.
th e
w o u ld
w h ic h
us
in
c a te g o ric a l
th erew ith
c o n stitu tio n ,
a p p lic a tio n
be b e tte r
upon
it
G erm an y
A u g u st.
d e c la r a tio n
su m m on ed
m ost
are
stra teg ic
d e c la r a tio n
rea son s
fo r
th e
c a b in e t
la id
and
d e cisio n
th e
in
19 J u l y / 1
c o m m u n ic a te d
im m e d ia te ly
me
c o n n e c tio n
a sse m b lin g
g a rd in g
w o u ld
to
a r is ,
G e r m a n y ’s
im m e d ia te ly
w h o le
in
p o litic a l
th e
as
th e
o b lig a tio n s
th e
fo r
I
R ep u b lic , w h o
h ow ever,
of
r e g a rd in g
d e cla r e d
and
r eg a rd in g
q u ir e d
it
te leg ra m
P r e sid e n t
th e
us
you r
N o.
P
P
I
(T e l.
M i n i s t e r .)
2 2 2 .)
fo r
C om -
x r a o o sr a ' i v n o i s s h h o n c k )
C O N G R E S S IO N A L
pare
th e
th e
b e a r in g
p ow ers
J u ly
F ran ce
of
now
and
rep rese n ted
R u s s ia
as
so
%•
37
to w a rd
th e
p r o m is in g
n e g o tia tio n s
and
te le g r a m
210
In
8 0 .]
(A m b a ssa d o r
In
F ran ce
(T e l.
(T h is
te le g r a m ,
e v id e n t ly
ber
as
to
N o.
th e
la s t
sen t
on
S un day,
is
to
be reg a rd ed
th e
as
been
g iv e n
p r e v io u s
th e first
th e
sam e
num
day
in
F ran ce
(T e l.
to
N o.
F o r e ig n
to J u l y /t
Aug.
S m a ll
som e
G erm an
m in o r
en a b les
th e
m oned
to
a v o id
F ren ch
m eet
am ong
T u esd a y,
have
o f th e
o th ers,
sig n e d
by
a d v a n ta g eo u s
p ro test
fr o m
E n g la n d
a lso
n ew s
A v io n ,
T h is
th a t
w h ich
w ill
London
to
in
h er
tro o p s
E n g la n d
a tta c k e d ,
been
r e c eiv e d
18 67 .
even
d ir ec tin g
of
and
sa id
E n g la n d
in fa llib ly
to
be
c a ll
n ea r ly .
V iv ia n i
F ren ch
to
Ita ly ,
is
con
fo rth
T h ere
to
c a ll
to
G r e y ’s
E X H IB IT
A ppendix
r e p la c e d
m arks
th e
88
in c re a se s :
as
p o s s ib le
in
o l s k i.
(K u h l, 6 0 ).
The
reserve
R e o r g a n iz a tio n
In
1914
The
begun
For
a c tiv e
reserve
th e
th e
creases
se r v ic e
w o u ld
la w
in
w ere
r e q u ir e d
1913
w ith
J ap an ese
e x p e n d itu r e s
reck oned
fo r c e
1910,
th e
on
a
as
m u ch
w ar w ere
2 ,6 0 0 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0
fo u r
years
R u s s ia n
w ith
to ta l
m on.
In
“ The
su m ed
e v e n tfu l
of
w ar.
of
p la c e s
th e
in
G erm an ,
c o n ta in s a
The
w as
in
in
stre n g th
o f
th e
For
o u t.
th e
fo llo w in g
E x c lu d in g
R u s s ia n
arm y
a lr y , o r C o s s a c k , d iv is io n s ,
35
year
S ib e r ia n
w as
30
reserve
in c r e a s e s
and
arm y
corp s,
d iv is io n s ,
w ere
T u rk e sta n
and
p la n n e d
tro o p s,
c o m p r is in g
40
354
th e
cav
n a tio n a l
d e fe n se
fa r
as
and
m en ;
The
th e
th e
v ie w e d
The
G erm an
v id e d
of
and
a lo n g
F ran ce
S ib e r ia n
and
fr o m
The
p ress
th e
R a ilw a y s :
tro o p s
A u s tr ia n
a
new
lo a n
w as
r a ilw a y
11
a ls o
great
to
R u s s ia n
to
fro m
w ere
1 ,5 8 1 ,0 0 0
“
The
A s
An
roads
th e
th o u sa n d
to
b r in g
by
a fte r
tlie
and
th e
fo r c e s
27,
by
th e
w ere
d i
fr a n c s .
The
fo r c e s
th e
to
A u g u st,
iu
fo u r
If
On
ta ry
days
sto p
Is
a
we
J u ly
30,
V iv ia n i
w ith
h is
216,
“ The
F ren ch
of
is
th e
of
In
and
w ere
e ig h t
O ran ge
w ere
m ade
or
n in e
out
of
b e fo r e
years
th e
p u b lis h
w as
illu s io n
B ook
le ft
of
w ic h
d id
th a t
up
any
That
ta m p ered
o u t
su pp osed
not
and
in
o n ly
so
w ere
p assages
a l
a s to
o r ig in a l
th e c h a n g e s, b u t th e re
O ran ge
Book
w as
a
d is
a d m is s io n
of
d e c la r a t io n
N o.
th e
th e
a
R u s s ia n
at
F o r e ig n
P a r is .
R u s s ia n
o f w ar upon
S a z o n o ff
207,
Its
d a te
m o b iliz a tio n
R u s s ia
a c tu a lly
m o d e r a tin g
Sehon
becau se
sa y s:
In flu e n c e
had
sa id
e v e n in g
P a r is .
A t
S a zo n o ff
th a t
in
1
as
of
on
S t
th a t
T h ese
th a t
F ren ch
m ili
event
H e
G erm an y
r e la te s
“ d e te r m in e d
fo r b id d e n ,
o ’c lo c k
fo llo w s
w as
S a zo n o ff
th e
p r e c a u t i o n s .”
peace, bu t
th a t
in
a d v is e s
“ c o m p la in s
s im ila r
w a n te d
3 1 st.
I s v o ls k y
P a r is ,
adopt
th e
S a z o n o ff,
am b assad or
e x e r c is in g
at
F ran ce
to
fr o m
h is
a d v a n c e .”
th a t
to
a d v is e s
O ran ge
hopes
e d itio n
th e
fir s t
r e v e a le d .
d is p e lle d
th e
th e
d e m o n s tra tio n
R u s s ia n
a g a in s t
d u r in g
m o b iliz a tio n .
V iv ia n i
now
G overn m en t
th e y
not
a fte r
at
to
1521,
te le g r a m
th a t
a lli e s .”
N o.
It
c o m p e lle d
com e
b e fo r e
London
g o v e rn m e n ts
I z v o ls k y ,
q u e s tio n
In
a n tiw a r
W e
N o.
to
am b assad or
r e p lie d
h er
is
th a t
p r e p a r a t i o n s ,”
be
th a t
im p r e s s io n
th a t
b e fo re
r e je c t
G erm an
“ w o u ld
The
says :
b e fo re th e G e r m a n
not
th e re
B o o k .”
G ooch.
d e lib e r a te ly
p assages
s ta r tlin g
s h o r tly
im m e d ia te ly
has
a
O ran ge
appeared
R om berg.
R u s s ia n
th e ir o w n
d is p a tc h
he
says,
th a t
to
act
a
p ro
p a ssa g es w ere su p p ressed .
in
th e
m o r n in g ,
(e n tir e ly
Is v o ls k y ,
o m itte d
fr o m
th e
B ook) :
w ar
m in is te r
fir m ly
F rench
G erm an y
in fo rm e d
reso lv ed
gen eral
and
on
sta ff
th a t
me
th a t
A u s tr ia
in
and
war
a ll
ea rn est
req u ests
our
w ill
be
ton es
us
e ffo rts
tre a ted
th a t
th e
c o n fir m
to
th e
w ill
as
be
a
d ir e c te d
n e g lig ib le
q u a n t it y ."
The
reader
w ill
fr o m
w ar.
becam e
W arsaw
even
( lb .) .
c o n c e a le d
of
is s u e d
v a r io u s
th e
G ooch
been
w ork
w as
so
th e
but
announced
1912
cap
d e c la r a
crossed
R u ssia n
g o v e rn m e n ts, w ere
be
r e fe r re d
In
fo r m a lly
G o v e rn m e n t.
In
w as
be
day
w as
th e
fr o n tie r ,
(w h ic h
1st
d e ta il
w o r k .”
fo u r
w o u ld
w hat
has
is s u e d
su sp e cted ,
P e tro g ra d ,
P etersb u rg
7 6 .)
th e
R u s s ia n s
to
(K u h l,
m illio n
up
im m e d ia te
K azan
fro n t.
9 .)
at
a n d fiv e d a y s
sh e
1910
(E g g e lin g ,
S o s n o w ic e
p u rch ased
s u p p la n te d
ta k e
p e r m it
tim e s
(fro m
c o u ld
a n g le .
to
to
w h ic h
very
th e
d is c o v e r e d
w o u ld
agreem ent
of
o m itte d
J u ly
in
q u e s tio n s
A rm y
peace
w ere
arm y
th is
rush ed
d o u b le -t r a c k e d
w ere
an
pre
of
w ith o u t
c o n n e c tio n
P r o fe sso r
th e tr u th
o m itte d
gen eral
p ie c e
w as
of
von
c o lo r s ,
a ll
ju s t
P r o fe sso r
th e re
The
le a r n e d
R u s s ia .
R e a d e rs w ill fo r m
be
It
th a t
book
w ork
d iffe r e n t
th a t
never
b e lie v e d
te le g r a m s
h on est
o ffic e r s
1 0 5 ).
P etersb u rg ,
lin e s — o n e
p r iv a te
w as
104,
crea ted
S t.
In
be
W arsaw )
o ffic ia ls
(K u h l,
A ll
R u s s ia
M oscow ,
th e se
1914
c r e a tin g
fr o n tie r s .
fo r
tw o
in
lin e s
of
of
T h ese
fro m
A le x a n d r o v s
76876—
th a t
G erm an y.
193 2
P o lis h
becam e
su m m er
3 ,4 6 1 ,7 5 0
by
R a ilw a y
In
th e
a g a in s t
th e
m ade
in
stre n g th
a im
M ilita r y
tra n sp o rt
th e re .
w ar
u ltim a te
o ffe n s iv e
w ere
stre n g th
great
a ls o
G erm an
1912
border
w o r ld ”
w ere
7 9 -8 0 .)
F r e ih e e r
by th e
th o u g h ,
concern s
w h o le
je c t e d
peace
“ th e
In to
borders
th e
S t.
rem arked,
2 2 ).
th e
of
com
to
a g a in s t A u s tr ia .
goes
to
6 6 -6 7 .)
th e
r e v e la t io n s
th is
On
w ar,
1 9 2 3 .)
th e
L a te r
w as
had
tered .
d iv is io n s .
The
th e
th a t
In
F a lsific a tio n s
v a r io u s
and
d is p a tc h e s ,
S cb on ,
1913.
p a r t c a r r ie d
of
o f th is
by
by
of
m a tte r,
g e n u in e .
423, 000
T b iB
m u st
(K u h l,
U n w in ,
fo r e w o r d
c o m p le te .
be
s e le c te d
“
K u h l, 6 1 - 6 2 .)
w as
in
oc
r o llin g
m is s io n
W arsaw
( i b .,
th e G e rm a n
n e g o t ia t io n s ."
n o te s
to
c o m m u n ic a tio n
and
w ith
o f h o s tilitie s
For
(V o n
and
break
is
2, 292, 00 0
1914
and
K u h l,
a
fo r c e s
E g g e lin g
m ovem ent
out
m easu res
“ The
“ b o o k s ,”
205, 000
o f ---------------------------------------
c a r r ie d
e d itio n
A lle n
r e p l a c e m e n t _______________________________________________________________________
s u r p lu s
fir st
(L o n d o n ,
For
or a
iu
Hun
w ere
w ere very
m ig h tie s t
K ie v
d is c u s s e s
a c tu a l
d e c la r a tio n
e n title d
M in is te r
c a te g o r ie s o f re se rv e
ready
o f c r o s s in g
p a t r o l s .”
exp osu re
876, 000
b o th
p la n
“ Our
th e
and
d e p a r tin g
and
of
iu
A ppendix I (B ausman ).
S in c e
748. 000
40, 000
to
1 6 -1 7 ;
und
th e
s p r in g
A u s tr ia n
in c r e a s e d ,
V tln a
S e r a je v o : V o n
As
The
s a n c tio n in g
headed
e ffic ie n c y ,
fie ld
m o b iliz a tio n ,
m o b iliz a tio n s
( I b .,
m om ent
He
th e
J o ffr e
arou nd
h im s e lf
d ip lo m a tic
enem y
th is
R u s s ia n
of
Dum a
test
a
1 6 .)
th e
8 2 .)
th e
h is
p la n n e d
rem o n stra n c es
fo r tr e s s e s : T h ese
G eneral
tro o p s
w eek.
w ar)
G e rm a n y ’s
by
at
a fte r
th e
th e
of
ren ew ed
by
day
(K u h l,
sto p p ed .
m ilita r y
fifth
reserves
a g a in s t G e r m a n y ,
tr ia l.
th a t
d u r in g
ap paren t
th a t
is
la s t
S u k h o m lin o ff’s
by
h er
announced
m o v e m e n ts
th e
1913
T lie
to c o n c e n tra te
F in a l
tio n
of
A rray
1 2 -2 2 ).
H u k h o m lln o tT
w us
s tre n g th e n in g
e x a m in e
R u s s ia n
f o r m a t i o n s ____________________________________________________________
In
to
coal
7 0 .)
N ic h o la s
th a t
of
w as
(Ib „
fo r m e r
(E g g e lin g ,
stre n g th
exch ange
T h is
1914.
sto p p ed
th e
in
S u k h o m lin o ff a n sw e re d
b e lie v e d
on
R u ssia n
a tte n d e d
7 2 .)
19,
th e
w as
C o n tin u a l
im p o r te d ,
a u tu m n
1912,
e ig h th .
peace
export
and
J u ly
p r e p a r a tio n s ,
1 8 .)
in c re a se s
4 9 -5 0 .)
but
sta ff
th e
e n tir e
G r a in
th e
(E g g e lin g ,
on
w ere
r e v ie w s
P etersb u rg
of
th e
in
be re a d y
en orm ou s
(E g g e lin g ,
added.
f o r m a t i o n s ____________________________________________________________
1, 86 9, 0 0 0
to
s u p p lie s
Peace
w ill
f o r m a t i o n s _______________________________________________
T RO U BLE.
th e
S h ilin s k i,
(K u h l,
on
n ecessary.
c o u ld
lin e
th e
m ilita r y
w ar
1913,
be
c h ie f,
w h ereu pon
gen eral
lin e
secon d
a r m ie s .
sto ck
of
be—
fir st
equ al
yet
G erm an
w itn e s s e d
p u b lic
in
S E R B IA N
a tte n d e d
fr a n c s .
(E g g e lin g ,
fo r
w o u ld
th e
p u b lic a tio n
R e s e r v is ts .
For
years
of
of
th e
lo s s e s o f
m ilita r y
sta ff
th e
w as
The
u n iv e r s a l
G erm an
d iv is io n s ;
th e
X .
p r e p a r a tio n s .
1913
tu re d
(B ausman ).
G
(E g g e lin g , 9 ) .
1011.
c o lo r s .
tw o
K u h l says
th is.
To make effective the duty o f France to mobilize and imme
diately attack Germany simultaneously with Russia under the
terms o f the treaty of 18D2 it was only necessary to make
Austria mobilize, above quoted, and this was accomplished
through the Slavs of Serbia.
That the German authorities were not entirely unsuspecting
o f the will to war by the French and Russian leaders is shown
by the sealed instruction sent under seal o f July 26 to the Ger
man ambassador at Brussels not to he opened until authorized
by telegram. The authority was given August 2, after the
French and Russian troops had crossed the German line. This
communication from the German Government was handed to
M. Devignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 7 o ’clock
p. m. August 2, 1914.
R u s s ia n
d e m o n s tra tio n
a lso .
te leg ra p h e d
a m ba ssa d or
a
tow a rd
Izv
secrecy
on
th a t
n eu tr a lity
yet
R u s s ia n
R je ta c h ,
read y,
c u r r in g ,
so
and
a d v a n c in g
B elg ia n
Journ al
d e s ir in g
g a r la n
v io la tin g
c ir c u m sta n c e
w ill
R u s s ia n
D u b a il,
R u s s ia n
N ic h o la s
su m
is
BEFORE T H E
m illio n
not
1914
and
t o -d a y
th ereb y
v io la tin g
m ore
th e
T h is
it
th e
dem anded
th o u sa n d
Duke
T h is
m a n ife s t g r e a te r e n e r g y .
are
In te n tio n
w h ic h
been
as
to
fr o n tie r
has
by
Aug.
te r rito r y .
P a r lia m e n t,
g u a ra n teed
F ra n ce,
ca u se
an
is
by
th e
w ere
and
Fren ch
te r rito r y ,
F ran ce
sev en tee n
year
th ey
fo r c e s
SO J u l y / t
F ren ch
s ta ff,
G ran d
In
has
N ew s
trea ty
G erm an
im m e d ia te ly
a tte n tio n
F ran ce
Lu xem bou rg
fo r
and
in d ic a te s
to u ch
th a t
th e
very
th e
1*14
The
th a t
M i n i s t e r .)
on
d e cla r e to
D u c h y , tch lc h
sid ered
is
to
o f tea r.
en tered
crossed
occurred
next
m ilita r y
2 2 5 .)
have
a lr ea d y
d e c la r a tio n
tro o p s
n eu tr a lity
have
G overn m en t
on
a fo r m a l
G erm an
d e ta c h m e n ts
c o llisio n s
her
th e
p ressu re
o f m o b iliz a tio n .
P aris ,
IN
of
c h ie f
th a t
d a y .]
IZVOI.8KI.
(A m b a ssa d o r
French.
ch arged
has
F rench
and
th e
M i n i s t e r .)
P aris ,
T o -d a y ,
th e
m an eu vers,
2 2 5 .)
in a d v e r te n tly ,
1911
fo r
F o r e ig n
MENACES
M IL IT A R Y
of
Sazonoff .
th <
RU88IAN
b etw ee n
N o.
RECORD.
th e
to
It
w ith o u t
m oral
w ar
n o te
p la in
w a itin g
e ffe c t
H ere
of
is
th a t
th is
w as
th e ir m o b iliz a t io n
a
th a t
fo r
fir s t
w hat
F ran ce
G erm an
a c tio n
Is v o ls k y
sen t
and
w as
b e fo re
w illin g
n o tio n ,
th e
R u s s ia n s
b e fo r e G e r m a n y
th a t
upon
h er
says
iu
part
h is
to
Jum p
sh e w a s
und
N o.
in to
s im p ly
not
218
had
to
had
d e c la r e d
th e
fr a y
s tu d y in g
h e s ita tin g
as
S a z o n o ff
on
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
38
A u gu st
sto p
1,
her
"F o r
It
Is
th e
day
upon
m o b iliz a tio n
p o litic a l
very
w h ic h
reason s.
Im p o rta n t
fo r
In
resp ect
th e
G erm an
but
In
h is
N o.
(su p p r e sse d )
sam e 1st
of
her
day
a
R u s s ia
and
by
day
had
says,
of
m o b iliz a tio n
The
fro m
u n til
e d itio n
th e
sh e
e ith e r
to
“
on
th e
sta te B
It
w ere
not
be
and
be
not
has
by
F ran ce
F ren ch
fo r
b o th
her
If
su ch
It
is
of
of
be
a tta c k e d
on
in
w ar
to
tw o
gen eral
and
th in g s
of
a
w ar
w a itin g
s im p ly
on
back
w ith
th a t
w ar
con
h a n g in g
p la n
w as
and
th e
have
th e
c o n ju n c t io n
w ar,
d e c la r e
or
of
h er
la u n c h
s h o u ld
th is
That
m ove
re s o lv e d
to
a ll
h er;
s tu d y in g
it
had
d e c la r e d
w ith
upon
her.
“
I
Von
m ilita r y
s itu a tio n
q u o ta tio n
h ere,
P r o b le m s
of
th e
R u s s ia ,
but
e x iste n c e ,
He
th e
Ita lia n
I ta ly
as
The
i n e c e s s ity .
m ade
case
fa c e
in
in
of
of
of
th e
w est
of
s ta n d in g
th e
is
tw o
us
a llie s
w h e th e r
It
U n til
it
is
p repon deran ce
of
h er
secu red ,
sh e
in fe r io r ity
a r tille r y ),
and
s u p e r io r ity
of
th e
fie ld
p r o v is io n
in
our
th e
num ber
of
m en
m anage
to
secu re
P art
II
upon.
R u s s ia
82
a
and
m uch
b e h in d h a n d
fo r c e s ,
fo r
of
an
p resen t
R u ssia
In
is
stro n g er
our
w ith
to
as
to
every
and
a tte m p t
to
76876—
11
th e
th a t
A
c a tc h
upon
up
h er
had
w e ll
us
as
d isp o sa l
a
w ith
in
p asses.
w ith
ea st
p o in t
m akes
th e
put
In to
in
an
of
of
in te r fe r e d
tro o p s
in
m o b iliz a
a r m in g
s e r io u s ly
be
o f
d e s tr u c tio n
th e
our
n e c e s s ity
be
th ese
th e
w ith ,
r e g io n s
advanced
by
w hat
sta te
n a tio n
in
p e c u n ia r y
le s s
th a n
an
of
P art
our
m ill-
have
I
m easu res
th e
d e ta il
In c r e a s in g
in
th e se
and
fa r
of
d e fe n se s
m ake
p erson al
out
m uch
th a t
our
In
s a id
in e x o r a b le
th e
II
of
dem ands
th e
m em o
s a c r ific e s .
th o se
n e ig h b o r s
ord er
we
But
in
have
s h o u ld
hnve
m ade
stre n g th en
to
on
g rea ter
year
th e
th e
R u s s ia
la s t
p erson al
D u r in g
ou rs.
m arks
“ B e lg iu m
w ill
to
th e ir
and
are
m ilita r y
str e n g th e n in g
dem anded
dem ands
fir s t
and
on
M orocco
of
h er
o b ta in e d
h er
e a ste rn
fr o m
p o p u la tio n
c r is e s
sh e
sp en t
fo rtre sse s.
her
n a tio n a l
assem
m ark s.
th ree
years
E n g la n d
has
sp en t
la r g e
su m s
to
g iv e
e ffe c t
r e fo r m s .
has
in tr o d u c e d
a
new
arm y
o r g a n iz a tio n
at
a
h eavy
has
is
now
be
c a r r y in g
brou gh t
la id
out
up
th ro u g h
to
a
en orm ou s
a
new
d e fe n se
m o b iliz a t io n
su m s
to
b ill,
stre n g th
m o d e r n iz e
by
of
th e
w h ic h
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
her
m en.
fo r tific a tio n s
of
A n tw erp .
“ U nder
p e lle d
arm y
p ressu re
dem and
w h ic h
Is
fo r
draw n
up
th a t
th e
in
in
th e
p o litic a l
m eet
a ll
m u st
be
p r o v is io n
P art
th e
p o litic a l
la r g e
c r e d its
c r is is
fo r
A u s tr ia
th a t
has
been
r e o r g a n iz a tio n
com
of
h er
o verd u e.
to o ,
th e
of
very
lo n g
G erm an y,
gram
so
th e
to
II
m u st
fu tu re
le a d e r s
p repared
of
th e
be
c a r r ie d
G erm an y,
of
th e
to
m ost
th ro u g h
tr u s tin g
n a tio n
m ake
u rgen t
a
to
sa c r ific e s.
w ith
h er
su pp ort
The
r e q u ir e m e n ts
th e
ow n
g rea test
stre n g th ,
w h ic h
is
pro
w h ic h
s o lid
is
en ergy,
can
g iv e
en ou gh
to
e m e r g e n c ie s .”
It demanded a peaceful passage through Belgium, proposing
to pay for damages and respect Belgian sovereignty and terri
tory when war ended, and claimed to know that Belgian neu
trality had already been violated by France. (E xhibit X II.)
E X H IB IT
X II.
Brussel,
I M P E R IA L G ERM AN L E G A T IO N
(H ig h ly
The
to
th e
O lv e t
of
th e se
lo n g
us
we
of
ItR
F ia n c e
best
IN
t, 191k.
A u gu st
B E L G IU M .
c o n f i d e n t i a l .)
w ill,
an
is
The
m arch
of
in
no
r e lia b le
in a rc h
le a v e s
G erm an y
a v o id
p o s itio n
a id .
In
no
M euR e,
doubt
fe a r
th is
fa c t
to
w ay
th e
B e lg ia n
su ch
a
In
la r g e ly
Is
of
in te n
te r r ito r y .
B e lg iu m ,
th e re
p r e s e r v a tio n
a c c o r d in g
by
sp ite
d e v e l
s u ffic ie n t
cer
G erm an y.
fo r
as
th a t
r e p u ls e
a g a in s t
d u ty
th e
th ro u g h
th e
to
in fo r m a tio n
on
th e
of
G erm an y
to
fo r e s ta ll
th e . e n e m y .
G erm an
an
to
not
w ith o u t
im p e r a tiv e
regard
as
of
G overnm en t
e n e m ie s
th e
be
on
can
t h r e a t d ir e c te d
a tta c k
in te n d
m a r c h in g
w ill
r e c e iv e d
in fo r m a tio n
G overnm en t
French
It
T h is
of
has
fo r c e s
N am ur.
of a
th is
G overnm en t
F rench
Im p e r ia l
ta in ty
over
th e
th e
and
oped
But
in
G erm an
w h ic h
tio n
regard s
as
th e
g re a te r
s a c r ific e s
on
H a ld a n e
arm y
The
a r t ille r y
her
In
In to
R u s s ia
v iew
of
is
as
E n g la n d
squad
of
th e
h er
as
sto n e
as
la n d
a
sea
very
a r m in g
need
her
we
not
1.
act
of
of
w o u ld
h o s tility
G erm an y
fe e l
a g a in st
o b lig e
keen
h e r s e lf
h er
on
regret
th e
h er
if
fa c t
B e lg iu m
th a t
p art
to
th e
s h o u ld
m easu res
v io la te
B e lg ia n
sh e
im p o ssib le
pow er
p ow er.
u n tu rn ed
a n te e
to
as
be
fo r
it
is
But
It
e m p lo y
2.
does
If
its
part
K in g d o m
cash
4.
a ll
I f B e lg iu m
in
its
soon
th e
dam ages
th a t
any
w ar
th e
to w a rd
on
th e
p o s s e s s io n s
under
as
a
th e
peace
act
G erm an
G overn m en t
is
fr ie n d ly
th e
of
w h o le
c o n d itio n s
a ttitu d e ,
by
her
r a ise s
G erm an y,
la id
a g a in st
to
B e l
ta k e
G erm an
peace,
to
up
G ov
gu ar
e x te n t.
dow n
to
ev a cu n te
c o n c lu d e d .
is
b e h a v e s in
com m ence
th e ir
th e
r e q u ir e d
h o s tility
to
d e c la r a tio n
in
of
in
of
about
a u th o r itie s
cau sed
p a r tic u la r
th e
u n d erta k e s,
p reserves
w ith
in
n e u tr a lity
and
as
B e lg iu m
fo r
and
m is u n d e r s ta n d in g ,
c o n te m p la te
u n d erta k e s
te r r ito r y
a g a in s t
th e
not
fr ie n d ly
G erm an y
agreem ent
any
c o n se n ts
of
on
th e
B e lg ia n
3.
d is s ip a te
B e lg iu m
a ttitu d e
ern m ent
su m s
w ill
an
If
of
keep
to
fo llo w s :
G erm an y
g iu m .
be
n u m e r ic a l
m u st
enorm ous
arm y,
ju st
a
of
s till
ord er
d e c la r e s a s
a g a in s t
319
and
fu tu re
In
a
w h ic h
fie ld
is
A llia n c e
s p ite
th e
e n jo y s
fo r c e s
th e
e q u ip m e n t,
T r ip le
no
th e
b a tta lio n s ,
m om ent
It
le a v e
R u s s ia
of
p u t in to
R u ssia
w ith
to
th e
1 ,3 7 4
th e
fo r w a r d
th a t
a ls o
“ S w itz e r la n d
in
even
and
us
by
s p e c ia l
p o s s ib ly
c o st.
The
w ith
us
w ith
nud
a
w ith
r ifle .
w ith
le v e l
w ar.
sim ila r
do
th e
th e
an
m arked
heavy
F ren ch
up
as
w ith
m ore
in fa n tr y
c a tc h
can
r e o r g a n iz a tio n
th a t
our
be
hom e
w ill
in
w ill
G erm an y
sh e
R u ssia .
our
th e
as our
in
of
b e in g
even
co m p ete
and
our
r e o r g a n iz a tio n ,
fa c t
yea r
on
o ff
th a t
fo r tr e s s e s
r e q u ir e s
east
m o b iliz a t io n ,
s a tis fa c tio n
great
lo s t
be
su p e r io rity
by
th e
is
w ill
F ra n ce
slig h t
p resen t
p r o c la m a tio n
fo rc e
opponent
rea r
th e
in
wo
b e h in d
to
sh o t.
1870
one
to
it
th is
c o m p a r is o n
p resen t
tim e
lo o k
th e
corps
o v e rta k e
at
a ls o
B ut
as
of
le v e l
c o m b in e d
th e
on
in c u m b e n t
sh ow s
we
m in d s
try
th e
c o n flic t
sp e n d in g
G erm an y
A t
a
in
Is
b rou gh t
to
s c a le
w h ic h
te r r ito r y .
su p e r io r ity
th e
w hen
are
th e
A rm y
a
not
le ft
Fran ce,
m om ent
get
Is
hand,
arm y.
R u m a n ia
fo r
arm ed
But
who
s u p e r io r ity .
w ith
th a t
s u p e r io r ity .
can
th e
a p p e n d ix
b a tte r ie s .
so
to
sh e
s e r v ic e ,
R u s s ia n
ron s,
a b le
fo r
th e m
n u m e r ic a l
r e v e a ls
be
num ber
o p e r a tio n
f ir e
th e
to
th e
A rm y
arm y
w ith
w e ll
d is
on
Ita lia n s ,
a g a in st
ahead
th e
th e
w ere
fie ld
in
F ran ce
to
I ta lia n
over
h o w itz e r s )
te n ts, a s
hand,
12
fo u g h t
th e
are
fo r
th e
W h ile
th e
at
o th e r
arm y
to
p u t in to
b a tta lio n s ,
s u p e r io r ity .
a b le
still
at
we
by
w h o le
and
in
fo r c e s
th e
or
u n a id e d .
(fie ld
and
sh e' w ill
th e
th e
ta k e
rests
fir e
2
can
Ita lia n
On
s lig h t
a tta c k e d
of m oney
G e rm a n y , A u s tr ia , a n d
of
p e r t in e n t
in fe r io r ity
e x tr a o r d in a r y
( th o u g h
o th e r
fit
of
great
to
M oreover,
tim e
an
of a
m u st
“ .I n
p r e t e x t ,"
tw o
added
The
th ir d
a s s e m b le s
be
a r tille r y
k itc h e n s
In
a
th e
an
be
im m o b iliz e d
Ita lia n
b a tta lio n s
n o ic
to
s h o .w
B e lg iu m
have
106
fu r th er
q u e s tio n
On
u s.
be
and
in fa n tr y
arm y.
a
re sp ec ts.
h er
th e
E n te n te ,
op posed
ta b le s
a r tille r y ,
has
w ill
o f fie ld
is o n ly
Ju st
t h e ir
th e
w o u ld
our
w ith
sa c r ific e s
1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
to
A u s tr ia
fo r
c o u n te d
G erm an y
T r ip le
b a tta lio n s .
be
n lo n e
d e v e lo p m e n t o f h lg h -a n g le
is
I
w h ic h
h a n d , w it h o u t b e in g
Im m en se
rear
be
opened,
of
fo r
th e
th e
w o u ld
in fa n tr y
a fr a id
and
r e p r e s e n ta tiv e
g iv e
w h ic h
th e
th e se
w e
She
a
w hat
of
b ly
r e v ie w s
b etw ee n
fig h tin g
w ith
p a r tic ip a te .
Ita ly
in
s u p e r io r ity
192
w o u ld
d e c is io n
h er
be
been
The
If
th e
"
c o n flic t
w ill
had
can
w ill
I d le , r ifle in
g a in
w h ic h
not
fr o n tie r .
v ery
F ran ce
th a t, “ n o m a tte r
w ith
w ill
fr o n tie r .
ta k e
He
a r m y , w h ic h
b a tt a lio n s ; i f
it
her
it
a
s in c e
a re th e fo r c e s
w ar
fig u re
as
to
of
says
c a lc u la tio n .
th e
A lp in e
a
124
im m a te r ia l
grea t
days
th ir d
a r m y , w h ic h
A lp in e
G erm an y,
m u st
fe w
E n g la n d .
th e
a cco u n t,
out of
in
and
e n e m ie s ,
F ren ch
th a t
in
A u s tr ia
a p p e n d ic e s ,
b a tte r ie s ,
F ran ce
of
le ft
57.
w ith
G erm an y,
la r g e
fo r c e s.
c o m p le te
c a lle d
up
th e
b ea ten
im p o r ta n c e
s itu a tio n
in v o lv e
m a k in g
"
G erm an y
our
out
page
fo r
L u d e n d o r ff
t h r e a t e n e d .”
a
her
lo n g
at
I,
in te re s t
to o
by
a g a in s t
and
be
o f th e a p p e n d ix
sq u ad ron s, an d
s id e
v ita l
h a r d ly
th ree
be
is
book
th e
our
e s t a b lis h e d
d e a lt
case
“ W e
now
fo llo w s :
fie ld
posal
w ill
in te rv ie w
It
th e
V o lu m e
S ta ff,
no
in
of
•
n e ig h b o r s
P r o v in c e s
In
on
not
im p r o v in g
cou rse,
w ill
any
have
O f
“ T h is
“ m em oran du m ”
fr o n tie r
w ere
our
on
our
fo r c e s
c e r ta in ly
tu n n e ls ,
and
p o lit ic a l
3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
lo n g
our
d e p lo y m e n t
and
h ere
ran du m
D e c e m b e r , 191Z.
a
I
and
“ F ran ce
m in is tr y .
G erm an y
w ill
an
adds
“ U nder I
th e
“ has
of
m ade
fo u n d
E n g la n d
n o t c o n tr ib u te
th e D
on es,
w ar
be
g e n e ra l s ta ff, w h o
w ill
lie
th e
can
W h ile
had
M o lt k e
G en eral
Ita ly
Ita ly
had
to
th a t
R u s s ia .
Von
but
th e
c e r ta in ty
and
M o ltk e ’s su m m a ry
1912,
arm ed
im m e d ia te ly
g rea test
r e in fo r c e d
fo r c e s
th a n
D ecem ber,
our
d is p o s a l
th e m .
ex p e ct,
a tta c k
and
very
b e lie v e
I ta ry
X I.
A ppendix A (R ausman ).
th e ir
In
her
W « < Wa
1
d e fe n se .
even
G erm an y
to
a tta c k
an
and
th e
. s h o u ld
an
at
in c r e a s in g
s itu a tio n
b r id g e s,
fo r tr e sse s,
i
of
have
a ls o ,
r a ilw a y s ,
th e
a fte r
o p e r a tio n s
W e
s illl
p o s itio n
brough t
th in k
m ilita r y
are
th a t
th ey
to
w est
tio n .
a
b e t t e r ,”
fir s t
th e
book :
of
E X H IB IT
In
b e fo re
began
th e
w h ic h
m a in ta in
a tte n tio n .
a g a in s t
su m m on ed
w o u ld
m ade
th e
he
w ar
a d v a n ta g e o u s
in
part
to
w h ic h
e n jo y e d
p re
e x p ir a tio n
th a t
of
b e in g
m ilita r y
p resen t
w as
Fran ce
resou rces
to
, above.
ready
in
th a t
He
to -d a y
m ore
b e g in
th e
fir m ly
th e
“ The
Im m e d ia t e ly
w ar
E n g la n d ,
S a zo n o ff on
d e c la r a tio n
hnd
c o n fir m a tio n
of
w ere
tim e
c o n s id e r e d
w a itin g
th e
w as
a p p r o p r ia te
a ll
I t .”
a c tio n .
be
to
F ran ce
R u s s ia n s
th a t
to
a d v a n c e d .”
see
secon d ,
out
“ w o u ld
w ill
by
w ho
F ren ch
o n ly
m ore
fr o n tie r
R u ssia
s h o u ld
a d v is e s
w ar.
of
fir s t
th e
to
e s p e c ia lly
G erm an y
G e r m a n y ’s
th a t,
in
th e
th a t
th e n
it
to
fu r th e r
d e c la r e d
sta te s
and
m o b iliz a tio n
an sw er
d e c la r a tio n
read er
te n d e d
been
th e
w ere
w as
hnd
I ’ o in c a r ft,
He
F ran ce
an
h e a r in g
r e g a r d in g
m o b iliz a t io n ,
if
a fte r
seen
“ if
u ltim n tu m
I ta ly
her
Is v o ls k y
a n n o u n c in g
c o u n c il
to
th a t
fo rm
R u s s ia
G e r m a n y ."
a llie s
th e
to
te le g r a m
m in is te r ia l
Is v o ls k y
s h o u ld
A u g u st,
t e le g r a m
r e c e iv e d
but
of
G orm an
order
F ran ce
ced e
222
th e
e x p ir e d :
G erm an y
B e lg ia n
tro o p s,
Is
p repared,
G o v e r n m e n t,
and
to
g iv e
to
in
buy
in d e m n ity
B e lg iu m .
a
h o s tile
d iffic u ltie s
m anner
a g a in s t
to w a rd
th e ir
th e
advance
G .e r m a n
by
tro o p s,
t h e o p p o s l-
C O N G R E S S IO N A L R E C O R D .
t l o n o f t h e fortifications of the Meuse or by destroying roads, railways,
tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to con
sider Belgium as an enemy.
In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but
she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward
one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a
justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian
Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its
taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two
neighboring States will become closer and more lasting.
On August 3 Belgium refused and the German troops there
after treated Belgium as an enemy ally o f France.
EXHIBIT XIV.
the gekman acceptance op armistice terms.
1. Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the
signature of the armistice.
2. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France,
Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within 14
days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have
not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will
become prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States
forces Jointly will keep pace with evacuation In these areas. All move
ments of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance
with a note annexed to the stated terms.
8. Repatriation, beginning at once nnd to be completed within 15
days, of all inhabitants of the countries above mentioned, including
hostages nnd persons under trial or convicted.
4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the follow
ing equipment: Five thousand guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field), 25,000
machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfers, 1,700 airplanes. The above to be
delivered in situ to the Allies and the United States troops in accord
ance with the detailed conditions laid down in the annexed note.
5. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left
bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall
be administered by the local troops of occupation under the control of
the allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation
of these territories will be carried out by allied and United States
garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Cob
lenz, Cologne, together with bridgeheads at these points in 80-kilometer
rudius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the
stragetic points of the regions.
A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right of the Rhine between
the stream and a line drawn parallel to it 40 kilometers (26 miles)
to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim
and as far as practicable a distance of 30 kilometers (20 miles) from
the east of stream from this parallel upon Swiss frontier. Evacua
tion by the enemy of the Rhine lands shall be so ordered as to be com
pleted within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the
signature of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupa
tion will be regulated according to the note annexed.
6. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacua
tion of inhabitants ; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons
or property of the inhabitants.
No destruction of any kind to be
committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered,
as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed
during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores af food of all kinds
for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial
establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel
shall not be moved. Roads and means of communication of every kind,
railroad, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall
be in no manner impaired. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses
o f participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice.
7. A l l c i v i l and military personnel at present employed on them
■ball r e m a in . Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 w a g o n s , a n d 5,000
motor lorries in good working order, with all necessary spare parts
and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the
period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The rail
ways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 36 days, together
with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary
for the working of railways In the country on the left bank of the
Rhine shall be left In situ. All stores of coal and material for the
upkeep of permanent ways, signals, and repair shops left entire In situ
and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of
armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them.
All civil und military personnel at present employed on such means
of communication and transporting, including waterways, shall remain.
8. The German command shall be responsible for revealing within
48 hours all mines or delay acting fuses disposed on territory evacuated
by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.
The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that
may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs, wells,
etc.) under penalty of reprisals.
70870— 11
39
0.
The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allies and the
United States Armies in all occupied territory, “ subject to regulation
of accounts with those whom it may concern.’’ The upkeep of the
troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine)
shall be charged to the German Government.
10. An Immediate repatriation without reciprocity, according to de
tailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States
prisoners of war. The allied powers and the United States shall be
able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish. This condition annuls
the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of
war, including the one of July, 1918, In course of ratification. How
ever, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland
and In Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of Ger
man prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the pro
llminaries of peace.
11. Sick and wounded who can not be removed from evacuated ter
ritory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the
spot with the medical material required.
12. All German troops at present In any territory which before the
war belonged to Rumania, Turkey, or Austria-Hungary shall immedi
ately withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on
August 1, 1914. German troops now in Russian territory shall with
draw within the frontiers of Germany as soon ns the Allies, taking into
account the Internal situation of those territories, shall decide that the
time for this 1ms come.
13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, nnd all German
instructors, prisoners, and civilian ns well as military agents now on
the territory of Russia (ns defined before 1914), to be recalled.
14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures nnd
any other undertakings, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for
Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on Angust 1, 1914).
15. Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and
of the supplementary treaties.
16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by
the Germans on their eastern frontier either through Danzig or by the
Vistula in order to convey supplies to the populations of those terri
tories and for the purpose of maintaining order.
17. Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within
a period to be fixed by the Allies.
18. Repatriation without reciprocity within maximum period of one
month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of
all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other allied or
associated States than those mentioned in clause 3, paragraph 19.
19. The following financial conditions are required : Reparation for
damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be
removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the
recovery or repatriation of the cash deposit, In the National Bank of
Belgium, and in general Immediate return of all documents, specie,
stock, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof,
touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitu
tion of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by
that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the
signature of peace.
20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite informa
tion to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships.
Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigatlou in all
territorial waters is given to the naval and merchant marines of the
allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.
21. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied
and associated powers in Germans hands to be returned without reci
procity.
22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of all
German submarines now existing (including all submarine cruisers and
mine-laying submarines), with their complete armament and equipment,
in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of
America. Those which can not take the sea shall be disarmed of the
material and personnel and shall remain under the supervision of the
Allies and the United States. All the conditions of the article shall
be carried Into effect within 14 days. Submarines ready for sea shall
be prepared to leave German ports Immediately upon orders by wire
less, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment.
23. The following German surface warships which shall be desig
nated by the Allies and the United States.of America shall forthwith be
disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, to be designated by
the Allies and the United States of America and placed under the sur
veillance of the Allies and the United States of American, only care
takers being left on board, namely :
Six battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, including 2 mine
layers, 50 destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface war
ships (Including river craft) are to be concentrated In naval bases to
be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are
to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the super
vision of the Allies and the United Stales of America. All vessels of
the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
40
V e s s e ls
d e s ig n a te d
fo r
w ith in
sev en
upon
m ent
of
24.
to
a ll
The
In te rn m e n t
v e s s e ls o f
A llie s
sw eep
m un
days
a ll
th e
and
m in e
F reed om
n avul and
U n ite d
fie ld s
of
and
and
a ccess
m e r c a n tile
by
a u x ilia r y
th e
te r r ito r ia l w a te r s ,
25.
s h a ll
d ir e c tio n s
be
t le e t s h a l l
S ta te s
of
and
to
occu py
to
a ll
sw eep
up
te r r ito r ia l
and
a ll
a ll
th e
and
of
su ch
of
m in e s
be
th e
T o se
s h a ll b e e m p o w e r e d
and
d e fe n se
and
th e
w orks
B a ltic ,
w ith o u t
and
G erm an
b e in g
o b s tr u c tio n s
r a is e d
are
to
be
In d ic a te d .
26.
The
a ted
e x is tin g
b lo c k a d e
pow ers
are
to
fo u n d
a t seu
are
to
S ta te s
s h a ll
g iv e
th e a r m is tic e
27.
A ll
G erm an
28.
In
bor
a ll
p a ra tu s
29.
to
and
B la c k
to
of
a ll
m a te r ia ls ,
th e
a llie d
a s s o c i
sh ip s
th e U n ite d
G erm an y
d u r in g
Im m o b iliz e d
U n ite d
p o rts,
cran es,
n a v ig a tio n ,
by
and
th e
In
to
of
are
a ll
a ll
1 ,0 1 7 ,5 7 0
be
in
be
sto res
In
th e
S ta te s
p a rts
c la u s e
28,
bands
in
A m e ric a
or
G erm an y,
h ar
and
a ll
and
m i n e s ________ ___________________ _______ _______ ______________________ __
ap
T o t a l _____________________________________________________
9.
R a ilr o a d
m a te r ia l
are
to
to
be
p o rts
to
m a te r ia ls
lo c o m o tiv e s ,
road
a ll
retu rn ed ,
be
to
th e
sp e c ifie d
by
be
th e
w ill
p la c e d
n eu tra l
b e fo r e
g o v e rn m e n ts
N orw ay,
on
c o u n tr ie s ,
th e
Sw eden,
tr a d in g
w h e th e r
in te r e s ts ,
as th e
G erm an
to
s h ip s
fis h in g
h arb or
and
by
of
th e
w h e th e r
of
D e liv e r ie s
w ith o u t
e x p o r t o f s h ip b u ild in g
The
c la u s e s ,
th e
p a r tie s
tio n
d u r a tio n
D u r in g
ta k e
on
of
m erch ant
p la c e
except
ord er
on
in
th e
th e
th e
is
a llie d
3
s h ip p in g
of
any
d e s c r ip tio n
of
th e
a r m is tic e .
to
d ays,
m ay
and
case
of
th e
m ilita r y
of
It
not
fa ith
in
a
one
th e
of
th e m
c o m m a n d e r s in
act
a
in to
th e
U n iv e r s ity
of
p e r io d
th e
a r m is tic e
85.
T ills
of
a r m is tic e
to
be
a c ce p ted
or
by
G erm an y
S a le
R h in e la n d
16.
Y ie ld
17.
M is c e lla n e o u s
of
H as
th e
e x e c u tio n
fo r
th e
v a r io u s
r e m a in s
m e n t,
tio n
tre a ty
it e m s ,
be
in c lu d e s
c lu d e s
o n ly
G erm an
and
of
th e
w ith in
S ta te
p ro p e rty
fig u r e s ”
r e c o g n iz e d
th e
w o r ld
m arks
m arket
o th e r
of
as
th e
cost
ite m s
is ' a b o u t
7 6 8 7 6 — 11
to o
by
th e
th e
r e c k o n in g s
$250.
to
ceded
by
31,
as
31,
The
does
th e ir
several
th e
R e p a r a tio n
vary,
and
th e
G erm an s
a
th e
th e
com e
as
la r g e
C o m m is s io n ,
th e
lo w
coal
IV.
V.
A
ta k e s
1 ,5 8 0 .0 0 0
(sc ra p ),
fr o m
th e
200, 000
eco
69, 337
a c t ______________________________
126. 29 5
e x p e n d itu r e s
of
A ls a c e -L o r r a in e ,
a g re e m e n t,
g u a r a n tie s
to
th e
e t c .,
PAYM ENTS
AND
D E L IV E R IE S .
19.
In te rn a l
(th e
c o sts
of
e x te rn a l
in
G erm an
th e
o c c u p a tio n
p a id
by
sta te
m ark
of
th e
N avy
by
w ith o u t
m et
to
by
3 .4
R e p a r a tio n
th e
pow ers
m ark
d e liv e r ie s
b illio n
in
g o ld
o c c u p y in g
ad van ces—
k in d .
m ark s
T h ese
on
A p r.
and
and
th e
o th e r
s u b s titu tio n s
in
and
or
(i.
e .,
s u b s titu te d )
d e liv e r ie s
of
of
m a c h in e s,
to
th e
Scapa
in
A llie s
F lo w ,
T s in g tn u
188
of
e x c lu s iv e
but
of
in c lu s iv e
ceded
to
th o se
of
8 0 1 ,0 0 0
in
90, 000
m a
to o ls ,
a n i m a l s — e s t i m a t e ----------------------------------------------- -----------
d e liv e r e d
186,
C o m m is s io n
c o m m i s s i o n s ___________________________________________________
e q u ip m e n t
6 0 3 ,0 0 0
advances
1 9 2 2 ) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
in te rn e d
The
in s ta n c e
and
G erm an y
a m o u n ted
R e s titu tio n s
22.
in c lu d in g
c o s t s o f o c c u p a t i o n — i. e ., t h e e x p e n s e s .
fir st
te r r ito r y ,
C ost
R ep ara
400, 000
v e s s e ls
th e
m a r in e
J a p a n — a r tic le s
184,
t r e a t y ______________ _________________________________
1 ,4 1 7 ,0 0 0
T o t a l ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 ,3 7 1 ,0 0 0
in
in c lu d e
V.
th e
coal
as
th e
w h ic h
at
28.
M ilita r y
E X P E N D IT U R E S
d is a r m a m e n t
e s tim a te —
aged
or
m is s io n ,
m arket
der,
no
c r e d ite d
th o u sa n d
m a te r ia l
revenu e
recovery
OTHER
r e s titu te d
d e liv e r e d
G erm an
w ar
C l e a r i n g ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and
Saar
PAYMENTS.
o th e r
p e n s io n
s h ip s ,
w ith in
on
a n i
to o ls ,
1 9 2 1 __ ___________________________________________
(w a r
te r ia l
la t te r
G erm an s
CASH
and
of
c r e d ite d
m in im u m .
c o m m is s io n
under
a
2 ,3 3 3 ,6 0 0
th e
b y -p r o d u c ts ,
m a c h in e ry ,
p a in tin g s ,
dam aged
E n g lis h
in
m a r in e ,
coal
w ith
18.
72
p a id
G erm an
fig u r e s
tim e s
reck on
at
not
be
and
1 9 22 ;
are
G erm an s
a
a c co u n t,
1922.
w h ic h
to
m erch ant
ta k e n
D ecem ber
c o m m is s io n
th e
th e
h e r e w ith
be
C o m m is s io n ;
g iv e n
lis te d
m ay
abroad ,
lo w ;
p r ic e ,
m in e s ,
am ount
accordan ce
164, 368
te r a llie d
has
in
6. 020. 391
p r i c e ) ____ ______
2, 140, 000
c o sts
G erm an y
m ark et
T o t a l _________________________________________________________________________
.
th e
m a x im u m
A u gu st
R e p a r a tio n
p r o v is io n a l
coun t
to
b ecause
p resen t
a
w h ic h
liq u id a te d
th e
are
as
paym en£s
p a y m e n ts
of
o th e r
p r ic e ;
a ll
Saar
th e re fo r e
regarded
sta te m e n t,
p ro p e rty
p u r v ie w
th e
p a id
w hat
been
e t c . ) ________________ __________________________
20.
p r e c is e ly
V e r s a ille s ,
as
W e
m ay
C o m m is s io n
of
su ch
u n s e t t le d .
w h ic h
fo r m e r
"
of
d e te r m in e
bad
w a terw a y s,
b o a t s ____________ _______ _________
(w o r ld
p r o d u c ts,
c o m m itte e ,
21.
to
in la n d
2 ,2 3 8 .4 3 3
A m e rica n
em b argo
s h ip s o f
L o u v a in ,
and
s a n c tio n s
In
con
X V .
W h a t
im p o s s ib le
of
c u sto m s
g u a ra n ty
80,
is
an
in
f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e -----------------------------------------------------------------
d estro y ed
fr o m
are
G erm an *
in
F r a n c o -G e r m a n
(See Exhibit 2 1 : Conditions o f armistice.)
It
v e s s e ls
e s t i m a t e ________________________________________________________________________
n o tific a tio n .
E X H IB IT
of
r iv e r
III.
c h ie f.
r e fu se d
D en
62 0, 5T 6
borne
h ou rs
d is tr ic t,
th e
c o m m is
a u th o r ity
r a il
(in c lu s iv e
1 1 ,1 1 3 ,0 0 0
P a y m e n ts
fix e d ,
b est
o th e r
e t c . ) __________
13.
execu
e x e c u tio n .
under
under
to
above
th e
m o to r
T o t a l _________________________________________________________________________
c o n tr a c tin g
th a t
w ith in
in te r n a tio n a l
s h a ll
th e
th e
M cm el
in s ta n c e ,
w ood s,
to
o p tio n
of
d e n u n c ia tio n
c o n v e n tio n
p erm an en t
w ith
o f any
u n d ersto o d
e x e c u tio n
th is
c o m m is s io n
naval
by
is
c a r r y in g
of
30
w arrant
in s u ffic ie n t
bad
T h is
and
d en oun ced
s h a ll
of
be
o f e x e c u tio n
n o tic e .
e x e c u tio n
p r in c ip le
a d m itte d .
be
18
is
fa ilu r e
(fo r
fo r
n o t,
of
r e c o n s tr u c tio n
te rm s
15.
or
s ig n a tu r e
a fte r
a r m is tic e
p r e v io u s
grou n d
assu m e
d itio n s ,
s io n
h ou rs’
a r t ic le s
to
th e
p e r io d , o n
a r m is tic e
48
a r m is tic e
of
th is
fo r
G ov
retu rn
m a te r ia ls
and
b y -p r o d u c ts
p h a r m a c e u tic a l
v e s s e ls
G erm an
in
and
te r r ito r ie s
w h ic h
b o a ts,
m a ls ,
th e
D enm ark,
th e ir
on
e q u ip m e n t,
12.
w ith
p a r ts,
sto ck ,
ceded
(in c lu s iv e
and
n o m ic
34.
v e s s e ls
and
C oal
r o llin g
th e
e x c lu s iv e
p la c e d )
th e
accordan ce
reserve
E u p e n - M a l m e d y ) ______________________________________
O c e a n -g o in g
11.
p e r m itte d
in
w a ters
c a n c e le d .
of
10.
In
in c lu d in g
S ile s ia ,
and
14.
su ch
are
U pper
a r m is tic e
n o tify
G o v e r n m e n ts o f
G erm an
a ll
e q u ip m e n t
m ark,
a llie d
r e c ip r o c ity .
to
of
and
be a b a n d o n ed .
b e lo n g in g
w ith o u t
tru ck s,
are
r e s to r a tio n .
a s s o c ia te d
tra n sfe r s
e x te n d .
d e liv e r e d
Sea
w a r lik e
2 9 , 394. 000
It, PAYM
ENTS A D D VBRIKS P O N
N EU
R M ATIO AL CAPITAL A D
N
N
C R E T PR D C N
URN
O U TIO .
te rm s,
A m e ric a ;
a ll
are
150. OO0
8. P r iv a t e a n d p u b lic c o b le s ___________________________________
70 4 10
4. N o n m ilit a r y p ro p e rty le ft In th e t e r r it o r y e v a c u a te d by
1, 897 , 150
th e G e rm a n tro o p s on th e w estern f r o n t ---------------------5. R a ilr o a d a n d p o n to o n b rid g e s o v e r th e K iiin e ( p a r t b e
lo n g in g to B a d e n ) _________________________________________
9 .6 1 1
6. S h a re s o f th e M o r o c c o S ta te B a n k a n d v a lu e o f th e
s to c k s a n d b on d s d e liv e r e d In a c c o r d a n c e w ith a r t ic le
2 60 o f th e p ea ce t r e a t y ------------------------------------------------------392. 0 13
7. O erm u n p r o p e r t y liq u id a te d a b r o a d _______________________ 1 1 , 7 4 0 ,0 0 0
8. G e r m a n y ’s c la im s on h e r fo r m e r a llie s ce d e d In a c
c o r d a n c e w ith the p e a ce t r e a t y _____________ __________
_
8. 600 , OG0
R u s s ia n
a ll
B la c k
of
r e le a s e d ;
th o se
in
by
U n ite d
to
resto red
of
r e s tr ic tio n s
p r iv a te
fla g
Saar
s h a ll
o th e r
a ir c r a ft,
a ll
in
2.
S ta te s.
G erm an y
and
and
G erm an y
G erm an
s h ip s
or
a ll
and
by
im m e d ia te ly
No
and
e v a cu a te d
s e iz e d
S ta te s
p a r tic u la r ly
n e u tra l
and
and
th e
a rm a m e n ts,
be
G overnm en t
s p e c ific c o n c e s s io n s ,
33.
and
lig h te r s ,
s p e c ifie d
p ow ers are
su rren d er,
or
of
c o n c e n tra te d
s e iz e d
s e iz e d
as
U n ite d
H o lla n d , t h a t
w ith
and
m erch ant
A llie s
p r o v is io n in g
in la n d
A llie s
v e s s e ls
G erm an
and
a llie d
as n ecessary.
A llie s
and
to
k in d s
d e s tr u c tio n
ern m ent
any
th e
No
w o r ld ,
are
v e s s e ls
th e
The
fo r
rrrn s
p o r ts
and
32.
are
a ll
The
c o a sts
tu g s,
th e
G erm an
5. 507. 6 1 6
a r m is tic e
m erch an t
e v a c u a tio n ,
be
th e
B e lg ia n
d e s c r ip tio n s
over
a sso c ia te d
31.
and
a ll
m a te r ia ls
A llie s
ca p tu re .
th e
to
by
s h ip s ,
m a te r ia ls
m erch ant
A ll
are
th e
Sea
of
G erm an
to
by
a ll
1. P ro p e r t y o f th e R eich a n d o f th e S ta te s ( e x c lu s iv e
of
E u p e n -M a lm cd y ,
A ls a c e -L o r r a in e ,
and
th e
c o l o n i e s ) ________________________ ______ _____________________
Add:
P r o p e r t y o f th e R e ic h and o f the S ta te s In
U u p e n - M u l m c d y ___ _________________________ _____________
k in d s .
handed
30.
to
up
and
r e c o g n iz e d
s p e c ifie d
sto re s,
o f a ll
n eu tra l
and
a ll
and
A ll
o th e r
be
m erch ant
v e s s e ls
be
a ir c r a ft
to
m a te r ia ls ,
m a te r ia ls
w ar
e x te n t
e v a c u a tin g
abandon
lia b le
c o n s id e r a tio n
naval
set
unchanged
r e m a in
to th e
bases
c o n d itio n s
r e m a in
G o ld m a r k s
(In th o u s a n d s ).
G er-
to
p ow ers.
In to
ito tn iw l,
G erm an
I. D M K tK P M MITEM
E V R H IIO
At.S O H D AN C SSIO O PROPB T
N AN
O E
N P
UT
W IN TUB R ICH A D A R A .
ITH
E
N BOD
r ig h t
In d ic a te d .
g iv e n
n e u t r a lit y
and
th e
o u ts id e
be
a s s o c ia te d
w ith in
q u e stio n
have
to
to
C a tte g a t
any
a ll
are
B a ltic
arm a
sh ore.
G erm an y
The
p o r ts
m ilita r y
s h a ll
b a tte r ie s ,
th e
G erm an
th e
o f A m e rica
o b s tr u c tio n s
w ith o u t
p o s itio n s
fr o m
by
and
fo r tific a tio n s ,
en tra n c es
m in e s
w a te rs
th e
fo r ts ,
th e
le a v e
put on
o f th e se
fr o m
m a r in e o f th e a llie d
G erm an
k i n d s in
be
la id
th e p o s itio n s
to
to
and
A m e rica
o b s tr u c tio n s
c u r e th is , th e A llie s a n d th e U n ite d S ta te s
o f a ll
read y
w ir e le s s ,
ac
g o ld
i.
arm y,
d estro y ed ,
s o ld
m o s tly
scrap
e .,
to
w ere
th e
LOSSES
W IT H IN
GERM ANY.
of
s a le s
of
s c r a p ),
undam
navy,
or
a ir
m a te r ia l
d e liv e r e d
to
th e
R e p a r a tio n
w h o le
in
AND
(e x c lu s iv e
or
broken
G erm an y,
A llie s .
c r e d ite d
to
th e
The
up
to
th e
proceeds
y ie ld
c a p ita l
of
fr o m
accou nt
C om
h ig h e st
A v h ich
th e
b id
w ere
s a le s
(v id e
of
su pra
1 4 ) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------
6 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0
U U O v J a u
C O N G R E S S I O N A L RECORD.
G o ld
(in
14.
In d u s tr ia l
25.
N o n m ilita r y
m a te r ia l
le ft
e v a c u a te d
te r r ito r y
on
th e
of
p le b is c ite s ,
16 .
M is c e lla n e o u s
tie r s ,
(c o sts
care
of
re fu g e e s,
th e
G erm an
e a ste rn
e t c .) —
tro o p s
In
2 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0
fr o n
482, 000
T o t a l __________________________________________________________________________
10, 482, 000
▼ SUMMARY.
I.
fr o m
m a te r ia ls
P a y m e n ts
and
d e liv e r ie s
ren t
C ash
on
h a n d ________________________________________
fr o m
n a tio n a l
c a p ita l
and
C o u n t r ie s .
.
U n i t e d S t a t e s 1 ..................................................
B r i t i s h E m p i r e *...............................................
F r a n c e » ...................................................................
I t a l y ....................................
J a p a n ..........................................................................
B e l g i u m ....................................................................
O t h e r s ........................................................................
5 9 ,4 9 1
9 5 5 ,1 6 1
1 ,3 2 2 , 70 9
3 9 ,1 0 0
T o t a l ............................................................
2 ,6 3 1 ,1 0 7
29, 394, 000
p a y m e n ts
and
and
2. 140. 0 0 0
d e l i v e r i e s _____________________________________________
lo s s e s
w ith in
59,666
635
6 ,0 3 1
5 9 ,4 9 1
1 ,0 9 7 ,6 2 1
1 ,4 2 5 ,7 6 4
1 9 6 ,8 2 9
6 7 ,9 7 8
1 ,4 6 3 ,4 7 7
1 4 2 ,6 5 8
1 ,7 5 4 , 4 6 5
6 8 ,2 1 6
4 ,4 5 3 ,8 1 8
2 5 4 ,6 4 0
538
2 ,0 4 2
1 1 ,0 0 7 ,2 8 3 t h o u s a n d g o ld m a r k s s t i ll u n p a i d .
* 6 0 ,1 5 9 t h o u s a n d g o ld m a r k s s t i l l u n p a i d .
* 1 5 5 ,6 3 5 t h o u s a n d g o ld m a r k s s t i ll u n p a i d .
p r o d u c t i o n _____________________________________________ ___________________ 1 1 , 1 1 3 . 0 0 0
E x p e n d itu r e s
1 4 1 ,9 2 2
1 0 1 ,0 1 3
1 5 7 ,7 2 3
8 ,9 7 8
1 ,2 0 8 ,2 0 2
1 3 6 ,6 2 7
cur
p a y m e n t s _____________________ _____________________________________________ -
O th e r
In t h o u s a n d g o ld m a rk s.
1, 050, 000
e s t i m a t e ---------------------------------
D e liv e r ie s
in. DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS.
m ark s
th e
fr o n t— e s tim a te —
d e te r m in in g
41
th o u s a n d s ).
d i s a r m a m e n t — e s t i m a t e ________________________________
by
w
vr
l v
3 ,3 7 1 .0 0 0
G e r m a n y ___________________________
T o t a l ___________________________________________________________________________
56, 500, 000
G o ld m a r k s
10, 482, 00 0
(In t h o u s a n d s ).
If
to
o n ie s ,
th is
and
te r r ito r ie s
and
to ta l
of
be
th e
th e
added,
d e liv e r ie s
v a lu e
p u r e ly
fig u r e
w e ll
run s
th e
above
T
The
yet
r e p a r a tio n
a v a ila b le
fr o m
th e
of
A
u b
c o m m is s io n
In
any
F ederal
A ls a c e -L o r r a in e ,
m ilita r y
r e p r e s e n tin g
in
S
fo r m .
are
fo r
B u lle tin
th e
G erm an
v a r io u s
G erm an y’6
f iim a b t
g o ld
c o l
ev a c u a te d
to ta l
p a y m e n ts
1,
On
c a p ita l
On
p o s t-M a y
On
s c h e d u le
c o m p le te ,
fo llo w in g
F ebru ary,
nor
are
s u m m a r ie s ,
PAYM ENTS
1921,
arm y
debt
1928,
are
th e
TO
c o sts
81,
A U G U ST
C e s s io n
to
D a n z ig
(p r o v is io n a l
f i g u r e ) __________________________________
O th e r
of
1921,
arm y
p a y m e n ts
c le a r e s t
and
coal
c o sts
m arks
ad van ces,
ac
to
2, 504, 342
a c c o u n t ___________________________
in s ta llm e n ts
15,
fa llin g
due
O c t.
2 6 8 ,1 9 0
1 9 2 2 ___________________________
1 ,9 5 2 ,9 2 8
1 9 2 2 ------------------------------
3 8 ,0 2 3
g o ld
or
21
In
g o ld
m ark s,
w as
g o ld
m ark s,
w as
per
c e n t,
fo r e ig n
p a id
p a id
or
1 ,5 6 2 ,2 4 4
curren cy; 45
in
k in d ; a n d
in
S ta te
per
34
per
p r o p e r ty
in
th o u sa n d
g o ld
m ark s,
An
fo r
If
II.
th e
a r m is tic e
R o llin g
cost
of
56
th e
PAYM ENTS
IN
expen ses
of
G erm an y
have
of
te r r ito r ie s .
w ar
sto ck
su ch
4 ,5 5 3
317. 804
M o to r
t r u c k s ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 509
F ix e d
r a ilw a y
A g r ic u ltu r a l
cars.
m a t e r i a l ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. 461
m a t e r i a l ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 0 0 ,0 0 0
1, 451
a c t ---------------------------------------------------------
114, 744
P roceeds
of
r e p a r a tio n
A nnex
S h ip s
t o n s ) --------------------------------------------------------------
700, 129
i n s t a l l a t i o n s -----------------------------------------------
4.
of
24, 830
m a t e r i a l _________________________________________________
19, 810
w a te r c r a ft
A nnex
IV
sh eep ,
(9 9 .3 0 0
2 1 ,6 6 4
M is c e lla n e o u s
h orses.
g o a ts,
under
U nder
C o a l,
1 7 5 ,4 3 9
2 4 5 ,6 8 8
A nnexes
and
II
c a ttle ,
2 1 8 ,0 7 0
c r e d it
A nnex
I V ------------------------------------------------
and
110, 268
lig n ite
(a c tu a l
to n n a g e
k i l o g r a m s ) -----------------------------------------------------
p ro d u c ts
( 7 5 3 ,7 7 5
k i l o g r a m s ) ---------------------
G erm an
fo l
m a in ta in e d
per
about
g iv e
G erm an
m ark s
annual
cent
by
of
th e
th e
“ G erm an
fo llo w in g
fa ilu r e
su m m ary
of
o ffe r
peace
by
M ay
d e le g a tio n
1,
1926,
at
aud
V er
8 0 ,0 0 0 ,-
p a y m e n ts.
p roposal
D o c to r
1921.
fo r
of
fin a l
s e ttle m e n t
G erm an
la b o r
fo r
p resen ted
at
r e c o n s tr u c tio n
S im o n ’s
p rop osa l
of
m ark s,
g o ld
w ith
paym ent
of
in te r e s t
a
at
to ta l
5
per
to
G erm an
to
be
n o te
a m o r tiz e d
to
in
th e
A m e ric a n
accordan ce
G overnm en t
w ith
an
In d ex
pro
fig u r e
p r o sp e r ity .
28,
1922.
R e p a r a tio n
M ay
28,
P la n s
fo r
fis c a l
re fo r m s
and
p a y m e n ts,
su b
C o m m is s io n .
1922.
N ovem ber,
F u r th e r
8.
J anu ary,
lig n ite to
2,
p r o p o s a ls
su b m itte d
to
R e p a r a tio n
Com
In
U n ite d
c o n v e rte d
S ta te s
4 0 ,0 3 7
1 2 ,8 1 3
49, 000
( 2 ,5 2 5 ,3 1 4
A llia n c e
G erm an
buyers
to
p r o p o s a ls
by
g ra n te d
Cuno
su b m itte d
to
R e p a r a tio n
B e r lin .
P r o p o s a ls
P o in c a lr g
1928.
th e
p a id
50, 074
( 6 2 0 , 8 0 5 k i l o g r a m s ) -------------
T o t a l __________ ________________________________________________________________
to
th e re fo r e
8 ,0 2 0
8, 8 1 8 , 5 4 2
th e
K a rl
h im
B ergm ann ,
no
not
o ffic ia lly
su b
a u d ie n c e .
p r o p o s a ls .
G o v e r n m e n t ’s
to ta l
fir s t p h a s e
la r g e
X V I.
su m s—
an
end.
an
c e s s a tio n
of
fo rm a l
a ll
o f r e p a r a tio n s d u r in g
p r o b a b ly
It
m ay
up
be
a p p r o p r ia te
to
th a t
th e
no
m om ent
announcem ent
p a y m e n ts,
w h ic h
fu ll
m ore
fo r
of
in c lu d in g
G erm an y
lim it
of
her
ever
w ill
be
r e v ie w in g
its
bank
d e liv e r ie s
In
c o n tin u o u s ly
c a p a c ity — h a s
p a id .
and
T h is
e s tim a tin g
is
her
p a s t p e r fo r m a n c e .
m in d
of
e s tim a te s
c la im s
th a t
h e a d lin e s
4, 564
G erm an
and
k in d , th e
of
( 2 ,8 4 1 ,4 9 7
k i l o g r a m s ) _________________________________________________________________
1 1 ----------- 6
230
m e tr ic
t o n n a g e ------------------------------------
T e x tile
F u r th e r
v is it
W H A T G E R M A N Y H A S P A ID ---- K E Y N E S .
W ith
The
L u xem bu rg
its
1923.
becau se
M ay
1922.
d u r in g
m itte d
C o m m is s io n :
3 ,4 0 0 ,3 8 7
to
th e
5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
to ta l,
Janu ary
com e
c a b l e s -----------------------------------------------------------
coke, an d
of
24,
sam e
ru p tcy
C o a l,
10870—
A p r il
7.
22, 855
R e p a r a tio n
D y e stu ffs
of
it
d is t r ic t s .)
1921.
80, 970
c o a l ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
V II :
to
u rad e
we
E X H IB IT
s u s p e n s e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
by
D y e stu ffs
c e ssio n s
a r m ie s )
770, 618
of
M i s c e l l a n e o u s __________________________________________________________________
to n s ;
86
curren t
OFFERS.
th a t
g o ld
G eneral
metric
in
P h a r m a c e u tic a l
S u b m a r in e
fro m
c o m m is s io n s
th a n
m arks
of
4 1 ,0 1 9 ,4 3 2
converted tonnage, 4 5 ,7 6 0 ,0 5 3
(1 7 ,3 6 3 ,9 9 0
A nnex
of
r e p e titio n
1,
v a lu e
0.
1 5 7 ,0 7 3
V I :
D y e stu ffs
N o te
1920.
d e v a sta te d
C o m m is s io n
p o u l t r y ) ---------------------------------
t o n s ) ____________________________________________________________________________
B y -p r o d u c ts
p a id
w o u ld
g o ld
out
o c c u p y in g
m ore
been
A llie s ”
n o n in te r e s t -b e a r in g
9.
coke,
m etric t o n s ;
C o a l,
1919.
12,
M arch
m itte d
V :
A nnex
and
p a id
It
m is s io n .
R e c o n s tr u c tio n
L iv e s to c k
and
:
a r m ie s
have
2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
(In c lu d e d
p o s in g
5.
gross
b e in g
th e
th a t
p a id
7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0
of
fo o d
c e n t.
III :
( 2 ,5 9 3 ,0 5 7
I n la n d
recovery
In
J u ly
c a p ita l
22. 709
L i b r a r y ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
L o u v a in
29,
o ffe r e d
o f th e
th e
been
w as
cent
fo r
adds
He
th a n
u se
been
G erm an y 1
sta te m e n ts
to
had
on
has
advances
a g ree m e n t.
to ta l
ab sorb ed
fro m
th e
p a id
p r o p o s a ls :
s a ille s
3.
lo o s e
p r o p o s a ls
M ay
Spa.
m a t e r i a l __________________________________ ____________
( 1 2 7 .0 3 9
m any
m ake
1.
(In t h o u s a n d s ) .
e x a cte d
to ta l
th is
per
th e
and
Spa
co m m e n ts
B u lle tin
th e
m ore
of
35
in
of
o c c u p a tio n
th e
w ith o u t
th e
th e
of
cent
r e m a in in g
R eserve
cent
o c c u p a tio n
G E R M A N Y 'S
th ou san d
K IN D .
th e
per
under
of
per
e ffe c te d
p a y m e n ts
F ederal
39
a r m ie s
cent
65
(th e
of
m ade
per
o n ly
th e
th a t
th a t
So
8 2 6 ,6 5 3
S a le s
expen se
m in e r s
p r o p e r ty
heavy
2 ,5 0 4 ,3 4 2
l o c o m o t i v e s ) ----------------
U nder
In
out
A llie s
th e
c e n t,
c o n v e n tio n :
A bandoned
U nder
th e
Ruhr
to ta l
S ta te
w r ite r
p o in tin g
by
tire
2.
U nder
fig u r e s ,
p r o d u c tio n
w as
m arks
503, 289
44, 350
S in c e
to
or
3 0 5 ,5 1 4
a sse ts :
7, 397, 553
ab sorb ed
th o u sa n d
ceded
u n d is tr ib u te d
3 0 0 ,0 0 0
1 ,7 3 0 ,5 8 2
1 9 2 1 ____________________________________________________________
p a id .
3 ,8 1 8 ,5 4 2
th e
f i g u r e ) _______________________
1 9 2 1 ______________________________________________________________
1,
anonym ous
th e se
c e n t, o r
G o ld
U nder
1,
and
7 ,3 8 5 .1 2 8
to ta l
15,
su spen se
(p r o v is io n a l
T o t a l _____________________________________________________________________________
lo w s
Aug.
in
have
2 ,0 2 1 ,0 5 0
a c co u n t:
due
th is
U nder
ite m s
th ey
(J „ t h o u s a n d s ).
1922.
a c c o u n t _________________________________________ ______________
1,
in s ta llm e n ts
in
f i g u r e ) ________________________________
ta k e n
T o t a l ___________________________________________________________________________
p a id
(p r o v is io n a l
ab sorb ed
p r e -M a y
O f
P o la n d
P r e -M a y
c o u n t __________________________________________________________________________________
On
Fran ce— S oar
to
P o s t -M a y
G o ld
I.
On
to
m ark s.
a v a ila b le :
On
C e s s io n
C e s s io n
.
not
The
of
th e
1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0
t- m e d
a cco u n ts
s im p le
R eserve
m a te r ia l
A part
Item s,
n a m e ly ,
sh e
th a t
fr o m
th ere
th e
th e
p u b lic
has
have
been
w h ic h
has
sh e
a lr e a d y
h a s p a id
d iffe r e n c e s
arc
to ta l
tw o
of
sets
fin a n c ia l
been
e x tr e m e ly
c u rre n t,
p a id
m ore
n o th in g a t
o p in io n
of
as
fig u r e s
b urd en
c o n fu se d
v a r y in g
th a n
fro m
by
th e
v a r ie ty
G erm an
£ 2 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
to
o ffic ia l
p ress
a ll.
to
th e
w h ic h
th ro w n
e s tim a tio n
have
on
been
G erm an y
of
p a r tic u la r
d is tin g u is h e d ,
by
th e
peace
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
42
tre a ty
and
tre a ty
to w a rd
on
th e
G erm any
not
a lth o u g h
fo r
o th e r
ite m s
cost
to
G erm an y.
and
d e liv e r e d
N ow
if
m e e tin g
jf
we
m u ch
are
her
are
m e th o d
of
th e
tre a ty
y ie ld s
to
as
as
th e
of
tow ard
w h ic h
fo r
th e
v a lu e
th an
w hat
c a l
of
th e ir
real
has
p a id
sh e
c r e d ite d
to
her
in
o r th e p u n is h m e n t im p o s e d
p rogress
G erm an y
la t te r
fig u re
of
e ffo r t
needed
has
a lo n e
to
m ade
is
to w a rd
r e le v a n t,
carry
but
her
bu rd en s
h e r i t is th e fo r m e r fig u r e w h ic h
on
to
th e
us
b e g in
R e p a r a tio n
th e
e s tim a te
c a te g o r ie s :
0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
m a tters.
fo r m
coal
le a s t
a
fu r th e r
r a tio n
and
in
su m s
C o m m is s io n
th e
I
at
(u n d e r
s t ill
us
coal
a llo w
t h e ir
and
th e ir
it
w o u ld
in
th e m
by
If
is
th e
e s tim a te d
been
w h ic h
th e
G erm an
a
G erm an
ceded
S ta te
liv e r ie s ,
G erm an
m is s io n
Thus
th e
ren d ers,
w ith o u t
of
tio n
m ay
be
a ll
sto ck .
It
th e
som e
m ent
as
of
be
of
th e
tre a ty
to
th e
know n
and
th e
not
to n
th a t
th e
a llie d
by
to
c a n t ile
v a lu e s
a c c r u in g
S in c e
so
o ffe re d
a fte r
fig u r e
som e
to
is
7 6 8 7 6 — 11
th e
v a lu a t io n ,
de
Com
has
The
e s tim a te
if
is
fo r
on
th e
le s s
and
to
is
th a n
Saar
one
has
say,
o f th e
to
n o th in g )
at
a
in c lu d e
p r iv a te
th e
im p o v e rish
th e
r u b b is h
is
D.
on
of
th e
Saar
h er ow n
to
in g
The
d e s tr u c tio n
ju s tic e .
It
p a r tly
It
c h a ra c te r
th e
th e
of
s h o u ld
depends
a r e ta k e n
a llie s
h as,
b u s in e s s
per
of
of
r e p a r a tio n
a sse ts,
G erm an y’s
r e p a r a tio n
fo r a p e r io d
o f le ss
m in e s
th e
th a n
s ix
p e r p e tu a lly
up
we
ite m
m ay
th a t
is
not
N o one,
a
by
fa ir ly
to
le s s th a n
a g a in s t
to
th e
lo w e r
fig u r e
th e
h a lf th e
£ 2 4 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
c o u ld
A llie s
th an
of
put
(w h ic h
th is .
th e
th e
F rench
th e
to
1923
d is p u te ,
s h o u ld
th a t
sh e
be
sh e
lik e
has
f in d
fille d
an
w ith
c h e a te d
h er
of
th e
is £ 3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
to o
h ig h
not
cost
to o
th e
and
th is
p e r io d
to
In
ord er
by
of
is
and
th e
M c
£ 1 ,2 9 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
fig u r e ,
a llo w
to a la t e r d a te .
th is ,
one
or
T h ere
tw o
G erm an y’s
ite m s ,
p r e -w a r
h e r w a r lo a n s
cou rse o f ev en ts,
of
an
th e
W a s h in g to n ,
my
r e g a r d in g
lo s s
reach
o p e n in g
M o u lto n
w ith
up
d is c h a r g e
to
b e fo r e
w r ite r s
to
su r
pou n ds,
agrees
by
to
and
b illio n
E c o n o m ic s
us
G erm an y
a r m is tic e
th e se
of
to
o b lig a t io n
a
Pay,
v a lu e le s s
pounds
v a lu e
in
“ good
th a t
th ro w n
and
her
w ill ”
e n o r m o u s ly
we
F rench
fa c ts,
charges
her
is
on
can
and
in
p e o p le in
broad
th in g
th a t
c r e d ito r s .
w ar
her
paym ent
of
fo u r
fo r e ig n
fo r e ig n
in v e st
G erm an
e q u iv a le n t
a fte r
p r o s p e r ity
th a t
fo r
h er
th e
th e
Judge
her
rem em ber
th e
of
e ffo r t
of
th e
ev en t,
th e
by
G erm an
1873.
th a t
and
T h ese
of
th e
G erm an y
h is to r y
b u lk
th a t
r e la tiv e
1919,
on
by
we
in
th e
o u tlin e s
of
c e r ta in
G erm an y
lia b ilit ie s ,
If
th an
and
th e
in
b urd en
resou rces
e a s ily
fo r
F ran ce
c le a r
m ore
w e a lth
th e
real
a n o th e r
it
and
G erm an y
W ar.
p r e v io u s
in ta c t,
th e
a
e x h a u s tin g
w ay
had
m oney
and
re p re se n ts
m ost
one
on
of
1871
F r a n c o -G e r m a n
o u tr a g e o u s
evaded
th e
e s tim a te
p r o b a b ly
of
a d d itio n
th e
in d e e d
th e
her
s in c e
ap pears
is
th e
in
to
en orm ou s
in
a lm o s t
th e se
and
lo s s .
her
c a lc u la tio n
b etw ee n
F ran ce
th e
as
abroad
o r g a n iz a tio n .
th e
e ffe c ts
and
of
it is
has
of
c a lc u la t io n s
In
d o u b le
re p re se n te d
fa c e
to
a lm o s t
m y
an
of
in
bur
d im in is h e d
fin a n c ia l
exceeded
In s titu te
w h ic h
chan ge
F ran ce
th e
in d e m n ity ,
th e
but
£ 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
ren d ered
and
lo s t
G erm an
£ 6 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 — a n d
and
d a te
has
e s tim a te
been
fo u g h t
to
have
G erm an y,
p e r io d
liq u id a te d
th e
C a p a c ity
to ta l.
a fte r
c o m p a r a tiv e
In
th e
th is
th e
d iffe r e n c e s
th a n
w hereas
has
th a t
had
m ade
I carry
been
of
£ 5 8 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 — T a r d ie u
v a lu e ,
lia b ilit ie s
Ruhr
has
by
p o p u la tio n
had
and
pay
I
course,
fo r
and
m e n ts
and
assu m e,
m easu re
I th in k ,
v a lu e
ite m
is
at
p r o p e r ty
reach es
1922,
th e
have
had
p e o p le in
b u ilt
c a p ita l
n et
th e
net
to
R u s s ia , T u r k e y , a n d A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y , a n d
m ore
G erm an y
th e
sh e
£ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
head
y ears
m er
up
£ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
in s tr u c tiv e
G erm an
30,
c o n n e c tio n s
and
fig u r e
th e
of
a
The
S ta te s),
th is
G o v e rn m en t’s
abroad
p resen t
b e tw e e n
G e r m a n y ’s
som e
of
A llo w in g
w e a lth
th e
o p in io n
c o r r e s p o n d in g
m ake
Is
w h o le
pays
on
w ere
n a m e ly ,
tre a ty
of
fig u r e
th e fa c t th a t
her
th e
p u b lis h e d
h ow ever,
th e re
of
h er
su m s
S e p te m b e r
fo r
are,
m in e s , a n d
p la c e d
th e
to
on
m in e s
to n
fo r
on
per
it
G erm an
been
e x te n t
a p p lie d
t h e ir
le n t
th e
th e
th a t
U n ite d
to
c le a r ly
d u r in g
be
fro m
w o r k in g
have
th is
a llie s — o r
th e
apart
to
lia b ilit ie s
can
in
of
p r e -w a r v a lu e .
tre a ty
v o lu m e ,
la t e ly
C.
up
of
m eet
e s tim a te ,
to
v a lu a tio n
The
th e
v a lu e
has
as
e x te n t
p r e v io u s ly
h er
th o u g h
h ig h e r,
v a lu e
o f its
th e
m in e s
th e
(a s
c a p ita l,
liq u id a te d
lit tle
am
th e
d e b ts,
Saar
£ 3 9 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 — a s
th e
of
as
of
I
b a s is
lia b ilit ie s .
fo rm e r
th e ir
e m e r g e n c ie s ,
la r g e .
o c c u p a tio n
s tr ik in g — th e
b etw ee n
d e liv e r ie s
tre a ty .
fro m
if w e
th e
w h ic h
e x a g g e r a tio n s ,
th e
e q u ip
m easu re
m o n th .
been
of
in v e s t m e n ts in
in te r e s t
th e
th a n
by
d is tin c t
in d u s tr ia l
th a n
re p re se n t its
th e
G u ir e ,
to
I
to
under
ren d er
d a te
up.
e ffo rts
re la te
c r o s s -e x a m in a tio n ,
to
term s
as
of
su m
her
v a lu a b le
a
a p p lie d
p a y m e n ts
m u ch
th e
to
m easure
b ank rup t
v a lu a tio n .
s a m e a u th o r ity
R epara
a
o b je c ts — o f
o b n o x io u s
pay
p o s s ib le
G erm an y
n a tu r a lly
th e
th e
s h ip p in g v a lu a t io n
p la c e d
th e
of
of
th e y
s h ip p in g
o u tr a g e o u s
v a lu a t io n
a ll
as
tre a ty
of
C o m m is s io n
of
in
not
th e
to
th e
s u r p lu s
G erm an y’s
of
of
n il.
a lto g e th e r .
and
to
rep re
is
p roceed s
d is c h a r g e
any
d e b ts.
it
c o n fid e n c e
The
o n ly
le ss
On
in
liq u id a te d
w h ile
5.
liq u id a tio n
th e
d im in is h in g
p ro p e rty
in te n d e d
s in c e
c la im e d
d a te
th e
e x p la in e d ,
e q u ip m e n t in to
one
of
th e
rem oved
u n d o u b te d ly
d e b ts
and
s e iz e d
p r iv a te
but
£ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
p r iv a te
a
Sum s
c o lo n ie s
and
of
m u ch
le s s
(1 )
s h ip s
s e iz e d
4, and
N e v e r t h e le s s ,
a g a in s t
a
3.
tre a ty
th e
p r o p e r ty
G erm an
c h a r a c te r .
of
p art
fo r e ig n
it
2,
tre a ty
am ount
very
th e
e s tim a te d
h ig h
re
G erm an y
A ls a c e -L o r r a in e ;
a llie d
v a lu e
G erm an y
th e
in
a m o u n t o f c a s h p a y m e n t s u n d e r th e c le a r in g -h o u s e s y s t e m
it
su r
be
o f th e
none
G erm an
d is c h a r g e
arou nd
to
p r ic e
th u s
as
are
of
and
ten d en cy
th a t
th e
le ss
be
of
h ow ever,
per
th a t
in ,
m ake
fig u r e s
v a lu e
can
on
term s
£ 8 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
w ith o u t
but
on
con cern .
reserves
in
G erm an
lo s s
in
a
th is
a lm o s t
th e
c a lle d
in d e p e n d e n t
correct
say
are,
th a t
but
d e b ts
at
g o in g
fa c t
th e A llie s , w h ic h
term s
its
a
a r m is tic e
m a r in e ,
c o a l,
v a r io u s
th is
are
(2 )
p ro p e rty
ite m s
a p p lie d
and
s o ld
to
d iffe r e n c e
to
as
The
of
net
p r iv a te
c a p a c ity
on
C o m m is s io n ,
and
th e
been
th e
U pper
of
th e fo llo w in g :
(5 )
m arket
of
th r o w n
been
p la c e d
a r m is tic e
can
not
se q u e stra te d
den,
a
th e
but
s p e c ific
is
d iffe r e n t
n a tio n a ls — u n d e r
have
ow n ers
of
been
liq u id
£ 3 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 ;
tim e s
th e
d e s tr u c tio n
v a lu a t io n
th e
fo r
c ritic is m
u nder
th e
are
not
been
G overnm en t
a
7
have
its
ite m s,
d is c h a r g e
has
ite m
som ew h ere
th e
her
c u r r e n t a t th e d a te o f d e liv e r y
th e
th e
G erm an
G erm an y
cases
at
su rren d er
c la im e d — t h a t
c r e d ite d
cost
th e
th ro w n
at
th e se
of
G erm an y
e s tim a te
and
ow n
of
th ro w n
p ro p e rty
te r r ito r y ;
fir s t
fig u r e ,
hag
R e p a r a tio n
concern
d iffe r e n c e
and
v a lu e s
by
by
p a r tic u la r ly
fo r
s u ffic ie n t
in te r e s t b ill
fo r
h er
in
p r ic e
th in k
under
S ta te
p r iv a te
by
th e
6
burden
a sse ts
s u p p lie d
p r o p e r ty
b urd en
a llie s ;
(8 )
r e p la c e m e n t
to
rep resen t
n et
I
C o m m is
goods
G erm an y
r e p a r a tio n ,
fo r m e r
G erm an y
put
th e
im p o r ta n t
G erm an
G erm an y’s
a lm o s t
ite m s
v a lu a tio n
w id e
th a t
is
a llo w in g
bu rd en
can
R e p a r a tio n
th e
curren t
assessed
th e
by
m e r c a n tile
th re e
be
In d e e d ,
The
F ran ce
w e ll illu s t r a t e s
w h ile
th e
th e
of
not
seem
lia b ilit y a s
w eeks,
p a rts
th e
m a r in e
th ey
of
to
I
of
Ite m s
and
m arket
m o s t im p o r ta n t a re
G erm an
r e lia b le
d a ta
a p p lie d
to
th e
w h ic h
th e
in v a d e d
p a y m e n ts
no
ite m s
her
in
(6 )
lo s s
accu racy
or
R e p a r a tio n
R e p a r a tio n
g o in g
to
n o te
p a r tia l
been
th e re a b o u ts)
th e
th e G e rm a n s,
w ith
w o u ld
Two
th e
of
of
R e p a r a tio n
ceded
w o r ld
v a lu e
e s tim a te
s itu a te d ;
th e
v a lu e
real
know
accou nt
Is
by
fro m
(7 )
fa c e
sen ts
th e
cash
£ 7 3 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
to w a rd
th e re
p o rts;
abroad;
th e
real
to ta l,
The
“ r e s titu tio n s ”
enem y
fo r
th e
c e r ta in
a ll
G erm an y
G erm an y
The
fo r
w ith
£ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
a d d itio n
G erm an y.
p r o p e r ty
th e se
of
v a lu e
by
S ile s ia ),
c o n v e r t o r g a n iz e d
m a r in e
are
a
in
to
th e se
on
to
at
S ta te
v a lu a t io n , £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
G erm an
to
as
it
b u s in e s s
th e
d is c r e p a n c y
The
t h a t th e d is c r e p a n c y
s lu m p
becau se
to
by
u p on w h e th e r th e b oom
or
fo r
o th e r
C o m m is s io n ,
p a rty ,
w o rth
o b je c t s ,
b etw ee n
s h ip p in g
(o r
assessed
th a n
th is
b etw ee n
m a r in e .
m e r c a n tile
be ad d ed
S ta te
p r e sc r ib e d
£ 7 9 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
e ith e r
is
th is
and
p la c e d
c la im e d
G erm an
of
G erm an y.
d e fin ite
d iffe r e n c e
of
G erm an y,
c a lc u la te d
£ 1 2 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
m ore
e sse n tia l
but
upon
m e r c a n tile
and
b etw ee n
U pper
c o n s is te n t
V e r s a ille s .
o f o u tp u t
of
R epa
com e
ow ed
(4 )
o c c u p a tio n ,
c o n s e r v a tiv e
coun t
charge
C r e d its
£ 3 9 1 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
h ead s.
now
To
is
c h a r a c te r is tic s — w e
and
by
been
c o n s id e r s w h a t i t is w o r th
m ost
ir o n ,
of
v a lu e
r e p a r a tio n
had
£ 2 0 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
a d o p te d .
q u ite
w h a te v e r it to u ch e s
one
th e
sev era l
R e p a r a tio n
to
d iffe r e n c e
th ro w n
a r m ie s
a
d is c h a r g e
a d d itio n a l
£ 1 7 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
fa ith
p ro p e rty
th e
scrap
th e
fo r m u la
(h a t
v a lu a tio n ,
P art
e q u a lly
m ig h t
v a lu e
b urd en
bad
th e
C o m m is s io n
o th e r
of
fo llo w s :
a d d itio n
th e se
W e
w o rth
th e
in d is p u ta b le
a ls o
C o m m is s io n ,
v a lu a tio n
v a lu a tio n
c o n s id e r s w h a t
in
th e
are
In c lu d in g
C o m m is s io n .
im p u tin g
p r in c ip le s
th e
in
as
under
as
a d v a n c e s ),
£ 1 5 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
garded
£ 2 4 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
G erm an
R e p a r a tio n
by
and
v a lu a tio n ,
G erm an
v a lu a tio n ,
to
a d ju s t m e n t s
d e liv e r ie s
d iffe r e n c e
v a lu a t io n ,
to ta l
th e
se r v ic e s
e s tim a te d
S a a r m in e s , G e r m a n
R e p a r a tio n
£ 5 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
G erm an y
On
and
c r e d it
m ost
£ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
w id e
(n o t
to
F u rth e rm o re ,
m ake
and
T h ere
£ 2 9 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
p r o p e r ty
£ 2 7 5 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
to ta l,
th e n
coal
£ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
£ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 :
in to
£ 1 2 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ;
fu r n is h e d
reckoned
of
G overn m en t
C o m m is s io n
v a lu a tio n ,
we
fa ll
£ 1 8 9 ,-
goods
and
th e
k in d ,
re tu rn e d
S ile s ia ,
th e se
in ste a d
C o m m is s io n a s f o l l o w s : T h e
R e p a r a tio n
If
of
th a t
is
been
of
rep resen t
T h ese
in
a g r e e m e n t).
and
e s tim a te
it e m s
c r e d ite d .
th e re
w as
books
w h ic h
d e liv e r ie s
c o n tr o l.
la r g e s t
v a lu e
p r ic e
and
c o m p u ta tio n .
Spa
U pper
th e
w ill be £ 5 1 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
The
th e
m ark et
have
Ite m s
fo r
v a lu e .
coke.
w o r ld
tre a ty ,
next
real
th e
£ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
in
te r r ito r ie s ,
of
of
h er
g o ld ;
have
to
area
ceded
v a r io u s it e m s , th e t o t a l s u m
Let
any
£ 1 9 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0
c o m m is s io n s
about
b e lo w
on
a b o u t £ 8 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0
has
in
to
In d is p u ta b le
ceded
£ 3 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
th e
p r o p e r ty
th in k ,
are
e ffo r t
advances
w o rth
c r e d ite d
£ 9 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0
O f th e se
of
o c c u p a tio n
h er
p r o p e r ty
h an d , curren cy
at
of
su m s
w h ic h
C ash,
S ta te
£ 4 1 1 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
th e
th e
C o m m is s io n ,
lo w e s t
th ree
w ith
Is
Spa
a r m ie s
S ile s ia ,
by
l^ e t
ta b le
(le s s
do
th e
m easu re
s io n
th e
C o m m is s io n .
w bat
Our
th e
tre a ty
fig u r e
su m
of
im p o s e d
ite m s
accou nt
lo w e r
th e
term s
c o u n tin g
dear
by
G erm an y
th a n
lia b ilitie s ,
th e
ju s t
a
th e
s a c r ific e s
ite m s
r e p a r a tio n
cost
c o n s id e r in g
s e e k in g
th e
p r e sc r ib e d
th e
g re a te r
under
C e r ta in
fr o m
G erm an y
u n d o u b te d ly
R e p a r a tio n
we
cost
th e
Thus
is
c o u n ts
a lt o g e t h e r
p u rp oses
c e r ta in
w h ic h
o f r e p a r a tio n s .
th ey
w h ile
th e
b o o k s o f th e
th is
e x c lu d e d
e x c lu d e d ,
c u la t in g
of
d is c h a r g e
are
r e p a r a tio n s ,
are
p o r tio n
th e
has
th a t
w h ic h
are
s e c tio n s
p a id
by
sta te m e n ts
next
b lu ff
and
not
o f th e
and
to
open
p ress
n o th in g ,
c h ic a n e r y
s u g g e s tio n s
are
u n tru e.
in
J ohn M aynard K kyn » » ,
L ondon
(b y
cable).
a a o o a a iv N O is s a a o N o o
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,
E X H IB IT
M ilita ry
c a s u a ltie s,
z\
43
E X H IB IT X I X .
X V II.
W o r ld
W ar,
e s tim a te d .
C o st o f W o r ld
[Casualties, by number.]
Total
mobilized
forces.
Countries.
Total
casualties
Prisoners
in per
Total
Wound
and
cent of
casualties. missing. casualties.
total mo
bilized.
Killed
and
died.’
ALLIES.
4.950.000 2,500,000
537.000
4.266.000
2,090,212
191,652
600.000
947.000
4,500
4234,300
907
3
80,000
120.000
152,958
133,148
34,659
44,686
1,000
21,000
12,318
13,751
7,000
10,000
12,000.000 1, 700,000
8,410; 000 1,357,800
8,904,4G
7
908,371
5.615.000
650,000
4.355.000 4 126,000
800,000
300
750.000
335,706
707,343
45,000
267.000
13,716
230.000
6,000
100.000
7,222
50,000
3,000
Russia.......
France 2.. .
British Empire2.
Italy....................
United States3. .
Japan. . . . . .
Rumania...
Serbia.........
Belgium___
Greece.........
Portugal___
Montenegro
76.3
73.3
35.8
39.1
8.0
.2
71.4
46.8
34.9
11.7
33.3
40.0
9.150.000
6,160,800
3,190,235
2.197.000
350,300
1,210
535,706
331,106
93,061
27.000
33,291
20.000
52.3
42,188.810 5,152,115 12,831,004 4,121,090 4 22,089,709
Total.
W ar
to p r in c ip a l b e llig e r e n ts , e s tim a te d .
& ross
e x p e n d itu r e s
in c lu d e
in te r g o v e r n m e n t
lo a n s
to ta lin g
$ 2 2 ,0 1 2 ,2 1 4 ,1 2 5 , w h ic h , i f s u b tr a c te d t o a v o id d u p lic a tio n , m a k e n e t
e x p e n d itu r e s o f $ 1 8 6 ,2 3 3 ,6 3 7 ,0 9 7 .
[Source of information: War Costs and Their Financing.]
Country.
Great Britain.................................. .
United States...................................
France...............................................
Russia in Europe..........................
Italy................. .................................
Canada...............................................
Rumania...........................................
Australia..........................................’
Belgium.............................................
India..................................................
Serbia............................................... ’
New Zealand....................................
South African Union......................
Greece.................................................
Crown colonies and dependencies.
Japan.................................................
Other Entente Allies......................
C E N TR AL PO W
E RS.
Per cent
of total.
Cost.
544,029 Oil, 868
32,080 266,968
25, S12; 782,800
21.1
15.4
12.4
22,593; 950.000
10.8
5.9
12,313, 998.000
1,665 576,032
1 , 600; 000,000
.8
.8
.7
1,423: 20S, 040
1 , 154: 467,914
601:279.000
399: 400.000
37s; 7.50.000
300, 000,000
270, 000,000
125, 000,000
40, 000,000
500, 000,000
.6
.3
.2
.2
.1
.1
.1
.2
Total.
145,287,690,622
69.7
Germany.............
Austro-Hungary.
Turkey................
Bulgaria...............
11,000,000 1, 773,700
7.800.000 1,200,000
2.850.000
325,000
1.200.000
87,500
4,216,058 1,152,800
3,620,000 2,200,000
250,000
400,000
27,029
152,390
7,142,558
7,020,000
975,000
266,919
64.9
90.0
34.2
22.2
Germany
iv...........
Austria-Hungary.
Turkey.
Bulgaria................
40,150,000,000
20,622,960,600
1,430,000,000
815,200,000
16.3
Total.
22,850,000 3,386,200
8,388,448 3,629,829
15,404,477
67.4
Total...........
63,018,160,600
30.3
65,038,810 8, 538,315 21,219,452 7,750,919
37,494,186
57.6
Grand total.
208,305,851,222
100.0
Grand total.
1 Includes deaths from all causes.
2 Official figures.
s Includes marines serving with the Army.
4Includes “ died of wounds” (14,500).
E X H IB IT
B a ttle
d ea th s,
U n ite d
S ta te s
A rm y,
X V III.
W o r ld
E X H IB IT
B a y e r is c h e
sp ru ch .
W a r , r e v ise d
to
M ay
1 , 1922.
D r.
D o c u m e n ts
D o c u m e n ts R e la tin g to
P r e -w a r
Aggregate.
D ip lo m a c y .
R e la tin g
1919.
E.
D.
to
13.204 ’ 51,481
302
1,148
48,040
36,751
13,506
Total.
Killed in
action.
Died of
wounds.
Total.
Died of
wounds.
Killed in
action.
Total.
Died of
wounds.
Killed in
action.
35,905
846
F.
F ran ce
E x p la in .
T a lio n is .
1.913
301
T otal.. 1,617
600
2,217
34,548 12,646
258
586
R e v is io n
of
th e
DIVISIO
N
2nd.............
1st...............
3rd..............
82nd...........
4th..............
28th.............
42nd...........
2 6 th ....'....
5th..............
77th.............
27th.............
30th.............
79th.............
78th............
90th.............
89th............
91st.............
82nd...........
35th.............
80th.............
29th.............
87th.............
33d..............
36th.............
93d..............
7th..............
81st.............
85th............
41st.............
92d........
83d..............
8th..............
40th.............
86th.............
89th.............
76th.............
84th.............
88th.............
31st.............
8th..............
87th.............
34th.............
3Sth.............
Total
12,906
w o rth ,
41
50
29
41
32
43
30
23
25
26
11
16
18
17
16
17
17
17
18
14
6
9
10
5
8
2
2
5
3
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1,357
556
133
193
129
131
99
109
88
86
89
94
69
62
57
49
49
51
56
56
48
53
35
28]
37
26
30
9
14
9
5
8
3
4
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1,913
1,796
3,499
2,466
2,075
2,043
2,026
1,933
1,471
1,519
1,371
1 362
l ’ 167
1,079
1 056
l'052
906
1,055
934
972
787
748
726
653
446
435
199
171
128
109
113
72
33
43
33
17
18
19
13
1
2
0
0
0
712
1,223
741
749
717
661
748
676
523
591
390
404
361
379
376
468
310
403
279
381
274
286
285
128
121
86
63
40
56
47
25
47
27
12
16
11
11
10
5
2
3
1
0
2,508
4,722
3,207
2,824
2,760
2 ,6S7
2,681
2,147
2,0-42
1,962
1,752
1,571
1,440
1,435
l'42S
1,374
1,365
1,337
1,251
1,108
1,022
1,012
938
574
556
285
234
168
165
160
97
80
70
45
33
29
30
23
6
4
3
1
0
1,888
3,642
2,566
2,165
2,110
2,092
1.991
1,534
1,583
1,439
1,420
1,213
1,11S
1 088
l ’ 085
940
1,091
973
1,002
826
777
745
680
467
457
206
1*3
132
111
120
74
36
44
33
17
19
19
13
1
2
0
0
0
753 ’ 5,013
1,273
4,915
770
3,336
790
2,955
749
2,859
704
2,796
778
2,769
699
2,233
548
2,131
617
2,056
1 821
401
420
1,633
379
1,497
396
1 484
392
1,477
485
1,425
327
1,421
420
1,393
297
1,299
395
1,221
280
1,057
295
1,040
295
975
133
600
129
586
88
294
65
248
45
177
170
59
48
168
26
100
84
48
27
71
12
45
16
33
30
11
30
11
24
11
5
6
5
3
3
3
1
1
0
0
34,548
12,648
47,196
35,905
13,204 >51,481
E n te n te
7 0 8 7 6 — 11
V o lu m e
I.
V o lu m e I I .
J.
M .
U n w in ,
&
C o .,
London
B a ltim o r e .
K eyn es;
H a rco u rt,
B race
&
C o .,
W o r ld
W ar.
B e t h m a n n -H o lw e g ; T h o r n to n ,
B u tte r-
to
Pay.
M o u lto n
&
M c G u ir e ;
M c G r a w -H ills
Y ork.
D ip lo m a c y
and
th e
W o r ld ,
d e S ie b e r t
K n ic k e r b o c k e r P r e s s ,
Y ork .
Ten
Y ears
o f S e c re t D ip lo m a c y
E.
D . M o r e l ; N a tio n a l L a b o r
P ress,
M a n ch e ste r.
The
F a ls ific a tio n
G eorge
The
B.
W .
A lle n
&
o f th e
U n w in ,
F a ls ific a tio n
N ew
R u s s ia n
of
O ran ge
B ook.
B aron
von
R om berg;
O ran ge
B ook.
B aron
von
R om berg;
London.
o f th e
H u eb sch , N ew
R e c o lle c tio n s
C o .,
R u s s ia n
Y ork.
a
F o r e ig n
M in is te r .
Iz v o ls k i
D o u b le d a y ,
Page
&
Y ork.
H is to r y
o f th e W o r ld
W ar.
F r a n c is
A . M a r c h ; John
C. W in s to n
C o .,
P h ila d e lp h ia .
Un
L iv r e
L ib r a ir ie
Les
N o ir
du
(R u ssia n
T r a v a il,
Q u e s tio n
A r c h iv e s ),
la
G u erre.
su r
P o in c a r e a -t -il
v o u lu
la
gu erre?
C.
M arch an d;
D o c u m e n ts
d e la
gu erre.
D u p in .
de T ou ry.
g u e r r e m o n d ia le .
G e n e s is o f W a r .
r e sp o n sa b le s d e la
G erm an
R ene
D e M o n tg e la s .
le s R e s p o n s a b ilit e s
C o m m e n t s ’ e s t d e c la n c h C e l a
Les
v o lu m e s .
D e M a r t ia l.
d e s R e s p o n s a b ilite s .
C o n s id e r a tio n s
D ip lo m a tic
2
P a r is.
R e s p o n s a b ilite s d e
S u r la
K a u tsk y .
E . D . M o r e l.
G u erre.
A.
R e la tiv e
to
P e v e t.
th e
O r ig in
of
th e
W ar,
4
v o lu m e s .
W ar,
8
v o lu m e s .
Jordan.
A u s tr ia n
O ffic ia l
D o c u m e n ts,
Secret
of
R e v e a le d .
D o c u m e n ts
R u s s ia .
E m ile
D ip lo m a tic
th e
W ar.
The
D ip lo m a tic
A c tio n
L o o k in g
to
p u b lic a tio n .
D ip lo m a c y
D.
M o r e l.
A r c h iv e s
o f th e
M in is t e r o f F o r e ig n
A ffa ir s
L a lo y .
D o c u m e n ts,
de
M y th
E.
o f th e
H is to r y
of
th e
P o lic y
of
th e
E n te n te
B e fo r o
S ie b e r t.
o f a G u ilty
N a tio n .
E c o n o m ic I m p e r ia lis m .
N ock ;
Leonard
B.
W .
H u eb sch , N ew
Y ork .
W o lf ; H a rc o u rt, B race & H ow e, N ew
Y ork.
The
B race
C au ses
&
T ru th
H ow
’ Includes 2,372 Marine Corps personnel, but does not include Navy personnel.
M c G in le y
T re a ty .
C a p a c ity
C o ., N e w
N ew
92
143
100
90
67
66
58
63
64
6S
5S
46
39
32
33
34
39
39
30
39
29
19
27
21
22
7
12
4
2
7
2
3
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
W ar.
London.
G erm an y’s
52,629
W o r ld
Y ork .
Book
35,134
Y e r s a i l l e r s c h u ld -
S e y m o u r C ock s.
H ills ; F le e t,
R e fle c tio n s o f t h e
556
44
th e
B n u s m a n ; A lle n
Lex
47,196
844
T r e a tie s .
Let
Divisions. . 1,357
260
Other units
zum
M o r e l.
Secret
A
und
th e W o r ld W a r .
The
N ew
.4
P . D ir r .
O ffic ia l G e r m a n
Enlisted.
.7
X X .
k r ie g s a u s b ru c h
O ffic ia l G e r m a n
[Total battle deaths.]
Commissioned.
d o k u m e n te zu m
9.9
Y ork.
H ow e,
and
of
In te r n a tio n a l
N ew
th e W a r .
D ip lo m a ts
W ar.
G.
L.
D ic k n s o n ;
H a rco u rt,
Y ork.
M ake
E. D.
W ar.
M o r e l.
F r a n c is
N e ils o n ;
B.
W .
H u ebsch ,
N ew
flS
l
MV
44
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.
B e lg iu m
and
th e
E uropean
C r is is .
O ffic ia l
B . S.
rep o rts;
M it le r
&
iS o n s , B e r l i n .
The
L iv in g
A ge.
D ip lo m a tic
e t c ., 2
A u g u st,
D o c u m e n ts
v o lu m e s .
S co tt.
S e p te m b e r, O c to b e r,
R e la tin g
Jos.
to
th e
of
E urop ean
W ar,
W .
XXI.
E X H IB IT
CO ND ITIO N S
1922.
O u tb r e a k
OF T H E A R M IS T IC E F IX E D BY T H E
AEDIKS
B
Y
AND ACCEPTED
GERM AN REPU BLIC.
The President of the United States, in his speech of January
8, 1918, proposed the conditions upon which world peace might
be assured. They included certain 14 points, as follows:
1.
O pen
co v en a n ts
2.
F reedom
of
n a v ig a tio n
3.
R em oval
of
e c o n o m ic
4.
R e d u c tio n
of
o p e n ly
5.
Im p a r tia l
E v a c u a tio n
of
7.
E v a c u a tio n
and
8.
E v a c u a tio n
of
9.
a d ju s t m e n t
R e a d ju s tm e n t
F rench
of
fo r
I ta lia n
11.
E v a c u a tio n
and
accorded
access
h is to r ic a l
g u a r a n tie s
12.
of
lin e s
and
a
fr e e
tra d e.
R u s s ia .
w ith
u n lim ite d
r e s to r a tio n
b o u n d a r ie s
of
a lo n g
of
s o v e r e ig n ty .
sea ;
lin e s
of
and
in
B a lk a n
M o n te n e g ro ;
S ta te s
n a tio n a lit y ,
w ith
d e te r m in e d
in te rn a tio n a l
in te g r ity .
s o v e r e ig n ty
a u to n o m o u s,
m a in ta in e d ,
w ith
but
s u b je c t
D a r d a n e lle s
opened
n a tio n a litie s
under
to
be
in te r n a tio n a l
g u a r a n tie s .
13.
In d ep en d e n t
14.
A s s o c ia tio n
P o la n d
of
g u a ra n tee d ;
n a tio n s
in
a
access
le a g u e
of
to
a ll
sea .
n a tio n s .
Among statements of principles presented by President Wil
son to be accepted are the follow ing:
It
w ill
be
our
w is h
and
p urp ose
th a t
th e
processes
th e y a r e b e g u n , s h a ll be a b s o lu te ly o p e n , a n d t h a t th e y
p e r m it
h e n c e fo r th
W e
w is h
su ch
as
w ar,
th e
w h ic h
W e
th is
can
no
tin c tio n
record
b lo c k
or
je a lo u s y
in
any
w ay
h er,
e ith e r
of
th e
W e
w is h
h er
th e
w o r ld ,
o n ly
th e
in
to
o f p a c ific
arm s
w hen
s h a ll in v o lv e an d
and
c h ie f
do
not
in flu e n c e
or
w ith
s ta b le
peace,
p r o v o c a tio n s
w o r ld
p la c e
in
of
w h ic h
su ch
as
to
to
n o th in g
W e
th e
her
her
do
liv e ,
or
not
of
to
w is h
tra d e,
o th e r p e a c e -lo v in g
la w
e q u a lity
and
am ong
fa ir
th e
in s te a d
d e a lin g .
p e o p le s
of
a
p la c e
of
of
m a stery .
N e ith e r
fic a tio n
do
of
we
her
and
p a r t,
sp ea k
ta ry
p a rty
W e
to
s h o u ld
fo r
I
m en
w h ose
now
s u r e ly
o u tlin e d .
p r in c ip le
one
is
a
act upon
th ey
th e y
no
are
It
th e ir
p art
ju s tic e
c ip le
in
is
to
a lte r a tio n
n ecessary, w e
in te llig e n t
her
te rm s
m u st
w ith
speak
m a jo r ity
to o
or
to
or
fo r
fo r
th e y
on
be
fo u n d a tio n
s t a n d '.
The
d ev o te
th e ir
of
to
stro n g
no
to
liv e s ,
to
term s
or
part
of
m ili
of
any
t h e w h o le
a ll
p e o p le s
o f lib e r ty
and
w eak.
U n le s s
o f th e
stru c tu r e
th e
U n ite d
th e v in d ic a tio n
th e ir
on
w hen
th e
a d m it
ju s tic e
equal
p e o p le
sa y ,
her
d o m in io n .
c o n crete
p r in c ip le
liv e
m o d i
fr a n k ly
d e a lin g
sp ok esm en
is im p e r ia l
o th e r p r in c ip le ; a n d
read y
any
R e ic h s ta g
th e
r ig h t
o f its
can.
her
e v id e n t p r in c ip le r u n s t h r o u g h
a n o th e r , w h e th e r
m ade
in te r n a tio n a l
and
is
any
creed
An
to
w hom
th e
th e
have
it
to
know
sp oken
w ith
c o u ld
But
w h e th e r
u s,
n a tio n a litie s ,
sa fe ty
su ggest
p r e lim in a r y
d o u b t o r q u e s tio n .
program
and
a
we
and
have
fu r th e r
as
th a t
th e y
to
in s titu tio n s .
n ecessary
our
p resu m e
honor,
of
and
th is
of
.S t a t e s
th is
p r in
possess.
e v e r y th in g
On July 4, 1918, the President of the United States declared
the issue of the war to be one between democracy and autocracy
and that the settlement must be final, and made the following
declarations:
1.
The
r a t e ly ,
d e s tr u c tio n
s e c r e tly ,
w o r ld ; or,
t io n
2.
to
not
e c o n o m ic
b a s is
of
a te ly
concern ed, and
v a n ta g e
th e
of
fr e e
any
s e ttle m e n t fo r
8.
each
its
be
a r b itr a r y
ow n
p r e s e n t ly
of
every
o th e r
by
11
an yw h ere
c h o ic e
d is tu r b
d e stro y e d , a t
a cce p ta n ce
not
o th e r
th e
q u e s tio n ,
a rra n g em e n t,
of
upon
n a tio n
sa k e o f Its
th e
sam e
or o f
th a t
th a t
th e
th e
can
p eace
sep a
of
th e
le a s t
its
red u c
te r r ito r y
or
sover
w h e th e r
of
p o litic a l
r e la tio n s h ip ,
s e ttle m e n t
th e b a s is o f th e
of
ow n
T h e c o n s e n t o f a ll n a tio n s
76876—
pow er
s in g le
im p o t e n c e .
s e ttle m e n t
of
any
of
can
it
v ir tu a l
The
e ig n ty ,
if
#f
and
to
p e o p le
w h ic h
e x te r io r
and
th e
p e o p le
upon
m ay
d e s ir e
a
th e
im m e d i
m a t e r ia l in te r e s t o r
in flu e n c e
be govern ed
p r in c ip le s o f h o n o r
by
nations and peoples of the world secure
the German autocracy represents. It Is a
until it is won can men everywhere live
breathe freely while they go about their
governments are their servants and not
ad
d iffe r e n t
or m a stery .
In t h e i r c o n d u c t t o w a r d
o f resp ect
fo r
1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination
between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do
not wish to be just.
It must be a justice that plays no favorites and
knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.
2. No special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group
of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which
is not consistent with the common interest of all.
8. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants or under
standings within the general or common family o f the League of
Nations.
4. There can be no special selfish economic combinations within
the league, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or
exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from
the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself
as a means of discipline and control.
5. A ll International agreements and treaties of every kind must be
made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. It is further
stated that the United States will enter into no special arrangements
or understandings with particular nations.
d is
a rra n g em e n ts
and
in
of
m ade
have
in ju r e
p ow er.
us and
we
is
a c h ie v e m e n t
w is h
or
o f ju s tic e
th e re
no
h o s tile
h e r s e lf w ith
a
and
h er
e n te r p r is e
W e
co v en a n ts
accept
new
peace,
k in d .
ju s t
g rea tn ess,
W e
le g itim a te
w ith
w o r ld
a
grudge
if sh e is w illin g to a s s o c ia te
n a tio n s
any
th e
it.
e n v ia b le .
h er
d e s ir e
r e m o v in g
G erm an
or
and
and
by
of
of
rem oves.
of
le a r n in g
fig h t
to
p r e v a il
im p a ir s
b r ig h t
u n d e r s ta n d in g s
o n ly
program
th a t
of
very
to
secu red
th is
have
secret
r ig h t
be
program
no
It is a war to make the
against every such power as
war of emancipation. Not
free from constant fear or
daily tasks and know that
their masters.
On September 27 President Wilson, in opening the Liberty
loan drive, declared the following five principles:
n a tio n a lity .
o f R u m a n ia , S e r b ia , a n d
r e la tio n s
In his Labor Day message of September 1 President Wilson
said:
A ls a c e -L o r r a in e .
A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y .
a lle g ia n c e
te r r ito r ia l
T u r k is h
fr e e
of
of
c la im s .
o f B e lg iu m
r e s to r a tio n
to
d ip lo m a c y .
sea s.
c o lo n ia l
te r r ito r y ;
p e o p le s
open
e q u a lity
te r r ito r y ;
r e s to r a tio n
A u to n o m y
th e
and
gu a ra n teed .
of
R u ssia n
10.
upon
upon
a t,
b a r r ie r s ;
a rm a m e n ts
6.
S e r b ia
a r r iv e d
mon law o f civilized society that govern the Individual citizens of all
modern States In their relations with one another, to the end that all
promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or
conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a
mutual trust established upon the handsome foundations of a mutual
respect for right.
4 . The establishment, of an organization for peace which shall make
It certain that the combined power of free nations will check every
Invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure
by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit,
nnd by which every international readjustment that can not be amicably
agreed upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned.
th e cora-
It was known to the German Government that President Wil
son spoke as the representative of the allied and associated
powers, and on October 4, 1918. Prince Maximilian, of Baden,
in notes transmitted to President Wilson by wireless, offered to
make peace on the basis of President Wilson’s address of Janu
ary 8, 1918, and his later pronouncemeirts, and to conclude an
armistice, and said:
The German Government requests the President of the United States
of America to take a hand in the restoration of peace, acquaint all
belligerent states with this request, and invite them to send plenipoten
tiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the program
set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Con
gress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially
his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations. W ith a
view to avoiding further bloodshed the German Government request*
the immediate conclusion of an armistice en land, on water, and in
the air.
The President replied desiring to know if the German Gov
ernment spoke for the German people and demanded a with
drawal o f German troops from allied territory as an evidence
of good faith.
The Gevmans replied October 12, accepting in unqualified
manner the President’s proposals in the following language:
The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President
W ilson in his address of January 8 and in his subsequent addresses on
the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object
In entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical
details of the application o f these terms.
The German Government
believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Gov
ernment of the United States also take the position taken by President
W ilson in bis address. The German Government, in accordance with
the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about
an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of
the President in regard to evacuation. The German Government sug
gests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commis
sion for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.
The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibil
ity for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and In
agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor,
supported in all his actions by the will of the majority, speaks in the
name of the German Government and of the German people.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
On October 14 the President replied demanding the absolute
overthrow of the Kaiser and the house of Hohenzollern and the
cessation of illegal and inhumane practices.
The Germans replied on October 20, agreeing to the annihila
tion of the Kaiser’s power and all the conditions, but protesting
the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions which they vigor
ously disclaimed, as follow s:
T h e G erm an
In h u m a n e
th e re b y
G o v e rn m en t p ro te sts
a c tio n s
a g a in s t
d e s tr u c tio n s
m ade
th e
w ill
a g a in s t
G erm an
a lw a y s
f a r a s is p e r m it te d
a g a in s t th e
th e
G erm an
p e o p le .
For
th e
n ecessary,
be
reproach
la n d
and
th ey
by in t e r n a t io n a l la w .
and
o f ille g a l a n d
sea
c o v e r in g
are
fo r c e s
of
a
c a r r ie d
T h e G erm an
and
retrea t
o u t In
so
tro o p s a re u nd er
t h e m o s t s t r ic t in s tr u c t io n
to s p a r e p r iv a te p r o p e r ty a n d to e x e r c is e c a re
fo r
best
th e
occu r
p o p u la tio n
in
s p ite
G erm an
to
th e
o f th ese
G overnm en t
of
th e ir
in s tr u c tio n s
fu rth e r
d e n ie s
s h ip s h a s e v e r p u r p o s e ly d e s tr o y e d
G erm an
fa c ts
up
by
n eu tra l
g u ilty
th a t
W h ere
a r e b e in g
th e
G erm an
life b o a ts w ith
G o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e s , w ith
b e c le a r e d
a b ility .
th e
regard
to
tra n s g r e s s io n s
p u n is h e d .
navy
in
The
sin k in g
th e ir p a s s e n g e r s .
The
a ll th o s e c h a r g e s , t h a t t h e
c o m m is s io n s .
The Germans advised the President that a new government
had been adopted In Germany “ in complete accordance with the
representation of the people based on equal, universal, direct
franchise.”
On October 23, 1918, the President of the United States re
plied to the effect that having received such assurances from
the German Government he felt he could not decline to take
up with the associated Governments the question of an armis
tice; that the armistice must leave the associated powers in
a position to enforce any arrangements that might be entered
into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Ger
many Impossible; that if such an armistice was suggested by
the military advisers of the associated nations the acceptance
of its terms by Germany would afford the best concrete evi
dence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and princi
ples of peace from which the whole action proceeded.
The German Government on October 27 replied accepting
the terms, and said:
The
G erm an
P r e s id e n t
of
G overnm en t
th e
U n ite d
has
ta k e n
S ta te s.
r e a c h in g c h a n g e s t h a t h a v e b ee n
in
th e
are
G erm an
b e in g
b o th
co n d u cted
a c tu a lly
s o n c lu s io n s .
m an
be
it
c o n s titu tio n a l
and
in
fir s t
h is
step
a
now ’
pow ers
a w a its
to w a rd
aw are
and
th e
peace,
a ls o
to
an
th e
n e g o tia tio n s
w h ose
m ake
su b je c t
fo r
as
o u t,
in
pow er
are
th e
fa r -
peace
to
hands
th e
it.
a r m is tic e
P r e s id e n t
of
of
th e
th a t
g o v ern m en t,
an sw er
a r e b e in g c a r r ie d
o u t, a n d
p r o p o s a ls
ju s t
a
th e
is
c a r r ie d
p e o p le ’s
m ilita r y
of
P r e s id e n t
stru c tu re ,
c o n s t itu tio n a lly ,
The
G overnm en t
th e
by
c o g n iz a n c e
The
rests,
d e c id in g
The
G er
w h ic h
son
fo r c e
to
th e
fo r
"by
w h ic h
b e fo r e
tw e en
in v e ste d
th e
se r ie s
Thus
eyes
of
a u th o r ity
of
th e
G overn m en t
fu n d a m e n ta l
com es
fu tu re
and
to
a
a cts,
c lo s e
a
g e n e r a tio n s .
a s p ir in g
a
r ig h ts
fo r c e s,
n ew
of
th e
The
a llie d
p e r io d
w h ic h
D e s p ite
it
has
a ll
com es
p er
sta n d s
s t r u g g le
ren d ered
in
be
p o s s ib le
g o v e rn m e n ts
w h ic h
S ta te s
th e
and
w h ic h
fo llo w ,
G overn m en t
d e v e lo p m e n t
w h ic h
o f th is
has
G erm an
th ey
of
have
g iv e n
p assed
c a r e fu l
b etw ee n
im p e r is h a b ly
re
w ar.
G o v e r n m e n t.
d e c la r e
G erm an y
on
th e ir
th e
c o n s id e r a tio n
to
P r e s id e n t
th e
th e
S u b je c t
w illin g n e ss
term s
e n u n c ia te d
m u st
in
h is
p o in t
d e s c r ib e d
as
su bseq u en t
o u t,
th e
of peace
s o m e o f w h ic h
th ey
th a t
of
peace
of
th e
cor
U n ite d
q u a lific a tio n s
peace
dow n
in
w ith
th e
th e
P r e si
th e p r in c ip le s o f s e t tl e
c o u ld
2,
se a s, is
not
on
a ccep t.
th is
r e la tin g
open
to
They
to
w hat
v a r io u s
Is
in te r *
m u s t th e r e fo r e
w h en th e y en ter
s u b je c t
c o n fe re n c e .
F u r t h e r , in
gress
th e
m ake
la id
c la u s e
th e
r e se r v e to th e m s e lv e s c o m p le te fr e e d o m
th e
of
a d d resses.
h ow ever,
fr e e d o m
to
to
d e n t ’ s a d d r e s s t o C o n g r e s s i n J a n u a r y , 1918, a n d
m en t
T hey
order
tre m e n d o u s
t h e w o n d e r fu l a c h ie v e m e n t s
resp on den ce
u s u a lly
K a ise r ’s
th a t
The notes between the Government of the United States and
the German Government in their complete continuity, setting
forth the proposed bases of peace, were immediately trans
mitted by the President of the United States to the supreme
war council, and Germany was so notified in his note of Octo
ber 28. Clemenceau turned these notes over to Foch, who
summoned Petain, Haig, and Pershing to read the correspond
ence to them and ask their advice. On the 26th Foch handed
the military terms of the armistice to Clemenceau at the
Trianon Palace Hotel, the meeting place of the supreme war
council in Versailles.
The representatives of the Entente Governments immedi
ately convened there to consider the terms laid before them
and to come to a conclusion as to their acceptance or rejec
tion ; to decide whether an armistice should be granted and
peace made upon the basis offered, or the offer of an armistice
refused and surrender demanded. They reached a final con
clusion on November 4, accepting the basis on which the Ger
mans agreed to surrender as fixed by President Wilson, hav
ing occupied a period of nine days in deliberating upon the
entire contract.
The representatives of the Entente Governments at the
Trianon Palace Hotel in the above conference were Mr. Bal
four; Prime Minister Lloyd-George, the foreign minister; the
secretary of state for w a r; the first lord of the Admiralty;
the high commissioner to the United States, Lord Reading;
the chief of the general staff, Field Marshal H aig; the first
sea lord, Admiral Wemyss; and Mr. Bonar Law, all of whom
represented Great Britain.
The French Government was represented in like fashion by
Clemenceau, by Foreign Minister Piclion, and most of the mem
bers of the French Government.
The United States was represented by General Bliss, Colonel
House, Admiral Benson, etc.
The Italian leaders were there.
In all, 24 delegates actively participated and reached the
following conclusion, to w it:
p r e ta tio n s ,
tra n sfers
p e o p le .
honor
a
p e o p le
i t s e l f in
s h a ll
p r o c la m a tio n .
P repared ,
our
d e s c r ib e d
has
On October 28 Emperor William issued the following decree
indorsing the constitutional amendments promulgated by the
Reichstag:
in to
to
v e a le d
45
th e
Jan u ary
c o n d itio n s o f
peace
8,
P r e s id e n t
1618,
to r ie s m u s t be r e s to r e d
th a t
no
th e y
u n d e r sta n d
a s w e ll a s
d ou bt o u g h t to
dam age done
to
b y th e a g g r e ssio n
th a t
th e
e x ist
dow n
w hat
w ill
p o p u la tio n
of
in
h is a d d r e s s
d e c la r e d
e v a c u a te d
as to
c o m p e n sa tio n
th e c iv ilia n
la id
and
th is
be
th a t
fr e e d .
The
p r o v is io n
m ade
th e
by
A llie s
C on
te r r i
A llie s
im p lie s .
G erm an y
and
o f G e m n a n y b y la n d , b y sea , a n d fr o m
to
in v a d e d
fe e l
By
fo r
it
a ll
th e ir p ro p e rty
th e a ir.
7 .6 8 7 8 — 1 1
W A S H I N G T O N : G O V E R N M ifiN T P R I N T I N G O P T I C S : 1093
