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SIXTY-EIG H TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION. THE INNER SECRETS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY DISCLOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. annex portions of Germany, and expand its power in the Balkans. The foreign office of France in like manner was a very old and venerable institution, with employees who had spent their How European Diplomacy Affects American Welfare— N o lives in the service and who had the ambition and fixed purpose Foundation Whatever for Canceling the Debts Due Amer- to increase the power, financial and commercial, territorial and ica—American Prices and Taxes: The Payment of a Bonus political, of “ France ”— that is, the Government of France_ Seriously Affected by European Instability Due to Secret throughout the world. Under the constitution of 1875, the President of France European Diplomacy. has a right to make a secret treaty on his sole authority with out the advice or consent of the French Senate or the French Parliament. SPEECH Joseph Barthelemy, French professor of political scieuce, OF in “ Democracy and Foreign Policy, 1917,” page 102, makes the following statement o f the principles of the French con stitution of 1875: HON. ROBERT O F In t h e S e n a t e L. OWEN, O K L A H O M A , o f t h e U n i t e d The S t a t e s , December 18, 1928. Mr. OWEN. Mr. President, the interest of the American people is affected in many ways by the present instability in Europe. Until the nations are stable they can not repay the loans due the United States, and we can not reduce taxes as we should be able to do. The European demand for American goods, the ability to pay for such products, the internal effect on the prices of agricultural products and manufactures all depend on European stability, as well as the equally important matter of world peace and international good will. If American ideals were accepted by the statesmen of Europe— the ideals of international understanding and good will, o f in ternational justice and helpfulness— the European nations could disarm, balance their budgets, stabilize their currency, go into maximum production, and into an era of prosperity and peace. Under those conditions America could afford to make loans to Europe sufficient to assist them meet such objects. Europe is still suffering somewhat from the old ideals which formerly dominated their respective foreign policies in which commercial imperialism sought by bayonets and intrigue to expand the power and prestige of each nation. Previous to 1914 Russia, Pra.nce, Great Britain, and Germany conspicuously were seeking to expand their control or hege mony over large areas of the earth’s surface in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, occupied by the unenlightened and ignorant peo ples of the earth, as well as in Europe. Great Britain, through its foreign office, its military and naval power, during many generations had established under such a policy great colonies throughout the world until its rule governed 440.000,000 people. ' Russia occupied and ruled under a like policy about onesixth of the entire surface of the land of the world and had under its Government 150,000,000 people speaking many lan guages and dialects. France, with its colonies, controlled 90,000,000, and had its co lonial claims in Asia, Africa, South America, and the islands of the sea. At one time France controlled the lands now occupied by the United States west of the Mississippi River, including Louisiana, and claimed eastern Canada. When we were in the great Civil War the French Government took part in sending and backing Emperor Maximilian in Mexico, and was com pelled by the United States to withdraw by show o f military force. Belgium has its Congo, Holland its Java, and Germany had secured portions of Asia, large colonies in Africa, and various islands of the sea. These ancient Governments controlled their foreign relations through a very compact, powerful, and, to all intents and pur poses, imperial government. Old Russia was an absolute mon archy, with a foreign office pursuing what they called a “ his toric mission,” having ever in view the acquisition o f larger territory, greater power, trading with the great powers and coercing the smaller powers, planning to get parts of Manchuria and China and Persia, laying covetous eyes on Sweden and Finland, determined on controlling the Dardanelles, desiring to 7 6 8 7 6 — -1 1 c o n s titu tio n a b o u t, am ong m o n a r c h is t lic a n d id r ig h t in upon th is be F ir s t, th e in th a t b assad ors of a fo r c e of c o n d itio n s u n a b le to p o in t a ll is to of a a e s ta b lis h th e a tr a n s a c tio n m on arch y fu n d a m e n ta l tr a n s a c tio n a l con cern ed r6su m 4 c o n s id e r th e fo r e ig n fo r e ig n d ors o f F ra n ce sp eak ture th a t he th e ju r id ic a l is r e s u lt th e th e of d ir e c tio n th e to g eth e r and p r o b le m s s o lu tio n ; th a t of th e repu b of c o n s ti is , w hat it a ffa ir s . w h ic h general a a fo r e ig n a rra n g em e n ts w ith brough t b etw ee n s h o u ld r u le s of th e r e g im e . in of th e by w h ic h p r in c ip le , n a tio n w as a d o p te d fo r g o tte n p a r lia m e n ta r y 1875 th in g s , U nder it n o ta b ly H ere not m a jo r ity m in o r ity . tu tio n a l of o th e r he P r e s id e n t a ffa ir s ; p ow ers; it it is is in of th e alone R e p u b lic to him a r e his name in w h ic h ; he co n d u c ts th e n e g o t ia tio n s ; it th e c o u n try b in d s in rep rese n ts a c c r e d ite d in te r n a tio n a l is th e th e am am b assa l>y his signa tr e a tie s of w h ic h a u th o r. On page 105: The p r in c ip le e x p r e s s ly set fo rth by A r tic le 16th o f J u l y , 1 8 7 5 , i s t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t o f and ratifies treaties upon his sole authority. 8 th e of th e la w of th e negotiates R e p u b lic On page 109: A lm o s t tu rn in g a ll th o se F ran ce, fie d in by of of w h ic h are th e th e to th e great our have of of 8 of p a r lia m e n ta r y tr e a tie s , th e p o lic ie s e x e r c is e d w ork a r t ic le in te r n a tio n a l fo r e ig n P r e s id e n t e ffe c t t h a t s u b m it th e a ll p o in t great th e th e th e a c ts w h ic h d u r in g th e a d e c is iv e in flu e n c e G overnm en t a lo n e R e p u b lic la w approval p o litic a l on and m ark ed c e n tu ry , th e 1 6 th m ost tr e a tie s and of J u ly , im p o r ta n t th e d e s tin ie s have been 1875, of of r a ti It does p erh aps tr e a tie s th e a lm o s t upon his sole authority. o f th e th e have h a lf of is not a ll a llia n c e . It was under this authority that the secret treaty between Russia and France of 1892 contemplating military operations against Germany was executed and withheld from the French Parliament. It was under this authority that the secret treaties of 1916-17 to divide German and Austrian territory between France and Russia were entered into. Great Britain’s foreign affairs are directed in like fashion by the British foreign office, No. 10 Downing Street, without being directed by or disclosed to the British Parliament. Sir Edward Grey, in his agreements with the Governments of France and Russia contemplating military and naval coopera tion between Russia, France, and Great Britain along the lines worked out by the military and naval staffs of Great Britain, France, and Russia, was able to do so in absolute secrecy. He did not submit these records to parliament until after the war had been entered into by Great Britain. Six times the British Parliament was advised there were no commitments made. (Ex hibits 11 and 12— How Diplomats Make War, Neilson; Entente Diplomacy and the W orld; Un Livre Noir, etc.). It is of supreme international importance that the world should understand the structure of these foreign offices and what they did in bringing about the World War. How they subsidized and controlled the press, how they formed public opinion through such means, and taught the people to fear and hate each other and build up armies to the limit of their taxing capacity. Until these methods are thoroughly understood by the world and corrected, the American ideals of international understand ing and international good will is impossible of accomplishment. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 2 Until these methods are understood, the great mass of the people who pay taxes and die on the battle field will never be able to realize that their hatred o f each other is completely artificial and a result o f the ambition and pride of their leaders in charge of foreign affairs. It is necessary to stop the malignant criticism of one people by another people through the press and by public men if war is to end. and imposed an Indemnity o f a billion dollars on France which left a terrible grievance in the heart of patriotic French iieople, which was revenged in the W orld War. And while during 41 years o f the life o f the German Empire it did not make war on its neighbors, it continually advocated the doctrine o f might. The German leaders taught the value o f military preparedness to the utmost limit o f their capacity, and they are Jointly re sponsible with the other nations of Europe for the evil conse T H E P E O P L E T H E M S E L V E S NO T R E S P O N S IB L E FOR W AR . quences which have resulted from this false doctrine and a Many men now think of Germany as composed of bad structure o f government irresponsible to the people. people o f criminal intent who wickedly and with malice pre America has believed, on the contrary, in the homely but wise pense assailed the Innocent, unsuspecting good people o f Bel doctrine o f Abraham Lincoln, who believed In a government gium and France. The people of Germany and o f France are of the people, by the people, and for the people, and who equally good. grandly said: Of the present population of Germany charged with the L e t u s h a v e t h e f a i t h to b e lie v e t h a t r ig h t m a k e s m ig h t . payment of reparations, about 20 per cent in 1914 were unborn Mr. President, the Ilohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, who bubes; about 80 per cent of the German people living in 1914 trusted alone to the sword, and the Romanoffs, who relied were women and children without knowledge and without alone on brute power, have been punished and we need not re political power and absolutely innocent of any wrongful pur proach them. Nicholas and ills family are all dead. The Aus pose. There is no adequate moral basis upon which they can trian Emperor and his successor are dead. The Hohenzollerna be charged with the responsibility of the war. were compelled to leave Germany and relinquish all power. About 10 per cent o f the population o f Germany were men With the destruction o f the Russian dynasty the secret capable of bearing arms, about 5 per cent capable o f some archives o f the Russian foreign office were exposed and printed slight service, and about 10 per cent engaged in other services by the Revolutionary Government A portion o f them have as noncombatants, and these groups are intermingled. been translated into French under the title “ Un Llvre Noir,” The 10 per cent fit for service had no option whatever and the former secretary o f the Russian Embassy at London. about answering the call o f mobilization. If any German had B. I)e Siebert, has also published 858 secret documents dis dared to do so, such a rebel under the military dynasty o f closing the policy o f the Russian Government and o f France Germany then in control would have faced a drum-head court- and Great Britain In relation to this war and In relation to martial, a firing squad, an ignominious death, and an odious the world, under the title, “ Entente Diplomacy and the W orld ” memory as a coward and a traitor to his country. by De Siebert. It is a “ Matrix o f the History o f Europe The same thing is perfectly true with regard to the men of 1909-1914,” which every student o f government should reud France, of Russia, o f Great Britain, of Belgium, as the case until he knows the inner secrets o f entente diplomacy. might be. In like manner the secret archives o f Germany have been The people themselves were not responsible for war. If disclosed to view, and o f Belgium, and some o f the English they had been responsible they have certainly paid a terrible records have come to light. penalty, for 8,538,315 o f these men were killed or died from These revelations of European diplomacy and of the Euro wounds, over 21,000,000 of them were wounded, over 7,000,000 pean methods o f conducting foreign affairs should be un were missing, most o f whom died without record. The un derstood by the American people. Perhaps when the world recorded women and children who died number many millions understands what these records disclose it may become possi more. ble for “ the common people, who pay the taxes and who die I f the German and Austrian people were responsible for the upon the battle field,” to exercise a larger influence with their war they have been punished; 2,972,000 of them were killed. Government leaders and bring about a larger recognition o f 7,186,000 were wounded, 3,252,000 were missing. the importance o f international understanding, international The total number o f killed, wounded and missing in the good will, international peace and prosperity. war was 37,494,000 men and probably half as many women SO M E S E C R E T S OF EU R O PE A N D IP L O M A C Y . and children died from war and exposure and famine. The records to which I have called the attention o f the The cost o f this was over two hundred and eight thousand million dollars ($208,000,000,000) at a low estimate. (E x Senate appear to demonstrate that the German militaristic rulers did not will the war, tried to avoid the war, and hibits 22, 23, 24.) The people of these countries did not will their own death only went into war because o f their conviction that the and destruction. This war was brought on by a few’ men persistent mobilizations o f Russia and France meant a deter In charge o f government, responsible for government, pur mination on war and were secretly intended ns a declaration suing policies w’ liich probably for the most part they thought o f war by Russia and France against Germany. The records wdse and necessary to advance what they vainly Imagined to show that the Russian and French leaders were determined be the “ glory ” and “ honor ” o f their owrn respective nations. on war, and intended the mobilizations as the beginning o f a It Is futile to denounce the leaders who brought this great war which had for many years been deliberately prepared and war on, but it is essential to the future o f mankind to under worked out by the complete plans o f campaign through annual stand what happened and how7 it happened to prevent again military conferences. In 1892 Russia and France entered into the following trea ty: the crucifixion o f the world by secret diplomacy. There are certain noble and splendid qualities which were E X H IB IT I. common to the Russians, the Germans, the French, the British, A p p e n d i x C. the Italians, the Belgians, and others. They were all splen T H E F R A N C O -R U S S IA N A L L IA N C E OF 1892. didly brave, magnificently loyal and patriotic o f heart. They T h e F r e n c h is s u e d a f t e r th e w a r , w h e n t h e y fir s t d is c lo s e d th e t e r m s followed their leaders believing that they were defending the o f t h i s a g r e e m e n t , a s p e c i a l Y e l l o w B o o k u p o n t h i s s u b j e c t . T h e e s s e n best interests of their country. t i a l t e r m s o f i t c a n b e fo u n d in th e p a m p h le t o f M a r c h , 1 9 1 9 , N o . When detached America went into the war it did so with a 1 3 0 , o f t h e A m e r i c a n A s s o c i a t i o n f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n . ’ T h e clearer vision. We were not fighting the German people as b o d y o f t h e e n g a g e m e n t s i s a s f o l l o w s : such. We were fighting a military despotism which ruled the D R A F T OF M IL IT A R Y C O N V E N T IO N . German people and had persistently made war on us. We were F r a n c e a n d R u s s ia , a n im a t e d b y a c o m m o n d e s ir e t o p r e s e r v e th e fighting for liberty and justice as w’ e understood it. We had p e a c e , a n d h a v i n g n o o t h e r e n d in m i n d t h a n t o w a r d o f f t h e n e c e s s i t i e s not a single doubt that the German rulers were exclusively o f a d e fe n s iv e w a r , p r o v o k e d by a n a tta c k o f th e fo r c e s o f th e T r ip le responsible for the war. We had seen them refuse In The A llia n c e a g a in s t e ith e r of th e m , have agreed upon th e fo llo w in g Hague conferences to agree to the principle o f arbitration and p r o v i s i o n s : of disarmament. We heard much o f their wonderful army, 1. I f F r a n c e is a tta c k e d by G erm an y, or by Ita ly su p p o rte d by of their annual maneuvers, o f their officers drinking the silent toast to “ Der Tag.” We heard about their invading G e r m a n y , R u s s i a s h a l l e m p l o y a l l I t s a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s t o f i g h t G e r m a n y . “ 2 . In case th e fo r c e s o f th e T r ip le A llia n c e , or o f on e of th e unprepared and unsuspecting Belgium and France and Russia. p o w e r s w h ic h a r e a p a r t y to it , s h o u ld b e m o b iliz e d , F r a n c e a n d R u s s ia , We heard of their poison gas and their atrocities in battle. a t t h e fir s t J u d ic a tio n o f t h e e v e n t , a n d w i t h o u t a p r e v io u s a g r e e m e n t And now. Mr. President, there has come out o f hiding a great b e i n g n e c e s s a r y , s h a l l m o b i l i z e a l l t h e i r f o r c e s I m m e d i a t e l y a n d s i m u l mass of evidence previously unknown, previously unsuspected, to t a n e o u s l y , a n d s h a l l t r a n s p o r t t h e m a s n e a r t o t h e i r f r o n t i e r s a s which we shall be compelled to give attention and which dis p o s s i b l e . close that the German leaders, bad as they were, were not “ 3 . T h e a v a ila b le fo r c e s w h ic h m u s t b e e m p lo y e d a g a in s t G e r m a n y exclusively responsible for the World War. They were cer s h a l l b e : F o r F t a n c e , 1 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 m e n ; f o r R u s s i a , f r o m 700 OOO t o tainly responsible for having seized Alsace-Lorraine in 1870 8 0 0 , O f IP m e n . 7 (1 8 7 (1 — 11 -------J§»— a. r I CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. “ T h ese p a tc h , east 4. “ of th a t and p la n fo r c e s so In th e The in th e s ta ffs m easu res s h a ll In fo r m a tio n s h a ll s tu d ie d and "5 . F ran ce The " th e have a r m ie s ord er set fo r th to a c tio n to fig h t w ith th e th e sam e at g rea test tim e in d is and to th e and R u s s ia . In to , t h e ir and and to th e tw o fo r each a r m ie s c o u n tr ie s and s h a ll fa c ilita te c o n s ta n tly th e th e o th e r, of th e in tim e T r ip le of peace, A llia n c e a ll w h ic h th e is in , in of in tim e of w ar s h a ll be s h a ll A ll c o n c lu d e s h a ll have a sep a ra te th e sam e th e c la u s e s e n u m era ted above s h a ll be kept An exO on ge w ho of co n d u cted Tw o P r e s id e n t a t A to A ll 12 th of a th a t v is it te c tio n . to 1899, to by and of B o is d e ffr e , F rench F ren ch in u n im p o r ta n t th e 8t. arm y fo r com m ent R u s s ia n F o r e ig n to The d o cu m e n ts C a s lm lr M in is te r th e a fo llo w in g M in is te r Is of has w as D e lc a s s e ’s F o r e ig n up to of rep ort th e report In to to th e w hat of rep ort he th is on of th e c o n sid e r s, a llia n c e , a J u s t ifia b le D M - to S t. P etersb u rg . k in d s — a g en era l A u gu st 9, 21, h e lm . and c o n s id e r d ip lo m a tic 1891, R ib o t, in E urope in and and of concert any t o January, 189k, w h ic h th e th e d u r a tio n f>«< of o f th e tch a t o th e rw is e q u e s tio n concern s T r ip le th e an R u s s ia expressed 1891, th a t and th e by G ie r s , th e tw o of p u ttin g a g g r e s s iv e are in s ig n e d c a p a b le A llia n c e , if v o litio n of of tw o le tte r s G o v e rn m e n ts th e of M oh ren w ill peace of o f D e c e m b e r S3, 1893, act w h ose T r ip le a ll its on th e part d u r a tio n A llia n c e is of one lim ite d to e h o u ld d i s s o lv e i f , f o r e x a m p le , m em bers; In b a la n c e m ore, In a b etw ee n w o u ld com m on N ow , tio n it it tr o u b le d m e and It fu l been s u p p o rt. a lw a y s th e on of stu d y . in situ a tio n . th e of in A u g u st, In stru m e n t sam e to be of a ls o th a t th e w ill s u r e ly P r e s id e n t The a n x io u s o f our em peror to 76876— tw o r e c e iv e is a ll th a t to th e assu red case im p o r ta n t lo n g r e m a in th e of me in to estee m and Your me th a t su ch in th e w as p a th very th o se H as a h is tw o of but G overn th e general th e m s e lv e s b etw ee n and m y s e lf th a t th e th e Ju st E uro d ip lo m a tic h is id e a m a je s ty ’s th e e x is te d r e m a in of b etw ee n w as done b a s is of w h ic h a b s o lu te ly le tte r s ex req u est, fu n d a m e n ta l a rra n g e m e n t, fo rm That th e a lr e a d y new th e h is on s h o u ld in to ex p ressed at u n d e r s ta n d in g secret, w h ic h Count W edn esd ay m orn - elcasse . u n prepared P ow ers w ar. w o u ld a v a ila b le fo r w e ll t h a t at c a lls it, in to sta ff th a t as W e th e fr o m th e ir th a t p ic tu r e h enchm en years peace; w ar of seek G erm an a th e a v o id th e assu ran ce A rm y c o u ld “ to fo r c e s — m u st th a t p in c e r s by L ord th e th e be th ey a t knew str ik in g L orebu rn F ren ch c o n c e n tra te ta k e o ffe n s iv e d ip lo m a t ic a lly sh e as of of sh ow s R u s s ia n s — w h ic h see c o r r id o r ,” con R u s a g g r e s s io n — Im m en se how W e It m ilita r y (m in im u m ) to th e began. c a m o u fla g e d w est. a p o s itio n in ta b le B r itis h c h ie f o f as r a p id ly o ffe n s iv e a g a in s t w ith th e h elp o f th e B r itis h A r m y on its l e f t fla n k .” G erm an y, T u rn w as p a la c e be “ B e lg ia n F ren ch in a th e G erm an y ; o b serve th e th e and r e c k o n in g u p w o u ld w itn le g e n d fo r th e d is c u s s in g and “ The F ren ch over 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 d e a lin g w ro te : e x c lu s iv e ly v ic tim s east th e W e th en ) and th e m we r e v e a ls b e fo r e s h o u ld and th e u s in g F ran ce. G erm an p la n s o v e r w h e lm in g on G erm an y F ran ce, (e v e n see w as th e D e s t r o y s ,” w ar, b e lo w th e n w h ic h F ren ch s im u lt a n e o u s ly r a p id ly even th a t th e years S ta te s, R u s s ia — w e re (m in im u m ) be fo r w ar th re e for 1911.) u np rep ared n ess th e ir F rench P retared and P o is o n d o c u m e n t p u b lis h e d “ d e fe n s iv e ” ta ck e d (IN “ The u n p rep ared n ess C e n tra l II. R ussians W ar. the m o n th , 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 to fr o m a la te r ; F ran ce E urope p re d a to ry w o r ld ev en ts agreem en t does not w h ic h and Your is th e s u d d e n ly le g io n s . th e sta te m e n ts h un dred and Im p e r ia l s t a r tle d “ W e w ere of us th e rep ose by m in is te r s w ar d r e a m in g her caught to w hen R u s s ia out a ll m ade p la tfo r m s of by broke out naught but th e u n prepared ” K a is e r ’s (M r . L lo y d - fe e lin g ; in d ic a te d you have th e not of th in k C arnot th e new he w as th a t by in g la n c e — w h e n of th e sort th e H ou se w h ic h lic • * B r itis h * ” * m ent th a t And are no “ 1 9 1 1 ), o th e r p o w e r ” w as th e th e is of no secret and and fu lly a g a in , o b lig a t io n s to th e d e c e p tio n F rench The of F r a n c o -R u s s ia n M E E T IN G S a r m ie s F rench p o in ts of c o n v e n tio n la tio n s h ip . by th e w ith A u gu st OF THE m ilita r y th e 1892, w as c o n fe rr in g to ‘‘A s been has ren d er of any th e fo r e ig n pub sta te d G overn m ilita r y p r a c tic e d m ilita r y FRENCH or naval upon th e B r itis h th e 1 of a r t ic le heads of a tt a c h e s in c e kept w as (th is 1892, had secret p a r tie s , and p resen t re fe r s to been as th e 1920) gave r ise to R U S S IA N 4 of th e of m ilita r y th e A u gu st con R u s s ia n 18 secreta ry . (3 1 ), The F r a n c o -R u s s ia n b a sis of w ere s u c c e s s iv e ly th e OF C H IE F S ( 8 1 ) , 1911. s ta ffs th e u n til c o n fe re n c e . AN D c o n fe re n c e a t K r a s n o e -S e lo c o n v e n tio n w h ic h , It p aragrap h 17, m e t in arran gem en t any th e sp eech es 1 9 1 1 ). S T A F F AT K R A S N O B -S B U O , AU G U ST 18 accord an ce “ w ith A s q u it h ’s d is c lo s e d w ith (D e ce m b e r, o ffe n s iv e M r. A f f a i r s .) sev en th THE O ff any e x te n t F rench e n g a g e m e n ts upon F o r e ig n th e fla n k ” — a t T h ere secret us le ft d is c lo s e d e n ta il any about its to (E d . M IN U T E S been (N o v e m b e r , e s tim a te N a tio n . T h is not th e re a s s is ta n c e read on C om m ons : has * • of you A rm y and 1911. v a r io u s m ilita r y F r a n c o -R u s s ia n fo llo w in g re e x a m in e d exch ange of v ie w s : . P re a m b le . perm an en t P r e s id e n t and Then h e lp In very our do M a je s ty th e th a t d u r a tio n . had w hom , e x is te n c e ow d is c u s s in g poor th e v e n tio n s h o u ld of to up c o n fir m e d , th e concern sam e I to exch ange. C z a r — e x a c t ly a g a in s t had and and F ran ce S t. P etersb u rg . a llie d The and had th a t 1894, and 1891 c o n v e n tio n th e th a t u n d e n ia b ly la s t and th e se c r is is R e p u b lic ? ” e s s e n tia lly An A ffa ir s w o u ld a llie d g e n e r a ls w h ic h F ran ce gen eral s o lid a r y ; of le ft a r tic le F ran ce m a je s tie s general “ S in c e th e III I R u s s ia n how me a p p r e h e n s io n e ffe c tiv e , as A le x a n d e r c o n fir m a tio n of p a id to o k th e have e v e n in g , th e ir q u e s tio n s , c o n v e n tio n as he b etw ee n one fr ie n d ly F r id a y p r o b le m s and fo rm e d : agreem ent say, a over pow er w h ic h w hat r e v ie w e d b e lie f to a v ie w s F r a n c o -E n g lis h r e la tio n s in m ilita r y me has A ffa ir s , w h ose w ith d iffe r e n t m y w as E m p eror F ren ch th e it N ic h o la s em peror te ll T r ip le w h ic h p a tr io tis m v is it th e to and w h ic h n a tio n s of c o n tin u e 11 year d isa r m e d m a k in g w ork th e of th e d u r a tio n — th a t in te re sts th e our s ia n conven th e F o r e ig n P etersb u rg la s t em peror ex ec u te th a t fo r th e th e of o p p o r tu n ity b r e a k fa st th e a p p r o a c h in g v ie w 1891, th in k th e over of S t. en ou gh d u r in g no pru d en t b r e a k fa st good ran cou rse w o u ld a r is e M a je s ty th e r e v e a le d a llia n c e s h o u ld w as u n ite d m ilita r y of E m peror to th e fu r th e r o n ly d e fic ie n c y M o u r a v ie ff, m in e , In in v ite d A fte r W e T hen, 1 w as conduct h im . d u r in g R u s s ia , I he w ith a n e g le c t Count A r r iv in g s draw n s o le m n ly b a la n c e of G e o rg e ). born M in is te r and fr o m to accord P e te r h o f. m y arou sed a r is e n p e r fe c t F ir s t to not th e e x is t; T hat lo ft y r e c e iv in g retu rn O c to b e r. at ap proval of your u p s e ttin g s itu a tio n , R u s s ia w hen to becam e of e x e c u tio n ? m om ent it. I and w hat and its cease r e s o lv e in to A u g u st, Sunday h is in fir m And fo r w o u ld w ith peace F ran ce even sin c e fo u n d Sure la s t 4th my fo r c e s? fin d p r e c ise it v a n is h d e c id e d been P a r i6 th e c o n s ta n tly have I at to read y th a t w o u ld I w e lc o m e , In J ust has it. but w ork A llia n c e , E u ropean d eserv e p la n is s h o u ld com e th e m ore general I it th in k d e c id e d th e and day F ren ch th re e th e w as e s ta b lis h e d a lle g e d m ore c o m p r o m is in g had m a in te n a n c e th e E X H IB IT and of and to M o u r a v ie ff, F o r e ig n T he G reat F raud E m p e r o r F r a n c is J o s e p h , w h o s e e m s a t t i m e s t h e o n l y b o n d b e t w e e n r iv * l a n d e v e n e n e m y r a c e s , s h o u l d s u d d e n ly d is a p p e a r ; i f A u s tr ia w e r e t h r e a te n e d by a d is m e m b e r m e n t, w h ic h p e r h a p s is , a f t e r a ll, d e e ir a b le , w h ic h p er h a p s m ig h t b e c o u n te n a n c e d , a nd w h ic h , in a n y c a s e , o n e m ig h t b ecom e a n x io u s to tu rn to a c c o u n t f W h a t c o u ld b e c a p a b le of c o n te n ts p e r fe c t ly th e to Count d e c la r a t io n . s u m p t i o n .” A llia n c e . happen by 27, s tip u la te d T r ip le w o u ld th a n 15, a nd a m ilita r y c o n v e n tio n Jeopardy; p ow ers a g r e e m e n t, good su b m ittin g D of w ith I s h o u ld of of In pursuance o f this troaty the military staffs of France and Russia entered into a military conference, August 81, 1911, printed by Foreign Affairs, in London, September, 1922, under the title, “ The Great Fraud,’.’ is as follow s: th e R e p u b lic . 1 a rra n g em e n ts A u gu st w h ic h of th e Our is in m ilita r y I. P r e s id e n t P r e s i d e n t : Y o u r e x c e lle n c y k n o w s w i t h w h a t id e a in m in d ear w ent seem ed It be th e assu res p ro P a r i s , A u g u s t IS, 1899. I p la n fu ll: L o u b e t, 1891 w h ile th e m a in te n a n c e a tta c h in g p la n . th e th e F rench fo r th ey so A llia n c e , a g a in s t be o n ly th a t com m on lib e r ty w h ic h of e x te n d e d ; th e fo r F o r e ig n R e p u b lic , T r ip le su p p osed A ffa ir s , in F ren ch s tr e n g th e n in g d is s o lu tio n arran gem en t th e In g , d e c la r a tio n a n x ie ty th is th e s h o u ld P e r le r , th e to o k p r o v id e s c a lle d M o u r a v ie ff A ffa ir s . su m m ed of D e lc a s s e P e te rsb u rg , even are P r e s id e n t H e th e th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e P etersb u rg . am bassad or, M o u r a v ie ff, M in is te r w hen 8t. o r ig in a l (D e lc a s s e , th e T *o u b et, o u tliv e th e one F ren ch in te r m e d ia te h im s e lf w ill w h ic h fo r de D e lc a s s e . A u g u st, It tra n s m is s io n M o n te b e llo , P a r is , a n d th ese a fte r fro m by of G en eral a ffa ir D e lc n s s e , r e p ly D e lc a s s e by th e le tte r s A ffa ir s , le tte r s docu m ent fo r I arran gem en t “ th e by M in is te r of th i« w ith em peror read th e ■ e c r e t .” upon p la n sh o rt, a c tly . a b s o lu te ly a fo r g e d f o r c e s .” The as of th e ex p ressed peace. d u r a tio n bonds m om ent s in g u la r ly my I th e it is arran gem en t not c o n v e n tio n In m u ch th e th a t d ra ft m e n ts In advance. R u s s ia th e peace, pean c o r r e s p o n d in g c lo s e r A t scop e as A llia n c e . 7. draw m o r n in g . e x e c u tio n p o s s e s s io n . m eans p resen t of prepare above. th e arran ged “ 6. T r ip le of in c o m m u n ic a te w ays c o m p le te w ill em peror r e g a r d in g com e “ The b e g in w est. concert “ They or s h a ll G erm an y 3 h is fa th e r T h e tw o c h ie fs o f s ta ff d e c la r e , b y co m m o n a c c o r d , th a t th e w ord s “ d e f e n s i v e w a r ” m u st n o t be i n te r p r e te d in th e s e n s e o f a w a r w h ich w o u ld b e c o n d u c te d d e fe n s i v e ly . T h e y affirm , on th e c o n tr a r y , th e a b s o lu t e n e c e s s i t y fo r th e R u ssia n a n d F r e n c h a rm ies to a d o p t a v ig o ro u s o ff e n s i v e , a nd a s fa r as p o s s ib le a s im u lta n e o u s o n e , in c o n fo r m it y w ith t h e t e x t o f a r t i c l e 3 o f th e c o n v e n ti o n , w h o se te r m s p r o v id e th a t u the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. forcea speed. the two contracting pow ert thall com e into full action with all of (T L ie “ d e fe n s iv e ” w ar w as s tr ic tly fo r d ip lo m a tic pu rp oses It w ill b e o b s e r v e d .) ( L e t forces dct deux puissances cont>actuates e'engagent & fond et en toute diligence.) ARTICLE 1. S a m e o b s e r v a tio n s ‘‘ T h e tw o as In t h e c o n f e r e n c e c h ie f o f s ta ff, c o n fir m in g o f 1 9 1 0 , r e a d in g a s th e e n tir e ly In accord on th e p o in t It seem s c e r ta in at very th e In d e e d , c o n fe r p la c o th a t The “ The r iv e d th a t to c o n fe r r in g at In th e th e fir s t p a r tie s new s th e n ecessary ; but A u s tr ia or p e n s a b le of Ita ly to to a ttra c te d th e and in be w ith o u t th is T hey good 8 a to a ll th e ir I), and F ran ce upon u n d e r s ta n d in g general in v ite th is ar Chap. ap pears In d is r e s p e c tiv e w h ic h has of G ov a lr e a d y t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s ." on th e tw e n tie th S h a r in g th e o p in io n of th e ir p red ecessors, th e c o n fe rr in g p a r tie s , G e n e ra l D u b a il p o in ts in th e n etw o rk th e recen t o f w estern fo r tific a tio n s The F ren ch ou t th a t n ew Im p ro v e m e n ts ere cted c h ie f of on a rg u m e n ts u n d erta k e n r a ilw a y s — op en fo r th is by lin e s , sh e d s , th e F re n c h In th e e a ste rn th e v ie w are to be in th e ir G erm an s la n d in g p la c e s — a n d by s u b m its of th e se fo llo w in g th e ir th e G erm an A t in v a s io n th a t th a n su rp r is e w ith th e 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 th e stre n g th of enem y and m en p r o v id e d fo r to red u ce th e F ren ch th u s be a th e in a llie d G o v e rn m e n ts le a r n e d th e by F rench a r tic le o r d e r t o im p o s e fr o m o b ta in to th e p o s itio n to of 8 A rm y w ill be o f th e c o n v e n tio n . t h a t th e G e r m a n s w ill c o n d u c t h o s tilit ie s w ith e s t p o s s ib le e n e r g y , in th e th e th e from the fifteenth to the eighteenth d ay.” o f B e lg iu m ) m om ent I t Is b e lie v e d w h ic h th e d e c is io n d e fe n s iv e . tu rn th e s ta ff has th e th e (?)) event o f g r e a te r p o r tio n or at su ccess of th e ir le a s t th ey fo r c e s to w o u ld a g a in s t R u s s ia n s . The c h ie f c ir c u m s ta n c e s nor It a ly (A u g u s t, w o u ld th a t ( prendre g iv e n w ill fo llo w th e la t te r to D u b a il, F ren ch be c o n tin u in g th a t w ar in th e a c tu a l n e ith e r n o t, b u t th in k s , on to if o n ly In B o s n ia h is and b e lie v e provoked w o u ld c o m p e lle d A u s tr ia m o b iliz a t io n to A u s tr ia h er. It a ly fait et cause p ou r), by reason s if G erm an y agrees th a t A u s tr ia G eneral th e 1911) im m e d ia te ly G e n e ra l G ilin s k y hand, of com e out of in w ith g r a titu d e and th e th e fo r o th e r G erm an s th e su p p ort H e r z e g o v in a . e x p o s itio n , in d ic a te s on gen eral lin e s c o n c e n tr a tio n . H e show s that the French A rm y concentrates as rapidly as the Ger man A r m y, and that as from the tw elfth day i t fa i n a position to take the offensive against G erm any, with the help o f the B ritish A rm y on its left flank. (In a c c o r d a n c e w ith th e s e c r e t a r r a n g e m e n t b etw ee n th e B r itis h and d e c is io n and of L ord even L ord F rench fro m a r t ic le 8 assu red neous is G rey th e H a ld a n e F ran ce g e n e r a l s ta ffs , and have th e read y m ilita r y to M r. su ccess, it is n ecessary and e ffe c tiv e a s s is ta n c e of but of 1900, by c o n c e a le d fr o m an d — so th e th e L ord J o in t n a tio n G rey and M in is t e r ).) in th e sen se 1892. th a t th e Janu ary, A s q u ith P r im e m arch c o n v e n tio n of In H a ld a n e , (e x c e p t a ffir m e d — t h e th e re fo r e of L ord C a b in e t begun sh e s tr ic tly H ow ever, s h o u ld R u s s ia n in d ic a te d In order r e c e iv e th e by to be s im u lta lie , R u s s ia is of G erm an h ue been n o t lik e ly In v ie w to of s tr a te g is ts , b u ild in g be th e soon up her c o n ju r e d p r o fo u n d and, fie ld of As of fr o m v ie w , an p r o v id e id e a l n o t a c tu a lly 1 9 0 0 , th e R u s s ia n u n d erto o k ichelon (b o d y G erm an A rm y of 70870— 11 to R u s s i a I) th e pace th e is at th e w h ic h n ig h tm a r e fo r on by e x is t in th is th e g e o g r a p h ic a l, n a tio n s , s im u lta n e o u s t h e d iffi a c tio n w h ic h r e a liz a b le . th e s u ffic ie n t su p p o rte d fro n ts 1905, o f th e a llie d to c o n fo r m ity e ig h te e n th engage a c e r ta in day w ith v ic to r io u s ly num ber of th is w ith p o in t th e fiv e reserve or fir s t s ix d iv is io n s . in w as in d ic a te d as ta k in g m ore th e o p in io n put fo r w a r d a r m ie s s h o u ld th e g re a te st p u rsu e th e p o s s ib le o b je c t num ber of b a s is of th e m ilita r y c o n v e n tio n of it th e (o f th e a d m itte d w ill th e F ren ch th e R u ssia n o ffe n siv e e ig h te e n th th e b e in g G erm an s day. by com m on d ir e c t c h ie f th e of th e P erh aps r e c e n t im p r o v e m e n ts by m ass sta ff e x p r e sse s a r m ie s ) w ith accord p r in c ip a l s h o u ld , Achrlon fir s t even as th is in tr o d u c e d d e la y in to th e fa r as (b o d y of m ig h t be th e R u s s ia n c o n c e n tr a tio n . c lo s e s h is e x p o s itio n m o tiv e s by w h ic h th e re u p o n a ll, fu lfill r e m a r k in g have th a t c o m p e lle d he is R u s s ia not to un r e v ise d e v e lo p s e m p h a t ic a lly s c r u p u lo u s ly th e R u s s ia n a ffir m s th e th e w ill o b lig a tio n s p o in t o f v ie w . of th e im p o s e d Im p e r ia l upon it G overn by th e con v e n tio n . G e n e r a l D u b a il h a s t e n s to d e c la r e t h a t h e fu lly of th is t io n th e d e c la r a t io n w ith at M oroccan tru e d u ty of th e m anner th e R u s s ia n A rm y. The la t te r began in adds is its to w ay R u s s ia n M oreover, e q u ip m e n t r e g im e n ts . G eneral by it is m ay is a c tu a l sta ff is on th e r e o r g a n iz a tio n but fo u r w ill years o n ly 1914, and la c k in g G ilin s k y to lo y a lty In connec e s tim a te w hat th rea ts of a c o n flic t e n lig h te n in a p r e c is e a c tu a l be ago. A th e th e great c o m p le t e new c o n d itio n la r g e r g iv e s d e ta ile d o n ly h eavy p o r tio n s of im a r tille r y of on In g rea test m u n itio n s in d ic a tio n s th e r e a lly num ber u s in g th e lu in fa n tr y of c a m p a ig n tr a n s fo r m a tio n o u t, b u t, ev en in fo r to fo llo w in g th is o f b e in g c a r r ie d in a r is in g n o t p o s s ib le o f th e s ta ff W a r ), A rm y are be. v ie w say, a p p r e c ia te s th e d iffic u ltie s h e a d q u a rte rs p u r s u in g lig h t a r tille r y su p p o rte d w hen h ea d q u a rters 1 9 0 8 — th a t in w hen t h a t in R u s s ia n is and (R u s s o -J a p a n e s e d ilig e n c e , t h e 1913, m om ent o f G erm an y F ren ch M a n c h u r ia a a ffa ir s in te n tio n s G e n e r a l G ilin s k y in th e in 1910. reserve th ese p o in ts , fig u re s. H e adds that, when the Russian A rm y will have com pleted its re organization, it w ill put into line forces very superior to the 800,000 men provided for by the convention. But fr o m It is th e th a t of fr o n tie r . th e n ecessary m ilita r y th e In w o u ld be d e stin e d to p o in t R u s s ia n rem ark of A rm y, and h ea d q u a rters in a to p o s itio n fa c e th a t v ie w . c o n tr a d is tin c tio n R u s s iu n its to th e is ta k e has s itu a tio n o ffe n s iv e is great now ta k e s to p la c e a d m it b e fo r e th e p rogress as p r e v a ilin g c o n s tr a in e d th e m ade m o b iliz a tio n c o n c e n tr a tio n w ith sta ff A u s tr ia H er r a p id nearer up t ill th a t as th e now . A u s tr ia R u s s ia n tro o p s h er. In these circum stances Russia does not appear to be in a condition to sustain, for tw o years at least ( t h a t i s t o s a y , n o t b e f o r e 1 9 1 3 . By th e s p r in g r e a d in e s s b e in of 1914, th ro u g h to N e v e r th e le s s , q u a rte rs p o s s ib le a c tiv e th e sta ff th e G ilin s k y arm y e ffo r ts fo r w ill m ay It be A rm y is n o ta b ly by th e be th e above, w ar success. to m ade to th a t w ill of th e in th e la s t o ffe n s iv e th e ir a war th e c e r ta in ly g iv e d e c is iv e above and g rea test m o b iliz e d on fro m m easu re tro o p s of fr o n tie r th e on con voys, and th a t on th e head s ta ff. th e tr a in s a n d c o m p le te in a llie d h e a d q u a rte rs th e be to sp e c ifie d c o n c e n tr a tio n o n ly w o u ld a b le fr ie n d ly s a tis fy French th e ir ta k e w h ic h th e announced m in is te r ), She d raw backs w ar, th e th e e x c e p tio n w ill of d e c la r e s c o m p le te d d a y , w ith p u b lic ly R u s s ia n fo r ready expressed have c h ie fs th e o ff b lo w s , b u t p e r h a p s le s s R u ssia n d e c la r e s of a certa in ty w h a te v e r d e sir e s m ilita r y organ w ard o f th e fifte e n th th a t R u s s ia ’s th e G erm any with a p o s itio n w a itin g g e n e r a l s t a f f, in a tta c k tro o p s), corps tP o o r u n p rep ared been tw o fr o n tie r once very F ran ce, v a r io u s of G eneral w h ic h to a lw a y s sin c e on a w a y .” ) d iffe r e n c e s c u lty to w ar c o n s id e r in g m ilita r y s itu a tio n has a a r m ie s e c o n o m ic , p o lit ic a l, a n d resp on ds to G ilin s k y fir s t p r e p a r a tio n p o s s ib ility tim e in te r v e n tio n th e d is p o s itio n o f h e r tr o o p s u p o n h e r te r r ito r y in t im e o f p e a c e . He renders a sincere homage to the efforts made during the last three years by Russia to reinforce her m ilitary pow er, and he is happy to note the im p rovem ent produced, as a w hole, in the friendly and allied a rm y by the latest modifications introduced into the m obilization. s a y in g n ig h tm a r e th e and th e b lo w s . th a t jo u r n a l: “ T h e th e R u s s ia n and ta k in g D u b a il of In a word, it is essential that G erm any shall be attacked at the same tim e on the w est and on the east. (J u s t a b o u t th e tim e t h is c o n fe re n c e w a s h e l d C o l o n e l R e p i n g t o n , m i l i t a r y c o r r e s p o n d e n t o f The Tim es, w a s in of fr o m G eneral against A rm y. th e d is p o s itio n p ro v em e n ts are by F rench peace day. m a in ta in th a t a g a in s t th e as aw are th e th e g r e a t fir s t d a y t h e ir w ill u p o n (in itia tiv e In g rea ter w as p a r tie s a llo w m e n t to sh ock ed in p rom p t be a tta in e d fo r c e s th a t p o s s ib le , c o n s id e r a “ From what is known of the German mobilization and concentration, one mag conclude that the first great encounters will probably take place in Lorraine, Luxem burg, and Belgium ( s o v a n i s h e s t h e l e g e n d o f of c a m p a ig n . of c o n fir m to c ir c u m s ta n c e s , G eneral th e tio n s : tro o p s v ie w fr o n tie r . w h ic h o n ly c o n fe r r in g d e s ir e fr o n tie r . s ta ff th e re u p o n G erm an y her of by the offensive. The effect of this offensive will be the m ore certain insomuch as it will take place sooner, will be carried out with greater stren gth , and will take a m ore dangerous direction for the enem y. In accord , o n ly R u s s ia n in the course o f the preceding conferences. o c c a s io n s red u ced , th a n k s think that G erm any will direct a greater portion of her forces against France and will only leave a minimum of troops against Russia. fo u n d sta ff can of p o in t th e to w a rd m o b iliz a tio n com m on of p a s s in g o b je c t , tro o p s) ARTICLE 8. th e f a r a s I t Is c o n c e r n e d , t h e 1 8 9 2 , can b e in g m o b iliz a tio n th e ir p o in t, th e fro m th e c o m p e llin g T h is accord, of fo r c e s u n d e r s ta n d in g to s e t t le 2 c o m p e ls R u s s ia or even agree fo llo w s : com m on (p a r . p r e lim in a r y (p r e lim in a r y ) th e re fo r e of th e ir 1900 A rm y a p a r tia l enough a tte n tio n m ore (2 1 ), s im u lt a n e o u s ly case o f a lo n e th em . ern m e n ts and event th a t once April of th e G e rm a n y Im m e d ia te ly of express c o n fe re n c e m o b iliz a tio n m o b iliz e th e c o n fe re n c e o f 1 9 1 0 , r e a d in g a s d is p o s itio n 1910 F rench fo r c e s a s In new com m encem ent several As th e d iffic u ltie s in o n ly upou of ARTICLE >. S a m e o b s e r v a tio n s th a t v o lv e s fo llo w s : v ie w p o in t o f p r e c e d in g the defeat of the German armies remains, w hatever the circumstances mag b e , the first and princi pal object o f the allied arm ies.” en ces, a re In 1908, responding to the sam e considerations, i t envisaged the means adopted i n order to give the Germ ans, from the v e ry beginning of war, the grea test possible a n xiety on their eastern flank. (Id em .) day, th e w ith o u t tw e n tie th day. G en eral G ilin s k y h ea d q u a rter sta ff arm y on corps h ea d q u a rters e stim a te d w ill th e ir s t a f f ’s com pel e a ste rn dem and. th a t th e th e fr o n tie r , H e m easu res G erm an s a ls o in to ta k e n le a v e at accord an ce g iv e s d e t a ile d by th e le a s t w ith R u s s ia n fiv e th e in d ic a tio n s or six F ren ch of th e m o b iliz a tio n of and p r e p a r a tio n , G eneral p la n a tio n s c o n c e n tr a tio n general D u b a il th a n k s on a c tu a l s ta te th e of th e d is p o s itio n , G eneral (iHODaa 'ivNOissaaotfoo v CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 5 R u s s ia n and A rm y (e ffe c tiv e s , d a te s c o n c e n tr a tio n ). G ilin s k y fo r o f p r e p a r a tio n th e s in c e r ity o f th e of R u s s ia n h is ex A rm y, and h i m s e l f f u l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h an offensive which w ill begin im m ediately a fter the fifteenth day, and which would be o f a nature calculated to retain at least five or a i r German arm y corps on the frontiers o f eastern Prussia. d e c la r e s Similar conferences will be found in Un Livre Noir, pages 425 to 437, inclusive, on July 13, 1912, and August, 1913, aa follows. Foreign Affairs prints an English translation of the 1912 conference with its comments, as follow s: (T h e e ig h th F r a n c o -R u s s ia n T he G reat F raud— The c h ie fs of of th e sta ff rep rod u ce o b s e r v a tio n s w ith o u t c o n c e r n in g a lte r a tio n a r tic le 4 th e in six fir s t (I I . para W e con ference o f th e tex ts 1910, r e a d in g The as fo llo w s : c o n fe r r in g p a r tie s agree, by com m on accord , on th e fo llo w in g of are “ (1 ) and, C o n fe r e n c e s in p r in c ip le , "(2 ) M oreover, h ea d q u a rters b etw ee n th e tw o c h ie fs of sta ff w ill be p e r io d ic a l a n n u a l. s ta ffs has w ill ta k e expressed a p la c e d e s ir e each tim e th a t one of th o th e re fo r . • • ( 8 ) The minutes o f the con ferences will be subm itted to the ap proval o f the Governm ent of each cou n try, and a v is 4 o f the minister of war and o f the prime minister will be attached th ereto , so that the chiefs o f staffs of the allied armies m ay refer to this docum ent in the realization o f desirable im provem ents. "(4 ) th e m ore c o n tin u o u s and e x c h n n g e o f in fo r m a tio n In of A p a r tic u la r , th e p o in ts b e fo r e w h ic h it each is c o m p le t e b etw ee n fo rm th e c o n fe re n c e , p rop osed to w ill th u s h e a d q u a rte rs regards fe r r in g ro u tes p a r tie s lin e , en d s. It m eans of agreed th a t h ow ever, w ith s y s te m a tic The F a r is -B o b r o u is k , is , fu r n is h e d sta tio n navy, to r u p tio n B la c k fo r an agenda be g iv e n fo r draw n up b e lo n g The w ill in t e le g r a p h y w o r k in g in th a t s ta tio n ow n In sta te s th e peace th a t is and a be w ar order e., of to w o r k in g to Is be “ In ta k e t lie fir s t th e at b o th w ay B o b r o u isk s h o u ld s u c c e s s fu lly be op p ose r m e ssa g e s). r e g u la r ly . handed absorbs to it e s ta b lis h The over c o n fe r r in g O c to b e r th e s h o u ld te c h n ic a l a s s e m b le d e ta il to he and n g a in ta k e n , B is e r ta , c o m m is s io n th e o th e r are (1 ) as on to w ith o u t th e th e In te r borders a n o th e r w ar fu n c tio n in g tim e m em bers In so agreed order th a t of to th e be w ill th a t th e of s ta tio n s in c e be 1910. p r o b a b ly In a on p o s itio n w ill h o ld " it s a fte r w a r d s at m eans p r o v id e d and P a r is th e th e s ta tio n s , a and at b e g in n in g to spot next C o m m is s io n th e m easu res B o b r o u is k , carry of P a r is , out th e B is e r ta . o r g a n iz e d fo r in th a t th is B e lg iu m c o m m u n ic a tio n s h a ll be via S ta te s and D enm ark. c a r r ie d out It via w ith now E n g la n d and th e M e d ite r r a n e a n The id e a abandoned, of as th e and a a ls o and th e P a c ific O cean, or P aragrap h A rm y, fo llo w in g F rench a tta c h e to p resen t in “ xhe by c a b le th e b etw ee n s e r v ic e of F ran ce c a r r ie r and R u s s ia has been th e h is A R T IC L E 5. observation s a s i n the con ference o f 1 910, reading as f o l l o w s : “ The conferring parties are agreed that article 5 com pels the con tracting parties not only n ot to make peace but also n ot to cease oper ations in order to conclude an arm istice individually.” A R T IC L E 8. In G eneral th e in c o n fe re n c e A u g u st, J u ly as th e th ey 1899, (J u n e w h ic h (?)) 2 d ip lo m a tic fo rm In th e fir st th e th e w as to d ip lo m a tic re fe rre d June 19, a rra n g em e n ts to 1900, arran gem en t in C h a p ter th e a c tu a lly I of c o n v e n tio n in of th e th e c o n fe re n c e w ill e x is te n c e , m o n th la s t and as p o in ts of te x t w ill be in c o m p le m e n t, w ill fa r as in th e and accord be in to J. G il in s k y , The Chief of the General Headquarters Staff of the Russian A rm y. The Chief of the Staff of the French A rm y. (V ls S d ) s e r v a tio n s (s p e lle d M e s s im i, p r e s u m a b ly in e r r o r ), The M inister o f W ar, 7tJ870— 11 P a r is o* H u itlD m e m ilita r y G ilin s k y , of th e J u ly 1 conven c h ie f of general (1 3 ), C u r iS r e s C ount The c o n v e n tio n gave r ise w ere to sta ff s ta ff of 1912. de C a s te ln a u , a tta c h ^ Ig n a tie f, la tte r m ilita r y o ffic e r s s u c c e s s iv e ly th e fo llo w in g p a r tie s w ere e x a m in e d exch ange of in te g r a lly in a of in th e th e have r e fe r e n c e one p r e c e d in g p resen t of th e back th a t every change th e m a r g in w ill . d e c id e w ith o u t m in u te s p r o c e e d in g w ith o b s e r v a t io n w ith o u t as In com m ent th e 1911 th e tim e th ey m ore new c o n fe re n c e , tex ts th e or m in u te s . a d v a n ta g e to by th e tex t c o n fe r r in g c o n fe re n c e . See A w h ic h th e sp e c ia l are th u s of d isp e n sin g , of th e as p r e c e d in g s e r v a tio n s F o r e ig n w ith o u t as a rt. 2, The la s t in com m ent th e 1911 c o m m e n ts 1911 th e tw o as by c o n fe r r in g See sen ten c e in th e p. th e fo llo w s : in te r p r e ta tio n 57, (s e e of th e and th e n of goes of fir s t, in “ ‘A sta ff th e n to th is end Is of v ie w , at w ar and c o n c e n tr a tio n stric t r e s e r v e , is m in im u m le ft on th e on of 1912 and of 1 9 1 1 .” F o r e ig n c o n fe re n c e has been (S e e A f f a i r s .) d iffe r s ap proved w ith th e and by th e s ig n a tu r e of c o n fe r e n c e o f A u g u s t, 1 9 1 1 .” III. fir st new th e p aragrap h 5 7 ). of A r tic le n etw o rk by upon th e III 1911 con o f th e 1912 c a p ita l th e its e lf of th a t it is A llie s on In th e r e g io n . s e p a r a t e ly th e (o p e n ta k en The In th e a g a in s t m u st b o th s id e s be, at th e on p resen t th e sta ff s itu a tio n r e la tio n has of th a t e s ta b lis h e d its bases: com p osed th e upon and F ren ch fo llo w in g tro o p s, fr o n tie r of th is e ffo r t. T u rks, th e and of G erm an s r a ilw a y s E iffe l p o in t p la n th e r e c e n tly s im u lta n e o u s ly b a s in g R u s s ia , th e The a tta c k su pport w estern s u c c e s s iv e ly c o m b in e d and in w h ic h In t h e n o ta b ly R u s s ia . w ith of th e m e a su re s th e o p e ra te to a rg u m e n ts im p r o v e m e n ts fr o n tie r , a g a in s t in F ran ce th a t and endeavor of the A ffa ir s , p . in in s is ts to 1910 accordan ce th e th e ir F rench m a x im u m w h ic h w ith in G erm an e and th e W ith I ta ly of ob is s u e fo llo w s . out p la c e s ), th e co n tra ry , w ith pow er th e as m a k in g of c h ie f on be fo u n d s h e d s , la n d in g F rench w ith F o r e ig n p o in ts a r e ' to of " of (S a m e S e p te m b e r issu e th e m in u te s o f id e n tic a l J o ffre v ie w n e ig h b o r h o o d once p a r t ie s .” 57, of c o n v e n tio n F ran ce th e to S e p te m b e r c o n t in u a lly th e ob is s u e II. S ep te m b e r m in u te s of o f R u s s ia paragrap h fe r e n c e on p. c o n fe re n c e s A R T IC L E lin e s (S a m e S e p te m b e r I. th e c o n fe re n c e . in c o n fe re n c e , G o v e rn m e n ts F ir s t are p a r t ie s .” 57, A f f a i r s .) “ Sam e of p. A f f a i r s .) A R T IC L E p la n M k s s im t (E d . PREAM BLE. “ A cc e p ted in D u b a il ^ p u b lis h 1918. m in u t e s .” F ran ce (S ig n e d ) o f th e c h ie f P a r is . accept th e in sc r ib e d T h is p o s s ib le , in te re s t o b s e r v a tio n s . 4 C o lo n e l in c o n fe rr in g reproduced reproduced. of w h ic h s h a ll in tak en se c r e ta r ie s . p a r tie s (aH6nas) paragraphs p o in t lo n g and w ere C o n fe re n c e ” — G eneral de R u s s ia ; E m b assy of p la c e th e th e m s e lv e s c o n fe re n c e A R T IC L E 7. No at p resen t: in R u s s ia n c a p a c ity fo llo w in g “ G eneral w ith our T h ese F ran ce we s ta ffs G eneral J o ffr e , p r e l im in a r y “ a b ro g a ted . c o n fo r m ity s im i 5 7 -5 9 . th e y m o n th s im ila r th e r e fe r rin g th a t th a t tw o o f a r t ic le and E m b assy th e G o v e rn m e n ts Sam e R e m a in s I e x c e lle n c y w e r e a ls o c o n fe rr in g read s as “ T h is p ig e o n s . N ext th e are v ie w s ” : by T u rkey. d ir e c t has U n ite d and th e pre i n s c r i b e d .) A R T IC L E T e le g r a p h y w ar th e w o r d s “ E ig h th w ar is pages c o n te n tio n fo r b etw ee n D enm ark. (2 ) th e A ffa ir s , “ c o n s p i r a c y .” 1892, A rm y, m et “ A cce p ted b etw ee n tex t, of c o n te n ts us The th e s a m e F o r e ig n th e 1912. n ot rep rod u ce of of J u ly , c h ie fs b e fo r e In d ic a te p r e p a r in g m in u te s 17, R u s s ia n th e fo llo w s : p ly in g in now th e re fo r e c o n fe re n c e o f th e A u gu st F o r e ig n c o r r e s p o n d in g P arD o r ig in a l M bbtinob of the F rench and R ubbian Chiefs Staff at F aris in J uly , 1912. accordan ce of F rench to s e r v ic e s . th e n have (th e R u s s ia n W e B la c k m e e tin g s a t B o b r o u is k , and of W e and deal a b s u r d ity th e G eneral F ren ch good Issu e G erm an th e in 1 9 1 2 .) m in u te s m in u te s . do not 1911. h e ld a th e th e fir s t s u b c h ie f o f th e s t a ff o f th e a r m y ; C o lo n e l M a t t o n , m ilit a r y w h ic h read y F r a n c o R u s s ia n stu d y fo u r in te c h n ic ia n s M essen gers p rop osed are s h o u ld of C r im e a , The tim e p a r tie s a of the r e fe r e n c e The th e of JU LY, of for A f f a i r s .) th e R u s s ia n e n tir e ly a lm o s t S e b a s to p o l, been and and w ere of A u g u st, 1911 S e p te m b e r by th e h ead tio n of m o n th . in (A t fin d in th e sh ow m in u te s M inuter con arm y. code of R u s s ia F o r e ig n th e m u st of th e not th a n has c o n fe re n c e th e s u r p r is e tim e , s a tisfa c to r y It and o th e r tim e th e in (t. w h ic h se r v ic e , p la c e to th e a p p a ra tu s b e lo n g s som e s o le ly code D u b a il The to In OF tex t m e e tin g s c o n fe re n c e w h e r e St e x i s t s d o cu m e n ts (h e s im ila r th is Im p e r ia l th e fu ll C o n fe r e n c e — a r e w ir e le s s th a t a w o r d in g read ers by of e x a m in e . corresp on d en ce brouillage ) d e c la r e s It Its in ( S eb a sto p o l sta ff w h ic h Sea, up of is d e s ir a b le stro n g e r m ix in g h e a d q u a rte rs Sea, of th e F rench) th e F rench Prepared and CO N F E R E N C E m o n th K r a s n o e -S e lo of “ The p la c e . The w ill are and to P A R IS la s t s ta ffs . The chiefs o f staffs particularly in sist that the m inutes of the con ferences shall be submitted to the tw o G overnm ents fo r ratification. As a m b le la r it y m e e tin g s in s ta ff a t m in u te s p o in ts : THE rep rod uced c o n f e r e n c e .) III. R ussians W ar . the H ow A R T IC L E 4. graphs m ilita r y E X H IB IT A lp s m ore tc e s p e c ia lly d e fe n d th e of p asses u n its of fo o t by 6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD fo o t. The w h o le b e g in n in g ou 1 ,3 0 0 .0 0 0 m en (T h e m u ss th e of th e th e n etw o rk one or th e of tw o an of by (in Is c o n c e n tra te d to ta l 8 w ill of C o n v e n tio n , th e g r e a tly fro m th e th e exceed th e read y, arm y. c o n v e n tio n w h ic h w as th e of 1892. s p in a l at Is m a k in g su ch new c o m p a n ie s c o n c e n tr a tio n , upon m ar th e as and im p r o v e m e n ts w ill a llo w , w ith in G erm an one p resen t m om ent in su pp ort of b e in g fro m E le v e n d ev o ted to th is w h ic h is set out “ G eneral th e He to to v ery " On tio n , w o u ld th a t “ On th e adopt an hand, e x p e cta n t m om ent on to -d a y . In s tig a te d th e la tte r th e le a v e in F i n l a n d w as A s ia and of M in o r th e ir and s t ill e n a b le fo r c e s on th e fig u r e a c tio n fin d to le a d her sh e The fo r c e s In any at le a s t, r a ilw a y s n e c e ssity th e and th e e ffe c tiv e s th e G erm an y a fte r to m o b iliz a tio n to d is s ip a te “ It be J o ffr e and is a ll th e R u ssia n a grou p at a ll d e v e lo p m e n t to r a ilw a y th e of lin e s w ere th e end. of th e it of W ith th e th e fo r c e s (a ) of th e of lin e s is d e c id e d fifte e n th th e r u p lin g la t t e r of of m ay re fe r fr o m S t. to th e day r ie s — o n e p a n ic s . th a t b e lo n g in g a b le . They to In th e secon d and agrees e ay ta k in g does w ith The fro m enem y gauges th e of one fr o m go u se th e lin e s (i. d o u b le e„ c u rv e ) its th e S ta te has a c q u ir e d fr o m tra n sp o rt w ill th e E m p ir e to th e r e c a lls th e gen eral reason s can W arsaw th u s th e m be w estern w h ic h 5 8 ), sta ff be in as tb s p r e p a ra to ry R u s s ia n G ilin s k y in he on of a r m ie s d ir e c tio n P r u s s ia th e th e le ft c a r r ie d bank out a tte m p ts to n e c e s s ity g r a v ity c o n d itio n s th e e a ste rn by has if of th ese w h ic h of w ill A lle n s t e ln or a tte m p s of th e h is to V is tu la c o n c e n tr a tio n le a v e th a t b ase to 1911 fo r s ia n and F rench w ar and order to a llo w th e navy has a lr e a d y arm y its e lf m is s io n been of R u s s ia th e to by is be a lr e a d y fo r tw o as p. in to R u s s ia stu d y in b etw ee n not th e c o n fe re n c e . p. in 1911 c o n fe re n c e . in su r e d fr o n tie r . in te r v e n e 1911 c o n fe re n c e . A R T IC L E Sam e is in A ffa ir s , p . 5 9 .) w ill C r im e a , and up to th e th a t a lr e a d y F ran ce and u tiliz in g q u e s tio n and has s ta ff. From o ffic e r s of it T ran s R u s s ia b e tw ee n to If F rench c o u n tr ie s T h is or F ran ce. th e sa t s u ffic e w ill R u s s ia n th e g iv e gen eral S e p te m b e r Issu e of F o r e ig n S e p te m b e r is s u e of F o r e ig n S e p te m b e r Issu e of F o r e ig n J. , V II. (S e e (S ig n e d ) G il in s k y The Chief of Staff o f the Russian A rm y. J. J offre , The C hief of Staff of the French A rm y. A. M illerand, The M inister of E X H IB IT T F o r. IV . L ibrary of Congress , L egisla tive R eferen ce Service. ( T r a n s la t i o n .) St (D n L iv r e N o is , D ip lo m a tic d 'a v a n t g u e r r e . P a r is , 1923 4 3 1 -4 3 7 1 ) t n in t h conference (a d odst of s e c tio n , vol ’ ’ a r tic le 4 2 pp of th e m s). w iti n orm a w ith o u l F in a lly to m u st V. (S e e an T h ori in to w h ic h w ir e le s s , 5 9 .) d iffic u lt to w a rd and to A R T IC L E V I. as th . e x e r c is e in in te n d s 5 9 .) th e am corre crea te of F ren ch (S e e com lin e lin e s th e of to s p e c ia l N orw ay. th e b e in g c o m m is s io n , p o s s ib ility H, o th ers th e th e and a ll s e c u rity . by up In d i are s ta ff fo r c o m m u n ic a tio n th e N everth eless F ran ce d ilig e n c e R u s draw n sy ste m th e s ta tio n of th e peace th e cod es, B iz e r ta in fo r in w h ic h th is S c a n d in a v ia n to 1911 c a te g o p o s itio n at b etw een th e p o sts d e te r m in e S eb a sto p o l sta tio n s s p e c ia l b e tte r and p r iv a te to be th e a lo n g been general c a n b e u s e d in o th e r C racow have satisfactory. s ta tio n A R T IC L E A ffa ir s , it d e p o s ite d th a t w ill in fo u r tim e s e r v ic e of w ar d ic tio n a r ie s by th ro u g h la t e r peace corresp on d en ce new of fo r m u la te d The e s ta b lis h e d c o m m u n ic a tio n s th e s ta tio n R u ssia n a d v is a b le tim e N ik o la ie ff. c a r r ie d s till th e r a tific a s t a f fs .” th is or th e th ro u g h are in su r e of fo r m om ent and R u s s ia n m essen gers sen t m in u te s c o n f e r e n c e .) in Code up p rove th e near a th e in s ta tio n s , and F rench c rea te para c o m m u n ic a tio n s tim e w ith is s u e fo llo w in g w is h e s p resen t th e The of tw o 1912 In s tr u c tio n s of c o m m u n ic a tio n s m ig h t w ir e le s s s t a t io n to u se p resen t d isp a tc h e s it th e w ar. fu r th e r , r e o r g a n iz e d code th e draw n r e g u la r concern ed w ith To of s ta tio n d is p a tc h e s a p p o in te d . r ise s o le th e boon S e p te m b e r th a t th e to At p resen t s till corresp ond en ce th e 1910, fo llo w s : r e c o n n a is s a n c e , th e It n ecessary p o in t w h e r e p o in t fir s t of th e G o v e rn m e n ts c o m m u n ic a tio n c h ie fs . s p e c ia l th a t r e c e n tly The six (s e e of c o r r e s p o n d in g w o r k in g fo r at been fo r have th e th e a c o m m u n ic a te be th e c o n fe re n c e 1911 tw o B lz e r t a -S o b a s to p o l. t h o r o u g h ly im p r o v e th e w ill th e in s is t fr o m as a c c o r d in g a llo w se c tio n is fo r is fy a lte r a tio n at e x c e p tio n th e d is a p p e a r s tim e fo r exch anged sp on d en ce to c o n fe r e n c e . s ig n a ls th e th e p a r tic u la r ly m in is tr ie s h ours of 4 c o n fe re n c e o f w ith m easures P n r is -B o b r u is k , th e IV. w ith o u t a r tic le c o n tin u e s (w ir e le s s ) and fix in s u b m itte d c o m p le te d tim e Sam e c o m in g u tiliz a t io n tra n s fo r m in g in r e so u r c e s a v a il to m ake of and and F. quad to th e and th e m eans S. A ffa ir s , r a ilw a y s fo r m e r w ith th e th e c e n te r fo rc es o ffe n s iv e reproduce M oscow u sed to th e th e enem y 4 o f th e p. paragraph of advanc a ttr ib u tin g b e lo n g in g of or tr a n s la t io n In to so u th fo r c e th e s ta ff th e re u p o n cou rse Sam e th e on on G en «yal tim e I v a n g o r o d .” a r tic le s h a ll th e is A ffa ir s ] be w ith m aneuver th e r a ilw a y s , in d iv id e d quad u sed b r in g B o lo g n e J o ffr e a to (d ) th e s h o u ld th e of h eart of on S ta te be a llo w re fe r F o r e ig n u se fu l w h ic h in te n tio n to fro m r a ilw a y s s t a ff on w ord a c c u ra te e c c e n tr ic The m ay an be fr o n tie r s , or L o u n in e tz - w ill The be accordan ce seem o f p r iv a te In flu e n c e . c o n tin u ity th e not w h ose th e p o r tio n s (c ) w o u ld o th e r p la c e On c o u ld d e v e lo p m e n t . o f th e in w h ic h r e s p e c tiv e ly , can con lin e s , F rench th in k s, it a p p ly and th e are c e r ta in th e w h ic h G en eral to if c o m in g , (voie russe) r a ilw a y s s in g le th e to w a rd The B r ia n s k -G o m e l, or not W arsaw , C row n, th e c a te g o ry 3 e “ e» « L ® l l i n s k y 7 6 8 7 6 — 11 of c o e r c iv e C racow gau ges. of The th a t d e la y e d . R r e s t-L ito v s k ; t r o o p s .— E d . w ith lin e s . B r e s t -L it o v s k ; m ay s id e , th e it ( anorm alee) abn orm al and of one w ill b e r e a liz e d n e ig h b o r h o o d d ir e c t m ay rem arks tr a n s la tio n . at It fr o m R u s s ia N e v e r th e le s s , by A ffa ir s ] jo in [th is P e te r s b u r g -R ig a -K o c h e d a r y , th e “ The p e r fe c te d d u tie s e s s e n tia l th e even he th e tra n sp o rte d if in to o b se r v a tio n s c h ie fs tex t T. of in (T h is The c a tio n s P e t e r s b u r g -T a p s -W a lk -R ig a - r a ilw a y s , a lig n m e n t to be ou t by s e c tio n s F o r e ig n th e Im p ro v e m e n ts p r o je c t e d . th e th e im p o r ta n c e in and a c c u ra te b o d ie s on d ir e c te d s tr a te g ic out t i o n .’ to m u st m in im u m . d o u b le th e if or A ffa ir s , c o n fe re n c e s of m o b iliz a t io n of in e v ita b ly S t. W arsaw to lin e s G ilin s k y to c a r r ie d lin e s a one a c c e le r a t e d been "c o u r a n t .” R u s s ia n be to w h ic h of lin e s of always are sam e fo llo w s ” : ns o f F o r lg n graph : to im m e d i a ttitu d e fo rc e s J o ffr e a ll S ie d le t s -W a r s a w , a d v a n c in g are “ C R m eral h ig h e s t tw o is not th u s to O r e l, s e c tio n s th e tro o p s are th e an Ed. fr o m u sed lin e s w h ic h T h orn. p o in ts a p p ly P etersb u rg , F in a lly , w ill th e d e la y s J a b in k a -B r e s t -L it o v s k , m ay tro o p s. G en eral im p r o v e m e n ts , to n ot be th e tow n w ord (b ) th e redu ced d o u b le d , d o u b lin g lin e be R u s s ia n T h ese s e c tio n s o th e r The by G erm an c o n s titu te s e m p ir e w ere m ay Jt b o d ie s and G erm an y b e in s p ir e d th e s u b je c t, h a s a lr e a d y O rel th e [th is "c o u r a n t ." in g of o b je c t, s e r io u s ly lin e s , by of m u st w o u ld be M o u r a v ie w o -K o c k e d a r y ; r u p lin g m ig h t o b v io u s ly by r a ilw a y s . a p p lie d tw o d e fe a t th is a r m ie s th a t w o u ld s in g le n a tio n a l J a b in k a , w h ic h On of q u a d r u p le d , a s fu lly th e a n n ih ila tio n th e p o r tio n hand, s e c tio n s of u tiliz e d w estern o th e r th e r a ilw a y s th a t c e n tr a tio n fe a r s c o sts. c o n c e n tr a tio n fa c to r s th a t ta k e T h o r n -P o s e n . and as “ Sam e of Tu rkey. th e re fo r e p u rsu ed and ob serves b u lk or B e r lin c h ie fs r e n d in g jo in R u s s ia of ev en t, a g a in s t fe lt p r o b a b ly th e ir r a ilw a y s th e m a in grou pm ent ARTICLE s itu a tio n c o n s id e r a b le fu tu re to o p p o rtu n e com pel c o n s tr u c tio n th e p resen t W arsaw " T h e in te n p resen t, th e w o u ld its th e at of th e th e m ilita r y h er an not w o u ld th e m en a r m ie s at is a c c e le r a t e in th e is on on accord to W arsaw , r e g io n m arch d a lly “ G en eral Sw eden th e seem s id e . d ev o te h e r s e lf m ore sid e . 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 her of not o ffe n s iv e to That th e c o n c e n ta te of of to th a t m arch in in tow ard e ith e r on to Is d is p o s e enem y “ ‘ Thp up to paragraphs A u s tr ia n th e re fo r e s c a le s . T u rks tim e ly th e debouch on and F ran ce m o b iliz e d G erm an y. J o ffr e th e m , in be d e v e lo p s d ir e c tin g and e n a b le G erm an y. F in a lly , to th e G erm an y, m ay of m o b iliz a t io n . a t e ly a r m ie s , to c o n c e n tr a tio n a g a in s t fr a n k ly W h ils t have G ilin s k y G en eral of th e y G erm an y. does o b v io u s P etersb u rg th e T h is c h ie f su b je c t d e v e lo p e d an on th e a g a in s t th e w ith c o n s id e r a tio n S t. re s o lv e d o ffe n s iv e by in d ic a te d . la r g e r c o n ta in in g th e on on h o s tilit ie s . appeared, th e T h is arou nd w o u ld g e n e r a l s t a f f is m ake le d R u s s ia . of m u st order of on g r e a t ly ns had in s id e c o n c e n tr a tio n . m a in ta in in g fo rc e s a ttitu d e , p r e c e d e n tly She m ap concordant and c ir c u m s ta n c e s check tim e Sw eden and a g a in s t has w th a r m ie s o p e n in g a sam e of a llie d r a ilw a y s , a ffo r d fa v o r a b le th an in A u s tr ia th e p r in c ip le ex p ressed th e a c o n c e n tr a tio n . in p resen t d is a s tr o u s . at o th e r at h er not be pow er tw o under le a s t hand, can th e e x p la n a tio n s , n e c e s s ity o p in io n a c tio n at th e h is fo r accord on of th e im p r o v e d R u s s ia in A rm y b u lk w h o se has e ffe c t fa c e th e d is p o s itio n s fu lly w ith o th e r sh e and m oral Is p r e s s in g , th e pow er; F ren ch F rench agrees A rm y, be to tiie d ir e c t a ls o It a lia n th e G ilin s k y sta ff o f e ffo rts e x h ib its , c o n c e n tr a tio n . R u s s ia of d ir e c te d if J o ffr e in G eneral s h o r t ly , yenr c o n c e n tr a tio n . th e in w o r k .' “ G en eral R u s s ia n m easu res r a ilw a y on tim e ) are a r t ic le sta ff v a r io u s advance fo r c e s The A llia n c e .] F rench fr a n c s F ren ch M ilita r y th e d ays' advance m illio n s fo r F r a n c o -Itu s s ia n “ ‘ M oreover, now th e fr o n tie r . p r o v id e d F r a n c o -R u s s la n row of G erm an d e la v J In accordan ce m ilita r y sk y, c h ie f c o n v e n tio n c h ie f o f of w ith th e th e th e of A u gu st general gen eral S t. P e te rsb u rg a n d o f A u g u st, 1 9 1 3 . at p r o v is io n s 17, sta ff o f sta ff of 1892, th e th e K r a s n o e -S e lo 1 of H is E x c e lle n c y R u s s ia n A rm y, and F ren ch A rm y, a t d iffe r e n t m et in G eneral G eneral G llin J o ffr e c o n fe re n c e tim e s d u r in g th e at n o n tfc t CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Others present were General de L agu’ che, military attachd o f the French Embassy in R u s s ia ; Colonel Count Ignaticf, m ilitary attachd of the Russian Embassy in Paris ; Colonel Berthelot, commander of the Ninety-fourth Infantry Regiment, aide major general d6sigt\6 of the French Arm y. The various points e f the agreement were successively considered by the conferees and the following views exchanged : P R E L IM IN A R Y REM ARK. First of all the conferees decide that whenever they agree to accept without change one or more paragraphs o f the procfcs-verbal o f the preceding conference the text o f It shall be reproduced in its entirety in the present proctis-verbai. A special note will be inscribed on the margin o f the texts thus re produced. This method of procedure dispenses with the necessity for referring back to the text o f the preceding report as much as possible. Preamble (accepted w ithout com m ent by the conferees) : The two chiefs o f general staff agree that the words “ defensive war ’ ’ should not be interpreted in the sense o f “ war to be conducted defensively.” They assert, on the contrary, the absolute necessity for the Russian and French arm ies to take a vigorous offensive and ns far as possible sim ul taneously, in compliance with the text of article 3 o f the agreement, according to which " the forces of the two contracting powers shall all comp into nction with the least delay.” F i r s t A r t i c l e . Same remarks as in t h e conferences of 1 9 1 0 a n d the follow ing ones, which rend as follo w s: “ The two chiefs of general staff, confirming the point o f view o f tho previous conferences, agree fully on this point, that the defeat of the German Arm ies remains under all circumstances the first and prin cipal aim o f the allied arm ies.” Completed as fo llo w s : “ And this even more so than form erly on account of the considerable growth o f the relative m ilitary power o f Germany in the triple alliance.” A r t . 2 . Same remarks a s in the conferences o f 1 9 10, 1911, a n d 1 9 1 2 . However, the Russian and French Governments having approved the interpretation of the two chiefs of general stuff by signing the proc^sverbaux of the conferences o f A ugust and July, 1 9 1 2 , these remarks should read as follow s : “ A s r e c o g n i z e d by the Russian a n d French Governm ents in 1 9 1 1 and 1 9 1 2 , Germ an mobilization w ill compel Russia and France to mobilize all their forces im m ediately and sim ultaneously as soon as it becomes known without the need of a previous agreement. The same icill apply to e v er y act of w ar o f the German A rm y against either o f the allied pow ers. But in case of partial or even general m obilization o f A ustria o r Ita ly alone, such agreement is required.’' The sentence underlined was added to provide for the possibility of a sudden attack with forces under cover preceding mobilization, for the purpose of gaining an important strategic point. A r t . 3. Sharing the opinion o f their predecessors, the conferees agree that Germ any will direct the greatest part o f its forces again st F rance and w ill only leave minimum of forces against Russia. The principal result of the enforcement of the German m ilitary law o f 1913 w ill be to hasten the mobilization of the German A rm y. T his arm y can then have more time than in the past to operate against France before turning against Russia. The plan o f the Allies should then be to try to attack both sides sim ultaneously, exerting the maximum o f combined efforts. General Joffre declares th at France w ill engage on its northeast frontier alm ost all her forces, the number of which w ill exceed that provided for in the text o f the convention by more than 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 men ; th a t the concentration of the fighting elements on this frontier w ill be com pleted, for the most part, on the tenth clay of m obilization, and that t h e offensive operations o f this group of forces w ill commence from t h e m orning o f the eleventh day. General Gilinsky declares that R ussia w ill engage against Germ any a group of forces consisting of at least 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 men and the concen tration o f the fighting element on the Russian-Germ an frontier w ill be completed, for the m ost part, on the fifteenth day o f m obilization, and th a t the offensive operations of that group of forces w ill commence im m ediately afte r the fifteenth day. B y the end o f 1 9 1 4 , the end of the concentration w ill be advanced about two clays. The conferees outline briefly the arrangements made for the con centration and grouping of the French and Russian Arm ies directed ag ain st Germ any. They agree upon the need o f directing the offensive against the heart o f the enemy c o u n tr y ; upon the advisability o f concentrating the forces in such a way as to be able to either combat the forces of the enemy concentrated in eastern Prussia or to march to. Berlin by s ta r t ing operations in the south of that province if the German forces are concentiatrd on the left bank of the Vistula. A lth ough aware of the need for Russia to m aintain large forces again st A ustria and Sweden, General Joffre thinks that the defeat of G erm any w ill greatly facilitate the operations which the Russian Ansiy shall direct against the other enemy powers. Annihilation of 7 6 8 7 6 — 11 7 the German forces, therefore, must be pushed at any cost, and this from the start. For this purpose delays in mobilization and concen tration of the allied armies should be reduced to a minimum. To this end the development of the railroad system is an essential fa c t o r ; General Gillusky states that the construction work recom mended in the preceding conference has been carried out as fo llo w s : The sections Briansk-Gomel and Lounlnetz-Jabinka o f the line from Orel to Varsovia have been double tracked. The section Jablnka-Brest-Lltovsk has been quadruple tracked. A s to the quadrupling o f Siedletz-Varsovia the difficulties of its exe cution are too great, and a better result w ill be obtained by construct ing a new line with double tracks starting from RIazan and Toula and ending at Varsovia. General Joffre agrees on this point. An examination of the railroad map leads the two chiefs o f general staff to conclude that a marked increase in the rapidity of concen tration would be obtained by constructing certain railroad lines con necting eastern Russia with the region o f Varsovia, such as 1. Doubling the line Batrakl-Fensa-Riajsk-Bogoiavlcnsk-SoukbinitchiS m o le n s k . 2. Doubling the line Rovno-Sarny Louninletz-Barnnovitchi. 8. Doubling the line L ozovain-Poltnva-K lev-Sarny-Kovel, construct ing the line Grichlno-Kovel. Offensive operations will also be facilitated by adopting the standard gauge on the Russian railroads on the left bank of the V istula, as well as by increasing the means of crossing the river In the region of Varsovia. L astly , it seems thut in order to obtain the service required of the railroads the rolling stock (cars and especially locomotives of great power) should be greatly increased. W ith respect to the conduct of operations it is quite necessary for the allied armies to obtain a decisive success as quickly as possible. A check of the French armies at the beginning of the war would permit Germany to transfer to Its eastern frontier a part of the forces which would have fought at first against France. Ir, on the contrary, the French armies quickly obtain a success against the German forces facing them, this success will facilitate to that extent the operations o f the Russian armies, since the forces brought by Germany to her western frontier w ill be unable to be transferred to the east. It Is therefore essential that the French armies should have a marked numerical superiority over the German forces of the west. These conditions w ill he easily realized If Germany is obliged to pro tect herself with larger forces on her eastern frontier. General Joffre states that, in this connection, it would be advan tageous for both armies to have the Russian forces so grouped I d the governm ent of Varsovia, even in peace time, that they constitute a direct menace to Germany. General Gllinsky states that the new plan o f reorganization of the Russian Arm y provides for the establishment of an army corps in the region o f Varsovia. A r t . 4 . The chiefs of general staff reproduce w ithout change the first three paragraphs of the observations concerning article 4 in the conference o f 1 9 12, which read as follows : “ 1. The two chiefs of general staff shall hold periodic and, in prin ciple, annual conferences. “ 2. Furthermore, a conference shall be held whenever a general staff shall deem one necessary.” Paragraph 3 could be simplified as follows : “ 3. The procfes-verbal o f the conference shall be submitted for ap proval to the government of each country so that the chiefs of general staff of the allied armies may rely on this document for the realiza tion o f desirable Improvements.” Paragraph 4 shall read as follows : “ 4. The exchange of inform ation between the allied armies, being of utm ost value, w ill continue regularly and frequently.” Before each conference the points which it Is proposed to consider shall be m utually made known. The w ays and means o f correspondence in time of war have been perfected according to the wishes expressed in the course of the con ference of 1911 and 1912. The wireless stations o f Paris-Bobrouisk and of Blzerte-Sebastopol are functioning well. The station at Bizerte has been reinforced by France ; a powerful station is being constructed in Russia near the Black Sea, so that communications may be as easy by day as by night. F ollow ing the attem pts at communicating between the Eiffel Tower and the Russian naval station at Sveaborg, It Is desirable to see the latter station reinforced. Telegraphic communications can be exchanged between the French ami Russian chiefs of general staff by British cables and with the aid of Great Britain. T he conventions with London have ju st been concluded, all ar rangements have been made, and operations can start. Cablegrams pass by way of America, A ustralia, and Zanzibar or by way o f South Africa and Zanzibar to reach Odessa. 8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Governm ent In the telegram o f February 24, 1910. No. 948, to the Communications by emissaries are organized by the French chief of effect that “ while allowing France nnd Englnnd complete liberty in general staff for the transm ission of dispatches from France to Rus delim iting the w estern frontiers of Germany we expect that the Allies sia. It would be advisable for the Russian chief of general staff to on their part w ill give us equal liberty In delimiting our frontiers with organize communications by emissaries on the same plan. A rt . 5. The Russian and French Governments having accepted the i Germ any and Austria-H ungary.” Hence the Impending exchange o f notes on the question raised by interpretation given since 1910 to article 6, said Interpretation could Doumergue will Justify us in asking the French Government sim ul read as fo llo w s : taneously to confirm Its assent to allowing Russia freedom of action in “ The Russian and French Governments have respectively recognized drawing up her future frontiers In the w est. Exact data on the ques that article 5 obliges the contracting parties not to stop operations tion w ill be supplied by us in due course to the French cabinet. or conclude an arm istice separately.” In addition we deem it necessary to stipulate for the assent of A r t . 6. (Accepted w ithout remarks by the conferees.) France to the removal at the termination o f the war of the disqualifi Article 6 is repealed as heretofore. Please explain the above to In conformity w ith the diplom atic agreement o f August, 1 8 99, men cations resting on the Aland Islands. Briand nnd wire the results. tioned in chapter 1 o f the conference o f July 2, 1 9 00, the convention will la st as long as the diplom atic agreements now In force which It 1 supplements. (Translated b> Lottie M. Manross, December 13, 1 9 2 3 .) A telegram from the Russian ambassador in Paris to M. Pokrovsky, In 1916 France and Russia entered into a secret treaty to January 31 (February 1 3 ), 1 9 1 7 : divide German and Austrian territory between Russia and France, as follow s: F X H IR IT V. A r r r .x n ix D. Secret agreement o f tMS—n between France and Russia for the disposi tion o f German and Austrian territory. I. The Russian M inister of Foreign Affairs (M . Sazonoff) to the Rus sian am bassador at Paris. February 24 (M arch 9 ) , 1 9 1 0 : (N o. 9 4 8 .) P etrograd. Please refer to my telegram No. 6063 o f 1915. A t the forth coming conference you may be guided by the following general principles: “ The political agreements concluded between the Allies during the war m ust remain intact, and are not subject to revision. They include the agreement, with France and England on Constantinople, the Straits, Syria, and Asia M inor, and also the London treaty with Ita ly. A ll sug gestions for the future delimitation of central Europe are at present premature, but in general one m ust bear in mind that w e are prepared to allow France and England com plete freedom in drawing up the w estern frontiers of G erm any, in the expectation that the Allies on their part would allow us equal freedom in drawing up our frontiers with G erm any and Austria. “ It is particularly necessary to insist on the exclusion of the Polish question from the subject o f international discussion and on the elimi nation o f all a ttem pts to place the future of Poland under the guar antee and the control o f the Pow ers. “ W ith regard to the Scandanavian States, it is necessary to en deavor to keep back Sweden from any action hostile to us and at the same time to examine betimes measures for attracting Norway on our side in case It should prove impossible to prevent a war w ith'S w ed en. " Rumania has already been offered all the political advantages which could induce her to take up arms, and therefore It would be per fectly futile to search for new baits in this respect. “ The question o f pushing out the Germans from the Chinese market, is of very great im portance, but Its solution Is Impossible w ithout the participation of Japan. It is preferable to examine it at the economic conference, where the representatives of Japan w ill be present. T his does not exclude the desirability of a preliminary exchange o f views on the subject between Russia and England by diplom atic m eans.” Sazonoff. II. (N o. 8 8 .) Copy to London. Referring to your telegram No. 50 7 . confidentially, I immediately communicated in writing its contents to Briand. who told me that toe would not fall to give me an official reply o f the French Government, but that he could at once declare, on his own behalf, th a t the satisfaction of the wishes contained in your telegrnm w ill meet with no difficulties. IsvonsKT. IV. On February 1 ( 1 4 ) , 1917, the Russian foreign m inister addressed the follow ing note to the French ambassador at P e tro g ra d : “ In your note of to-day’s date your excellency w as good enough to inform the Imperial Government th a t the Governm ent o f the Repub lic w as contem plating the inclusion In the terms of peace to be offered to Germ any the following demands and guaranties of a territorial n a tu r e : “ 1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France. “ 2. The frontiers are to be extended at least up to the lim its o f the form er principality of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up a t the discretion o f the French Government so as to provide tor the stra tegic needs and for the inclusion in French territory of the entire iron district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of the Faar V alley. “ 3. The rest of the territories situated on the left bank o f the Rhine, which now form part of the German Empire, are to be en tirely separated from G erm any and freed from all political and economic de pendence upon her. “ 4. The territories of the left bank o f the Rhine outside French territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, and are to be occupied by French troops until such time as the enemy States have completely satisfied all the conditions and guaranties indicated In the treaty o f peace. “ Your excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would be happy to be able to rely upon the support o f the Im perial G o v e r n ment for the carrying out of Its plans. B y order o f H is Im perial M a jesty , m y m ost august m aster, I have the honor, in the name o f the Russian G overnm ent, to inform your excellency b y the p resen t note that the G overnm ent of the Republic m ay rely upon th e support o f the Im perial G overnm ent f w the carrying out of its plans as set out a b o ve." V. F inally, on February 26 (M arch 1 1 ) , 1917, the Russian am bassador at P aris sent the follow ing telegram to M. Pekrovsky : (N o. 1 68.) Confidential telegram from M . Pokrovsky, M. Sazonoff’s second sue- | See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Governm ent o f the cessor ns foreign m inister, to the Russian ambassador a t Paris, JanuFrench Republic, anxious to confirm the importance o f the treaties ary 80 (February 1 2 ) , 1917. concluded w ith the Russian Governm ent in 1 9 15, for the settlem ent (No. 5 0 2 .) on the term ination o f the war of the question of Constantinople and the S traits in accordance w ith R ussia's aspirations, anxious, on the P etrograd. Copy to London confidentially. A t an audience w ith the m ost high, j other hand, to secure for its ally in m ilitary and Industrial respects M . Doumergue submitted to the Em peror the desire of France to secure ! all the guaranties desirable for the safety and the economic develop for herself at the end of the present war the restoration o f Alsacement of the Em pire, recognize Russia’s com plete liberty is establishing Lorraine and a special position In the valley o f the River Saar as well her w estern frontiers. as to attain the political separation from Germany o f her transISVObSKY. Rhenish districts and their organization on a separate basis, in order Bailsman sa y s: that in future the River Rhine m ight form a permanent strategical On the very next day (M arch 12 ) the Russian Revolution took frontier against a Germanic invasion. Doumergue expressed the hope place, and on M arch 1 5 the T sar abdicated. that the Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw *p its assent to those suggestions in a form al manner. T H E P R E S E N T P O S IT IO N (B A C S M A N ). His Imperial M ajesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, in Apparently the design of driving Germany back to the left bank o f consequence o f which I requested Doumergue, after communicating with the Rhine has now been abandoned by the French Government, although his Government, to let me have the d raft of an agreement, which there has been no official statem ent to this effect. would then be given a form al sanction by an exchange of notes between M r. Balfour, in the House of Commons, on December 19, 1917, saia the French am bassador and m yself. o f this p la n : Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our ally, I nevertheless con “ W e have never expressed our approval of It, nor do I believe it sider it my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by the Imperial presents the policy o f successive French Government who have held 16876— 11 traooan ayNLoissaHOKOO 8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 9 •ffice daring the war. Never did we desire and never did we en courage the idea that a bit of Germany should be cut off from the parent State and erected into some kind of, • • * independent Government on the left bank of the Rhine. His M ajesty’ s Governm ent were never aware that was seriously entertained by any French statesm an.” It must be noted in this connection that by the declaration o f Sep tember 5, 1 914, the Allies undertook to make peace in common. Any arrangement between France and Russia therefore equally affects G reat Britain. In the light of these treaties and these military c o n f e r ences, 1 call attention to chapter 12 of “ Entente Diplomacy and the World.” giving the dispatches showing the Entente prepara tions for war. Exhibit 0. And the Falsification of the Russian Orange Book. In lOOtJ Sir Edward Grey, on behalf of the British Govern ment, entered Into an agreement with France which in 1912 he reduced to writing, as follow s: E X H IB IT S VIII A N D IX. (L e tte r Sir Edward Grey to French Am bassador Cambon, Nov. * 22, 1912.) M r D e a r A m b a s s a d o r : From time to time in recent years the French and British military and naval experts huve consulted to gether. It has always been understood that such consultation docs not restrict the freedom of either Governm ent to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. W e have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that com m its either Governm ent to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and B ritish fleets, respec tively, a t the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. You hove, however, pointed out that if either Governm ent have grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it m ight become essential to know w hether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 1 agree th a t if either Government v'-".d grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss w ith the other whether both Governm ents should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, w bat measures they would be prepared to take in common. I f these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governm ents would then decide what effect should be given to them. iT h e last vital paragraph was not read to Parliament by G rey, although afterw ards published in the W hite Book.] (H ow D iplom ats Make W a r , 3 0 3 .) The French ambassador, Camdon, immediately replied In the following letter; F rench London, D bar S ib E dw ahd E m bassy N ovem ber , 23, 1912. : You reminded me in your letter o f yesterday, November 22, that during the last few years the m ilitary and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each oth er from time to t i m e ; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty o f either Govern ment to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support o f their armed forces ; that on either side these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered us engagements binding our Governm ents to take action in certain e v e n tu a litie s; that, however, I had remarked to you that If one or other of the two Governm ents had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third power it would become essential to know w hether It could count on the armed support o f the other. Y our letter answers that p o i n t ; and I am authorized to state that in the event o f one of our tw o Governments having grave reasons to fear either an attack from a third power or some event threaten ing the general peace, that Government would immediately examine w ith the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent aggression or preserve peace. I f so, the two Governm ents would deliberate aa to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common. I f those measures in volved action, the tw o Governments would take into immediate con sideration the plans o f their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Y ours, etc., P aul Cam bon . (H o w Diplom ats Make W ar, 2 7 9 .) In 1914 Sir Edward Grey delivered copies o f these letters exchanged between him and the French ambassador to the Russian ambassador as a basis for an entente between Great 7 0 8 7 6 — 11-------- 2 Britain and Russia (see ch, 12, Entente Diplomacy and the World, p. 709), under which a plan of naval cooperation be tween Great Britain, Russia, and France was worked out. When the German rulers ordered a German mobilization, 5 p. m., Saturday afternoon, August 1, it was followed imme diately by the marching of regiments through London equipped for war the following morning, Sunday, August 2. 1914. (How Diplomats Make War, Neilson, p. 295.) French troops invaded German soil Sunday, August 2, 1914. (Reflections o f the World War, p. 145.) On Saturday, the 1st day of August, the German border was crossed in four places by Russian patrols. (Preparation and Conduct o f the World War, Von Kuhl, pp. 7 9 -SO.) Germany declared a state o f war existing with Russia, be cause o f Russian acts, on August 1, 1914, 7.10 p. m .; with France, August 3, 1914; Belgium, August 4, 1914. (Scott Docu ments on World War, p. 1877.) France declared war against rman.v on August 3, 1914; Great Britain against Germany, August 4, 1914 ; Russia against Germany. August 7. 1914. The evidence appears to show that it was the Russian policy to invade Germany without a declara tion of war and to make its mobilization complete under the camouflage of peaceful negotiations (Von Kuhl, pp. 70-80.) In the Russian Czar’s orders for mobilization, 30th of Sep tember, 1912, Chancellor Von Bethinann-Hollwcg quotes the following language: It Is the Em peror's order that (ho notification of the mobilization should be equivalent to the notification of a sla te of war with Germany. In other words, the Russian mobilization 'order was to lie regarded as a secret declaration of war. Hollweg further states that the Russian instruction for the troops on the German front w*is: As soon as concentration is completed we shall proceed to advance against the armed forces of Germany with the object of carrying the war on to their own territory. (Reflection on the W orld W ar, p. 132.) This was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian treaty of 1892 and the military conferences of 1911, 1912, and 1913. It will be observed that under the Franco-Russian secret treaty of 1892, section 1, it was provided that in case of war Russia should employ all Its available forces to fight Germany and that the military and naval staffs, in the military con ference above quoted, expressly contemplated that the German Army should be obliged to attack France through Belgium, and stipulated: The French Arm y could concentrate as rapidly as the German Arm y, and that as from the tw elfth day it is in a position to take the offensive against Germany with the help of the British Arm y on its left flank. And thus clearly outlines the cooperation agreed upon be tween Russia, France, and Great Britain. The conference states : It Is essential that Germany on the east and on the west. shall be attacked at the same time But the most important light is thrown upon the matter by the preamble in the minutes o f the meetings of the French and Russian chiefs of staffs, as follow s: pream ble . T he two chiefs o f staff declare, by common accord, that the words “ defensive w ar ” must not be interpreted in the sense of a war which would be conducted defensively. They aflirm, on the contrary, the absolute necessity for the Russian and French armies to adopt a vigor ous offensive, and, as far as possible, a simultaneous one, in conformity w ith the text of article 3 of the convention, whose terms provide that the forces of the two contracting powers shall com e into full action w ith all speed / The Franco-Russian treaty, 1892, provided “ In case the forces o f the triple alliance or o f one of the powers which are a party to i t ” [for example, Austria] “ should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the first indication o f the event and without a previous agreement being necessary shall mobilize all their forces immediately and simultaneously and shall trans port them as near to their frontiers as possible.” * * * “ These forces shall begin complete action with the greatest dispatch, so that Germany will have to fight at the same time in the east and In the west.” Therefore when Austria partially mobilized in Ignorance of the terms o f this secret Franco-Russian treaty of 1892, Russia and France were under a secret contract to immediately mobi lize and attack Germany with all their forces. This was a secret declaration o f war on Germany as of the date o f th« Austrian mobilization, July 28, 1914. J 10 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The Russian and French mobilizntions, which were begun under the treaty o f 1802. must be interpreted in the light o f that treaty and the annual military conferences from 1903 to 1918 of the general staffs of the Russian and French Armies. R U S S IA N PR K P A R A T IO N S . The manner in which the Russian military und railway prep arations and mobilization had been worked out is set forth in tlie work o f Von Eggeling, The Russian Mobilization and the Outbreak o f the War, and by Gen. H. von Kuhl in his work, The German General Staff in Preparation and Conduct of the World War, an abstract o f which is submitted. Exhibit X. All the military authorities in Europe knew and recognized, as a matter o f military strategy, that in a war between Germany, Russia, and France, the German troops would be compelled to enter France through Belgium, as the French frontier otherwise was absolutely Impregnable because of the gigantic forts and prepared military defenses. Further the military strategists were all agreed that Ger many’s only chance to win in such a military struggle was by speed and efficiency, conquering France first, and then meeting Russia. Germany claimed that while Belgium had never collaborated with Germany to preserve Belgium's neutrality against France and Great Britain, Belgium had a positive understanding with Great Britain and France as to cooperation in a war o f France and Great Britain with Germany. See Belgian documents in facsimile in German White Book [pp. 837 to 860, Diplomatic Documents Relating to Outbreak o f the European War. Scott]. The secret documents exhibited in “ Entente Diplomacy and tlie W orld,” S58” in number, demonstrate beyond the shadow of a doubt that it was the fixed policy of the Russian Govern ment to control the Dardanelles and expand its power in the Balkan States where there were millions o f Slavs in Serbia and in Austria, and that this could only be done by means of a general European war. It was therefore necessary for the carrying out o f the Russian policy to bring about a general European war and at the same time to put the moral responsi bility o f such a war on others. These secret documents show that It was tlie design of the Russian Government to do this, and that the means o f accomplishing this end lay through the Slavs of Serbia and their intrigues with the so-called “ unllberated Slavs o f Austria.” The Serbian intrigues through a period of years were financed by Russia and the Austrian Government was so seriously dis turbed by these Intrigues that they wrere compelled at huge ex pense and great internal inconvenience to mobilize in 1912, and again In 1913, and again in 1914, wdien the Crown Prince of Austria and his consort were murdered by a Serb believed to have been instigated by a malignant press campaign car ried on in Serbia and alleged to have been directly arranged by the Pan Slav “ Black Hand,” fostered by the Russian min ister at Belgrade. In Professor’s Sloan’s work, ‘‘ The Balkans,” page 193, May, 1914, he says: A t Belgrade the trade of politics has been on a level unknown else where, unless It be at Constantinople. The overthrow of one king and the setting up of another was a m atter of money, and it was the Rus sian ambassador who provided the funds. The whole conspiracy has been traced to Its so u rc e ; there is not a step for which tlie docu mentary evidence can not be produced. Nitti, in ids book “ Peaceless Europe,” pages 12, 83, 84, 87, says: Under the treaty o f 1892 France had financed Russia to the extent o f about $7,000,000,009 to enable Russia to baNi up u gigantic army and to build military railways to tlie Gernmu frontier (Lex Talionis). The assassination of tlie Crown Prince (June 28. 1914) caused tlie Austrinn Government to demand immediate satis faction o f the Serbian Government on July 23. On July 24 Serbia mobilized, but accepted the Austrinn de mands, except one or two affecting the question of sovereignty, which they proposed to arbitrate. Austria ordered a partial mobilization against Serbia. The same day the Russian Gov ernment authorized a mobilization, and the Russian Minister o f War, Sukhomlinoff, made it a general mobilization and afterwards made the Czar believe it was a partial mobilization, which the Czar made u general mobilization on July 30. Tlie army o f Belgium was mobilized ns of this day, July 24. Tlie Britisli fleet was completely mobilized and ready for war as of July 24. The French Government took preliminary steps, can celing leaves o f absence, and so forth. Ren6 Viviana, president of the council, August 4, 1914, in the French Chamber o f Deputies, in commenting on the Aus trian notice to Serbia o f July 23 aud subsequent events, said: A s these events unfolded them selves, the Governm ent, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required— the general mo bilization of our forces on land and sea was ordered. Under the secret 1892 treaty the Austrian mobilization re quired the immediate mobilization o f all the Russian and French forces and the speediest possible simultaneous attack on Germany east and west. William II was in Scandinavia on a summer cruise, returning on Sunday, July 26. Upon his return he directed tlie German chancellor to urge on Austria the acceptance of the Serbian reply and the acceptance of a method o f adjustment acceptable to the entente powers. Austria yielded to this demand, de clared that the demand on Serbia was not intended as an ulti matum, that Austria was willing to have the matter adjusted by an International cr ..fi- ar.ee, it had no designs on Serbian territory, that it had only made a partial mobilization against Serbia, and that it only sought its own internal peace against Serbian intrigue. The secret Russian records show that the Russian Govern ment was determined on war, that the French Government was determined on war, that the French Government refused to attempt to moderate the attitude of Russia, and that the Brit ish Government refused to attempt to exercise a moderating j influence with tlie Russian Government, and that the Russian Government rejected in advance any attempt to exercise a mod erating influence with the Russian Government. These secret documents show that it was a part o f the policy of the French and Russian Governments to put the odium o f the World War upon the German Government. The German chancellor, Von Bellimann-Hollweg, states that: The German m inister of war thought it a mistake to declare w ar on Russia, not because he considered that war could be avoided after Russia had mobilized, but because he feared that the p olitical effect would be prejudicial. But that the chief o f the general staff favored declaring w a r: Because our hope of success against the enormous superiority iu num bers was dependent on the extreme rapidity of our movements. And this opinion prevailed. (Reflections of tlie World War, 138J Because Germany declared war on Russia and mobilized at 5 p. m., Saturday, August 1. 1914, public opinion throughout the world has largely accepted tlie view that the German lead ers were responsible for the war. This has been emphasized In 1908 the Czar had assured Paschitch, the Serbian minis and made more effective by propaganda and by tlie excitement ter, that the Bosnia-Herzegovinian question would be decided and hostility o f war. A fter August 1, 1914, Russia and the various powers issued by war alone, for which meantime they could preserve a calm attitude with military preparations. (Bogitsevitch quoted in Orange Books, White Books. Yellow Books, etc., eacli o f which was intended to prove an alibi and show that each of the sev Diplomatic Revelations, p. 101.) In the German White Book, 1919, Part II, page 53, is an account eral Governments wras innocent of the responsibility for the pending gigantic catastrophe. of a visit of the Serbian Prime Minister to the Czar of Russia The Russian Foreign Office issued an Orange Book to show February 2, 1914, and his report that he requested of the Czar 120,000 rifles and munitions, and so forth ; that the Czar said the innocence o f tlie Russian Government. Out of 60 dis that Russia was doing as much as it could to arm. He asked patches in the Foreign Office for the few days preceding the how many soldiers Serbia could muster. Tlie minister an W orld War, it appears that 50 of them were falsified by swered a half million well-clothed, well-armed soldiers. The omissions, deletion or insertion. (Exhibit 7.) This document shows by its forgeries iu suppressing the vital Czar replied: dispatches a fixed policy to exculpate the Russian aud French ri hat Is satisfactory ; i t is no small m atter and one can accomplish statesmen and make it possible to cast the odium of the war on much by m e n u o f it. tlie German statesmen. 70870— 1J Russia alone promoted and kept alive the agitation In Serbia and of the Slavs in Austria. It was on account of Russia that the Serbian Government was a perpetual cause o f disturbance, a perpetual threat to Austria-H ungary. The Russian policy In Serbia was really criminal. aaooaa rivKoissaaoNOD 01 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. G P. Gooch appears to be justified (Falsification o f the Rus sian Orange Rook) In stating: It Is 1. That fr o m th e R u s s ia n m ade 2. now e s ta b lis h e d That in by g iv in g 3. th a t sh e 4. on to That v .u s c o n s i d e r e d (T e le g r a m s o n ly to N os. of b e tte r 218, 222, e ffo r t in F ran ce th e lia d w ar 216 fr o m or fro m peace G erm an y in w ill to in w ar P e te rsb u rg had been to appar P a r is .) d e c la r in g o p in io n sh e in flu e n c e R u s s ia n su p p o rt. and V ie n n a m o d e r a tin g in fo r m e d p u b lic 225, a w ar N o. th a t on w ard s u n c o n d itio n a l r e g a r d in g r e fr a in e d be in stre n g th en ed upon to G e r m a n y 's h e r s e lf (T e le g r a m regard quarrel ow n. to c o n tra ry , d e c is io n th e w ar F ran ce s h o u ld a g a in s t and appear G erm an y, E n g la n d , th e it aggressor. 2 2 6 .) Any evidence from Russian or French sources favoruble to the German Government obviously Is entitled to great weight, while self-serving evidence of the Russian statesmen must be taken with reserve. T H K O RAN O K BOOK AS CORRECTED FROM U N L IV R E N O IR . Telegram 18-4 (Falsification o f the Russian Orange Rook, p. ID), the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonoff, on July 24, states: G erm any a rdently desired In te r fe r e n c e of m u st in c a lc u la b le had have an any on th e con sequ en ces. grou n d * * of * im p r e s s io n am b n ssn d or conflict, as th e e x is tin g tre a tie s K x M in is te r P ic h o n w h ic h th e A u s tr ia n the intend g a in e d th e of A ustria-H ungary did not her step to be regarded as an unconditional ultim atum . a ls o w ith pow er localisation fr o m he In te r v ie w o th e r the t o -d a y , th a t Telegram 18G, from the Russian representative at Paris to Sazonoff, Petrograd, on July 25, said that the action of the German ambassador— ila s to som e In d ic a tio n e x te n t reassu red th e fo r e ig n m in is tr y as b e in g G erm any does not seek for war in a ny case. th a t • • an * That the German Ambassador had pointed out-~That A ustrian note has not the character o f an u ltim a tu m ; t h e German step had only for its object the localiza tion o f the Austro-Serbian conflict; • * • t h a t th e a b se n c e o f th e • • the * th a t P r e s id e n t of th e R e p u b lic and of th e M in is te r P r e s id e n t (V iv ia n !) prevents the foreign office for the m om ent from expressing its opinion definitely regarding present events. P O IN C A R E AN D V IV IA N I W ERE EN ROUTE FR O M ST. PETERSBU RG TO P A R IS . Telegram 187, July 26, from the Russian representative at Paris to Sazonoff, Petrograd, states that the German ambas sador had advised the French Minister for Foreign A ffa irs: A ustria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial gains and does n o t threaten the in tegrity of Serbia. H er sole object is to secure her ow n peace and to maintain order. Telegram 188, July 26, from the Paris Russian representative to Sazonoff says that Bertbelot, the director o f the political department o f France, inclines to the opinion— That G erm any and A ustria do n ot desire war in any case. Telegram 1521, July 27, Sazonoff, Russian foreign minister, to Izvolski, Russian ambassador in P a ris: I f there is a question of exercising a m oderating influence in P etersb u rg , w e reject it in advance, as w e have adopted a standpoint from the o u tset which w e can in no w ay alter. * * * Telegram 194, Izvolski wired that Poincare will return to Paris on Wednesday, July 29 (five days after Belgium mobilization, four days after Russian general mobilization had begun, and on the next night, Juiy 30, the French Minister of W ar told the Russian military attach^ the French Govern ment toas determined on war, telegram 216). Telegram 195, July 27th, the German Ambassador is shown urging a new proposal for the intervention o f France and Germany between Russia and Austria, which was not ac cepted. Izvolski says in this rega rd : * w as s u r p r is e d at th e correct u n d e r s ta n d in g of th e s itu a tio n s e e how firm and tranquil th ey w ere in their determ ination to extend to w s their fullest support a n d t o a v o i d t h e s l i g h t e s t a p p e a r a n c e o f a n y l a c k m a n ife s te d o f u n ity by th e b e tw e e n a c tin g m in is te r and h is a s s is ta n t and to Cam bon (F r e n c h in r e p ly toward 76876— 11 would im m ediately rep ly by attacking In consequence o f A ustria-H ungary’s declaration of war against Serbia, we shall announce tom orrow a m obilization of the Odessa, K leff, Moscow, and Kazan military districts. In bringing this to the notice o f the German G overnm ent repeat that Russia has no aggres sive intentions against Germ any. M eanw hile our ambassador in Vienna Is not being recalled. Sukhomllnoff had already issued a general mobilization order o f the Russian Army, He “ lied to the C za r” as to its being a general mobilization ( “ Eggerling ” ), said it was partial, and pretended that he had stopped the mobilization, although he did not do so. The Czar, however, July 30, authorized the general mobilization. (Let France Explain, p. 201.) Telegram 198, July 28, Izvolski to Sazonoff: I deem it my duty to make clear that, as results from my conver sation yesterday at the Qua! d'Orsay, the acting French M inister for Foreign Affairs did not for a m oment admit the possibility of exercis ing a moderating influence in Petersburg, * * • A s a result o f his conversation with Baron Sclion, the minister declined to accept the German proposal.” Germany was exercising strenuously u moderating influence on Vienna In favor of peace. Telegram 201, July 28, Izvolski to Sazonoff, states that the Gerruuu Ambassador had again visited the French Foreign Minister and told him that: G erm any ardently desired to work with France for the maintenance o f peace. * * • That Germ any was ready to cooperate w ith the other powers for the maintenance of peace. Telegram 1544, Sazonoff to Izvolski, July 29: The German Am bassador informed me on behalf o f the Imperial Chancellor that Germany had not ceased and will not cease to ex ercise a moderating influence in Vienna, and would continue to do so despite the declaration o f war. Up to this m orning no news has been received of the crossing of Austrian troops on to Serbian territory. Telegram 1551, July 29, Sazonoff to Izvolski: The German ambassador has communicated to me to-day the de cision of his Government to mobolize if Russia does not stop her m ilitary preparation. • * * A s we can not accede to Germany’s wish, nothing remains for us but to hasten our ow n warlike prepa rations and to reckon w ith the probable inevita bility o f war. In form the French G overnm ent o f this, and at the sam e tim e thank it fo r its declaration made in its name by the French ambassador that w e can fully rely upon the support of our ally France. Under present circum stances this declaration is especially valuable for us. It is v e ry desirable that England also w ithout loss of tim e should associate herself w ith France and R ussia, as it is only thus that she can suocecd in preventing a dangerous alteration in the European balance. London telegraphed to In like terms. Of course, England could not stand for the control of West ern Europe by the military machine o f Germany. Sazonoff knew this and could count on British help. The association of Great Britain with Russia and France would guarantee the safety of attack by Russia on Germany. Telegram 304, July 29, Sazonoff to Izvolski: I urgently request you to communicate to the French foreign min Ister the follow ing telegram from the French am bassador In Peters b u r g : The German ambassador has ju st Informed Sazonoff that if Russia does not stop her m ilitary preparations the German A rm y w ill be ordered to mobilize. * * * Telegram 202, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff: Bienvenu-M artin, the acting foreign minister, told me that this morning the German ambassador made a com m unication to him, em ploying practically the following expressions: G erm any is continu ing her endeavors in Vienna to cause Austria to agree to a friendly exchange of opinions which should indicate the object and the extent o f the steps undertaken by her and concerning which Germany has not so far been exactly informed. The declaration o f war will not stand in the way o f this exchange of opinions. G erm any hopes to receive during the course of these negotiations exp la n a t^n s which will s a tisfy Russia. F inally, Baron Schon again protested against the assertion that Germany was encouraging Austria to be unyielding. am b assad or in B e r lin ) te le g r a p h s • * Germany * * • declares that as w e have received the assurance that A ustria seeks no territorial gains, the maintenance of peace entirely depends on Russia because it turns upon (lie necessity for localizing the Austre-Serbian a ffa ir ; that is, the punishment of Serbia for her former policy and the giving of guaranties for the future. • * • • fro m B e r lin to b is q u e s tio n as to what attitude Germ any would a partial mobilization by Russia, J a g o w ( G e r m a n s e c r e t a r y o f s t a t e f o r f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ) r e p l i e d t h a t a m o b i l i z a t i o n o f that kind w o u l d n o t r e s u l t i n G e r m a n m o b i l i z a t i o n , b u t that i f Russia th a t adopt Germ any Telegram 203, July 29, Izvolski to Sazonoff: u s. Telegram 197, July 27, Izvolski to Sazonoff: M . Austria, Telegram 1539, July 28, Sazonoff to Izvolski: p r o o f: of her exert d e c id e d a F ran ce v ie w co n tra st assu ra n ces th ere. h a v in g d o c a m e n ta ry of to th e had b e fo r e com e b ecau se, re fu se d b u t, e ffe c t e n t ly p o in t r e p e a te d That by com m encem ent c o m p le te c a te g o r ic a lly P e te rsb u rg , th e attacked Russia. 11 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 12 order m obilization. T o my query as to w hether this was equivalent to a declaration o f w ar, the am bassador replied that it was not, but added that tor w ir e v ery near to war. He states: That France and England p ositively could not exercise any m oderat ing influence in Russia. * • • On Saturday, August 1, 5 p. m., Germany issued a general order o f mobilization; at 7.10 p. m. the German ambassador notified Sazonoff Germany accepted the war challenge of Rus sia. The negotiation with Austria and Germany for the preser vation of peace appears to have been used as a camouflage for a predetermined tear. Telegram 208, July 30, from Izvolskl to Sazonoff assured h im : Telegram 204, July 29, Wednesday, Izvolskl to Sazonoff: The firm attitude taken up by the French press continues. It passes severe Judgment upon the Austrian attack uml upon G erm any’s manifest share of blame for it, and unhesitatingly declares that this touches us, and that tee can not remain unsym pathetic. A s regards solidarity w ith u s, this question Is not once discussed, but is tnken as a m atter of course. E v e r y journalist expresses him self in this sense, including such prominent personages belonging to the most diverse parties as I’ lehon, Clenienceau, and even Jaures, and also Ilerve, the father of anti m ilitarism. The press reilected the French Government’s wishes. gram 210.) Telegram 206, July 29, Izvolskl to Sazonoff: (Tele W hen the President returned to Paris, he was received at the m ilway station and in the streets with sym pathetic demonstrations from the assembled crowd. Margerie (political director in the French foreign office) told me that the President, from his conversations during his Journey with prefects and politicians, had become con vinced o f the firm, energetic, and at the same time calm sta te of public opinion, which plainly form ed a correct estim ate o f the true signifi cance of even ts. The sam e attitude reigned am ong a large section of the Radical Socialists. The Government attaches no Importance to the antim ilitary demonstrations of the revoluntlonary party, and Intends to take energetic measures against it. Our m ilitary attachd reports in detail regarding the preparatory m ilitary measures. Feeling tuns high in m ilitary circles and in the chief command. I report re garding the press in a special telegram. Telegram 207, July 29, Izvolskl to Sazonoff shows further efforts on the part of Germany to get an adjustment and states: Finally Baron Schon complained of France’ s m ilitary preparations, and said that in this case Germ any would be compelled to adopt sim i lar precautions. Vivianl, on his part, declared th a t France honestly desired peace, but at 'th e same time was firmly determ ined to act in full agreement w ith her allies, aud Baron Schon could convince him self that this decision was finding the liveliest support in the country. This evening Viviani has forbidden a projected anti-war m eeting o f the revolutionary party. It was the night of the next day that the French minister of war told the military attache that the French Government was determined on war. Telegram 1554, Sazonoff to Izvolskl, states that if Austria would admit that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed the character o f a European question and would declare a readi ness to eliminate from her ultimatum those points which vio late the sovereign right of Serbia, Russia undertakes to sus pend her military preparations. These preparations had been going on for at least five days. The Russian policy was to use diplomatic negotiations to con ceal the war measures, and the Russian policy fixed in 1912 was to cross the German border without a declaration o f war. (Von Kuhl, p. 79, 80.) Telegram 1555, July 30, Sazonoff wires Izvolskl: Until we receive a thoroughly satisfactory reply from Austria through the German Government, w e shall continue our m ilitary preparations. This is communicated to you very confidentially. Tlie word “ thoroughly ” is interesting. That very night, at 1 a. m., Izvolskl telegraphed to Sazonoff, telegram 216: From m ilitary a tta c M to war m inister, 1 a. m. The French war m inister inform ed me in earnest, hea rty tones (sin cerity Cnthusiastique) that the G overnm ent is firmly decided upon tear, and requested me to confirm the hope o f the French general staff that all our efforts will be directed against G erm any, and that Austria will be treated as a quantity negligeable. This attitude was strictly in line with the Franco-Russian secret treaty o f 1892 and the military plans worked out by the French and Russian general staffs in annual conferences and frequent intercommunications. So that the French Government gave Austria no time to make “ a thoroughly satisfactory ” reply to Russia or any other kind o f reply. On August 1, telegram 1601, Sazonoff wired Izvolskl: At midnight the German ambassador informed me on behalf of his Government that if within 12 hours— that is, befibre midday on Satur day— w e do not begin to dem obilize, not only as against G erm any, but also us against A ustria, ths German Governm ent will be compelled to 7 6 8 7 6 -1 1 1 The French G overnm ent is ready to fulfill all its obligations as an ally. It is o f opinion, however, that at the present m om ent, wheu negotiations are still In progress between the less Interested powers, It would be to the purpose that R ussia, so far as the m easures o f a d efen sive and precautionary nature which it has deemed necessary to adopt w ill permit, should not take any direct step s which would serve G erm any as a p retex t for ordering the general or partial mobilization o f her forces. j The term “ defensive” had already been defined by the French and Russian staffs, with the approval of the French aud Russian Governments as "o ffe n s iv e ” in their annual confer ences. The significance of tills suppressed telegram is revealed In combination with telegram 1551 o f July 29 and suppressed tele grams 209 and 210 and 216 from Paris on July 30. The French Government (July 30) having determined on wmr does not wish Germany to mobilize yet, but to gradually discover a situation so dangerous Germany shall declare tvar as a military necessity. Telegram 1551, on July 29, from Sazonoff to Izvolski, stated: N othing remains fo r us but to hasten our own warlike preparations and to reckon w ith the probable inevita bility of war. In fo rm the, French G overnm ent o f this and at the same time thank it for its declaration * • * that w e can fully rely upon the support o f our a lly, France. This was two days before the German Government demanded that the Russian mobilization should stop under a penalty o f German mobilization and three days before the German Em peror, by the German ambassador at Petersburg, accepted a state o f war as forced on the German Government. It was not a German declaration of war. It was a German acceptance o f a state o f war. Telegram 209, of July 30, Izvolski to Sazonoff, states that the French ambassador in L ondon: W a s instructed to confer w ith G rey as to the fixing o f the com bined attitu de of France and England concerning which these tw o powers, in consequence of the general understanding existing betw een them , have to deliberate whenever a period of political tension arises. The time “ to deliberate ” had nearly arrived. This proposed conference was based on the notes exchanged between Gambon and Grey on the 22d and 23d o f November, 1912 (Exhibits 8 and 9, How Diplomats Make W a r), and the war plans of the military and naval staffs of Great Britain, France, and Russia, already completely matured. Telegram 210, of July 30, from Izvolski to Sazonoff, referring to the French war minister, said that the French tear minister had said to the Russian military attach4: * * * that w e could declare that in the higher interests of peace w e are ready tem porarily to delay our preparations for m obilization, since this would not preven t us from continuing our preparations and indeed from intensifyin g them, but w e should have to refrain from the possible greater m ovem ents of troops. These suppressed telegrams indicate that both in Petersburg and in Paris the negotiations for the maintenance of peace were “ a ruse de guerre ” and being used as a screen for a war already fully determined on both in Paris and in Petersburg. Telegram 216 of July 31, Izvolski to Sazonoff, expressed a fixed war determination ( l a . m. of July 31 was the night of Thursday, July 30) : From m ilitary attach^ to war minister. 1 a. m. T he French war m inister informed me in earnest, cerity enthuslastique) that the G overnm ent is firmly and requested me to confirm the hope o f the French all our efforts will be directed against G erm any, w ill be treated as a quantity negligeable. hearty tones (sin decided upon war, general staff that and that Austria Tiiis was equal to n secret declaration o f war on Germany, in view of the Franco-Russian treaty and military plans agreed on. It was 23 hours before the German Government demanded a cessation o f the Russian mobilization and two days before Ger many declared a state of war existing. kvji K)m A.n/j.nt n o } kii Aj .u tb Xui ox 'u o f j m i j f y o u t j j p . i o :« cmooaa ’iVNOTSsaaoNoo C O N G R E SSIO N A L On the same day, July 31, telegram 215 from Izvolski to Pazonnff discloses that Enron Schfin asked Vivlani what atti tude France would adopt in the event of an armed collision l>etween Russia and Germany. Viviani declined to answer. Earon Schhn requested arrangements for passports. On August 1 the German ambassador again visited Viviani, and the latter expressed his “ astonishment” to Baron Schcin at his action yesterday, “ which was not justified by the rela tions between France and Germany.” although, as above, the French Government had already decided upon war and advised Russia to attack Germany with all its forces— and Viviani knew it as premier. Izvolski to Sazonoff, August 1, telegram 219, states that the German ambassador had visited Viviani for the second time. That Viviani informed him that the President o f the Republic, Poincare, had signed a decree ordering French mobilization. (It may be remembered that the order of Belgian mobilization was issued July 31 also, although the army had been mobilized on and before July 24.) Viviani expressed his astonishment that Germany should have adopted such a measure as demanding that Russia demobilize under penalty o f a German mobiliza tion— When a friendly erchanyt of view* was In progress between Russia, A u s tria, and the other powers. Here Is the refinement o f high-class diplomacy where two nations have fully prepared themselves for war, are determined on war against a neighbor, and the Premier of France assures the ambassador of Germany that a friendly exchange o f views between the powers forbids Germany to prepare for defense. And the same day, August 1, Izvolski wires Sazonoff: Poincare declared to me in the m ost categorical manner that both he him self and the whole cabinet are firm ly determ ined fu lly to carry out the obligations laid upon us by the term s o f our alliance. The French general mobilization and an immediate offensive on Germany was required by the secret Russian agreement o f 1892. Izvolski, Russian ambassador, wires Sazonoff the same day, August 1, 1914, telegram 223. as follow s: Poincare told me that during the last few days the A ustrian ambassador had energetically assured him and Viviani that A ustria had declared to us ( R u ssia ) her readiness not only to respect the territorial integrity o f Serbia but also her sovereign rights, but that we ( R u ssia ) had intentionally concealed those assurances. To m y remark that this was a com plete He, Poincare replied that similar sta te m ents had been made in London by A ustria, w here th ey might create a very dangerous impression, and therefore ought to be denied there as well. That Austria did make these representations is shown by telegram 195: by a verbal declaration o f Count Pourtales, French ambassador in St. Petersburg; and by Sazonoff’s an swer contained in the first two sentences from St. Petersburg of telegram 1554 and by many other records. The attitude of Italy is shown by telegram 220 of August 1, from Izvolski to Sazonoff, as follow s: Mnrgerie told me that according to information from n v ery secret source Ita ly apparently intends, in reliance upon the manner In which the conflict has arisen, to remain neutral at first, and then to com e to one decision or another in accordance w ith the course o f even ts. 13 the guilt upon all three Russian heads, Sazonoff, and Jaunuschkevitch. He states that at dinner linoff, then minister o f war, when he received a Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia heard the war minister exclaim— i F O I8 an or RECORD. “ CETTB 04 H) S NOUS Sukhomlinaff, with Sukhomtelegram that (July 25), he M ARCHERONS! * that Is, “ This time we shall march.” (Ibid., July 24, 1920, 132.) (This rneaut under the treaty, 1892, and military and naval conventions with France Russia would attack Germany.) Baron Rosen states that the intelligencia and military party of Russia were for war. (Ibid., August 21, 1920.) (They con trolled the Government.) Baron Rosen further tells that Sazonoff and Jaunuschkevitch stopped the dispatch of the Czar’s aide to Berlin and secured on Thursday, July 30, a reorder of the general mobilization (Ibid., August 21, 1920.) It was in this condition o f affairs, with Russia having an army o f over 2,000.000 men on the East, who had been prac ticing mobilization since spring and actually had been In process of mobilizing at least since the 25th of July' (Czar’s telegram), that the German Government demanded the rm billznllon stopped under the alleged necessity o f regarding It as u declaration of war by Russia. It was well understood by the military strategists of France and Russia and of Europe that Germany’s only chance in such a war as this was by lightning speed and efficiency, striking France through Belgium. (See French and Russian military conferences.) The dispatches show that Germany tried to se cure French neutrality* and failed, tried to obtain British neu trality and failed, tried to induce Belgium to submit to an unopposed passage and failed. (Morel, Truth and the War. How Diplomats Make War, Neilson.) (Diplom atic Documents, World War, Scott.) SO M E EV ID E N C E F RO M B E R L IN . It was the policy of Germany to support Austria in rebuking Serbia, as far as could be done through diplomacy, but even if the diplomatic effort should fail, Germany did not intend to be drawn into a war. On Sunday, the 26th o f July, the Kaiser returned from his Scandinavian cruise. On Monday a rapid fire of telegrams took place from Berlin to Vienna, under the instruction of the Kaiser, demanding a peaceful adjustment, Berlin assuming that the purpose of the Entente was not necessarily hostile or determined on war, and that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement was really sincere, put great pressure on the Aus trian Government, as appears, through the following telegrams: [From the German Chancellor to the German am bassador, Vienna, July 27.] W e can not reject the rdle of mediator and m ust place the English proposal before the Vienna cabinet for consideration. Request C o u D t Berchtold’s opinion o n the British proposal, as well as on SazonotTs wish to negotiate directly with Vienna. (Die Deutscheu Dokumento, No. 396 .) On July 28 he sent this dispatch: The refusal of every exchange of views with Fetrograd would be a serious mistake if it provokes Russia precisely to armed interference, which Austria is primarily interested in avoiding. W e are ready, to be sure, to fulfill our obligations as an ally, but m ust refuse to allow ourselves to be draten by Vienna into a world conflagration frivolously and in disregard o f our advice. Please say tliis to Count Berchtold at once w ith all emphasis and w ith great seriousness. (Ibid. No. 800 .) The entente had already weakened Italy’s attachment to Ger many by concessions in Africa and elsewhere. On July 29 he sent this dispatch: The chief of the German general staff, Von Moltke’s memo I regard the attitude o f the Austrian Government and Its unparal randum o f 1012, showed that the Germans did not count upon Italy. (E xhibit 11.) That Germany could not compete on the leled procedure toward the various Governments with Increasing as ocean with Britain or on land with R ussia; that Germany had tonishment * * *. It leaves us wholly in the dark as to its pro gram • * *. I must conclude that the Austrian Government but little hope in a war with Russia and France. Austria accepted the proposed mediation as between herself is harboring plans which it sees fit to conceal from us In order to and Serbia as two sovereign Governments (Austrian Red Book assure herself in all events of German support and avoid the refusal which might result from a frank statem ent. (Ibid. No. 39 6 , p. 3 8 1 ). III, p. 65), but it availed nothing. Petrograd knew o f Austria’s acceptance o f mediation which He sent five warning telegrams on the 29th and 30th to was disclosed to Grey in London on the 1st o f August. (British Vienna. (Ibid.) White Book, 133.) The Kaiser had informed Foreign Minister Jagow on seeing Sazonoff, former Russian minister of foreign affairs seven the Serbian reply accepting the Austrian conditions and agree years later, November 15, 1921 in La Revue de France, tells that ing to mediation that— the Czar received a telegram from the Kaiser begging the Czar, Now, no cause f o r war any longer exists. notwithstanding the declaration o f war, to keep the troops from On July 30 the German Chancellor sent the following tele the German frontier, and that the German Emperor was nearly gram : frantic. If Austria refuses all negotiations, we are face to face with a con Baron Rosen in “ Forty Years o f Diplomatic Life,” Saturday Evening Post, August 21, 1020, page S5, gives it as ills opinion flagration in which England will be against us. Rumania and Ita ly, that the Russian mobilization necessarily led to war. He places according to all indications, will not be fo r us, and we shall stand two 76870— 11 14 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD against four power*. Through England's opposition the main blow will fall on Germ any. A ustria’ s political prestige, the military honor of her army, as well as her Just claim s against Serbia, can be ade quately satisfied by hep occupation of Belgrade or other places. Through her hum iliation of Serbia she will make her position in the Balkans, as well ns In her relation to Russia, strong again. Tender these circumstances, we m ust urgently and em phatically press upon the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the adoption of mediation In accordance with the above honorable conditions. The responsibility tor the consequences which would otherwise follow wotild be for Austria and for us an uncommonly heavy one. (Germnn W hite Book, p. 8 0 5 .) In Oman’s Outbreak o f the War, pages 01, 08, 00, 77, 70. 88. and 89, will be found the exchange of telegrams between William II and Nicholas, as follow s: J uly 28— 10 45 P. M. I have heard with the greatest nnxiety of the impression which Is caused by the action of Austro-H ungary against Serbia. The un scrupulous agitation which had been going on for years in Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim . The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sov ereigns, have a common Interest to insist that all those who arc responsible for this horrible murder shall sutfer their deserved punish ment. On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by you and your Governm ent to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use m y entire influence to induce AustriaH ungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding w ith Russia. I hope confidently that you will support me in m y efforts to overcome all difficulties which m ay y e t arise. Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin. W il h e l m . G overnm en t tion, has m o b iliz e d R u s s ia , of N ich olas . as your th e J u ly 2 9 — 6 .3 0 f . m . I have received your telegram and Ishare your desire for the con servation of peace. However,I can not— as I told you In my first telegram— consider the action of Austria-H ungary ns an “ Ignominious w ar.” Austria-H ungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion the action o f Austria-H ungary Is to be con sidered as an attem pt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion T am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that AustriaHungary intended no territorial gain nt the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbinn W a r without drawing Europe Into the most terrible war It has ever seen. I believe that a direct under standing is possible and desirable between 1’ our Government and Vienna, an understanding w hich, as I have already telegraphed you, m y G overnm ent endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which m ight be construed as a menace by Austria-H ungary, would accelerate a calam ity which both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my position as mediator, which, upon your appeal to my friendship and aid, I w illingly accepted. (O m an’s Outbreak of the W ar, p. 6 8 .) W il h e l m . It was the very next night that the French minister of war Bald the French Government was determined on war.— (Tele gram 216.) P eterhok P alace , July 29. Thanks for your telegram, which Is conciliatory, while the official message presented by your ambnssador to my foreign minister was conveyed iti a very different tone. I beg you to explain the difference. It would be right to give over the Aitstro-Sorbian problem to The Hogue Conference. I trust in your wisdom and friendship. (O m an's Outbreak of the W ar, p. 69 .) N ic h o l a s . th e in s tr u c tio n s d angers o n ly seem s a g a in s t to be G o v e rn m e n t, m e d ia to r , m anner and w h ic h I have th e a. 30— 1 a tte n tio n m of . your serious consequences of a m o b i / t m m y last telegram. A u s tr ia H u n g a ry S e r b ia , a n d o n ly a p a r t o f h e r a r m y . If th e w h ic h d ir e c t and <n case, m o b iliz e s w ith to a c c o r d in g a g a in st you have a c ce p ted to your A u s tr ia In tr u ste d upon your a d v ic e H u ngary, me In ex p ress and th e th a t p art su ch of fr ie n d ly d e s ir e , Is th rea t The entire w eight o f decision note rests upon yo u r sh ould ers; you have to bear the responsibility o f war or peace. ened, If not m ade im p o s s ib le . W ilh el m . (O m a n ’s O u tb re a k of th e W ar, p. 7 7 .) This was the day the Tsar reordered Russian mobilization and the French minister advised Russia “ the French Govern* ruent was determined on war.” th a n k you fro m T atlsch eff to n ig h t my h eart (R u s s ia n fo r your honorary q u ic k a id SO— ISO July I’ ETERHOF, I r e p ly . to th e I m. p. am s e n d in g K a is e r ) w ith In The m ilitary measures now taking form w ere decided upon five days ago, a n d f o r t h e r e a s o n o f d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s s tr u c tlo n s . of A u s tr ln . in fiu e u e e very an I In hope any h ig h ly . w ith a ll m anner W e u n d e r s ta n d in g my your n eed your can be h eart th a t p o s itio n stro n g a r r iv e d as th e se p ressu re at w ith m easu res m e d ia to r , w h ic h upon w ill T not s p p r n ls * A u s tr ia so th a t u s. N ic h o l a s . (G e r m a n W h ite B ook. 1915, 2 3 -A .) Then Nicholas reorders Russian mobilization. J u l y 31, I th a n k you c o r d ia lly fo r your m e d ia tio n , w h ic h p e r m its 1914. th e hope I t is technically im possible to discontinue our m ilitary preparations, whioh have b e e n made neces sa ry by the Austrian mobilisation. I t is f a r fr o m u s to w a n t w a r . As th a t e v e r y th in g as th e w ill yet end n e g o tia tio n s th ereon . hope fo r our m ay u n d e rta k e w ord th e c o u n tr ie s 1 no c o n fid e su ccess and of th e p e a c e a b ly . b etw ee n A u s tr ia p r o v o c a tiv e w ith your peace a ll my fa ith m e d ia tio n of and a c tio n . In in S e r b ia 1 g iv e th e V ie n n a c o n tin u e , you m y grace of fo r th e G od. O u tb re a k of th e my s o le m n and w e lfa r e I of E u rop e. N (O m a n ’s W ar, p. ic h o l a s . 8 8 .) Under the 1892 treaty a partial Austrian mobilization re quired Russia and France to attack Germany. The AustrianSerbian negotiations could end when Nicholas said the word and Russia was ready to enter Germany. J uly 31— 2 p . m . fo r m y a id , I hare engaged in mediation beticecn yo u r G overnm ent and the G o vern m ent of A ustria-H un gary. W hile this action was taking place you r troops were being mobilised a g a i n s t m y a l l y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , w h e r e b y , U pon (Om an’ s Outbreak of the W ar. p. 6 1 .) to has l have told you the same tro o p s I ’ e t e r h o f P a l a c e , J u ly 29— 1 p m. I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment T ask you earnestly to help me. An Ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall he unable to resist the pressure exercised upon m e, and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all In your power to restrain your ally from going too far. am b assad or lo n g (O m an’s Outbreak of the W ar, p. 6 1 .) 76870— 11 J uly M y as I your have appeal a lr e a d y to my fr ie n d s h ip c o m m u n ic a te d to and you, your m y requ est m e d ia tio n has becom e I n ow receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on m y eastern frontier. The responsibility fo r the secu rity o f m y co u n try fo rm s me to m easures of defense. I hare gone to the extrem e limit o f the possible in m y efforts for the preservation of the peace o f the world. It is not I who bear Hie responsibility fo r the m isfortu ne which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in you r hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia, w h i c h m i g h t w e l l h a v e a w a i t e d t h e s u c c e s s o f in .v m e d i a t i o n . The friendship fo r you a n d your cou ntry, bequeathed to me by m y grandfather on his deathbed, has alw ays been sacred to me, a n d I have stood fa ith fully by Russia while it teas in serious affliction, especially during its last war. T h e p e a c e o f E u r o p e c a n s t i l l b e p r e s e r v e d b y y o u if Russia decides to discontinue those m ilitary preparations w h i c h m e n a c e G e r m a n y a n d a lm o s t illu s o r y . Tn s p i t e o f t h i s I have c o n tin u e d it, an d A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y . W (O m a n ’s O u tb re a k of th e W ar, il h e l m . p. 8 9 . ) No reply. Wilhelm, at midnight Friday, gave notice the Ger man Army would mobilize if by noon Saturday Russian mobili zation did not stop. At 5 p. m. Saturday, August J, German mobilization was issued. At 7.10 p. m. German ambassador at Petrograd advised the Russian Government that Germany accepted the Russian challenge and the state of war forced on Germany. It will be observed in this exchange of telegrams that Nicho• las was under a pressure he feared he should be unable to r e sist. On the very day that the Kaiser advised him that he would have to bear the responsibility o f war or peace if he ordered a general mobilization, he reordered the mobilization which had been begun by his own statement on July 25, and on July 31, having the day before ordered the general mobilization. •CIHOM?! IVNOISSaHOxVOO pi RECORD. 15 C O N G R E SSIO N A L he advises the Kaiser it was impossible to discontinue the mili tary preparations, and lie gives his solemn word that the Rus sian troops will undertake no provocative action, although they cross the German border in four places the next day. (Kuhl 79-30.) The German leaders, getting daily reports from Paris, Lon don, Brussels, and Petersburg, accepted what they had become convinced was now absolutely unavoidable, and on Saturday, 5 p. m., August 1, ordered a general mobilization. (N o te A u gu st The at 7 .1 0 Im p e r ia l b ig in n in g of p lia n c e w ith R u s s ia , th e B r ita in . a a ta ry by fa ile d th e s a fe ty m ent p art of but R u s s ia , of to B is dem and, a c tio n w ith S t. P e te rsb u rg p e r il, e x iste n c e to of m ake od c o n s id e r e d h a v in g my E m p ero r o f A ll sh ow n by a g a in s t th e E m p ir e , E m peror, a c ce p ts th is th e to in fo r m my th e I au gu st (this and to G overn th e to G overn in s is t h a v in g to In th is her th e as th e in fo llo w s : nam e of h im s e lf th e at w ar R u s s ia . POCRTALES. The w ord s th a t tw o th e y w ere in p a re n th e se s v a r ia tio n s b o th hnd occur been In serted in In th e prepared th e o r ig in a l. In It m u st advance, and be su p p osed th a t by m is ta k e n o te . R E L A T IV E E N T E N T E AN D G E R M A N P R E P A R A T I O N S . General Von Moltke, in the summary above referred to, says that Germany would he obliged in the event o f war— to ta k e s till th e fie ld w ith ta ck e d a in a g a in s t s lig h t th e rear F ran ce w ith s u p e r io r ity by in an In fe r io r ity a r tille r y ), in and in fa n tr y w ill (th o u g h fu r th e r be a t R u s s ia . And he says: In tio n v ie w of Is Ju st u la n d a sen of her as th e army en orm ou s sh e w ill im p o s s ib le pow er as it fo r is su m s he R u s s ia stro n g e r G erm an y fo r h er to is s p e n d in g on w ith to try a tte m p t every and to th e year c o m p ete c a tc h r e o r g a n iz a th a t up p asses. w ith w ith In spite of the fact that Vienna was ready to enter into direct con versation with Petersburg on the Serbian issue. In spite o f the fact that Vienna had accepted the Grey mediation. In spite of the fact that Vienna hnd given assurances as to the integrity of Serbia. In spite of the fact that Vienna was prepared not to go beyond such a temporary occupation of a part of Serbian territory as England Itself had considered acceptable. F inally, in spite of the fact that Austria had only mobilized again st Serbia and that Germany had not yet mobilized at all. Former Chancellor Hollweg then says: Consequently, when the telegraph brought us news of the mobili zation on the morning of the 31st of July, we could not be other than convinced that Russia desired tear under all conditions. It appears that neither Germany nor Austria knew the terms o f the treaty of 1892 requiring Russia and France to attack Germany if Austria mobilized. upon th a t on E x c e lle n c y Hollweg points out that Russia mobilized because it desired \v:ir. It refused to suspend mobilization. SOME r e fu se d an sw er) h on or, c o n s id e r s w as c o m p r o m ise d a ttitu d e ) th e so v e r e ig n . c h a lle n g e con m ili G erm an n ecessary Your In G overnm en t have am i S t. any E m p ir e The have and proceeded sea. G erm an of G reat G erm an R u s s ia re fu sa l w ith by % v o u ld th e com E m p eror V ie n n a aD d R u s H ia s it In ju s tiile d th e a c ts. G erm an y, G o v e rn m e n t, th e If sin c e r e s u lt , r e p r e s e n ta tio n s h a y in g d ir e c te d of la n d not th e con cert on th ey m ilita r y (n o t in G erm an y. th e th e M a je s ty any G erm an y, e ffo r t s e ttle m e n t. fo r w as dan ger. th is every c a b in e ts b o th w h ic h of o b lig e d th e fo r c e s im m in e n t very H is w a itin g step , part u sed p e a c e fu l by a fo r e sa id of at u n d erta k e n , of M a je s ty G erm an h im b etw een h er a g a in s t th e a M a je s ty and s tr u c tio n s H is gu ard w ith w as of th e and th e re fo r e , c e s s a tio n c o m p ly on grave to w ith o u t th r e a te n in g have about had m e d ia to r m o b J Iiz n tio i! w ere, m ent b r in g E m peror and am bassad or G overn m en t to expressed th is n had to c r is is p r o c e e d in g s fa c e d a G erm an w is h gen eral of G erm an G erm an th e seq u en ce th e p . m .) th e P ete rsb u rg ; to by p resen ted 1, distrust, im perialistic ideals, and a patriotism restricted to material national instincts respectively worked each other np without its ever being possible to say that any particular nation had contributed most to the general tendency of the world. (Ibid. 169.) It R u s s ia as E n g la n d as pow er. BE L G IA N EVID E N C E . In the reports from the Belgian ministers and charges d ’affaires at Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels, printed by E. S. Mitler & Sons, Berlin, will he found 200 pages o f evidence going to show the attitude of Quai d'Orsa.v, o f London, and o f Berlin to the general effect that the Berlin Government was very desirous of maintaining peace, that the French Government became increas ingly disposed to war as the war powers of Russia and France were expanded and the Entente with Great Britain became dependable. For example, the Belgian minister at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs o f Belgium says, page 184: Everyone in England, and France considers the E n ten te Cordiale to be a defensive and offensive alliance against G erm any. * * • I t is the E n ten te Cordiale which has reawakened in France an idea of ravanche, which up to then had slumbered. It is also the E nten te Cordiale which is responsible for the state of uneasiness and unrest prevailing in Europe for the last seven years. * * * F or the present it must therefore be considered as approved that the plan of assisting France in a w ar against G erm any by landing an army of 150,000 English troops was discussed in London. There is nothing In this 'calculated to surprise us. I t is the continuation of the singular proposals made some years ago by Colonel Barnardston to General Ducarne. The Belgian minister, Guillaume, at Paris to the Belgian In chapter 10 (let France explain) Bausman points out the preparedness of the entente allies— Russia, France, and Eng Minister for Foreign Affairs, January 16. 1914, says: land— and that in 1914 the expenditures of Russia. France, I already had the honor of inform ing you that it is M M . I'oinearS and England for war purposes made a total of $1,337,259,735, Dolcasso, Millernnd, and their friends who hare inaugurated and pur while Germany and Austria expended in 1914 $420,133,850, so sued the nationalistic, m ilitaristic, and Chauvinistic policy, the renas that the entente allies expended $917,000,000 more in 1014 than cence of which w e witnessed, Such a policy con stitutes a danger for Germany and Austria, and this does not include Belgium or Europe— and also for Belgium. 1 see in it the greatest peril threat Italy. ening to-day the peace of Europe. * * * The attitude adopted by The number of men available for immediate action o f Ilus- I Barthou has provoked a recrudescence of m ilitarism in Germ any. sia, France. England, and Italy was 2,663,003. The total for | (Ibid. p. 169.) Germany and Austria was 1,176,741. The Belgian minister at Berlin in a long letter on February General B uat’s figures give the German active army 870,000 men, the French active army 910.000 men. General Joffre in 20, 1914, quotes the French ambassador at Berlin, as follow s: The m ajority of the Germ ans and of the French undoubtedly wish to Franco-Russian conferences o f 1913 said he would have 200,000 live in peace. But in both countries there is a pow erful minority dream more men than agreed to. Of course, Great Britain, France, and Russia controlled the ing solely of battles, of wars o f conquest, or ravanche. Herein lies the sea through the giant navy o f Great Britain, and therefore d a n g e r; it is like a powder barrel which any rash act may set on fire. Germany was cut off from supplies throughout the world, while (Ibid. p. 173.) the Entente Allies had the whole world to draw from. On May 8, 1914, the Belgian Minister Guillaume at Paris to When the war ended Germany with approximately 67,000,000 the Belgian foreign office quotes an “ experienced and highly people was facing nearly the whole world, or over 1,400,000,000 placed diplom at” as stating: people against the German Government. If a serious incident should arise one o f these days between France Chancellor Hollweg states that— The su p p o s itio n th a t G erm an y th a t pow er is in e n tire ab sen ce an to th e a s s u m p tio n an so s illy w o r ld of any a sc r ib e s opponent in th e to % He says: The gram co n tro v ersy of an ces gen eral w ill p r o b a b ly 76870— 11 as to never th e of w h ic h arm am en t be le t and lo o s e h is to r in n o th e r us heat a w ar w o u ld e x p la n a tio n sort of p o lit ic a l p a rty to fo u g h t a to fo lly out at th e p e r v e rs io n a fin is h . fir s t of m ere ta k e a ll. th a t c o n tro v ersy . gave of o n ly * is It lu s t * o n ly * Such a ttr ib u te d (H o llw e g , im p u ls e th e of s e r io u s ly to p o lic y Im m e a s u r a b le 1 0 3 .) a pro of a lli m u tu a l and Germany, the statesm en of the two countries will have to arrive at a peaceful solution of the m atter w ithin three days or else there will be war. One of the most dangerous elements of the present situation is the return of France to the three yea rs’ ser v ic e ; the latter has been lncon siderately imposed by the m ilitary party, and the country is unable to stand It, Before two years have elapsed Franco w ill be placed before the alternative either o f abrogating the three-yea rs' aot or o f going to war. * * * The press in both countries is blam ew orthy. The campaign pursued in G erm any against the Foreign Legion is exceedingly a u o D 'i u LI iy m o is sa a w jv u ^ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 10 c l u m s t , and the tone o j the French new spaper* is invariably a crim on ious and augresaivc. ( I b i d . p . 1 8 1 . ) Mr. Neilson points out (p. 205) : i N ew s had reach ed On .Tune 0, 1914. Guillaume wires the Belgian foreign office 1 2 4 a m o b i l i z a t i o n b a s s a d o r s w h ic h from Paris as follow s: Ile r lin th n t c ir c u la r , and c o n ta in e d th e Ile lg lu m an hnd u n d a te d is s u e d as In str u c tio n In fo r m a tio n th e y w ere e a r ly aa to B e lg ia n to g iv e J u ly am to th e the p ress campaign <n fa v o r o f the p r in c h a n c e l l o r s a s t o h e r " s tr e n g t h e n e d p e a ce fo o ti n g .” The Belgian circular o f July 24 (day Austria made demand ciple o f the t h r ee y e a r s ’ s e r v i c e has been ex trem ely violent. A l l s o r t s Serbia) announced that the Belgian Army hnd already o f m o a n s h a v e b o r n a d o p t e d w i t h a v i e w t o i n f l u e n c i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n . ; on D u r in g th e la s t The n ew sp apers W e have a ls o co n tra ry to fe w have seen a ll fla y s not th e h e s ita te d F ren ch to c o m p r o m is e am bassad or p re c e d e n ts— nn in itia tiv e in even S t. w h ic h G en eral .T o ft r p . P etersb u rg m ay p rove been mobilized and forts near Germany put in order for wnr. In the circular o f the Belgian Foreign Office to its ambassa dors, dated Jvly 2-). was the inolosnre heretofore referred to, without date, but necessarily either o f that date or o f nn earlier date, which states: i ta k e— d angerous Is it true, that th e St. P ete rs b u rg cabin et p led g ed France to adopt the th r ee -y ea r s ’ s e r v i c e and that the fo r m e r is to-day brin ging all its influence to bear in or d er to p re v e n t the abro g ation o f the law in questionT * * * W e m u s t t h e r e f o r e a s k o u r fo r th e s e lv e s fu tu re if th e of F ran ce. a ttftu d e of th e S t. P e te rsb u rg c a b in e t is based on p. th a t j ch osen a A n o th e r th ree c r itic is m years' w h ic h s e r v ic e in can be F ran ce le v e le d is th a t a g a in s t th e c h a m p io n s of th e p e rp e tu a lly d ra g g in g Russia of into the d iscussion — I t u s s i a w h o s e p o l i t i c a l a l m s r e m a i n a m y s t e r y , w h o utilises the dual allian ce s o lely fo r her own benefit a n d w h o l i k e w i s e , a l t h o u g h s h e i s lti n o w a y s t h r e a t e n e d b y G e r m a n y , in creases her arm am ents in alarm in g proportion. ( I b i d . p . 1 8 6 . ) SOM E E V ID E N C E FROM LONDON. Tn great detail and with innumerable quotations, Francis Neilson, a member of the English Parliament, in his work. How Diplomats Make War, substantially confirms from Eng lish records what has been disclosed in the telegrams above quoted; that Is, that there was in effect an understanding be tween Russia, France, and Great Britain with the military and naval details all worked out. by repeated conferences of their general staffs and the understanding that Great Britain would cooperate with France in the event of a war with Germany. For exam ple: In London, C arson , and w o r ld . on M r. (H o w S a tu rd a y , B onar A u gu st Law D ip lo m a ts 1, h a ste n e d M ake W ar. L ord L an sd ow n e, to th e p. 2 0 3 .) c e n te r of S ir tlie G erm an y sta te and secu re In su re resp ect of B e lg ia n n e u t r a lit y h are The llrlgian Army has taking up such s t r a t e g i c position s a s h a v e b e e n is th e The to tak en hy th e d e fe n s e fo rta of G o v e rn m e n t. of th e A n tw erp c o u n try and on and th e th e M eu se resp ect of Its h a r e been put In o f d e fe n se . There is no manner o f doubt what the Grey-Oaiubon letters meant. The complete plan of naval and military strategy was worked out between the French and British naval and army officers, and on Sunday morning, the very next morning, the \ time Germany ordered her mobilization Saturday nfternoon. and con | and accepted the state of war intended by Russia templated by the mobilization and the Gear’s secret order to the staff, British regiments were marching through London to the front fully equipped for war. (H ow Diplomats Make War, p. 295.) A number o f the members of the British Cabinet resigned when they discovered tills secret diplomacy, including Lord Mprley and the famous patriot, John Burns. The French Government immediately offered Belgium mili tary support (Ibid., 810). and the following dispatch from the French ambassador at Brussels to the French Government ex plains tlie relations between France and Belgium. The tele gram follow s: The th e of r h lr f F ren ch and of th e c a b in e t m ilita r y co n ta ct r e s u lts E d w ard of th e of th e F ren ch appeal tro o p s to B e lg ia n M in is tr y to p re p a r e at o n ce a tta c h *) th e w ith th e B e lg ia n g u a r a n te e in g of fo r pow ers W ar th e A rm y now has ask ed c o o p e r a tio n p e n d in g b e in g th e m ade. Orders h a re t h e r e f o r e been g iv e n to Belgian pro vin cial g o v e r n o r s not to re g a rd m o v em en ts o f F rench troops as a violation o f the fr o n tier . d ip lo m a tic had to step s been n e u tr a lity . 1 8 2 .) ( “ Events are imminent” means “ war is near.” ) The Belgian minister, Eryens, at Berlin, June 12. 1914, in a dispatch to the Belgian foreign office, says: n ecessary been mobilized th e e v e n t s are im m in ent w h ich will perm it of Russia makin g use o f the in stru m en t placed by h er in the hand o f h e r ally. ( I b i d . c o n v ic tio n A ll n e v e r t h e le s s issu e d The British troops took their place on the left wing o f the French under the plans long since worked out. th e K in g d o m t h o u s a n d s o f fe e t tra m p e d C h a n n e lw a r d s . r e g im e n t a ft e r j The mobilization of the Belgian army was completed at least r e g i m e n t w i t h f u l l k i t w o u n d t h r o u g h L o n d o n s t r e e t s a s t h e b e l l s f r o m ; the day before the genera} mobilization of the Russian army t o w e r a n d s t e e p le c a lle d t h e fo lk to p r a y e r . M in is te r s w e n t to a c a b in e t begun under Sukhomlinoff s order. .July 25, about which “ he m e e t in g th e r e a n d y ie ld e d u p t o t h e F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r s o m e to k e n o f ! lie d ” to tlie Russian Czar (see Sukhomlinoffs trial) when he B r i t i s h fr ie n d s h ip ) represented to the Russian Czar that it was a partial mobiliza tion. but which was reordered as a general mobilization by the The German mobilization was ordered 5 p. m. Saturday. The English regiments were on the March Sunday morning i Russian Czar on July 30. In the trial of Sukhomlinoff. Minister of War. at St. Peters armed for war. On August 1 Sir Edward Grey told the German ambassador burg. by the revolutionary government of Russia, Bailsman that Great Britain would not engage to remain neutral, that— sa y s: o rd ers fo r th e g e n e r a l to be m o b iliz a tio n th e S a b b a th , th e fir s t ic e must keep our hands free. o f her a rm y day. T h rough (H o w and th e n a v y ; th e next lo n g D ip lo m a ts S a b b a th M ake a ll W ar, day, over S u U h o m lin o lT 290 ) The fact was Grey was not really free but fully committed, both by the real intent of the agreement with France, but far more by the interests of Great Britain, and Great Britain instantly carried out the commitment under the agreements with France and with Russia. Telegram 148 from the British Foreign Office, August 2. 1914: A fte r lo w in g th e C a b in e t m e e tin g th is m o r n in g , gave M . O nm bon th e fo l- a u th o r iz e d to g iv e nn a s s u r a n c e th a t into Ihe Channel o r th r o u g h the North Sea a g a in s t F ren ch coast or s h ip p in g , if the German fleet c o m cs to u n d e rta k e h o s tile op era th e British fleet will give, all the p ro tection in its pow er. “ T h is assu ra n ce G overn m en t is , r e c e iv in g of cou rse, th e j j i s u b je c t of to th e p o lic y P a r lia m e n t , of and H is M a j e s t y 's m u st not be c o n fe s s e d th e K a is e r th n t th e a fte r C zn r th e c a lle d C zar th e hnd r e c e iv e d M in is te r of th e se W nr t e le up by told him to stop the mobilization. At that tim e the Czar th o u g h t th e mobilization w a s o n l y partial. It w as r e a l l y a l r e a d y g en e ra l, a p r o c e d u r e f o r w h i c h t h e d i r e c t a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C z a r w ; s n ecessary and hnd not been g iv e n . S u k h o m lin o tT c o n fe sse d th a t in making the mobilization g en e ra l h e had c o n ce a le d this from the Czar; n a y , m o r e , t h a t hr did not revea l it tn him in t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n b y t e l e phone. H e n e x t a d m i t t e d t h a t he vrom isetl th e Czar to stop th e f u r t h e r mobilization a n d not to issue a g en e ra l mobilization. Hr h ung up the t ele p h o n e w ilh a false prom ise t o t h e C z a r , a n d , h e s a y s, w e n t on with the mobilization. H i s f e l l o w r o g u e , J a u n u S t d i k e v f t c h , f l o u n d e r i n g i n h i s te s tim o n y sta n d su p p ort fro m te le p h o n e m em oran du m : “ I am tio n s I gram s 2 0 0 ; In a ls o and and th e c o n fr o n te d sam e O m a n 's at d is g u s tin g O u tb re a k of a ll and th e tim e s w ith h u m ilia tin g W ar, c o n tr a d ic tio n s , c o n d itio n . le ft th e (B a ils m a n , 6 8 .) If tlie democracies or peoples of the world continue to permit t a k e n a s b i n d i n g H i s M a j e s t y ’ s G o v e r n m e n t t o t a k e a n y a c t i o n until secret diplomacy with its ambitious intrigue, militarism, com the above co n t i n g e n c y of action by the German fleet takes pla ce.” mercial imperialism, this World War will not he the last So that the enteute was iv f,»ct effective, after all, on the cer The greatest of the English papers, the Ivondon Times, c o r tain contingency o f action by the German fleet, and Parlia rectly states the true position with regard to this mailer of ment was committed by its own Government’s acts. This ac British participation in the Triple Entente, as follows (How tion was equal to agreeing to attack Germany as an ally of Diplomats Slake War. 330) : France. The interests of Great Britain, however, made it nec [F r o m t h e L o n d o n T im e s . M a r c h 1 5 , 1 9 1 5 .) essary when a war actually came between France and Ger T h e r e a r e s t i l l s o m e E n g l i s h m e n a n d E n g l i s h w o m e n w h o g r e a t l y err many that Great Britain should fight the military rulers of the a s t o t h e r e a s o n s t h a t h a v e f o r c e d E n g l a n d t o d r a w t h e s w o r d . T h e y German people who would have been dangerous to British in k n o w t h a t I t w a s G e r m a n y ' s f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n o f B e l g i a n n e u t r a l i t y terests If they had conquered France and dominated western w h i c h f i l l e d t h e c u p o f h e r I n d i g n a t i o n a n d m a d e h e r p e o p l e I n s i s t Europe (w hether they were responsible for the war or not). on w a r (s ic ). T h e y d o n o t r e f l e c t t h a t ou r h on or and ou r in te re st 7*8876— 11 UH03HU I VrMOrSS3JI!')iV03 91 RECORD. 17 C O N G R E S S IO N A L m u tt h a v e co m p elle d us to join F ian ce and Russia had s c r u p u lo u s ly sou gh t to back resp ected her w ay th e in to r ig h ts F ran ce of her s m a ll th r o u g h th e even If G erm an y n e ig h b o r s , e a ste rn and had fo rtre sse s. Great Britain was led into the war on tlie theory that British interests required cooperation icith France and Russia, for which Sir Edward Grey had laid the ground by years of naval and military conferences in which every detail of a war on Ger many had been carefully outlined. In Entente Diplomacy and tlie World, Documents S47 and 850 (Exhibit V II), will be found the Britisli-Russian Entente plans. * These dispatches demonstrate beyond a possibility o f doubt that there were secret conventions thoroughly worked out and planned between Russia, France, and Great Britain as to how war should be made on Germany, involving Great Britain send ing empty ships into the Baltic Sea for Russia’s use against Germany just before the war of 1914 was declared; (Doc. 850) that England should be prepared to fetter the German fleet in the North S ea ; arrangements in the Mediterranean were to lie made, and especial authority to the Russian ships to use French and English porta to establish a complete working plan between the nuvies and the armies o f the three countries— Great Britain, Russia, and France. The limit of discussion makes It Inexpedient to quote these innumerable documents. It should be nuflicient to enll the attention of the Senate to these documents and of their convincing character. The Russian ambassador, Ixindon, June 25, 1914, telegraphs to Sazonoff (Doc. 855, p. 730, Ibid.) : m e t o - d a y t h a t h e w a s g r e a tly alarm ed b y t h e f a l s e r u m o r s circu la tin g in the German press co n c e r n in g the c o n te n ts o f th e a lle g e d naval co n v e n tio n between England e n d R ussia _ • • * Grey a s su re d the German am bassador * * * that b e tw e e n England, on th e o n e hand, a n d F rance and Russia th e re ex isted n e i t h e r an alli a n ce n o r a con ven tion • • • t h a t t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s h a d n e v e r assu m ed a c h a r a c t e r d ir e ct ed again st Germ any n o r had t h e y a n y r e f e r e n c e to th e so-called “ e n cir clin g p o licy .’’ G rey w h ic h to ld w ore On the face of the Cambou-Grey letters was an express dis claimer of either Government being bound by them, but the actual intent and true, common interest against the German Imperial Government is quite clear. The English honor and interest were both Involved. It cer tainly appears that France. Russia, and Great Britain did have secret conventions; the conventions were directed against Ger many, worked out in detail then in process of execution and they were in pursuance of “ the encircling policy,” and were carried out on the battle fields and at sea within GO days. Three days later Ilusso-Serbian intrigues led to the murder o f Archduke Ferdinand, and the grand drama, with stage fully set, opened to the astonishment and grief of the poor, little common people who die and pay taxes. The secret entente agreements with France and Russia were repeatedly denied by the British foreign office in Parliament by its representatives asserting that there was no commitment o f the British Government to support the French Government in case o f a war with Germany. On March 10 o f the following year, 1913, Mr. Asquith, re plying to a question in the Commons from Lord Hugh Cecil, denied that England was under an— o b lig a tio n cou rse of of th is a r is in g o w in g d ip lo m a tic c o u n try to to an assu ran ce n e g o tia tio n s o p era te in to sen d g iv e n a by v ery th e la r g e no E urop ean q u e s tio n we to in te rfe r e a b ig any to ta k e B r itis h up G overnm en t arm s in a w o u ld fo r e ig n be q u arrel so is g u ilty m ore to w a rd th a n I our can c o u n try b e lie v e . On April 28, 1914, and again on June 11. Sir Edward Grey confirmed in the House o f Commons Mr. Asquith’s assertion, 7 0 8 7 0 — 11------- 8 as very G erm an y not life is m e r e ly and by to th e e x is te n c e o f in d e p e n d e n c e o th e r n a tio n s , of th e each (D a ily of th e G e rm a n n a tio n w h ic h C h r o n ic le , Its e lf, p ossesses Janu ary 1, is read y and hopes th a t Fran ce is ready. (B o u r se G a z e t t e .) This article appears to have been inspired by Sukhomlinoff, minister of war. This paper goes on to state that the Russian Army Is now 2,320,000 men. (Bausman, 31.) This paper (supra) further said; W e have p r o je c te d r a ilw a y s to A p p e n d ix G .) and begun c o n c e n tra te th e to b u ild arm y THE as a w h o le q u ic k ly EUROPEAN as n etw o rk of p o s s ib le . str a te g ic (B a u s m a n , PRESS. The press o f Russia, France, Germany, und Serbia in 1914 was a press largely controlled by subsidies. The journals were not supported by advertisements as in America. They relied upon subsidies from governments, politichins, and from commercial and financial interests. Through this agency the people o f Germany, France, and Russia were taught to hate each other. The death o f the crown prince of Austria was attributed by the Government of Aus tria to the Serbian press propaganda financed by the Russian Government through the Russian mfnister at Belgrade with the connivance of the Serbian Government. In Livre Noir, which discloses the secret archives of the Russian foreign office, are many dispatches showing the manner in which the Russian Government subsidized and directed the press. On page 208, Livre Noir, for example, in telegram 591, De cember 18, 1913, Isvolsky, the Russian ambassador at Paris, speaking o f the Paris press, says: The papers w h ic h are in s tr u c tio n s , and haps th e m s e lv e s en gage if we d ev o ted do not w ith a to u s, as g iv e th e m fa ls e v ie w . Le M a tin , r e ly d ir e c tio n s on th ey me fo r m ig h t per On page 213 (Ibid.) Isvolsky says: It is p ress. m ore have p a r tic u la r ly im p o r ta n t O th e r w is e it m ay th a t it th a n in su re v ie w o n ly th e ir h ere, engage is at its e lf su ch w ith c o n t in u a lly ow n s p e c ia l a a m oved m o m e n t, fa ls e by to co n tro l v ie w ; b e s id e s fin a n c ia l c ir c le s th e it is w ho In te re sts. On page 271 of Livre Noir Isvolsky w rites: E n d e a v o r in g w ith th e p ress to of m a in ta in th e at th e sam e th a n k s to th e m easures o b ta in e d . of I As th e ta k e is , you it su ch as th e to a ttitu d e s but I and do th is M in is te r in th e tim e , not e ffic a c io u s Journ al p ress. in te rv e n e d is tr ib u tio n of F o r e ig n and des are In th e D e b a ts, I W ith in w h ic h th e its am and in have th e us m y v ie w , been d is tr ib u F rench th e en d s. fo r d o in g th is r e s u lt s d ir e c tly A ffa ir s o b ta in s d e s ifk b le w o r ld , c o n s id e r a b le to in flu e n c e p e r s o n a lly T em p s, w h ic h p o litic a l in flu e n c e tak en know , ap pears, exert every d ay P a r is , tim e s u b sid ie s, p a rt, th e G overn m en t u tm o st t io n Ou July 1 Lord Loreburu, Lord Chancellor from 1906 to 1912, said— as R u s s ia iste r s w ith is v it a l th e The French Army was much more powerful than the German (conferences above quoted). The semiofficial paper Birshewija Wjedomasti, of Petrograd, on June 13, 1914, before the Serajevo tragedy, stated: F in a n c e , concern ed A rm y to 1 9 1 4 .) th e arm y. th a t but about as p o w e r fu l as h e r own. arm s out E urope. w ere G erm an su rrou n d ed in On March 24 he made similar denials in reply to questions from Sir W. Byles and Mr. King. On April 14 Mr. llunciman, in n speech at Birkenhead, denied “ in the most categorical way ” the existence of a secret understanding with any foreign power. On May 3 the Secretary for the Colonies, Mr. Harcourt, de clared that he “ could conceive no circumstances in which con tinental operations would not be a crime against the people o J this country.” On June 28 the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr Acland, declared publicly that— In The E m p ir e , fo r c e m in is tr y arm ed made March 11 and 24, 1913, o f British freedom from engage ments with continental powers. (See Neilson How Diplomats Make W a r; Morel Truth and the War, etc.) These disclosures justify America in receiving the assurances of European diplomats with some reserve. Lloyd George five months before the war sa id : m in M in is te r F rom my m o s t im p o r t a n t jo u r n a ls L ’E c h o de of s id e of P a r is . The manner in which the press responds to such stimulation has heretofore been shown In the dispatches which I have quoted, showing that they were instrumentalities in moving the French people to war and in moving the Russian people to war. From these disclosures it will appear how extremely signifi cant to the German rulers was the attitude of the French press in Paris in July, 1914, where they were denouncing Germany and Austria and demanding the support of Russia, and it is worth while to recall the declaration of the Nouvelle Revue that France was determined on war, and of the Petrograd press that Russia was determined on war, and that France and Russia were prepared. In the American press a few weeks ago was an item announc ing that the French Government requested 8,000.000 francs to he used with the press without disclosing the details. I have Just received by mail as a Senator of the United States a book o f 112 pages o f press clippings strenuously sup porting the French policy in the Ruhr. It is obviously paid a a o o a a 61 18 ’i v N o i s s a a o N o o CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. propaganda. The first article declares, among other things, In I’egard to the W orld W ar: W hat G erm an y m an eu ver. A r m is tic e It, w a s She D ay th e c o u ld has a h o llo w fir s t to not do broken In th e m ockery. fa lte r . L ast b a ttle u n ity in of sh e Is th e A llie s A m e ric a , und th e we fie ld , d o in g by and h is to r y w ere th e e v a sio n has and m ade of m u st so w r ite fir st to le a v e . This unfair Imputation was printed in an American news paper and purports to be written by an American editor. The fact is, America, and history must so write it, won the war, and only left when the military dynasties had been destroyed in battle. When the Allies were sending delegation after delegation Imploring our help, telling us that the British and Belgian troops had their backs to the wall, and that the French troops were bled white, America sent 2,000.000 o f the ablest and brav est men on earth to the battle line and drove the Germans back, and the American President by diplomacy presented terms the German people accepted as a basis o f armistice. See the dispatch of June 3, 1918, of General Foch, Lloyd-George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, beseeching our assistance immediately (Exhibit 13) and urgently declaring tliat'without American help the war was lost and victory impossible. Until the great mass o f European people understand how they are ruled and led into war by a few leaders there can be little hope o f permanent peace in the woi'ld. I f a few diplomats having access to the national purse are permitted by propaganda, through a subsidized press, to teach the people to hate each other, permanent peace is impossible. The peoples ought to be taught to understand each other, to respect each other and promote friendly commercial rela tions with each other. There is no possible reason why the farmers and laborers of France should be led to kill the farmers and laborers of Germany, and there is no just cause why the mechanics, clerks, and domestics o f Germany should be taught to hate and kill the mechanics, clerks, and domestics of France. They are all alike entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But their peace depends on the intelligence, power, and initia tive of the people themselves expressed through their proper parliaments elected by the suffrage of the people. This is a matter that the people o f Europe themselves must work out. They can not be advised from America. Possibly the seeds we sow in feeding their famishing may finally lead their states men to realize that the American ideals o f international under standing and good will is the better policy. The Belgian minister at Berlin, Baron Beyens, speaks about the French inflammatory discourses which place Belgium in so dangerous a position and which interfere with those trying to preserve the peace between France and Germany. Baron Guillaume, the Belgian ambassador at Paris, wrote his home office, May 8, that Frenchmen were proclaiming a certain victory over Germany. (Dip. Rev., p. 288.) The Russian ambassador at Berlin advises his Government March 12, 1914, that Germany “ is trying to appear not afraid.” Isvolsky, the Russian ambassador at Paris, on September 12, 1912, reports a conversation with Poincare assuring 1dm of the French loyalty to Russia, as fo llo w s: a c o n flic t w ith v e n tio n , If F ran ce w ill not a m in ute lo s e A u s tr ia at In on ce s h o u ld int'olve r e c o g n iz e it as fulfilling her p le d g e s G erm an y’s a to arm ed casus fo e d e ris R u s s ia . in te r and (P ra v d a , will 19 19 ; A B a u s m a n , 3 4 .) On December 23, 1920, Lloyd-George expresses the opinion— That th in g no In to one at w h ic h th e th ey head of g lid e d , or a ffa ir s ra th e r q u ite m eant sta g g ere d w ar. and It w as som e s tu m b le d . This view is very charitable but comes a little late. It is worth while to remember that Germany had over 4,500 miles o f frontier to protect and no natural boundaries to pro tect her on the east or the west or the south and that their authorities naturally were apprehensive. Frederick Bausman, former member of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, in Let France Explain, thoroughly documented (London, George Allen & Unwin), believes that the Government o f France under Poincare was also to blame for the world catastrophe, and he lays down the following propo sitions : First. That the alliance of France and Russia was unneces sary to the safety of France and was hostile to the peace o f Europe by its inviting into western Europe an overwhelming mass led by irresponsible men who aimed at extending there an Irresponsible government and a shameful despotism. TO870— 11 Second. That France deliberately and continually armed Rus sia and encouraged her aggressiveness against Germ any; that French policy was continuously directed to creating a favorable opportunity for war upon Germany to regain her lost Provluces, disintegrate Germany as she had kept her disintegrated In previous centuries, and resume her old pluee at the head of European affairs. Third. That the German armaments were, beyond all ques tion, made necessary by the enormous and wholly unnecessary increases In Russian armaments. Fourth. That the Serbians were amon?; the most ruthless people In E urope; that Russia had no regard for Serbia other than to extend her own empire Into the Balkans; and that Russia desired to break up, through Serbia, the Austro-Hun garian Empire, a result that would have left Germany helpless against Russia later. Fifth. That the war sprang out of Russian ambition in the Balkans and in nothing vital to the French whatsoever, and that France could have stopped Russia at the outset by telling her that she would not support her Balkan ambitions, because Russia would not have gone into the war unless supported by France, which country immediately udvised her that she would support her. Sixth. That Germany did everything possible to avert the war after discovering that Russia actually would go to war and France support Russian ambitions in the Balkans, the chancellor imperatively and repeatedly requesting Austria to acquiesce, and the Kaiser personally imploring the Tsar to stop, and that England, though embarrassed by previous rela tions with the French and Russians, also exerted herself to prevent war, but that the French Government did nothing whatever to restrain Russia. ^ Seventh. That the Russians, finding themselves certain of French support and possibly of English support, too, pushed, at first by stealth and then openly, a general m obilization; that they brought 2,000,000 of well-equipped troops toward the Ger man frontier and refused, after reasonable notice from Ger many, to stop the m obilization; that France and Russia knew that they could ultimately drive England into the war, because England could not risk the conquest of France by Germany under any circumstances, and that Italy would not aid Ger many at all. Eighth. That Russia wanted a war, that France knew that Russia wanted a war, and that the Government o f Poincare did all that was possible to lash up the people o f France against Germany before the war because his Government believed that the combined forces o f France and Russia, especially If aided by England, were invincible. Ninth. That the French and Russians, neither o f them sur prised but on the contrary long prepared, went into the war at the height of their overwhelming strength, the French Army being alone equal to that o f Germany and the fully equipped part of the Russian much larger. Tenth. That if the war had ended successfully for Russia, the best part of central Europe would have been absorbed by h e r; that France during the war actually made a secret treaty to that effect; that the Germans were compelled to resist with enormous loss the spread of the Slavs into western Europe and have contributed to its protection; and that the English, compelled by sheer military necessity to save France from de feat. have suffered incalculably in life, trade, and wealth. And sa y s: s in g le have t e le g r a m p re v e n te d w o u ld fro m th e w ar, a w as not even m o b iliz e d su ch m essage, th e v e n tu re F ran ce R u s s ia n in to a tta c k e d a g a in s t I e x p la in , th e p. w ar w o u ld 3 6 .) u n le s s C e n tra l G erm an y G overnm en t at th is G overnm en t te le g r a m have th e (B r itis h had o u tse t of W h ite th e P ow ers, saved “ secu re to w a r n in g c o n flic t c o n c e r n in g by h er. re p e a t, F ren ch s im p le n o t s u p p o r t h e r in a h e r s e lf fo r th is not th e had F ran ce B a lk a n s w h e n R u s s ia n e ith e r of m o b iliz e d sta te d su p p ort P aper w o u ld th a t c iv iliz a tio n th e R u s s ia n R u s s ia its th a t of at w h ic h had a ll. One c a ta stro p h e , it w o u ld F r a n c e .” not (L e t 1 7 .) In order to comprehend what took place in Europe, one should remember that the Governments o f Europe are in the hands of a comparatively few men. The record shows, o f course, that the Czarist Russian Govern ment was a military dynasty, controlled by the Czar, Grand Dukes, and their military satellites. The French Government, the record shows, entered into a secret written treaty with this military monarchy whose views of government were diametri cally opposed to the supposed principles of the Republic of France. The British Foreign Office entered into a secret agreement with France and Russia without the knowledge of Parliament, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and thus stimulated and made aggressive the militarism o f the French leaders, and all the more made aggressive the leaders of Russia whose objects were entirely at variance with those of the British people or of the French people. The French leaders had some reason to fear the possible aggression o f the German military dynasty and by making an alliance with Russia and England were able to make the German military authorities afraid to attack France, but the policy fatally en couraged Russia to attack Germany. Russia had a far more important and different purpose to serve. The Russian Gov ernment had long had a determined policy to control the Dar danelles, to have free access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. It was impossible for Russia to get this advantage except as the result of a general European war, and the way to provoke a general European war was precisely the means employed by Russia with its intrigues in Serbia, where the Slavs of Serbia were stimulated and financed to carry on secret intrigues against the Austrian Government through the Slav population o f Austria. It was only necessary to compel Austria to partially mobilize, whereupon the Franco-Russian agree ment to attack Germany came into effect automatically, and France and Germany must instantly mobilize and attack Ger many at the same time on the east and on the west with all their forces. These Serbian intrigues compelled Austria to mobilize in 1912. (Russia not quite ready.) Again compelled Austria to mobilize in 1913. (Russia not quite ready.) In 1914, when they led to the murder o f the Crown Prince of Austria and his consort, the court at Vienna in extreme anger delivered a 4S-hour demand for satisfaction and mobilized against Serbia. A pretext for the Russian mobilization had been created by Russia and instantly SazonolT said, “ This time we shall march.” This was the precise situation which the Russian clique, led by Sazonof and Sukhomlinoff, seems to have desired to accom plish and the war was on. F K E N C II E V ID E N C E . Colonel Boucher, of the French general staff, issued in 1910 to 1913 three books— one France Victorious in To-morrow’s Wars, one the Offensive Against Germany, and another Ger many in Peril. In the latter he says: G e r m a n y la m en a ced on a ll fr o n tie r s , a n d s itu a te d t h a t s h e c a n n o t fe e l s e c u r e o f h e r fu t u r e a g a in s t a ll h er a d v e rs a rie s , w it h o u t fin d in g s om e w a y to e lim in a t e us * * • m en a ce d on th e n o r th b y E n g la n d . on th e w e s t by F ra n c e , o n th e ea st by R u s sia , a n d t o -d a y e q u a lly ou t h e s o u th * • * In d a n g e r o f p a n sla v is m . S he m ust ra ise her fo r c e s to th e s u p re m e degree. General Buat, o f the French general staff, showed that the mobile forces of France were in active army of 910,000 men with reserves o f 1,325,000. O n e ca n s a y th en t h a t w it h o u t ta k in g a n y a c c o u n t o f th e B e lg ia n a r m y o r o f th e fo u r B r itis h d iv is io n s , F ra n c e a lo n e w a s a t t h e b e g in n in g , at le a s t, e q u a l, i f n o t s u p e rio r, to h e r fo r m id a b le a d v e r s a r y in th e n u m b e r o f th e p r in c ip a l u n its . ( L ’ A rm ee A lle m a n d e , p p . 1 - 9 . ) The French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Paleologue, in the early part o f 1914 was warned by Vlviani that war would soon break out (Revue des deux Mondes, January, 1921) ; but Viviani, in his opening speech to the French Parliament after the German declaration of war, complained o f its being “ unex pected.” Lord French tells us that the preparations with France were on a complete and mutual understanding ( “ 1914,” p. 8) and that England was to put 160,000 men at a point near Belgium on 12 days’ notice. Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador to London, s a id : W h e n I r e c a ll C a m b o n ’ s c o n v e r s a tio n s w it h m e, th e w o r d s e x c h a n g e d a n d a d d th e a tt it u d e o f P o in c a r e , th e t h o u g h t co m e s t o m e as a c o n v i c t i o n t h a t o f a ll th e p o w e r s F r a n c e is t h e o n ly o n e w h ic h n o t t o say t h a t i t w is h e s w a r w o u ld y e t lo o k u p on i t w it h o u t g r e a t re g re t. (G e r m an W h it e B o o k , p t. 2, p. 7 5 .) Many notable French men have issued protests and accusa tions against Poincare, such as De Martial, Henri Barbusse, Anatole France, Ernest Renauld, etc. Renauld, a distinguished historical writer, engaged Poincare In an argument and s a id : T h e E n t e n t e w a n te d t h e w a r as m u ch as W illia m I I , a n d y o u , M r. P r e s id e n t , an d y o u r g r o u p o f fr ie n d s w a n ted it m o re th a n a ll. (B a u s m an , p 2 9 .) 76876— 11 19 Sukhomlinoff, Russian Foreign Minister, August, 1912, after one o f Poincare’s visits sent a circular to his Russian diplomats saying: W hen th e be m o st c r itic a l d e s ir a b le P o in c a r e h im s e lf, c h a ra c te r F ren ch and have at w ho P r im e in m om en t to at le a s t has a as M in is te r . in te r n a tio n a l th e head o f th e p e r s o n a lity little fe a r (E n te n te r e la tio n s a llie d w ho of has th e sam e r e s p o n s ib ility D ip lo m a c y , it a r r iv e s, g o v e rn m e n ts, pp. as w ill if not e n e r g e tic th e p resen t 6 5 2 -6 5 5 .) In Poincare-a-t-il-Voulu-la-Gerre the warlike course of the French Government is attributed to Poincare from his coming into office in 1912. The work o f Peve les Responsables de la Guerre places the responsibility on Poincare. (Bausman.) Poincare assured the extra session of the French Parliament August 4, 1914, that France— w a s prepared and (F r e n c h our enem y Y e llo w Book, p. w ill m e e t on th e ir p a th our v a lia n t tro o p s 1 5 8 .) The attitude of the French war party may be appreciated from the quotation o f Mr. Buxton, in the foreign office de bate o f July, 1912, taken from the “ Nouvelle Revue,” one of the most prominent of Paris Review's: W e we in te n d can at F ren ch revue s tr ik e , w ill and not * * p. 4 * or th e p a rty , w ill N avy w ar. u tte r in have in to th e ir not com e, in • * a * 40 w ith * • * r e m a in s (H o w ago, * and of sh e th e a t th e th e ir fle e t w h o le D ip lo m a ts a to d iv e r g e n t W e, th a t of ready annual E n g la n d th e is years th e peace read ers F ran ce to c o u n try . arm ed se r io u s • ready w a te rs. h e a v ily th e o w in g each G erm an of • arran ged fo llo w e d th e w as to ra te have years w ith o u t sh oes. sh e years b ir th 40 o p in io n ub 5 w ill A fte r th is conqu er, in of tacking have s h a k in g to be n u m bers m nn to le a s t oer- M ake W ar, 2 0 6 .) M. Poincar6 has not escaped the criticism o f representatives of the people o f France in the French Chamber o f Deputies. On July 5, 1922, while M. Poincar6 was presiding over the Chamber of Deputies as its President, M. Vaillant-Couturier ( p . 2337-2338, Journal Official) declared “ upon his conscience as an old soldier ” that he was convinced o f the responsibility o f Raymond Poincare for the World War because o f his policy in the Balkans and his unwarrantable support of Russian am bitions and Russian policies. He declared that the war was desired by a group o f important rank in the Court of Russia and that Poincar6 did not do what he could have done to deter the war, that Poincare’s culpability would be exposed by the records and he accused him on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies to have been responsible for building up in France by Russian propaganda public opinion among the French people favorable to the Russian intervention in Balkan affairs. That he had contributed to the war by allowing chances for peace to pass. M. Vaillant-Coutourier in the course of a long speech said: W e accu se liz e d th e F ren ch hoped accu se p u b lic a tio n W e m is e d he h a v in g been revenge on of W e w o u ld h im accu se R u s s ia n m ig h t of fo r n a tio n a lis ts . J aurd s W e h im d e s ir e of th e not of and w is h e s h im th e W Te of • of F ran ce r e a c tio n in to h im d e s tin ie s at th a t or of of w h ic h of tex ts w ar. in th e *. accu se th e c r y s ta l tu r b u le n t been o m is s io n s * w as m ost h a v in g c e r ta in G erm an y w hom th e p r e s id e n t th ro w n 1914 about of of a r c h iv e s h a v in g th e m an part p ass p rovok ed . 1912 been be, le t d ip lo m a tic h im b etw een have accu se h a v in g m o b iliz a tio n th e th e a of th a t w ar of w h ic h h a v in g Fran ce, tim e — th e c o m p i 'o w h a te v e r * * * and stated that the “ stillborn treaty of the peace of Ver sailles,” which “ they all condemn more or less,” stood between a peaceable future and the French people, and said : For to us M. produ ce T o -d a y h is P o in c a r S of a rep rese n ts fu n e r e a l p o lic y le a d s a ll c h a ra c te r us to th a t n a tio n a lis m b e fo r e , is o la tio n , d u r in g , to and fa ilu r e , and has been a b le a fte r th e w ar. to new w ars. On January 15, 1914, Izvolski, in a “ very confidential ” letter (Livre Noir, 230) says: If th e w ith in P o in c a r S sev eral in c id e n t th e c o n tin u e s scop e of expressed tim e s , “ It th e h im s e lf is w e ll to d e v e lo p , a llia n c e . e x a c tly u n d e r sto o d In th e a th e th a t q u e s tio n m ig h t c o n v e r s a tio n sam e, w e by sh a ll put w ith r e p e a tin g su sta in its e lf m e, M. to me y o u ." I respectfully call the attention of the Senate to the secret telegrams from Izvolski, in Livre Noir, pages 14, 19, 20, In which Izvolski, on January 29, 1913, over a year before the World War, sa ys: I h a v e Juet had a lo n g c o n v e r s a tio n w ith P o in ca ird , w h o has d e cla re d to m e In his c a p a c ity as P r e s id e n t o f th e R e p u b lic he w ill h ave a bu n d a n t p o s s ib ility o f d ir e c t ly In flu e n cin g th e fo r e ig n p o lic y o f F ra n ce • • •. A c c o r d in g to him i t is o f th e h ig h e st im p o r ta n c e fo r th e 16 V I U V /L /U 11 X T 4 20 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. F ren ch lic G overnm en t o p in io n B a lk a n s . as • to • to b e a b le a w ar In advance w h ic h to c o u ld ta k e a r is e p art in in th e d ir e c tin g p u b m a tte r of th e • And on January 30, 1913, page 19: The en ergy, appear th e as th e th e R e p u b lic he lic r e s — w ith a d e c o r a tiv e , tim e s th e That is m ent • and r O le M . he th e k n o w le d g e of th e of and and, it fo r m ig h t of fo r e ig n years we sev en at th e p erson s as to r e p ly , head to it. * no * so M. at * be C r u p p i, to o p in io n a ll • • c o m p le t e ly F ren ch day of F a l- expressed , and a ffa ir s . th e every ex p resses be can of P o in c a ir # P r e sid e n t m eans C a lla lu r , com e M . as e x a m p le , d o m a in c o n tin u e s c o n se n ts if of c a p a c ity every next no c h a ra c te r h ie by th e su ch In in flu e n c e ap pearan ce m akes It in e n tir e h im s e lf— a s , p a ssiv e w o u ld P o in c a ir S Jonn ert th e w h ic h co n ten t p o lic y d ip lo m a c y M . and th a t not d u r in g a g a in s t * of p u r e ly th a t F ren ch and * w ill but why assu red d e c is io n , g u a ra n ty G overn N o n is , th e e tc . m in is tr y , w ith o u t he has * And page 20: The F rench o b lig a tio n a ll th e a is e x a c t ly gen eral A ls o rest nor it in R u s s ia th e case th a t th e th e t lip and e n te r p r is e s of w hen in by th e th e th e d ip lo m a tic R u s s ia n th e draw * * to d e p r iv e sw ord and not th e • R u s s ia S ta te s. in arm s c o n v e n tio n a s s is ta n c e of o b lig a tio n s B a lk a n in com F ran ce c o n v e n tio n e n te rta in its w ith a c tu a l s h o u ld su p p ort G overnm en t us and of m oral F r a n c o -R u s s ia n e ffe c tiv e th e concern s th e m ilita r y w is h th e on of m in is tr y not tow ard p a r tic ip a tio n F ran ce doubt o n ly fu lfill k n o w le d g e r e s u lt th e h e s ita tio n . does put not of to fu ll fin a l F ren ch w h ic h count fo r e s e e n th e s lig h te s t th a t can w ith F r a n c o -R u s s ia n th e to d e c id e d n e c e ssity m om ent by nor e n e r g e tic (th e fir m ly a d m its G overnm en t a c tio n , upon m ost it The F ren ch of q e n tly th e w ar. doubt is it n ecessary fo r u n d e r s ta n d in g th e lib e r ty be and d e te r m in e d th e s lig h te s t a lly , b lo o d can in in an c o ld p lic a tio n s under G overnm en t as but (o f F ran ce upon Fran ce) fa v o r of its w h ic h C on se- of sa id th e in Polncarfe insisted on having Grey announce the Entente avow edly as u means o f preventing Germany from declaring war. Grey was unwilling, probably because it would have stimulated Russia to war if every element o f doubt of British support were removed. Grey did not wish war, but had no option but to support France if it came. On the night of July 29, the British ambassador at Berlin wired Sir Edward Grey that the German Chancellor had told him (the British nmbassador in Berlin) that— a ll S ta te s B a lk a n s ). As (a ) T hat s ta n d in g (b ) th e w ith That (c ) T bat (d ) w ar in g T hat and it (e ) to p. th e th e b ecau se th e (p . had e ffo rts to com e to a good u n der a r e v isio n , w h ic h he m is q u o te s , of th e 5 6 ). a lw a y s in m in d th e recovery of th e lo s t 2 5 ). th a t That r e p e a te d 2 5 ). m ade tre a ty F ran ce (p . m ade (p . D e lc a s s e F r a n c o -R u s s ia n P r o v in c e s K a is e r F ran ce F r a n c o -R u s s ia n V iv ia n i, w ith a tre a ty copy in never d is c lo s e d h is w as p o ck e t, re fr a in e d w as r e c a lle d b e fo r e fr o m th e read P a r lia m e n t . th e p a c ific G eorges L o u is R u s s ia n s w a n te d a d iffe r e n t s o r t, e tc . fr o m (L e t S t. P etersb u rg F ran ce E x p la in , 2 2 9 .) PoincnrG’s defense will be found in the Living Age, Saturday, August 2G, 1922, page 503, in which he says that Saaonoff was a “ pacifist,” that— th e and th o u g h t of c r u s h in g S e r b ia d o m in a te d th e w h o le p o lic y of A u s tr ia G erm an y. That when lie and Viviani (July 29, 1914) — reach ed fa r of fro m P a r is we w ere r e c e iv e d w is h in g w ar, w as F ran ce, a lth o u g h fir m ly by a s t a r tle d o v e r w h e lm e d r e so lv e d upon and w ith any t r o u b le d s o lic itu d e s a c r ific e s n a tio n fo r to th e th a t, sa fe ty d e fe n d th e fa th e rla n d . It will be observed that Poincarg returned to Paris on July 29, and that it was on the night of the next day— July 30— that the French minister of war told the military attach^ o f the Russian Embassy with “ enthusiastic sincerity ” that the Government is firmly decided upon war and requested the Rus sian Embassy to confirm the hope o f the French general staff that all the Russian efforts should be directed against Germany. (Telegram 216.) Poincar6 states that with the consent o f the ministry he wrote a letter to King George on July 81, 1914, informing the King that France would do all in her power to maintain peace. This letter to King George is not consistent with telegram 216, nor with the secret military treaty and the secret conferences of the Russian and French general staffs of 1911, of 1912, of 1913, to mobilize and attack Germany in the event of an Austrian mobilization, but was extremely serviceable in con vincing British public opinion of the peaceful attitude of the French Government and of the guilt of the German Govern ment in willing the war. 76876— 11 as he w as a b le to Judge th e m a in p r in c ip le w h ic h govern ed Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed In any conflict there might be. ( H o w D i p l o m a t s M ake p o lic y W ar, w as th a t 2 6 3 .) So that it is clear that the German Government expected Great Britain to support France in the event o f war. The fact that Great Britain would support France fully justified the Russian war party and the French war party in their deter mination on war. Moreover, Sir Edward Grey told the French ambassador at London, Cambon (British White Paper, 87), that he meant to tell the German ambassador that day, Wednesday, July 29, that he must not be misled from the friendly tone o f their conversation that Britain would stand aside, so that both Germany and France knew that Britain would not stand aside. On Friday, July 31, the British ambassador to Berlin, Sir Edward Goghem, wired Sir Edward Grey that the German chancellor said he had done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, b u t he could not leave his country defense less— w h ile tim e le a r n s is w as b e in g u tiliz e d by o th e r p ow ers; and if, as be military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, I t will be impossible for h i m to remain quiet. (Ib id . Poincar6 undertook his own defense by writing a book “ Les Origines de la G uerre” (Cassie) in 1921, in English 1922, an analysis o f which appears in “ I^et France Explain,” Chapter XIV. He wholly omits the Russian mobilization and does not contradict the Belgian minister’s charge against him as bringing on the war. He omits the vital record o f the Falsifi cation of the Russian Orange Book, but admits—- fa r B r itis h th e case, 2 8 1 .) Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that he did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend military preparations unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Serbia. (Ibid. 2S2.) In other words, he did not exercise an effective moderating influence on St. Petersburg; he justified their military prep arations. The whole story is set forth quite fully by Neilson, a member o f the British Parliament, in chapter 12 of How Diplomats Make War. The chapter is entitled “ A Game of Chess.” Without doubt patriotism In the form o f intense nationalism moved most o f the European leaders, who thought In terms of military strategy alone. It is futile to reproach Individuals in the foreign office of Petersburg, o f Paris, of London, of Vienna, or Berlin. These men were produced by their environment in an atmosphere of secret diplomacy, believing in the power of might first, last, and all the time, but nevertheless also believing it necessary to subsidize the press and direct public opinion so as to have the support as far as possible of their own nationals. A profound distrust was everywhere evident between the leaders of the different nations. These foreign offices were controlled by a consuming desire for further political power over other people and over other territory. Their whole diplomacy in foreign relations largely consisted of trading with each other, giving and taking “ com pensations.” The prime moving force was commercialized im perialism. The Entente Allies should have conquered Germany and Austria within a few months considering the enormous prepon derance of power in favor of the Entente Allies. It should have been a profitable war in the matter of colonial possessions, an nexations, and indemnities; but its prolongation for four years was very unexpected and costly. The collapse of the Russian armies, probably due largely to the hate o f the Russian people of the Romanoff Governmeut, proved a blessing in disguise to the whole world, includiug the French, British, and Russian people. The overthrow of the German military government will prob ably prove a blessing to the world, especially to the German people, notwithstanding the severe suffering which has tem porarily taken place since the armistice. Tn due time no doubt the British, French, and Belgian people will correct the defects in the Government o f their own fo r eign offices, and the extent to which commercialized government has gone in the past will probably be abated in the future. I f the principles o f the League of Nations shall become the rule governing the relation of nations to each other, the evils v I I i CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. o f the past will be entirely abated and international understand ing, good will, and cooperation will become the rule o f inter national intercourse. In the light o f the disclosures which are made ®f the secret diplomacy o f Europe, It is clear that a profound national humiliation was put upon the German people by article 231 of the treaty o f Versailles in violation o f the evidence now known to the world. Article 231 is as follow s: 21 America was not Informed with regard to the secret intrigues of Europe, nor o f its commercialized imperialistic aims. America declared a state of war with Germany because the military rulers of Germany committed one act o f war after another on America in violation of accepted international law, and America did not lay down the sword until that Government was annihilated and the Hohenzollerns driven from power. It cost America forty-two billions of dollars and hundreds of Happily A k t . 2 3 1 . T h e a l l i e d a n d associated Governments affirm a n d Germany thousands o f men and a huge future tax of pensions. accepts the responsibility o f G e r m a n y a n d h e r a l l i e s f o r causing all the for the freedom o f mankind the war resulted in the destruction loss and damage t o w h i c h t h e a l l i e d a n d a s s o c i a t e d G o v e r n m e n t s a n d o f the three great military dynasties— of the Hohenzollerns of Germany, the Hapsburgs of Austria, and the Romanoffs of t h e i r n a t i o n a l s h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t e d a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f the war im Russia— and has promoted the cause o f democracy and the free posed upon them by the aggression of Germany a n d h e r a l l i e s . dom o f mankind. This article makes the German Republic, representing a free But the record which I have disclosed, Mr. President, that the people, accept the responsibility of having imposed upon the British foreign office did not dare to disclose to the British peo Allies the W orld War by the aggression o f the Imperial Ger ple in their Parliament the truth of the secret Intrigue with the man Government of 1014, which was the master o f the subject French and Russian Governments, thereby giving the highest German people. testimony to America that British public opinion, like American The German people feel a profound bitterness over this public opinion, will not consciously support international intrigue. article and its consequences, and it will be well for the world It Is for American statesmen to consider now how far these to consider whether a reconciliation between the peoples of secret forces are in control o f the British and French Govern Germany, France, and Great Britain Is possible so long as the ments, and the extent to which they are in control must be German people are unjustly charged with this great wrong. read in the light o f the actions o f these Governments, not In the Memoirs o f IzvolskI is narrated a personal attempt, merely by their words or official public communications. o f William II, In 1003, to establish permanent peace between The purposes o f America in fighting this war were expressed Russia, Germany, and France in the so-called Treaty o f Rjorkoe, with great force in the address o f the President of the United as fo llo w s : States, January 8, 1918, and subsequent explanatory addresses T h e i r Im p e r ia l M a je s t ie s , th e E m p e r o r o f a ll th e R u s s ia s , o f t h e o n e in which he voiced the declared purposes o f the Entente Allies p a r t, a n d th e E m p e r o r o f G e r m a n y , o f th e o th e r p a r t, w it h th e o b je c t and conditions on which they were willing to make peace, and of a ssu rin g th e peace of E urope, have agreed upon th e fo llo w in g which they, after nine days’ discussion at the Trianon, Ver p o in t s o f Ih e t r e a t y h e r e in a fte r r e la te d , w ith r e fe r e n c e to a d e fe n s iv e sailles, formally accepted November 4, 1918. They then and a llia n c e : there pledged themselves to these conditions as the basis upon “ A r t ic l e I . I f a n y E u r o p e a n S ta t e s h a ll a t ta c k e it h e r o f th e tw o which the German Republic directed Its military commanders E m p ir e s , t h e a lli e d p a r t y e n g a g e s to a id h is c o c o n t r a c t o r w it h a ll h is to sign the terms of an armistice and practically surrendered. fo r c e s o n la n d a n d o n s e a . The German Republic accepted the terms and directed their “ A r t . I I . T h e h ig h c o n t r a c t in g p a r tie s a g r e e n o t to c o n c lu d e a s e p military commanders to accept the terms o f the armistice. a r a te p ea ce w ith a n y e n em y w h a tso e v e r . The pledges made to the German Republic through the Presi " A r t . I I I . T h e p r e s e n t t r e a ty s h a ll b e in fo r c e fr o m th e m o m e n t o f dent o f the United States by the Allies was in effect— t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f p e a c e b e t w e e n R u s s i a a 'n cf J a p a n and m a y o n ly be (a ) The end o f secret diplomacy. c a n c e le d b y a y e a r ’ s p r e v io u s n o tic e . (b ) The removal o f economic barriers and equality of trade. " A r t. IV . W h en th is tr e a ty g o e s in to e ffe c t, R u s s ia w ill t a k e th e (c ) Impartial adjustment o f colonial claims. n e c e s s a r y s t e p s to m a k e Its t e r m s k n o w n to F r a n c e a n d in v ite h e r t o (d ) Association of nations in a League o f Nations, having in s u b s c r ib e to it a s a n a lly .” mind the protection of every nation, o f its territorial integrity, N ic h o l a s . and political independence. . W il l ia m . (e ) A just and stable peace; that Germany should— The hostility o f France to this treaty caused its cancella a c c e p t a p l a c e o f e q u a l i t y a m o n g t h e p e o p l e s o f t h e e a r t h * * • tion. i n s t e a d o f a p l a c e of m a s t e r y . The records to which I have above referred show in many ( f ) The right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety of ways the efforts of the German Government to effect a rap prochement with France and with Great Britain, all o f which all nations. (g ) The destruction of any arbitrary power anywhere that were unavailing. One o f the most learned men in Europe, E. D. Morel, a mem can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the ber o f the British Parliament, has written several works ex peace of the world. (h ) The consent o f all nations to be governed in their con plaining this unfortunate condition of European diplomacy, such as Truth and the War. Diplomacy Revealed. Ten duct toward each other by the same principles o f honor and of Tears o f Secret Diplomacy, in which these processes are ex respect for the common law of civilized society that governs the plained in great detail and fully confirm what the records to Individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with which I have above referred e x h ib it; and the underlying policy one another. (i) The impartial justice meted out must involve no dis o f the diplomacy of the foreign office of the European nations is set forth by Leonard W olf in a little work called “ Economic crimination between those to whom we wish to be just and Imperialism,” showing the substantial fact that governments those to whom we do not wish to be just. ( j ) No special or separate interest of any single nation, or had been employed for money making purposes in the exploita tion o f the ignorant and unenlightened races; that under this any group o f nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest policy all o f A frica had been divided up and other parts o f the world seized for similar purposes, to make rich the industrial o f all. (k ) No leagues or alliances or special covenants or under ists of the nation which annexes and controls such territories. The covenant of the League of Nations is bringing before the standings within the general or common fam ily of the League world a new conception o f international relationship In which of Nations. (l) No special, selfish economic combinations within the international justice, understanding, and good will is being league. made increasingly possible. (m ) All international agreements and treaties of every kind America is now concerned In judging from the past the prob abilities of stability in Europe. Unless Europe shall have stable must be made known in their entirety to the rest o f the world. (n ) No punitive damages, no annexations, no indemnities, government, America can not afford to extend any large credits to Europe which it might be desirable to do to help the people but an honorable and a just peace. The German Republic accepted and instructed its military o f France and the people of Germany to again get back Into officials. Then the Entente military command imposed the mili full production. W e all desire truly to see <he French protected. I favored tary terms on the German generals, as shown In Exhibit 14. The manner in which the British, French, and Belgian Gov the treaty guaranteeing France protection and fully supported France during the war, hut the Ruhr invasion is indefensible ernments carried out these pledges is set forth in the treaty of Versailles and analyzed with great care by Warren Hills in from any standpoint. “ Lex Talionis ” and by J. Maynard Keynes in ‘‘ Economic A M E R IC A J U S T I F I E D IN E N T E R IN G T H E W A R . Consequences o f the Peace.” They show the Entente statesmen entirely violated the America was justified In entering the war regardless o f who was responsible for willing the war and putting it in motion. pledges made, and the United States has been put by them In 76876— 11 C6 U 22 a U i J i l d 1 > i v v / i o o CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. the false position o f having betrayed the German people with fulse promises to induce their surrender. The United Stntes should not be content to rest under this unjust imputation without proper protest. The English people are becoming impatient with these conditions. The terrible anxiety of France, Great Britain, and Italy, which led them to fully accept American terms, is shown by Exhibit 13, in which Foch, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando im plored American aid June 3, 1918, ns necessary to avoid entente defeat. E X H IB IT (A c tio n The in g P r im e at of V e r s a ille s , th e U n ite d “ W e th e at one tim e p ast g r a v ity , in and d an ger p o s s ib le sp ect th e J u ly avert sen ts e s ta b lis h q u ir e d th is c a m p a ig n to of n eed s U n ite d th a n le v ie s , m o n th , w ith th a t we do im m e d ia te le v ie s s u p e r io r ity regard s E v e n ts of th e as fe e l w ho on to th a t is in th e m a x i w h ic h re m arked, th e in th e th o se rep re war u n le ss th e th e of he A llie s to fo r c e re A m e ric a n u rges and p resen t b e fo r e fu tu re , c o n tin u o u s s h o u ld not w h o se m ilita r y th a t can to not p roceed u ltim a te th e w ith as soon in to th e th e th e of th e and m eet th e w ar p o s s ib le of (F ro m A lu m n i, th e “ The 1920, th e A llie d G reat V o l. V I, 1 8 7 .) And the Allies solemnly declared to the Germans, November 4, 1918: T h e ir w illin g n e s s on th e te rm s o f on Janu ary, su bseq u en t to peace 1918, m ake la id and peace dow n th e in w ith th e p r in c ip le s th e G overnm en t P r e s id e n t’ s of ad dress s e t t le m e n t of G erm an y to C on gress e n u n c ia te d in h is ad d resses. Under these terms the Allies— U n d e rsta n d to th a t c o m p e n sa tio n age done th e th e a g g r e ssio n c iv ilia n of w ill p o p u la tio n G erm an y by be of m ade th e la n d , b y by A llie s sea , and G erm an y fo r and p r o p e r ty th e ir fro m th e a ll d a m by a ir . On November 11, 1918, the President of the United States, In speaking of the military autocracies of Europe, declared that— The great u n ite d in lo n g in g a n a tio n s com m on of th e r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s m ous r e s o lu tio n th in g th a t fo o d and th e ir v e ry liv e s . and a s s o c ia te d to w h o le w o r ld in su prem e th e assu red is p o s s ib le w ith m ad n ess w h ic h p u rp ose in r e lie v e a ll * th e fo r up th e m s e lv e s su ch w ar c o u n c il p e o p le s th e c ir c u m s ta n c e s * u g ly d is tr e s s a d is in te r e s te d th e th e * set of th e H u n ger does at so be done b reed d e fin ite ly s a tis fy * * have E m p ir e s m any m ake now w ill * V e r s a ille s w ill not th a t as ju s tic e . C e n tra l t h a t is in d is te m p e r s have peace to by u n a n i th a t every s u p p ly th em p la c e s t h r e a t e n in g r e fo r m , b u t it an th e T h e ir o r d e r ly life b reeds im p o s s ib le . The Government of Great Britain, immediately after the dis armament of the Germans, the taking of their warships, and o f their mercantile marine, established by an Order in Council a blockade not only not supplying the food the German people required, but cutting off the food they might have secured for themselves, even cutting off fish supply from the Baltic Sea find using the pressure of famine to coerce the German Republic to accept the terms o f the treaty o f Versailles. The Entente 76876— 11 H 'S E O . W J U U r ? FOB IS O THE W O K T .t* WAB. A r t . 2 3 1 . T h e a lli e d a n d a s s o c ia t e d G o v e r n m e n t s a ffir m a n d G e r m a n y a cce p ts c o n tin u o u s as C h ie f v ic t o r y .” N a tio n a l b o th M O B AT The moral responsibility for willing the World W ar has been definitely fixed upon Germany by article 231, as follow s: we G overn m en t done, p r o v id e p resen t o v e r e stim a tin g th e be th e ju d g m e n t THE be p o s s ib ly be d o n e . c o n d u c tin g C om m ander by grea t of m ost o p in io n , r e lia n c e , is c o n fid e n t th e and a th e in en a b le to ta l h is c o n tra ry is th a t Is th e a s th is c a n and to p u b lis h e d th e th e d iv i B r itis h to e s ta b lis h in g a t o ta l A m e ric a n Foch, and e s s e n tia l W a r ,” as th e m o n th s o f J u n e w ill s itu a tio n s t ill enem y in fir m ity e x h a u ste d to th e th ere d e fea t v ic to r y c a lc u la te d w h ic h th e u ltim a te a d a te e v e r y th in g d u r in g G erm an (o n A llie s in in of gu n n ers, a llie d d iv is io n s a b s o lu te fo r w hat a d v e n t o f A m er ic a n a rm y a v ie w of A llie s of in s is te n c e lo o k in g p la c e s a b ilit y th e th e an w h ic h , G eneral m ost and w ill A r m ie s p. an 100 le s s th e fr e sh n u m e r ic a l fo r e se e su ch no case, th e of to by b e in g and lie a p la c e th e of r a is in g reserves th is , c o n su m m a te S ta te s needs to of of W ils o n h ow ever, 200 n u m e r ic a l A m e ric a su p erio rity. s a tis fie d w ith c o n tin u e fro m th e u p ), m a c h in e s id e to c ris is , d iv is io n s u tm o st dan ger d iv is io n s a t a s e a r ly are m e et P r e s id e n t excess p o s s ib ility th e m th e and in su p e r io r ity no th e ir th e P r e s id e n t op pose p o s s ib le th e a llie d A m e ric a n 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 fo rc e o f 1 0 0 on p ro v id e at fre sh le s s th a n “ W e to as is keep u n le s s w ith m en th e of to in fa n tr y b e s h ip p e d u ltim a te of of im p o ssib le a b le fo r now th e us a sta te m e n t o f th e u tm o st now th e re r a p id ly a d d itio n it is is 1 9 1 8 .) B r ita in , a id The n u m e r ic a l as lo st im m e d ia te to In th a t r a is in g to th e to ren d ered to d iv is io n s num ber u rges of th e o w in g enem y. A m er ic a as been em ergen cy. s tr a its b e in g sh o rta g e c a m p a ig n th e th e num ber c o n tin u e to 2, m essn ge to A m e ric a n p resen ted th a t, e x tre m e war has th a t and th e re fo r e m um s h o u ld to has a llie d b e r e m e d ie d He tro o p s. and G reat th a n k s w h ic h great out 1G 2 in c r e a s in g th e A llie s c a n 1 and fo llo w in g w arm est w ith a Foch heavy, put of June Ita ly , th e p r a c tic a b le p o in ts w h ere very are sen d our m eet G eneral F rench th ey to express to w h ic h is c o n fe re n c e F ran ce, p ro m p tn e ss seem ed F ran ce, s io n s , d e s ir e to m o n th c o n tin u e s . at of S ta te s : d e s ir e r e m a r k a b le th e ta k e n M in is te r s X III. Allies established a reparation eommlaslon, controlled by France, Belgium, Italy, nnd Groat Britain, who llxed the reparations regardless o f the promises made the German people by the allied governments on November 4, 1918. The Entente Allies in writing the treaty of Versailles took all the German colonies, took away from German territory a large part o f east nnd west Prussia, of Poland nnd Silesia, and the entire left bank o f the Rhine was occupied from Swit zerland to Holland, 50 kilometers on the right bank were held subject to military control, the coal fields of the Suar Valley were taken by France. Morosnet, Eupen, and Malmedy were given to Belgium, Schles wig added to Denmark, the German Republic not permitted to enter the League, and all overtures from the German Govern ment treated with indifference or contempt. French officials took an active part In the political disin tegration of the German Republic by promoting a movement for an independent Rhine State, an independent Bavaria, an inde pendent Saxony, seized the industrial heart of Germany in the Ruhr, and made such strenuous demands upon the German Gov ernment for instant reparations that that Government is now absolutely bankrupt, unemployment breaking down the indus trial life of the German people and threatening them with famine. German statisticians estimate that less than 5 per cent o f the German coal has been left the German Govern ment’s con trol; that Germany has lost 14 per cent o f its aren% 10 per cent o f its population, 70 per cent o f Its zinc and iron ore, 20 per cent o f the potato land, 18 per cent of the wheat ana rye land, and the cost o f the occupation from 1918 to 1922 is put at four and one-half billion dollars or more than sixteen times as much as the cost o f German occupation o f France In 1870-1873. The reparations bill which is estimated by Andre Tardieu in December, 1918, after the armistice, at nine billions, is now fixed at thirty-three billions by the employees o f the proposed beneficiaries, and credits are refused which the Germans esti mate at approximately twenty-five billions. The details of these claims and counterclaims I submit ns Exhibits 15 and 16. lo s s th e r e s p o n s ib ility and th e ir dam age n a tio n a ls im p o s e d upon to of have th e m G erm an y w h ic h by been th e th e and a llie s su b je c te d a g g r e s s io n h er and as of a llie s fo r a s s o c ia te d a c a u s in g con sequ en ce G erm an y a ll G o v e rn m e n ts and h er of th e a llie s . This necessarily means the aggression o f the German Gov ernment o f August 1, 1914, under William II, a military autoc racy, controlling without their consent the German people with a rod of iron. The German people of August 1, 1914, can not be held re sponsible for the decision of William II. They were a subject people. 80 per cent of them were women and children without political capacity, about 10 per cent were men engaged in pro duction and distribution, about 10 per cent were called to arms by an order o f mobilization which could not be disobeyed under penalty of immediate death. Something over 10 per cent of these Germans took up arms under penalty o f d ea th ; 1,773,780 were killed, 4,216,056 were wounded, 1,152,800 were prisoners or missing, a total o f 7,142,558. Hardly a man escaped. But the penalties o f the moral responsibility of willing the war is being visited on the German people of to-day, 20 per cent o f whom were unborn babes August 1. 1914. 50 per cent were then infants, 16 per cent were then women, leaving about 14 per cent of men now living who were then either combatants or noncombatants. I f William II was exclusively and entirely responsible for this war, the Entente Allies have allowed him to go in peace with his property, and they are imposing the penalties o f this wrong upon people who can not be charged with the moral responsibility o f the war and in violation o f the conditions of the armistice. But, it will be said, who then shall be responsible for reparations? The reparations agreed to— that is, compensation for dam ages clone the civilian population of the Entente Allies by the German troops on land and sea and air— was accepted by the German Republic, representing the German people, and this reparation they are legally and morally bound by, hut it should he established In honor and justice by disinterested judges and experts, not by the beneficiaries or representatives moved by the old principles o f European diplomacy that led directly to this war. 66 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. If the old principles o f commercialized imperialism moving In profound secrecy is to fix the policy o f international relation ship, we have no just reason to hope for the restoration of peace and prosperity in Europe. The conditions laid down for the armistice by the President o f the United States, accepted by the Allies, and then accepted bj- the German Republic, can not be flagrantly dishonored with impunity. Such evil seeds sown will bring a harvest of hate and future wars. It is not yet entirely too late to correct this great wrong to the German people. The fundamental condition of peace is good faith, absolute Justice arrived at by Just processes. Then international understanding and good will becomes possible. Then we can hope for the actual reduction of arma ments to the limit o f domestic requirements for police and good order. Then we can hope to see the budgets balanced. Then we can hope to see European currencies stabilized, put on a gold basis, and people given a currency medium with which they can make contracts safely. Then European bonds could be sold throughout the world to the fullest extent o f their legitimate needs. Then the safety o f France will be assured, as ull the world desires. Then America will he Justified in cooperating with the new world conducted along the lines o f International Justice, Inter national good will, and sincere international commercial and financial cooperation. Mr. President, the great masses of the people in France de serve the warmest admiration. They ure a great people, very brave, very loyal, very intelligent, Industrious, and th r ifty ; their lunguage, their architecture, their sculpture, their paint ings, their productions are unsurpassed in beauty. I am con vinced that these people in their hearts desire to live at peace with the world, to live their own lives, raise their children, and enjoy social intercourse with each other, and that they would commend international policies which would lead to this result. And when this has been said, the same thing can be said with equal truth and with equal force o f the German people, o f the Italian people, and o f the British people. Mr. President, I have discharged an irksome, painful duty. Senators will find the complete record referred to in the biblio graphy which I present and will find quotations so abundantly made that there remains no reason why any Senator should not be perfectly informed with regard to what has taken place and what caused the W orld War. It was caused at last by fear of each other, by ambition, by pride of a fe\v men in a few chanceries who were doubtless doing what they believed to be for the welfare and “ glory ” o f their own country, but whose error o f judgment has crucified the world. We do not wish a repetition of it. During the World War I favored the French in every pos sible way with money, credit, supplies, ships, and men. I was one o f those who favored a treaty to guarantee the French people against future German aggression, and I favor now whatever is necessary to protect the French people against the future aggression of Germany, but I do not favor the breach o f agreement of the armistice conditions on which the peace o f France and the lives of Frenchmen were saved on the battle field by the cessation o f battle through the armistice contract o f November 4. 1918. The preservation of the w'hlte civilization of Europe demands that the statesmen of the world realize the importance o f pur suing processes which will really and in truth establish inter national understanding, good will, and cooperation. Open diplomacy and the orderly rule o f the people by the peaceful processes of democratic or republican government is the true remedy. It is probably the only remedy, and the people alone can make It effective in each of the several Nations. America can set a good example. The success financially and commercially o f this doctrine in America should encourage the people o f other coun tries as they advance in the practice of democratic government'. Let us still pray with our immortal Lincoln that government o f the people, by the people, and for the people shall not perish from the earth. A P P E N D IC E S . llH T K IT R TO SPEECH OF MR. OW EN, UNITW D STATES SE N A T O R OKLAH OM A. E x h ib it E x h ib it E x h ib it E x h ib it [E x h ib it s n ot q u o te d In sp eech a re a d d e d h e r e .] 1.— F r a n c o -R u s s la n tr e a ty , 1892. 2.— F r a n c o -R u s s la n m ilit a r y co n fe r e n c e , 1911. 8.— F ra n c o -K u s s ia n m ilit a r y c o n fe re n ce s , 1912. 4 .— F r a n c o -R u s s la n m ilit a r y co n fe r e n c e s , 1918. 78876— 11 FRO M E x h ib it 5 .— F r n n c o -R u s s ia n E x h ib it 6 .— C h a p t e r R u s s ia n 23 tre a ty , X IT . D ip lo m a c y F a ls ific a tio n — R u s s ia n E x h ib it 8 .— L e tte r , E x h ib it 9 .— L e tte r , B r itis h en ten te G rey O ran ge E x h ib it 1 2 .— G e r m a n E x h ib it 1 3 .— D is p a t c h , 3, M o lt k e to G rey, 1918, dem and on p r a y in g 1 5 .— W hat term s E x h ib it 1 6 .— IIo w E x h ib it 1 7 .— K ille d and E x h ib it 1 8 .— U n ite d S ta te s E x h ib it 1 9 .— C o s ts of E x h ib it 2 0 .— B o o k s 2 1 .— A b s t r a c t sp eedy has has E n te n te G erm an y te leg ra m , to th e was of P th e a r m is tic e and I you th e rort 1918. in W o r ld W ar. of N ovem ber at Jagow of S ie b c r t. W uropean ar. S n z o n o ff. L e tte r, J anu ary 1 9 1 4 .) a tte n tio n t e le g r a p h d e c la r e d of your agency in stea d ily th e E tu b to 18, G erm an b etw een 1918. 1 9 1 4 .) th e had th e W ar— D e for B e r lin w ere 4, V I. W o r ld R u s s ia n r e la tio n s r e la tio n s are a w a re, G erm an ce p ta b le p osa l to has E n g lish not fo r h ere th e e x c e lle n c y in B e r lin , B ud get im p r o v in g . naval and th e ic ith th e te th a t C o m m issio n In m in ister E n g lish th e b etw een lu te ly no sa m e r e fe r en c e G erm an n a v ie s, (Q u ite a n o u g h ts a re has of th e out an of th e th e m y As he a ll th e in in London r eg a rd in g th is in th is th e be s i t u a t i o n ___ u n p o s a ls cam e C am bon of a ll th e c h ie fly Thus n a u g h t, as fleet m u ch of rapproch em en t to to c e r ta in ob serve but of I do th e not r e g u la te m ore th e be th e ir a lso effo r ts I of la c k in th e th e m y w ho to sin ce a ll a th e to w o u ld of in w o u ld case m ake d e v o te d fu tu r e an had no w o u ld be [R a th e r fr o m su sp en d G osch en c o u ld G erm an y case ta k en p ow ers o p in io n he be n u m erou s A part s u ffic e great was w ork be th r o w n e a sily re q u ir e s. not as h ow ever, id e a th e case b u ild t» c o n flic ts , im p o s s ib le d is a r m a m e n t p ro e x p e c t e d .] c o n sta n t sin ce he tw o fe a rs , and in rum ors a grees th a t c o u n tr ie s I can not E n g la n d , A fr ic a , w h ich m ig h t q u e stio n s. From G overn m en t of is, th is a d v e r tis e d in terests G er w a r s h ip s sta te , th a t c o u ld th a t in p e o p le n eg o tia tio n s, fo r su ch in F ran ce. th e se no h ow ever, w h ich th ese w h ic h b u ild had, w h ose th ese to dread G osch en , o th er and, G erm an y G erm an 1 6 :1 0 , of C a n a d ia n he, sh ip b u ild in g r e la tio n s, p o ssib ility had of w o u ld m uch p o litica l (n R u s s ia fa c ts, ord er it a g a in st ec o n o m ic and se c re ta ry w orkm en in a rm y; sh a re w h ic h to G erm an y w o u ld of b etw een a bso in te r e sts a m ba ssa d or r e p lie d by had Jagow , sa v in g s th e th a t im p o r ta n t a greem en t cou rse, fu lly th o u g h t th e C a m b o n ], w o r r ie d p o ssib ility ceed p la c e B e r lin th e c o n sta n tly r e a s o n a b le A n g lo -G e r m a n begu n in ra pproch em ent r e la tio n w ith to ya rd s th e la n d in fr o m a b etw een c o n fid e n c e , E n g lish in te r r u p tio n d ir ec te d very str ict y e a r ," im p a sse . to is A lth o u g h th e in v o lu n ta r ily, so m eth in g G e r m a n y — a ll “ exem pt th e a E n g lish added, and provem ent tir ely of a ssu ra n ces in p roposal sou n d ya rd s th e E n g lish id e a , sin ce stren g th en in g w o u ld S t. m y occu rred r a ilw a y th a t of a cc e p ta b le a m ba ssa d or of to s h ip b u ild in g th e th e The m e le ss E n g la n d con seq u en ce th e of d e s i r e s . ’ *) accordan ce an sw er. to ld and p r o p o r tio n , sh ip b u ild in g w h ich of pro a sk ed ta k in g to on e q u a rter e x p la n a tio n s not by p r iv a te sh ip b u ild in g a pprove w ere a ll e s ta b lis h to a lso h a v e to d o t h e s a m e . M y F ren ch c o lle a g u e [J u le s a sk ed I th is, o p in io n s a ssu m p tio n th is as B r itish to fr o m th e and “ d ip lo m a tic a gree. are G erm an sh ip s th is, c a b in e t had ac th is a ssu ra n ces lea d th a t of e c o n o m ic lo c a lit y em p lo ym en t, w h erea s by sm a ll and th e fin a lly exch a n ge m u tu a l or e v a s iv e o p in io n , of over m e, in s tr u c te d u n r e lia b le m en year, t o ld h im n a m ely, a ffir m e d sc a r c e ly w h o le been th e fo r n eg o tia tio n s E ?ig lish e n tir e ly p r o p o sitio n s. e x p la in e d , u su a l, p rop osa l ex c lu d e d c o u ld g iv e n th a t th e y e a r ," im p r o v e m e n t m ig h t th e re m o te m is s io n ” c o lle a g u e a be of was exem pt rec u r r in g an c o n sta n t to C h u r c h ill’s E n g lish fo r su ch w h ich as th a t lim ite d “ h is to r ic G osch en to “ d ecla res no th a t r e la tio n C h u r c h ill, an c o n sta n tly w ere th a t of Jagow e ffe ct was and A fr ic a . m any id e a th e by c o u n tr ie s. v a lu e to th e a dvanced B erlin th a t p rop osed to th e th e re p ly was A s h ow and London no as a cc ep ted . th o u g h t b o th G o sc h e n ’s A s re la tio n s London rem a rk ed 1 6 :1 0 , p resen t to A n g lo -G e r m a n tw een be th e c o lle a g u e sta te sm e n provoked T ir p itz fle e t, G erm an y. c o u ld J am es in 14, sta te m e n ts. W ar. c o n d itio n s th e c a lle d th e d e c la r a tio n m u tu a l N ovem ber w ounded r e p a r a t io n s 19 of S ta te O r m e n tio n e d . A s to N o. A n g lo -G e r m a n Foeh W o r ld and 3 1 -F e b r u a r y t e le g r a m C le m e n c e a u , s u p p o rt. W ar. A m b n ssa d or c o m m u n ic a tio n p assage. q u o ted . ntbn tb R u s s ia n of F ran eo- p a id — K e y n e s . in k ille d d ip lo m a c y E urth er fo r by ( F e b r u a r y —J u l y , th a t 1912. (B a ils m a n ), A m e ric a n E X H IB IT S ec r e ta r y 23, p a id — c o m p a r a tiv e w ounded W o r ld E x h ib it m y 1914. L lo y d -G e o r g e , im p o s e d G erm an y m uch Focb, fo r 1 4 .— A r m i s t i c e In of (B a u sm a n ). B e lg iu m G eneral E x h ib it th e W o r ld -s e c r e t 22, 1912. N ovem ber p r e p a r a tio n s su m m ary E x h ib it The Book C am bon. N ovem ber m ilita r y 1 1 .— V o n June to C am bon E x h ib it (8 8 7 . th e m em o. E x h i b i t 1 0 .— R u s s ia n F and d o cu m e n ts. E x h ib it 7 .— la n d o , 1 9 1 8 -1 7 . E n te n te ju d g in g to in free once W ill p le a se what I an im th e r e th e is th ey tim e th e en have pro to » a b le to le a d am a fu tu r e. m y se lf in fin a lly h ere of B r itish ; im p r e ssio n th ese aaooaa £3 t v k o is s s h d m o j CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 24 efforts make upon leading cir cle s in England. [T h e y m ade very (8 4 1 . little The R u s s ia n am b assad or ruary I m p r e s s i o n .] (8 3 8 . The sam e to th e nam e. C o n fid e n tia l 12. • • • g r o w in g A c c o r d in g m ilita r y to w h o lly stre n g th rep o rt, c o n fid e n tia l of F ebru ary 2 7 -M a r c h Yonr 1 9 1 4 .) R u s s ia la rep o rts c a u s in g r e a c h in g ever m e, m ore th e a n x ie ty th e c a ta stro p h e Is a x io m a t ic (8 3 9 . The In e ith e r o f th e sam e a p o lic y to th e m ilita r y of th e or an e c o n o m ic w ay, th e C o n fid e n tia l le tte r , M arch 2 7 -A p r il 9, 1 9 1 4 .) The u n fr ie n d ly a ttitu d e ever s in c e th e has m u ch Im p ro v e d upon R u s s ia , th a t fa c t b e g in n in g u n fa v o r a b le to T h is dow n. s t a n t ly d ie fro m ta ry m en and T h is m a n y’s fe a r a re by th is or S o u th p r o b a b ly com e th ro u g h cou rse, I la te r due can 6 in c e ary even th e le a s t, th e ren ew al w h ic h , fo r c e 12, is of to is of th is m u ch of my our lo n g to G er p ow er. th e In m ili w a r lik e c o n flic t su ch T h ey b etw een p r e p a r a tio n s a b ilit y a of c o n flic t th e m u st h ere. A u s tr ia . rep o rted p e r s o n a lly ; d is tu r b e d our arm y c o n v ic tio n . is even Our th is perh aps is w o u ld by of m ore m a n i c o m p a tr io ts fe e lin g th e ir to t a lc s w ho m e. are to have le tt e r Of m u ch d o u b t, th e of in R u s s ia p rep ared n m ay th e e x is tin g so, F ebru fu r th e r m o r e , w h ic h m in d of ta k e n m ilita r y 1917, th e my m easu res no in upon In our is tre a ty p r e y in g p r e fe r th e and T h ere c o m m e r c ia l G erm an y, p r o b a b ly , as in flu e n c e th e m u s t c o n ta in so m e k e rn e l o f tr u th ; a ll th e m o r e in c re a se su ch fa v o r a b le th e fr e q u e n t ly on R u s s ia G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t, a s I rep o rted 2 7 -M a r c h to w a rd A t th e to w a rd test e x a g g era ted , b u t th e y n o t d o u b te d h o s tilit y a ex con o p in io n th e ir m ilita ry That th e h ear m a n ife stly fo r or s e r io u s le t I p u b lic of th is or so ec o n o m ic our R u s s ia .] a p p a r e n tly have and a tta c k s w h e r e in due e n t ir e ly th is to not to and m om en t [D e p e n d in g d a lly not secret is sin ce does R u s s ia , no m ilita r y fa v o r a b le lo a n s is here our n eig h b o r , c o m p le te . G erm an y fe st, m ake fe e lin g m ost m ake a p p a re n t, w in te r , p u b lis h in g h ow ever, a g a in s t w a r lik e of ea ste r n to o n ly n o tic e a b le la s t in v e n tio n s p ress q u ie t, its of fr e e G erm an ever becam e ceased m is s e d Ju n k ers and th e m ea n s com e soon er In is has Is m o s tly is as w h ic h S a n d e r s e p is o d e p ress th e sou rce, in c rea se h er banks of P r u s s ia n th e and no F rench th e von c o m p a r a tiv e arou sed ex c ite m e n t of th a t G erm an y as The R u s s ia , T h is r e lia b le R u s s ia , L im a n o p p o rtu n ity a ttitu d e s till m ood. th in k a is th e la te . no c ite m e n t G erm an y of a lth o u g h d is to r tio n s . to w a rd of p rove B e r lin tre a ty ss. th a t le s s c a b in e t, r e m a in in a s p o s s ib le . N e v e r th e le s s I am of th e o p in io n , in w h ic h I am c o n fir m e d by th e the Berlin cabinet dors not share th e vie w s of th e bellicose e lem en ts o f Germany, which p r o fe s s to desire an im m ediate arm ed conflict w ith Russia. The German Gov ern m en t p re fe r s to try all p e a ce fu l m ean s tow ard reco n cilia tio n b efore taking an y d e c i s i v e step. A m o n g t h e s e m e a n s o n e o f t h e m o s t i m secret in fo r m a tio n s p o rta n t is th e in c id e n ta l fu lly c o m m e r c ia l n e g o tia tio n s d r a fte d (8 4 0 . m e n tio n e d S a zo n o ff la c k th e to to th e R u s s ia n ire fr e q u e n tly w h ic h an w o u ld organ su ch been u n ite as The corresp on d en ce la y s w h ic h have an to th e c a b in e t d o e s not we th e ir v ie w s . a re th a t m e r e ly I to at th e h ere lin e s fo r of London. N o. a th e care T e le g r a m . 11 th e enough to in G rey in st r u ctio n s in [a t in as th e to th re e of th is of lo s e s as m a tter. a c tio n in not E n te n te th e are e x a g g e r a tio n ], soon as m ore you r of to de As th e o b je c t s h o u ld c o m m u n ity grou p w e c o n fe re n c e w ill of S a z o n o ff. T e le g r a m , Feb 3 9 .) r e c e iv e d . I b y t e le g r a p h ic c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w o u ld d e c is io n s in s ta n c e d case th e of o f th e be a v o id e d th re e p o w e rs A lb a n ia , w h ith e r and w o u ld th e th e In flu e n c e be en h an ced . P r in c e of W ie d w as to Grey r e p lied th a t in the ca s e m en tion ed by m e the Triple Alliance had th e ad v a n t a g e o f being able to a c t , w h ile th e Triple E ntente cou ld o n ly d e fe n d i t s e l f again st en cr o a ch m e n ts. H ow ever, Grey raised no o b je c t i o n to y o u r proposal, and told me that hr was plea sed to a c c e p t it. and s u g g e s t e d that I should m e et him to-m orrow , Thursday. He has a lr ea d y in fo rm ed Cambon o f this, w ho has m ade a sim ilar s ta t e m e n t to him this m orning. proceed, (8 4 2 . b e fo r e v a r io u s S a z o n o ff to th e im p o r ta n t R u s s ia n M arch q u e s tio n s had am bassad or at 2 0 -A p r il 2, 1914. been P a r is . N o. s o lv e d . C o n fid e n tia l le tt e r , 2 3 .) In y o u r le t t e r o f March 6-18 you m en tion ed t h e question o f a c lo s e r union b etw een Russia and England and expressed th e w ish to a scer ta in m y vie w s upon this s u b je ct ( I s w o l s k y ' s i n q u i r y w a s p r o b a b l y t h e r e s u l t of F ren ch r e a c tio n to S a zo n o ff’s regret th a t th ere w as “ la c k ” of an th e m o r e so s i n c e t h e r e w as a possibility that this question w ould be to u ch e d u pon by th e lea d ers o f French and English fo r eig n p o licy d u rin g th e im p e n d in g H a d o f K in g G eorge to Paris. I th e r e fo r e co n s id e r it m y d u ty to in fo rm y o u that a fu r t h e r r e i n fo r c e m e n t and d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e so c a lled Triple Entente, and, if possible, its tra n sfo rm a tio n into a n ew trip le allian ce appears to m e to be a dem and o f the p r e s en t hour. Whilst th o r o u g h l y in su rin g th e in tern ation al position of France, Russia, and England, an a llian ce o f this n a tu re would, beca u se o f its lack o f any t h o u g h t o f c o n q u e s t o n the part o f th e p o w ers m e n t i o n e d , t h r e o t e n n o o n e , b u t s i g n i f y the best g u a r a n ty f o r th e p re s erv a tio n o f th e p e a c e o f Europe. ( W o u l d organ have fa c ilita tin g done th a t S a z o n o f f 's In te rc o u rse by of s ta b iliz in g s o lic it u d e fo r th e E n te n te ), In te r n a tio n a l th e peace of r e la tio n s . E urope A t th e c o u ld sam e not be tim e ta k e n i t s arridre p e n s ie.) Certain step s h a v e alrea d y been undertaken by France, and England w ith r e g a rd to w ork in g out a plan fo r th e m ost u n ifo rm a ctio n possible and f o r a m o r e p r e c i s e definition of m utual obligation s. O b v i o u s l y , w o s e r io u s ly ; It h a d to o m u st w ork q u e s tio n s fo r in m ig h t th e be sam e jo in e d d is c u s s io n — s u b je c ts lis h in te r e s ts In d ir e c tio n , to n w h ic h n u m erou s w h o le w hereby s e r ie s im p in g e of h e a v ily a num ber s u b je c ts upon of in c id e n ta l w h ic h R u s s ia n are r ip e and Eng fie ld s . As y ou a rc aw are, t h e in n er situ ation o f England is at p r e s e n t su ch that it w h o lly absorbs th e a tte n tio n o f the R oyal G overn m en t an d of th e public. ( D i s t u r b a n c e s i n I r e l a n d a n d l a b o r q u e s t i o n s . ) Under t h e se c i r cu m s ta n ce s th e soil fo r in tern a tion a l a g r e em en ts , c o n c e r n in g w h ich the English, in a cco r d a n ce w ith th e ir n atu re, are so s e n s i t i v e , is m o s t u nfa vora b le, and w e m ust, th e r e fo r e, n o l e n s v o l e n s , pu rsue this o b je c t w ith the g re a te st caution. In spite, o f this, I sh a re y ou r opinion that it w ou td not prove, inex p e d ien t if Poincarfi and D oum crgue ( F r e n c h m i n i s t e r o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r s ) , on th e occasion o f th e m e etin g unth K ing George, and his m i n i s t e r ( S i r F . d w a r d G r e y ) , w ou ld in con fid en ce in d ica te to them that a c lo s e r a g r e e m ent b e tw e e n Russia and England w ould also be hailed in France, as an au sp iciou s e v e n t, w h ich w ould p r o v e equ ally desirable to all th r ee p a r tn er s in th e Triple Entente. T h e e s t a b l i s h i n g o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s upon w h ic h n a tu r a lly a p o lit ic a l c o n v e n tio n have to be th e of su b je c t th is of s o r t m ig h t be c o n c lu d e d d ir e c t n e g o tia tio n s w o u ld b etw ee n and tio n or London ; has it c o n s is te n tly t r e a t y .) sim ila r but T h is c o n v e n tio n p o s s ib le d e n ie d m ig h t b etw ee n is th e n R u s s ia th a t th a t th e re R crve and th e S t. ns a F ren ch w as b a sis a p o litic a l fo r conven w o r k in g out a E n g la n d . London a ffa ir s . th e still th a t le a d s year’s la s t o p p o s ite s lig h t sen se th is of e s t a b lis h th ereb y la c k perh aps pow ers th e a c o n fer e n c e p rogress G rey com m on th is convene London le a s t to fro m but pow ers its e lf, th e a m b a ssa d o ria l it, th e and o u r se lv e s to N o. G overn m en t w ou ld co n sid e r it u se fu l to p ropose to Grey to com m u n ica te to us <r» co m m o n th e co n te n ts o f th e political co n v e n tio n w h ich you speak o f as h a v in g been co n clu d ed b etw een England and France. ( T h e B r i t i s h 2 3 2 .) c o n v in c e v iew s a g a in upon le a s t to r e s u lt in g d e s ir e in s is t w h ile sp ea k le a g u e r e c e i v e s 76870— not d e lib e r a tin g w ea k you at 1914. a b le e ffe c t on r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s F or coh eren ce, beg in ju r io u s fu r th e r p rop osa l th ro u g h th e ir 12, th e th e yea r. s h a ll p r e p a r in g a lo n g 252 w e ig h t o f th e G overnm en t have organ p ow ers, London are am b assad or 3 0 -F e b r u a r y la st we th ey en ergy P a r is . la te an so s p e c ia l and P e te rsb u rg Janu ary Of tre a ty , w ith th a t p la n . * Copy above, cau sed j e x p r e s s io n E n t e n t e .] sam e. N o. London 1914. Cambon r e c e iv e d t h e n e ce s s a r y in stru ction s y e s te r d a y , a r i d 7 i n f o r m e d Grey to-day o f y o u r proposal. I told him that, co n s id e r in g the w a n t o f an adequate organ, such as last y e a r ’s ambassador ial c o n f e r e n ce, you t h o u g h t it n e c e s s a r y to a rra n ge fo r o n ex chan ge o f v ie w s on th e p e n d in g question s, in ord er to a rr iv e i n this w a y at a p relim in a ry a g r e e m e n t b etw een th e th r ee e n t e n t e pow ers. I n t h i s w a y t h e d e l a y s s e r io u s a t B e r lin . In th e opinion o f German G overn m en t circles, the n ew h ea v y s ie g e a r t ille r y in Russia trill he finished by 1916, and from that m om en t Russia will step into th e lists as a m ost form idable fo e w ith w h om G ermany toill h a v e to cr o ss arms. No w o n d e r that in v i e w o f such con sideration s the Germans are stra in in g e v e r y n e r v e to be re a d y fo r w a r wi'.'i us, and no w o n d e r that t h e y try to in tim id a te us, so as to a v ert the suspicion that Germ any is afraid o f Russia. N everth eless it is m y co n v ictio n that b etw een all the lines p rin ted about Russo-German relations in th e German n e w s papers o f late on e m a y a lw ays read fe a r o f Russia. [ R e f e r s t o t h e cry o f t h e G e r m a n s : Die ru s s is ch e Gefahr — t h e R u s s i a n p e r i l . ] In con clu sion , let me express th e h o p e that t h e y are not in erro r about this at Berlin, and th a t w e are a ctu a lly taking all m easu res fo r s tr e n g t h e n in g our m ilitary p o w er, w h i c h m u s t co m p e l Germany to h es ita te b e fo r e no m ea su res so as to b r i n g h er p re p a r ed n ess fo r w a r to the h ig h e s t pitch. [ S w e r b e i e f f , k n o w i n g t h a t t h i s w o u l d b r i n g o n te le g r a m at 6 -1 8 , and its of a ctin g our fo rc e. F ren ch c o l (8 4 3 . The R u s s ia n am b assad or at P a r is A p r il A fte r u se of sa tio n th e th e in r e c e ip t fir st of your o p p o r tu n ity regard to th e le tte r once S a zo n o ff. 1 9 1 4 .) of M arch m ore q u e s tio n to 9, of to a 2 0 -A p r il en gage c lo s e r L e tte r, 2, N o. D ou m ergu e M arch 23, in u n d e r s ta n d in g I 27- m ade conver b e tw e e n D ou m ergue con firm ed to me in th e m ost d e cis iv e m a n n er his in ten tion o f speaking to Grey, d u rin g th e im pendin g m eetin g , to th e e ffe c t that an a g r e e m e n t o f this n a tu re w as h ig h ly desirable. He b e liev es that it w ill p r o v e v e r y e a s y to bring fo r th co n v i n c i n g a rg u m e n ts in fa v o r o f this th o u g h t, because it is most obvious that, in asm u ch as F ran ce has s p ecia l m ilitary and n aval u n d ersta n d in g s with Russia and R u s s ia and E n g la n d . u u o ;x -m T V N O is s a a o N O D rs RECORD. C O N G R E S S IO N A L 25 England, this system m ust be coordina ted and com p lem en ted by co r r e spondin g u n d erstan din gs between Russia and England. D oumergue be lieves that th e Russo-English a g reem en t would h a v e to be in the form o f a naval con ven tion , and that this would re n d er n e c e s s a r y t ech n ica l co n su lta tio n s between the three staffs o f admiralty. (Russian. F r e n c h , the v i e w s y ou r e x cellen cy entertain ed re g a rd in g th e n e c e s s i t y o f a still c lo s e r union b etw een th e Triple Entente, a c co r d in g to w h ich e v e n r* allian ce a ft e r th e p a ttern of th e t h r ee o t h e r p o w ers was n ot excluded. ■ nd a llia n c e . B r i t i s h .) T T ff/r r e g a r d to the political co m p a ct betw een England and France, w hich is to be com m un icated to us a f t e r con su lta tion w ith Qrey, Doum e rg u e assu red me that France and England w e r e n ot bound by p o s itiv e p olitical obligations, but that, should th e cou rse o f eiwnts lead to c o m mon a ction on th e part o f both p ow ers, they w ou ld ad h ere to th e t e c h n ical a r r a n g e m e n t s worked out by the g en era l staffs. ( Q u i t e t h e w o r s t fo rm of ‘‘ a llia n c e ” ad versary th e and p o litic a l th e re le a v e s opponent Is, becau se It casus fo e d e r is th e can not d e fin e conveys no w a r n in g d e te r m in a b le to h im s e lf, a s by he to th e c ir c u m s ta n c e s can e a s ily do In D oumcrguc added that he did not r e m e m b e r w h e th e r the fo r eg o in g was expressed in a definite form ula, but h e p ro m ised to look up th e docu m en ts in the a rch iv es o f the m in istry , and to bear in mind the w ish es w h ich w e h ave expressed. case of Up “ d e fe n s iv e ” to th e p resen t c o n v e r s a tio n I s h a ll cu ss (8 4 4 . w ith m ake w ith an h im The a lli a n c e s .) I have P o in c a r ^ e ffo r t th e to upon see c o n te n ts R u s s ia n not had th is h im at m e, E d w a rd to ld G rey me th a t o p p o r tu n ity of dor, had w h ic h m anner h is how v is it. req u ested s in c e s e e in g not me He p erson al w ho had to ld save hnd me th a t ta k e n part In he th e s t ill h is at E re. retu rn and my But to d is S a ro n o ff. h im , P a r is p resen ce to th e L e tte r, not d e s c r ib e th in k th o se A p ril upon had th e to had F rench me in r e c e iv in g no o th e r am b assa a v e r ita b le w h ic h h e h a d r e c e iv e d o n he of and, he of im p r e s s io n a ls o th e w as m e r e ly K in g and g iv in g of a ll th e n th ere corded bore had w as T h e ir th e v is it. “ c r is is ” M a je s tie s as d e e p ly in upon a any T h a t, on o f sin c e r e It rested of R u s s i a .) a ll sort Id in th a t th e F ran ce as E urope; a d d itio n o c c a s io n s sy m p a th y . t h e c o n c lu s io n root o f th is to sta m p d raw n ta k e n no w ent to and From p a r tic u la r ly th is E n g la n d , fir m s h o r tly th is , th e w h erever fu n d a m e n ta l in and th ey th e B r itis h Id e a o f th e and th a t e n d u r in g a fte r w a r d s r e c e p tio n in ac appeared G overnm en t E n te n te had con sequ en ce b a s is . On this o cca s io n Grey spoke w ith a w arm th w h ich is n ot usual w ith him and w h ich p r o v e d that h e m ade his d e d u ctio n s from firm ly g r o u n d e d ju d g m e n t. The intention by w h ich he w as g o v e r n e d in asking m e to c o m e and s ee him, in order to make such a com m u n ication to me, is e n t i r e ly clear. He w is h ed to a n n o u n ce to me the b egin n ing o f a ph ase o f a still clo s e r ra p p roch em en t to France. This in ten tion beca m e still m ore obvious to m e upon his rem arking to me w ith o u t an y prelim i n aries, th a t I w as d o u b tlessly in form ed about th e c o n v e rs a tio n w h ich he had had w ith D ou m ergue on the s u b ject o f Russia. He told m e that it had been im possib le fo r him in Paris, being at a d ista n ce from his co ll e a g u e s , to do m ore than express his p ersonal a s se n t to the plan, a c c o r d i n g to w h ich th e G overn m en ts o f England and F rance w e r e to in fo rm th e Russian G overn m en t o f all m ilitary c o n v e n ti o n s existing b e tw e e n England and France. ( T h e R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t h a d d e s i r e d th a t on fo r m e r o c c a s io n s , w ith o u t su ccess, G rey to U ls te r to ld me convene q u e s tio n th a t, th e to h is c a b in e t and th e great fo r re g re t, th is budget it p u rp ose dem anded had not d u r in g th e been th is e n tir e p o s s ib le fir st fo r w eek ; th e a tte n tio n of th e 7 said o n ly a f e w w o r d s in rep ly . I thanked Sir Edward Grey fo r his co m m u n ica tio n and told h i m that I knew h o w to ap p recia te its sig n ifica n ce to its full extent. [ B e n c k e n d o r f f r e a l i z e d t h a t a n a v a l o r c o n v e n tio n fa r -r e a c h in g in g tio n of of o n la n c e su ch h is a e ffe c ts w ith upon a g ree m e n ts ow n l i t t l e in e ffo r ts G reat th e w o u ld W e g la d s o m e B r ita in , or in te r n a tio n a l hnve fin d , been th e n , a n tic ip a tio n b o th of s itu a tio n . a m ost th a t o f th e th is th ese, w o u ld B e s id e s , s a tisfa c to r y san e m an p r o m is e d sta te th e have m ak c u lm in a lo s e s h is o f a ffa ir s w h e n e v e r h e w r ite s o f I t .) 7 su m m ed up the situation to the e ffect that if th e two g o v e r n m e n t s should communicate, to us their m ilitary c o n v e n t i o n s [ g o i n g a s t e p f u r t h e r , B e n c k e n d o r f f w a n t e d n o t o n l y a naval b u t a l s o a m ilita ry c o n v e n t i o n ) , th e Russian G overnm ent would r e s e r v e th e p r i v i le g e o f m a k i n g a c o r re sp o n d in g proposal upon a n analogous basis to th e British Government, I told him that I assum ed h e knew 76876— 11------- 4 yon to o th a t, A as d e fin ite an dent in In P e r s ia , h im th e fin d th e an th e even r e a liz e tie d a llia n c e as p o s s ib le . d iffic u ltie s of su ch to m ake T u rkey, th e and n e c e s s ity w ith th a t dow n h o s tile R u s s ia th e an by of F ran ce N o rth p o s s ib le of R u s s ia N one to of fin d th e se term s A fr ic a . becau se a lm o s t t o t a l a b s e n c e in v e stm e n ts. b etw ee n o f d e fin ite and w as a g ree m e n ts; co n ta ct a llia n c e B a lk a n s , [F r e n c h im p e r ia lis m d e fin ite p o in ts an Fran ce. B r itis h of of c o llid in g c a p ita l fa c to rs and w ere of e v i r e l a t i o n s .) to th a t he th e sam e. in fo r m s he had F ren ch th e be m any R u s s ia am bassad or w h ic h a fte r to -d a y to G erm an y, on sam e u n d ersta n d to to o to and The an sw er fa ile d p r o fita b le F rench nam e a llia n c e b etw ee n A n g lo -R u s s ia n to c o n s id e r conceded no C h in a , a v e rsio n (8 4 5 . The not had w ere a llia n c e to d id a ls o in s titu tio n in te r e s ts , F ran ce he F ra n ce, and com m on c o lo n ia l have th e re B r ita in , th e ir we la r g e p o s s ib le , th a t p e r s o n a lly sta te sm e n In d e e d , G reat I added : see, w as had g iv e n M. M ay th a t s u b m itte d m in is te r R u ssia n L e tte r, me to m ode G overn m en t of th e e v e n in g m in is te r ia l in c le a r 1 9 1 4 .) la s t th e D ou m ergue hnd 3 -1 6 , G rey P a r is to h im in th e gave c o u n c il h is ow n e x p e d ie n c y corresp on d en ce w h ic h had order that the lit. P e te rs b u rg cabinet m ig h t begin n eg o tia tio n s to con clu de an a g r e e m e n t on t h e same basis r e g a rd in g th e e v e n tu a l cooperation o f the Russian and English navies. Sir Edward had remarked, in addi tion, that the m inisterial cou n cil had a pproved o f this answ er. He (G r e y ) r e s e r v e d th e rig h t o f in fo rm in g me o f t h i s ; but as the pro posal had o r ig in a ted with D oum ergue h e co n sid e re d it n ece s s a r y first to in fo rm him o f the d ecision o f the B ritish cabinet. ta k e n p la c e b e tw e e n A c c o r d in g be as to S ir th e F rench E d w a r d ’s and v ie w , th e th e E n g lis h course G o v e r n m e n ts, of th e in p r o c e e d in g s m ig h t fo llo w s : A fter authorization by his G overnm ent, Cambon w ou ld in form me o f th e ex chan ge o f n otes, w h ilst at th e sam e tim e iflr Edward, on his part, w ou ld co m m u n ica t e the sa m e to me in o r d e r that I m ay in form th e Russian G overnm ent. J u s t as th e a g r e e m e n ts e n t e r e d in to with F rance provide, in th e e v e n t o f a casus belli, first of all fo r the coop era tion o f the arm ies, so, a cco r d in g to Fir Edward Grey, th e n atu re o f thin gs dem ands that the even tu a l a greem etits w ith Russia should rela te to th e navy. The n eg otia tion s w ou ld, in co n se q u e n c e, h a ve to be ca r ried on betw een th e Russian and English staffs o f admiralty. The n egotiation s w ith F rance took p la ce at the tim e in London, and the F ren ch m ilitary and naval a tta ch e s in London t ra v e le d to P aris in order to obtain the in stru ctio n s w h ich o cca sion re n d e r e d n ece ss a ry . Finally, P rin ce Louis o f B a tr cn b erg tcent to Paris quite inofficially in o r d er to co o r d in a te th e a g re em en ts . [ F i r s t L o r d o f t h e A d m i r a l t y , b u t b y n o m eans of a a n av a l e x p e rt, so p o litic a l Cam bon in g s . th e w as H e th a t th e c o o r d in a tio n in q u e stio n w a s p r o b a b ly c h a r a c t e r .) c o m m u n ic a te d to ld of it th e o p in io n w o u ld me n e g o tia tio n s be th a t, m ig h t th a t a fte r n ecessary a c c o r d in g to to be c o n d u c ted th e corresp on d en ce d e te r m in e th e o p in io n p r e c is e ly th e of as in had fu rth e r S ir th e been p roceed E d w a rd case o f G rey, F ia n c e , i. c . , that our n aval a t ta c h 6 in London w ou ld be e m p o w e r e d to e n ter into n egotia tion s w ith the B ritish adm iralty staff, a f t e r he had been g i v e n in stru ction s in St. P etersb u rg, fo r e v e n re p e a te d jo u r n e y s on th e part o f th e naval a t ta ch 6 would in no w is e aro u se pu blic attention, w h erea s the arrival o f m ore prom inen t Russian naval officers in London would s u r ely b e co m e known and m ig h t lead to u ndesirable co m m en ts (a n d th u s In fo r m (8 4 6 . U pon G rey in Ms m et my bad ow n th a t he fo r to to London fr o m to h im fo u n d of or 10 d ays. w hat added, th e he T r ip le A llia n c e ). L e tte r, M ay P a r is had th a t it p o s s ib le day, He G rey, had to w h ic h been In 5 -1 8 , C am bon to ld s in c e d iffic u ltie s th e c o n v e r s a tio n s . 8 th e sam e. of not yet of th e G rey q u e stio n s P a r is tio n s retu rn nam e. had m em bers sam e because Im p o rta n t th e th e The c o n fir m e d d a ily , P o in c a r S h is retu rn I r e la n d ta k e up re fe r re d o b lig e d h ow ever, had and th e and w ith to to 1 9 1 4 .) In fo rm e d fo r e ig n to had b u d g e t, so c o lle a g u e s p o stp o n e rep o rted th a t C a b in e t th e h is me D ou m ergue a ffa ir s th e se A sq u ith th e and qu es on h is Asquith had an s w e r e d that he saw no in su rm oun table difficulties a g a in st c a r r y in g out th e plan p ro p osed in Paris. Since then Asquith has re p e a te d this to Cambon him self. The la tter has been able to establish th e fa ct that th e p rim e m in ister is v e r y fa v ora b ly d isposed to plans o f th a t kind. T hese re fe r , con seq u en tly , to e v e n tu a l m ilita ry c o n v e n tio n s betw een Russia and England an alogou s to th ose w h ich exist b etw een F rance and England. The la tter w ou ld be com m u n ica ted to u s in con fidence, w h e r e upon th e Russian G overnm ent w ou ld h a v e to make an alogou s proposals to t h e B ritish G overnm ent, w h ich , a cco r d in g to the nature o f things, w ou ld r e f e r m ore to th e n a v y than to the army. I t is n ot to be a ssu m ed that all m em b ers o t the Cabinet w ill g iv e t h eir sanction to this beforeh an d and w ith o u t opposition. [ F e e l i n g jo u r n e y . m in is te r s . m ilita r y He R u s s ia n h o w e v e r .) He w a s able to .in form m e to-day th a t he had spoken o f this to th e p rim e m i n i s t e r im m e d ia t ely u pon his re tu rn to L o n d o n ; th e la t te r s h a r ed his opinion and had no o b je ct io n s to make again st the plan p roposed. The w h o le affair was, h o w e v e r , ess en tia lly o f su ch importnnee th a t it cou ld n ot b e d e cid ed upon w ith o u t th e a s se n t o f th e ca b in et-cou n cil. h im “ A s r e p lie d th a t and h is th o se Orey told me that t h e se im pression s had ex ceed ed his ex pectation s by far, and that he cou ld not sufficiently c o n g r a lu la t e h im s elf upon the recep tion by the P resid en t o f the Republic and by D oumergue, w ith w h o m a p e r fe c t u n d ersta n d in g had been a ch iev ed r e g a r d in g all cu rre n t q uestion s an d the g e n e r a l p olitical situation. ( I t s o h a p p e n e d t h a t J u s t P o ln c a r ^ E d w a rd retu rn ed o f in fo r m in g to upon fro m th e d id but Is r e n e w in g 1 9 1 4 .) c a ll h im been im p r e s s io n s , 12, fo In he a fte r London retu rn p e r m itte d p r o fo u n d ow n h is me s u b je c t ; of le tt e r . at 2 9 —M a y S ir p o s s ib ility once of your am b assad or th e 8 ir I th a t v ie w . so W ith o u t lo n g The b in d in g d e la y e d s o u n d in g a of th e C a b in e t c o n v e n tio n G rey by w ith to th e p resen t, R u s s ia had B e n c k e n d o r ff had a d e fin ite been a o b je c t in c o n tin u o u s i v J X U V S S iia tfM O iJ u a u L fin a 2(5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. p e rfo rm a n c e , so th a t an em ergen cy w o u ld be d e te c te d b e h in d G rey 8 N ev erth e less, the firm d eterm in a tio n o f th e rea l leaders o f the Cabinet will ca r r y the. day. a» I do not doubt in the least, and th en th e real n eg otia tion s may begin. After the r e s u lt s w h ich h a ve fu st been d escrib ed will h a ve been ach iev ed we, as 1 b elieve, will h ave attain ed the main o b ject in view , namely, to s u b s titu te fo r the h ith e rto fa r too t h e o re tica l and pea cea b le basic idea o f the e n t e n te s o m e th in g m ore tangible. My s ojou rn i n Paris and th e s p e c t a c l e w h ich I th e re w i t n e ss e d h a ve a n ew substan tiated m y opinion, that an alliance o r an y o t h e r form o f public a g r e e m ent is im possible, and that, e v e n if the B ritish G overnm ent should permit its e lf to a g r e e to this, th e re su lts w ould be quite d ifferent from t h ose expected. T h e r e c e p t i o n w h i c h w a s a c c o r d e d t h e K i n g a n d t h e w illin g n e s s Q ueen to w as approach no doubt H u sa in an c lo s e r in a e x tr a o r d in a r ily m ilita r y s e n s e .] h e a rty one, m uch fo rm e r E n g lis h h e a r tie r , I Fir Edward em phasized the, fa ct that, w ith ou t s o m e su ch p revio u s a g r e e m e n t, an im m ed ia te coo p era tio n , e v e n w ith the best o f will* and in s p ite o f t h e c lo s e p olitical e n t e n t e b e tw e e n both G overnm ent*, w ould e n c o u n t e r s erio u * t ech n ic a l difficulties. [ H a r d l y t h e c a s e . T h e B r i t i s h G overnm en t te c h n ic a l or not an a llia n c e it to an to so fa r h is w hat spite o f this, th e im possib ility o f co n clu d in g a form a l alliance b etw een England and F rance has been recogn ized, th en this w ill i n a still g r e a te r d e g r e e be th e c a s e b etw een Russia and England. [ N a t u r a l l y , sam e G reat E n g lis h t o ld th e re , th a n B r ita in ’s w ere reason s id e n tic a l R u s s ia . w o r ld The w as to fo r th ose B r itis h th e case not th a t r e a lly to p in y fr ie n d s a ll w h ile m a k in g argu ed G overnm en t p o lit ic s — a s t h o s e o f a n y n ecessary w ith S ta te s a ll d e fin ite a llia n c e a g a in s t w as o th e r at a d e fin ite le a s t tru e E m p ir e — w e r e a g a in s t w ere a one p o te n tia l v is its . a n o th e r, w ith in F ran ce a llia n c e w ith su ch If, w ith it s e lf. Its th a t it b eca m e w h ic h none w ere e n e m ie s .] I doubt w h e t h e r a m ore p o w erfu l g u a ra n ty fo r com m on m ilitary o p er ations could be fou n d in t h e e v e n t o f w a r [ a l l t o o t r u e ] than this spirit o f th e e n t en te , as it re v e a ls its e lf at p resen t, r e i n fo r c e d by the existent m ilitary co n ven tio n s. I f w e r e v i e w th e va riou s ph ases o f the e n ten te it can not be denied that England has n e v e r h es ita ted in th r ea ten in g m om en ts to pla ce h er s e lf on the sid e o f F r a n c e ; the sa m e holds g ood fo r R u s s i a on e v e r y occasion on w h ich English and Russian i n te re sts w e r e sim u ltan eou sly affected, and this, d e sp ite the difficulty o f r e co n cilin g th e p olicies o f both cou n tries in question s that arise day a ft e r day, and desp ite those reasons, w h ich it w ou ld lead too fa r to discuss here, but w h ich explain cle a rly w h y th e e n t e n t e betw een Russia and England has n ot taken ro o t so d eep ly as that b e tw e e n F rance and England. [ T h e s e p o l i c i e s and reason s w as averse a r e o u tlin e d to in th e fo o tn o te s e x p la in in g w hy G reat B r ita in th is w h ic h w o u ld G rey have know n w a n te d to ju s t a v o id w hat a.s is to ex p e ct, sh ow n by and th e it is p r e c is e ly by o b lig a tio n s as yet be m eans upon of h er, d e c is iv e th e F ren ch c o n fir m e d to approved h is The E d w ard my ow n and a llia n c e w h ic h con sequ en ces w o u ld im p o s e o f w h ic h can not of to y e ste rd a y c o lle a g u e me th e nam e th e had London L e tte r , th a t a lr e a d y th a t w h ic h w it, at sam e. re q u ested fa c t an sw er [to th e he w ith o u t th e g iv e n con sen t 1 0 -2 3 , and m e, th e E n g lis h had S a z o n o f f .) M ay C am bon in fo r m e d th e to I 1 9 1 4 .) c a ll S ec reta ry M in is te r ia l to D o u in e r g u e of th e upon of h im . S ta te C o u n c il in had P a r is C a b in e t in c o u n c il], a ft e r the F ren ch m in ister had spoken o f the relations b e tw e e n Russia and England and had in d ica ted h o w usefu l, u n d er certa in co n tin g en cie s, previo u s m ilita ry co n v e n tio n s b etw een th e G overn m en ts w o u ld prove. The first s te p to be con sid ered w as to co m m u n ica te to th e Russian G overnment, on th e part o f F rance and England, th e tw o con fidential and s e c r e t d o cu m en ts, w h ich had been ex chan ged b etw e e n th e F ren ch and B ritish G overn m en ts in th e y e a r 191t. S ir E d w a rd d o cu m e n ts la id s p e c ia l sh ow ed th a t stre ss no upon a llia n c e th e w as p o in t, th a t c o n c lu d e d th e te x t b etw ee n o f th e se th e tw o T hey fulfilled th e p u rpose ra th er o f p u ttin g th e su b sta n ce o f the m ilitary a g r e e m e n ts in th e p ro p er ligh t, a g r e e m e n ts w h ioh had been e n t e r e d in to b e tw e e n th e a rm y and n a v y au th orities fo r the e v e n t u a lit y that it should becom e n e ce s s a r y fo r th e British and French naval and land f o r c e s to co o p e r a t e actively. [ T h e e v e n t u a l i t y d i f f e r s fr o m t h e r e g u l a r casu s foederis o f d e f e n s i v e a l l i a n c e s i n s o f a r a s i t p ow ers. m akes < * * < p e r a tio n s e le c tiv e p o in t and and con sen t of of c o n d itio n s p r e c is e m a n n e r .] 76876— 11 th e th e of arm ed s u b s c r ib in g fo r c e s c o n tin g e n t G o v e rn m e n ts, “ o p e r a tiv e n e s s ” of th e upon th e m u tu a l in s te a d of fix in g a llia n c e in a th e d e fin ite and so E n g la n d had en tered in in to and th e fn c t and th a t R u s s ia n to c o n c lu d e d R u s s ia and m u st th e lim its w as w illin g argu m en t G reat an fo r B r it a in .] agreem en t b e tw e e n th e le ft p a r tic i G o v e rn m e n ts good b etw ee n fo r G rey w ith o b je c tio n s F rom c o n v e n tio n beyond a corresp on d en ce No w h e th e r G overnm en t fa r o ffe r in g o f a llia n c e no th e of “ n e c e s s ity ” s o v e r e ig n ty . as a llia n c e . d e s ir a b le . a B r itis h French m u ch and B r ita in and th e by th e G reat w a n t— tr e a tie s ex p ressed s ta ffs H ereu p on , he had on copy th e of fo llo w in g In in th e C am bon R u s s ia n and and th e to A d m ir a lty . S ir E d w ard to h is th e p art r e p ly G rey gave F rench gave w h ic h m e, he me a copy am b assad or on th e had on of a u th o r ity d ir e c te d th e docum ent N ovem ber to of S ir 22, h is w h ic h 1912, and G o v e r n m e n t, E d w a rd G rey on a th e day. resp on se e x p e d ie n t don of handed Cam bon to th in g p la c e my to q u e s tio n , do w o u ld h im s e lf in S ir be to E d w a rd a u th o r iz e c o m m u n ic a tio n d e c la r e d our w ith th a t naval th e th e a tta c h e B r itis h m ost in sta ff Lon of Ad The first Lord o f Admiralty, as w ell a* t h e B ritish m in isters, w e r e in s t r u cte d as to our plans. The B ritish sta ff o f Adm iralty is in p o ssession o f th e c o n v e n tio n s r e g a r d i n g th e n a v y w h ich w e r e w ork ed out in com m on by F rance and England. As to th e r e m a in in g a g r e e m en ts, F rance, w h o w as allied w ith us, m ig h t use th e m as s h e d e e m e d n ecessa ry . m ir a lty . s e lf (h a n k in g to to ld S ir E d w ard r e m a r k in g d o cu m e n ts me (8 4 8 . to th a t your w hen I fo r fro m th e S ir h is w o u ld e x c e lle n c y h a n d in g L e tte r fr ie n d ly at and once s e n tim e n ts , tr a n s m it rep ort to you th e I c o n fin e d c o p ie s e x a c tly m y of w hat b o th he had copy. E d w ard A m b assad or at G rey to London. M. Paul N ov. 22, Cam bon, th e F rench 1 9 1 2 .‘ ) “ From tim e to time, du rin g th e co u r s e o f the last j e w y e a r s seem to C am bon * fr o m of deal h ere and G rey tim e th e th e to C a m b o n . it c o n ta in e d N ovem ber is b road its of a c tiv ity to proper b e n e fit of th is , of th e th e th e n e g o tia tio n s . le tte r s u n d e r s ta n d in g by th e tex t is In in B r itis h , th e no th a t and, one, su ch th e m ilita r y case, th e se b e in g a and fa c ts , and of th e th e a have con w as in on. S in c e and naval G rey and c o n v e n tio n as R u s s ia n s to w ere n o n r e s p o n s ib ility , very b e g in n in g v a lu e screen naval th a t e x p e r ts c o n d itio n s The w r it as s im p ly m ilita r y b e tw e e n F r a n c o -R u s s ia n e x a cted says th e fu rth e r le tte r s s tip u la tio n s th e ir of sh ow n [w e b etw ee n c o n v e n tio n B r itis h th e but years, a u th o r itie s u n d e r s ta n d in g . w as lig h t great m ade th e 1912, fe w th e be and th a t c e r ta in of 23, naval w ill of corresp on d en ce la s t w ord s, F ren ch assu m e and th e and o th e r exch ange to The 22 of scope, a s e ffe c tiv e n e s s in fo r m e d cou rse m ilita r y in r e a s o n a b le in th e B r itis h th is fo r Cam bon in c o n s is te n c y . d a te d a n te rio r q u e stio n an a n o t h e r '— in very of w as is and one and p e r io d a g e n ts w ith tim e , d u r in g F rench w ith e x is te n c e , never am b assad or sam e fa r th e r , of an m a tter p e r ju r y ; th e stru ck w ith a d e s ir e d r e c o g n iz e h on or” a ll In a c o n v e n tio n o f this kind he s a w th e sa m e p ra ctica l advantage* w h i c h r e s u lt from th e c o n v e n t i o n w ith F rance. He told u s t h a t h e w a s thinking o f a n aval co n v e n tio n , be ca u se this, in v i e w o f the cir c u m s ta n c e s , was the m o s t suitable, and b eca u se h e w as, m o r eo v e r, d is p o se d to b e liev e that this w ou ld also be in a cco r d a n ce w ith th e w ish es o f th e Im perial G overnm ent. th e (R u s s ia n As c o n d itio n s of fo r e se e n . (8 4 7 . S ir tre a tie s w as w h im re je c te d w as w ith o u t b e in g th e w ith o u t d id th a t h im s e lf , b e in g s u lte d d o c u m e n t s .] no r e a lly as to e n te n te s v ie w s added escap e “ n a tio n a l and s p ir it In To reca p itu la te in brief, I w ou ld like to s a y that e v e n th o s e English m en w ho are firm ly co n v i n c e d that s oon er or later a conflict w ith Ger m an y w ill p ro v e in ev ita b le w o u l d b e f r i g h t e n e d b y t h e i d e a o f b i n d i n g E n g la n d H e “ a lli a n c e s .” ] The rea son fo r this is to be s o u g h t in the t a c t that e v e n a m ost c a r e fu l but public allian ce w ou ld m e et w ith s tr o n g and u n d isguised opposi tion in England, and that not o n ly on the part o f th e IAberal P arty, and that a g r e a t p a r t o f th e p olitical e ffec t in te n d e d w ou ld be fr u s tr a te d by it. I believ e th a t u n d er su ch cir cu m s ta n ce s an alliance w ou ld not b e w o rth much. It w ou ld m erely , in a v e r y s lig h t d e gr ee , in cre a se the g u a ra n ties w h ich are offered to F rance and Russia by England, and it would, on the o t h e r hand, offer a fa r m ore fe r t i le soil f o r a g ita tion in fa v o r o f Germany, s o m e th in g upon w h ich Germ any p la ces m o r e w e i g h t than ever. [ S o m e w h a t f a r - f e t c h e d . W h a t a n a l l i a n c e w o u l d h a v e d o n e is : G e r m a n y th e y by to or It c o n v e n tio n im p o s s ib le b o w in g th e ir set a cce p ted a w as can. not v a lu e d go or a c ce p ted in v o lv e d . G overnm en t th u s o r d in a r ily in w as One In e ith e r w ere retrea t B r itis h p a tio n . F ran ce have a llia n c e th e have w o u ld d iffic u ltie s of fo r th e th e of G reya c tu a l c o o p e r a tio n w ith the experts o f the F rench and English m ilita ry and n aval a u th orities h ave co n su lted with on e another. I t w a s c o n s t a n tly a g r e e d that s u ch discu ssion s w e r e n ot to r e s t r i c t th e fr e e d o m o f decision o f the tw o G o vern m en ts as to w h e t h e r the one w a s to su p p or t the o th e r w ith arms or not. W e assu m ed in this that su ch co n su lta tio n s by ex p e rts r e p r e s e n te d no a g r e em en t, and cou ld n ot be r e g a r d e d as one, w h e r e b y th e on e G overn m en t or the o t h e r w ou ld be p le d g e d to i n te r c e d e in an e v e n t u a lit y w h ich had n ot y e t taken pla ce and w h ich m ig h t n e v e r take place. Thus, fo r in sta n ce, th e p r e s e n t division o f th e fleets o f F rance and England is n ot based upon an obligation to o p e r a t e in c o m mon in th e e v e n t o f war. “ You h a v e in th e m e a n tim e poin ted out that if the on e G o vern m en t or th e o th e r sh o u ld h a ve w e i g h t y re a s o n s to fe a r an u n p rovo k ed attack on th e part of a third p ow er, it w o u ld be n e c e s s a r y to know i f it m igh t, in s u c h a case, co u n t upon th e arm ed a s sis ta n ce o f the oth er, I am e n t i r e ly o f the opinion that if th e o n e G overn m en t or th e o t h e r should h a v e w e i g h t y r e a s o n s to fe a r an u nprovok ed attack on th e part o f a th ir d pow er, o r an y o t h e r th r e a t e n e d distu rb a n ce o f p e a c e , this Gov- F ran ce 1 T h is B r itis h Book ” p o s s ib le ] te x t “ B lu e text. d iffe r s s lig h tly B o o k ,” due, no fr o m d o u b t, th e to v e rs io n su b seq u en t of th e e d itin g le tte r ot th e In th e “ B lu e _ ........_________ ___l ________________________ Oo (1H0D3H TV MOISSailONOO RECORD. C O N G R E S S IO N A L 27 “ It w a s first o f all r ecog n iz ed that our n aval co n v e n tio n with Eng land. like the Franco-Russian n aval co n ven tio n , w ou ld h a ve to bear in m ind a ctions of ou r n a v y in c o n ju n ctio n w ith the English Navy w h ich , w hile con stitu tin g a ction s a g re ed upon, w ou ld n e v e r th e l e s s be separate. "As to th e s t r a t e g i c aims, w h ich , fr o m our sta n d p oin t, are to becom e o p era tive in the e v e n t o f a w a r b etw een th e p o w e r s o f the Triple En t en te and the p o w ers o f th e Triple Alliance [ a v e r y d a n g e r o u s a n d u n d i p l o m a t i c a d m i s s i o n ] , on e m u st d is tin gu is h : on th e on e ha?id, b etw een (8 t P . L e tte r fro m M . F a u l C a m b o n , th e F re n c h A m b a s s a d o r a t L o n d o n , th e opera tion s in th e reg ion o f th e B altic and t h e North S e a ; on the t o S i r E d w a r d G r e y , N o v . 2 3 , 1 9 1 2 .* ) o t h e r hand, the M editerranean. In both w e m u st seek to obtain c o m You re m in d ed me, t h r o u gh y o u r l e tt e r o f y e s te r d a y , th e tid o f N ovem p en sa tion fr o m England fo r d iv e rtin g a part o f th e German fleet upon ber, that from tim e to tim e du rin g the co u rse o f th e last fe w y e a r s the ou rselv es. I T h e R u s s i a n s w a n t e d ‘ c o m p e n s a t i o n ’ e v e n w h e n t h e y ex perts o f the m ilitary and naval au th orities o f F rance and E ngland w e r e t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s . ] h a v e co n s u lt e d w ith on e an oth er, that it was c o n s t a n tly a g re ed that " In the n orth ern t h e a te r o f w a r our i n te r e s t s d em an d th a t England t h e se d iscu ssion s w e r e not to r e s t r i c t th e fr ee d o m o f a n y G overn m en t sh o u ld f e t t e r as g r e a t a portion o f th e German fleet as possible in the in d e cid in g in th e fu tu re w h e t h e r it w is h ed to g ra n t th e o th e r arm ed North Sea. B y this m ean s th e va st p r e p o n d er a n ce o f the German fleet a s s i s ta n c e o r n ot, that t h e se con su lta tion s betw een the ex perts fo r m e d o v e r ou r own w ou ld be equalized and perh a p s perm it, in the m ost no obligation on e it h e r side, and w e r e n ot to be r e g a rd e d as an y w h ich fa v o ra b le circu m s ta n ce s, a landing in P om erania being made. Should w ou ld co m p el th e tw o G overnm ents to in te r v e n e in ce rta in e v e n tu a lities , it be possible to undertake this operation, its ex ecu tion w ou ld be re n and that y o u h a ve in the m ean tim e p oin ted out that if on e or th e o t h e r d e re d extraordinarily difficult o ilin g to the lack o f tran sport v e s s e ls in G o vern m en t sh ould h a ve w e i g h t y re a son s to fe a r an unprovoked attack t h e Baltio. The British G overnm ent m igh t, t h e r e fo r e , assist us co n on th e part o f a third p o w e r it w ou ld b e im portant to know w h e t h e r it sid era b ly by re n d er in g it possible that a ce rta in n u m ber o f m erch an t m ig h t co u n t upon the arm ed a s sista n ce o f the other. v e s s e ls should be sen t to ou r B altic ports b e fo re th e begin n ing o f w a r Your l e t t e r g i v e s the a n sw er to this point and I a m e m p o w e r e d to like op era tion s so that th e lack o f tra n sp ort v e s s e ls m igh t be made s ta t e th a t in th e e v e n t o f one o f th e tw o G overnm ents haiAng w e i g h t y g o o d in this way. [ T h i s s h o u l d r e m o v e a l l d o u b t a s a g a i n s t w h o m t h e g ro u n d s f o r fe a r i n g an attack by a third p o w er or a d istu rban ce o f c o n v e n t i o n w a s d i r e c t e d . T h e casus fo e d e ris m a y h a v e b e e n a b s e n t , b u t g e n e r a l p ea ce, th e G overnm ent in question ou ght at o n ce to d e cid e in t h e o b j e c t i v e a t l e a s t w a s p l a i n l y I d e n t i f i e d . ] c o n ju n c t i o n with the oth er, w h e t h e r a p ro ced u re in com m on by th e “ The situ ation in th e M editerranean also c o n c e r n s o u r in terests m ost tw o G o vern m en ts w ould be fea sib le to p r e v e n t th e attack or to p r e ess en tia lly , s in ce in th e e v e n t o f t h e Austro-Italian f o r c e s in this sea s e r v e pea ce. In this ca s e th e tw o G overn m en ts w ou ld d iscuss t h e h a r i n g the u pper hand, an attack by the Austrian fleet in the Black m e a s u r e s w h i c h w e r e to be taken con jo in tly. Should t h ese m ea su res Sea w ou ld be possible, w h ich w ou ld mean a serio u s blow to us. It is, make a m ilita ry a ction n ece s s a r y , the tw o G overn m en ts w ou ld at o n ce t h e r e fo r e , fr o m ou r p oin t o f v ie w , e x trem ely im p o r ta n t that a sa fe c o n s i d e r th e plan s o f their g en e ra l staffs, and a decision w ou ld be m ade p r e p o n d er a n ce o f th e figh tin g fo r c e s o f th e E n tente o v e r t h e AustroItalian Fleet in the M editerranean be establish ed. S in ce t h e Austroa s to h ow fa r t h e s e plans w e r e to be follow ed. Italian naval f o r c e s are su p e rio r to t h e F ren ch , it is desirable that (8 5 0 . S a z o n o ff to th e R u s s ia n A m bassad or a t L ondon. C o n fid e n tia l England, by sta tio n in g th e req u isite n u m ber o f v e s s e ls in th e M editer le tte r , M a y 1 5 —2 8 , 1914. N o . 4 7 .) ranean, s e cu r e th e p re p o n d er a n ce o f th e E n tente P ow er s, at least so The re a d in ess of the B ritish G overn m en t to begin, w ith o u t d e la y lon g as th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f our o w n fleet does n ot p e rm it us to assum e {th e B r itis h G o v e r n m e n t w a s in n o h u r r y , a c c o r d i n g t o P r i n c e L o u i s this duty. It w ou ld also be desirable that E ngland’s co n se n t to our o f B a t t e n b e r g , w 'b i c h i s t o b e e x p l a i n e d l a r g e l y b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e ships u sin g th e English ports in th e e a ster n M editerranean as bases R u s s ia n fle e t b e in g a n e g lig ib le q u a n t i t y J u s t t h e n , G r e a t B r i t a i n a s be s ecu re d , sim ilar to w h a t is g r a n te d to us by t h e F r en ch naval co n su m ed m o s t o f t h e l i a b i l i t i e s ] , n eg o t ia tio n s r e g a r d i n g th e co n clu sio n ven tion , w h ich p erm its m s to make u se o f th e F ren ch ports in th e o f an a g r e e m e n t b etw een Russia and England, w h ich w ou ld c o n c e r n w e s t e r n M editerranean. Joint o p e r a t io n s o f ou r n a va l fo r c e s in the e v e n t o f a com m on m ilita ry “ Should th e question o f th e Straits (th e B o s p h o r u s a n d th e D a r a ction, has been r e c e iv e d on ou r part w ith a fe e li n g o f the g r e a t e s t d a n e l l e s ) be d iscu ssed in c o n n ect io n w ith th e situ ation in th e Mediter sa tis fa ctio n . Quite apart from th e fa c t th a t s u ch an a g r e e m e n t is ranean, then political questions w e r e n ot to be t o u ch e d u p o n ; but on ly desira ble fr o m a s p ecia l m ilita ry stan dpoin t w e a t ta ch g re a t im p o r ta n ce tem p o ra ry operations in the Straits, as on e o f ou r s t r a t e g i c m ea su res in to it in a g e n e r a l p olitical sense. the e v e n t of war, w e r e to be borne in mind. In t h e co n clu s io n o f s u ch an a g r e e m e n t w e s ee a n im portan t s te p “ In addition, th e c o n f e r e n c e reco g n iz e d that it w a s desirable that all Inward b rin g in g England into c lo s e r union w ith th e F ranco-Russian details o f the re la tion s b etw e e n th e Russian and th e B ritish n avies in a llia n ce and an e f f e c t i v e m ean s o f r e i n fo r c i n g th e r e co g n itio n o f the th e p r o je c te d n aval co n ve n tio n b e tw e e n o u rs elv es and England should com m on i n te r e s t s of England and Russia w h ich , w e are co n v in ce d , w ill be established. For this pu rpose it w ill be n e c e s s a r y to co m e to an fa v o ra b ly in flu en ce all the questions w h ich a ffect B ritish and Russian u n derstan din g as to sign als and sp ecial ciphers, w i r e le s s m e ssa g es, and in terests. I h a v e ca lled th e a tte n tio n o f our m in istry o f the n a vy , in th e relations b e tw e e n th e B ritish and the Russian n aval staffs. p a r ticu la r o f ou r n aval a g en t in London, m ost s p ecia lly to th e g r e a t “ I t is m o r eo v e r n e c e s s a r y that in form ation r e g a r d i n g the navies of p o litica l sig n ifica n ce o f th e im p e n d in g n eg otia tion s w h i c h t h e la tte r will o th e r p ow ers, as w e ll as on e’s oum n a vy , and in p a r ticu la r w i t h regard h a v e to c a r r y on w ith th e English staff o f adm iralty. [ A c c o r d i n g t o to tech n ica l details, in stru m en ts, and in ven tion s, be ex chan ged b etw een G r e y , t h e y w e r e n o t to h a v e “ g r e a t p o li t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ,” a n d t h e r e th e tw o naval departm en ts. w a s n o m e n t i o n in t h e C a m b o n l e t t e r s o f “ a c t i v e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e i r “ In the opinion o f th e co n fe r e n ce , it w ou ld also be n e ce s s a r y to n a v a l f ig h t in g f o r c e s ,” w h ic h te r m , h o w e v e r, S a zo n o ff m a y h a v e c o n a rra n ge fo r a p eriod ic exchange o f opinion b etw een th e heads of the s id e r e d a s m e r e ly c ir c u m s c r ib e d . B e t h is a s it m a y , S a z o n o ff e v in c e s Russian and th e English adm iralty staffs a cco r d in g to the example o f a n e a g e r n e s s h a r d ly c o m p a tib le w it h th e d ig n it y o f th e I m p e r ia l R u s th e Franco-Russian n aval con ven tion .’’ [ A r a t h e r a c c u r a t e t r a n s c r i p t s ia n G o v e r n m e n t .] The p ro p o sa l m ade by t h e B ritish G o vern m en t o f t h e a b o v e d o c u m e n t p a s s e d i n t o t h e h a n d s o f t h e G e r m a n G o v e r n r e s p e c t i n g t h e form in w h ich th e co n v e n tio n is to be co n clu d e d is m e n t . T h e d e m e n t i s o f t h e B r i t i s h a n d R u s s i a n G o v e r n m e n t s d i d n o t , r e co g n iz e d by us as in e v e r y w a y s u ited to the put p o s e [ s h o w i n g t h a t a n d n a t u r a l l y c o u l d n o t , r e m o v e t h e d e e p i m p r e s s i o n m a d e b y t h e t e r m s r m m m t o u g h t at on ce to co m e to an u n derstan din g w ith th e o t h e r as to w h e t h e r both G overn m en ts are to p ro ceed i n com m on in o r d e r to ward off th e attack and to p r e s er v e p e a ce , and to co n sid e r w h a t m ea su re s are to be m u tu ally taken. I f t h ese m e a su res co m p rise a m ilita ry action, then the plans o f the g en e ra l staffs are to be co n sid ered at on ce, and it w ou ld be the d u ty o f th e G overn m en ts to d e cid e as to h o w f a r th ese w e r e to be fo llo w e d .” th e R u s s ia n C V overn m en t w as not ■very p a r tic u la r as to q u a lity 1 , and Captain Volkoff has b e en in s t r u c t e d to e n t e r in to n eg o tia tio n s w i t h t h e B ritish G overn m en t. T h e p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h a r e t o b e c o n s i d e r e d d u r i n g th e im p e n d in g to o k p la c e n e g o tia tio n s on M ay 1 3 -2 6 have In been th e th e o ffic e o b je c t o f a of th e c o n s u lta tio n c h ie f of th e w h ic h s ta ff of a d m ir a lty . For p assed p erson al th is in fo r m a tio n , I append a copy of th e r e s o lu tio n s c o n fe re n c e . “ On May 13-26, 1914, a con su ltation took p lace in th e office o f th e c h i e f o f n a va l staff fo r th e p u rp ose o f an exchange o f opinions r e s p e c t in g th e im p en d in g n eg o tia tio n s as to a co n v e n tio n b etw een Russia and England, w h ich c o n ce rn s th e a c t i v e coop era tion s o f t h eir n aval figh tin g f o r c e s sh o u ld warlike operations, a g re ed upon by Russia and England, take p la ce w ith the participation o f France. After it had been pri m arily rem ark ed h ow desirable such a co n v e n tio n w ou ld be from a sp ecific n-eval stan dpoin t and, a b o v e all, w ith reg a rd to g en e ra l political co n sid e ra tio n s, the m em bers o f th e c o n fe r e n ce , a ft e r a co m p re h e n s iv e examination o f the question, ca m e to the fo llo w in g d e cisio n s: 1 See fir s t fo o tn o te 76870— 11 th e a tr ip duke to p r e c e d in g d o cu m e n t. above in to c o m m u n ic a tio n . S c a n d in a v ia n F r a n c is (8 5 1 . The have ch ase fo r of th e th e th e se fu n d s naval B e fo r e th a t th is my A rm stro n g c o u n c il in th o u g h no have C h ile G overnm en t be fin a l ch a n g e o f fron t not fr o m of E m peror a fte r th e W illia m w ent a ss a s s in a tio n of on A rch h ere a fte r and approved fo u n d It a th e th e R u s s ia n N o. r e g a r d in g w ere in r a is e d C h ile , it 1 8 2 .) th e th e th e as appeared to pu r m arket n ecessary w e ll as th e to th e he s a le c e r ta in and th a t fu tu re . c o n v e r s a tio n to s a le p o s s ib le to agreed near r e s u lt s of h a v in g of 1914. E n g la n d . fin a lly th e c h ie f 6, T u rkey P e te rsb u rg had fo llo w in g and la t te r w ith th e e x c e lle n c y b e lo n g in g in rep o rt: of to th e w ith tw o c o n fir m th e A lth o u g h fir m th e d rea d n o u g h ts, th is d e c is io n , of naval th e even an sw er h a s been g iv e n on its p a rt. This to be attribu ted e n t ir e ly to the Chilean m inister here. n e g a tiv e is o f th e S t. C h ile to 2 4 -J u n e your R u s s ia c o n c lu d e d th e has has to agreem en t d e p a rtu re retu rn I th a t, London su b s c r ip tio n ] c o n d itio n a l hence in [b o th p o p u la tio n G overn m en t m ig h t agent r e p o r tin g dreadnou ght my th e A fte r of p o p u la t io n p r o s p e c tiv e even S ecret rep o rt, M a y honor s h ip s , th e by D e s p ite w a ters F e r d i n a n d .] R u s s ia n s ta ff o f a d m ir a lty . I your at of b6 U U O J U U 1 V N O IS S U H D N tO J 28 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The la tte r on ce tia tio n s, th a t S in c e A r m str o n g s e c u r in g to at in d ic a te th is n us d o u b tfu l th is be h is one s h a ll he to su b m it th a t th e A fte r c o n s id e r a tio n s nnval c o n v e n tio n m ea n s G rey to grow of p le a se d w ith is upon e s t a b lis h R a tte n b e rg th e fo llo w in g [L o u is, w ho a fte r had w ith my c o n v e r s a tio n c o o r d in a te d th e The B r itish G overn m en t in s is ts upon fa r th e fo r h a ste so a n e g lig ib le w h o lly im p o s s ib le B a lt ic .] as p la n The so c o m in g K a ra l M in ister to see A u g u st, h im w ith h im s e lf fo r as and U n ite d S ta te s and e x a c tly $ 1 2 ,5 3 5 ,2 7 0 .9 8 .] I have w ith P r in c e agree an is F ren ch Your The R u s s ia n n o tifie d G rey P etersb u rg and A d m ir a lt y . am b assad or y e ste rd a y had G rey been at a In c o n tro l h is th is d e p a rtu re are order to ta k e th e n w ith th e to p la c e of th a t th a t th is. th e had r e g r e tta b ly fir st G erm an and th en th is q u e stio n . r ep ly to a en ter re la tiv e to th a t I, w h ich r ep ea ted Your E x c e lle n c y N ovoc V e r m in was to a n sw er cover th e th e h im m ore e x p e d ie n t to a ll to o m a tter and th a t th e m s e lv e s w ith w ill be L ord th a t c e r ta in be put to o b lig e d a of r e g r e tte d v iew , of of as to G rey to lie to ld r e tu r n in g w e ll as w hat th e o th er [A th e th e th e sam e. S ir h im w hat not th e gen era l o u tlin e s had B r itis h fr o m I th is, P a r lia m e n t r e p lie d th is p o in t th a t of it or are to T e le g r a m M ay 12, to ld me d e c la r a tio n s R u ssia , th e th e th e B r itish fr o m th is G rey added b o th G reat B r ita in s in c e ta ry a im tu r n in g in te r e sts m is s io n in th e to of N o. e n tir e ly so th a t fle e t p e r m itte d th e re of and R u s s ia n s , fa lle n p roposed and naval fin e la n d , been G overn m en t N e v e r th e les s, B r itish o ffic e r s th o u g h T h ese w ith o u t w ith o u t been sig n e d w h ic h your in th e lie le ft of th e m . m ore o r d e r in g le g a l B r itish to The lo s t and at a m ba ssa d or r e p r es en ta tio n s to to exp ress L im a n von T h ere by th e p e r c e p tio n sh ip s in to Eng oppose C o n s ta n tin o p le su b lim e have, n o tific a tio n th e q u ite w ith th e T u r k is h beyond th a t A o r th has th e brou gh t p o rta , and, th e m se lv e s in about r e s u lt , of naval th e B r itis h m issio n , G overn m en t in flu e n c e c o m p lic a tio n s w ith of th e and th e co n tra cts E n g lis h are 1914. by th e a sa le b e fo r e to pre it Is K ie l, w ish In to a m ba ssa d or h o n o r a b le w ay he th a t th a t th ere e x iste d any sp ea k and b etw een n eith er an m a n .” ] to is th e E n g la n d h im of c o n n e c tio n w h ere b etw een an 1 6 7 .) ru m ore c o n te n ts in n ecessa ry to a ssu red a n d R u ssia N o. fa lse th e R u ssia g o in g H e d u rin g th e H e. con cea l fro m by S ir a re fe r en c e to W . th e g iv e n H ou se th e se yea rs a g a in st S ir ‘‘ e n c ir c lin g E d w ard C om m ons m em ber by of su ch G erm an y. s o -c a lle d by of B y le s , naval G reat ask ed our and th e any b etw ee n agreem ent B r ita in , a g ree m e n t, R u s s ia m ake a ffe c t of d irec ted any and naval B y le s can cou rse G rey M r. to K in g , P a r lia m e n t, In c ite d : w h e th e r to th e ch a ra cter an sw er in and be a any b etw ee n he w o u ld G reat r e la tio n s re c e n tly of w ith S ta te r e c e n tly any nego ta k e n p la c e fo r regard and w ith been w h e th e r B r ita in . S ecreta ry B r ita in has and have sta te m e n t G reat paper. tio n s a It to R u s s ia ; G erm an y, have sin c e arc lik e ly to agreem ent or m o d ify q u o te d , la id T hat F o r e ig n an how and a lle g e d fa r w ill su ch he la y be P r im e o u g h t, b e fo r e su ch In ns it w ith G reat w as any upon, so fa r th a t M i n i s t e r 's are ns I sta te m e n t o p in io n , to and a g r a in If th e s h o u ld ago. w o u ld year, th e n e g o tia m ake and B ut to th e none if any w ith d r a w w h ic h th a t par on No Judge. su pp ose agree G overnm en t q u e s tio n s n ecessary la s t I ns th a t p rogress, can of be, of tb n l in It day, r e p lie d B r ita in year pow er sam e u n p u b lis h e d th e n m ade m em ber th e no b o th q u e s tio n th e n fr e e d o m not n e g o tia tio n s c o n c lu d e d my th e covers t o -d a y c o n c lu d e d No w ere s im ila r h o n o r a b lo on M in is te r or a th e a ls o th e re ham per an sw er e n tered to P r im e w h e th e r tru e been be th e It as tru e. w ere or and q u e s tio n pow ers d e c id e w ar. lo s s The S o m erse t ask ed fo r c e s , s im ila r r e s lr ic t to r e m a in s sta te m e n t a E u rop ean w o u ld in N o rth m ilita r y t o -d a y . b etw ee n P a r lia m e n t tic ip a te fo r to ask ed done w h ic h of m em ber regard S a lfo r d a g a in m e n ts J w ith it I have w o u ld be, P a r lia m e n t .” A n o th er (8 5 G . f a ls e h o o d — fla v o r e d S a zo n o ff to th e w ith Im m e d ia te ly you th a t to be I of our of th a t fe a rs and have G rey fe a r e d la te c o m in g of to to a rc, th e I in as tru th . th e S ir and a ll J w ere p o sitio n g r e a te r h im th e even G eorge part to rega rd fo r m e th e q u ite th is p resen t p o ssib le our and m ost of c o u r ie r th e lik e ly to in I it tr a c e d ba ck w ere th a t how be on, in J to In fo r m th e B r itish of th e r e c o o lin g been to once m y I n o tic e th e fa c t m ore be a ssu m p tio n once m ore u n fo u n d e d d e sir ed , a q u e stio n . had o p in io n m y se lf w ith w h ich In d ia d e cisiv e h a ste n dan ger con seq u en ce, s h o u ld la te r be p rove p u b lic m ost C o n fid e n tia l P e r sia n con ced ed In c o n te n te d th a t th e e x c item en t w h ich to se r io u s of E n g la n d th a t, London. yesterd a y th e B uch an an and in to accou n t c o r r e c t. h in te d in to c a lled on a rg u m en ts G overn m en t have I p e r tu r b a tio n th e of at 1 9 1 4 .) c o n v e r sa tio n E n g la n d E n g la n d to 1 2 -2 5 , d e p a rtu re lo n g B r itish la r a tio n s I seem s th e am b assad or June a tte n tio n to m a n ife s t. fo r fea rs w h ose th a t th e a n o th e r r e la tio n s a ssu m ed p ea ted b e fo r e had a m b a ssa d or, a b le th a t R u s s ia n le tt e r , th e s h ip b u ild in g G o v e rn m e n t. G reece v ie w agreem ent has th e sa m e G o v e rn m e n t, d ir e c t and d isc u sse d not th e R u s s ia W illia m arose was h ow ever, to day G rey : fo r B e n o k e n d o rff d isp o sa l in th e th e p ro m o ted of th is d e v e lo p m e n t s p le n d id sa le its In w hy G erm an s. a stu te h is th e of o n ly th e c o n ce r n in g G erm an B ru tu s d id th ey to o f th e in te llig e n c e r e la tio n s ” m ea n s a re th e m ili p resen ce th e to a r g u m e n t, reason th a t G ov T u r k ish G erm an s e r v ic e s to in d ir e c tly . p r e v io u s o p in io n , th e a h o n o r a b le year ■ or every c o n tr a r y The o n ly m o- th e in t h e th e a p o o r o p in io n “ c lo s e r once th e no been one C o n sta n tin o p le b etw ee n th e r e ta in had th e and had c o o p e r a tio n 76879— U of to m ake m ore any any is to d e c la r a t io n s yards of As have G rey w as sw ay c o n v e n tio n in s tr u c te d sen se, th is th e J u d g m e n t .] th e th ese. under to m a k in g been th a t h im ask ed w h e th e r E. w ar en ter T u rkey sou nd im p o s s ib le . w as to g ra n ted been a w a s n o d a n g e r a t a ll w o u ld S ir E d w a r d th e m is s io n of to p e n d in g S ir la s t he dan ger d u ll been have [N o t In a its r e su lte d w o u ld su cceeded G overn m en t d isa p p r o v a l o f have E n g la n d . a lm o s t w e re tim e s w h e n had w h ich and In w ith “ The fr ie n d ly p e r m itte d o n ly th e and s ig n ifie d been has w ith R u s s ia G overnm en t w as O tto m a n m eet naval N avy he M ay p ap ers. 1914. B r itish in d e p e n d e n c e and T u r k is h th e th e T u rkey B r itis h th e have h ow ever, G erm an y, R u ssia of of not fr a n k sh o w s d ip lo m a c y d e fen d w o u ld H ad th a t a r e fu sa l w o u ld T u rkey B and ers P a sh a , to your T u r k ish w o u ld d ocu m ent N avy d e v ia tio n th e th e p erm issio n , ern m en t. G overn m en t N avy. of o ffic ers [T h is T u r k ish a p p r e c ia te d th e T u r k is h S in c e th is e n a b le h ig h ly d ev elo p m en t se r v ic e . m e n t s .] he r e g a r d in g th a t T u rk ish th a t had put K in g j new n aval agreem ent v ie w . 3 0 -.T u n e th e t r u e .] ["A n d e o n n e e .t lo n d eserv es now “ 5. S ir sam e not a ssu m ed P a r lia m e n t, M r. A ffa ir s w ith seem ed of tia tio n s , th e e n jo y e d N or th is 1914, ” 8. w o u ld p la c e a ssu red a ffir m e d n ever j e n te re d In to b etw ee n a sk ed w h ich ta k en [In m em ber v a lu e of He P a r lia m e n t, a nd w h ic h th e aw are he had q u e s tio n s June, th e 1 4 9 .) fo r hand f a ls e h o o d .] th e th a t th a t E d w a r d .] in G o v e r n m e n t .] m a tte r c o n v in ce d p ress E n g la n d is th a t of T h e d iffic u lty o p p o r tu n ity 1 2 -2 5 , d eem ed c o n v e n tio n . th e fig u r e d is c u s s e d m e a la r m e d had [H a r d ly t o ld - h i m n eg o tia tio n s in d isc r e tio n s, to ld was me th o se e x te n t a n d , th e tre a t in w as I [S h o w in g G rey v ir tu o u s th e n th ese I and d e m e n ti. [T h e tex t. th o u g h t me The b e lie v e d nor a June who had p u rch ase w h ic h T e le g r a m not to ld he S tr a its yea rs. th e d ays. op p osed L ic h n o w sk y , G rey fo r w h ie n becau se th e th r e e G o v e r n m e n ts h ad g r o w n so j h im th a t th e in tim a c y b e tw e e n i g r e a t d u r i n g t h e s e la s t y e a r s t h a t t h e y h a d o n a ll o c c a s i o n s c o m e to a n u n d e r s ta n d i n g u p o n a ll q u e s t i o n s j u s t a s th o u g h t h e y w e r e a l l ie s . On to in. h im G erm an b etw een S tr a its ; to fe w fa v o r a b le w a s g r e a tly th e th e is a fo r c e s, r e p e a te d ly G rey T e le g r a m he th e o n e h a n d a n d F r a n c e n ev e r th e le ss, he fr e q u e n tly ; p o in t s a tis fie d . [In d ic a tin g G rey on th e th is w ill th e fiv e w ith o c c u p ied sin ce w h ich e x tr e m e ly p u b lish ed th e he c o n fid e n c e p a rt, th is n eg o tia tio n s, F ra n ce. (8 5 3 . of fo r n e g o tia tio n s th e F ir s t in of u nd er m in ister . sam e. th a t E m peror. a llia n c e rem a rk ed in had d e m e n t i s — d e n ia ls — is .] w e ll w h ich our m y sh a red had very sen d on th e m se lv e s g o v e rn m e n ta l th e see of u se th e c o n v e n tio n c o n fid e n c e | p o l i c y ." r e p lie d m e to m ake naval S a zo n o ff. la s t m in ister an to 1 5 0 .) have th e c risie a ttitu d e At i s s i s s i p p i , to th a t th e b a r g a in c o u n te r N o. I th e O a u n tle tt, London 1914. to h er th e w h a tso e v e r . on th e c ir cu la tin g S t. C om m on s. and in R u ssia to to -d a y naval fr o m a c q u a in t G rey c o m m itte d th is M ay m e retu rn ed had in to a t once n ew sp a p ers th is, L e tte r, w o u ld sam e at 13, how evoT, S h o u ld to c o m e as and nt r e c e iv e d . sa le p o ssib le q u e stio n th is E n g la n d V o lk o ff o c c a sio n h ern o th er r e g r e tte d q u e stio n to w o u ld th is S a zo n o ff. he J. Id a h o dow n C h ile a n th a t as F red o ffic e d u r i n g th e any w ere th e th a t to to ld of 1137 fo r e ig n but a lleg ed w ith S t. n e g o tia 1 9 1 4 .) C a p ta in he On in d isc r e tio n s H e 11, to fa c t The w h ich me in knocked am b assad or N o. th e m u ch G rey p rep are th e se as (8 5 5 . w ith ask th e R u ssia , v a il d u r in g w ill in w ith yesterd a y w as q u e stio n in to q u ite of w ife he lie s n eed fle e t w ith agreem en t no R u s s ia n not o p in io n , London in s tr u c te d r e p lie d th e A d m i r a l t y of t e le g r a m c o n fer a u g m e n tin g s tru sts. is p r e p a r e d to b a ttle s h ip s C on gress R u s s ia n w as he C o n s ta n tin o p le . and th ro u g h S ta te s In at London 8 1 -J u n e G overn w as r o m o r n n la d iscu ss h is of in w as to w h ic h q u ite in R u ssia B e fo r e n e g o tia tio n s F llg h n e s s fle e t to exch ange The tro o p s a u th o r iz ed you . th e [T h e r e con cern ed. tra v el 2 9 -.T u n e I The q u e stio n (8 5 2 . of U n ite d been th e It is n e g o tia tin g , to tio n s . I w as a rm a m e n ts; d e la y [T u r k e y retu rn ed F r a n e o -B r ltls h m a tter. E n te n te is to th is la n d in g to w ith fu r th e r F ils th e he and h a ste, and w ere and in te n d s regard th e P etersb u rg . no B r itis h lo n g th e in q u a n tity p r in c e th e is e x p e d itin g w ith o u t of q u e s tio n w h ich G overn m en t us a d o p te d . th e her th e u p p e r h a n d to am b assad or E n g la n d , th e w ith be G reece su ch In c re a se n b lo b e in g m e n ts] : m rn t to (8 5 4 . p r o s p e c tiv e s h o u ld w ill k e e p a cu te sta n d in g has our T u rkey p ru d en ce W ir y be upon if n ego E n g la n d . req u est d e te r m in e coun t th e se our to o n ly w o u ld w ill m ig h t b o th . of o n ly a m ba ssa d or G rey we not our sh ip s E n g la n d w h e th e r If b e g in n in g b elie v e s th a t case, v e s s e l. th e se ll th e have m in ister th e to su p p o rt. th e to is s till req u est C h ile a n le a s t b efo re th is, la I of of sh ip It London a b le one S h o u ld nt to a w are th e p urchase As is le a st even it p o s s ib le to sa le . step . rem a rk ed , h e c o n sid e r e d re a ll su ch c o u ld g iv e re a ssu r in g dec w e fo r m . w ith th e se c o n n e c tio n h in ts ; w ith yet our it fu r •>v>oo p jn o i >Bq) is 'a o A O M o q e i d o u u u u i s u o j U| p u u q ju il d u o q i i l o j q u (M < u u o p ii.n l s^su n «q t s ju o u n m u u J jq p in o q a o bu jjju j A 'o q j n x ;| ■ y u o iO u x -oOju of th e r n eg o tia tio n s, w e h er In d ia n m ig h t prop ose as p o sse ss io n s to th e p osed p resen t naval sta te m e n t in th a t F r a n c is of th e a lle g e d w r itin g of w o u ld of th e th is have have p o stp o n e c io u sly to g iv e n th a t g iv e in is to h er a g u a ra n tee h er tea s cou ch ed tr o u b led on by Japan an th is and of in P e r sia n I have your to r e c e iv e d w h ic h sta te m e n t In d ia by a is fe w as b etw een as at a r is e s P e r s ia . fo r It S ir th e re th e hope It en d, to le tt e r of G eorge a June of June 1 2 -2 5 . th e h ow ever, a be con seq u en ce it fo llo w s as n o t, im p o r ta n t w ith h ow ever, c e r ta in do to a an to not w h ich w o u ld m ore d ir ec t m a n n er; The fe w I sh a ll tw een tio n p rove do a ll B r itish r e su lt Is in fo rm ed r e p ly to o ld fe a r s ns th e of th rea ten ed stre ss fu r th e r o p in io n th e as a ssu m ed th e fr o m th e to a I P rin c e but to tio n s w h ich been have how th e as to d e n ie d in som ew h at in d eed , to go on to tio n h is is new s a not 76876— P a ris, th e it still no to th e up and to I if is is tr u e to very seem 11 your th e and be and th e tim e G rey upon w e ll th e ask ed as w h e th e r w a r lik e a c q u ie s c e n a tu r a l As p resen t, th e a m oreover, in an th a t as a d v e r s e ly a llu d e th a t r e p ly in g c o u ld of In te re st he bad B e r lin very d u r in g th e a rea ssu red . to th e th e o ffic ia l th e M in is te r fo r F o r e ig n an th e yet th e in d isc r e h a v in g ever to in of w o u ld w o u ld a lso w h ic h a to ld by m e, th e pow ers B e lg r a d e In w h ic h B e r lin has A u s tr ia n th is he s h o u ld w o u ld co n sid e r a b le , to J u ly rep ort no fe w to It and be por am b assad or 3 -1 0 , you fu r th e r d ays. co n sid e r s th e a as he fo llo w no to n e e x -M in is te r oth er in hope S e r b ia P ic h o n fr o m w h ic h not in ten d had on an h er d id th a t not and p o in t, to th a t S er b ia . g a in e d step not lo st in te r v ie w a lso be w ord s, am bassad or A u str ia he th e to o th e r was b etw een at w as The In s tr u c tio n s th a t p ow er p resen t a c tio n if to d e sir e d con seq u en ces. w as or, w as th e m gen eral any d em an d s. had d id w ho su m m on s, n eg o tia tio n to d a y , of A u s tr ia ’s th is a r d e n tly in c a lcu la b le se c tio n , w h e th e r fo r F o r e ig n A ffa ir s to th e chargd w ith th e be d ’a ffa ir e s N o. 1 4 8 8 .) th e A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n St . ta k e d e m e n ti, B r itis h le tt e r , have A u s tr ia S e r b ia in to s ta tin g m ilita r y v ie w p ow ers G erm an y in terferen c e and ta k e and th e read a ttitu d e G erm an th e th e im rega rd ed u ltim a tu m . c o m m u n ic a tio n 1 9 1 4 .) pow ers th e to N e v e r th e les s, o u tb rea k of th e fo r th e her tim e a ffo r d ter. th em In th e th e c e r ta in th e term of tra ry speak to of a ll pow ers to th e u ltim a tu m e ffe c t ns in F r a n c e .) e ffe c t, w ill In stru c t ils London, R om e, and d e c la r e 1 1 /H I J u ly . w h ic h th a t to ' th e us a be in G o v e rn m e n t. d e p r iv e th e th e o th e r r e s u lts ought c o n c e r n in g of a th e pow ers de of th e a ls o to ta k e n and to has th e r e fu sa l step by to m a t ju s tific a t io n p o s itio n A th e a d o p te d w h ic h th e c o n v in c e d a ll in d is p e n s a b le grou n ded, Judgm ent to u n der a r is e n . fo r a c tio n pow ers are to have fa te fu l of to u ltim a tu m to by w o u ld convey ex te n d A u stro bo con cu sto m . (R u s s ia n hoD e its r e p r e s e n ta tiv e B e r lin , th e in to , G overnm en t A u s t r o -H u n g a r y , w o u ld S e r b ia n m ode appears b e in g w o u ld p e r io d th e it th e y regard s K u d a sc h e ff th is fr o m fo r m in g dem ands of c o m p lic a tio n s a c c u s a tio n s of th e h a n d in g S e r b ia . h er etersbu rg con sequ en ces, c o m m u n ic a te In te r n a tio n a l In str u c t to to to P sh ort G o v e rn m e n t, w h ic h a d v ic e a th e r e s u lt p o s s ib ility th e of a ll a s id e g r a n te d event o n ly th e I n c a lc u la b le c o u ld A u s tr ia n c o r r e sp o n d in g fo llo w in g se ttin g r e a d in e s s on by pow ers w h ic h in v e s tig a tio n th e day o b v ia te a lik e , m ade A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n c la r e d fo r th e a n y th in g o rd e r a c c r e d ite d to -d a y . d is q u ie tin g on le a v e s H u ngary th e th e h is A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y M in is te r The N o t n eg o tia tio n s. a of I n e v it a b ly th a t a m ba ssa d or th a t in te re s t m u st and n ecessary, A u str ia A u s tr ia ’s fr o m se ttle d th a t ap saw r e p r e s e n tin g a d e fia n t if to d a y , a V read y a r g u m e n ts th e o n ly In s ta tin g be a d o p te d p o litic a l a c tio n ju s tic e , A u s tr ia n and, have P e te rsb u rg ) in am b assad or g a th ered of to com m u am b assad or by as or w h ic h G erm an concern ed. u ltim a tu m by it, o ffic ia lly am b assad or s e t t le d tr e a tie s th e fo r th e w as A u s tr ia n v is it or th e c o n flic t, of th e th e sta te d pow ers th e u n c o n d itio n a l (T h e very becom e of th e th a t issu e by fo r th to B e lg r a d e Shvastopulo. one su r p r ise . a la r m tow a rd la s t H e be of slig h t in flu e n c e d has d e sir es re c e iv e d th e tex ts in Text can v isit, th a n e x is te n c e r6 le C o n fid e n tia l Is p r in t: e x c e p tio n d o c u m e n t s .) to m in is te r d ir e c tly w as th e at la t t e r ’s w as e x istin g be A u str ia n p r e ssio n as in su b o r d in a te th ese, fu r th e r w ith th a t th a t 1 8 4 .) p ressu re u n c o n d it io n a lly B e r th e lo t W e sam e. doubt R om an no S t. not in to it be d ir e c to r regard ed th e th e of in te rv ie w , evaded it of B e r th e lo t, a ffa ir p ress. c o n v e r s a tio n le a d e r V II. N o. L a ter exert en d to lo c a liza tio n th e of has m e r e ly (T h e tim e — a as yea r th e no o m is s io n s sam e F rn nce c o m p lia n c e to th a t th e g rou n d th e im p o r ta n t n o th in g d iffic u lt E n g lish be is w a r lik e p r e c e d in g to te le g r a p h ic and th e rea son s s e ttin g s h o u ld a ffa ir it w ish es o n ly on d u r in g th e th a t but in flu e n c e . little to it sa m e th e by handed d e ta ile d r e fu se d A t m a tte r out p riv a te p u b lic , a s s a s s in a tio n en ters fin d G erm an y, and th is th e E dw ard he th e y e s ie r d a y V ie n n a S ir w o u ld at th a t good me th a t fr o m d e sir e have w h ic h o r ig in a l G overnm en t of o b lig e d th is w a s, p a r tic u la r c o n v e n tio n . doubt e m p lo y e d . in n ew sp a p ers. S e r b ia th a t n e g o tia tio n s of I no th a t un V ie n n a . to F a ls ific a tio n s proved n o te F rench th e be carry th e q u ite be- in d ic a eyes G overn m en t th e la s t c o n v in c in g . see w a y, th e c lo se r . th e n eg o tia tio n s in m ore V o lk o ff. It I and but sa ys sta n d p o in t th e was th ere. B e r lin are H e peacem aker H is c o u ld who ty p e s (B ie n v e n u -M a r tin , F r e n c h p r o lo n g b e fo r e he as c o m m u n ic a tio n w o u ld th e th e m in is te r le a v e in is I depen ds p resen t ca u se th e d u r in g B ook th e d ’ a ffa ir e s a d d itio n in a th a t of th e th e con in d u r in g w h ich in to v isit m uch rem a rked P erh a ps p a rty, sam e but to ld fro m d id w ith to a c o n tr a r y , th is g la n c e C a p ta in F ren ch no tow a rd ow n e v id e n t have G rey fir s t to (R e s u ltin g th a t p la y The th is r e a lity up be a lla y e d tr u e e x e r c is e (8 5 8 . in n eg o tia tin g o b lig e d he be p r e s u m p t i v e .) is, I to w ith (T e l. c o m m itte d . Anglo g r e a t. be at in of m u st O ran ge p r in t: Book ch arge copy m easu res. P a r li a m e n t .) seem s very of in th e r e th em . P a r is , I t / t i J u ly . The Just fo r n ec e ssity th e p e n etra te lo n g er d iffe r e n t h im s e lf. has c o m m itte d know n of exact to no (T e l. have s till any of d a te is been c ir c u m sta n c e , d a te Ita lic th e h im in a dragged b r in g w h ic h n e g o tia tio n s it It (F ro m m in is te r a th e th e p r a c tic a l to L o u is assu m e, in on has J osef E X H IB IT d iffe r e n c e , In d ia as e x p e d ite th a t is th e R u s s ia n O ran ge to a g reem en ts, A d m ir a lty . b e g in n in g , th e w h ic h w ith s ta n d in g , of R u s s ia n p eared of e n te n te c le a r B a tte n b er g n o th in g c ir c u m s ta n c e , a F r a n cis F e r d in a n d , la n g u a g e c o m p a r iso n d o cu m e n ts. in e v e n ts fin d in g , G rey im p o r ta n c e m a tter The N a tu r a lly, upon lik e ly w ill of c lo se . w h ic h p re p a ra to ry h e ir very L o u is to as b e lie v e , th is our w ith h e s ita te s , I in to P rin c e T here sees m ake B r itish of p resen t is u n ea sy. th a n sin c e b e in g le s s even was p la in of o ffic ia l a fte r fea r th e th is th a n se c u rity had g re a te r a ttr ib u te d d is p o s e d been it s till he fix e d . G rey a our th e p ow er P a r is. th e Im p o rta n ce , is in of w h ic h G overn m en t upon If c o n cern in g One th e fo r e ig n w h ic h , by upon p o ssib ility m e r e ly th e a ctio n , very (E x p la n a tio n S h o u ld ex ists. rev iv a l la y p o litica l c o n fid e n c e h y p o th e s is , he to have m y e n te n te . P etersb u rg degree in and th e to in s tr u c t I m a im e r lie s G o v ern m en t; of a B r itish has tco u ld w h ic h V o lk o ff a greed q u e stio n been th is of u sed so r e str a in The in p u b lic fu ll go th e ex p ressio n in th a t th e p la n th is th is C a p ta in th a t th e g iv e c o n v e r s a tio n s days p r e clu d e m o d ific a tio n s m u la le ss F r a n c is to G erm an y is E m peror yea r m ore a b le The military advance on Germany while Germany was pre vented from mobilizing by diplomatic negotiations appears from the dispatches published in “ The Falsification of the Russian Orange Book.” (Exhibit V II.) s u p p le m e n te d of e n te n te be w ith ap pears th a t in th is w o u ld th e re fo r e me th a t A rchduke p a rty has se lv e s , docs n ec tio n th e G rey th is th e upon N ic o lso n be in d ic a te d . T h is of th a t id e a count th e be H is not L e tte r, B uchanan r e v iv a l is lo n g th ere E n g lish th e c o m p lic a tio n s now ta k e n in upon lo n g er w o u ld DOCUM ENTS. S a z o n o ff. G o v ern m en t, so en ten te th e c ir cu m sta n c e s. ba sed no d a n gerou s, A f f a i r s .) m u st, E n g la n d , deal th e can G eorge of m ig h t w e a ll of le tte r very w h ich der gra C zar as e le m e n ts th a t a m ba s T h is th e E n g la n d to w as In d ia fe a rs an to if of B r itish no to of by to p a ssio n s fe w n ic a te d and th e seem s fe a rs th e as have o n ly not tea s w ord s. have W e q u e stio n . O dbran a S ir G eorge. w ork very 1 9 1 4 .) by c o rre c t; se c u r ity com e and London 2, you a u d ie n c e th a t th e B r itish th a t exp resses c o n fid e n tia l to E n g la n d R u ssia w e ll e n te n te ever, in th e in te n tio n s, th is in th a t a d d itio n a l E n g la n d , our very g iv e n u n d o u b te d ly In a sm u ch e n te n te your w as th e K in g a g a in s t n a tio n a l q u e stio n . 1 9 -J u ly an sw er and R u ssia w hen M a je s ty to th e assu ran ce im p o rta n t m e n tio n fr o m becau se a fte r N arod n a H is sen se s p e c ia l term s, am b assad or and w ay a n tip a th y is It in A rch d uk e days som e S e r b ia n w ill in m u ch pro rounds th e th e G overnm en t th is le tte r of th e in te r e s tin g th e th ree needed th e I b etw een th e been a g reem en t, yesterd a y out c r i s i s .] in ra th er su m m er w as B r itis h c lo se , frien d ly R u ssia n never h im se lf r e la tio n s put he B a lk a n a u to g ra p h very th e he as co n clu d e m a k in g th a t S a z o n o ff th e To r e c eiv e d a ccoun t The of exp ress h im in th a t of secret ” of to [A p o ssib le . to had and next p resen ce. hand M a je s ty (8 5 7 . to w as A le x a n d e r th e co n clu sio n m y B uch an an su pp ort n ecessa ry cou rse te n d e n c ie s , T h ere P r in c e m e as n ‘pj)f.iuu4ju souo ujffoj uqj. ujus 29 as “ open th e E n g la n d , th e p le a se d sa d o r order In th e in A u s tr ia p rodu ced th e of le tt e r . C row n s h o u ld of to q u ic k ly th a t a n ti-S la v A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y he appears as lig h t t im e , F e r d in a n d h is it c o n fer e n ce E urop e at tim e vuojjq RECORD. 1902. A t » H f llJH Of J /Q f u s o u 83 E n g la n d e ffe ctiv e *d tq s OufUUfliJq X i u o o a u lYNLOISSUHOMOD C O N G R E S S IO N A L of fiiu o Jo xno th a t charge th e concurrence in V ie n n a B e lg r a d e , and d 'a f f a i r e s G overnm en t In to our v ie w s ta k e B u ch arest in to V ie n n a ) w h ic h and a c tio n you to are Im m e d ia te ly a c c o r d in g ly . in fo r m e d . S A z O N o r r, v i u v / k / n u A r t v i / 1 lI a ^ / iv J 30 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. (T h e charge d ’a ffa ir e s In F ran ce to th e M in is te r fo r F o r e ig n in A f f a i r s .) e ffe c t a b assad or (T e l. W ilh r e fe r e n c e The E ch o de th is step P a r is , Is no w ith saw bore th e p r e v io u s d isc u ssio n arrow to as an ta k e case. In fr o m th e to d a y . once The G erm an y in m a n ded w h ic h of w ith in S er b ia n a th e R ep u b lic e v en ts. p a r tie s, are som e B a ron of th a t th e p erio d . The fo r its fr o m P u b lic th e P r e sid e n t and ex c ited a ctio n , by E cho an th e th r e a te n s to even le t de do a M in is te r to th e am bassad or in by N o. I am te le g r a p h in g “ T o -d a y I had A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n ten dem ands th in g but a b s o lu te ly s h o u ld and 2 c o u ld S k u p s tc h in a fillm e n t even of c a ll and As not to fo r th th e of a d e q u a te “ in th e To exch ange d ra ft to not hand, d angerous of be me fin d c o n ta in e d a th e fu l to be A u str ia put an end of to end it in as s h o u ld me a as th e th e p o s s ib le very c e r ta in fo r an su p p o rte d to th e p resen t of th e fr ie n d ly m anner a p r iv a te fin d re (2 3 d ) a of fo r m u la A u s tr ia Speak of A u stro - m u tu a l 1 0 th to a ffo r d in g d em an d s. a it s ta te th e in to m a k in g to p ow ers, th a t en ter of a c c o r d in g o th e r p o s s ib le tim e London th e to n o te p rove sam e w h ic h , d e s ir a b le A u s tr ia n and and as p urp ose im p o r ta n t B e r lin peace, em pow ered th e p r o b a b ly c a u tio u s a ffa ir s . of s in c e r e ly me be in at m ost to fo r w o u ld and as soon seem ed a r tic le s it her te le g r a m fo r e ig n th e S e r b ia , r e g a r d in g d e s ir e d w ith w ay m a in te n a n c e s a tisfa c in th e sen se of w ith th e m in is te r in fo r m e d . charg6 d ’a ffa ir e s In F ran ce (T e l. to th e N o. M in is te r fo r T o -d a y fo r th e fo r e ig n a ffa ir s sta te m e n t: to r ia l is how has to d e s ir e w ords h a n d le th e to p reserve fo r proof and in fe e ls peace, a w ith and tru sts m o d e r a tin g th e S e r b ia had g iv e n of her th e n F ran ce, not ask ed c o u ld to th a t not ta k e th a t it. th e step s in fo u r in th e w h ic h , The w ill V ie n n a , to h im be in u se m in is te r in upon 1508. P etersb u rg and me w h e th e r and he if c o n sid e r s in th e in it c o n fe re n c e fin d in g I he N o. to t e le g r a m fr o m v iew of to th e d ip lo m a tic com es to and th e in w h o le o p in io n v ic to r y , but ex trem es en e r g e tic th ey a c tio n th e F o r e ig n d e p a rtm e n t d id not h im In a th e h is in very th e me c o n te n ts had not o p in io n fa v o r a b le of A ffa ir s to a to th e of th a t been of th e th e S e r b ia ’s G le sl sa tis fie d d ir e c to r of e ffe c t. am bassad or S e r b ia in F r a n c e .) to of th e set th e m easu res u rged and a in tw o N o. 203 w h ic h or of th e of J u ly a ll In be It fo r of I to earn est is no w ay of A u str ia ’s had a ffa ir s it and have N o. we as a cc e p ta b le G erm an y, crept a th a t F o r e ig n M in is te r to (T e l. have to an e x p e d itio n c le a r of d is p u te ) q u a r r e l. The Ita ly , w as fu rth e r by th e w ord th e th e N o. N o. a m od c o n s ta n tly th is J u ly 28 a lr e a d y sort fro m fr o m sh ow n d em a n d s. and Ita ly am b assad or B aron th e (in a g a in st c o u ld w ith G le s l. th e The b etw ee n S e r b ia , c o n s is t. we th e It P etersbu rg c a b in e t B ook , U /2 7 w h ic h th e our to g iv e not B e r lin , is e ffe c te d R u s s ia n and u n d ersta n d R om e, th e a ll th e w ord change do r e p ly exceed s (e x p r e s s e d ) V ie n n a th e O ra n g e “ w a r .” F r a n c e .) 1 5 2 4 .) r e a d in e s s U n le s s in J u ly . 1521. a c q u a in te d d iffe r e n c e dem ands s ta n tin o p le to and s a tis fa c tio n . m akes G erm an y, m y s e lf m o d e r a tio n te x t fo r th e te le g r a m handed The G erm an y m y m ade G overnm en t its M a r tin ) of A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y , St. R e fe r r in g fu lle s t th e S azonoff . (T h e by fo r in to sta n d p o in t have th e (S a z a u o ff a llie s In flu e n c e a d o p te d a lte r , w ith n ecessa ry of to w as c a lc u la t e d advance 201 1592 I ex erc isin g h is Is w as r e p ly (B ic n v e n u of in m o d e r a tin g we in p roposal q u e stio n te le g r a m N o. no n o te . n ev e r th e le ss, he w h ic h n e g o tia tio n s w h ich as a th e w ith w h ic h te le g r a m of re a lr e a d y n e g o tia te and th e a had r e c e iv e d E n g lis h r e fe c t m easu res, to fr o m d ir e c t a sh e in fo r m e d . I a th e w ith regard ed ev en ts, had fo r e ig n e x e r c is e E n g la n d , read y seen w a s, w e as to d is c u s s A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y , o th e r th ere 2 9 ), In itia tiv e n e g o tia tio n s r e d r a ftin g su p p ressed can to am bassad ors of our r e s u lt. s h o u ld we to If If N o. ask ed Ita ly m ay w h ic h w as cou rse any m in ister th e and (V ie n n a m isu n d ersta n d in g so rts fa v o ra b le is P etersb u rg , C om p are o u tse t no a m ba ssa d or. G erm an y V ie n n a . th e to but c o m b in e d th is my u ltim a tu m s u p p r e sse d ), s e ttle m e n t s u b s titu te w ith th a t a a sid e in flu e n c e th e a d v ic e , la k e p ow ers fa v o r a b ly fu rth e r w as s h o u ld a lth o u g h r e a d in e s s th e accept le a d G erm an e r a tin g In p e a c e fu l d u ly of J u ly . m in e am b assad or G erm an y, fo u r H /2 7 and s itu a tio n . th a t, T h is w h ic h to th e in a d m is s ib le , It. r e g a r d in g c a b in e t to r e p ly a th a t 187 E n g lis h F ran ce, p resen t h e lp th e N o. E n g la n d of begun G e r m a n y ’s ready e ffe c t V ie n n a th e had as P e te rsb u rg , th e re fo r e m e of r e c o g n iz a b le to th a t ord er am b assad or R u s s ia n p rop osa l to in out th e te le g r a m G o v e rn m e n t, is a g r e e a b le r e g a r d in g p la in ly m y h is r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s w ay to P e te rsb u rg fr o m by London w ith handed so S e v a s to p u lo u ’ s am bassad or d r a ftin g R u s s ia it J u ly. th a t a sto n is h m e n t B e lg r a d e ) m u st, have , 1 3 /1 3 a r is in fo rm e d of conceal m in is te r M i n i s t e r .) 1 8 9 .) in fo r m e d F o r e ig n to th e In r e p lie d A u s tr ia n of in flu e n c e as P a r is In te r v e n tio n in c lin e s em p h a tic F ran ce p o litic a l as fo r R u s s ia su m m on c o n c ilia to r y . V ie n n a , and b r illia n t a lth o u g h c o m p la is a n c e In stru c te d p la c e d E n g la n d , a to her St . P etersburg, a fte r A u s t r o -S e r b ia n H e n o te th a t In u s e fu l. th e r e fe r e n c e e s p e c ia lly as J u ly . d e c la r e d dem arch es secu re la R u s s ia observed im p o s s ib le , it. s o le id e a th e her to to g e th e r , a fte r ca se, d e p a rtm e n t, M in is te r te r r i ( fa ir e h ow ever, F ran ce F ran ce p ow ers, no H er ord er 1 3 /2 3 fo llo w in g S e r b ia . it d e p e n d s d e s ir e to of th e of S e r b ia ’s The m in is te r seek s A f f a i r s .) ( T e l. N o . 1 5 2 1 .) J u ly . A u s t r o -G e r m a n w ith sam e seem ed in te r fe r e w h e th e r one s e n s e .” do th a t but o f th is h e r s e lf a t h im sh e m a in ta in th e S e r b ia , m ig h t r e p lie d a p tly con sequ en ce p art d e te r m in e d m in is te r In h er am bassad or w as c o n flic t to , 1 3 /2 6 F o r e ig n d e p a rtm e n t, A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y , u ltim a tu m , p o litic a l P a r is A f f a i r s .) s u b s titu te to th a t in te g r ity and reveal th e m ade R u s s ia th e peace ita lic v is ite d a r is fo r G erm an [c o m p a r e and fa cts d ’a ffa ir e s th e to o u r se lv e s and to th re a te n ow n in G erm an y P etersb u rg d e c la r e d not her [T h e G erm an y th e has does secu re w ar. a g a in (B ie n v e n u -M a r tin ) n e v e r a c c e p t e d .] o b v ia te In and to p o l i c e .) am bassad or “ A u str ia g a in s o b je c t G erm an F o r e ig n 1 8 7 .) P th e e ffe c t 1 8 8 .) p o litic a l Fran ce th e A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n in “ Saxanoff.” (T h e M in is te r s u c c e s s iv e any B e r lin ch arge a ttr ib u ta b le th e fr o m and th e s tr iv in g in r e p ly and h ou se b a sis c o u ld th e in te n tio n . s u b je c t to of royal A u s t r i a 's th a t, p o in ts r e s u lt s th e war d ir e c to r W ith S e r b ia n o th e r d iffic u lt th e y th e th e m em bers to be of ap proval th e N o. 2 6 th ] and are am bassad or, th e m G overn e x a m p le , th e s c a r c e ly appeared S e r b ia n a lte r a tio n in th e F r a n c e .] any of w h ic h on a g a in s t a c c u s a tio n s of v ie w s th is a c c e p t a b le th is it th e For e x tr e m e ly c o u ld w o u ld am b assad or som e In t io n th e th is of of J u ly . a tte m p ts it an to o b ta in e d ; have th e som e p r o o f. e s s e n tia l H u n g a r ia n fo r if be m ig h t p o in ts , w ord s, te n s io n . 5 w ith o u t th e fr o m if expressed to at B ook S eyastopulo . th e th a t, a p art th e m . a ll G erm an y s h r in k (T h e w ith h im even accept of J u ly A u s tr ia n th e 13/16 July. up, O ru nge 2 6 th , P The (th e w ith draw n to (T e l. w a r. e x a m in e d w ere a s s e m b ly , w h ic h d e ta ils , in te re s ts S za p a ry ’s w as and th ey ns J u ly of stro n g ly c o n v e r s a tio n bad rem arked to out and s c a r c e ly I fu lfillm e n t , c a r r ie d P a s h itc h , o th e r I w h ic h of p ress 4 A fte r r e a d in e s s te r r o r is t u n d e r s ta n d in g by be th e p o in ts a lte r a tio n s its fr ie n d ly th e p resen t S bvastopulo . fo llo w s : very S e r b ia , In im p o s s ib le c o u ld a g a in s t to fo r m d e c la r e r e g a r d in g as nnd am bassad or. a d d ressed w ere 1 V ie n n a lo n g d ex tero u s m ent la w s to a of p ow ers E n g la n d fo r e ig n gen eral , m in ister th e not 187. th e in tim id a te T a k in g (T h e F r a n c e .) etersbu rg v ie w of as a 1 5 0 8 .) St . P 188 in am F in a lly , was o m itte d in tim id a te N o. d ir e c to r to d e sir e not T e l. o p in io n 187, of not w ith (T e l. N o. th e se w ill Sbvasto pulo . (F o r e ig n N o. F ran ce r e g a rd in g J a u rfs w as The p o in t. th e d istin c tio n lo o s e in te n d e d a ttitu d e th a t of th e In m y th e P e te rsb u rg . th a t of person al P a r is , of ca u sed d e fin ite ly w ith o u t ev en ts; w ere A u str o - P r e sid e n t p r e v e n ts o p in io n p ress, sta te s h ts th e is th e r a r is th e to p roposal B e r th e lo t B c r t h e l o t 'a P a r is , se e k in g d ’a ffa ir e s B e r th e lo t, In any not a n sw er of G erm an A u s tr ia . th is P aris , her in ch arge C o n tin u a tio n m in istry has fu rth er weakened (T e l. a c o m m u n ic a tio n de of (V iv ia n i) its th e se w h ic h th a t th e sen ten c e fr o m and on of by war n o te R u s s ia in s tr u c tio n s Revastopulo. n ecessa ry fo r e ig n lo c a liza tio n a bsen ce e x p r e ssin g o p in io n e x tr e m e ly of The g u id e d it accept have w as of U n fo r tu n a te ly , [T h is w o u ld G erm an y (T h e It, S c h tin s s t a t e m e n t ann ou ncem en t th e He any fo r A u str ia n m ea ns o b je c t rev ela tio n s to d a y. M in ister A u s tr ia ’s p u b lish in g sen se had th e seek is th e o n ly not th a t th e m . ex p ressed be to a b sen t. t e le g r a m b etw ee n la c k w ords w ith o u t deem ed It qu arrel h is th is approved he o n ly has rea ssu red does H avas but as a to d e c id e d was fo llo w in g ot of c o n v e r sa tio n . becau se th e at h is to G erm an y c o u ld ex ten t th a t S e r b ia If, S ch bn G erm an y A gen ce to are by c h a ra c te r a ttr ib u te d th a t out g iv e n th e B a ron fo rm , concern ed in s is te d n a tu r a lly in m om en t p resen t to but y e ste rd a y th r e a te n in g n o te G erm an y th a t m in is te r p r e sid e n t exact m u ch and p o in te d The of th e con dem n s is B ou rse and fo r B e r lin , th a t th e h er th a t th e o n ly c o n flic t. of o ffic e has th e ir c h a ra c te r and u ltim a tu m , step w h ic h w ith E m ba ssy it an G erm an p a n ic step in d ic a tio n am b assad or In m o r n in g f ly ," th e J u ly . th is not handed le t 1 2 /2 3 184. am b assad or, th is fa c t con seq u en ce ch a ra cter th e w as a lly . an It v ie w , Paris, G erm an In The had of of th is n e w being as lh e th r e a te n in g A u s tr ia p o in t N o. c o m m e n ts, B e r th e lo t th a t 1 8 6 .) p erh aps e m p h a s iz e d . m eans “ th e by a lt h o u g h declared A u str ia ’s te le g r a m m ade to d u y , in d is c r e tio n , d u ty my d e c la r a t io n s rep rod u ced by to N o. case a p p e a le d S e r b ia n e x p e c ta tio n s A u s tr ia se e k in g fo r a th e pre “ e x p e d it io n ’ ’ is re by th e of V ie n n a , th is one A u s tr ia n w hat w ord v ie w A u s tr ia ’s London, C on in fo r m e d . Bazonofp . 7 6 8 7 6 — 11 X X m 't t l >1 )U|Od m q» eqx mu ««0 KUOHDIVUHU, JO P " 8 8l*«»H (T h e ch arge d 'a f f a i r e s in th e O ran ge B ook th e re: “ T h e d e ta il t o -d a y am b assad or of th e G erm an w ith th e s tr o n g ly m e d ia tio n or w h o le of of a R e fe r r in g 7 A t to m y o ’c lo c k secon d and fin d th e F o r e ig n c o u ld h is tio n a ow n. th e is th e fa ls ifie d , situ a tio n p o lit ic a l e x c lu d in g sh o u ld been done id e a th e th is sort in s is te d to he as of a greed . reads in V ie n n a o b je c t to w ith th e d e ta il r u lin g th e a ll H e d id G overn m en t w ish th a t n eg o tia tio n s th a t or sh ort sh o u ld m a in te n a n c e of m ake it w h e th e r it and fu lle st la c k of no in in w ay P a r is and th is to th e F o r e ig n am bassad or N o. th e by The of F ren ch fillin g as a m ba ssa d or th e p ost of in S w itz e r la n d R u ssia n in s is ts upon a t t a c h <5 i n m ilita ry th e d esir a b ility S w itz e r la n d as soon Sevastopu am b assad or in F ran ce (T e l. to N o. th e F o r e ig n te le g r a m G o v e r n m e n t ’s th is n ew s w as 20 F o r e ig n te rd a y w ith 6 h ours order H ere te le g r a m you on th e w ay. to V ie n n a m a in ta in th e re is no to doubt The in F ran ce (T e l. a. m. S e r b ia n b e a r in g an te le g r a m th e day w as of th e b e fo r e yes o n ly in te n tio n a l to N o. th e F o r e ig n ju st retu rn ed I have d e la y (T h e am b assad or in over F ran ce to th e th e (T e l. N o. 1 9 4 .) of C h r istia n ia th e R ep u b lic has g iv e n and r etu rn s h ere on am b assad or in (T e l. to N o. conduct F o r e ig n a c tin g out m in is te r (T h e becau se They c o n fir m e d fo r is R u s s ia one in up h is of o m is s io n d e p r iv e s p reserve o b v ia te F ran ce. th e The was u n d o u b te d ly o b je c t in r e s p o n s ib ility done a ll sh e upon R u s s ia th e A u str ia n tfli G erm an G o v e r n m e n t, w ay to th e to to th e sta te m e n t m in is te r is o la t e our to a lly , m a in ta in Fran ce. T o -d a y of th e a m ba ssa d or v isite d m ade p rop osa l 11 a n ew R u ssia p rop osa l and to at step A bel fo r and to s a id tlin t it end of c r o s s in g F o r e ig n pre tak en of w a r .” as a r e p ly g iv e query m ig h t th e d e c la r a tio n o l s k i. A f f a i r s .) , 7 4 /2 7 J u l y . a r is as he be to a th e w hat not case In c o n s id e r e d A u s tr iu h er had h ere w as T u esd ay, to th a t w o u ld n ecessary th e se been e ith e r step s p r e c is e ly of an u lti a c r o ssin g of th e S er b ia n fr o n tie r . t e le g r a m is as “ But th e of rep rese n ted re p ly a S e r b ia n fo llo w s : fr o n tie r , T h e r e fo r e p a r tic u la r ly o f an m eans it u ltim a tu m , s u b s e q u e n tly severe Ferry and, of in A bel of F erry th e very to th e M in is te r N o. fo r th e of F o r e ig n la s t e x e r tin g su pp ressed proof th a t o l s k i. A f f a i r s .) 1 9 7 .) in th e O ran ge G e r m a n y ’s a r is B ook a ttitu d e , 7 4 /2 7 J u ly . b ecau se w as not (F r e n c h to h is in a ffa ir s) G erm an w o u ld as m o b iliz a tio n fo r e ig n r e su lt a m ba ssa d or q u e stio n to by r e p lie d B e r lin ) it con u n c o n d i th a t a w o u ld ( G erm an se c r e ta r y Jagow th a t by fr o m G erm an y m o b iliz a tio n but r e p ly te le g r a p h s a ttitu d e R u ssia , m o b iliz a tio n , im m e d ia te ly in w hat of if R u ssia a tta c k in g th a t B er lin adopt k in d a tta c k e d of w o u ld A u str ia , R u ssia . am t e le g r a p h in g m y to to th e N o. am b assad or th e O ran ge added] c o u ld regard s T h is I am th e in g b e in g p la c e d ta k e n w h ic h th e n stre n g th en and th a t t u d e .” a at be very th e by T h is is and w as in to u n y ie ld in g and is to say, s y m p to m a tic th e its th e a p a rty to G erm an y of B e r lin e n tire The im been th e c a b in e t, c r is is , a p p e a r s am b assad or h ere m ore th e me e x tr e m e ly any n ecessary th e key to th e c o n n e c tio n B e r lin , p r iv a te th a t key sy m p a th y crea te th e a ttitu d e w as w ith th e Is step s th e th a t to in in in B e r lin . of recom m en d ed sen ten ce, c o n s ta n tly is in B e r lin , ir r e c o n c ila b le th e th e in s te a d fir st s itu a tio n A u s tr ia ’s fo u n d is corresp on d F o u r ta l6 s th e im p r e s s io n be exert w ord s, in to w ith to pow er situ a tio n put t a lk s th e to th e se w ith are d is q u ie tin g , a n d o th e r step s rearran gem en t in in to th a n tru e a tti cause fo r B e r li n .] Sazo n o ff. (T h e M in is te r fo r F o r e ig n A ffa ir s (T e l. N o. to th e am t e le g r a p h in g W ith regard w ith to a by tio n s N o. 196, le s s . of h is A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y F ran ce and th a t fo r e ig n am bassad or in F r a n c e .) 1 5 3 8 .) S t . P e t e r s b u r g , 1 5 /2 8 I have ta k in g nam e r e p lie d th e have th a t The a lly . g a in s ig n ific a n c e m o n a r c h y .] upon I m ore ” becom e p r e v io u sly [T h a t appears doubt “ M y , 1 5 /2 8 J u l y . u n s a tis fa c to r y . B e r lin im p r e s s io n am b assad or d e v e lo p m e n t o f c le v e r end read s : m y as E n g la n d G erm an y A u s tr ia ’s in W ith o u t of th e etersbu rg “ m ore has th e to E n g la n d u n d erta k e m eans to G e rm a n y ’s th a t G erm an w ords a ttitu d e . in flu e n c e r e p ly of in flu e n c e . [B y to to of S e r b ia n th e G erm an y as F r a n c e .) fo llo w s : th e danger a rrested o p in io n p o s itio n a sort a ttitu d e of as have no th a t o p in io n m u rder e x e r c is e w ith B ook u n y ie ld in g A u str ia ’s as in 1 5 2 8 .) d iv e r t w o u ld th e of to London P etersb u rg , teleg ra m th e w h ic h to c o n v e r s a tio n s [in S e r a je v o to r e s p o n s ib ility a c tin g M in is te r G erm an y w ar to F o r e ig n persu aded Fran ce, in at G erm an y of and th is m y w ith in flu e n c e of w as “ in te r v e n tio n k n o w le d g e re sts s o le Sch on part p r io r sen se, a b s o lu te ly B aron event seek s H er s h o u ld R u s s ia in S e r b ia . general b e in g th e L e ft sh e p o in t .) a ffa ir s in F ran ce St . P G erm an of th e re fo r e p la c e o ’c lo c k , in w as p a r tia l fo r sh ared t e le g r a m s . th a t ap pearan ce, d e scr ib e d th e S e r b ia a A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y ’s A bel y e ste rd a y s o lid a r ity on th e n il A u s tr ia ,” th e in th e of peace, th e to 2 6tep s w a r li k e .] From t e le g r a m .) h is r e p r e s e n ta tio n s and peace by th e c o n n e c tio n to th is in a ll It b etw ee n w ho, th e a t o -m o r r o w , w a r, or o f (T e l. th e o ffic e . in te g r ity of fo r e ig n m ake of ta k e n Fran ce, a c tio n d is u n io n G erm an y, a m ba ssa d or th is fo r a b o v e -m e n tio n e d w h ic h th e I zv o l s k i. J u ly . and a lte r th e , 7 4 /2 7 fo r e ig n R u s s ia (2 ) as th a t is C am bon p r e s s io n B e r th e lo t th e not and th is r e p e lla n t Iz v G erm an y o l s k i. of sta te m e n t d is tu r b In te le g r a m th e am b assad or S e r b ia ’s m in is te r ’s but of th a t com pel th e J u ly . w ith h a lf assu ra n ces to s e n s e .” fr o m and not fo r A u s tr ia n C open ha gen d is c u s s io n in fo rm e d does of u n p le a s a n t in not em ba ssy. z v o l s k i. a step s tr a n q u illity . p ro m o te to w ord a r is S e v a s to p u lo h is G erm an y G overnm en t c o u ld b e ttc c c n b r in g 7687«— th e F rench th e G erm an y ow n a c tin g of and th is d e s ir e u n d e r lin e d th is s titu te d sta te M i n i s t e r .) F rench th re a te n A u s tr ia n (3 ) m o d e r a tin g th a t th e her w ar. arden t a of th e th e has ex th is F ran ce, P I had th e c o n fir m e d not I by B ook case s u b s e q u e n tly secon d of you A u s tr ia and w o u ld S chon to to a ppearan ce 1 9 6 .) th e am b assad or p o in t, t e le g r a m J u le s J u ly . , 7 4 /2 7 a r is v isit F o r e ig n p resen ce in th e d e ta ils does p a r tic u la r ly in d u c e th e c o m m u n ic a te d and to in m e in of “ (1 ) th e R u s s ia th e 1 9 5 .) sta te g a in s th e to of to th e th a t (T h e th e P a r is a ffa ir s fo llo w s : a p p a r e n t ly o b je c t to s u p p r e s s io n B aron te r rito r ia l [A lth o u g h it and m o r n in g as retu rn fo r e ig n to r th e w r itin g , no m y u n d ersecreta ry of am b assad or T h is a fte r of and M i n i s t e r .) P Im m e d ia te ly r e p ly am b assad or [T h is W ed n esd a y. F ran ce of proved a tte n d in g M in is te r N o. (T e l. th a t Izv (T h e F erry. (T h e o l s k i. , 7 4 /2 7 a r is P P resid en t a and to a d e c la r a tio n of to w a rd I and on 1 9 3 .) ta k en th e m in is te r V ie n n a , o f, O ran ge be even d e liv e r e d M i n i s t e r .) P The th e tio n a lly am b assad or h a lf of a W ed a ssista n t m th e Izv (T h e on e v e n tu a lity lin e s . H a v in g [In or B e lg r a d e p r e s s in g 11 to know fr o m s ta n d p o in t as in fo r m e d m a tu m , o f , 7 4 /2 7 J u l y . a r is not yet me at our on u n d e r sta n d in g h is slig h te st it a ttitu d e r e c eiv e P a r is p r e s s u r e .] d id sen t sen t to . lo 1 9 2 .) sh ow s th a t The M in is te r th e o ’c lo c k . A u s tr ia n 1508 r e p ly . F rench at N o. to G o v e rn m e n t, step s ” In c o n s is t m ig h t M i n i s t e r .) F Your F ran ce fo r e ig n In “ e n e r g e tic w o u ld p o ssib le. (T h e in h is a c tin g u n s a tis fa c to r y , 1 4 /2 7 J u l y . a r is secon d su ccess q u ite it, and d e te r m in a tio n th e P ta k e M i n i s t e r .) 1 9 1 .) P of le a v e not w o u ld to and th e ir becau se m is tr u s tfu l p o s s ib ility (T e l. g u a r a n tie s . (T e l. B ook he has Sevastopulo. F ran ce in d id m istr u ste d correct a v o id to p e r so n a lly Iz v (T h e fo rm e d in th e th e [T h e u s. he he th a t p o in t G e r m a n y .] In str u c te d c h n r g d d 'a f f a i r e s ?SJBqa aq j.) S ch on th a t th a t m in ister to th e r etu rn ed at w ere and O ran ge me he a ctin g to B a ron m o r n in g th ey b etw een ju s tifie d advance to ld w h en th e m ore th a t S c h o n ’s ; th e su pp ort th e be to su r p r ise d by tra n q u il u n ity in in was p u b lish e d and in fo r m e d . (T h e fir m and c lu d e d I th e ir in B a ron h im m a n ife ste d su pp ressed and m in ister us to any rest, w o u ld m in iste r of te ll fo r e ig n th e w as to d a y. Ix in d o n how step to it fo r e ig n n ew th e For see c o m m u n ic a be peace, of perhaps h ow ever, a try p ow ers, fo u r a ctin g situ a tio n of th e to p o ssib ility v iew n o t, fo r th a t th is fr o m ten d observed th e in te n d e d r e p ly 5 o ’ c lo c k . B e r th e lo t out th e at m in istry w ith h is th e th e p la c e to The m e r e ly The p o s s ib ility , 7 4 /2 7 J u l y . a r is to o k exp ressed exp ressed its cam e upon but o n ly u n d e r sta n d a n d in d e p a rtm e n t. any teleg ra m situ a tio n o r ig in a te d and n esda y. F r a n c o -G e r m a n have and anew to in th e H e F in a lly r e g a rd in g w h ich to a d v ic e th is istcr, 187. c o n fer e n c e , g iv e w h e th e r w as o u t. of M i n i s t e r .) in te r v e n tio n te le g r a m a m ba ssa d or d iscu sse d w ay or E n g la n d G erm an and a m e d ia tio n c le u r th e tim e N o. r e fe r r e d sojjbjjb.P 31 c o n f e r e n c e .") T e l. c o n v e r s a tio n Ja»H|»IK ^*U» °1 a0UUJJl U| joj C O N G R E S S IO N A L R E C O R D . to of upon u^ iojoj oe P The (•8J|«J»V x i u o o 'a u ' i v K O i s s a H O N O O d isc u sse d d ir e c to r in s is te d J K lM iSbuq 1 9 0 .) th is am b assad or p*pK JU U » (oJJBnb v jo o»vo u )09jja u( F ran ce (T e l. N o . (In T1>UI » | q « » » W is th e (T h e h ere an to d e c la r a tio n B ook and tie s had th e t e le g r a m th e n resp ect to w ar a g a in s t S e r b ia , ta k e n fro m d o u b le p la c e am bassad or read s: S e r b ia , it is in te n tio n a l he of w ith A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n O ran ge m in - London fa ls ific a tio n . N o. a ls o 1544 th e of my J u ly . N o. 1521. d ir e c t n e g o tia a p p a r e n t ly p u rp ose of h o s tilit ie s b etw ee n th a t On t e le g r a m are v ie w n ecessary [c o m p a re P etersb u rg “ In m y E n g l a n d ,” th e fir s t J u ly one T h ere no h o s tili hand it a lic iz e d 2 9 ], etc. and sen ten c e on th e in o th e r CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD 32 hand th e It la th e re fo r e of d ir e c t Id e a sa ry th a t E n g la n d sp eed , a n d pended to th a t to “ and any p o stp o n e p u rp ose e q u ilib r iu m m o st o f th e (T h e to th e fo r th e In c a p a b le F o r e ig n as w h ic h , In to N o. th e In am In t e l a /r a p h i n g con sequ en ce S er b ia , K ie ff, ic e sh a ll M oscow , su pp ressed In th e and m easu res and R u s s ia n th a t th re a te n e d by G overn m en t th e re fo r e A u s t r i a .) V ie n n a , b ecause In our and It by b r in g in g W llh th e of B e r lin . v ie w fa r m ore In no no so J u ly . to th e in th e O d essa , t e le g r a m th a t is of th e w as th e O erm a n a g a in st b ein g rec a lled . (T h e F o r e ig n M in is te r to (T e l. th e N o. am b assad or in F r a n c e .) can c o m m u n ic a te G overn m en t London, to w h ich V ie n n a , th e you and c o n te n ts are of te leg ra m , to In fo r m in g n e ith e r ste p s in F ran ce (T e l. to N o. (h e F o r e ig n o f part h im Your th a t, th e te leg ra m , as r e su lts a c tin g a d m it Fren ch th e rem arks so rts in th e o n ly but A u str ia th e e x e r tin g w ith G erm an a B a ron b e fo r e are of and a ll th e not 27, th a t th a t in an w h ic h a 20, any A s m u st a not if d e c lin e d to p roposal we to w ere A t not m eans n e g o tia tio n s and as th e fa c e dur of th e c r is is of e x is tin g w ith pow ers to th e in London, a ccept am b assad or in P a r is to th e F o r e ig n e n tir e ly fo r m in g W ith a to th e p ressu re J u ly J u ly su p p ressed a Judgm ent regard stro n g of 27, 28, to fr o m fro m te le g r a m c o n c e r n in g of tea s d e c la r e d d ir e c t In o f th e V ie n n a , of th e com pare P etersb u rg , and n o te th e a ttitu d e e x e r tio n to d u r in g by to o th e r The b est to th e su p p ressed it a g a in n o te th ere if a not beg th e a you is th e te le g r a m V ie n n a te n s io n sh ow ed is N o. in to th e 1528 to sim ila r G er it to a to R om e, M in is te r c o m m u n ic a te to w h ich m essa ge to th e chan ge of t o -d a y and h im d e c la r e d an be th e a r d e n tly d e sir ed In r e p ly to a p r o je c t B a ron th is th e fo r of r e p lie d th a t o b je c t ea sy th e a B a ron th a t tr ia . In in g to a ctio n , ten ts of be a tta in e d in G erm an y was u n ju s tly he sa id , th a t sh e 11 was not o th er to fin d he W ith regard A t c r is is . of N o. to o 1521, 198, not in th e Is had n o te. or of had to good a tr u e th a t been The a to th e N o. th e th ro w th e id e n tify c o n feren ce. to th e th a t “ V ie n n a , w ith th a t w h o le c a lle d 28) u sed in s tr u c tio n s of to on of exert in s tig a tin g G erm an y in a pproves advance G overn m en t w ith fo r m in ister sa m e be s h o u ld very a ffo r d im p a s s e . p o in t, on th e of of c o u ld th a t / [T h e N isc h . h e r s e lf, as it s u b s ta n tia l but A u s w as to th e 1 6 /2 9 , th a t th e N o. N o. am te leg ra p h in g a lso d id not ten d su ch step , a her d e n tly v e rs a tio n con in te r - to in th a t h om e, peace of of h er and r e la tio n s h arsh so a so and by ju stify . even th e I if it a b lo w and in th a t o th er it S e r b i a 's n ew s th is have ord er in th e of tex t in r e p ly proved M o n te n e g r o ’s th e en h an ce ord er its at th a t of th e u s, but d e c id e d its very p resen t n o te . not th e The w as so u n d e r ta k e in s in c e r ity w as e v i m o b iliz a tio n and h is o p i n i o n , t h e r e fr o m th is con h a s a t p r e s e n t d ecid ed in flu e n c e in G e r m a n y ’s su pp ort to th e lo c a lize w ith th e arm ed and m in ister im p r e ssio n G overn m en t to c o u n try co u ld fo r e ig n o ffe r an not of th e m e a s u r e , w h i c h , in upon o n ly de w ith r e p lie d o p in io n s d e sir ed , The g a in e d to co u n ts p ow ers so fu tu re . th e at of w o u ld fr o m S e r b ia , c o u ld o p in io n I A u s tr ia c o n n e c tio n had com m on arch y situ a tio n of fu ll a fo r m in is te r th e w h ic h a g a in s t p u b lic beca u se r e g a r d in g fo r e ig n m anner g iv e n n o te . and th e r e s u lt exch ange d is c u s s io n a cu te of I fo llo w s : r e g a r d in g d e s ir a b le th is of be A u s tr ia n w o u ld The as fr ie n d ly R u s s ia in is can you th e w ith G o v e rn m e n t, m easu res in to m ore w h ic h fre e J u ly . am b assad or 105 very w as r e la tio n s a tte n tio n a a w ith in s e r io u s n e s s fr o m , azonoff 1 6 /2 9 , G erm an N o. la q u e s tio n S e r b ia . th e th e v ie w s fu tu re E u rope of of th e A u s tr o -H u n g a r ia n th e m ove F r a n c e .) am b assad or a r tic le s B e r c h to ld ’ s d istu r b e d to w ith sp ok en th e th e h is a s t o n is h m e n t n o th in g at fo r G o v er n m e n t, th e d ea l S er b ia and of th e th e of im p r o v e e n te r g r e a tly A ccord th e ta k e p r o m is e s exp ressed of d e r iv e d becom e th a t th is to 1544. [te le g r a m ju s t exchange som e A u s tr ia be 105 have s o lu tio n peace and had was A u s t r i a ’s to ex c ite d of I c o n s c io u s to of to 1 5 4 8 .) N o. N o. A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n w ay c risis a d ir e c te d u n w illin g ly g iv e of w o u ld th e J u ly . 1544 te leg ra m am b assad or A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n g u a r a n tie s a d v a n ta g e s F ren ch not . azon off F r a n c e .) c o m m u n ic a tio n c e r t a in ly c o n v e r s a tio n p r iv a te su ch fu lly th e A u str ia . r e d r a ftin g c la r e d b etw ee n p ressu re of a c o n flic t fo r m J u ly . e ffe c t he p eace. fo r w a r d th e in C o n sta n tin o p le in m y a c c r e d ite d . and t e le g r a m la s t The I h e r se lf th is c o m p la in e d in fo r m e d G erm an fr o m to m y t e le g r a m 1 5 /2 8 to w o u ld th e ir 1 5 4 7 .) G overnm en t M in is te r in y B e r c h t o ld . danger The A u str ia e x it of S e r b ia . a cc ep ted , fo r m it pro w ith tim e to r e c e iv e d w h ic h of a lr ea d y and “ th e th e J u ly am b assad or c o n te n ts are London F o r e ig n G erm an y put u n a cc e p ta b le and p o sitio n G erm an y had th e in s is t a m ba ssa d or not m a in te n a n c e rea dy of th a t had or ta lk step s th e c o n c ilia to r y no a v o id in g a dded w ill fo r c o u r s e .] r e fe r e n c e not b lu e d J u ly . m in ister to H e o b je c tio n to a of w ish e d E n g la n d ta k e 1 5 /2 8 fo r e ig n c o m m u n ic a tio n Ita ly m ea n s, had a ccu sed it fo r th a t and ra ised by th a t but 78878— d id a r b itr a tio n c o n n e c tio n A u str ia n F ra n ce G overn m en t what th e it a ctin g no m ea n s F ra n ce o n ly w h ic h r e p lie d th is p r e s s , w h ic h of A u str ia had r e c a lle d . G erm an y th a t G erm an S ch on kn ew th a t th e n ev erth eless o b se r v a tio n w h ic h if tim e th e w ith tr ib u n a l th e p ow ers and w ork r e p lie d cou hl fo r to p r o v id e d A u str ia he b e in g m in is t e r 's he m ake, of m e d ia tio n S ch on a ctio n , to situ a tio n in c a p a b le v isite d a lth o u g h o ffic ia l n a t u r e r e g a rd in g w o u ld th a t a g a in not s till d is p la c e m e n t and B u c h a rest, to you S e r b ia n of (T h e pow er a m ba ssa d or be s u b s titu te d a tte m p t as us u n c e r ta in ty sen se. V ie n n a , F o r e ig n G overn m en t th e N o. be a n il th e to th e A u s tr iu s im ila r ly to appeared “ G erm an y” [T e l. t e le g r a m , t e le g r a m . to g rea test P etersbu rg , I te le g r a m th e Is m e th o d us Ita ly , w ith of w ith a d v ic e R u ssia F ran ce, m o m e n ts r e g a r d in g p o in ts H ook (T e l. con G erm an y la r g e p o w e r s , w ith appeared c o n v e r s a tio n s th e th a t fo u r S (T h e h is In The a G e r m a n y ’s E n g la n d . 2 8 ], P a r is .) G erm an p osa l o f G erm an y, fo rm e d . z v o i .s k i . v a lu a b le I ta k e n . A u s tr ia . Pete rsb u rg , e x c e e d in g ly G e r m a n y 's Im p o s s ib ilit y in Is th e n e g o tia tio n s if s y m p a th e tic . c o n c e s s io n s M i n i s t e r .) P a r is , The so I (T e l. N o . 2 0 1 .) (T h is to lia s S (T h e has te r ri th a n k s a g a in s t d ir e c t s o lu tio n u n d e r s ta n d in g p a c ify in g N isc h , do n cto i m o b iliz a tio n do p ow ers, to G erm an y th e a q u ite fo u r O ran ge here in to to year. an upon to th e la s t resp ect Thus cen se no R u s s ia regard tim e fr ie n d ly reso rted to [In a S e r b ia n com e lm c o m m u n ic a tio n . th a t c o n tin u e sam e s im u lt a n e o u s been th e not p r o p o sa l. I to h is th e to th e 2 8 .) d ir e c te d by of S er b ia n sin c e r e of J u ly . c o n tin u e o n to J u ly w ith read y appear to of had of w ill m o r n in g rny w ay e x p la in e d and th is 1538, no b e h a lf w o u ld m easu res In on troop s convey I d /t O te le g r a p h in g n o te done of peace. A rm y. doeH a ll to R u ssia it be r e su lt N o. m easu res be V ie n n a . G erm an y u tiliz in g P eters J u ly was case to to c h a ra c te r are c o n c lu d in g of ton s of F r a n c e .) m om en t in th e In and A u str ia n to am me cen sed Vp of m ilita r y th e se th a t In not I to a c c e p t t h e p r o p o s a l o f a c o n fe r e n c e d iffic u lt c lea r th e A u s tr ia n ear prepared in flu e n c e d ’O rsa y, C om pare it th is V ie n n a . m ake fo r and N o. J u ly . Quai in flu e n c e P a r is , m in ister to th e e m p lo y e d . J u ly in flu e n c e , in 1 5 /2 8 d u ty at d id a m ba ssa d or peace, S ch lin , a ffa ir s fro m m o d er a tin g but m y m o d er a tin g 1521, te le g r a m th r e a te n e d P etersb u rg v e rsa tio n m an to a m easu res N o. it yesterd a y fo r e ig n of su p p ressed who of in fo r e x e r c isin g P etersb u rg , reto rted q u e stio n o n ly m in ister tw o deem c o n v e r sa tio n a g a in fr o m but m y of t e le g r a m / 1521, r e c e i v e d . p o ssib ility [h e r e bu rg to N o. fr o m , rega rd s m a in te n a n c e 1521, V ie n n a w ar. fr ie n d ly are r e p lie d a tte n tio n a r is as G erm an y n m bnssn dor In fo r m e d t e le g r a m a m b a ssa d o r’s I of a g g r e s s iv e us r e s p o n s ib ility 1 » S .) to th a t by th e th e V ie n n a th e M i n i s t e r .) P th e th e N o. In am b assad or c o n s titu te ta k en In in fo r m e d . n o te th e w ith p o w e r s .” am b assad or fo r th a t 1 5 4 4 .) had In flu e n c e c r o ssin g h im th e Sazonoff. (T h e to N o. G erm an y th e a c q u a in te d d u r in g J u ly . 15 39, a c c r e d ite d . R om e A ffa ir s te le g r a m d e c la r u t lo o of th e G erm an y, 1 5 /2 8 N o. th e fo r c a b in e t, m y th a t (C o m p a r e p a r a lle l 1 5 4 0 .) St . P e t e r s b u r g , You p ow ers am b assad or m o d e r a tin g re q u ested of Sazon ofv. a m y G erm an r e c eiv e d fo u n d in fo r m e d . to c h a n c e llo r To in te n tio n s not F o r e ig n c h a n c e llo r S e r b ia she th a t is th e th a n a g a in s t n o tic e V ie n n a a g a in st sh ow s fe e l a g g r e ssiv e T h e d e s p ite I war e x te n s iv e w ay fo r r e fe r e n c e to ry. of M in is te r e x e r c is e F r a n c e .) w h o le in d is p u t a b ly th is has a m ba ssa d or R om e (T h e A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y c o u ld R u ssia m o b iliz a tio n w ere e ffe c te d R u s s ia th a t a d istr ic ts. m o b iliz a t io n s M e a n w h ile London, B ook p r e v io u s ly repeat G erm an y. m ilita ry O ran ge S e r b ia n t o -m o r r o io K asan o ilie r g u a r a n tie s ST. PETERSBURG, of 1 5 /2 8 of th e o b ta in a ffir m e d a d d i q u e s tio n been d e c la r a tio n w ith m u tt a g a in (T e l. 1 5 3 9 .) A u s tr ia -H u n g a r y 's announce and m ilita r y a lo n e , of c o o p era te A u str ia , w h o a m ba ssa d or A u s tila B e r lin — to th e I zvolsk.1. p e r la l St . P etersburg , I to (T h e SA/.ONOFF. am b assad or w ith F in a lly fu r th e r . T h is a b r u sq u e ly su s p retex t a ffo r d B a lk a n s . ’ c o n flic t, be a sta te s o f lo c a liz a t io n .] A fT a lr s (T e l. th e as to o S er b ia . ready p o s s ib le s h o u ld H ook s u b s e q u e n tly neces Is u ll serves fe r e r e je c te d It w ith and O ran ge p o s itio n fir s t S e r b ia o n ly q u e s tio n [T h e rep resen t w as a c tio n a g a in s t A u s t r o -S e r b ia n g rea t p ow ers, M in is te r of w h ic h onld nets.1 tw o m e d ia tio n S e r b ia . c o m m a n d in g V ie n n a th e a c tio n s o lu tio n a Its not m e d ia to r y m ilita r y th e fo r E u rop ean In itia te sm ash assu m e has and b etw een d e la y , o t h e r w is e c o m p le te ly to tio n s h o u ld A u s tr ia ’s w ith o u t g r e a tly tim e P etersb u rg n e g o tia tio n s th e and c o n f li c t .” B a lk a n s th e lo v e [ g lin t- S8 c r a o o a n lY M o i s s a a o N O D =s RECORD. C O N G R E S S IO N A L la r te le g r a m s to B e r lin , P a r is , London, o u r a m b a s s a d o r In A u s t r i a , f r o m n et r e fu se s to en ter th is a s s e r tio n th e In to lo c a liz a t io n o f h e r c o n flic t w ith R u ssia a sse rte d by S a z o n o ff, w ith 1521 of quence th e th e J u ly sh e V ie n n a , a o f v ie w s d id not P etersb u rg and we le a v e m ay deem R om e, th e e x te n d to be B e r lin , S e h e b e k o .] th e [In th e C a b i o p p o s itio n th a t h er th e n o te of q u e stio n t e le g r a m to to 1 5 9 2 .] as and B u ch arest in S F o r e ig n M in is te r to th e am bassad or in azonoff. th e v a tio n s m ade a N o. 1 5 6 1 .) The of G erm an h ie am b assad or G overnm en t p r e p a r a tio n s . begun not by we but to and rig h t any R u s s ia o n ly arm y fo r to does b ecause of nnd corp s, m e th o d w ith o u t a me t o -d a y not sto p th e th e her d e c isio n pare m ilita r y te le g r a m m o b iliz a tio n b ecause fr ie n d ly in sh e w as s o lu tio n of fo r th a t sh e E u ropeon su p p ressed It fo r we It Rnd a lr e a d y in c o n flic t In th a t tio n s r e ly upon c ir c u m s ta n c e s th is is fu lly very su cceed in [T h e b a la n c e . S a zo n o ff*s t e le g r a m s m ade d e sir a b le th a t p r e v e n tin g a fro m Illu m in a t e d P a r is N os. of its s u p jio r t E n g la n d and range but 209, 201 above had H ie are Is s ir a b le In a lte r a o b je c t e x e r c is in g sam e tim e her b o th c la im s R u s s ia p r o je c t . b r in g e a ste rn m ore so about th e 27 sh e u nder to th e th e g rea test accept in flu e n c in g in seek p re te x t chan ge of and 210 to In lik e am b assad or In F ran ce (T e l. te rm s. M in is te r to th e (T e l. am b assad or N o. in The . F r a n c e .) fir m u r g e n tly iste r th e reg u est fo llo w in g bu rg: T h e G erm an d ors sto p not ordered to h er by eig h t A u str ia n a rm y to to a ct te le g r a m N o. reason fo r 15”9, th e a m b assad or’s of J u ly P v U s s ia n th e th a t m o b iliz a tio n but to R u ssia n has m o b iliz a tio n In of a ttitu d e not (3 ) A u s tr ia ’s fa ct th e IS to th e to n e d e c la r a t io n be th a t to n e S ir arm y to N o. in F ran ce (T e l. R ie n v e n u -M a r tin , m o rn in g th e th e G erm an p r a c tic a lly en d ea vors in to N o. th e o p in io n s of th e u n d e r ta k e n fa r been e x a c tly of cou rse F in a lly , th is of H u ron was to F o r e ig n th e th is g u estio n th e F o r e ig n of w ar by a g a in s t exch an ge S ch on a g a in of to be w ill h opes a g a in st is a and to th e In F ran ce (T e l. A p rop os m in ls le r of has a n te e s th e w h ic h a r r iv a l prepared fo llo w in g u tiliz e d th e a w ords : m u rder of m ig h t of th e sh ort N o. th e sta tio n th is h im , em w ord o m in o u s am bassad or c o n tin u in g th e ex ex ten t has not of not so sta n d in re c eiv e d u r in g R u s s i a .” th a t P r e sid e n t and in th e In to ld m e w ith ex p osA th e w h ic h arch d u k e th a t and at fo r m e d [T h e tru e d eeper th a n The th e re fo r e of nnd d e c la r e s th a t te n d e d to cut seek s aw ay no te r r ito r ia l th e g ro u n d s o f 7 0 8 7 0 — 1 1 --------6 n S e r b ia n and A u str ia ns th e p o r tin g Yhat fe a r s as we g a in s th e p re te x t th e fa G erm an th e of a g a in st g a rd in g ta ry a th e of th is and th e in tim e fr o m th e a fte r su p p ressed te le th e th e th e la r g e Our m ilita ry th e of th e p a rty c h ie f com m a n d . d is in te g r a tio n , c o n fid e n c e dem nndng th e gu ar m ilita r y is su p a ssu ra n ce o m is s io n argu m en t and to d u rin g of in ju s tify have u r g e n t ly th a t in to in c o n fir m e d net In Fran ce c ir c le s p a tr io tic to and w h ich F rench n a tio n c o n f l i c t .] r a d ic a l th e so c ia l a n tim ilita r y to rep o rts F e e lin g h is fir m , e v en ts. In ten d s 1 report to N o. ta k e in ru n s h ig h r e g a rd in g en er d e ta il in re m ili th e p ress Izv o l s k i. in th e F o r e ig n M i n i s t e r .) 2 0 7 .) mp th e a n il and p ow ers in as so m e my of V ie n n a q u ic k ly fo r m p resen ce or w ith r e s o lu tio n th e It as fe e lin g of T h is h is a n o th e r. w ho th e retu rn V lv ia n i to su p p o rte d s o c ia lis ts , th a t h is to th e P a r is , a b s o lu te te le g r a p h e d to th e n e g o tia tio n s th e fo r r e c e iv e d r e p e a te d th e F re n c h r a d ic a l V iv ia n ! d ir e c t p rop osa l of Is e x p r e s s io n o ff o f Us , 1 6 /9 9 J u l y . d e c is io n in c lu d in g I n d is p e n s a b le p o s s ib le t o -d a y , u s. th e ir g r o u p . a fte r a r is d e te r m in a tio n g iv in g b r e a k in g is fir m p a r tie s , L o n d o n , im m e d ia te ly repeat in by and con sequ en ce P e te rsb u rg and h im th e to agreem en t handed sh ouh l sad or th e of th e to th e fo r e ig n o p in io n , th e of a tta c h e m ea su res. fr o m A u s t r o S e r b ia n se c tio n r a ilw a y F ren ch p u b lic fo r J u ly. th e s ig n ific a n c e im p o rta n c e m ilita ry 1 6 /t p at c o n v e r sa tio n s la y v iz , no in tru e th e re fo r e a , a r is r e c eiv e d b eco m e c o n v in c e d sta te of rev o lu tio n a ry am b assad or w id e s t w ho G erm an y M i n i s t e r .) P a p p r o x im a t e ly S e r b ia ’ s te n d e n tio u s of d e m o n str a tio n s h is had cau se, am ong it. lie w a s d ir e c to r c a lm ev en ts (T e l. by rec eiv ed as fa th e r s h o r tly G er fo r e ig n fo r p a r tie s th e w as of in c lu d in g te leg ra m . R e p u b lic of m a tter d iv e r se F o r e ig n sy m p a th e tic a tta c h e s p r e p a r a to r y c ir c le s sp e c ia l P a r is e stim a te r e ig n e d g e tic G overnm en t tn a u s, w ith 2 0 0 .) ( p o litic a l ap paren t d e m o n str a tio n s m ea su res to w ith sa m e G overn m en t J u ly . te r r ito r y . have N o. P r e sid e n t correct a ttitu d e The P a r i s . 1 6 /1 9 in te r n a l o c c u p a tio n in to u c h e s sen se, H erv fi, JaurA g p a sses m a n ife st s o lid a r ity as th is M i n i s t e r .) s itu a tio n quo ,* l y . It th is ta k e n m ost u sed 1 6 /h . G e r m a n y ’s th a t a lso th a t to a n d p o litic ia n s, sig n ific a n c e sa m e is ts . th e th e a V lv ia n i b a s ju s t th e in c o m m u n ic a tio n s , A u s tr ia , of in th e ‘ ‘e v e n ” F ran ce A la r g e r ic p r e fec ts (T h e th e sta tu s s o u n d .] retu rn ed str e e ts crow d . m uch 2 0 3 .) of de m e d ia M i n i s t e r .) P W h en p la in ly J u ly . fr ie n d ly a sse r tio n F o r e ig n P r e s id e n t A u s tr ia , e v e n tu a te th e v ery G r e y ’s “ g u a r a n t i e s ,” rega rd s is and I t Is r e m e m b e r e d lit tle A s but to J c u r l 's , (T e l. u n y ie ld in g . to d ecla res h im se lf b e lo n g in g even IZVO LSKI. am b assad or is In th e se I z v o l o k i. o ffic e ) th a t w ill s a t is fy th e if c o n tin u e s. and u pon d iscu sse d exp resses and a lm o s t a tta c k p ress u n sy m p a th e tic . once [W h e n ;. n (T h e jo u r n e y to G erm an y war G erm an y p ro tested to o b je c t w h ic h e x p la n a tio n s w h ic h A u str ia m e G erm an y agree th e d e c la r a tio n o f o p in io n s . " to c o n ce r n in g The n e g o tia tio n s e n c o u r a g in g A u str ia in d ic a te and azonoff. 1 6 /2 9 c o m m u n ic a tio n e x p r e ssio n s: sh o u ld h er to ld not F ren ch u n h e s ita tin g ly p erson a g es m u rdered , g a in s e n e r g e tic , a is C ltm c n c ea u , a n tim ilita r ism . w ards and r e m a in jo u r n a list p r o m in e n t gram it, not E very P ic lio n . G erm an M i n i s t e r .) M in ister , m ade ca u se in fo rm ed . th ese (T h e th e It E. te r r ito r ia l th e 2 0 2 .) F o r e ig n fo llo w in g w h ich step s th e w a y A c tin g a m ba ssa d or V ie n n a th e m any u s, su ch j fo r to e c a n corps sta te s of Paris , change b la m e a sse m b le d am b assad or th e 2 0 4 .) th e th e A u str ia n su p p ressed S p lo y in g and in B e r b i a .] (T h e p r o lo n g th e R u ssia n S a z o n o ff th e w ill of th a t up b y ta k en upon and cou rse. P eters if R u ssia th e th e n o te M in p r e p a r a tio n s (£ ) cau sed t e le g r a m be (n arm y m o b iliz ed ; [C o m p a re 28. c o m m u n ic a tio n G erm an th e J u ly . F o r e ig n S a z o n o ff th a t c o m m u n ic a tio n A u str ia . /< 5 /2 9 F ren ch a ttitu d e ; been , rg a m ba ssa d or th e th a t a lr ea d y to n ig h t a g a in st F ren ch u n y ie ld in g h is th e in fo r m e d r e p lie d had m ade ord er to p r e p a r a tio n s A u s t r i a ’s corps th e h as ju st F a z o n o ff {!) P o u r ta lfs d e stin e d fr o m m ilita ry m o b iliz e. G overn m en t c o m m u n ic a te te leg ra m o c c a sio n e d C ount to a m ba ssa d or w ere w h ic h you sh a re .1 0 4 .) Petersbu in V ie n n a , Izvolski. (T h e s e v e r e ju d g m e n t F o r e ig n G er E urope. of off c o n d i and and to o b ta in in g th e th e n e g o tia tio n s in c r e a se . in in flu T o -d n y P a r is , te le g r a p h e d (T h e I a ll m easu res, s u p p o rt, to su pp ressed R u s s ia , d ila t o r y a c tiv e con Com m o d e r a tio n , P e te rsb u rg A u s tr ia w as w o u ld m o d e r a tin g a c ce p t. of b r in g been and p u rsu es th e a c tu a l had to h er fu ll to V ie n n a . any th e reser w ord In c o r r e s p o n d in g ly g iv e G erm an y in b o th fo r o p in io n to a d o p ts th e In (th is S e r b ia and F ran ce In th re a te n e d n o te P a r is lim ite d p o s s ib le a c tio n m ove V ie n n a p u b lic e x e r c is e id e a o p e n ly an as m u st in I n flu e n c e m a n ife s te d G erm an y w ill s h o u ld O th e r w is e , can becau se w as fo r m e r sen se London. p o sitiv e ly Book m e d ia to r y A u s tr ia in of w ar E n g la n d it to S im u lta n e o u s ly th a t m ade to th e not her G erm an y w h o le Sazon th e th a t v a in In th in g s a d v is e d seem s to w as in w ith H O .] London h er a ll u n ity J u ly de th e b o th d is c u s s of th e e n tir e ly m o d e r a tin g r e je c te d e x e rte d c o u ld is t e le g r a m lo c a liz in g fo r to h ith e r to n o te s itu a tio n . A u s tr ia had a is m o d e r a tin g 1521 S e r b ia be th e a 28) A u s tr ln n to le r a t e d to ry a lso N o. J u ly sh e to w a rd of of v ie w , fo r m u st and to peace re fu sa l O ran ge exert te le g r a m w h ic h a lo n e at th is of sou gh t in of It n o te fu tu re . h e r d e c la r a tio n th e to R u s s ia , th e Iz v o ls k l’ a a n s w e r . 208, to N o. P etersb u rg . R u ssia , as o f th e upon p resen t nam e d an gerou s by th e sh ared in c lin e s th is , d e c la r a t io n F ra n ce e x tr a o r d in a r y is In th e ns w ith G overnm en t d e c la r a t io n can reck on fo r have S c h iin h er F ran ce In c a lle d n o te ence e v id e n tly h er r e m a in s to F rench a sso c ia te h e r s e lf w ith can of th e its p resen t u s. n o th in g p r e p a r a tio n s th a t U nder w is h , In fo r m th a n k c o m m u n ic a tio n th e w ar. tim e s h o u ld th u s th e o f th is tim e v a lu a b le G e r m a n y 's w a r lik e of am b assad or lo ss o f o n ly J u ly sam e to ow n Fran ce. e s p e c ia lly tio n our French a lly is accede in e v ita b ility th e t lie our not h a a trn at B ee th ese if m any can p r o b a b le it of accept c o m m u n ic a te d s ta n tly S e r b ia . As by to has m o b iliz e began A u str ia ready w ith W e to 1 6 /1 9 , .J u ly . S e r b ia , a n d w ar. th e s o p h is tr y p ressu re A u s tr ia , th e n e c e s s ity p r e s s u r e in endeavor th a t of th e fo r R u s s ia sam e w as su pp ressed s c a r c e ly Petersburg, by general p r o b a b ly (T e l. r e p ly on s o p h is m .” in p u n is h m e n t T h is B aron bear The dem ands th e " to m a in te n a n c e upon th is t h a t P a r is to peace. th e tu rn s is , e x p r e s s io n a tte n tio n o f g u a ra n tee s fr o m In th e 27] it P e te rsb u rg . in flu e n c e of about F r a n c e .) in London. b r in g c a p ita ls in deduces e x e r c is e d e x c e s s iv e (T h e th e of c a lle d J u ly a ffa ir ; th a t and te re sts C o n s ta n tin o p le , of because g iv in g to fo r m e d . P a r is on been A u s t r o -S e r b ia n and regard s has R u s s ia G erm an y u se fu l. N is c h , fro m on fu rth e r as p o lic y be N o. con se as 195 pends n e g o tia In In itia tiv e te n d e n c y N o. un te le g r a m e m p lo y m e n t sam e to S e r b ia , d ir e c t to N o. th e re fu sa l of n o te E n g la n d fr o m V ie n n a n e v e r th e le s s s t r o v e fo r C om pare to th e u s. and tex t to su pp ressed c o m p le te ly w ith S e r b ia , of C a b in e t. th e N ls c h . th a t A u s tr ia w ith r e d r a ftin g 27 o f th is ste p s change It m u s t b e e m p h a s i z e d d erta k e tio n s a and w h ic h It a p p e a r s t h a t 33 London m e d ia tio n th e G erm an assu ran ces as e ffe c t b etw ee n c a b in e t by th e am bas to Q er CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 34 m a n y ’s p e a c e fu l I n te n tio n s . d e sir e s peace p r o p o s a ls th e u se th a t to fo r of it w as th a t w ord not In o r d e r to In r e p ly o u tb r e a k fro m 220 fr o m F ran ce d e te r m in e d Book th e th e of te le g r a m s act fr o m c o u n try . m e e tin g of th e (T h e N os. 1554, agreem en t are on th is E n g lis h c a b in e t B a ron had 218, 304 on h er a llie s (in T h is w as m a tter of fa c t B aron th e liv e lie s t a to fo r R u ssia n p o lic y Sehon c o u ld su p p ort p r o je c te d p a rty. M in is te r la t e r F rench and fo r b id d e n fir m ly O rau ge th e am b assad or In r e fe r e n c e my N o. t e le g r a m (1 ) S e r b ia . I req u est of we w ere h im th e I G overn m en t Is p o s s ib le a llo w of m ake you a d o p ts (2 ) a th is (T h e 207 I c h a ra c te r r ig h ts of t io n s .” th a t a J u ly S e r b ia , A u s tr ia R u s s ia w h ic h w ns London s h o u ld s u ffic e . th e sta te of th e te leg ra m c o n te n ts im m e d ia te ly in s tr u c te d to of and F ra n ce quen ce of c o n d itio n s of of a ffo r d th e C om pare w h ic h w ith to b e lo w G erm an to do we w hat can and h ere : not G erm an y “ in w h ic h th is th e query and Is A u s t r o -S e r b ia n q u e stio n th o se back and to q u e s tio n d e c la r e s p o in ts h er u n a c c e p ta b le m ade on G rey on fo u n d a tio n F o r e ig n I G erm an T h is is In th e to m y w h ic h su sp en d her v io la te her u ltim a tu m fo r to c o n n e c tio n O ran ge Book com m encem ent o f to th e F re n c h N o. n o te to r e a d in e s s th e sh a ll you very w ith th is of th a n S e r b ia , and th e th e a tta c h ^ in V iv ia n i, at th e and teleg ra m n is h e d is tio n s as in h im tio n s fo r Is P a r is in has w e th a t th is h ig h ly are still w ith 70878— 11 in fix in g w h ic h of th e Paul tw o to N o. and not th e peace, h a v in g are id e a A F ran ce as m ade G r e y ’s a to our in t e le g r a m is R u s s ia th e and and to th e m ilita ry fo r of in an th e N o. it (T h e to The p eace co u n c il fr o m is to th e F o r e ig n th e ta k e am b assad or th e M in ister ia l te leg ra m and sen t in C o u n c il, to th e m e n tio n e d (T h e N o. J u ly . 1. The F ran ce to N o. p r e sid e d F ren ch in m y F o r e ig n "W it h th ro u g h p r e p a r a tio n s. w as is su p er In th e th e F o r e ig n over by A m b a ssa d or M in is te r in w is h w h ic h th a t I N o. to my I of N o. is a fix in g to to th a t th e b etw een th e tex t “ F r a n c e ,” fu lfill at. a ll was its th e p resen t th e le ss our h eld th e and d isc u ssio n th e F ren ch sen se. The in s tr u c tio n s th e n sta te s: o b lig a tio n s m o m e n t, in te r e ste d com m ilita ry r o in c a r d , a to fo llo w in g of b o th in V ie n n a , w ere b e in g z v o l s k i. M i n i s t e r .) in , a r is T l/S O J u l y . has a pproved P etersb u rg th e 208. am b assad or (h e N o. London to th e E n g lis h In z v o l s k i. F r a n c e .) 1 5 8 3 .) b t f .r s b u r o . 1 8 /3 1 J u l y . 1554. c o m m u n ic a te d th e of p r e v io u s to me C a b in e t G erm an in to tlie nam e m ake A m b assad or p r o p o s a l, and sen d of som e h is change y e ste rd a y . you th e I a lt e r e d 2. Razonoff. M in is te r to am b assad or (T e l. N o. in F r a n c e .) 1 5 8 2 .) P E T E R SB U R G , 1 8 /3 1 J u l y . w a r. sen t see th e 1 7 /3 0 J u l y . in s ta n c e im m e d ia te ly te leg ra m a p p ro x im a tely a llu sio n ready p rog ress M e ssim y w h ic h to te le g r a m p roposed a cce p ted (F o r e ig n fo r at w ill in w h ic h P o in c a r i, M i n i s t e r .) m in ister p la c e I th a t su pp ressed regard s i m m e d i a t e l y , i. e ., a t S a . m ., th e in d eed 2 1 2 .) te leg ra m A m b assad or th e d ra ft r e p lie d d r a ft resp ect E n g lis h N o. m y are sin ce m a in te n a n c e o f en d eavors p r e p a r a tio n s P The 2 0 8 .) A t and w e th e p o ssib le a fte r w h ic h p roof be war F r a n c e .] (T e l. 2. tio n If as w h en p ow ers, an “ P ow ers th a t in te r e s t m ay s o v e re ig n ta in in g 215 of o f J u ly J u ly 31. | m o r n in g o f J u ly | A rm y ! s la n w h ic h 31 a u t h o r iz e d .” G overnm en t fo r E urope, in to and w hat to her th e s a tis fa c tio n w ith o u t by la s t e n t ir e ly th e su p p ressed A m b a s s a d o r P a ld o lo g u e It had can s u r e ly th e re b y no arm y on S e r b ia n becom e a concedes S e r b ia d e tr im e n t to R u s s ia q u es th a t a ffo rd her r ig h ts u n d erta k e s The P e te rsb u rg te le g r a m at 1 0 .1 0 of th e P a r is in th e O ran ge te le g r a p h e d th e can n o t ta k e h is o w n fo llo w in g : fr o m sen ten c e to h is G o v e r n m e n t : h er th e re fo r e [ T h a t S a z o n o ff d id e v id e n c e d by of c o n flic t h a s in d e p e n d e n c e , w a s d is p a tc h e d is advance A u s t r o -S e r b ia n a ttitu d e . B ut th a t th e F re n c h th e th e and is c le a r ly 31. sto p G overn m en t sta te S a zo n o ff’s d r a ft ev en in g to e x a m in e h er w a itin g p o s a l s e r io u s ly I p la in w o u ld a d m its general m a in ta in fu r a lly. agrees A u s t r o -H u n g a r ia n a The n eg o tia it th e as A u s tr ia and of G reat to b a ttle sh ip how ever, s h o u ld a tta c h d , of r e fr a in G e rm a n y ’s hut n eg o tia p r e p a r a tio n s, a n d to G ov m o b ilisa tio n , ir r e fu ta b le m ilita r y in J u ly . F ren ch p o ssib le . th e fu r th e r n e g o tia tio n s fo r fo r th e in te r e sts our have m in ister ia l p r o p o s a ls screen 1 7 /3 0 c o n tin u in g , as p r e p a r a tio n s s h o u ld tro o p s. k i. p r e p a r a tio n s, rega rd s till h ig h e r c o n tin u in g w e su p p ressed in in c lu d in g served of but , a r is th a t p r e sid e n c y o f P o In ca rd , im m e d ia te ly [T h is V iv ia n i. m o b i li z a t i o n .] to aud M i n i s t e r .) m ilita ry c h a ra cter th e our sa id our th a t (a in u s fro m th em , in (T e l. N o . A u str ia th a t th e E n g la n d 2 1 0 .) th ese, sa m e th a t d e la y p reven t P etersb u rg an d s e c r e tly c o n d itio n [C o m m e n t as Cam bon c o n s titu te d b etw ee n F o r e ig n sp ok en , peace th e to m o vem en ts 6 .3 0 u n d e r t h e lu st th a t of d e c la r e in te n s ify in g g r e a te r a dem and 1 7 /3 0 m ilita ry te le g r a m to [C a m b o n * 19 9. in te r fe r e c h a lle n g in g d e v e lo p e d c o u ld N o. have to m a in te n a n c e G overnm en t our con se have b etw een w h ic h agreem ent in th em , a r ise s. exch anged 1912, was a ttitu d e p ow ers, b etw een te n sio n n o te s P etersb u rg C am bon th e c o m b in e d th e se e x istin g p o litic a l F ran ce d e sir a b le te m p o r a r ily w o u ld fr o m / w ish a m b a s s a d o r .) im p o r ta n t m in ister . M in ister P etersb u rg o p in io n , th e a m b a s s a d o r in w h ereby N ovem ber, te leg ra m w hom p u b lic m in iste r m y not as s a id ready of w ith th e little n ig h t c o n fid e n tia lly . th e n ig h t, a n d a resu lt G overn m en t of F ren ch p o lit ic o m ilit a r y am b assad or d oes it to r e c eiv e d . fo r e ig n W ar fro m to of n / 3 0 J u ly . I z v o i -a o n ly 15 5 ). c o n tin u e gen eral c o m m u n ic a te d b e g in s to F ren ch It th e th e ftlys6 e, a m ba ssa d or 1 6 51 it d u rin g lik e w ise London, P Vo. fo llo w in g R u s s ia n te le g r a m ■ N o . to th e 23d r i. M i n i s t e r .) p rep ara a P a r is , it to of grou nds 22d th e (T h e te r r ito r y r e c eiv e d F o r e ig n 1 5 5 5 .) d e c la r a tio n (T e l. I and 2 0 9 .) to as p e r io d Sa zo n o f f . m u n ic a te d 20® to s. c o n c e r n in g so v e r e ig n m ilita r y s a tis fa c to r y r e p ly fr o m w e (T h e a m b a ssa d o r Your te le g r a m s , N o a . F r a n c e .] to V ie n n a .] te leg ra m a th o ro u g h ly G o v e r n m e n t, o o m m u n ic a tc d flu o u s . In and I M in is te r refe r U n til w e r e c e iv e th e N o. th e u n d e r sta n d in g a th e th e In 29. h as a ssu m ed Petersburg. u rg en t. G rey E n g la n d gen eral a fo r c e s .” r e v e a le d In fo r m e d . (T e l. V ery w ith w h enever Sazosoff. (T h e U of I th e o f S a z o n o ff’s sig n ifie s n o th in g le s s V ie n n a on th e as A u s tr ia w ord s of d ic ta te d r e a d in e s s q u e s tio n , we u rgen t rep rod uced a ttitu d e our th e to adds w hat if th e to N o. tr a n sm itte d c o n fer th e d e lib e r a te rega rd s in te g r ity A t h er as J u ly P B e r lin ask ed p r e p a r a tio n s , 1 once m e r e ly u n d erta k e s ta k e n a tu r a lly and m e, v io la te th e of te le g r a m P etersb u rg su p p ressed F ran ce The C o n tin u a tio n to fr o m per G erm an y 2 9 .) u ltim a tu m [T h is fo r m u la v is ite d to not p roof B oob E uropean her new n a tu re O ran ge In (T e l. T1/S0 J u l y . te le g r a p h in g c o m m u n ic a tio n nt p r e p a r a tio n s * of of fr o m th e s o lu tio n “ I f A u s tr ia a d m its th a t e lim in a te d id m ilita r y B e r lin th is J u st not sh o u ld our te le g r a p h fr ie n d ly m ilita ry No to tow ard tow ard th e ir th a t to has p r o m ise a ssu ra n ce su sp en d d is p n tr h tim e . t e le g r a m th e to n e g o tia tio n s o f g a in th is a m ba ssa d or requ est who A u str ia ’s th a t read y u rgen t (2 ). am bassad or, w ith r e p lie d s till fo r In G erm an sa tis fie d am b assad or te leg ra m ern m en t 1521, 1 am serve m o b ilisa tio n su p p ressed 1551 lik e w is e m y a n tiw a r 1 5 5 4 .) N o. p a r tia l w ill adopt 3 0 .] of as The be and J u ly would w h ic h to in fo llo w s : c o u ld a to th is N o. C o n tin u a tio n M a r g e r ie . W ith on or nnd m ea su res o f a d e fen siv e n ecessa ry Paris, F r a n c e .) PETERSBURG, as of te le g r a m Izvolski. th e (T e l. general fo llo w in g P a r is step s (T e l. w ere d e v ia ted w as th e of th e th e d eem ed I z v o i -m th e 220, done fo r m d ir ec t s ig n ific a n c e (T h e com fo r part tim e any fa r a s has to (F a I 6 o lo g u e a ) h is ta k e w ith tw o n o t* a lr e a d y 210, w h o le i< w h ich S eh on r e s p o n s ib ility sam e fin d in g has fr o m su p- a llia n c e ) w as V iv ia n i r e v o lu tio n a ry F o r e ig n a th e 210, ea se o r ig in a l as w ith S e ih ia . th e h ere. th e d e c is io n e v e n in g w ith added th a t th e at pow ers (T h e V iv io n i but th e fr o m p r e c a u tio n s. and o rd etH n g fo r [T h e 1*» t h i s 1637, p r e te x t c o m b in a tio n th a t 215, not o p in io n S e r b ia n th a t R u ssia , so n a tu re m it, s h o u ld d iffic u lt th e th a t pu rpose of B e r lin sa id th e be F in a lly th e 214, e f f e c t .) In d ic a te s th a t T h is 210. rem arked to is b etw ee n th e and sim ila r N os. n e v e r th e le s s o u tse t fo r fro m be p r e c a u tio n a r y not Sehon m e a n w h ile G erm n n y sh ran k to d em n n d p ropagan d a peace fr ie n d s P a r is h im s e lf th e sam e fu ll and th e and th e In ea sy E n g la n d s \ lv ia n l w o u ld e x a m in a tio n . p la c in g on d e s lr p d E n g la n d ; fro m c o n v in c e th e to w ord s sa k e rested have h o n e s tly It H u ro n th a t adopt m arks T a r ls th a t p r e p a r a tio n s to T e le g r a m s P etersb u rg th a t c o m p e lle d w ar. v ery of A u s tr ia n e g o tia tio n s p o in t, b u t s u b je c t sen ten c e and th e he w ith “ a r b it r a t io n .’ w h a t A u s t r ia in te n d s m ilita ry t h e o b je c t o f of 225, he fo r h e r s e lf th a t m e d ia tio n . w o u ld th e s a id or w e fr d s of th a t F r a n c e ’s th is w ith it a s s o c ia te Sehon su ccess on be of of m enced 228, th a t w o u ld p r e s s lo n of fo r m assu re w o u ld G erm an y q u e stio n A u str ia c o m p la in e d to B aron to a s c e r ta in r e p lie d In te rro g a te h a ste n “ c o n fe re n c e ” o th e r Is n e c e s s a r y V iv lu n t a som e In r e p ly t o V ly ln n l’ s r e m a r k t h a t If G e r m a n y s h o u ld m e d ia tio n , th e d e v is e it sh e on te le g r a m Book, a lr e a d y on to p ro con th « N o. It is th e “ F u l l m o b iliz .n t io n o f t h e R u s s i a n lo n g e r ir r e v o c a b ly be d is p u te d d e c id e d th a t upon th e w ar. R u sThs tc CKIOOSttl IVNOTSSailONOC) C O N G R E S S IO N A L R E C O R D . S azon o f f d r a ft a ls o con firm s th e v ie w ex p re sse d in th e n o te to te le g ra m 2 1 0 t h a t a ll fu r th e r n e g o tia t io n s by R u s sia a n d F r a n c e m e re ly s e rv e d as a c o v e r f o r th e ir fe v e r is h ly co n d u cte d s e c r e t m ilit a r y p r e p a r a t io n s .] B e rlin , V ie n n a , L o n d o n , R o m e in fo r m e d . Bazono f f . N o. te le g r a m bu rg , had ju st d a ted R u ssia n been th is A rm y, r e c eiv e d m o r n in g , to w h ich fr o m th e c o n fir m in g he a dd ed n o in F ran ce to th e N o. From Petersburg, ern m en t (a c o n te n ts of tio n , and con du ct ir e tio n of to th a t In order S er b ia n E n g lish th a t th a t an to S er b ia . s h o u ld w ill w ill n eg o tia tio n s A u str ia w o u ld sh a ll su sp en d m y be ta k e th e s a tis fa c proceed to p a r tic ip a t th e d ir ec th a n k s of a ll fa v o r a b ly , m ilita ry it o p e r a tio n s te r rito r y . te le g r a m s to London, B e r lin . V ie n n a , and H om e. Sazon (A m b a ssa d o r in F ran ce (T e l. to F ren ch h im to in g rega rd com e o b lig e d as a to to a s, of to o , of very next day, su p p ressed ) to h is c lo sin g The 1. e ., on c o m m u n ic a tin g th ey in to m e, ila rg er ie of th e G erm an a ll h er fo rces. of th e It is R u ssia n n o tew o rth y th ere A r m y ,” p r e m a tu r e ly on one m ea su res th e part m any is on e v id e n tly r e g a r d in g of th e fo r th in k s th e on th e th e on th e o th e r of th e th a t bord ers or of of to [In th is to w ar. In “ new s P a r is w as by In about of of a lr e a d y z a tio n of of th e m ea su res sa m e s ia in tim e is in a sk lisio n F ran ce upon fo r A rm y a ccord a n ce w ith w ith th e J u ly 3 1 .] 215 of F o r e ig n N o. s ittin g tr ic k th e and but who has th e G e r m a n y 's 7 6 8 7 5 — 11 fo r e x p r e ssio n th a t B a ron S ch on adopt to fa c ts . to procedu re, th e See o l s k i. g iv e to h im any d e c la r e d to of in adopt w a r .” A t th e R u s h er r e fu sa l, lo a s i n s t r u c t e d an a rm ed to th e a n sw er. a t 1 o ’c lo c k T here to -m o r r o w p r e s e n t a sp e c ia l m in is te r ia l c o u n c il th e th ese d e ta ils a m ba ssa d or w h ic h d e c la r a tio n P r e sid e n t is of to th e m e. n ecessa ry R ep u b lic. sla te d t o -m o r r o w , a s in ten d ed w a r. of th e a m ba s A t th e m ake c o l a n tic ip a tio n of to to p la c e M a r g e r ie to is th e now in w ith m u st J u ly be fu ll in 31 to on a dd ed he th a t sees F ra n ce th a t a of th e r e fe r re d th e in to M in is te r to (T e l. m id n ig h t th e G overnm en t th a t day— we not ns ord er a do if of w ere B e r lin , To th e m y w a r, th e very near London, not G erm an query te le g r a m w o u ld N o. 210 o l s k i. F r a n c e .) etersbu rg is , as to on b e fo r e o n ly as w h e th e r r e p lie d , IS J u l y / 1 me m id d a y w ill th is th a t w as of on h is S a tu r G erm an y be w as it Aug. b e h a lf a g a in s t G overnm en t am b assad or to In in fo rm e d h ou rs— th a t d e m o b iliz e , A u s tr ia , m o b iliz a tio n . we to 12 th e am b assad or, 1 0 0 1 .) am bassad or w ith in b e g in a g a in s t d e c la r a tio n th a t G erm an of a c c o u n t .] am b assad or N o. to o b je c t u n d ersta n d G erm an su pp ressed a th e m o b iliz a tio n w ith fu lly be as to h is d ir e c t q u e s tio n , a n d day, ta k e n R u s s ia n th e con w ill trea ted p ropagan d a order th a t to im p o r ta n c e s w in g , to to n e s effo r ts be great The regard our w ill general 214. fo llo w in g 31 th e th e B ut a ttitu d e J u ly . me Jz v but c o m p e lle d to e q u iv a le n t to n o t, b u t added w ar. V ie n n a , Rom e in fo r m e d . SlZONOFF. (F o r e ig n M in is te r to am bassad or (T e l. N o. In F r a n c e .) — .) P etersbu rg , G erm an y has d e c la r e d war a g a in st u s. F ran ce to 19 J u l y / i Aug. Sazonoff, (A m b a ssa d o r in (T e l. N o. F o r e ig n M i n i s t e r .) 2 1 7 .) P a r is , The of m ilita ry G erm an a tta c h d fo r c e s on U , 1 5 , 16, 3 1 , 8 a n d td 18 on th e tro o p s M etz 1 9 th me to ( 1st J u ly in fo r m fr o m th e (C o m p a re D istr ib u tio n th e n o te of fr o n tie r to corps te le g r a m six fr o n tie r In crea sed m ay Aug. G r o u p in g o f 7 , 11 a n d c o m p le te d , d istr ic t in 19 J u l y / 1 fo llo w s: The fr o n t. a re as b y p a rts h orses S a a r b u r g -B r u g e s fiv e you A u g u st). B a v a r ia n , r e in fo r c e d p rog ress. or F ra n ce req u ests G e r m a n -L u x e m b o u r g -B e lfo r t in m o vem en ts An soon c o m p le te a tta c k be ex p e c te d . r e a d in e ss in F ran ce to N o. F o r e ig n and in fo r m e d th e te r r ito r ia l th e o th e r am bassad or h im th a t pow ers T o -d a y th e yesterd a y, G erm an a c tio n yesterd a y, F ra n ce but a lso m any a c c o rd in g A t th is 30 of th e was not a m ba ssa d or was S ch on F r a n c e 's and see in te n tio n s h im a g a in a ttitu d e by was at s p e c ia l p ersu aded th a t th e . R u ssia v isib ly not th r e a t e v en in g . to d a y , th e m ilita r y under by in resp ect im p o rta n t fo r m an, s h o u ld but of F ra n ce fo r m Ita ly , th a t an h er m ore, to th e h is A s but th e sea a lo n g s o -c a lle d w h ich m ay of sh o u ld la tte r . a sea th a t of a lo n g as to V iv ia n i to a m ba ssa d or’s m uch of p la c e d is tu r b e d fr o n tie r , danger th e fo r it p reced e T h is G er fo rc es. re p ly E n g la n d , not (n A u str ia , F rench hand, 215, th a t, fo r c e s, a sk ed sta te o th er e sp e cia lly th e th e be have 210. resu lt G erm an h is r e p lie d h er fo r G o v e r n m e n t is th e m u st a g a in st th e ap at ex istin g V iv ia n i dem a n d d ep a rtu re, th e tim e d e c la r a tio n m o b iliz ed w ith b e a r in g s . t e le g r a m s , N o s . and m o b iliz a tio n a n sw er its re la tio n s la n d m easu res but th e m ea su res, not v io la tin g a sto n ish m en t R u ssia n F ren ch of a ll as had Aug. e v e n in g , n e g o tia te b e fo r e h is su r p r ise d . of in o n ly I w a r a n a c t u a l m o b i l i z a t i o n i s In p r o g r e s s , A r m y in a d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s p o s i t i o n . On rea son s S e r b ia not repeat of to “ a s to n is h m e n t” A lth o u g h cover in te n tio n a m ba ssa d or’s en e r g e tic d id h is th is m o d ifie d G e r m a n y 's b e in g 6 ju stifie d of *. lsk 19 J u l y / 1 y e ste rd a y read y V iv ia n i m o b iliz a tio n , h ere c o n v e r sa tio n , B a ro n w ith exp ressed th e no a ls o th e su p p resse d To adopt in fo r m a tio n V iv ia n i has is [ V i v i a n i 's G erm an y, to o n ly but v isite d la tte r 3 1 .] w ith c o n flic t th e e v id e n t a g a in st th e h er C om pare and c o m p e lle d to not S e r b ia , G erm an y. fe ig n e d . as was w h ic h w a r. 2 1 8 .) tw ic e a m ba ssa d or and and J u ly of r e g a r d in g p o in te d tw e e n w as A u s tr ia In te g r ity In fo r M i n i s t e r .) P a r is , A u s tr ia n of fro m N o . 2 1 4 .) (T e l. The corp s, perhaps Izvo (A m b a ssa d o r con seq u en ce of 207 to h ea rty req u ested a ll A u str ia and G erm an y. (F o r e ig n o b lig e d he on o f J u ly of liste n e d h im P a r is w h o lly even t on l i v i a n i 's an sw er 216, of even t fr o m N o. h e g a v e n o a n sw e r on no been and d e m o b iliz e . th a t th e , I S /S t J u l y . in c o m m u n ic a te d re p ly added in com e is sh a ll th e V iv ia n i d e c lin e d th e “ D a n ger R u ssia w h i c h , in G erm an y. to w hom g iv e b la m e of “ g e n era l m o b ili V iv ia n i G erm an y w o u ld h im to rega rd N a v y ,” a fte r p r e sid e n cy ju st cam e th e m e n d a c ity w h ile 2 1 5 .) th a t he w o u ld begged V it ia n i w ill n o t in th e f o r h is d e p a r tu r e . r e s p o n s ib ility and S c h o n sa id u n der M a r g e r ie , p r o b a b ly a F ra n ce R u ssia a n sw er, and d em a n d ed m o b iliz e. c o m m u n ic a tio n , B a ron h is has a ttitu d e b etw een p u ttin g t e le g r a m as 1582 th a t on M i n i s t e r .) a r is to N o. one fo r advanced, accordan ce th a t, h a v in g h o u r s’ d e la y , w ill a lso a rra n g em en ts is 12 n o te te le g r a m s th a t and new s s u s p ic io n N o. to a m ba ssa d or R u ssia n a what s a d o r 's G erm an G overn m en t G erm an y g iv e n G erm an y to th e h is In to r e s p o n s i s 'a c c u s e ,” fa r n o te s ea rn est, w ar, s ta ff regard 1 8 /3 1 m easu res th e th is G er fa ls e F ren ch s’excu se seek s a n a lo g o u s sen ten ce F ran ce p resen ce r e c e iv e d m o b iliz a tio n about m eans P 6 . SO p . m . rep ort In r e p ly th a t G er m a n y c o n c lu d in g upon Qui w as te le g r a m (T e l. nam e a m b a s s a d o r 's F rench see and a ls o m o b iliz in g m essa g e b r in g b r in g put proverb, m o b iliz a tio n (A m b a ssa d o r A t [W ith gen era l G erm an y, in me upon rep ort w o u ld general id e a a tte m p te d to to Izv th e n S p H g c a b le . th e w a r .” ) F ra n ce " F ren ch q u a n tity of on th e 1 a. m . arm y 127, a b le fo r H avas th e th e in fo r m e d d ecid ed a g a in st m ea s th a t im m e d ia te ly th e of th e order th e th e G erm an of In in upon o f h a v in g 31 th a t of fir m ly w ith fiv e N o. w as Pabis, m in ister . m o b iliz a tio n . t e le g r a m by a n o th e r F ra n ce. F rench se n te n c e added m e n tio n of n o te d p repared A rm y m o b iliz a tio n J u ly o u tb re a k hand c o n c lu d in g w h ic h accu sed in v o lu n ta r ily one a lso grou nd R u s s ia n m o b iliz a tio n b ility is be hope m in iste r is o th e rw ise h eld , th e p r e p a r a to r y P a r is “ fu lly th is B e r lin m u st P a r is m o b iliz a tio n to th e war d ir ec te d know n o r d e r in g d e m o b iliz e , c h a ra cter it (s e e w ere th e was of M i n i s t e r .) m ea su res, im m e d ia te ly c o m p lete a tta c h ^ th e fro m to resp ect th e oth er and hav A r m y ," m ea su res e n ta il c o u n c il w ith corps, 1 m ilita r y R u ssia m ost to h ere fir m a ls o req u ested G erm an y, R u ssia n to u r F ren ch to P 1 8 /3 1 J u l y . Jagow r e g r e t, th e fr o n tie r th em m ilita r y th a t th e th e to great of th e a d o p t, A u gu st R u s s ia n G overnm en t of fr o n tie r th a t th e m s e lv e s begs to g iv in g fiv e h er m in ister ia l fr o n tie r , th e se th e of G erm an y d ecid ed th e to se c u r ity th e etc. to ow n w h ich how ever, regard th a t, teleg ra p h s m o b iliz a tio n and m o b iliz e. to B er lin sa id h er p resid in g , w ith o u t, (W ith fo r sie g e , in general W a r ,” a d ja c e n t u res, and th e e x a m p le , w ill P o in c a ir d corps “ adopt fo r sta te sh e, h im , to “ D a n ger su ch a m ba ssa d or a tta c h A G overn m en t A t 2 1 4 .) N o. P eters 2 1 6 .) . off M in ls le r .) F o r e ig n Paris, The th e to (C o m p a re n o te s to te le g ra m s N o s . 2 0 9 an d 2 1 0 . R e g a r d in g th e w illin g n e s s o f A u s t r i a to e n g a g e In d i r e c t n e g o tia t io n s w it h R u s sia , c o m p a r e n o t e to te le g r a m N o. 1 5 4 8 o f J u ly 2 9 . W ith re g a rd to S a z o n o f i " # dem and th a t A u s tria h ou ld suej>ond m ilit a r y o p e r a t io n s o n S erbian s o li, c o m p a r e te le g ra m No. 2 1 0 o f J u ly 3 0 .) s im ita r m ilita ry The G ov p r e fer a b le over th e h er h is r e g a rd in g P ow ers earn J u ly . th a t v ieto s G reat G overn m en t 1 8 /3 1 m e exp ressed it th e it of I th a t a ll w hereby th e se in fo r m e d exch an ge London, d isc u ssio n s, im p o rta n t in to and a m ba ssa d or in th e m e h an ded th e n eg o tia tio n s hope v isite d en ter u ltim a tu m th e se very on th e to rem a rk ed E u rope. is prepared th e in g . a m ba ssa d or F o r e ig n » (T e l. N o. 1 5 0 2 .) in m o b iliz a tio n Izvolski. (A m b a ssa d o r (T e l. A u str ia n a m ba ssa d or general ex p la n a tio n . (F o r e ig n M in is te r to a m b a s s a d o r in F r a n c e .) The Fren ch th e of Fren ch p o litic a l is th e q u e stio n very G er is at CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 36 p r e te n t is b e in g very d iscu sse d p r o b a b le by th e th a t g en era l m in ister ia l c o u n c il at m o b ilisa tio n tr ill be th e f .l y s d e , a n d d e c id e d dared it of upon. IZVOLHKl. in F ran ce (T e l. to N o. F o r e ig n M i n i s t e r .) bnrg, r e c e iv in g in w h ic h G erm an th e th e he of an nounced am b assad or R e p u b lic t e le g r a m th e r e g a r d in g s ig n e d th e th e F rench 19 m ade d e c is io n , The G erm an but im p a r te d new , but V lv la n l d e c la r e d been r e c e iv e d . tio n decree, and a d o p te d v ie w s [H o w 210, 210, w ar, and and A u s tr ia n fo r rep ea ted “ a b s o lu te ly a n l 's w h o le a lr e a d y re fe rre d d ep a rtu re, and o f a ll in and and fo r can can B aron m o M liz a - o th e r have not as Y iv l- yet in N os. m ean V ie n n a a b so lu te ly ba ron O ran ge F ran ce (T e l. to S c h b n ’ s d e p a r t u r e .” N o. F o r e ig n to ld Ita ly th e c o n flic t one d ecisio n m e th a t a p p a ren tly a c c o rd in g Thnt th e th a t tim e gage in has a r ise n , to r e m a in or a n o th e r in a ccord a n ce n eu tra l upon at w ith fir st th e fr o m th e and a th e 1548. w h ic h very in to in F ran ce (T e l. to N o. F o r e ig n 8 .W th e m ilita ry m. p. S erb ia The to ta k e th e as d a te to and th e to be of C o r p s, S ix th op p osed ev en ts. th e G u ards of to th e be w as To te leg ra m to (1 ) (3 ) o ffe n siv e To In S econ d is A u s tr ia O ran ge in F ran ce sa id to lo ss of re c eiv e d to F o r e ig n th a t tim e n e ith e r to m u st V a lo n a w ith in flu e n c e by R u s s ia , C om pare at to en n o te u n s u s ta in a b le , to and of th e a b so lu te be h er be m ade freed o m to n ew s d a ily a g a in st G erm an y d e sir a b le A c c o r d in g T w en tieth M i n i s t e r .) a r i8, in te n tio n s n eu tra lity The brou gh t to d raw Ita ly in of to A rm y A u g u st. at B u ch a rest R u m a n ia , w h o nor to p a rtic ip a tio n P r e sid e n t of th e bear T ra n sylv a n ia . a c tio n 19 J u l y / 1 m in ister on In over to R c p u b lla R u m a n ia w ith o u t P o in c a r d ’s our sid e by o p in io n , p r o m is in g A lb a n ia . I r .v o i .8 K i . have th e at m ove are m easu res s u b je c t B o o k .) Fren ch A u str ia . m u st p r o m is in g a lso and th e r eg a rd in g n eg o tia tio n s m e fr o m in F ran ce (T e l. in fo r m e d C orps Ser N o . 2 2 4 .) a n x iety (A m b a ssa d o r To m ost Is w h ile th e and th e re fo r e th e ns p u n ito r y fo r m e d re A u str ia by to be th e th e to in te g r ity above, h er r e a d in e s s . a s s e rtio n fa ls ific a tio n been be in c lin e d com m on h er oom e has d isp la y s g r e a t a tte m p ts A u g u st. r ec eiv e u s. F ren ch th e b etw ee n P A secret ann ou nced P o s e n -W a r sa w . and have to F o r e ig n J u st c o u n c il fu lfill th e com r of in te r e sts h er b efo re m en t o b lig a tio n s of b o th h o s tilitie s m any be tr ill a tta c k os an a lly. it F ran ce d iffic u lt. A t m eet. at The The once in above d e c isio n b e tte r 10 th e to th a t sta te m en ts m u st am bassad or In th a t to be fe a r com P a r lia th a t c o m p letio n be to in r e q u ir e d , p e r io d to ren d er tn . th a t F ra n ce w o u ld of a. sa id u n r e se r v e d ly fo r c o n tin u e s order who r e c o g n iz e d days end P o in c a r d A u g u st— 3 R ep u b lic, c o u n o il be p u rp ose com m enced . to th e th e w o u ld w h ic h IS J u l y / 1 of c o n fir m e d A llie s fo r su m m on ed m o b iliz a tio n lu te ly th e are P r e sid e n t a g a in m o b iliz a tio n , w ill th e m in isters F r a n c e ’s p le te fr o m M i n i s t e r .) N o . 2 2 5 .1 P aris , w ish : F ir st, S ev en teen th , and C orp s, by w o u ld (T e l. ev en ts. , 19 J u l y / 1 th e to our For c o n tin u e s D en m ark R eserve a g a in st of a r is (8 ) p r o m p tly . corps to u ch ed M i n i s t e r .) m o b iliz a tio n exp ressed com m en cem en t fa it b lo w fro m has m ore arm y th e au our in fo r m a tio n a ct o ffen siv e of G en eral M in ister G erm an k ep t, d ir ec tio n to W a r th e r e g a rd in g a tta c h 6 : 223 is read er assu ran ces te r r ito r ia l N o. very w e ll. te le g r a m fo r th e g u a ra n tee d te le g r a m d e c la r e d th e a as I s v o l s k i. I P From a c tu a lly th e sta te m en ts th ere A u s tr ia n h er w ere had (A m b a s s a d o r w h ich 2 2 1 .) • to th e to of Is nnd of c rea te d e n ie d It fro m P etersb u rg , m ig h t be w r itte n 195 se n te n c e s p o r tio n to a ls o th e N o. th a t sim ila r th ey to end re fe rs or n e g o tia tio n s I z v o i .s k i . (A m b a ssa d o r r e p lie d w h ere in lie c a te g o r ic a l d e com pare tw o m u rder, I z v o ls k i’s th e fir s t ought e ffe c t n o te S a r a je v o fo r m e r fo r in th e d ir e c t N o. a cco u n ts is s a id A u g u st. th e n of th e w h ic h te le g r a m in m an ner cou rse of th e o n ly r ig h ts w as r ig h ts , by P o in c a r d a c o m p le te a te le g r a m P o u r ta lA s th e A u str ia , in In te g r ity in te n tio n a lly was w ith th in c a t e g o r i c a l l y . " d e m e n ti by in had th is lie !) (1 ) Count su p p ressed s o v e r e ig n lu tt e r s o v e r e ig n n e c e s s ita te d propagan d a 19 J u l y / 1 in fo r m a tio n r e lia n c e th e te r r ito r ia l we sta te m e n ts, th e r e fo r e d e n ie d sh o w n of by and “ I th is th e in d is p u t a b ly th is I ,o n d o n th o t (th e P a r is u n d e r 1 5 5 4 ], Book S e r b ia ’s it tb s th n t V iv l- 2 2 0 .) to in t e n d s , in in N o. but rem a rk c o n ta in e d im p r e ssio n , re M i n i s t e r .) P a r is , t e le g r a m w h e th e r w e ll. b i a 's an sw er resp ect A u s tr ia n In m a in ta in e d IzV0I.SK I, M a r g c r ie d e c id e th e S c h tin m y op pose d e c la r a tio n s fo llo w s : g a r d in g w h ich In verb al O ran ge as to B aron to r ig h ts , To read s: “ l regard o n ly not t o .] (A m b a s s a d o r sou rce j a ssu ra n ces. m ade th e g iv e n not s o v e r e ig n sta te s H a v in g be upon no had B ook r e m a in .” s c a r c e ly fo u n d e d of p ow ers. of been [In had te le g r a m s . th e dan gerou s exch ange te a s in d e e d had to h er Book S a x o n o l t '8 of hns s h o u ld r e m a in in g th is , th e it u n d o u b te d ly does th e r e P e te rsb u rg th e th a t sta te m e n t P a r is w as by n o th in g th e th e th is th e P a r is 218, of fr ie n d ly A u s tr ia , P etersb u rg g ro u n d s e x is t Is a by h im G erm an y m o b iliz a tio n am b assad or a ttitu d e w hen a ls o su m m on s to th e P eters- am b assad or s ig n in g sou rces, [In s te a d th o se W ith P a r is ; P r e s id e n t t e le g r a m s th n t am b assad or in 210 th e th e a lt e r e d th a t R u s s ia n N os. no is o th e r added go. G erm an te le g r a m s of R u s s ia , sen se S c h O n ’s to h im m om ent am b assad or B a ron “ The to th a t H e h is t h r e a t m e r e ly : gard 2 2 2 .] a am ong th a t ju s t a s th e th e grou nd at tru e by, d e c ip h e r a s to n is h m e n t b etw ee n th e p la in and h is titn e , to in fo r m e d p rogress m nde secon d I n a b ilit y m easu re c o m p le t e ly Is h is expressed a in th e V iv ia n i su ch w as a n l’s fo r h im The Ju st Aug. in to th e m o b iliz a tio n . t h e r e s e r v e s i s b e i n g b e a t e n In t h e s t r e e t s . v isite d J u l y /1 am b assad or c o m m u n ic a tio n o r d e r in g . a r is r e a d in e ss a ls o sta te m e n ts o f G e r m a n y ’s d ecree her but O ran ge n ia l.” 2 1 9 .) P A fte r us c o n c e a le d [th e (A m b a ssa d o r to .S e r b i a G er of p reserved th e a bso s e c r e t. d e ta ile d I z v o l s k i. u s. (F o r e ig n M in is te r to F r a n c e .) I z v o l s k i. (A m b a ssa d o r in F ran ce (T e l. to N o. F o r e ig n r e c eiv e d a g a in st th e us you r at 11 o ’c lo o k . P r e sid e n t of th e c o u n c il. b o th P o in c a r d he carry h im se lf out T h ere th e a rose, q u e stio n s c o r d in g sa ry to doubt a F ren ch a to its and rea son s fo r but by o n ly b eg in th e G erm an y. th e w o u ld fir st be m ore rest p e r m ittin g d iscu ssio n he h er su m m on of th e to a ll m e is by fo r p ersu a d ed and a v o id war be th a t born e th e A llie s a tta c k m o b iliz a tio n . by as th e to a llia n c e . c o m p lic a te d p la c e , is ac n eces in F ran ce d eb a te not N o. th a t th a t not 1 0 ), F ra n ce, sad or had to ld th a t e n e r g e tic a lly 76876— 11 me d a r in g assu red th e h im la R t and fe w fo r a a fte r c o u n c il dec w ith o u t th e P o in c a r d a r is V iv ia n i th e A u s tr ia n th a t A u s tr ia am b as had de- te le g r a m w ith c a r r ie d out in fr o m th a t we been have c o n flic t , th a n Its a d d itio n : w h en n eg o tia tio n s upon h er se lf c le a r th e p u rp ose of n lr e n d y The T zar A u s tr ia had accept w ith E urop ean of w id e [In th e our out p ow ers w ere In of th e b la m e fo r s till th is th e n o te th e d ig n ity Book d e cla r e It in on tru e onr w o u ld have c h a ra c te r is N o. fo l a tim e sh e m ade to to o k q u its w h ic h 207 G erm an y. of m ore th e at c o n te n ts, to com is s u e and su sp en se, te le g r a m w ar th e doubt w as us Is th e a ll in fin it e ly a d d itio n to w ord ns w o u ld th ere war h is o th e r E uropean O ran ge to th a t w as A u s tr ia and A ny as sig n ific a n c e , th e in ow n T h is d e c id e d c a lle d w ay e q u ilib r iu m , G erm an y. w o r ld th e any to r ig h t to in d e p e n d e n c e . th e th e m s e lv e s . s o lo n g no and r e v e a ls te le g r a m g iv e n a c tio n had m is r e p r e s e n ta tio n tr a n sfe r r in g a ttr ib u te d and p r o v o c a tiv e r e s p o n s i b i l it y .” been C om pare peace, G e rm a n y G erm an y b etw een h ea vy a c tio n th e c o m p lete Book g u a ra n ty o c c s s io n . “ A s te n d e n tio u s has of 28. th e is r e g a r d in g th is in c o m p a t ib le w as O ran ge V ie n n a R u s s ia 3 0 .] any J o y fu lly hegem ony J u ly h er if and at th e re A fte r d ig n ity q u ite w h ic h a fo r sh a tte r e d th e J u ly ta k e of c o n tin u e d . w o u ld S e r b ia ’s about a tte n tio n d e s ir e of to on th e tim e , w h ile and te le g r a m n eces in c u r r e d good n e g o tia tio n s in s e r tio n th e 210 not A u s tr ia R u s s i a ’s have brough t N o. K a is e r w ith n a tu r a lly th e in In th e com w as have Book h y p o th e tic a l im p o r ta n t , 19 J u l y / 1 A u g u s t . su bseq u en t " s h o u ld O ran ge a ttitu d e of lo w in g se n te n ce : th e of m o b iliz a tio n , th e th e p a tib le th e p ro tra c te d A ug. fo r s u p p r e s s io n m o b iliz a tio n we m easu res th e G erm an w o u ld th e th e 27] w h ic h [In , to J u l y / l r e s p o n s ib ility R u s s ia n o f J u ly rest assu ra n ce d e la y th e w ith to w a it of th e For p r o o fs For to corresp on d s it o n ly to B e lg r a d e . to regard m o b iliz a t io n th e r e fo r e w ere 197 th e A u s tr ia n 1854. th e [w ith etersbu rg tu rn p r e c a u tio n a r y h e r s e lf T h is general N o. th e fa ls ific a tio n n e g o tia tio n s M i n i s t e r .) days a d d itio n C om pare to a ll lim ite d to r e s p o n s ib ility b o m b a r d in g is 2 2 3 .) P P o in c a r d 1 6 2 7 .) c h a ra c te r te le g r a m ta k e n e v id e n t N o. genera l Im m e n se m o b iliz a t io n .” e x a c tly Our P a r is to -d a y advanoed. w ith o u t re g rou n d s, by Im m e d ia te ly F o r e ig n fo llo w in g a lle g e d th e r e su lts. to (T e l. N o . had tim e e n d e a v o r in g “ gen eral ” th e A u str ia no th ese u s. th e not sam e o p e n ly to had has Iz v o n sm , (A m b a ssa d o r we P o in c a r d te le g r a m m in ister ia l to Is to by th e m ore w ill fu lly n o te re if F ra n ce h er th a t a re m in d was to pare p u b lic and a llu s io n days m a d e, in on s ita te d fir s t On ( see w ere G erm an y w ill a to ru p tu re m an ner our tw o a llia n c e . E n g la n d of b o th h er m e to p erson d ecisio n le a st war a m in ister ia l of th e A lth o u g h m o b iliz a tio n but In at of se r ie s m o b iliz a tio n , q u e stio n s in fo r m of con cern a fte r c o m p lete and p r e fer F ren ch term s a of d e te r m in e d p a r lia m e n ta r y tr e a ty fu r th e r F ra n ce, th ese a d e c la r a tio n a d v a n ta g eo u s te a r of th e m u st th e P a r lia m e n t. ch ie fly th e by fir m ly n a tu re. w a r, w o u ld of o p e r a tio n s P o in c a r d of of of It day m ilita ry la r a tio n w ill if us in c a te g o ric a l th erew ith c o n stitu tio n , a p p lic a tio n w h ic h upon it G erm an y A u g u st. d e c la r a tio n su m m on ed m ost are stra teg ic d e c la r a tio n be b e tte r th e c a b in e t la id and d e cisio n th e in 19 J u l y / 1 c o m m u n ic a te d im m e d ia te ly me c o n n e c tio n a sse m b lin g g a rd in g w o u ld to a r is , G e r m a n y ’s im m e d ia te ly w h o le in p o litic a l th e as th e o b lig a tio n s th e fo r I R ep u b lic , w h o h ow ever, of r e g a rd in g d e cla r e d and r eg a rd in g q u ir e d it te leg ra m N o. P P I (T e l. M i n i s t e r .) 2 2 2 .) fo r C om - pare th e th e b e a r in g p ow ers J u ly F ran ce of now and rep rese n ted R u s s ia as so x r a o o sr a ' i v n o i s s h h o n c k ) %• C O N G R E S S IO N A L 37 to w a rd th e p r o m is in g n e g o tia tio n s and te le g r a m 210 In 8 0 .] (A m b a ssa d o r In F ran ce (T e l. (T h is te le g r a m , e v id e n t ly ber as to N o. F o r e ig n th e la s t sen t on M i n i s t e r .) th e been g iv e n p r e v io u s S un day, is to be reg a rd ed as th e first th e sam e num d a y .] day to J u l y /t Aug. o f m o b iliz a tio n . IZVOI.8KI. (A m b a ssa d o r in F ran ce (T e l. to N o. F o r e ig n S m a ll som e G erm an m in o r en a b les th e m oned to a v o id F ren ch m eet am ong T u esd a y, have sig n e d by a d v a n ta g eo u s p ro test fr o m E n g la n d a lso n ew s A v io n , T h is th a t w h ich w ill London and a tte n tio n to tro o p s even d ir ec tin g P a r lia m e n t, w h ic h been a tta c k e d , been r e c eiv e d te r rito r y , 18 67 . by T h is it and th ereb y and c ir c u m sta n c e w ill in fa llib ly c a ll are m ore sa id to be B elg ia n n ea r ly . V iv ia n i F ren ch to Ita ly , con T h ere tow a rd n eu tr a lity to c a ll to G r e y ’s Izv o l s k i. E X H IB IT A ppendix R u s s ia n secrecy r e p la c e d m arks th e 88 in c re a se s : as p o s s ib le in In (K u h l, 6 0 ). c o lo r s . The reserve R e o r g a n iz a tio n (E g g e lin g , 9 ) . 1011. 1914 The begun se r v ic e w o u ld la w in w ere r e q u ir e d 1913 w ith J ap an ese e x p e n d itu r e s reck oned fo r c e 1910, on a as m u ch w ar w ere 2 ,6 0 0 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 fo u r years R u s s ia n w ith to ta l For a c tiv e reserve m ilita r y d e m o n s tra tio n tw o of th e creases sto ck m on. In “ The su m ed F in a l e v e n tfu l by of w ar. ap paren t th a t of p la c e s by T b iB w as in in th e stre n g th o f th e For o u t. th e fo llo w in g E x c lu d in g R u s s ia n arm y a lr y , o r C o s s a c k , d iv is io n s , 35 year S ib e r ia n w as 30 reserve in c r e a s e s and arm y corp s, d iv is io n s , w ere T u rk e sta n and p la n n e d tro o p s, c o m p r is in g 40 354 th e cav n a tio n a l d e fe n se and m en ; The th e th e v ie w e d The G erm an v id e d of and a lo n g F ran ce S ib e r ia n and fr o m The P o lis h th a t G erm an y. p ress th e R a ilw a y s : tro o p s a new lo a n w as A le x a n d r o v s r a ilw a y 11 th e se a ls o to R u s s ia n fro m w ere 1 ,5 8 1 ,0 0 0 o ffic e r s in G erm an , c o n ta in s a The A rm y peace roads w ere arm y th is rush ed to th e to b r in g (fro m by ta k e q u e s tio n s a fte r 1910 (E g g e lin g , tlie and th e fo r c e s fro n t. m illio n up by th e to th e w ere d i (K u h l, 7 6 .) fr a n c s . The fo r c e s th e R u s s ia n s 9 .) im m e d ia te K azan S o s n o w ic e p u rch ased s u p p la n te d c o u ld p e r m it tim e s to w h ic h a n g le . th o u sa n d d o u b le -t r a c k e d w ere an to and w ith fo r e w o r d “ b o o k s ,” o f h o s tilitie s to c o m p le te . be s e le c te d “ th e th e great pre very of (w h ic h w as be cap d e c la r a c o n c e a le d day w as th e fr o n tie r , w ith o u t 1st d e ta il a ls o G erm an 1912 border w o r ld ” w ere of A u g u st, crossed iu fo u r 7 9 -8 0 .) d is p a tc h e s , fa r as w h o le “ The gen eral h on est p ie c e o m itte d but G ooch An o m itte d J u ly at fo u r w o u ld If th e re On ta ry days sto p Is a we J u ly 30, V iv ia n i w ith h is 216, O ran ge “ The F ren ch hopes of th e th e is th e of In m ade or n in e out of b e fo r e years th e p u b lis h w as illu s io n B ook le ft of w ic h d id th a t up any not and in o n ly so w ere p assages a l a s to o r ig in a l th e c h a n g e s, b u t th e re O ran ge Book w as a d is and a d m is s io n a 207, Sehon th e R u s s ia n at F o r e ig n P a r is . R u s s ia n o f w ar upon m o d e r a tin g Its d a te m o b iliz a tio n R u s s ia a c tu a lly I s v o ls k y becau se sa y s: In flu e n c e had sa id e v e n in g P a r is . A t S a zo n o ff th a t in 1 as of on S t th a t T h ese th a t F ren ch m ili event H e G erm an y r e la te s “ d e te r m in e d fo r b id d e n , o ’c lo c k fo llo w s w as S a zo n o ff th e p r e c a u t i o n s .” peace, bu t th a t in a d v is e s “ c o m p la in s s im ila r w a n te d 3 1 st. a d v is e s th e S a z o n o ff P a r is , adopt th e of d e c la r a t io n N o. th a t to S a z o n o ff, am b assad or e x e r c is in g at F ran ce to fr o m h is a d v a n c e .” d e m o n s tra tio n R u s s ia n a g a in s t O ran ge w ere m o b iliz a tio n . V iv ia n i now G overn m en t e ig h t o u t su pp osed That ta m p ered d is p e lle d 1521, te le g r a m th a t a lli e s .” N o. It c o m p e lle d com e w ere to I z v o ls k y , q u e s tio n In a n tiw a r W e N o. to am b assad or r e p lie d h er is th a t p r e p a r a t i o n s ,” be e d itio n th e fir s t r e v e a le d . g o v e rn m e n ts im p r e s s io n th a t b e fo re r e je c t G erm an “ w o u ld d u r in g p assages b e fo re th e G e r m a n not P etersb u rg th e y not a fte r at v a r io u s has b e fo r e London w o r k .” d is p a tc h a n d fiv e d a y s sh e th a t R u s s ia n th e ir o w n P e tro g ra d , 27, The says : agreem ent of th e B o o k .” G ooch. d e lib e r a te ly so r e fe r re d In P r o fe sso r be s ta r tlin g s h o r tly im m e d ia te ly w as a O ran ge appeared R om berg. d is c o v e r e d th e is s u e d g o v e rn m e n ts, w ere th e tr u th w hat been R u ssia n w ork is s u e d su sp e cted , ju s t R e a d e rs w ill fo r m be w as a ll has th e P r o fe sso r c o lo r s , R u s s ia . te le g r a m s A s le a r n e d w o u ld th a t book concern s tered . It of von d iffe r e n t th a t never b e lie v e d g e n u in e . th e th o u g h , w as had th e re The F r e ih e e r by th e and w ork 1 9 2 3 .) v a r io u s L a te r m a tte r, he says, th a t to act a p ro p a ssa g es w ere su p p ressed . in th e m o r n in g , (e n tir e ly Is v o ls k y , o m itte d fr o m th e B ook) : w ar m in is te r fir m ly F rench G erm an y in fo rm e d reso lv ed gen eral and on sta ff th a t me th a t A u s tr ia in and war a ll ea rn est req u ests our w ill be ton es us e ffo rts tre a ted to th a t th e c o n fir m th e w ill as be a d ir e c te d n e g lig ib le q u a n t it y ." The reader w ill fr o m w ar. becam e W arsaw even ( lb .) . w ar, In to c o n n e c tio n th e S t. rem arked, 2 2 ). borders th is On com to th e r e v e la t io n s of 6 6 -6 7 .) m is s io n in oc r o llin g a g a in s t A u s tr ia . goes to Hun and W arsaw ( i b ., th e th a t In F a lsific a tio n s by by of announced 1912 of o f th is U n w in , n o te s fo r m a lly G o v e rn m e n t. In m u st (K u h l, “ The break in 1 0 5 ). P etersb u rg , lin e s — o n e p r iv a te w as 104, crea ted S t. In be W arsaw ) o ffic ia ls (K u h l, A ll R u s s ia to 1914 c r e a tin g fr o n tie r s . great of of M oscow , lin e s fo r tw o in T h ese fro m A u s tr ia n 193 2 76876— becam e su m m er 3 ,4 6 1 ,7 5 0 by R a ilw a y In th e a g a in s t th e m ade in stre n g th a im M ilita r y tra n sp o rt th e re . w ar u ltim a te o ffe n s iv e w ere stre n g th w as n e g o t ia t io n s ." d e c la r a tio n 1914 of iu w ere K u h l, a fo r c e s E g g e lin g th e G e rm a n and d e p a r tin g and m ovem ent out m easu res e d itio n A lle n je c t e d peace fir st (L o n d o n , d iv is io n s . The a c tu a l c a r r ie d p a t r o l s .” e n title d S cb on , 1913. p a r t c a r r ie d iu s p r in g w ere very m ig h tie s t K ie v d is c u s s e s o f c r o s s in g “ Our exp osu re 423, 000 K u h l, 6 1 - 6 2 .) p la n d ip lo m a tic enem y to 1 6 -1 7 ; headed th e th e ready He The s a n c tio n in g in c r e a s e d , V tln a fie ld m o b iliz a tio n , A u s tr ia n und a A ppendix I (B ausman ). S in c e “ 2, 292, 00 0 As w ar) G e rm a n y ’s c o m m u n ic a tio n o f --------------------------------------- th e m om ent S e r a je v o : V o n w eek. R u s s ia n of m o b iliz a tio n s ( I b ., h is p la n n e d 1 6 .) th e day th e e ffic ie n c y , ren ew ed rem o n stra n c es Dum a test J o ffr e arou nd h im s e lf a fte r tr ia l. th e th is 7 0 .) fo r tr e s s e s : T h ese a g a in s t G e r m a n y , la s t th a t d u r in g of (Ib „ 8 2 .) th e reserves G eneral tro o p s fifth (K u h l, sto p p ed . m ilita r y at announced S u k h o m lin o ff’s tio n is T lie m o v e m e n ts th e 1913 h er A rray 1 2 -2 2 ). H u k h o m lln o tT For 40, 000 e x a m in e to c o n c e n tra te is s u r p lu s to coal w as 1914. by th a t of exch ange T h is fo r m e r (E g g e lin g , th e in 7 2 .) N ic h o la s b e lie v e d on R u ssia n a tte n d e d S u k h o m lin o ff a n sw e re d sto p p ed stre n g th w us 19, th e w as C o n tin u a l s tre n g th e n in g of 1912, e ig h th . peace export and J u ly p r e p a r a tio n s , 1 8 .) in c re a se s 4 9 -5 0 .) but im p o r te d , a u tu m n R u s s ia n 205, 000 and th e (E g g e lin g , r e p l a c e m e n t _______________________________________________________________________ or a T RO U BLE. th e S h ilin s k i, (K u h l, on in sta ff th e e n tir e G r a in w ar be re a d y on w ere r e v ie w s P etersb u rg of th e m ilita r y n ecessary. en orm ou s (E g g e lin g , added. Peace For 1, 86 9, 0 0 0 to be c h ie f, w h ereu pon 1913, c o u ld lin e th e s u p p lie s M in is te r c a te g o r ie s o f re se rv e S E R B IA N a tte n d e d fr a n c s . R je ta c h , gen eral lin e secon d equ al 876, 000 f o r m a t i o n s _______________________________________________ fir st a r m ie s . 748. 000 (V o n th e yet G erm an R u s s ia n (E g g e lin g , fo r w o u ld th e w itn e s s e d f o r m a t i o n s ____________________________________________________________ b o th years of f o r m a t i o n s ____________________________________________________________ In p r e p a r a tio n s . 1913 w ill R e s e r v is ts . For on of be— yet p ressu re p u b lic th e Journ al read y, p u b lic a tio n in R u s s ia n D u b a il, R u s s ia n d e s ir in g th e lo s s e s o f m ilita r y sta ff th e w as The u n iv e r s a l G erm an d iv is io n s ; th e X . (B ausman ). G BEFORE T H E m illio n N ic h o la s tu re d To make effective the duty o f France to mobilize and imme diately attack Germany simultaneously with Russia under the terms o f the treaty of 18D2 it was only necessary to make Austria mobilize, above quoted, and this was accomplished through the Slavs of Serbia. That the German authorities were not entirely unsuspecting o f the will to war by the French and Russian leaders is shown by the sealed instruction sent under seal o f July 26 to the Ger man ambassador at Brussels not to he opened until authorized by telegram. The authority was given August 2, after the French and Russian troops had crossed the German line. This communication from the German Government was handed to M. Devignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 7 o ’clock p. m. August 2, 1914. dem anded th o u sa n d not K u h l says th is. th e Duke a lso . te leg ra p h e d a m ba ssa d or a th e year w ere th a t fo rth a d v a n c in g v io la tin g s ta ff, th ey c u r r in g , is 1*14 G ran d su m v io la tin g E n g la n d by g a r la n so next F ran ce sev en tee n T h is t o -d a y IN of th a t 1914 and is m a n ife s t g r e a te r e n e r g y . of th e fr o n tie r te r rito r y . has as to In te n tio n E n g la n d im m e d ia te ly in h er Fren ch Aug. th e c h ie f The and SO J u l y / t F ren ch g u a ra n teed F ra n ce, ca u se an is her fo r c e s has N ew s trea ty G erm an in d ic a te s to u ch F ran ce Lu xem bou rg fo r th e on d e cla r e to th a t th e very is to D u c h y , tch lc h sid ered crossed occurred o f tea r. en tered o f th e o th ers, have a lr ea d y d e c la r a tio n tro o p s n eu tr a lity have G overn m en t on a fo r m a l G erm an d e ta c h m e n ts c o llisio n s French. In 2 2 5 .) F rench and fo r th a t M i n i s t e r .) P aris , th e th e ch arged has P aris , T o -d a y , 1911 m an eu vers, 2 2 5 .) in a d v e r te n tly , MENACES M IL IT A R Y of Sazonoff . th < RU88IAN b etw ee n N o. RECORD. th e to It w ith o u t m oral w ar n o te p la in w a itin g e ffe c t H ere of is th a t th is w as th e ir m o b iliz a t io n a th a t fo r fir s t w hat F ran ce G erm an a c tio n Is v o ls k y sen t and w as b e fo re w illin g n o tio n , th e R u s s ia n s b e fo r e G e r m a n y th a t upon h er says iu part h is to Jum p sh e w a s und N o. in to s im p ly not 218 had to had d e c la r e d th e fr a y s tu d y in g h e s ita tin g as S a z o n o ff on CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 38 A u gu st sto p 1, her "F o r It Is th e day upon m o b iliz a tio n p o litic a l very w h ic h reason s. Im p o rta n t fo r In resp ect th e G erm an but In h is N o. (su p p r e sse d ) sam e 1st of her day a R u s s ia and by day had says, of m o b iliz a tio n The u n til e d itio n secon d , sh e w a itin g e ith e r to “ on th e sta te B It w ere not be and be not th e has by F ran ce F ren ch fo r b o th th e a fte r her on a tta c k e d gen eral in w ar to and th in g s of a w ar w a itin g s im p ly on back w ith th a t w ar con h a n g in g p la n w as and th e have tw o th e c o n ju n c t io n w ar, d e c la r e or of h er la u n c h s h o u ld th is That m ove re s o lv e d to a ll h er; s tu d y in g it had a ls o , If su ch r a ilw a y s , It is of of be d e c la r e d w ith upon her. “ I Von m ilita r y s itu a tio n q u o ta tio n h ere, P r o b le m s of th e R u s s ia , but e x iste n c e , He th e Ita lia n I ta ly as The m ade h ere ran du m any case fa c e in in of of of th e w est of A lp in e th e G erm an y, th e is If tw o us a llie s w h e th e r It U n til it is of h er secu red , sh e in fe r io r ity and s u p e r io r ity of in fie ld p r o v is io n a re sp ec ts. u s. In tim e th e num ber of m en to secu re P art II of great 82 a and m uch b e h in d h a n d sh e' w ill s e r v ic e , fo r a p p e n d ix of an p resen t R u ssia In is stro n g er our w ith G erm an y to as to on every and a tte m p t 11 th e to are sh ow s th e th e fa c t th a t A c a tc h upon up h er our th e as our w ith m ore and us as d isp o sa l w ith in p asses. w ith to th e can ea st th e by th e o f put In to in an of of in te r fe r e d tro o p s in m o b iliz a a r m in g s e r io u s ly be s p e c ia l p o s s ib ly d e s tr u c tio n th e our n e c e s s ity m ake p erson al be th ese th e w ith , r e g io n s advanced by w hat n a tio n in th a n an of P art p e c u n ia r y le s s I m easu res th e d e ta il In c r e a s in g in th e se and fa r of d e fe n se s g re a te r w ill sta te our m ill- have s a id in e x o r a b le th e II of dem ands th e m em o s a c r ific e s . th o se we s h o u ld But in have to w ar. p o in t m akes out th a t s a c r ific e s m uch on ou rs. m arks on year our In n e ig h b o r s ord er to la s t g rea ter p erson al D u r in g th e th e R u s s ia hnve m ade stre n g th en th e ir and are m ilita r y str e n g th e n in g dem anded dem ands fir s t and on M orocco of h er o b ta in e d h er e a ste rn fr o m p o p u la tio n c r is e s sh e sp en t fo rtre sse s. her n a tio n a l assem m ark s. th ree H a ld a n e “ B e lg iu m arm y years E n g la n d has sp en t la r g e su m s to g iv e e ffe c t r e fo r m s . has in tr o d u c e d a new arm y o r g a n iz a tio n at a h eavy w ill has is now be c a r r y in g brou gh t la id out up th ro u g h to a en orm ou s a new d e fe n se m o b iliz a t io n su m s to b ill, stre n g th m o d e r n iz e by of th e w h ic h 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 her m en. fo r tific a tio n s of A n tw erp . “ U nder p e lle d p ressu re dem and w h ic h Is fo r draw n up th a t th e in in th e p o litic a l m eet a ll m u st be p r o v is io n P art th e p o litic a l la r g e c r e d its c r is is fo r A u s tr ia th a t has been r e o r g a n iz a tio n com of h er o verd u e. to o , th e of very lo n g G erm an y, gram so th e to arm y II m u st fu tu re le a d e r s p repared of th e be c a r r ie d G erm an y, of th e to m ost th ro u g h tr u s tin g n a tio n m ake u rgen t a to sa c r ific e s. w ith h er su pp ort The r e q u ir e m e n ts th e ow n g rea test stre n g th , w h ic h is pro w h ic h s o lid is en ergy, can g iv e en ou gh to e m e r g e n c ie s .” It demanded a peaceful passage through Belgium, proposing to pay for damages and respect Belgian sovereignty and terri tory when war ended, and claimed to know that Belgian neu trality had already been violated by France. (E xhibit X II.) E X H IB IT X II. Brussel, I M P E R IA L G ERM AN L E G A T IO N (H ig h ly The to O lv e t tio n th e of even over lo n g th e us we th e and of ItR best IN t, 191k. A u gu st B E L G IU M . c o n f i d e n t i a l .) w ill, It an is The m arch of in no d u ty r e lia b le in a rc h le a v e s G erm an y a v o id p o s itio n a id . In no M euR e, doubt fe a r th is fa c t G erm an y. fo r p r e s e r v a tio n as to w ay th e th e re a In la r g e ly Is sp ite d e v e l s u ffic ie n t G erm an y of in te n te r r ito r y . B e lg iu m , su ch of a c c o r d in g by B e lg ia n th a t r e p u ls e a g a in s t th e th e th ro u g h th e to in fo r m a tio n on to cer fo r e s ta ll th e . e n e m y . G erm an an to not w ith o u t im p e r a tiv e regard as of e n e m ie s th e be on can t h r e a t d ir e c te d a tta c k in te n d m a r c h in g w ill r e c e iv e d in fo r m a tio n G overnm en t French of a T h is of has fo r c e s N am ur. F ia n c e ta in ty th is G overnm en t F rench Im p e r ia l oped But th e se G erm an w h ic h The in her In In to R u s s ia v iew of It is as E n g la n d a g a in s t 319 squad th e h er as as la n d a sea very a r m in g need her we not sh e G overnm en t act of of w o u ld h o s tility G erm an y fe e l a g a in st o b lig e keen h e r s e lf h er on regret th e h er if fa c t B e lg iu m th a t p art to th e s h o u ld m easu res v io la te B e lg ia n p ow er. u n tu rn ed to as an If fo r it is But It e m p lo y 2. on th e does If its part K in g d o m cash dam ages 4. I f B e lg iu m in its soon th e a ll th a t any w ar th e to w a rd on th e p o s s e s s io n s under as a th e peace G erm an G overn m en t is fr ie n d ly G erm an y, th e ir a ttitu d e , by her r a ise s com m ence th e of w h o le c o n d itio n s is b e h a v e s in h o s tility to la id a g a in st to B e l ta k e G erm an peace, to up G ov gu ar e x te n t. dow n to ev a cu n te c o n c lu d e d . th e r e q u ir e d of d e c la r a tio n in of in act about a u th o r itie s cau sed p a r tic u la r th e u n d erta k e s, p reserves w ith in n e u tr a lity and as B e lg iu m fo r and m is u n d e r s ta n d in g , c o n te m p la te u n d erta k e s a g a in s t th e not fr ie n d ly te r r ito r y agreem ent any c o n se n ts of G erm an y B e lg ia n 3. d is s ip a te B e lg iu m a ttitu d e a n te e be to fo llo w s : G erm an y ern m ent su m s im p o ssib le pow er 1. g iu m . of keep w ill ord er d e c la r e s a s be n u m e r ic a l m u st enorm ous arm y, ju st sto n e of fu tu re of a and s till In a w h ic h fie ld is A llia n c e s p ite th e e n jo y s fo r c e s th e e q u ip m e n t, T r ip le no th e b a tta lio n s , m om ent R u ssia le a v e R u s s ia of p u t in to 1 ,3 7 4 th e fo r w a r d w ith a ls o “ S w itz e r la n d in regard s as a a r t ille r y r ifle . us nud c o st. The w ith us w ith le v e l a m arked heavy w ith lo s t sim ila r do th e th e an w ith R u ssia . F ren ch up as su p e r io rity o v e rta k e in of b e in g th a t of a be had w e ll in fa n tr y c a tc h c o m p a r is o n r e o r g a n iz a tio n th a t and be hom e w ill in great G erm an y sh e F ra n ce our o ff th a t s a tis fa c tio n is w ill opponent on r e q u ir e s east m o b iliz a t io n , fo rc e th is by p resen t b e h in d to sh o t. slig h t to it th e in wo te r r ito r y . p resen t even co m p ete corps one a ls o B ut 1870 rea r our r e o r g a n iz a tio n , lo o k yea r at c o m b in e d we th e a in Is b rou gh t as of le v e l not th e arm y. tim e c o n flic t m in d s try who get su p e r io r ity th e w hen in c u m b e n t 76876— fo r sp e n d in g can R u m a n ia w ith arm ed But to sh e le ft A rm y a to Is hand, Fran ce, th e w e ll num ber o p e r a tio n f ir e m om ent F ran ce th e A rm y arm y w ith ahead d is on Ita lia n s , a g a in st h o w itz e r s ) are s u p e r io r ity . A t to th e th e w ere fie ld in to I ta lia n fo u g h t th e a b le th e th e 12 over still at s u p e r io r ity . or p u t in to b a tta lio n s , o th e r arm y W h ile th e in fo r c e s th e by a b le and at fo r be 2 can Ita lia n On w h o le te n ts, a s fo r th e m th a t s u p e r io r ity . h er upon. p e r t in e n t tw o added The u n a id e d . we hand, b a tte r ie s . so th e (fie ld and R u s s ia n ron s, fo r c e s , fir e o th e r n u m e r ic a l r e v e a ls Ju st of th e sa c r ific e s m u st “ .I n p r e t e x t ," in fe r io r ity e x tr a o r d in a r y ta k e rests be s lig h t a tta c k e d of m oney th e an ( th o u g h M oreover, G e rm a n y , A u s tr ia , a n d R u s s ia to be a r tille r y fit a th e an th ir d b a tta lio n s n o ic k itc h e n s On B e lg iu m a s s e m b le s and to s h o .w im m o b iliz e d a r tille r y , fu r th er q u e s tio n m anage is th e E n te n te , op posed Ita lia n opened, in fa n tr y arm y. o f fie ld is o n ly fo r t h e ir to s c a le w h ic h p r o c la m a tio n b ea ten w o u ld our w ith in v o lv e 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 to A u s tr ia fo r c o u n te d G erm an y T r ip le ta b le s have 106 d e v e lo p m e n t o f h lg h -a n g le th e be be n lo n e has w ill our w h ic h h a n d , w it h o u t b e in g p repon deran ce a r tille r y ), th e be th e w o u ld Im m en se a fr a id th e I b a tta lio n s . Ita ly of h er and r e p r e s e n ta tiv e g iv e w h ic h d e a lt th e se w e She a w hat of b ly r e v ie w s b etw ee n fig h tin g w ith p a r tic ip a te . w o u ld in fa n tr y rear 192 w ill in s u p e r io r ity " be been The c a lc u la tio n . d e c is io n v ery F ran ce had can a r m y , w h ic h I d le , r ifle in g a in w h ic h th e ta k e He th a t, “ n o m a tte r w ith not fr o n tie r . s ta n d in g it 57. c o n flic t w ill s in c e a re th e fo r c e s w ill fr o n tie r . of a c a lle d la r g e fo r c e s. c o m p le te w ith a r m y , w h ic h b a tt a lio n s ; i f it her grea t says w ar fig u re as to A lp in e a 124 im m a te r ia l m u st in days th ir d E n g la n d . th e a cco u n t, out of in and e n e m ie s , F ren ch th a t fe w a p p e n d ic e s , b a tte r ie s , F ran ce of le ft G erm an y, A u s tr ia cou rse, m a k in g " G erm an y our out page fo r L u d e n d o r ff t h r e a t e n e d .” a her lo n g at I, in te re s t to o by a g a in s t and be o f th e a p p e n d ix sq u ad ron s, an d s id e v ita l h a r d ly th ree be is book th e up th e th e fo r tr e s s e s s itu a tio n O f case “ W e now fo llo w s : fie ld posal w ill in te rv ie w It th e V o lu m e S ta ff, no in of our • n e ig h b o r s P r o v in c e s In on im p o r ta n c e e s t a b lis h e d and w ill “ T h is “ m em oran du m ” our im p r o v in g p o lit ic a l 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 lo n g not d e p lo y m e n t have and i n e c e s s ity . D e c e m b e r , 191Z. a I fo r c e s “ F ran ce m in is tr y . G erm an y w ill an adds “ U nder I th e “ has of m ade fo u n d E n g la n d n o t c o n tr ib u te th e D on es, w ar be g e n e ra l s ta ff, w h o w ill lie th e can W h ile had M o lt k e G en eral Ita ly Ita ly had to th a t R u s s ia . Von but th e c e r ta in ty and M o ltk e ’s su m m a ry 1912, fr o n tie r w ere and fo r c e s c e r ta in ly tu n n e ls , g rea test r e in fo r c e d b e lie v e I ta ry th a n D ecem ber, our our im m e d ia te ly a tta c k and very arm ed on our th e m . ex p e ct, a tta c k an In d is p o s a l d e fe n se . X I. A ppendix A (R ausman ). to her W « <1 W a th e ir s itu a tio n an at in c r e a s in g have and th e . s h o u ld of b r id g e s, fo r tr e sse s, i even G erm an y W e s illl p o s itio n brough t th in k m ilita r y are th a t th ey to w est tio n . a b e t t e r ,” fir s t o p e r a tio n s book : of E X H IB IT In b e fo re began th e w h ic h m a in ta in a tte n tio n . a g a in s t su m m on ed w o u ld m ade th e he w ar a d v a n ta g e o u s in part to w h ic h e n jo y e d p re e x p ir a tio n th a t of b e in g m ilita r y p resen t w as Fran ce resou rces to , above. ready in th a t He to -d a y m ore b e g in th e fir m ly th e “ The Im m e d ia t e ly w ar E n g la n d , S a zo n o ff on d e c la r a tio n hnd c o n fir m a tio n of w ere tim e c o n s id e r e d a ll I t .” a c tio n . be to F ran ce w as a p p r o p r ia te out th e by R u s s ia n s th a t to a d v a n c e d .” see th e been “ w o u ld w ill fr o n tie r w ho of fir s t th e R u ssia s h o u ld a d v is e s w ar. th a t, in th e to e s p e c ia lly G erm an y G e r m a n y ’s F ren ch o n ly m ore th a t th e n it to fu r th e r d e c la r e d sta te s and m o b iliz a tio n an sw er d e c la r a tio n read er te n d e d th e th e w ere w as hnd I ’ o in c a r ft, He F ran ce an h e a r in g r e g a r d in g m o b iliz a t io n , if a fte r seen “ if u ltim n tu m I ta ly her Is v o ls k y a n n o u n c in g c o u n c il to th a t fo rm R u s s ia G e r m a n y ." a llie s fro m to te le g r a m m in is te r ia l Is v o ls k y s h o u ld A u g u st, t e le g r a m r e c e iv e d but of G orm an order F ran ce ced e 222 th e e x p ir e d : G erm an y B e lg ia n tro o p s, Is p repared, G o v e r n m e n t, and to g iv e to in buy in d e m n ity B e lg iu m . a h o s tile d iffic u ltie s m anner a g a in s t to w a rd th e ir th e advance G .e r m a n by tro o p s, t h e o p p o s l- C O N G R E S S IO N A L R E C O R D . t l o n o f t h e fortifications of the Meuse or by destroying roads, railways, tunnels, or other engineering works, Germany will be compelled to con sider Belgium as an enemy. In this case Germany will take no engagements toward Belgium, but she will leave the later settlement of relations of the two States toward one another to the decision of arms. The German Government has a justified hope that this contingency will not arise and that the Belgian Government will know how to take suitable measures to hinder its taking place. In this case the friendly relations which unite the two neighboring States will become closer and more lasting. On August 3 Belgium refused and the German troops there after treated Belgium as an enemy ally o f France. EXHIBIT XIV. the gekman acceptance op armistice terms. 1. Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice. 2. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within 14 days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States forces Jointly will keep pace with evacuation In these areas. All move ments of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms. 8. Repatriation, beginning at once nnd to be completed within 15 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above mentioned, including hostages nnd persons under trial or convicted. 4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the follow ing equipment: Five thousand guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfers, 1,700 airplanes. The above to be delivered in situ to the Allies and the United States troops in accord ance with the detailed conditions laid down in the annexed note. 5. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation under the control of the allied and United States armies of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine, Mayence, Cob lenz, Cologne, together with bridgeheads at these points in 80-kilometer rudius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the stragetic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to it 40 kilometers (26 miles) to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim and as far as practicable a distance of 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the east of stream from this parallel upon Swiss frontier. Evacua tion by the enemy of the Rhine lands shall be so ordered as to be com pleted within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signature of the armistice. All movements of evacuation and occupa tion will be regulated according to the note annexed. 6. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacua tion of inhabitants ; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No destruction of any kind to be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered, as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation. Stores af food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroad, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses o f participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice. 7. A l l c i v i l and military personnel at present employed on them ■ball r e m a in . Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 w a g o n s , a n d 5,000 motor lorries in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg. The rail ways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 36 days, together with all pre-war personnel and material. Further material necessary for the working of railways In the country on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left In situ. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent ways, signals, and repair shops left entire In situ and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of armistice. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. All civil und military personnel at present employed on such means of communication and transporting, including waterways, shall remain. 8. The German command shall be responsible for revealing within 48 hours all mines or delay acting fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. The German command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs, wells, etc.) under penalty of reprisals. 70870— 11 39 0. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allies and the United States Armies in all occupied territory, “ subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern.’’ The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government. 10. An Immediate repatriation without reciprocity, according to de tailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all allied and United States prisoners of war. The allied powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish. This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the one of July, 1918, In course of ratification. How ever, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and In Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of Ger man prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the pro llminaries of peace. 11. Sick and wounded who can not be removed from evacuated ter ritory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required. 12. All German troops at present In any territory which before the war belonged to Rumania, Turkey, or Austria-Hungary shall immedi ately withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. German troops now in Russian territory shall with draw within the frontiers of Germany as soon ns the Allies, taking into account the Internal situation of those territories, shall decide that the time for this 1ms come. 13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, nnd all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian ns well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (ns defined before 1914), to be recalled. 14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures nnd any other undertakings, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia (as defined on Angust 1, 1914). 15. Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties. 16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier either through Danzig or by the Vistula in order to convey supplies to the populations of those terri tories and for the purpose of maintaining order. 17. Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies. 18. Repatriation without reciprocity within maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other allied or associated States than those mentioned in clause 3, paragraph 19. 19. The following financial conditions are required : Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or repatriation of the cash deposit, In the National Bank of Belgium, and in general Immediate return of all documents, specie, stock, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitu tion of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace. 20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite informa tion to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigatlou in all territorial waters is given to the naval and merchant marines of the allied and associated powers, all questions of neutrality being waived. 21. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the allied and associated powers in Germans hands to be returned without reci procity. 22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of all German submarines now existing (including all submarine cruisers and mine-laying submarines), with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. Those which can not take the sea shall be disarmed of the material and personnel and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. All the conditions of the article shall be carried Into effect within 14 days. Submarines ready for sea shall be prepared to leave German ports Immediately upon orders by wire less, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. 23. The following German surface warships which shall be desig nated by the Allies and the United States.of America shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America and placed under the sur veillance of the Allies and the United States of American, only care takers being left on board, namely : Six battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, including 2 mine layers, 50 destroyers of the most modern type. All other surface war ships (Including river craft) are to be concentrated In naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the super vision of the Allies and the United Stales of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. 40 V e s s e ls d e s ig n a te d fo r w ith in sev en upon m ent of 24. to a ll The In te rn m e n t v e s s e ls o f A llie s sw eep m un days a ll th e and m in e F reed om n avul and U n ite d fie ld s of and and a ccess m e r c a n tile by a u x ilia r y th e te r r ito r ia l w a te r s , 25. s h a ll d ir e c tio n s be t le e t s h a l l S ta te s of and to occu py to a ll sw eep up te r r ito r ia l and a ll a ll th e and of a ll are B a ltic w ith in q u e stio n su ch m in e s of be th e T o se s h a ll b e e m p o w e r e d and d e fe n se and th e w orks B a ltic , w ith o u t and G erm an b e in g o b s tr u c tio n s r a is e d are to be In d ic a te d . 26. The a ted e x is tin g b lo c k a d e pow ers are to fo u n d a t seu are to S ta te s s h a ll g iv e th e a r m is tic e 27. A ll G erm an 28. In bor a ll p a ra tu s 29. to and B la c k 32. to of a ll 33. a llie d No a s s o c i sh ip s th e U n ite d G erm an y d u r in g Im m o b iliz e d U n ite d p o rts, cran es, n a v ig a tio n , by and th e In to of are a ll a ll 2. 1 ,0 1 7 ,5 7 0 sto res be or th e S ta te s p a rts 28, bands in A m e ric a In h ar and a ll and ap are to to p o rts to w ith o u t T o t a l _____________________________________________________ be 9. m a te r ia ls to be lo c o m o tiv e s , road a ll th e p la c e d th e sp e c ifie d by th e Sw eden, tr a d in g w h e th e r in te r e s ts , as th e g o v e rn m e n ts and by of th e w h e th e r e x p o r t o f s h ip b u ild in g of of are G erm an to ta k e m erch ant p la c e s h ip s fis h in g G erm an in or The c la u s e s , th e p a r tie s tio n d u r a tio n D u r in g on of except ord er on in th e th e th e is a llie d 3 a fte r m ay and case s h ip p in g of any d e s c r ip tio n s ig n a tu r e of th e a r m is tic e . to d ays, of a T h is and It not fa ith in e x e c u tio n p r in c ip le m ilita r y d en oun ced one th e of th e m c o m m a n d e r s in act th e a in to th e of p e r io d th e a r m is tic e 85. T ills of a r m is tic e to be a c ce p ted or by G erm an y im p o s s ib le e x e c u tio n fo r th e v a r io u s r e m a in s m e n t, tio n G erm an * H as be in c lu d e s c lu d e s o n ly and R h in e la n d 16. Y ie ld 17. M is c e lla n e o u s of S ta te p ro p e rty fig u r e s ” r e c o g n iz e d th e w o r ld m arks m arket o th e r of as th e cost ite m s is ' a b o u t 7 6 8 7 6 — 11 to o by th e th e r e c k o n in g s $250. to ceded by 31, as 31, The does th e ir several th e R e p a r a tio n of th e s a n c tio n s fr o m vary, and th e G erm an s th e a a th e com e as C o m m is s io n , th e lo w coal g u a ra n ty V. A ta k e s coal w ith 6. 020. 391 b y -p r o d u c ts , m a c h in e ry , 2 ,3 3 3 ,6 0 0 th e a n i to o ls , PAYMENTS. w ar m a te r ia l revenu e 1 ,5 8 0 .0 0 0 (sc ra p ), fr o m th e 200, 000 eco 1 9 2 1 __ ___________________________________________ 69, 337 a c t ______________________________ 126. 29 5 recovery e x p e n d itu r e s of A ls a c e -L o r r a in e , a g re e m e n t, g u a r a n tie s to th e e t c . ) ________________ __________________________ 164, 368 T o t a l _________________________________________________________________________ 2, 140, 000 IV. OTHER e t c ., PAYM ENTS AND D E L IV E R IE S . 18. C l e a r i n g --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19. In te rn a l (th e c o sts of e x te rn a l in G erm an th e o c c u p a tio n p a id by R e s titu tio n s of th e N avy by w ith o u t m et to by 3 .4 R e p a r a tio n and th e pow ers m ark d e liv e r ie s b illio n in g o ld o c c u p y in g ad van ces— k in d . m ark s T h ese on A p r. 186, C o m m is s io n and th e o th e r s u b s titu tio n s in and or (i. e ., s u b s titu te d ) d e liv e r ie s of of m a c h in e s, to th e Scapa in A llie s F lo w , T s in g tn u 188 of e x c lu s iv e but of in c lu s iv e ceded to th o se of 8 0 1 ,0 0 0 in 90, 000 m a to o ls , a n i m a l s — e s t i m a t e ----------------------------------------------- ----------- e q u ip m e n t 6 0 3 ,0 0 0 advances c o m m i s s i o n s ___________________________________________________ d e liv e r e d in te rn e d The m ark 1 9 2 2 ) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 21. sta te in s ta n c e and G erm an y a m o u n ted C ost 22. in c lu d in g c o s t s o f o c c u p a t i o n — i. e ., t h e e x p e n s e s . fir st te r r ito r y , 20. R ep ara 400, 000 v e s s e ls th e m a r in e J a p a n — a r tic le s 184, t r e a t y ______________ _________________________________ 1 ,4 1 7 ,0 0 0 T o t a l ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8 ,3 7 1 ,0 0 0 in in c lu d e V. th e coal as th e w h ic h at 28. M ilita r y E X P E N D IT U R E S d is a r m a m e n t e s tim a te — aged or m is s io n , m arket der, no c r e d ite d th o u sa n d been p r i c e ) ____ ______ p a in tin g s , o th e r c o m m itte e , r e s titu te d d e liv e r e d G erm an bad w a terw a y s, accordan ce CASH p e n s io n and Saar la r g e (w a r s h ip s , w ith in on in p r o d u c ts, and of te r ia l la t te r G erm an s m ark et dam aged E n g lis h c r e d ite d m in im u m . c o m m is s io n under th e in m a r in e , em b argo in la n d 2 ,2 3 8 .4 3 3 A m e rica n b o a t s ____________ _______ _________ (w o r ld L o u v a in , and F r a n c o -G e r m a n 72 p a id G erm an fig u r e s tim e s reck on at not be and 1 9 22 ; are G erm an s a a c co u n t, 1922. w h ic h to m erch ant ta k e n D ecem ber c o m m is s io n th e th e h e r e w ith be C o m m is s io n ; g iv e n lis te d m ay abroad , lo w ; p r ic e , m in e s , am ount in f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e ----------------------------------------------------------------- In con w ith in has an s h ip s o f in s ta n c e , of c u sto m s te r a llie d th e m a x im u m A u gu st R e p a r a tio n p r o v is io n a l coun t to b ecause in d estro y ed c o sts G erm an y v e s s e ls e s t i m a t e ________________________________________________________________________ . w hat p resen t a w h ic h liq u id a te d th e are as paym en£s p a y m e n ts of o th e r p r ic e ; a ll Saar th e re fo r e regarded sta te m e n t, p ro p e rty p u r v ie w th e p a id p r e c is e ly V e r s a ille s , as W e m ay C o m m is s io n of su ch u n s e t t le d . G erm an d e te r m in e tre a ty it e m s , w h ic h fo r m e r " of to D en 62 0, 5T 6 are W h a t is d is tr ic t, 1 1 ,1 1 3 ,0 0 0 80, It r a il (in c lu s iv e e t c . ) __________ 15. (See Exhibit 2 1 : Conditions o f armistice.) X V . (fo r U n iv e r s ity S a le n o tific a tio n . E X H IB IT o th e r T o t a l _________________________________________________________________________ 14. c h ie f. r e fu se d th e m o to r th e c o m m is a u th o r ity te rm s w ood s, fix e d , b est M cm el of r iv e r III. execu e x e c u tio n . under under to above of r e c o n s tr u c tio n p h a r m a c e u tic a l borne h ou rs fo r P a y m e n ts c o n tr a c tin g th a t w ith in in te r n a tio n a l s h a ll th e and b y -p r o d u c ts 13. to o p tio n of d e n u n c ia tio n c o n v e n tio n p erm an en t w ith o f any u n d ersto o d e x e c u tio n th is c o m m is s io n naval by is c a r r y in g of 30 w arrant in s u ffic ie n t bad be o f e x e c u tio n n o tic e . s h a ll of is fa ilu r e be 18 of th e a d m itte d . a r m is tic e p r e v io u s grou n d assu m e d itio n s , s io n h ou rs’ a r t ic le s to th e p e r io d , o n a r m is tic e 48 a r m is tic e of th is e q u ip m e n t, w ith o u t fo r n o t, and te r r ito r ie s w h ic h b o a ts, G ov retu rn m a te r ia ls on m a ls , v e s s e ls w ith p a r ts, sto ck , ceded (in c lu s iv e and n o m ic 34. e x te n d . v e s s e ls and D e liv e r ie s r o llin g th e e x c lu s iv e p la c e d ) 12. D enm ark, th e ir in w a ters h arb or accordan ce reserve E u p e n - M a l m e d y ) ______________________________________ O c e a n -g o in g C oal In in c lu d in g S ile s ia , and 11. th e c a n c e le d . fla g 10. th e b e fo r e U pper m ark, a llie d p e r m itte d N orw ay, on c o u n tr ie s , G erm an su ch n eu tra l G o v e r n m e n ts o f a s s o c ia te d tra n sfe r s of and a ll e q u ip m e n t a r m is tic e n o tify d e liv e r e d tru ck s, are r e s to r a tio n . w ill m a te r ia l Sea r e c ip r o c ity . to R a ilr o a d R u s s ia n retu rn ed , 2 9 , 394. 000 It, PAYMENTS AND DEUVBRIKS PROM NATIONAL CAPITAL AND CURRENT PRODUCTION. be a b a n d o n ed . be 150. OO0 8. P r iv a t e a n d p u b lic c o b le s ___________________________________ 70 4 10 4. N o n m ilit a r y p ro p e rty le ft In th e t e r r it o r y e v a c u a te d by 1, 897 , 150 th e G e rm a n tro o p s on th e w estern f r o n t ---------------------5. R a ilr o a d a n d p o n to o n b rid g e s o v e r th e K iiin e ( p a r t b e lo n g in g to B a d e n ) _________________________________________ 9 .6 1 1 6. S h a re s o f th e M o r o c c o S ta te B a n k a n d v a lu e o f th e s to c k s a n d b on d s d e liv e r e d In a c c o r d a n c e w ith a r t ic le 2 60 o f th e p ea ce t r e a t y ------------------------------------------------------392. 0 13 7. O erm u n p r o p e r t y liq u id a te d a b r o a d _______________________ 1 1 , 7 4 0 ,0 0 0 8. G e r m a n y ’s c la im s on h e r fo r m e r a llie s ce d e d In a c c o r d a n c e w ith the p e a ce t r e a t y _____________ ___________ 8. 600 , OG0 te rm s, w a r lik e b e lo n g in g m i n e s ________ ___________________ _______ _______ ______________________ __ a r m is tic e A m e ric a ; a ll are a ll B la c k of r e le a s e d ; c la u s e resto red of r e s tr ic tio n s p r iv a te be th o se in G erm an y, U n ite d to in by Saar s h a ll o th e r a ir c r a ft, a ll in 5. 507. 6 1 6 S ta te s. G erm an y and and G erm an y G erm an s h ip s or a ll and by n e u tra l and e v a cu a te d s e iz e d S ta te s p a r tic u la r ly H o lla n d , t h a t im m e d ia te ly any and and th e a rm a m e n ts, be G overnm en t s p e c ific c o n c e s s io n s , are and lig h te r s , s p e c ifie d p ow ers are su rren d er, or of c o n c e n tra te d s e iz e d s e iz e d as U n ite d G erm an th e and m erch ant A llie s p r o v is io n in g in la n d A llie s v e s s e ls d e s tr u c tio n ern m ent a llie d as n ecessary. A llie s and to k in d s m a te r ia ls , No and are th e th e w o r ld , fo r th e G erm an The c o a sts tu g s, rrrn s v e s s e ls and The w ith a ll p o r ts m erch an t e v a c u a tio n , be th e B e lg ia n d e s c r ip tio n s over a sso c ia te d 31. and a ll m a te r ia ls A llie s ca p tu re . th e to by s h ip s , m a te r ia ls m erch ant A ll are th e Sea of G erm an to by a ll 1. P ro p e r t y o f th e R eich a n d o f th e S ta te s ( e x c lu s iv e of E u p e n -M a lm cd y , A ls a c e -L o r r a in e , and th e c o l o n i e s ) ________________________ ______ _____________________ Add: P r o p e r t y o f th e R e ic h and o f the S ta te s In U u p e n - M u l m c d y ___ _________________________ _____________ k in d s . handed 30. to up and r e c o g n iz e d s p e c ifie d sto re s, o f a ll n eu tra l and a ll and A ll o th e r be m erch ant v e s s e ls be a ir c r a ft to m a te r ia ls , m a te r ia ls w ar e x te n t e v a c u a tin g abandon lia b le c o n s id e r a tio n naval set unchanged r e m a in to th e bases c o n d itio n s r e m a in G o ld m a r k s (In th o u s a n d s ). G er- to p ow ers. In to ito tn iw l, G erm an I. DEMVKRtKH PIIOM MITEMAt.S ON HAND ANO CESSION OP PROPBUTT WITHIN TUB REICH AND ABROAD. r ig h t In d ic a te d . g iv e n n e u t r a lit y and th e o u ts id e be a s s o c ia te d C a tte g a t any have to to arm a sh ore. G erm an y The p o r ts m ilita r y s h a ll b a tte r ie s , th e G erm an th e o f A m e rica o b s tr u c tio n s w ith o u t p o s itio n s fr o m by and fo r tific a tio n s , en tra n c es m in e s w a te rs th e fo r ts , th e le a v e put on o f th e se fr o m m a r in e o f th e a llie d G erm an k i n d s in be la id th e p o s itio n s to to and A m e rica o b s tr u c tio n s c u r e th is , th e A llie s a n d th e U n ite d S ta te s o f a ll read y w ir e le s s , ac g o ld i. arm y, d estro y ed , s o ld m o s tly scrap e ., to w ere th e LOSSES W IT H IN GERM ANY. of s a le s of s c r a p ), undam navy, or a ir m a te r ia l d e liv e r e d to th e R e p a r a tio n w h o le in AND (e x c lu s iv e or broken G erm an y, A llie s . c r e d ite d to th e The up to th e proceeds y ie ld c a p ita l of fr o m accou nt C om h ig h e st A v h ich th e b id w ere s a le s (v id e of su pra 1 4 ) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- 6 ,2 5 0 ,0 0 0 U U O v J a u C O N G R E S S I O N A L RECORD. G o ld (in 14. In d u s tr ia l 25. N o n m ilita r y m a te r ia l le ft e v a c u a te d te r r ito r y on th e of p le b is c ite s , 16 . M is c e lla n e o u s tie r s , (c o sts care of re fu g e e s, th e G erm an e a ste rn e t c .) — tro o p s In 2 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0 fr o n 482, 000 T o t a l __________________________________________________________________________ 10, 482, 000 ▼I. SUMMARY. fr o m m a te r ia ls P a y m e n ts and d e liv e r ie s ren t C ash on h a n d ________________________________________ fr o m n a tio n a l c a p ita l and C o u n t r ie s . . U n i t e d S t a t e s 1 .................................................. B r i t i s h E m p i r e *............................................... F r a n c e » ................................................................... I t a l y .................................... J a p a n .......................................................................... B e l g i u m .................................................................... O t h e r s ........................................................................ 5 9 ,4 9 1 9 5 5 ,1 6 1 1 ,3 2 2 , 70 9 3 9 ,1 0 0 T o t a l ............................................................ 2 ,6 3 1 ,1 0 7 29, 394, 000 p a y m e n ts and and 2. 140. 0 0 0 d e l i v e r i e s _____________________________________________ lo s s e s w ith in 59,666 635 6 ,0 3 1 5 9 ,4 9 1 1 ,0 9 7 ,6 2 1 1 ,4 2 5 ,7 6 4 1 9 6 ,8 2 9 6 7 ,9 7 8 1 ,4 6 3 ,4 7 7 1 4 2 ,6 5 8 1 ,7 5 4 , 4 6 5 6 8 ,2 1 6 4 ,4 5 3 ,8 1 8 2 5 4 ,6 4 0 538 2 ,0 4 2 1 1 ,0 0 7 ,2 8 3 t h o u s a n d g o ld m a r k s s t i ll u n p a i d . * 6 0 ,1 5 9 t h o u s a n d g o ld m a r k s s t i l l u n p a i d . * 1 5 5 ,6 3 5 t h o u s a n d g o ld m a r k s s t i ll u n p a i d . p r o d u c t i o n _____________________________________________ ___________________ 1 1 , 1 1 3 . 0 0 0 E x p e n d itu r e s 1 4 1 ,9 2 2 1 0 1 ,0 1 3 1 5 7 ,7 2 3 8 ,9 7 8 1 ,2 0 8 ,2 0 2 1 3 6 ,6 2 7 cur p a y m e n t s _____________________ _____________________________________________ - O th e r In t h o u s a n d g o ld m a rk s. 1, 050, 000 e s t i m a t e --------------------------------- D e liv e r ie s in. DISTRIBUTION OF RECEIPTS. m ark s th e fr o n t— e s tim a te — d e te r m in in g 41 th o u s a n d s ). d i s a r m a m e n t — e s t i m a t e ________________________________ by w vr l v 3 ,3 7 1 .0 0 0 G e r m a n y ___________________________ 10, 482, 00 0 T o t a l ___________________________________________________________________________ 56, 500, 000 G o ld m a r k s (In t h o u s a n d s ). If to o n ie s , th is and te r r ito r ie s and to ta l of be th e th e added, d e liv e r ie s v a lu e p u r e ly run s th e fig u r e w e ll above T The yet r e p a r a tio n a v a ila b le fr o m th e of A u b c o m m is s io n In any F ederal A ls a c e -L o r r a in e , m ilita r y r e p r e s e n tin g in S fo r m . are fo r B u lle tin th e G erm an v a r io u s G erm an y’6 f iim a b t g o ld c o l ev a c u a te d to ta l p a y m e n ts 1, On c a p ita l On p o s t-M a y On s c h e d u le PAYM ENTS 1921, debt arm y c o m p le te , fo llo w in g F ebru ary, nor are s u m m a r ie s , 1928, are th e TO c o sts 81, A U G U ST in f i g u r e ) ________________________________ C e s s io n to D a n z ig (p r o v is io n a l f i g u r e ) __________________________________ O th e r of 1921, arm y p a y m e n ts c le a r e s t and coal c o sts m arks ad van ces, ac 2 ,0 2 1 ,0 5 0 2, 504, 342 a c c o u n t ___________________________ 2 6 8 ,1 9 0 a c co u n t: due to An in s ta llm e n ts fa llin g 15, due O c t. 1 9 2 2 ___________________________ 1 ,9 5 2 ,9 2 8 1 9 2 2 ------------------------------ 3 8 ,0 2 3 7 ,3 8 5 .1 2 8 to ta l g o ld or 21 In m ark s, w as g o ld m ark s, w as per c e n t, fo r e ig n p a id p a id or 1 ,5 6 2 ,2 4 4 curren cy; 45 in k in d ; a n d in 15, S ta te per 34 per p r o p e r ty in th o u sa n d g o ld m ark s, If PAYM ENTS IN 2 ,5 0 4 ,3 4 2 th ou san d of K IN D . te r r ito r ie s . c o n v e n tio n : A bandoned R o llin g w ar sto ck 8 2 6 ,6 5 3 M o to r t r u c k s ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 17. 509 F ix e d r a ilw a y A g r ic u ltu r a l 2. 461 m a t e r i a l ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22. 709 1, 451 a c t --------------------------------------------------------- 114, 744 of r e p a r a tio n A nnex S h ip s gross t o n s ) -------------------------------------------------------------- 700, 129 IV i n s t a l l a t i o n s ----------------------------------------------- 24, 830 m a t e r i a l _________________________________________________ 19, 810 sh eep , (9 9 .3 0 0 2 1 ,6 6 4 M is c e lla n e o u s under U nder V : A nnex coke, h orses. g o a ts, and 1 7 5 ,4 3 9 2 4 5 ,6 8 8 A nnexes m etric t o n s ; lig n ite II and c a ttle , 2 1 8 ,0 7 0 c r e d it B y -p r o d u c ts U nder A nnex 1 5 7 ,0 7 3 I V ------------------------------------------------ 110, 268 (a c tu a l to n n a g e s u s p e n s e ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80, 970 c o a l ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22, 855 p ro d u c ts ( 7 5 3 ,7 7 5 k i l o g r a m s ) --------------------- R e p a r a tio n C o a l, coke, an d to lig n ite to to In a r m ie s fro m th e th e and p a id p a id 86 w o u ld m arks of fro m curren t c e ssio n s a r m ie s ) c o m m is s io n s th a n th a t It g o ld out o c c u p y in g m ore fo o d of it fo l m a in ta in e d per cent by of th e G erm an y 1 sta te m e n ts to b e in g of ab sorb ed have OFFERS. been A llie s ” 1919. 12, 1920. (In c lu d e d of th a t th e u rad e we about g iv e 1, th e “ G erm an fo llo w in g fa ilu r e su m m ary m ark s annual o ffe r M ay d e le g a tio n 1, 1926, at aud V er 8 0 ,0 0 0 ,- p a y m e n ts. p roposal of peace by fo r of fin a l s e ttle m e n t G erm an la b o r fo r p resen ted at r e c o n s tr u c tio n d is t r ic t s .) 1921. v a lu e G erm an g o ld G eneral r e p e titio n d e v a sta te d M arch c a p ita l N o te 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 n o n in te r e s t -b e a r in g J u ly of D o c to r S im o n ’s 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 g o ld p rop osa l of m ark s, w ith paym ent of in te r e s t a at to ta l 5 per c e n t. 4. A p r il p o s in g of 24, sam e G erm an 1921. to ta l, m itte d to 0. G erm an to be n o te a m o r tiz e d to in th e A m e ric a n accordan ce G overnm en t w ith an In d ex pro fig u r e p r o sp e r ity . Janu ary 28, 1922. R e p a r a tio n M ay 7. 28, P la n s fo r fis c a l re fo r m s and p a y m e n ts, su b C o m m is s io n . 1922. N ovem ber, F u r th e r 8. J anu ary, In U n ite d c o n v e rte d S ta te s ( 2 ,5 2 5 ,3 1 4 1 2 ,8 1 3 G erm an 1 1 ----------- 6 230 m e tr ic t o n n a g e ------------------------------------ T e x tile A llia n c e buyers its 1923. becau se 9. 2, M ay 1922. d u r in g m itte d p r o p o s a ls su b m itte d to R e p a r a tio n Com F u r th e r v is it to p r o p o s a ls P r o p o s a ls P o in c a lr g 1928. by g ra n te d Cuno su b m itte d to R e p a r a tio n B e r lin . K a rl h im B ergm ann , no not o ffic ia lly su b a u d ie n c e . p r o p o s a ls . th e p a id 50, 074 to th e re fo r e 8 ,0 2 0 8, 8 1 8 , 5 4 2 th e G o v e r n m e n t ’s to ta l fir s t p h a s e la r g e su m s— an end. an c e s s a tio n of fo rm a l a ll o f r e p a r a tio n s d u r in g p r o b a b ly It m ay up be a p p r o p r ia te to th a t th e no m om ent announcem ent p a y m e n ts, w h ic h fu ll m ore fo r of in c lu d in g G erm an y lim it w ill of her ever be r e v ie w in g its bank d e liv e r ie s In c o n tin u o u s ly c a p a c ity — h a s p a id . and T h is e s tim a tin g is her p a s t p e r fo r m a n c e . m in d of e s tim a te s c la im s th a t h e a d lin e s 4, 564 G erm an and k in d , th e of ( 2 ,8 4 1 ,4 9 7 ( 6 2 0 , 8 0 5 k i l o g r a m s ) ------------- X V I. W H A T G E R M A N Y H A S P A ID ---- K E Y N E S . W ith The L u xem bu rg T o t a l __________ ________________________________________________________________ 10870— 4 0 ,0 3 7 49, 000 k i l o g r a m s ) _________________________________________________________________ D y e stu ffs 29, o ffe r e d o f th e C o m m is s io n : 3 ,4 0 0 ,3 8 7 D y e stu ffs 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 w as cent fo r adds p a id th a n u se been p r o p o s a ls : 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 3. lo o s e p r o p o s a ls M ay com e c a b l e s ----------------------------------------------------------- by to n s ; m any ru p tcy k i l o g r a m s ) ----------------------------------------------------- M i s c e l l a n e o u s __________________________________________________________________ S a le s e x a cte d been to ta l E X H IB IT V II : S u b m a r in e p a y m e n ts had He on has advances a g ree m e n t. th is per th e th e p a id 770, 618 of (1 7 ,3 6 3 ,9 9 0 A nnex have metric in P h a r m a c e u tic a l U nder of to ta l m ore of 35 co m m e n ts B u lle tin th e and Spa o c c u p a tio n th e w ith o u t expen ses of 4 1 ,0 1 9 ,4 3 2 converted tonnage, 4 5 ,7 6 0 ,0 5 3 V I : D y e stu ffs r e m a in in g e ffe c te d th e of cent G erm an y C o m m is s io n p o u l t r y ) --------------------------------- t o n s ) ____________________________________________________________________________ C o a l, (th e of per R eserve cent o c c u p a tio n a r m ie s cent 65 per m is s io n . R e c o n s tr u c tio n L iv e s to c k and : per o n ly th e in su ch 5. w a te r c r a ft A nnex C o a l, recovery 56 th e F ederal 39 under th e s a ille s III : ( 2 ,5 9 3 ,0 5 7 I n la n d U nder m a t e r i a l ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- L i b r a r y --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- P roceeds U nder 4 ,5 5 3 317. 804 l o c o m o t i v e s ) ---------------- L o u v a in cars. of of m ade th a t Spa. m a t e r i a l __________________________________ ____________ ( 1 2 7 .0 3 9 expen se m in e r s cost th e th a t A llie s m ake 1. (In t h o u s a n d s ) . In out G E R M A N Y 'S c e n t, m arks th e p r o p e r ty So to or by Ruhr p r o d u c tio n th o u sa n d ceded w r ite r p o in tin g S in c e w as 503, 289 44, 350 ab sorb ed heavy 3 0 5 ,5 1 4 a sse ts : 7, 397, 553 p a id . th e u n d is tr ib u te d 3 0 0 ,0 0 0 1 ,7 3 0 ,5 8 2 T o t a l _____________________________________________________________________________ to ta l S ta te and f i g u r e ) _______________________ 1 9 2 1 ______________________________________________________________ 1, fig u r e s , th e (p r o v is io n a l 1 9 2 1 ____________________________________________________________ tire 2. a r m is tic e su spen se 1, have 3 ,8 1 8 ,5 4 2 G o ld II. fo r c e n t, o r th e in anonym ous th e se lo w s Aug. T o t a l ___________________________________________________________________________ g o ld U nder ite m s th ey ta k e n (J „ t h o u s a n d s ). 1922. a c c o u n t _________________________________________ ______________ 1, in s ta llm e n ts th is p a id (p r o v is io n a l ab sorb ed p r e -M a y O f P o la n d P r e -M a y c o u n t __________________________________________________________________________________ On Fran ce— S oar to P o s t -M a y G o ld I. On to m ark s. a v a ila b le : On C e s s io n C e s s io n . not The of th e 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 t- m e d a cco u n ts s im p le R eserve m a te r ia l A part Item s, n a m e ly , sh e th a t fr o m th ere th e th e p u b lic has have been w h ic h has sh e a lr e a d y h a s p a id d iffe r e n c e s arc to ta l tw o of sets fin a n c ia l been e x tr e m e ly c u rre n t, p a id m ore n o th in g a t o p in io n of as fig u r e s b urd en c o n fu se d v a r y in g th a n fro m by th e v a r ie ty G erm an £ 2 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 to o ffic ia l p ress a ll. to th e w h ic h th ro w n e s tim a tio n have on been G erm an y of p a r tic u la r d is tin g u is h e d , by th e peace CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 42 tre a ty and tre a ty to w a rd on th e G erm any not a lth o u g h fo r o th e r ite m s cost to G erm an y. and d e liv e r e d N ow if m e e tin g jf we m u ch are her are m e th o d of th e tre a ty y ie ld s to as as th e fig u r e of su m of tow ard w h ic h tre a ty fo r th e v a lu e th an w hat to c a l of th e ir real has p a id sh e c r e d ite d her in o r th e p u n is h m e n t im p o s e d on to p rogress G erm an y la t te r fig u re of e ffo r t needed has a lo n e to m ade is to w a rd r e le v a n t, carry but her bu rd en s th e us b e g in R e p a r a tio n th e e s tim a te c a te g o r ie s : 0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; h e r i t is th e fo r m e r fig u r e w h ic h m a tters. fo r m coal le a s t a fu r th e r r a tio n and in su m s C o m m is s io n th e I at about Let us s t ill to area of coal and th e ir it w o u ld in th e m by If is th e e s tim a te d been w h ic h th e G erm an ceded a S ta te ren d ers, liv e r ie s , G erm an m is s io n Thus th e w ith o u t of tio n m ay be a ll sto ck . It th e som e m ent as of be of th e tre a ty to th e know n and th e to n th a t th e d iffe r e n c e a llie d p la c e d c a n t ile to p r o p e r ty a c c r u in g S in c e v a lu e s o ffe re d a fte r bu rd en fig u r e cost som e th e is 7 6 8 7 6 — 11 fo r th e fo r on th e le s s th e th ey a sse ts h er by th e to a lm o s t de Com th e is The e s tim a te if is of th a n one in d u s tr ia l say, o f th e n o th in g ) at a if w e th e to of th e im p o v e rish th e r u b b is h is in c lu d e p r iv a te on of th e Saar h er ow n fo r to th e on m in e s D. C. up to in g p la c e d th e d e s tr u c tio n ju s tic e . It p a r tly It of th e of s h o u ld depends a r e ta k e n a llie s h as, b u s in e s s fig u r e of of fo r a p e r io d o f le ss m in e s th e th a n s ix p e r p e tu a lly up we ite m m ay th a t is not N o one, a by fa ir ly le s s th a n a g a in s t to th e lo w e r fig u r e th e h a lf th e £ 2 4 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 c o u ld A llie s th an of put (w h ic h th is . th e abroad le n t to th e F rench th e to 1923 d is p u te , s h o u ld th a t sh e be sh e has of f in d fille d an to w ith c h e a te d h er th e e s tim a te of th e is £ 3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . to o p r o b a b ly h ig h not of cost to o th is p e r io d to ord er of is w ith by and th e M c £ 1 ,2 9 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 fig u r e , a llo w to a la t e r d a te . th is , one or T h ere tw o G erm an y’s ite m s , p r e -w a r h e r w a r lo a n s cou rse o f ev en ts, of an th e W a s h in g to n , my r e g a r d in g lo s s reach o p e n in g M o u lto n w r ite r s up d is c h a r g e to b e fo r e by agrees v a lu e le s s th e and pou n ds, In su r and b illio n th e se to to a r m is tic e E c o n o m ic s a d d itio n G erm an y a Pay, us to o b lig a t io n of en orm ou s in th e pounds v a lu e in “ good th a t th ro w n and her w ill ” e n o r m o u s ly we th e F rench fa c ts, charges her is on can and in p e o p le in broad th in g th a t c r e d ito r s . w ar her of G erm an y her paym ent rem em ber of fo u r fo r e ig n fo r e ig n in v e st G erm an e q u iv a le n t a fte r p r o s p e r ity th a t fo r h er th e th e th e on th e of e ffo r t of th e ev en t, th e by G erm an 1873. th a t and T h ese r e la tiv e 1919, h is to r y b u lk th a t Judge by we in th e o u tlin e s of c e r ta in G erm an y lia b ilit ie s , If th an and th e in b urd en resou rces e a s ily fo r F ran ce c le a r m ore w e a lth th e real a n o th e r it and G erm an y W ar. p r e v io u s in ta c t, in d e e d a e x h a u s tin g w ay had m oney and re p re se n ts m ost one on of 1871 F r a n c o -G e r m a n o u tr a g e o u s evaded her s in c e ap pears her c a lc u la tio n b etw ee n In a lm o s t th e and lo s s . is th e in c a lc u la t io n s F ran ce th e th e se abroad o r g a n iz a tio n . th e e ffe c ts and of it is has to a lm o s t m y d o u b le as bur d im in is h e d fin a n c ia l exceeded In s titu te an of re p re se n te d fa c e but and d a te C a p a c ity ren d ered F ran ce G erm an £ 6 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 — a n d £ 1 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . w h ic h been in to have G erm an y, p e r io d liq u id a te d th e has e s tim a te chan ge lik e in d e m n ity , th e th e th is th e to ta l. and lo s t c o m p a r a tiv e In th a t had m ade by fo u g h t th e has has d iffe r e n c e s a fte r of £ 5 8 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 — T a r d ie u v a lu e , lia b ilit ie s Ruhr reach es I carry th a n w hereas pay th e I p o p u la tio n had and o p in io n sh e been th e net to c a p ita l n et is at p r o p e r ty p resen t b e tw e e n of course, fo r and m e n ts and assu m e, m easu re I th in k , v a lu e ite m a The S ta te s), th is G o v e rn m en t’s n a m e ly , tre a ty 1922, th e have had p e o p le in b u ilt w ere been e x te n t a p p lie d t h e ir fro m th e th e th a t U n ite d R u s s ia , T u r k e y , a n d A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y , a n d m ore G erm an y a sse ts, th e £ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 head r e p a r a tio n r e p a r a tio n up £ 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 th e G erm an y’s 30, c o n n e c tio n s and th e G e r m a n y ’s som e of A llo w in g w e a lth y ears m er it be to c le a r ly d u r in g have th is a llie s — o r th e w o r k in g to p r e -w a r v a lu e . fig u r e th e fa c t th a t her of c o r r e s p o n d in g m ake in s tr u c tiv e G erm an in of lia b ilit ie s can apart G erm an h ig h e r, h er p u b lis h e d h ow ever, per of su m s v o lu m e , The th e re o f its tre a ty S e p te m b e r Is w h o le pays on The th e v a lu e has as e x te n t p r e v io u s ly h er liq u id a te d v a lu e e s tim a te , la t e ly fo r are, m in e s , a n d to n c h a ra c te r on per c a p ita l, th o u g h re p re se n t its th e to v a lu a tio n (a s e m e r g e n c ie s , as of I b a s is lia b ilit ie s . fo rm e r th e ir p a y m e n ts lit tle m eet th e d e b ts, m in e s th e th a n la r g e . o c c u p a tio n Saar £ 3 9 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 — a s th e of s tr ik in g — th e b etw ee n d e liv e r ie s tre a ty . fro m th e w h ic h e x a g g e r a tio n s , th e e q u ip m easu re a p p lie d th e to th e s u r p lu s G erm an y’s of of n il. a lto g e th e r . and to rep re is p roceed s d is c h a r g e any d e b ts. it c o n fid e n c e The o n ly not On in liq u id a te d w h ile 5. liq u id a tio n th e d im in is h in g m u ch am under G u ir e , to m o n th . been d a te I to in v e s t m e n ts in in te r e s t has ren d er up. v a lu a b le a th e rem oved u n d o u b te d ly d e b ts and s e iz e d p r iv a te £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 p r iv a te a Sum s c o lo n ie s and but m u ch le s s (1 ) s h ip s of 4, and N e v e r t h e le s s , a g a in s t th e to e ffo rts b ank rup t v a lu a tio n . Saar R epara su m her re la te o b n o x io u s th a n by d is tin c t n a tu r a lly th e th e s h ip p in g v a lu a t io n th e th e 3. tre a ty th e p r o p e r ty s e iz e d v a lu e le ss am ount th u s a m easure tre a ty of s h ip p in g p la c e d in of of o b je c ts — o f c la im e d of th e a re G erm an y A ls a c e -L o r r a in e ; G erm an c h a r a c te r . of in d is c h a r g e 2, tre a ty p art p ro p e rty in te n d e d as su r be o f th e none G erm an £ 8 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , arou nd to term s a llie d (5 ) G erm an y th e fo r e ig n it th e y c r o s s -e x a m in a tio n , to term s as e s tim a te d h ig h can on a m o u n t o f c a s h p a y m e n t s u n d e r th e c le a r in g -h o u s e s y s t e m it c o a l, v a r io u s th is are (2 ) w ith o u t but on p r ic e very th e s in c e th a t d a te of e x p la in e d , e q u ip m e n t in to h ow ever, per th a t lo s s in a as are of and ten d en cy d e s tr u c tio n pay p o s s ib le G erm an y v a lu e has in , in G erm an d e b ts th is m ake fig u r e s but con cern . reserves in d e p e n d e n t of th a t c a lle d th e A llie s , w h ic h correct one fa c t a r m is tic e C o m m is s io n , and g o in g to m a r in e , U pper of th e fo llo w in g : p ro p e rty ite m s a p p lie d at th e p ro p e rty m arket of of net and s o ld a its th r o w n p r iv a te c a p a c ity d iffe r e n c e to C o m m is s io n s a m e a u th o r ity le ss and a ll th e th e as The of th ro w n but s p e c ific is d iffe r e n t n a tio n a ls — u n d e r been th e a been p la c e d v a lu a t io n , be not ite m ite m s, of been liq u id a r m is tic e can not been £ 3 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 ; are of som ew h ere 7 her on th e se d is c h a r g e has S ta te G erm an y e s tim a te fig u r e , se q u e stra te d den, in p r ic e th in k under te r r ito r y ; fir s t th e have ow n ers s u p p lie d p r o p e r ty b urd en a llie s ; (8 ) p r iv a te G erm an y put th e fo r m e r by th e and have I C o m m is goods G erm an y r e p a r a tio n , r e p la c e m e n t 6 ow n and m arket m o s t im p o r ta n t a re in v a d e d to burden or at I of rep resen t n et of r e lia b le d a ta Ite m s to th e w h ic h th e G erm an to hag G overnm en t say are, no a p p lie d in p a y m e n ts lo s s accu racy been Is R e p a r a tio n tim e s term s its o u tr a g e o u s v a lu a t io n c ritic is m u nder p a r tia l accou nt R e p a r a tio n G erm an y’s d iffe r e n c e v a lu a t io n th e of of ite m s her th e v a lu e real know e s tim a te s itu a te d ; (6 ) im p o r ta n t c u r r e n t a t th e d a te o f d e liv e r y th e th e G erm an G erm an y cases at su rren d er c la im e d — t h a t to th e G erm an concern p a r tic u la r ly and v a lu e s by by a (7 ) fa c e sen ts th e se m e r c a n tile th re e be a lm o s t ite m s v a lu a tio n s u ffic ie n t assessed th ro w n c r e d ite d can fo r th e w id e th a t of not R e p a r a tio n m a r in e in te r e s t b ill fo r th e th e In d e e d , The th e curren t is a llo w in g by R e p a r a tio n g o in g p a rts w o u ld Two w e ll illu s t r a t e s th e th e se th e re a b o u ts) v a lu e th e G e rm a n s, w ith seem w h ile of o th e r th e S ile s ia ), c o n v e r t o r g a n iz e d F ran ce so a th e lia b ilit y a s fo r by fro m p o rts; The w o r ld v a lu e R e p a r a tio n ceded £ 7 3 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . to w a rd th e re “ r e s titu tio n s ” abroad; th e real to ta l, The G erm an y G erm an y enem y fo r th e c e r ta in a ll G erm an y. S ta te v a lu a t io n , £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , G erm an to to n o te (o r d is c r e p a n c y The w o rth b etw ee n to by by are m a r in e w eeks, is in to S ta te c a lc u la te d C o m m is s io n , p a rty , as it b u s in e s s of G erm an y, p r e sc r ib e d assessed th a n th is t h a t th e d is c r e p a n c y s lu m p been £ 7 9 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , e ith e r o b je c t s , b etw ee n s h ip p in g becau se to m a r in e . u p on w h e th e r th e b oom or of th is and m e r c a n tile be ad d ed of R epa to at ow ed To G erm an y. d e fin ite c la im e d G erm an by £ 1 2 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; m ore e sse n tia l but upon m e r c a n tile and b etw ee n U pper c o n s is te n t V e r s a ille s . o f o u tp u t had £ 2 0 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; is c h a r a c te r is tic s — w e and v a lu e r e p a r a tio n c o n s id e r s w h a t i t is w o r th m ost ir o n , of th e sev era l R e p a r a tio n a d o p te d . q u ite w h a te v e r it to u ch e s one a r m ie s on th e cash £ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; a d d itio n fo r w ith h ead s. coun t charge C r e d its £ 3 9 1 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; o c c u p a tio n , c o n s e r v a tiv e com e d is c h a r g e a d d itio n a l £ 1 7 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , fa ith d iffe r e n c e th ro w n th e fo r m u la (h a t v a lu a tio n , p ro p e rty th e scrap o th e r a now not w o rth th e in d is p u ta b le a ls o C o m m is s io n , P art e q u a lly m ig h t v a lu e b urd en bad th e C o m m is s io n in th e are In c lu d in g v a lu a tio n v a lu a tio n c o n s id e r s w h a t by and v a lu a tio n , C o m m is s io n . im p u tin g p r in c ip le s th e in of fo llo w s : a d d itio n th e se W e £ 2 4 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . G erm an R e p a r a tio n to a d ju s t m e n t s S a a r m in e s , G e r m a n G erm an v a lu a tio n , th e se r v ic e s e s tim a te d d e liv e r ie s d iffe r e n c e v a lu a t io n , to ta l G erm an y On and c r e d it m ost £ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 w id e R e p a r a tio n £ 5 9 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; to F u rth e rm o re , m ake and T h ere (n o t to ta l, as under as a d v a n c e s ), £ 1 5 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; garded (4 ) th e n coal £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; £ 7 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 : in to £ 1 2 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ; fu r n is h e d reckoned of £ 2 9 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , p r o p e r ty we fa ll £ 1 8 9 ,- goods and th e k in d , a g r e e m e n t). and of rep resen t T h ese in re tu rn e d S ile s ia , th e se G overn m en t C o m m is s io n v a lu a tio n , If in ste a d th a t is G erm an £ 2 7 5 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 , U pper of C o m m is s io n a s f o l l o w s : T h e R e p a r a tio n Spa e s tim a te it e m s c r e d ite d . th e re w as books w h ic h d e liv e r ie s c o n tr o l. la r g e s t v a lu e p r ic e and c o m p u ta tio n . been of th e w ill be £ 5 1 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . The th e m ark et have Ite m s fo r v a lu e . coke. w o r ld tre a ty , next real in te r r ito r ie s , th e £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . h er g o ld ; have c o m m is s io n s ceded a llo w t h e ir any £ 1 9 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 (u n d e r v a r io u s it e m s , th e t o t a l s u m b e lo w on a b o u t £ 8 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 0 has in to In d is p u ta b le ceded £ 3 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 th e p r o p e r ty th in k , are e ffo r t advances w o rth c r e d ite d £ 9 5 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 O f th e se of o c c u p a tio n h er p r o p e r ty h an d , curren cy at of su m s w h ic h C ash, S ta te £ 4 1 1 .0 0 0 ,0 0 0 . th e th e C o m m is s io n , lo w e s t th ree w ith Is Spa a r m ie s S ile s ia , by l^ e t ta b le (le s s do th e m easu re s io n th e C o m m is s io n . w bat Our th e im p o s e d ite m s accou nt lo w e r th e term s c o u n tin g dear by G erm an y th a n lia b ilitie s , th e ju s t a th e s a c r ific e s ite m s r e p a r a tio n cost c o n s id e r in g s e e k in g th e p r e sc r ib e d th e g re a te r under C e r ta in fr o m G erm an y u n d o u b te d ly R e p a r a tio n we cost th e Thus is c o u n ts a lt o g e t h e r p u rp oses c e r ta in w h ic h o f r e p a r a tio n s . th ey w h ile th e b o o k s o f th e th is e x c lu d e d e x c lu d e d , c u la t in g of d is c h a r g e are r e p a r a tio n s , are p o r tio n th e has th a t w h ic h are s e c tio n s p a id by sta te m e n ts next b lu ff and not o f th e and to open p ress n o th in g , c h ic a n e r y s u g g e s tio n s are u n tru e. in J ohn M aynard K kyn » » , L ondon (b y cable). E X H IB IT M ilita ry c a s u a ltie s, a a o o a a iv N O is s a a o N o o z\ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 43 E X H IB IT X I X . X V II. W o r ld W ar, e s tim a te d . C o st o f W o r ld [Casualties, by number.] Total mobilized forces. Countries. Total casualties Prisoners in per Total Wound and cent of casualties. missing. casualties. total mo bilized. Killed and died.’ ALLIES. 4.950.000 2,500,000 537.000 4.266.000 2,090,212 191,652 600.000 947.000 4,500 4234,300 907 3 80,000 120.000 152,958 133,148 34,659 44,686 1,000 21,000 12,318 13,751 7,000 10,000 12,000.000 1, 700,000 8,410; 000 1,357,800 8,904,4G7 908,371 5.615.000 650,000 4.355.000 4 126,000 800,000 300 750.000 335,706 707,343 45,000 267.000 13,716 230.000 6,000 100.000 7,222 50,000 3,000 Russia....... France 2.. . British Empire2. Italy.................... United States3. . Japan. . . . . . Rumania... Serbia......... Belgium___ Greece......... Portugal___ Montenegro 76.3 73.3 35.8 39.1 8.0 .2 71.4 46.8 34.9 11.7 33.3 40.0 9.150.000 6,160,800 3,190,235 2.197.000 350,300 1,210 535,706 331,106 93,061 27.000 33,291 20.000 52.3 42,188.810 5,152,115 12,831,004 4,121,090 4 22,089,709 Total. W ar to p r in c ip a l b e llig e r e n ts , e s tim a te d . & ross e x p e n d itu r e s in c lu d e in te r g o v e r n m e n t lo a n s to ta lin g $ 2 2 ,0 1 2 ,2 1 4 ,1 2 5 , w h ic h , i f s u b tr a c te d t o a v o id d u p lic a tio n , m a k e n e t e x p e n d itu r e s o f $ 1 8 6 ,2 3 3 ,6 3 7 ,0 9 7 . [Source of information: War Costs and Their Financing.] Country. Great Britain.................................. . United States................................... France............................................... Russia in Europe.......................... Italy................. ................................. Canada............................................... Rumania........................................... Australia..........................................’ Belgium............................................. India.................................................. Serbia............................................... ’ New Zealand.................................... South African Union...................... Greece................................................. Crown colonies and dependencies. Japan................................................. Other Entente Allies...................... C E N TR AL PO W E RS. Per cent of total. Cost. 544,029 Oil, 868 32,080 266,968 25, S12; 782,800 21.1 15.4 12.4 22,593; 950.000 10.8 5.9 12,313, 998.000 1,665 576,032 1 , 600; 000,000 .8 .8 .7 1,423: 20S, 040 1 , 154: 467,914 601:279.000 399: 400.000 37s; 7.50.000 300, 000,000 270, 000,000 125, 000,000 40, 000,000 500, 000,000 .6 .3 .2 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 Total. 145,287,690,622 69.7 Germany............. Austro-Hungary. Turkey................ Bulgaria............... 11,000,000 1, 773,700 7.800.000 1,200,000 2.850.000 325,000 1.200.000 87,500 4,216,058 1,152,800 3,620,000 2,200,000 250,000 400,000 27,029 152,390 7,142,558 7,020,000 975,000 266,919 64.9 90.0 34.2 22.2 Germany iv........... Austria-Hungary. Turkey. Bulgaria................ 40,150,000,000 20,622,960,600 1,430,000,000 815,200,000 16.3 Total. 22,850,000 3,386,200 8,388,448 3,629,829 15,404,477 67.4 Total........... 63,018,160,600 30.3 65,038,810 8, 538,315 21,219,452 7,750,919 37,494,186 57.6 Grand total. 208,305,851,222 100.0 Grand total. 1 Includes deaths from all causes. 2 Official figures. s Includes marines serving with the Army. 4Includes “ died of wounds” (14,500). E X H IB IT B a ttle d ea th s, U n ite d S ta te s A rm y, X V III. W o r ld E X H IB IT B a y e r is c h e sp ru ch . W a r , r e v ise d to M ay 1 , 1922. [Total battle deaths.] D r. 47,196 844 35,905 846 13.204 ’ 51,481 302 1,148 48,040 36,751 13,506 Total. Killed in action. Died of wounds. Aggregate. Total. Died of wounds. Killed in action. Total. Died of wounds. Killed in action. Enlisted. D o c u m e n ts D o c u m e n ts R e la tin g to D ip lo m a c y . 556 44 1.913 301 T otal.. 1,617 600 2,217 34,548 12,646 258 586 DIVISION 2nd............. 1st............... 3rd.............. 82nd........... 4th.............. 28th............. 42nd........... 2 6 th ....'.... 5th.............. 77th............. 27th............. 30th............. 79th............. 78th............ 90th............. 89th............ 91st............. 82nd........... 35th............. 80th............. 29th............. 87th............. 33d.............. 36th............. 93d.............. 7th.............. 81st............. 85th............ 41st............. 92d........ 83d.............. 8th.............. 40th............. 86th............. 89th............. 76th............. 84th............. 88th............. 31st............. 8th.............. 87th............. 34th............. 3Sth............. Total 12,906 41 50 29 41 32 43 30 23 25 26 11 16 18 17 16 17 17 17 18 14 6 9 10 5 8 2 2 5 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1,357 556 133 193 129 131 99 109 88 86 89 94 69 62 57 49 49 51 56 56 48 53 35 28] 37 26 30 9 14 9 5 8 3 4 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1,913 1,796 3,499 2,466 2,075 2,043 2,026 1,933 1,471 1,519 1,371 1 362 l ’ 167 1,079 1 056 l'052 906 1,055 934 972 787 748 726 653 446 435 199 171 128 109 113 72 33 43 33 17 18 19 13 1 2 0 0 0 712 1,223 741 749 717 661 748 676 523 591 390 404 361 379 376 468 310 403 279 381 274 286 285 128 121 86 63 40 56 47 25 47 27 12 16 11 11 10 5 2 3 1 0 2,508 4,722 3,207 2,824 2,760 2 ,6S7 2,681 2,147 2,0-42 1,962 1,752 1,571 1,440 1,435 l'42S 1,374 1,365 1,337 1,251 1,108 1,022 1,012 938 574 556 285 234 168 165 160 97 80 70 45 33 29 30 23 6 4 3 1 0 1,888 3,642 2,566 2,165 2,110 2,092 1.991 1,534 1,583 1,439 1,420 1,213 1,11S 1 088 l ’ 085 940 1,091 973 1,002 826 777 745 680 467 457 206 1*3 132 111 120 74 36 44 33 17 19 19 13 1 2 0 0 0 753 ’ 5,013 1,273 4,915 770 3,336 790 2,955 749 2,859 704 2,796 778 2,769 699 2,233 548 2,131 617 2,056 1 821 401 420 1,633 379 1,497 396 1 484 392 1,477 485 1,425 327 1,421 420 1,393 297 1,299 395 1,221 280 1,057 295 1,040 295 975 133 600 129 586 88 294 65 248 45 177 170 59 48 168 26 100 84 48 27 71 12 45 16 33 30 11 30 11 24 11 5 6 5 3 3 3 1 1 0 0 34,548 12,648 47,196 35,905 13,204 >51,481 7 0 8 7 6 — 11 zum Y e r s a i l l e r s c h u ld - F ran ce E x p la in . B n u s m a n ; A lle n T a lio n is . R e v is io n th e W o r ld W ar. V o lu m e I. V o lu m e I I . S e y m o u r C ock s. H ills ; F le e t, of th e M o r e l. Let M c G in le y T re a ty . J. M . U n w in , & C o ., London B a ltim o r e . K eyn es; H a rco u rt, B race & C o ., Y ork . W o r ld W ar. B e t h m a n n -H o lw e g ; T h o r n to n , B u tte r- London. G erm an y’s C a p a c ity C o ., N e w E n te n te to Pay. M o u lto n & M c G u ir e ; M c G r a w -H ills Y ork. D ip lo m a c y and th e W o r ld , d e S ie b e r t K n ic k e r b o c k e r P r e s s , Y ork . Ten Y ears o f S e c re t D ip lo m a c y E. D . M o r e l ; N a tio n a l L a b o r P ress, M a n ch e ste r. The F a ls ific a tio n G eorge The B. W . A lle n & o f th e U n w in , F a ls ific a tio n N ew R u s s ia n of O ran ge B ook. B aron von R om berg; O ran ge B ook. B aron von R om berg; London. o f th e H u eb sch , N ew R e c o lle c tio n s C o ., R u s s ia n Y ork. a F o r e ig n M in is te r . Iz v o ls k i D o u b le d a y , Page & Y ork. H is to r y o f th e W o r ld W ar. F r a n c is A . M a r c h ; John C. W in s to n C o ., P h ila d e lp h ia . Un L iv r e L ib r a ir ie Les N o ir du (R u ssia n T r a v a il, Q u e s tio n A r c h iv e s ), la G u erre. su r P o in c a r e a -t -il v o u lu la gu erre? C. M arch an d; D o c u m e n ts d e la gu erre. D u p in . de T ou ry. g u e r r e m o n d ia le . G e n e s is o f W a r . r e sp o n sa b le s d e la G erm an R ene D e M o n tg e la s . le s R e s p o n s a b ilit e s C o m m e n t s ’ e s t d e c la n c h C e l a Les v o lu m e s . D e M a r t ia l. d e s R e s p o n s a b ilite s . C o n s id e r a tio n s D ip lo m a tic 2 P a r is. R e s p o n s a b ilite s d e S u r la K a u tsk y . E . D . M o r e l. G u erre. A. R e la tiv e to P e v e t. th e O r ig in of th e W ar, 4 v o lu m e s . W ar, 8 v o lu m e s . Jordan. A u s tr ia n O ffic ia l D o c u m e n ts, Secret of R e v e a le d . D o c u m e n ts R u s s ia . E m ile D ip lo m a tic th e W ar. The D ip lo m a tic A c tio n L o o k in g to p u b lic a tio n . D ip lo m a c y D. M o r e l. A r c h iv e s o f th e M in is t e r o f F o r e ig n A ffa ir s L a lo y . D o c u m e n ts, de M y th E. o f th e H is to r y of th e P o lic y of th e E n te n te B e fo r o S ie b e r t. o f a G u ilty N a tio n . E c o n o m ic I m p e r ia lis m . N ock ; Leonard B. W . H u eb sch , N ew Y ork . W o lf ; H a rc o u rt, B race & H ow e, N ew Y ork. The B race C au ses & T ru th H ow ’ Includes 2,372 Marine Corps personnel, but does not include Navy personnel. D. Lex N ew 92 143 100 90 67 66 58 63 64 6S 5S 46 39 32 33 34 39 39 30 39 29 19 27 21 22 7 12 4 2 7 2 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E. F. w o rth , 52,629 und th e W o r ld W a r . T r e a tie s . Book 35,134 1919. to Secret R e fle c tio n s o f t h e Divisions. . 1,357 260 Other units R e la tin g The A .4 P . D ir r . O ffic ia l G e r m a n N ew .7 X X . k r ie g s a u s b ru c h O ffic ia l G e r m a n P r e -w a r Commissioned. d o k u m e n te zu m 9.9 Y ork. H ow e, and of In te r n a tio n a l N ew th e W a r . D ip lo m a ts W ar. G. L. D ic k n s o n ; H a rco u rt, Y ork. M ake E. D. W ar. M o r e l. F r a n c is N e ils o n ; B. W . H u ebsch , N ew flSl MV 44 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. B e lg iu m and th e E uropean C r is is . O ffic ia l B . S. rep o rts; M it le r & iS o n s , B e r l i n . The L iv in g A ge. D ip lo m a tic e t c ., 2 A u g u st, D o c u m e n ts v o lu m e s . S co tt. S e p te m b e r, O c to b e r, R e la tin g Jos. to th e of E urop ean W ar, W . XXI. E X H IB IT CO ND ITIO N S 1922. O u tb r e a k OF T H E A R M IS T IC E F IX E D BY T H E AEDIKS BY AND ACCEPTED GERM AN REPU BLIC. The President of the United States, in his speech of January 8, 1918, proposed the conditions upon which world peace might be assured. They included certain 14 points, as follows: 1. O pen co v en a n ts 2. F reedom of n a v ig a tio n 3. R em oval of e c o n o m ic 4. R e d u c tio n of o p e n ly 5. Im p a r tia l E v a c u a tio n of 7. E v a c u a tio n and 8. E v a c u a tio n of 9. a d ju s t m e n t R e a d ju s tm e n t F rench of fo r I ta lia n 11. E v a c u a tio n and accorded access h is to r ic a l g u a r a n tie s 12. of lin e s and a fr e e tra d e. R u s s ia . w ith u n lim ite d r e s to r a tio n b o u n d a r ie s of a lo n g of s o v e r e ig n ty . sea ; lin e s of and in B a lk a n M o n te n e g ro ; S ta te s n a tio n a lit y , w ith d e te r m in e d in te rn a tio n a l in te g r ity . s o v e r e ig n ty a u to n o m o u s, m a in ta in e d , w ith but s u b je c t D a r d a n e lle s opened n a tio n a litie s under to be in te r n a tio n a l g u a r a n tie s . 13. In d ep en d e n t 14. A s s o c ia tio n P o la n d of g u a ra n tee d ; n a tio n s in a access le a g u e of to a ll sea . n a tio n s . Among statements of principles presented by President Wil son to be accepted are the follow ing: It w ill be our w is h and p urp ose th a t th e processes th e y a r e b e g u n , s h a ll be a b s o lu te ly o p e n , a n d t h a t th e y p e r m it h e n c e fo r th W e w is h su ch as w ar, w h ic h W e th is no record b lo c k or je a lo u s y p r e v a il of le a r n in g or and in any w ay fig h t h er, e ith e r of th e W e w is h h er th e w o r ld , o n ly th e in to g rea tn ess, o f p a c ific arm s peace, w hen s h a ll in v o lv e an d k in d . ju s t and c h ie f do not in flu e n c e or w ith s ta b le peace, p r o v o c a tio n s w o r ld p la c e in of w h ic h su ch as to to n o th in g have in ju r e p ow er. W e th e and d is m ade her her do liv e , or not of to w is h tra d e, o th e r p e a c e -lo v in g la w e q u a lity in of a rra n g em e n ts us and we is a c h ie v e m e n t w is h or o f ju s tic e th e re no h o s tile h e r s e lf w ith a and h er e n te r p r is e W e co v en a n ts accept new a grudge W e le g itim a te w ith w o r ld any th e it. e n v ia b le . h er d e s ir e r e m o v in g G erm an if sh e is w illin g to a s s o c ia te n a tio n s and by of of rem oves. im p a ir s b r ig h t u n d e r s ta n d in g s o n ly program th a t of very to secu red th is have secret r ig h t be program tin c tio n to th e can no and am ong fa ir th e in s te a d d e a lin g . p e o p le s of a p la c e of of m a stery . N e ith e r fic a tio n do of we her and n ecessary our p a r t, sp ea k ta ry p a rty W e to u s, I s h o u ld know w h e th e r fo r w h ose sp oken now s u r e ly p r in c ip le one is a p art ju s tic e act upon c ip le th ey th e y possess. no are in is to a lte r a tio n n ecessary, w e in te llig e n t her te rm s m u st w ith speak m a jo r ity to o or to or fo r fo r th e y on be fo u n d a tio n s t a n d '. The d ev o te th e ir of to stro n g no to liv e s , to term s or part of m ili of any t h e w h o le a ll p e o p le s o f lib e r ty and w eak. U n le s s o f th e stru c tu r e th e U n ite d th e v in d ic a tio n th e ir on w hen th e a d m it ju s tic e equal p e o p le sa y , her d o m in io n . c o n crete p r in c ip le liv e m o d i fr a n k ly d e a lin g sp ok esm en is im p e r ia l o th e r p r in c ip le ; a n d read y any R e ic h s ta g th e r ig h t o f its can. her e v id e n t p r in c ip le r u n s t h r o u g h It th e ir is w hom a n o th e r , w h e th e r m ade in te r n a tio n a l and to any creed An o u tlin e d . it to th e m en have w ith c o u ld But th e n a tio n a litie s , sa fe ty su ggest p r e lim in a r y d o u b t o r q u e s tio n . program and a we and have fu r th e r to in s titu tio n s . as th a t th e y p resu m e honor, of and th is of .S t a t e s th is p r in e v e r y th in g On July 4, 1918, the President of the United States declared the issue of the war to be one between democracy and autocracy and that the settlement must be final, and made the following declarations: 1. The r a t e ly , d e s tr u c tio n s e c r e tly , w o r ld ; or, t io n 2. to it v ir tu a l The e ig n ty , if of can not e c o n o m ic b a s is of a te ly concern ed, and v a n ta g e th e of fr e e any s e ttle m e n t fo r 8. each any its be a r b itr a r y ow n p r e s e n t ly of every o th e r by 11 an yw h ere c h o ic e d is tu r b d e stro y e d , a t a cce p ta n ce not o th e r th e q u e s tio n , a rra n g em e n t, of upon n a tio n sa k e o f Its th e sam e or o f th a t th a t th e th e can p eace sep a of th e le a s t its red u c te r r ito r y or sover w h e th e r of p o litic a l r e la tio n s h ip , s e ttle m e n t th e b a s is o f th e of ow n T h e c o n s e n t o f a ll n a tio n s 76876— pow er s in g le im p o t e n c e . s e ttle m e n t of #f and to p e o p le w h ic h e x te r io r and th e p e o p le upon m ay d e s ir e a th e im m e d i m a t e r ia l in te r e s t o r in flu e n c e be govern ed p r in c ip le s o f h o n o r by It is a war to make the against every such power as war of emancipation. Not free from constant fear or daily tasks and know that their masters. nations and peoples of the world secure the German autocracy represents. It Is a until it is won can men everywhere live breathe freely while they go about their governments are their servants and not On September 27 President Wilson, in opening the Liberty loan drive, declared the following five principles: n a tio n a lity . o f R u m a n ia , S e r b ia , a n d r e la tio n s In his Labor Day message of September 1 President Wilson said: A ls a c e -L o r r a in e . A u s t r ia -H u n g a r y . a lle g ia n c e te r r ito r ia l T u r k is h fr e e of of c la im s . o f B e lg iu m r e s to r a tio n to d ip lo m a c y . sea s. c o lo n ia l te r r ito r y ; p e o p le s open e q u a lity te r r ito r y ; r e s to r a tio n A u to n o m y th e and gu a ra n teed . of R u ssia n 10. upon upon a t, b a r r ie r s ; a rm a m e n ts 6. S e r b ia a r r iv e d mon law o f civilized society that govern the Individual citizens of all modern States In their relations with one another, to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundations of a mutual respect for right. 4 . The establishment, of an organization for peace which shall make It certain that the combined power of free nations will check every Invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit, nnd by which every international readjustment that can not be amicably agreed upon by the people directly concerned shall be sanctioned. ad d iffe r e n t or m a stery . In t h e i r c o n d u c t t o w a r d o f resp ect fo r th e cora- 1. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. 2. No special or separate interest of any single nation, or any group of nations, can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all. 8. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants or under standings within the general or common family o f the League of Nations. 4. There can be no special selfish economic combinations within the league, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control. 5. A ll International agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. It is further stated that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations. It was known to the German Government that President Wil son spoke as the representative of the allied and associated powers, and on October 4, 1918. Prince Maximilian, of Baden, in notes transmitted to President Wilson by wireless, offered to make peace on the basis of President Wilson’s address of Janu ary 8, 1918, and his later pronouncemeirts, and to conclude an armistice, and said: The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take a hand in the restoration of peace, acquaint all belligerent states with this request, and invite them to send plenipoten tiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Con gress of January 8, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations. W ith a view to avoiding further bloodshed the German Government request* the immediate conclusion of an armistice en land, on water, and in the air. The President replied desiring to know if the German Gov ernment spoke for the German people and demanded a with drawal o f German troops from allied territory as an evidence of good faith. The Gevmans replied October 12, accepting in unqualified manner the President’s proposals in the following language: The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President W ilson in his address of January 8 and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object In entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application o f these terms. The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Gov ernment of the United States also take the position taken by President W ilson in bis address. The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. The German Government sug gests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commis sion for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation. The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibil ity for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and In agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The chancellor, supported in all his actions by the will of the majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD On October 14 the President replied demanding the absolute overthrow of the Kaiser and the house of Hohenzollern and the cessation of illegal and inhumane practices. The Germans replied on October 20, agreeing to the annihila tion of the Kaiser’s power and all the conditions, but protesting the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions which they vigor ously disclaimed, as follow s: T h e G erm an In h u m a n e th e re b y G o v e rn m en t p ro te sts a c tio n s a g a in s t d e s tr u c tio n s m ade th e w ill a g a in s t G erm an a lw a y s f a r a s is p e r m it te d be a g a in s t th e th e G erm an p e o p le . For th e n ecessary, and th ey by in t e r n a t io n a l la w . reproach la n d and o f ille g a l a n d sea c o v e r in g are fo r c e s of a c a r r ie d T h e G erm an and retrea t o u t In so tro o p s a re u nd er t h e m o s t s t r ic t in s tr u c t io n to s p a r e p r iv a te p r o p e r ty a n d to e x e r c is e c a re fo r best th e occu r p o p u la tio n in s p ite G erm an to th e o f th ese G overnm en t of th e ir in s tr u c tio n s fu rth e r d e n ie s s h ip s h a s e v e r p u r p o s e ly d e s tr o y e d G erm an fa c ts up by n eu tra l g u ilty th a t W h ere a r e b e in g th e G erm an life b o a ts w ith G o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e s , w ith b e c le a r e d a b ility . th e regard to tra n s g r e s s io n s p u n is h e d . navy in The sin k in g th e ir p a s s e n g e r s . The a ll th o s e c h a r g e s , t h a t t h e c o m m is s io n s . The Germans advised the President that a new government had been adopted In Germany “ in complete accordance with the representation of the people based on equal, universal, direct franchise.” On October 23, 1918, the President of the United States re plied to the effect that having received such assurances from the German Government he felt he could not decline to take up with the associated Governments the question of an armis tice; that the armistice must leave the associated powers in a position to enforce any arrangements that might be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Ger many Impossible; that if such an armistice was suggested by the military advisers of the associated nations the acceptance of its terms by Germany would afford the best concrete evi dence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and princi ples of peace from which the whole action proceeded. The German Government on October 27 replied accepting the terms, and said: The G erm an P r e s id e n t of G overnm en t th e U n ite d has ta k e n S ta te s. r e a c h in g c h a n g e s t h a t h a v e b ee n in th e are G erm an b e in g b o th co n d u cted a c tu a lly s o n c lu s io n s . m an be it c o n s titu tio n a l and in fir s t h is step a now ’ pow ers a w a its to w a rd aw are o u t, a n d and th e pow er are a ls o peace, an th e th e a r e b e in g c a r r ie d o u t, peace in w h ose to m ake to n e g o tia tio n s hands th e it. a r m is tic e P r e s id e n t of of fa r - su b je c t fo r as an sw er th e th a t g o v ern m en t, p r o p o s a ls ju s t a th e is c a r r ie d p e o p le ’s m ilita r y of P r e s id e n t stru c tu re , c o n s t itu tio n a lly , The G overnm en t th e by c o g n iz a n c e The rests, d e c id in g The G er w h ic h has son fo r c e to th e fo r "by w h ic h b e fo r e tw e en in v e ste d th e se r ie s Thus eyes of a u th o r ity of th e G overn m en t fu n d a m e n ta l com es fu tu re and to a a cts, c lo s e a g e n e r a tio n s . a s p ir in g a r ig h ts fo r c e s, n ew of th e The a llie d p e r io d w h ic h D e s p ite it has a ll com es p er sta n d s s t r u g g le ren d ered in be p o s s ib le g o v e rn m e n ts w h ic h S ta te s th e and w h ic h fo llo w , G overn m en t d e v e lo p m e n t w h ic h o f th is has G erm an th ey of have g iv e n p assed c a r e fu l b etw ee n th e im p e r is h a b ly re w ar. G o v e r n m e n t. d e c la r e G erm an y on th e ir th e c o n s id e r a tio n to P r e s id e n t th e S u b je c t w illin g n e ss term s e n u n c ia te d m u st in h is p o in t d e s c r ib e d as su bseq u en t o u t, th e of peace s o m e o f w h ic h th ey th a t of peace of th e cor U n ite d q u a lific a tio n s peace dow n in w ith th e th e P r e si th e p r in c ip le s o f s e t tl e c o u ld 2, se a s, is not on a ccep t. th is r e la tin g open to They to w hat v a r io u s Is in te r * m u s t th e r e fo r e w h en th e y en ter s u b je c t c o n fe re n c e . F u r t h e r , in gress th e m ake la id c la u s e th e r e se r v e to th e m s e lv e s c o m p le te fr e e d o m th e of a d d resses. h ow ever, fr e e d o m to to d e n t ’ s a d d r e s s t o C o n g r e s s i n J a n u a r y , 1918, a n d m en t T hey order tre m e n d o u s t h e w o n d e r fu l a c h ie v e m e n t s resp on den ce u s u a lly K a ise r ’s th a t The notes between the Government of the United States and the German Government in their complete continuity, setting forth the proposed bases of peace, were immediately trans mitted by the President of the United States to the supreme war council, and Germany was so notified in his note of Octo ber 28. Clemenceau turned these notes over to Foch, who summoned Petain, Haig, and Pershing to read the correspond ence to them and ask their advice. On the 26th Foch handed the military terms of the armistice to Clemenceau at the Trianon Palace Hotel, the meeting place of the supreme war council in Versailles. The representatives of the Entente Governments immedi ately convened there to consider the terms laid before them and to come to a conclusion as to their acceptance or rejec tion ; to decide whether an armistice should be granted and peace made upon the basis offered, or the offer of an armistice refused and surrender demanded. They reached a final con clusion on November 4, accepting the basis on which the Ger mans agreed to surrender as fixed by President Wilson, hav ing occupied a period of nine days in deliberating upon the entire contract. The representatives of the Entente Governments at the Trianon Palace Hotel in the above conference were Mr. Bal four; Prime Minister Lloyd-George, the foreign minister; the secretary of state for w a r; the first lord of the Admiralty; the high commissioner to the United States, Lord Reading; the chief of the general staff, Field Marshal H aig; the first sea lord, Admiral Wemyss; and Mr. Bonar Law, all of whom represented Great Britain. The French Government was represented in like fashion by Clemenceau, by Foreign Minister Piclion, and most of the mem bers of the French Government. The United States was represented by General Bliss, Colonel House, Admiral Benson, etc. The Italian leaders were there. In all, 24 delegates actively participated and reached the following conclusion, to w it: p r e ta tio n s , tra n sfers p e o p le . honor a p e o p le i t s e l f in s h a ll p r o c la m a tio n . P repared , our d e s c r ib e d On October 28 Emperor William issued the following decree indorsing the constitutional amendments promulgated by the Reichstag: in to to v e a le d 45 th e Jan u ary c o n d itio n s o f peace 8, P r e s id e n t 1618, to r ie s m u s t be r e s to r e d th a t no th e y u n d e r sta n d a s w e ll a s d ou bt o u g h t to dam age done to b y th e a g g r e ssio n th a t th e e x ist dow n w hat w ill p o p u la tio n of in h is a d d r e s s d e c la r e d e v a c u a te d as to c o m p e n sa tio n th e c iv ilia n la id and th is be th a t fr e e d . The p r o v is io n m ade th e by A llie s C on te r r i A llie s im p lie s . G erm an y and o f G e m n a n y b y la n d , b y sea , a n d fr o m to in v a d e d fe e l By fo r it a ll th e ir p ro p e rty th e a ir. 7 .6 8 7 8 — 1 1 W A S H I N G T O N : G O V E R N M ifiN T P R I N T I N G O P T I C S : 1093