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/ Election and Recall of Federal Judges. ABSTKACT . V OF HON. R O B E R T ) SPEECH OF L. 0 ¥ E N g Monday, July SI, 1911. [Congressional Record, p. 3687.] Mr. OWEN. Mr. President, I am moved to offer this bill for the election and recall of Federal judges, and to discuss it, in connection with the Arizona constitution. The people of that State propose the right to elect and recall all officials, including judges, by a vote of the electorate. , A BST RA CT OF ARGUMENT. n a I shall endeavor to show the justification of the right of election and recall of judges—■ First. By precedents, showing that many States do elect their judges and that all of the 46 States do have the explicit right to recall their judges by the legislature, or automatically recall by a short or fixed tenure of office. Second. That the election and recall of judges is justified by sound reason and common sense. Third. That the recall of judges is justified in a peculiar sense in this Republic at this time, for the reasons—first, the Federal courts have unlawfully assumed the right to declare acts o f Congress unconstitutional; second, have undertaken to invade the legislative function of Congress by judicial legisla tion ; third, have overridden the rights of State laws in a similar manner, either on the charge that such State laws were uncon stitutional or that such State laws were invalid on grounds of policy; fourth, such courts have become tyrannical by denying jury trial in contempt cases, inconsiderate in injunction cases, and so forth, and that the reason of this bad behavior is due to the fact that the judiciary is not responsible to the people either by election or recall. The election and recall of Federal judges would abate the present jealousy felt by the States against the Federal Govern ment and bring into harmonious relation the States and Nation. I shall examine the argument of judicial infallibility and answer it. I shall endeavor to show that the Constitution of the United States abundantly justifies Congress to follow the example of the States and provide both the election and the recall of Federal judges. I shall endeavor to show that the time has come when the liberties of the American people require the exercise of this con stitutional power, or if it be deemed unconstitutional by Con gress, then that Congress should submit an amendment to the Constitution to provide for this and other relief by establishing an easy means of amending the Constitution. T H E ARGUM ENT. ' * Mr. President, the bill which I now submit proposes to put the recall of Federal judges in the hands of the Congress of the United States, while the Arizona constitution proposes to 7197— 10319 2 put the recall of .judges in the hands of the electorate of that State. They are the sovereign power, they are the governing power, and if the court has a bias against the interest of the people and the people wish to recall for that purpose that bias need not be named as a ground for such action. It need not be mentioned. No reason is necessary to be assigned why the sov ereign power of the people of this country should be exercised in recalling any public servant. It has a right to be exercised without assigning reasons. To assign reasons is to discredit the incumbent, while re moval without assignment of reasons is the mildest method of dealing with a public servant whose service is no longer desired. And self-governing people should govern themselves without apology or need to assign reasons in the exercise of the right of self-government. The mere fact that the people do not like a judge and do not desire him to serve them justifies recall. He has no function, no public office, or public dignity except as it is bestowed upon him by the people themselves, yet the Tory argu ment is constantly advanced—that judges ought not to be re called, that they ought to be independent of the people, that they ought to have office for life whether their service is acceptable to the people or not. There is no sound sense and no good reason in this contention, and it impairs the right o f self-government and liberties of a free people. Such a policy can only result in a judicial oligarchy. THE T E O rL E ARE C O N S E R V A T IV E . It will be contended by some that the recall of judges might safely be left to the National Legislature or to the State legis latures, but should not be left to the electorate, because the electorate would not be so conservative in the exercise of the power to recall a judge as their representatives in the legis lature. The answer to this is that the electorate of an American State and of any of the American States is abundantly conservative and moves very slowly, more slowly than their progressive rep resentatives would move. A political party is controlled by caucus and in convention, and is easily moved by passion or impulse. The people in their peaceful homes or in the quiet seclusion of a voting booth are not so easily moved. * * * * * * * The reactionary argument that the people are turbulent, un duly excitable, that they are wild and visionary, that they are unduly passionate, that they comprise an irresponsible mob unworthy to be trusted with power, conies with poor grace from those who hold their honors, their dignities, and their salaries from these same people. The long-suffering patience of the people is best evidenced by the forbearance with which the people permit men in public service to give currency and approval to these unfounded and absurd criticisms of the great American electorate. IF PBOPLE ARE IN T E L L IG E N T WHY ARE JU D G E S? THEY NOT ENOUGH IN T E L L IG E N T TO ELECT ENOUGH AND RECALL TO ELECT SEN ATORS, AND RECALL * * * * * * * Every Member of Congress is elected by direct vote of the people. Have the people intelligence enough to elect Senators 7107— 10319 3 and Members of the House, and yet do they lack intelligence to elect or to recall a judge? Would they recall a Senator or a Member of the House who performed his duty faithfully and truly represented his constituency? * * * * * * * THE C H IE F VALUE OF T H E RECALL W IL L BE FOUND IN M A K IN G IT S USE U N NECESSARY. Mr. President, the chief value of the recall will not be the exercise of this power in actually recalling judges, but the con trary. If the power of recall exists, the conduct of judges will be so exemplary, so satisfactory to the people of the United States, that no recall of any Federal judge would ever be necessary. The moment the recall went into effect the courts would promptly discontinue their unauthorized, unconstitu tional, and grossly improper conduct of declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional. The Federal courts would no longer, because of their views of public policy, amend acts of Congress by inserting words in important statutes which Con gress had refused to insert, as the Supreme Court, in substance, did in its opinion in the Standard Oil case and in the Tobacco Trust case. The courts would no longer deal with undue se verity in contempt cases, and government by injunction would cease. The right of recall and the power of recall would make the recall itself unnecessary. PRECEDENTS---- N EARLY A L L T H E STATES DO ELECT T H E IR JUDGES. Mr. President, when our Federal Constitution was adopted in 1787 none of the judges were elected by the people, although there was a greatly restricted suffrage; but since that time, although the suffrage has been greatly enlarged, so that we have almost universal manhood suffrage and in five States woman’s suffrage, yet with the growth of modern Democracy or progressive Republicanism very many of the States have adopted the doctrine of electing judges and giving them fixed terms of office. For example: (Here follow provisions for electing or appointing judges in the 4G States.) * * * * * * * It will thus be seen that 36 States elect the judges by popu lar vote; Connecticut, Georgia, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia elect by the general assembly; and Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and New Jersey appoint. All of the States have the recall by fixed tenure, except Massachu setts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, all of which recall by the legislature. Thirty-two o f the States provide by constitu tion for recall of judges by the legislature. It is therefore substantially the unanimous opinion of all the States that judges should hold by fixed tenure and be subject to the automatic recall of short terms or by resolution of the legislature. When the Constitution of the United States was adopted, in many States the legislatures directly elected the judiciary, as in Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Delaware, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, and they exercised con trol over the judges by fixing their term o f office “ during good behavior,” as was done in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, 7197— 10319 4 and by a short tennre o f office o f one year, a s in Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Georgia, and by the right of recall by an ad dress o f the legislature, a s in M assachusetts, New H am pshire, M aryland, D elaw are, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania. THE RECALL OP JUD G ES BY ST A T E S . '■ M any of the States have exercised and now exercise the right o f recall of the ju d iciary by the address of the legislatures. F or e x a m p le : (H ere follow provisions governing the recall in 32 States.) * * * * * # * In m any o f the States— A labam a, D elaw are, Florida, K en tucky, Louisiana, M ichigan, M ississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, T exas, and so forth—-the language is nsed in the constitution that where the offense charged is not sufficient ground for impeachm ent that judges m ay be recalled or re moved by address o f the legislature. v IM P E A C H M E N T IS M ERELY A FORM OF RECALL. I t is not denied that judges should be impeached when guilty of high crimes. A ll the State constitutions, and the United States Constitution also, provides for this, and it is justified by reason. B u t impeachment is fa r more serious than recall. Im peachments involve the conviction for crim inal conduct. The recall is a much more benign remedy, and can be invoked where the fa u lt of the judge or the reason for rem oval is not so great as in the case of impeachm ent and m ay be Invoked w ith honor to the judge who h as become infirm and who m ay for his own good be retired on a pension. A ll of the States provide for recalling judges by impeachment, but this recall carries dis grace. T H E SH O RT TENURE OF O FFICE OF A JUDGE IS A FORM OF RECALL. M r. President, the short tenure o f office is a form o f recall, by virtue o f which the people who elect judges or have them elected by the legislature, or appointed by the governor, prevent them from becoming a judicial oligarchy, prevent them from becom ing tyrannical, and prevent them from becoming judicial rulers or indulging any unseemly exercise o f power by recalling them w ith a short tenure of office. A s I pointed out, three of the States when the Constitution w as fram ed elected judges only fo r 12 months. It is w onderful, when a careful exam ination is made, to see how universally the people of this country have provided against judicial oligarchy in the S tates by a fixed tenure of office. I call attention to this record, giving all of the States in order, the number of years for w hich the higher State judges are elected, and how elected or appointed, and the number o f these States which at the sam e tim e, in addition to the short tenure, exercise the right of recall directly through the legislature. T h irty-fou r of the States elect judges by the qualified electors, six others elect judges by the general assembly, and only six States appoint by the governor and council. Forty-three States exercise autom atic recall by the fixed or short tenure o f office and 32 States recall directly by the legislatu re; and no State fa ils to have the right o f recall either by the short or fixed tenure or by tbe legislature. 7197— 10319 TENURE OF O FF IC E OF STATE JUDGES. ETC. ' Alabama, 5 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified electors of State. Arkansas, 8 years. Elected by qualified electors of State. California, 12 years. Recall by people’s vote (pending). Elected by qualified electors of State. Colorado, 9 years. Elected by qualified electors of State. Connecticut, 8 years. Recall by legislature. Appointed by general assembly. Delaware, 12 years. Recall by legislature. Appointed by governor. Florida, G years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified electors of State. ,, Georgia. 6 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by general assembly. Idaho, 6 years. Elected by qualified electors of State. Illinois, 9 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of each district. Indiana, 6 years. Recall as by law. Elected by electors of State at large. Iowa, 6 years. Elected by qualified electors of State. Kansas, 6 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified electors of State. Kentucky, 8 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by districts. Louisiana, 12 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of State. Maine, 7 years. Recall by legislature. Appointed by governor. Maryland, 15 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of districts. Massachusetts, during good behavior. Recall by legislature. Ap pointed by governor. Michigan, 8 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of State. Minnesota, G years. Elected by electors of State. Mississippi, 9 years. Recall by legislature. Appointed by governor. Missouri, 10 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of State. Montana, 6 years. Elected by electors of State at large. Nebraska, 6 years. Elected by electors of State at large. Nevada, 6 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified electors of State. New Hampshire, during good behavior. Recall by legislature. Ap pointed by governor and council. New Jersey, 7 years. Appointed by governor. New York, 14 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of judicial districts. North Carolina, 8 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified voters of Si ate. North Dakota, 6 years. Elected by qualified voters of State. Ohio, 5 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by electors of the State at large. Oklahoma, 6 years. Elected by electors of judicial districts. Oregon, 6 years. Recall by people's vote. Elected by qualified electors of State. Pennsylvania, 21 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified electors of State. Rhode Island, subject to resolution of general assembly. Recall by legislature. Elected by the two houses in grand committee. South, Carolina, 8 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by joint assembly. South Dakota, G years. Elected from districts by electors of State at laTge. Tennessee, 8 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified voters of the State. Texas, 6 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified voters of the State. Utah, G years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified voters of the State. Vermont, 2 years. Elected by senate and house of representatives in joint assembly. Virginia, 12 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by general as sembly. Washington, G years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified elec tors of State at large. West Virginia, 12 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by voters of State. Wisconsin, 10 years. Recall by legislature. Elected by qualified elec tors of State. Wyoming, 8 years. Elected by qualified voters of the State. 7197— 10319 6 It w ill th u s be seen that all o f the S tates have an autom atic recall of ju d ges by a short tenure o f office, excepting Rhode Island, N ew H am pshire, and M assachusetts, all three of which expressly provide in their constitutions for the recall o f judges by the legislature. N ew H am pshire has recalled her judges four tim es, and, I understand, on grounds o f policy. Rhode Island recalled her judiciary— by dropping them a t the end o f the short tenure— which declared an act o f the Rhode Island Legislature uncon stitutional, I insist that the recall o f ju dges by the voters of a State, in the seclusion o f the ballot box, is more conservative than to remove ju d ges by caucus in a legislature, where passion or in terest m igh t affect the judgm ent. The people of A rizona can be relied upon to deal ju stly w ith this question, and their right o f self-government in this particular can not be ju stly denied. * * * * * * * TI1E E LECTIO N AND RECALL OF JUDGES TS J U S T IF IE D EX EVERY P R IN C IP L E OF SELF-G OV ERN M EN T. T h e election and recall o f judges, w hich I have shown thus to prevail in all of the States of the Union, has been adopted by the various States after discussion and consideration by the best people in the United States, and their action in regard to th is m atter is justified by sound reason and common sense. Since the establishment o f common schools, of high schools, of university privileges— since the establishment of the m odem newspapers which penetrate every nook and cranny of the land— since the growth o f universal intelligence— w hy should not the A m erican people elect judges who are to serve them on the bench? I f citizens have a civil dispute, do they not n atu rally arbitrate their differences and choose their own arbiters? And if they are satisfied, who should com plain? I f citizens o f a village w ish to choose their own justice o f the peace, w hy should they not have the right to elect such an official? I f the citizens of a county desire to elect the county judge, w hat sensible reason can be assigned that those whose lives and property are subject to the jurisdiction should not elect the citizen who is a candidate for county judge? D o they not pay him his sala ry? A re they not self-governing people? A re they not entitled to the unqualified rights of self-govern ment recognized in the D eclaration of Independence and in the various bills of rights in the several States? Or have we fo r gotten the source of authority in this country, and that it springs from the people and does not descend to the people from, a governing class? I t seems to be necessary, M r. President, to recall to the Congress o f the United States and to the country the principles laid down by the Declaration of Independence, in which it w as set forth that the right to govern came from the people and not from the king. A J U D IC IA L O LIG ARC H Y, OR J U D IC IA L RU LERS, INDEPEN DENT OF T H E PEO PLE, NOT C O N SIST E N T W IT H L IB E R T Y AND SELF-G OVERN M EN T AS SET F O R TH IN D ECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND B IL L S OF R IG H T S ----T H E PEO PLE ARE SOVEREIGN, NOT T H E J U D IC IA R Y ---- T H E SOVEREIGN POW ER IN T H E PEOPLE M U ST BE E X E R C ISE D FOR T H E W ELFARE OF T H E PEOPLE. “ The U nanim ous Declaration o f the Thirteen U nited States o f A m erica,” issued July 4, 1776, sa id : W e hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created eq u al; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable T1S7— 10319 7 rig h ts; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that when ever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new govern ment, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. T h is declaration is a declaration in effect that all powers of government emanate directly from the people. A nd this right is reiterated in the constitutions of alm ost every State in the Union, declaring in various form s that all powers of govern m ent spring directly from the people. For exam p le: (H ere follow excerpts from 46 State constitutions, showing all political power to be in the hands o f the people.) * * * * * * * M r. President, undoubtedly all governing powers spring from the people, and this fundam ental fact is recognized universally. One o f the most im portant o f the governing powers is the right to elect judges and to recall them when they cease to be satis factory to the people for any reason whatever, o r iv ith o u t a n y re a so n iv h a tc v e r . T h e p e o p le a re n o t ca lled u p on to a ssig n a n y re a so n in e x e r c is in g th is rig h t o f s e lf-g o v e r n m e n t. IF JUD G ES SHOU LD BE APPOIN TE D FOE L IF E , W H Y NOT H AVE SENATORS AND CO NG RESSM EN APPOIN TE D BY T H E PRESID ENT FOR L I F E ? I f judges for life, w hy not Senators and Congressmen for life? W h y not prosecuting attorneys for life ? W h y not a President for life ? W ou ld it not make them more in d e p e n d e n t o f “ popu la r cla m o r ” ? W ou ld it not thus enable them to be free from the influence of the p r e ju d ic e s , p a ssio n s, and im m a tu r e v i e w s of the v u lg a r p o p u la c e ? W ou ld they not, under such favorable conditions, make better ru le rs o f the people? But, M r. President, it is not ru le rs o f th e v u lg a r p o p u la ce we seek. W e demand p u b lic s e r v a n ts , not r u le rs , and we wish these servants to respect the w ill of the people, and not despise the people, or view them as a “ vulgar populace.” L et us hear no more o f “ p o p u la r c l a m o r of the “ tu rb u len c e o f th e d em o c ra cy o f the “ v u lg a r p o p u la ce .” The people have more w is dom, more dignity, and more justice than those ,of their paid servants who indulge such sentiments or voice such views. No man has the right to hold public office and thus offend the con fidence of those who trust him w ith their powers and dignities. T H E R IG H T OF RECALL OF JUDGES IS J U S T IF IE D BY REASON AND COMMON SEN SE AS W ELL AS BY PRECEDENT. * * * * * * * W h y should anyone contend that a judge who for any reason is incapacitated to properly serve the people should not be re called, except by impeachm ent? * * * * . * * * Should a judge who becomes imbecile, weak of intellect, or a neurotic, retain power to pass upon the life and property of citizens, upon the liberty of citizens, w ithout the possibility of recall except by impeachm ent? Impeachment is too severe in such a case. The recall m ay be* applied with honor. Such a judge having been faith fu l might well be recalled and placed upon a pension roll by virtue of his past services. * * 7197— 10319 * * * * * 8 Shall a judge w ho is a victim o f paresis or of a permanent m alignant disease continue to w ear the ermine and oppress those w ho have honored him, and they have no rem edy? Shall his incompetency, his unfitness, his inefficiency have no remedy ex cept by im peachm ent? The recall is a much m ilder system than impeachment. It operates benignly, and m ay remove a jndge who becomes infirm, disabled, or inefficient, w ithout disgrace, and it may be exercised w ith honor to the judge. * * * * * * * M r. President, a judge upon the bench is only a human being after all, and he m ight become intemperate, not sufficiently to ju stify impeachment, perhaps, bift sufficiently to ju stify recall. H e might become mentally incapable or physically incapable, not sufficiently, perhaps, to ju stify impeachment, but quite suffi ciently to ju s tify recall for the benefit of the service. Such a ju dge might become corrupt and be so skillful in his corrupt judgm ents that it w ould be impossible to im peach; and yet the wisdom of his removal by recall might be beyond d ou bt * * * * M r. President, there are many degrees of m alfeasance and of m isfeasance ju stifyin g recall which w ould not ju stify impeach ment. M r. President, a judge upon the bench is merely a law yer employed by the people, at a sala ry, to interpret the law . H e does so in the light of his environment, influenced by his educa tion, by his previous political and judicial predilections, influ enced by his long practice at the bar. Perhaps he m ay have been the valued attorney of various powerful corporations, whom he has long served and whose interest in him has led to his preferment on the bench by the skilled influences of commer cial interests brought to bear upon llie appointing power. Sup pose such a judge in a series of decisions uniform ly decided cases against the interests of the people, whose servant he had become, and uniform ly decided such cases in favor of special privilege, whose paid servant he form erly was. Should the people have no right to recall him except by impeachm ent? Such a judge may be perfectly conscientious; but will that suffice to ju stify his continuance in office under such circum stances? M r. President, the right of recall of judges is all the more important when wre recognize the fa c t that the big interests of this country have taken infinite pains to bring about the nomi nation and promotion as Federal judges of those whose opinions and bias of mind w ere known to be favorable to their point of view'. W henever a vacancy occurs on the Federal bench, immediately the most lively and active pressure is brought to bear by vari ous business interests in favor, of candidates desired by them, and I pause to remark that it is quite im m aterial whether such candidate has previously been regarded as a Dem ocrat or as a Republican. I do not mean to suggest that candidates thus urged are in any degree dishonest or corrupt, although that is alw ays a pos s ib ility ; but I do mean to s * y that they are merely human beings. T h at such candidates have been practicing law yers, some good law yers and some not so good, gives them no divine unction of infallibility. T h at they are influenced and con7197— 10319 9 trolled in their opinions by their education and their environ ment and by the argum ents which they have previously been engaged in m aking is absolutely certain. I do mean to say that corporate interests do seek to place upon the Federal bench and in the State courts those candidates who are known to favor the point of view of the special interests as against the interests of the people, and that I do believe such appointments on the Federal bench are the rule and not the exception. A short time ago I had the honor of calling the attention of the Senate to an illum inating instance of how judges appointed to discharge the most important work are influenced by their previous environment. T h is w as illustrated by the record of the Electoral Commission of 1S77, appointed to determine who should be President o f the United States— whether Mr. Tilden, of New Y ork, or M r. H a yes, o f Ohio. T h at commission w as composed of five Justices of the Supreme Court of the United S tates— Hon. Joseph P. Bradley, Hon. N athan Clifford, Hon. Samuel F. M iller, Hon. Stephen J. Field, and H on. W . S tron g; five distinguished United States Sena tors— Edm unds, M orton, Frelinghuysen, Thurm an, and B a y a r d ; and five great leaders of the H ouse of Representatives— Mr. Payne, M r. Hunton, M r. Abbott, Mr. Garfield, and Mr. Hoar. T h is distinguished commission passed upon four contestedelectoral cases involving the electoral vote of Oregon, of South Carolina, of Louisiana, and of Florida, a voluminous record, involving many difficult questions, and the remarkable result follow ed that every one of the 15 follow ed his previous political 'predilection, and by a decision of 8 to 7 decided every point of importance in that case and decided the result in each o f the fou r cases in the strictest accord w ith the previous political opinion of each of these 33 judges sitting upon that electoral commission to determine the Presidency o f the United States in the Tilden and H ayes controversy. It is not necessary to question the integrity of purpose or the sincerity of judgm ent of any one of the seven great Dem ocrats who sat on that Electoral Commission or of the eight distin guished Republicans who sat on it, but it taught a lesson to this country that men are profoundly influenced by their previous environment and partisan prejudices. These illustrations could be multiplied indefinitely. Mr. President, this peculiar characteristic of mortal man to be influenced by his previous opinions m ust not be ignored by prudent statesmen in determining tbe conduct o f government. I f the Supreme Bench, consisting o f nine excellent gentlemen, should be composed of nine loyal and patriotic Irishm en, they would be unanimously in favor of “ home r u le ” for Ireland, and give most learned reasons for the opinion. Or if this excellent tribunal should consist of nine loyal and faith fu l Tories, they w ould conscientiously decide “ home rule ” to be a dangerous heresy, and give overwhelming argum ents why it should he denied. N or would it be fa ir or decent to charge them with bad faith for their decisions or opinions. It is a question of previous predilection, of previous fixed opinion, of the point o f view which has molded itself in the personal experience of the judge and become a part of him. A President who could be persuaded to appoint a m ajority o f Irishmen on the Supreme Bench need not be astonished at home7197— 10319 10 rule decisions. N or should he be shocked if a T ory bench de cide against home rule. T h is psychological fa ct gives a sound reason for the active interest of big business in the appointment o f Federal judges. B ig business men understand perfectly well the importance of engineering the nomination of judges. Yes, M r. President, and they understand perfectly well the importance o f engineering the nom ination of a President of the United States whose honest sym pathies and view s are in harm ony w ith their point o f view, so that such an E xecutive should be expected to listen w ith re spect and w ith conviction to the convincing argum ents in favor of candidates for the ermine “ who are the right kind of people.” These am iable gentlemen who engineer nom inations “ know exactly w hat they w ant.” A s Abraham Lincoln once remarked, “ For the kind o f people that like that kind o f thing, it is the very kind of thing that th at kind o f people like.” I venture to believe, M r. President, that the people of the United States have slow ly learned to know exactly w hat they w ant, and the people w ill acquire it by peaceful processes, by progressive processes, and, am ong other agencies, by the right of election and of recall of judges. T H E RECALL J U S T IF IE D AS A M EANS OF CONTROLLING A J U D IC IA L RU LIN G P O W ER T H A T H A S VIOLATED T H E CO N ST IT U T IO N OF T H E UN ITED ST A T E S , VIO LATED T H E R IG H T S OF T IIE ST A T E S , INVADED T H E L E G ISL A T IV E F U N C T IO N , AND BECOME AN IN ST R U M E N T OF O PPRE SSIO N TH RO U G H J U D IC IA L L E G ISL A T IO N . The Federal courts have invaded the Constitution and in vaded the rights of the States and invaded the legislative func tion o f Congress and of the States, and have become an instru ment through which the special interests have been enabled to block all progressive legislation o f recent years. The manner in which this has been done has been -well explained by James A llen Smith, Ph. D ., professor of political science, U niversity of W ashington, in T h e Spirit of A m erican G overnm ent; by Hon. W a lte r Clark, chief justice of the Supreme Court of North Caro lina, in his address before the law departm ent o f the U niversity o f Pennsylvania, April 27, 1906 (E x h ib it B ) ; by Gilbert E. Itoe, under the title of “ Our Judicial Oligarchy,” in L a F ollette’s, June 17. 1911, to July 15, 1 9 1 1 ; Pearson’s, A ugust, 1 9 1 1 ; and by other able law yers and students of government. * * * * * * * The Constitutional Convention, secret and reactionary though it was, fou r tim es refused to provide that the Supreme Court should pass upon the constitutionality of acts o f Congress, to w it: On June 5, 1787, the proposal received the vote o f two States o n ly ; on June 6 , July 21, and A ugust 15 the proposal w as renewed, and at no tim e received the votes of more than three States. * * * * * * * T h is mild provision for d isa p p ro v in g a la w b e fo r e p a ssa g e, w hich still m ight pass by a tw o-thirds vote of Congress, even if disapproved by the Supreme Court w as overwhelmingly rejected. T h e court now vetoes an act of Congress after it is passed, and a unanimous Congress can not m ake it constitutional or valid i f th e c o u rt's a ctio n is c o n stitu tio n a l. Such a provision in the Constitution w ould have defeated it before the States, yet by slow degrees the Supreme Court has 7197— 10319 11 assumed, without constitutional w arrant, to declare acts of Con gress unconstitutional. The Constitution is one of delegated powers, and it does not delegate the right to declare statutes unconstitutional. The courts o f no republic have such authority. In th e great Republics of New Zealand, A u stralia, Switzerland, and France, and even in the Em pires o f Great Britain and Germany, A u s tria, and o f Denm ark, the courts exercise no such right. I understand the constitution of M exico, our great neighbor on the south, directly forbids the courts to declare unconsti tutional an act of the Congress of M exico. * $ * * * 4c * T h e conduct o f George Jeffreys, lord chief justice o f England, in holding acts of P arliam ent invalid, caused the revolution of 1GSS in England. The revolution of 1GSS led to the act of settlement o f 1701. since which tim e Parliam ent has exercised the right o f recall of English judges. Thom as Jefferson, in his letter to M r. Jarvis, in 1S20, wisely s a id : You seem to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all con stitutional questions ; a very dangerous doctrine, indeed, and one that would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy. John M arshall, the fam ous C hief Justice o f the Supreme Court, before he became C hief Justice, declared in the presence of the Supreme C o u rt: The legislative authority of any country can only be restrained by Its own municipal constitution; this is a principle that springs from the very nature of society, and the judicial authority can have no right to question the validity of a law, unless such a jurisdiction is ex pressly given by the Constitution. (W are v. Hylton, 3 Dali., 211.) No one pretends that the jurisdiction is e x p r e s s l y given by the Constitution, and John M arshall ought to have known it w as expressly refused. In all of the great Governments o f Great Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland, and so forth, the P arliam ent decides the constitutionality of its own acts, being responsible to the su f frage of the people. T h e Congress of the United States— consist ing of 483 elected representatives of the people in the Senate and House, who took a solemn oath o f office before A lm ighty God that they would fa ith fu lly observe the Constitution— and the President are naturally better qualified and fitted to deter mine the constitutionality of their own acts, being immediately responsible to their people at home, than any other power. They are better qualified to do this than the nine law yers com prising the Supreme Court, who are appointed for life, and who are not responsible to the people and who are not elected by the people. The Supreme Court is appointed by the President, the President being nominated by a national convention con sisting o f delegates three degrees removed from the people, and elected by electors several tim es removed from the people. Those who are directly responsible to the people, those who have by constitutional authority the right to make the law s, are charged by the Constitution w ith the duty o f observing the Constitution in m aking such laws, and they take a solemn oath to perform this very function. 7197— 10319 12 T o allow their decisions to be set aside by any tribunal not responsible to tlie people, not elected by the people, not subject to the recall o f the people, or o f the people's representatives, is to establish a judicial oligarchy and to overthrow the Republic, I t very nearly overthrew the Republic under the Dred Scott decision attem pting to nationalize slavery. T o permit the Supreme Court to nu llify acts of Congress, de clared by Congress to be constitutional, is to permit the judicial branch to overthrow the legislative branch, as it has over throw n the antitrust law w ithout declaring it unconstitutional. No such power w as intended by the Constitution to be granted to the judiciary branch. T h is doctrine w as most em phatically denied by President Jackson in the case o f the United States Bank, which the Supreme Court attem pted to uphold against his policy. Jackson did not perm it it, and received the ap proval of the people of the country. T H E J U D IC IA L RU LIN G PO W ER H A S BECOME A B U LW A R K PRIV ILE G E . OF S P E C IA L Up to 1887 20 Federal statutes and 185 State statutes had been held invalid by the Supreme Court of the United States alone. This does not include the innumerable State statutes which the lower Federal courts have nullified under the shield of the Supreme Court decisions. This list will be found in One hundred and thirty-first United States Reports, Appendix C C X X X V , and since that time this list has been greatly increased, and the decisions have been most objectionable since 1887. These decisions have usually been made by a divided court, but in some cases the change of a single vote would have completely changed the result. The legislation thus destroyed was practically all carefully devised to meet existing and recognized evils, and enacted in response to an overwhelming demand of the people. (Gilbert E. Roe.) These various decisions have not only nullified statutes of the greatest importance, passed fo r the protection of the people, but other decisions have been made, w hich are, in effect, judicial legislation. T H E GREAT IN D U ST R IA L CORPORATIONS H A V E BEEN SH IE L D E D UNDER TH ESE D E C ISIO N S, T H E CONTROL OF R A IL W A Y S AND M ONOPOLIES OBSTRUCTED, CO M PEN SATIO N FOR IN D U ST R IA L ACCID EN TS DEFEATED, AND T H E A RB ITRA TIO N OF IN D U ST R IA L D ISP U TE S STRU C K D O W N, AND VARIOU S STATE ST ATU TES VETOED AND A B O L ISH ED . Out of the great multitude I subm it a few instances as illus trations. F or e x a m p le : In ex parte Young (209 U. S. 123) the attorney general of Minnesota is punished for contempt for performing his duty in obedience to the statute of the State of Minnesota regulating the rates of public-service corporations. The s ta t u t e o f T e x a s w as set aside as unconstitutional in the case o f Galveston, H arrisburg & San Antonio Railroad Co. ver sus the State of T exas (210 U. S., 2 1 7 ), taxing the gross re ceipts o f railroad companies within the State. The s ta tu te o f K a n s a s taxin g the W estern Union Telegraph Co. w as set aside in like manner. (21 6 U. S., 1.) The Oklahom a, c o n stitu tio n establishing a corporation commis sion w as declared invalid under the Constitution o f the United States by the decision of Justice Hook, March 29, 1911. Judge Sanborn’s decision in the case o f Sheppard versus Northern Pacific R ailw ay Co. on A pril 11 practically destroyed the M innesota statute providing for the regulation of rates *01 public-service corporations. The fourteenth amendment, intended to protect the negro, has been tw isted from its purpose to protect the trusts and monop olies in imposing long hours of labor on employees on the absurd 7197— 10319 13 theory that to deny the employee the right to work long hours is a denial o f his constitutional “ privileges.” Everyone knows that the sole intent and purpose of the people in adding this amendment to the Constitution was to protect the then re cently emancipated negroes in their rights of citizenship. The courts, however, have made this amendment include all manner of trusts and corporations and of contracts and practices, none of which were even in the thoughts of the people when they adopted the amendment. In the hands of the courts this amendment has become a shield to pro tect corporations and combinations of wealth from the legislation aimed at them by an indignant public and also a sword by which statute after statute has been cut down, enacted by the lawmaking branch of the Government in the public interest. (Roe.) T h e e m p lo y e r s ' lia b ility a ct, for the protection of employees, w as held unconstitutional by 5 to 1 (39 Cong. Ilec., 11, 1 8 0 4 ; 40 Cong.* Itec., 93, 1905.) T h e c o m p u ls o r y a rb itr a tio n act, passed as the result of the great strike at Chicago in 1S94 and intended to prevent the re currence of such unfortunate difficulties, w as destroyed by the Supreme Court. (A d a ir v . U. S., 20S U. S., 1G4.) T h e i n t e r s ta te -c o m m e r c e a ct has b een em a sc u la ted by the Supreme Court. (E x h ib it A .) T h e rv h olcsa le liq u o r in t e r e s t w a s p r o te c te d by the so-called package decision (L esley v . H ardin, 135 U. S., 1 0 0 ), and it required a special act of Congress to authorize police powers of the States to apply to liquor in original packages. (W ilk erson v . Ilahrer, 140 U. S., 545.) T h e p r in c ip les laid d oicn in th e D e c la r a tio n o f In d e p e n d e n c e w e r e r e v e r s e d in the insular cases, holding that this Republic had imperial power to govern and control other people as s u b je c t s , et cetera. T h e w o r k m e n 's c o m p e n sa tio n laio o f N ew Y ork w as, in like manner, destroyed by the New Y ork courts. (Iv es v . So. Buffalo lly . Co., 201 N. Y ., 271.) T h e in c o m e t a x laio w as struck down in like manner by the Supreme Court. T h e serious error of the Supreme Court in this case I heretofore pointed out on the floor o f the Senate, where the inhibition o f a direct tax on a State w as absurdly construed to inhibit a direct ta x on a citizen of the United States. (M a y 7, 1909, Ilec., 1821, and M ay 17, 1909, Rec., 2104.) The deci sion in his case, by the change of the vote of one jud ge— of one law yer in this court, appointed at whose instance w e do not know— has cost the mass of the people of the United States a hundred million a year for over 1G years, $1,600,000,000 in all, and relieved those best able to bear the ta x of a like amount. One billion six hundred m illions of dollars by the vote of one man, appointed by w hat influence? W e do not know and can not say. No such power ought to be put in the hands o f any man. No man not responsible to the people or the representa tives o f the people ought to have the power to control the fiscal policy of this Nation contrary to the law of the people o f the N ation and contrary to the will o f the Senate of the United States and the Congress of the United States. No such uncon stitutional decision would have been rendered if the court had been subject to recall. W h a t better evidence could be afforded o f the patience, for bearance, and conservatism o f the people than that they have so long borne patiently w ith such a decision? 7197— 10319 ' u 4 M r Justice Field, in his opinion in this case, spoke o f the income tax as “ th e p r e s e n t a ssa u lt u p o n c a p ita l ,” and suggested that, if the court allow ed it to stand, the tim e w ould come when the lim itation on the ta x on incomes m ight be designated by “ a board of w alking delegates.” T h is insolent reference would have justified his impeachm ent by Congress. Justice Jackson, on this court, declared this decision “ th e m o s t d is a stro u s blou) e v e r s tr u c k a t th e c o n stitu tio n a l p o w e r o f C o n g re ss * * * * * * * Justice Brow n expressed the fear that the decision, in some moment o f national peril, w ould rise up to “ f r u s t r a t e th e w ill and p a r a ly z e th e a r m " o f Congress. H e sa id : I hope it may not prove Che first step toward the despotism of wealth. As I can not escape the conviction that the decision of the court in this great case is fraught with immeasurable danger to the future of the country, and that it approaches the proportions of a national calamity, I feel it my duty to enter my protest against it. * * * * * * * Justice H arlan said it w as to be “ deeply deplored ” “ as a dis aster to the country,” and s a id : I can not assent to an interpretation of the Constitution that impairs and cripples the just powers of the National Government in the essential matter of taxation and at the same time discriminates against the greater part of the people of our country. Justice Jackson, Justice Brown, and Justice H arlan are not radicals, but are all conservatives and patriots, and they de serve the thanks o f the country for pointing out the dangerous character o f the decisions o f the Supreme Court in this and other cases. T h e most serious feature o f this decision w as that the real question in the minds of the judges w as not its conflict w ith the Constitution, but th e ir v i e w o f th e e x p e d ie n c y o f th e in co m e ta x . T h e y th o u g h t it had p o lic y, and f o r th a t rea so n fo u n d it u n c o n stitu tio n a l b y an in telle c tu a l leg erd em a in to s e t a sid e th e u n b ro k en p r ec ed e n ts o f th e S u p r e m e C o u r t i t s e l f f o r o v e r a h u n d red y e a r s . * * * * * * * T H E A N TIT R U ST ACT. The S h e rm a n a n titr u st la w h as, by the recent decisions o f the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case and in the Tobacco T ru st case by w riting in the word “ unreasonable,” b een e ffe c t u a lly d e s tr o y e d . I t w as loudly proclaimed that the Standard Oil monopoly had been dissolved by this decision. T h e fact is that the Stand ard Oil stock im m ediately went up, instead of down, after this decision w as rendered. On M ay 15, 1911, the day of the decision, it was G79; and on M ay 19, four days later, it w as GS6 , after the owners of this stock had had tim e to digest the opinion. The packers who had been indicted as guilty o f a crime, under this statute— Sherman antitrust— im m ediately offered the de fense that their restraint o f trade had been reasonable, and as they are entitled to a reasonable doubt, th e crim in a l p a rt o f this s ta tu te is m a d e n u g a to r y b y th e S u p r e m e C o u rt o f th e U n ited S ta te s . The court has, in effect, vetoed the act of Congress by judicial legislation. * * 7197— 10319 * * * * * 15 T H E TH EO RY OF J U D IC IA L IN F A L L IB IL IT Y . I t has alw ays been the habit o f kings and potentates to sur round themselves w ith pomp and ceremony to impress the mass o f men w ith their sacred function. They have claim ed to re ceive the right to rule from God him self, and to rule by divine right. T h e judge in ancient tim es wore a huge horsehair wig, silk gown, and ermine. It impressed the people w ith the enor mous dignity of the individual so attired. I t raised the presump tion o f his infallibility. I t excited the reverence of men, and so t h o s e w h o h a v e fo u n d th e ir s h e lte r beh in d a ju d ic ia l o lig a rc h y h a v e im p r e s s e d t r e m e n d o u s ly u p o n th e p e o p le o f th is c o u n tr y t h e id ea o f ju d ic ia l in fa llib ility . W e are taught that we should reverence the co u rts; that we should not question their jud g ments, and when the Supreme Court o f the United States has spoken it should no more be questioned than we should question the W ord o f God. I believe th a t the people should be taught to reverence the judicial branch of the Government, and I believe the judicial branch of the Governm ent should be so fram ed as to m erit rev erence. I have a reverence for government. I have a reverence for the ju diciary. I have a great respect for the judges on the bench, yet I should not hesitate to vote for the impeachment o f a corrupt judge, nor would I hesitate to vote for the recall of a ju dge who merited recall or a judge who regarded an income ta x as an assault on w ealth. The theory o f judicial infallibility has the sam e meritorious foundation o f truth as Santa Claus. I t is a pleasing fiction suitable for very young children. F our out of five o f these distinguished justices and five out o f fou r are constantly assuring the country, with great gravity and decorum, in their various opinions o f the honorable and dis tinguished fallibility o f their brethren on the bench. I f we take a series o f cases, each ju dge in turn w ill be found in the minor ity and w ill be discovered in the interesting situation o f having the m ajority o f the Supreme Court declaring his fallibility. E ach judge in turn is proven to be fallible by the Supreme Court o f the United States, until not a single justice is left whose fa lli bility has not been ju dicially ascertained by a m ajority of the Supreme Bench of the United States. T his is interesting but not surprising, fo r nobody ever imagined in the first case that the justices on the bench were anything but fallible. In the Legal Tender cases did they not reverse them selves? And w as not the court packed by President Grant, with the connivance of Congress, who first reduced the court and then added to it for this very purpose? In the Standard Oil case and the Tobacco T ru st case did not the Supreme Court reverse itself and its own decisions in the Inter-M issouri Freight case of 1S97 and in the Joint Traffic case in 1S9S, in which the court expressly refused to w rite the word “ unreasonable ” before “ restraint o f trade ” ? T h is fiction o f ju d icial in fallibility m ight as w ell be abandoned by thinking men. * * * * * * * Congress is authorized by the Constitution (A rt. I l l , sec. 1) to ordain and establish the Supreme Court and the inferior courts. B y the judiciary act o f September 24. 17S9 (1 Stat., 7 3 ), it did ordain and establish these courts, designating how many judges should be on the court, providing them with suit able conveniences, fixed the time when they should hold office 7197— 10319 16 and the place where they should hold office, providing their salary, and annually thereafter made the appropriation to keep them in office and compensate them for their services. Congress has, since then, increased the number o f judges of the Supreme Court. I t has diminished the number of the Supreme Court, as it did in the Legal Tender cases, to 7 judges, and thereafter increased the number again to 9 judges (A p r. 10, 1S 6 9 ), and obviously under the law could provide for 25 judges on this bench or 75 or diminish it to 3 judges. I t cer tainly has the legal p o w e r to refuse to appropriate its salaries if it w ants to do so. T h e exercise of such powers as I have enumerated— the power of impeachment, the power to ordain and establish the court, to determine the number o f judges on the bench, the power to pay or w ithhold salaries, to determine when it shall sit and where it shall sit— certainly carries w ith it the sm aller and lesser power o f recalling judges from the bench for bad be havior and to determine w hat bad behavior is. * * ' ' * * * * j P U B L IC O PIN IO N OF J U D IC IA L ABUSE. M r. President, the country has been profoundly disturbed by the aggression o f the courts, by the nullification o f acts of Con gress on alleged constitutional grounds, by judicial legislation, even where the constitutionality o f the act w as conceded, and by the other judicial aggressions I have pointed out. The Republican platform o f 190S declares against certain in junctions by the court. The Dem ocratic platform (19 0 8) protests against government by injunction. T h e Independence P arty (1908) condemns the arbitrary use of injunctions and contempt proceedings by the courts as a vio lation o f the fundam ental American right o f trial by jury. The People’s P arty of 190S em phatically condemned the un ju st assum ption o f authority by inferior Federal courts into nullifying by injunction the laws o f the State and demanding its prohibition, and so forth. The Socialist Party, casting h alf a million votes and repre senting two and a h alf m illion people in 1908, said “ our courts are in the hands o f the ruling classes.” (Col. R oosevelt; President T a f t ; President L in co ln ; United States Circuit Judge Grossc-up; Hon. W a lte r L. Clark, chief ju stice of the Supreme Court o f North C a ro lin a ; Hon. W illia m Jennixgs B r y a n ; M r. Justice H a r la n ; Hon. Gilbert E. R o e ; ana others, quoted to show the attitude o f the courts.) ❖ * * * * I believe in the sovereignty of the people o f the United States and not in the sovereignty of any judicial tribunal appointed for life. I therefore believe that they should be subject to recall, as the constitution authorizes. _ * * * * * * * Is it possible that all o f the States of the Union are wrong in their view o f the necessity o f controlling the judiciary by the popular vote? And if they be right, Mr. President, by what reasoning do the Senators on this floor representing those States disregard or lightly set aside the ascertained view s of policy of the people o f their own States? 7197— 10310 o