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TESTIMONY OF

RICKI TIGERT HELFER
CHAIRMAN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

ON

INTERAGENCY EFFORTS TO REVISE REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND CONSUMER CREDIT
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 1995
ROOM 2128 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

INTRODUCTION

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee,

I

appreciate and welcome this opportunity to testify before you
today on the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the interagency
proposal to reform implementation of the Act.

The Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is strongly committed to
carrying out its responsibilities under the CRA.

The regulatory

agencies on this panel have spent the last 21 months in an
extensive effort to reform CRA regulations.

This effort has

included a series of seven public hearings across the country
where hundreds of witnesses addressed some of the same issues and
concerns addressed in your letter of invitation.

While I am

relatively new to the process, I want to commend my colleagues on
this panel for their intensive efforts to make the CRA
regulations less burdensome and more effective.

Federally-insured financial institutions perform a vital
intermediary role in the communities in which they operate:

In

making loans with the money that depositors leave with them, they
fuel economic growth.

The CRA was enacted to encourage banks to

make the oppportunity for economic growth available to
qualifiying borrowers throughout their communities, by expanding




2

the "convenience and needs" criteria that regulators have long
used in weighing charter and branch applications to cover credit.

The record shows that the CRA has improved access to credit
in communities across the country.

The regulations implementing

the CRA have encouraged many institutions to make substantial
commitments to increase lending and services to all income
levels.

I support the goals of the CRA, and I subscribe to efforts
to focus attention on meaningful performance by banks and thrifts
instead of on building unproductive paper trails.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In introducing the Community Reinvestment Act 18 years ago,
former-Senate Banking Committee Chairman William Proxmire said
that it was: "intended to establish a system of regulatory
incentives to encourage banks and savings institutions to more
effectively meet the credit needs of the localities they are
chartered to serve, consistent with sound lending practices."

In

somewhat less formal language at hearings on the legislation
three months later, he said:

"What this bill would do would be

to try to make the banks more sensitive than they have been in
the past to their responsibilities to provide for local community
needs."




These needs, he had noted when introducing the bill,

3
included "domestic economic development, housing, and community
revitalization."

The built-in latitude in the CRA —

the legislative

directive to "encourage" but not "require" and the lack of
specificity on how to go about it —

prompted regulators to hold

public hearings around the country in 1978 for guidance prior to
drafting implementing regulations.

The legislative history is clear, however, that the CRA was
not intended to force banks to make unprofitable loans.

The law

specifically states, "In connection with its examination of a
financial institution, the appropriate Federal financial
supervisory agency shall assess the institutions's record of
meeting the credit needs of its entire community, including lowand moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institution."

The banking agencies have found the CRA a difficult law to
administer, in large part because it was intended to change the
attitudes of lenders —

not simply draw distinctions between

legal and illegal behavior —

and thereby increase lending for

community development, a broadly defined target.




4
OVERVIEW

This testimony addresses the effectiveness of the CRA in
fulfilling its purpose of meeting the credit needs of the
communities in which financial institutions operate.

It

discusses the problems that lenders and community representatives
see with the current system for evaluating CRA compliance, and it
describes how the proposal of the federal banking agencies
addresses these problems.

The testimony also discusses concerns

about credit allocation and addresses how the CRA relates to
equal credit and fair housing laws.

Finally, it comments on

recently introduced legislation affording certain institutions a
"safe harbor" protection against denial of applications.

As

agreed by the Subcommittee, the agencies are submitting a
separate, joint interagency statement, which discusses in detail
the history of the CRA and the efforts underway to reform the
regulations implementing the CRA.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CRA

Concern about redlining, in large part, motivated enactment
of the CRA in 1977.

As mentioned earlier, access to credit is

essential to the financial viability of every community; this
viability is threatened to the extent that artificial limits
based on geographic location, demographic composition, or
personal attributes not relevant to lending risk are imposed by




5
lenders.

The CRA is a statute that promotes community

development by stipulating that financial institutions should
serve the credit needs of their entire communities.

It

complements, but is different than federal fair lending laws,
such as the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), which specifically prohibit
discrimination by all lenders, not just insured financial
institutions, in a broader range of housing and credit
transactions.

The CRA does not require that institutions make specific
types or amounts of loans and does not allocate loans to
particular persons or geographic areas.

Consequently, there are

no hard data to quantify how much lending and investment is
directly attributable to the CRA.

There is, nevertheless,

evidence that suggests the CRA has focused attention on lending
opportunities that otherwise might have been overlooked.

Since

the passage of the CRA, FDIC compliance examiners report that
lenders have demonstrated a willingness to offer new lending
products and services that benefit low-income households.
Financial institutions have expanded their marketing, often
advertising through the use of media targeted to specific
underserved neighborhoods and in some cases in languages other
than English.

Many FDIC-supervised institutions identify lending

opportunities by working closely with community groups and state
and local governments, often participating in special programs in




6

conjunction with these groups.

The FDIC has 24 Community Affairs

Officers in eight regional offices that try to be catalysts for
encouraging this interaction.

The banking industry has acknowledged that CRA has helped to
put billions of dollars into low- and moderate-income
communities, as indicated by the Consumer Bankers Association
(CBA) in its 1993 testimony at interagency public hearings.

In

addition, CBA stated that, the CRA has allowed many financial
institutions to recognize that there is a market in the
revitalization of their communities and has led to creative ways
to address the needs of underserved neighborhoods.

Despite positive results, the CRA examination process has
long been the subject of criticism from both the banking industry
and community organizations.

Bankers repeatedly have claimed

that guidance from the agencies is unclear, examination standards
are applied inconsistently, and the current evaluation system is
burdensome and emphasizes paperwork rather than a bank's record
of. making loans.

Community organizations have complained that

the current evaluation system is inconsistent and focuses too
much on paperwork rather than performance.

Overall, almost all

of the comments called for change, although there was much
disagreement about the specifics of how change should be
accomplished.




7
ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM

In July, 1993, these concerns gave rise to a letter from the
President to banking and thrift regulators that called for reform
of CRA regulations.

In response to that letter and to widespread

criticism, the regulators have put substantial effort into
reforming CRA regulations.

In 1993, the agencies held a series

of public hearings around the nation in order to understand the
criticisms and concerns of interested parties, including
representatives from financial institutions, the business
community, consumer and community groups, and state and local
government officials.

Following the hearings the banking agencies in December,
1993, issued a proposed rule (the "1993 proposal") that
substituted a more performance-based evaluation system for the
twelve assessment factors in the existing CRA regulations.

Under

the 1993 proposal, the agencies would evaluate an institution
based on the results of actual lending, service, and investment
performance rather than the method or process used to determine
credit needs as is too often the case under the existing
regulation.

The agencies received over 6,700 written comments on

the 1993 proposal.
letters.




The FDIC alone received almost 2,400 comment

8

On October 7, 1994, the agencies published a revised
proposal (the "1994 proposal").

This proposal addressed concerns

raised in the public comments, while retaining the basic
structure of the 1993 proposal.

Many of the revisions

incorporated in the 1994 proposal would lessen burdensome
requirements on financial institutions.

In general, the

revisions simplified the 1993 proposed data reporting
requirements and modified the tests for evaluating a bank's
lending, investment and service performance to focus on community
development.

The comments received —

altogether, 2,059 by the FDIC alone —
the agencies' joint statement.

7,100 by the agencies
are discussed in detail in

I would like to highlight a few

elements of the current proposal.

Like the 1993 proposal, the 1994 proposal would replace the
existing twelve factors for assessing CRA performance, which
focus largely on process and paperwork, with performance
standards based on results.

The proposal would eliminate the

requirement that institutions prepare CRA statements, review them
annually and document them in the minutes of the board of
directors' meetings.

Further, the agencies would no longer

require institutions to justify the basis for community
delineations or to document efforts in marketing or in
ascertaining community credit needs.
to such procedural requirements —




Resources formerly devoted

time, money, and personnel —

9
would be available for making loans and investments and providing
services in the community.

Both the 1993 and the 1994 proposals contain a streamlined
examination procedure for small institutions.

Both proposals

define a small institution as an independent institution with
total assets of less than $250 million or an affiliate of a
holding company with total bank and thrift assets of less than
$250 million.

The current proposal would evaluate a small

institution under a streamlined assessment method to answer the
question:

Are its loan-to-deposit ratio and lending record

reasonable relative to the institution's size, financial
condition, and management expertise, and to the credit needs of
its community?

In addition, to provide institutions flexibility in meeting
their CRA obligation, the proposals would give all institutions
the option of being evaluated on the basis of a Strategic Plan
rather than on the lending, service and investment tests, or
under the small institution assessment standards, discussed
above.

An institution's plan would have to specify measurable

goals for helping to meet the credit needs of its service area,
particularly the needs of low- and moderate-income individuals.
The proposal requires giving the public 30 days to comment on the
plan, lets the institution take account of the comments, and then
provides for agency approval of the completed plan.




Thereafter,

10

the institution's CRA evaluation and rating would be based on how
well the institution meets or exceeds the goals it has
established for itself.

The 1994 proposal requires large insured depository
institutions to collect and report race and gender data on loans
to small businesses and small farms.

In contrast, the proposal

does not require small institutions to collect or report
additional data.

Nearly every financial institutions that commented on the
mandatory collection and reporting of race and gender data
opposed it.

A limited number of institutions did, however,

express interest in having the option to collect such data for
their own assessments of compliance with fair lending laws.

Many

institutions commented that fair lending enforcement should be
handled under the ECOA and the FHA and proposed amending
Regulation B, the Federal Reserve's regulation implementing the
ECOA, to allow, but not require, institutions to collect or
report the data.

Regulation B prohibits discrimination on the irrevelant,
prohibited grounds of sex, race, color, religion, national
origin, marital status, age, receipt of public assistance or the
exercise in good faith of rights granted under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act.




Regulation B also currently prohibits a

11

creditor from collecting information on the prohibited bases on
any loan, except housing-related loans covered by the statutory
requirements for data collection in the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA), or unless otherwise required by statute, regulation,
or an order issued by a court or a federal or state enforcement
agency.

Comments from community organizations were overwhelmingly in
favor of the collection and reporting of data on loans to small
businesses and small farms owned by women and minorities.

They

contended that the data are necessary to assess adequately an
institution's performance in meeting the credit needs of its
community.

The collection of race and gender data on small business and
farm borrowers could be used to support elements of the fair
lending component of the CRA assessment, one of several factors
used to evaluate whether an institution is helping to meet the
credit needs of its "entire community."

Concerns have been

expressed, however, about the anomaly of requiring large banks
and thrifts to collect data that Regulation B prohibits all other
creditors from collecting.

Removal of the restrictions in

Regulation B would permit institutions to assess compliance with
fair lending laws on all the prohibited bases, not only race and
gender.

The four agencies are giving serious consideration to




12

the arguments both for and against collection of this data before
deciding how to deal with the issue in the final regulation.

EXAMINATION AND SUPERVISION

The FDIC is the primary federal supervisor of approximately
7,100 insured financial institutions.

Between 1990 and 1994, the

FDIC conducted an average of 3,200 examinations per year for
compliance with the CRA.

Last year the FDIC strengthened its examination and
supervision efforts in the compliance area through the creation
of the Division of Compliance and Consumer Affairs.

The new

division consolidates the compliance examination and enforcement
responsibilities previously carried out by the Division of
Supervision with the community outreach, consumer protection and
civil rights oversight functions of the former Office of Consumer
Affairs.

The FDIC has sought to assure that bankers receive
consistent supervisory treatment from compliance and safety and
soundness examiners.

To that end, the FDIC has detailed 150

safety and soundness examiners to the compliance examination
program.

In addition, half of our consumer compliance

examinations are conducted concurrently with safety and soundness
examinations.




Efforts are being made to increase the percentage

13
of concurrent examinations to reduce the burden on financial
institutions of multiple examinations and to increase the
coordination and consistency among compliance and safety and
soundness examiners.

Going forward, in an effort to ensure consistency among the
regulatory agencies, we will issue joint examination guidelines
on the new CRA regulation, and provide interagency training to
examiners under the auspices of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council.

Further, the FDIC is

developing a community development course that will be attended
by both compliance and safety and soundness examiners to increase
examiner understanding of community development lending within
the context of safety and soundness standards.

CONCERNS ABOUT CREDIT ALLOCATION

The 1993 proposal would have required an assessment of an
institution's market share in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods compared to its market share in other parts of the
institution's community.

A number of comments characterized this

comparison of market share as a form of credit allocation.

The 1994 proposal eliminated this market share component
from the lending test.

The lending test would continue to give

significant weight to the geographic distribution of an




14
institution's lending within the community it seeks to serve.

It

does not, however, require examiners to use a ratio to measure
market share, nor does it mandate that a financial institution
must make loans to every neighborhood in the area it serves.
Rather, examiners would be required to evaluate a bank's efforts
to provide credit and service to low— and moderate-income members
of its community and to look at geographic dispersion of lending
to determine that low- and moderate-income areas are not
specifically excluded.

The proposal makes clear at the same time

that there is no magic lending ratio banks must meet and that all
lending must be done in a safe and sound manner.

THE CRA'S RELATIONSHIP TO FAIR LENDING LAWS

The focus of the CRA is on community development through
access to bank credit and services.

The CRA applies to

federally-insured banks and savings associations.

The fair

lending laws, which include the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA), were enacted to address specific concerns.
The ECOA contains absolute prohibitions against lending
decisions, as outlined above, with respect to any aspect_of_a
credit transaction.

The FHA prohibits discrimination on similar

grounds as the ECOA in anv aspect of the sale or rental of
housing, including the financing of housing.

Both the ECOA and

the FHA apply to all lenders and others involved in the extension




15
of credit, not just depository institutions.

Denial of credit on

the grounds of a personal trait, which in no way relates to
whether a borrower will be able to repay a loan, is not only
repugnant to fair-minded Americans, it calls into question the
soundness of the credit judgments a lender is making.

The FDIC

takes seriously its responsibility to monitor compliance with
fair lending laws.

In the past three years it has referred 26

cases to the Department of Justice under the ECOA and 97 cases to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under FHA.

In the HMDA, the Congress imposed specific data collection
requirements with respect to home purchase and home improvement
loans.

The agencies use this data to assist in determining if

institutions are in compliance with the ECOA and the FHA with
respect to home mortgage loans.

In determining compliance with

the CRA, the HMDA data are used to assist in determining whether
financial institutions are serving the housing credit needs of
their communities.

I view effective enforcement of the fair lending laws as
necessary to assure the creditability and fairness of the banking
system.

When we examine an institution for CRA compliance, we

take into account the institution's record with respect to
illegal discriminatory credit practices, particularly where they
suggest a pattern or practice of illegal conduct.

Wholly apart

from our obligations to refer violations of ECOA and FHA to the




16
Justice Department and to HUD, respectively, the institution's
record in this area is a key factor considered in our
determination of how well the institution has met the credit
needs of its community.

SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS IN RECENTLY INTRODUCED LEGISLATION

The Community Reinvestment Improvement Act of 1995
(H.R. 317), introduced by Representative McCollum, creates an
explicit "safe harbor" for institutions seeking approval of an
application for a deposit facility.

Under the bill, if the

institution receives a Satisfactory or Outstanding CRA rating
from the appropriate federal financial supervisory agency within
the previous 24 months, an institution's application for a
deposit facility cannot be denied on CRA grounds, unless an
institution's CRA compliance has materially deteriorated since
the evaluation.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act outlines various statutory
factors that must be considered by the FDIC in deciding whether
to approve an application by a state-chartered insured
institution for a deposit facility.

The statutory factors

include, but are not limited to, the financial history and
condition of the institution, the general character and fitness
of the management of the institution, and the convenience and
needs of the community to be served.




Although an institution's

17
CRA rating is important in this process, particularly in
assessing the degree to which the institution is serving the
convenience and needs of the community, it is not conclusive.
The effect of H.R. 317 would be to protect institutions from
having applications delayed in the case of public protest.
practical matter, such protests are rare at the FDIC.

As a

By way of

illustration, of 2,749 applications on which the FDIC took action
in 1994, only eight were protested on CRA grounds.

Our experience has shown that the lending strategies and
performance of institutions can change appreciably, for better or
worse, during a 24-month period.

An institution receiving a CRA

rating of "Needs to Improve" may thereafter begin to perform
satisfactorily, while the performance of an institution receiving
a rating of "Satisfactory" may deteriorate.

We find merit in the concept of providing incentivés or
rewards to banks for robustly meeting the credit needs of their
communities.

In light of the current efforts to reform CRA

evaluations, however, it may make more sense to see how the
reforms work before including a safe harbor provision.




18
CONCLUSION

Over the past 21 months, the federal banking agencies have
worked to reduce regulatory burden on banks and to produce
clearer and more objective standards, both to guide institutions
in their CRA compliance and to assess their performance.

My

participation in the process since October has led me to conclude
that the FDIC and the other agencies represented here today are
making a serious effort to wrestle with all the difficult issues
that CRA reform has presented.

We are working to find a way to accomplish an effective and
meaningful evaluation of an institution's CRA performance without
burdensome paperwork and recordkeeping requirements on the one
hand, and without undue reliance on ratios or formulas on the
other.

We must make very clear that the objective of CRA is for
financial institutions to provide credit and service to customers
throughout their communities, not to build a mountain of
paperwork to justify their efforts.

No interest is served if

bankers spend more time filling out forms or printing brochures
than they spend in making sound loans in their communities.

While our examination standards need to be consistently
applied, we must have the flexibility to assess the performance




19
of an institution based on its capabilities and the needs of the
community it serves.

Each institution —— like each community ——

is unique.

We need to ensure that everyone understands the laws and
standards under which institutions will be evaluated.

To

accomplish this, we must continue to provide our examiners with
the resources and training they need.

Finally, we regulators must keep in mind we have a dual
responsibility:

To encourage institutions to help meet the

credit needs of their entire communities, while at the same time
assuring that they meet the standards for safety and soundness.




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