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Remarks by
Ricki Heifer
Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Before the
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition
Sponsored by
The Federal Reserve Bank o f Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
May 11, 1995

It is indeed a pleasure to speak to such a distinguished meeting o f economists,
analysts, and bankers. The conference includes even promoters o f a "narrow little
technical bill" to privatize deposit insurance and banking regulation. We are certainly a
diverse and tolerant group here today. It is also -- and always — a pleasure to be in
Chicago —which, for five years, was the home away from home for most o f the
headquarters staff o f the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Literally.
The celebrations earlier this week o f Victory in Europe reminded me o f that fact.
In the spring o f 1942, soon after the entry o f the United States into the Second World
War, hundreds o f FDIC employees in Washington were told that -- within two months ~
they would be transferred to Chicago for the duration o f the war. The transfer was part o f
a program to free up office space in Washington for use by the military. The Pentagon
was still a year from completion and government offices tied to the war effort were
springing up all over town. The Field Building — at 135 LaSalle Street, in the Loop —was
to become the Chicago home o f the FDIC during the war.
As one writer described it: "One by one, FDIC employees did sell homes and pull
children out o f school. Spouses quit their jobs to keep the family together for the rest o f
the w ar -- however long that would be. Together, they said good-bye to friends and
relatives in Washington and made new lives for themselves in Chicago."
It was a big change.
FDIC employees made the move, however, because necessity demanded it.




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Much o f what government does is a response to necessity — meeting immediate
needs -- from building roads to recapitalizing deposit insurance funds. If reporters write
history on the run, governmental policy-makers make history on the run — necessity
demands it.
From the standpoint o f government officials, occasions such as this conference
provide an opportunity to engage economists, bankers and others in examining the longerterm questions we face -- without having to assign staff to the job. At the FDIC we
welcome any thoughtful contribution, and I am joined here today by several o f my FDIC
colleagues eager to hear the contributions. Today I will talk about two developments that
have occurred in recent years.
The first is the subject o f this timely conference: financial innovation and its effect
on the banking industry. The second development has been the subject o f this conference
in past years: the deposit insurance system. When looked at in tandem, financial
innovation and deposit insurance reform certainly do raise some thought-provoking
questions about the changing nature o f the industry the FDIC insures and the role o f
deposit insurance in the overall safety net.
As this conference highlights, financial innovation is changing the way commercial
banks and thrifts do business. As time passes, it becomes clearer that banking is an
information-based business. Telecommunications is changing the delivery o f financial
products: brick-and-mortar and geographic proximity mean less. The explosive growth in
computing power has provided increasingly sophisticated analytical tools for risk
management -- and even greater need for risk management -- as if that were possible after
the thrift and banking crises we recently experienced. As Alan Greenspan said earlier
today, financial institutions have been able to lose money the old fashioned way, too —
where inadequate systems for assessing risks have been in place.
Globalization o f financial markets brings greater competition and
interconnectedness. The pricing o f financial instruments and services results more and
more from competitive market forces rather than nonmarket arrangements.
Within the banking industry, these changes are having the greatest impact on larger
institutions. Many large banks are moving away from traditional balance sheet products
toward risk management products and services. Several large money-center banks have or
are changing their business strategies to reflect the convergence o f credit markets and
capital markets. With respect to derivative contracts, fewer than seven hundred banks
report any use. These banks hold almost three quarters o f the banking industry’s assets.
In fact, the 15 most active banks account for 95 percent o f the reported notional amounts
of derivative instruments in the banking industry.




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The picture is similar with respect to securities activities. There are 36 bank
holding companies with section 20 subsidiaries; all but three are over $10 billion in assets.
With respect to globalization, 175 U.S. banks have active foreign branches; 99 percent o f
the assets in these banks are in banks over one billion dollars in size. Likewise, most
securitization o f assets, other than residential mortgages, is done by larger banks.
Large banks are more active in the sale o f mutual funds: 71 percent o f banks over
$1 billion report fee income from fund sales, while 28 percent o f banks under $1 billion
report such fees.
While the business o f banking has been changing over the past decade, so has the
business o f deposit insurance. The FDIC Improvement Act, or FDICIA - and the events
that led to its passage —are well-known to this audience. Much o f the impetus for
FDICIA was to address concerns that a de facto too-big-to-fail policy had resulted in an
over-extended deposit insurance safety net. There was a widely-held view that the
connection between deposit insurance and large banks had wandered off course. FDICIA
was designed to correct this by putting more market discipline into the banking system and
by drawing a distinction between the deposit insurance safety net and the broader, but less
explicit, systemic safety net that includes supervision and backup liquidity.
The legislative measures to address too-big-to-fail included the provisions dealing
with prompt corrective action, least-cost resolutions, and systemic risk. Prompt corrective
action, which includes mandatory supervisory sanctions and restrictions on the use o f the
discount window, forces shareholders and potential investors to decide at an earlier stage
whether to shore up a troubled bank. This and other factors have had the effect o f
encouraging banks to maintain higher capital levels in order to avoid such a day o f
reckoning. The systemic risk exception clarified the FD IC’s role in the safety net. It takes
the decision to incur additional costs to protect other creditors out o f the FD IC ’s hands
alone by requiring the concurrence o f the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board. It also
requires that the cost o f such a decision be recouped through a special assessment on the
industry based on liabilities rather than deposits; this places a greater share o f the burden
on larger institutions. It represents an explicit narrowing o f the FDIC’s role in the overall
safety net.
The most recent legislative change that has had a major impact on deposit
insurance is the establishment in 1993 o f national depositor preference. Depositor
preference alters the priority o f claims when a bank is placed into receivership so that
depositors stand ahead o f unsecured general creditors. Thus, depositor preference is a
mechanism that makes it unlikely that the FDIC would lose money in a least-cost
resolution involving a bank that relied heavily on nondeposit funding —but we cannot
ignore that it brings with it a number o f very real negatives.




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For instance, since all general creditors are now subordinate to those depositors
protected by depositor preference, the costs to banks o f using unsecured non-deposit
liabilities and other general credit obligations such as qualifying financial contracts may
increase. Some o f these obligations are used by banks to hedge their interest rate or
currency risk. Increasing these costs may discourage banks from using these instruments.
Also providing a preference for uninsured depositors reduces the incentives they have for
selecting a depository institution carefully. As it happens, the banks that have low levels
o f deposit funding tend to be large banks. For example, banks over $10 billion in asset
size on average fund 55 percent o f their assets with domestic deposits. In contrast, for
banks under $10 billion in size, the comparable figure is 86 percent.
Thus, financial innovation and deposit insurance reform share a common feature:
their impact is most pronounced on larger institutions.
This means that a greater share o f innovative financial activity is being conducted
in institutions that are less reliant on the explicit deposit insurance safety net and more
subject to market discipline.
Let me illustrate this by classifying the commercial banking industry, which
includes 10,450 banks with $4.0 trillion in assets, into three groups based on derivatives
use and funding base and I will raise a few questions along the way. While the lines I
draw leave room for ambiguity as to where certain banks belong, the divisions are based
on simple measures and help to shed light on the changing nature o f the industry.
The first group consists o f banks that report no off-balance sheet derivatives.
These nearly 9,900 banks hold $1.1 trillion in assets or 27 percent o f the assets o f the
commercial banking industry. The average size o f these banks is $110 million in assets.
These banks fund 87 percent o f their assets with domestic deposits on average.
The second group o f banks are those that report some off-balance sheet derivatives
and that fund more than one-half o f their asset base with domestic deposits. These 525
banks hold $1.7 trillion in assets, or 42 percent o f the industry. The average size o f these
banks is $3.2 billion in assets. On average, these banks fund 79 percent o f their assets
with domestic deposits.
The third group are those banks that report off-balance sheet derivatives and fund
less than half o f their assets with domestic deposits. These 69 banks hold $1.2 trillion in
assets, or 31 percent o f industry assets, just under 90 percent o f the derivatives, and just
over 90 percent o f the trading account assets in the industry. The average size o f these
banks is $ 18 billion in assets. These banks fund 27 percent o f their assets with domestic
deposits.




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Let me ask you: Does this grouping o f the commercial banking industry help us
think about how deposit insurance should be administered in an era o f rapid financial
innovation? The vast majority o f banks are small, rely on deposit funding, do not use offbalance sheet derivatives, and do not have trading activity or foreign operations. These
banks for the most part are not publicly traded - thus, they are not subject to a significant
amount o f discipline by the capital markets. Because they support the intermediation o f
funds from small transaction and savings accounts to borrowers not served by the national
capital markets, are not these banks the reason we have deposit insurance? Are there
other reasons?
The third group o f banks, by contrast, is much different in nature. The global
marketplace is their arena. Their customers can choose to go directly to the market for
their financial services. The performance o f these banks is continually monitored and
assessed by global capital markets.
Domestic deposit funding is but one o f a variety o f funding options available to
these banks. Their role in the payments system is critical, and liquidity problems for these
banks are likely to result in liquidity problems in the broader financial markets. All
developed countries have such banks, and the governments o f these countries support
these banks with backup liquidity and supervision, regardless o f whether a significant
deposit insurance system is in place. What role does deposit insurance have for these
banks? Is the FDIC's role in protecting against systemic risk and disruption significant for
these banks -- as well as for smaller banks?
The middle group o f banks is a hybrid o f the other two. These banks can be large,
but their role in the global marketplace is less prominent than the third group o f banks.
Their customers are likely to be mid-sized firms with some limited access to national
capital markets. Many, but not all, o f these banks are publicly traded. Domestic deposit
funding is critical to their operation and thus deposit insurance is important for them.
These banks find that they must adapt to rapid market developments to compete, but they
are not likely to be on the leading edge o f financial innovation. What role does deposit
insurance play for them? Does it assure a significant, stable funding source? How
important is that for their operations?
The grouping o f banks that I have just described raises some other important
questions. First, as the nature o f commercial banking changes, does the potential grow for
financial innovation and deposit insurance to be intertwined in ways that limit market
discipline?
If so, how should policymakers and regulators respond to current trends so as to
minimize risks to the deposit insurance funds, without stifling financial innovation, and
while assuring a stable financial system? In this context, it is essential to remember that,




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for bank failures, the FDIC has been the "lender o f last resort." Further, what are the
implications o f a substantial and growing segment o f the banking industry that has a
rapidly evolving risk profile, but a risk profile that is shifting from the deposit insurance
funds toward the market? From the perspective o f protecting the deposit insurance funds,
should we find the fact that newer and rapidly growing activities are taking place in banks
that rely less on insured deposits comforting ~ or less comforting? From the broader
perspective o f the entire financial system, if deposit insurance is not the back-up stabilizing
mechanism for these banks, what is? In the event o f a financial crisis, could the
government address a financial crisis through ad hoc measures? Is that feasible over the
longer term?
Another question concerns the FD IC’s role as receiver for institutions with a bank
or thrift charter. One could conceive o f a situation in which an insolvent bank does not
pose a systemic risk and whose funding structure poses virtually no risk to the deposit
insurance fund. Does it make sense for the FDIC to be the receiver for this institution? If
so, what protection, if any, should be provided beyond insured deposits?
The groupings I have presented raise a question about the coming evolution o f the
banking industry. Are we witnessing a bifurcation o f the industry, with one group o f
larger institutions transforming themselves into broad financial service providers while
other smaller banks retain their important traditional roles in their communities? Or, are
the transformed institutions leading the way to a financial frontier that the entire industry
will likely inhabit someday?
On a more concrete topic, risk-based pricing o f deposit insurance has been a
dramatic change in the way the FDIC fulfills its insurance responsibility. Do our current
risk-based schedules adequately reflect the risks to the insurance funds posed by the bestcapitalized institutions with the highest supervisory ratings? If not, what would? Further,
the current risk-based premium system is an administered system that in effect does little
more than penalize the current minority o f institutions whose capital levels and
supervisory ratings fall below acceptable standards.
This may be an entirely appropriate role for a risk-based deposit insurance system.
Nevertheless, it does not, in all likelihood, replicate the pricing that a market-driven
system would provide. As financial markets evolve and we gain a greater appreciation for
the ability o f market-based pricing systems to produce and disseminate valuable
information, does the appeal o f taking steps toward a market-driven system increase? As I
said earlier, I would welcome feedback from the thoughtful and experienced audience
gathered here today on any or all o f these questions.
Deposit insurance was put in place to stabilize a fragmented banking structure by
providing explicit, but limited, protection to bank depositors. Over time, deposit




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insurance has provided de facto protection to the system as a whole. Where do we go
from here? Where will necessity take us?
I grew up in Tennessee ~ a state where necessity is no stranger. Many years ago,
a woman in Tennessee went to see the governor to try to talk him into releasing her
husband from prison.
The governor gave her a meeting.
"Well," he said, opening the meeting up, "what is your husband in prison for?”
The woman replied: "For stealing a ham."
That doesnt sound too bad," said the governor, "tell me, is he a good husband?"
"No," replied the woman, "not at all. In fact, he never notices me at all."
"Well," said the governor, "is he a good worker?"
"No," said the woman, "he is as lazy as a man can be."
The governor then asked: "Is he a good father?"
"No," answered the woman, "he just yells at the children all day."
"Ma'am," the governor asked, "why would you want a man like that out o f
prison?"
"Governor," she replied, "we're about out o f ham."
Wherever necessity takes us, we will be going, but we must understand necessity
has both reaches and limits.
Again, it was a pleasure speaking with you.




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