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Remarks
by
Martin J. Gruenberg Acting Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Before an
International Open House
of the
Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation
Seoul, Korea
June 16, 2006

Good afternoon. I am very pleased to be here today to celebrate the tenth anniversary
of the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation and to discuss issues regarding the
improvement of deposit insurance systems with the distinguished heads of other deposit
insurance agencies. The program states that the purpose of this session is to share the
challenges facing our organizations and the visions we are developing for them. In this
regard, I would like to commend Mr. Choi and his staff at the KDIC for guiding their
agency through some very difficult times over the past decade and for forging ahead to
make improvements in their deposit insurance system. During the past ten years, the
KDIC has successfully moved from a temporary blanket coverage system to a limited
coverage system; has been given authority to investigate banks that received public
funds; and, most recently has been given authority to examine troubled insured financial
institutions.
We at the FDIC have also faced challenges during our history, especially during the late
1980s and early 1990s when an unprecedented number of U.S. banks failed. Following
that crisis, deposit insurance laws changed markedly in the United States. Most
significantly, a system of prompt corrective action was introduced that mandated
intervention by regulators if bank capital fell below required levels. In addition, our
system for assessing banks a premium for deposit insurance was changed from a flatrate system to one that was risk-based. A target reserve ratio was also established for
our fund. We spent the past decade implementing and refining these modifications to
our deposit insurance system.
In light of the guidance produced by the Working Group on Deposit Insurance for the
Financial Stability Forum in 2001, the FDIC undertook a review of the changes we had
implemented over the previous decade to see how well they were working and to
determine whether further improvements could be made. Our review culminated in a
report, Keeping the Promise: Recommendations for Deposit Insurance Reform. In that
report, the FDIC laid out its vision for refining our deposit insurance system. After
working closely with our legislative and executive branches of government, we were
successful in getting legislation passed in February of this year that, we believe, will
help us to improve the operation of our deposit insurance system. Some of the
changes—such as the merger of our two separate funds for banks and thrifts—are
largely unique to the U.S. system. What I would like to discuss in the remainder of my

time here today are a few of the changes we are making that may be relevant for other
deposit insurers as they consider how to improve their systems.
In particular, I would like to focus on the use of a reserve range as a tool to gauge the
adequacy of our deposit insurance fund, rather than a specific (or hard) target reserve
ratio. Following passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
in 1991, a target reserve ratio—termed a designated reserve ratio or DRR—was
established for our deposit insurance funds. I'm sure many of you are familiar with our
DRR of 1.25 percent of insured deposits, which guided our premium setting for the past
decade. Now we are in the process of developing an assessment system with
somewhat more flexibility, which we anticipate will accomplish two things. First, the new
system should reduce some of the potential for large swings in assessment rates that
existed under the previous system and thus help to reduce volatility in the premiums
bank pay. Second, the new system should help us ensure that banks are properly
charged for the risk they pose to the system.
Let me briefly explain. Our old system operated in a pro-cyclical fashion, in that the
FDIC could be required to raise assessment rates during economic downturns. If a
downturn were to increase the FDIC's insurance losses and push the reserve ratio
below the 1.25 percent target, we could be forced to increase premiums at a time when
banks are already under stress due to deteriorating economic conditions. In other
words, banks could be forced to pay the most at a time when they are least able to
afford it. The old system thus tended to exacerbate the swings of the business cycle
instead of moderating them.
Under the new system, the FDIC will be able to allow the deposit insurance fund to
fluctuate within a reserve ratio range of 1.15 to 1.50 percent of insured deposits.
Additionally, there is no requirement that the reserve ratio meet a target DRR. The FDIC
must simply keep the reserve ratio within the designated range.
A benefit the FDIC anticipates from the recent deposit insurance reform legislation is to
be able to charge all banks at all times for the risk they pose to the system. Under the
old structure, the FDIC was prevented from charging well-capitalized and well-managed
institutions a premium when the DRR is above its target ratio of 1.25 percent. Under the
new legislation, the FDIC will be able to charge a bank a premium for deposit insurance
that reflects the risk it poses to the deposit insurance system regardless of the reserve
ratio of the fund.
Our goal first and foremost will be to price premiums fairly. And any system that we
adopt will be open and transparent. The industry, with the help of the general public, will
have an opportunity to weigh in on any changes we propose.
Key to implementing this change will be to devise ever-more-accurate systems for
measuring the risk a bank poses to the system. As a result of much discussion with
bankers, trade group representatives and other regulators, as well as our own analysis,
the FDIC is looking at several pricing methodologies. For example, we are considering

whether a different pricing system for the largest banks and thrifts may be appropriate,
given the scope and complexity of operations at these institutions.
The FDIC Board will meet in July to adopt a proposed regulation for comment on
alternatives for pricing deposit insurance premiums, and we expect to adopt final
implementing regulations on all aspects of deposit insurance reform by November 5th.
These reforms have been the subject of much discussion and debate, and I expect this
dialogue to continue as we move forward with implementation. The FDIC welcomes any
input from the members of this distinguished audience as we develop the policies and
regulations that will implement our deposit insurance reforms.
I hope that my comments have given you an idea of some of the work that is currently
underway at the FDIC. As I stated in the beginning, these changes are largely the result
of a self-assessment process that the FDIC implemented a number of years ago. Like
the KDIC, we have found the practice of regular self-assessment to be of great value,
and we strive to maintain an approach that fosters openness to new ideas and reforms
that can enhance the effectiveness of our deposit insurance system.
I thank Mr. Choi for this opportunity both to share the experiences of the FDIC and to
learn about the work of others. Once again, I want to congratulate Mr. Choi and all of
our KDIC colleagues on the occasion of their tenth anniversary. Our two institutions
have developed a strong working relationship that has proven to be most productive
and rewarding, and we look forward to building on this solid foundation as we go
forward. Together, we can do much to promote stability in our rapidly evolving global
financial system. Thank you.

Last Updated 6/26/2006