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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
12 noon, E.D.T.
O c t o b e r 18, 1984

CURRENT ISSUES CONFRONTING MONETARY POLICY

Remarks by

Martha R. Seger

Member, Board of Governors of t h e F e d e r a l Reserve Syste

b e f o r e t h e N a t i o n a l Bankers A s s o c i a t i o n

New York, New York

O c t o b e r 18, 1984

I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you on current
issues confronting monetary policy.
In mafty respects, today's economic conditions are extremely favorable.

The current recovery has been one of the strongest of the postwar era

and recently has shown signs of moderating to a sustainable phase.

Accom-

panying the impressive gains in production, household income has advanced
substantially and unemployment has dropped sharply.

At the same time,

inflation has fallen well below its earlier double-digit pace and indicators
suggest that near-term inflationary pressures will remain subdued.

The

restraint on labor costs resulting from moderate wage increases and healthy
productivity gains has been especially encouraging.
A number of financial factors also point to an optimistic outlook.
Growth of the monetary aggregates has been broadly consistent with our goal
of gradually reducing monetary expansion over time to promote the ultimate
attainment of reasonable price stability.

The narrower monetary aggregates,

Ml and M2, remain well within their target ranges for 1984, and M 3 — a l t h o u g h
boosted by strong credit g r o w t h — i s running at about the top of its range.
Interest rates not only have come down significantly from their 1981-1982
peaks but also have moved lower in recent months, perhaps in part reflecting
a further ebbing of inflation expectations.
Despite these promising developments, much remains to be done.
There is certainly scope for further employment gains.

Unemployment is still

well above a range that might be considered consistent with "full employment"
and is distressingly high among blacks and teenagers and in certain industries
and areas of the country.

Interest rates, though m u c h lower, have stayed

high by historical standards, especially when compared with current inflation

-

rates.

2

-

Pressure on interest rates has been maintained by outsized credit

demands, bolstered by substantial federal borrowing.

The stronger dollar,

£

while reinforcing the slowing of inflation, has boosted our trade deficit,
retarded recovery in our export and import-competing industries, and increasingly led these industries to seek protectionist relief.

And the higher

current account deficit has fostered increased dependence on foreign capital
inflows to fund domestic borrowing.
These aspects of today's economic situation raise questions about
the permanence of the recent more favorable developments.

The issue at

hand is whether the needed adjustments will be aided by constructive public
policies or whether events will take their own c o u r s e — w i t h the accompanying
strains on the financial system and risks to the economy.
For our part, the Federal Reserve intends to continue to provide
sufficient liquidity to promote sustainable economic growth without rekindling inflation.
outcome.

Of course, monetary policy alone can not guarantee such an

Although encouraging steps have been taken to reduce the substan-

tial federal deficit, further progress in aligning federal expenditures with
receipts would make our task much easier.

Our job also is complicated by

continuing imbalances in many sectors of the economy as well as by the
rapid pace of financial innovation and deregulation of recent years.

In

the remainder of my remarks, I'd like to give my assessment of these issues.
As you well know, the progress we've made toward price stability
has been at great cost, including a severe economic contraction.

To be sure,

if inflation had not been reduced, the ultimate dislocations would have been
still more severe.

Even with the robust recovery, lingering effects of the

recession are still evident on our financial system and many sectors of our

-

3

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economy have not yet shared in the recovery.

To a degree, these problems

are the unavoidable side-effect of a transition from a period of high inflation and elevated interest rates to one of reasonable price stability and
more moderate credit costs.

Wage and price contracts had embodied expec-

tations of continued high inflation and disinflation was accompanied by
considerable loss of employment and output when these expectations were not
realized.

Borrowers also had locked in contracts on the assumption of

continued high inflation, and the adjustment toward price stability has
imp ired their ability to repay.
The debt burdens of certain developing countries are of particular

oncern.

Some countries found it increasingly difficult to generate

eno

h export revenues to service their debt obligations, as sensitive

com

dity prices fell following cyclical increases and the effects of the

wor

wide recession spread and persisted.

tha

has accompanied the recovery added to their payment difficulties.

The increase in interest rates
In

lig

of the progress that has been made by certain countries in reducing

rel

nee on external sources of funds and rescheduling loan payments, the

pro

em seems manageable over time.

tan

Nevertheless, there remains some dis-

* to go before we can feel sanguine about this situation and strains

wou d intensify if interest rates were to rise much above current levels,
giv< n the floating-rate nature of this debt.
Similarly, softness in the price of oil created problems in this
country for small energy-related firms, particularly those that had invested
heavily in marginal fields and new equipment on the assumption of ever-rising
energy prices.

These borrowers in many cases found it impossible to repay

- 4 -

their debt on schedule as the value of their output failed to keep pace with
expectations based on previous trends.
Farmers and others in the agricultural sector also have been
adversely affected.

Many of these producers, particularly those just start-

ing out, had acquired very heavy debt loads in order to expand production in
what was seen as an era of upward-trending prices of agricultural products
and rising land values.

But instead, agricultural prices stabilized, land

values fell, and both the ability of farmers to service their debt and the
value of the collateral for these loans deteriorated.
rates also reduced their ability to repay.

The higher interest

With many producers of farm

commodities heavily dependent on the export market, the strengthening international value of the dollar and the lagging recoveries in major foreign
markets have compounded their difficulties.

Moreover, should the U.S. turn

increasingly protectionist, foreign retaliation could further depress farm
export markets.

As with the developing countries, conditions in the farm

sector would erode further in the event of a backup in interest rates.
A number of banks and other lenders also have been caught in this
transitional squeeze.

So long as commodity and oil prices continued to trend

upward, loans in these areas appeared quite sound.

However, as the condi-

tions facing these borrowers deteriorated, lagging payments on interest and
principal in a number of cases have led to increases in nonperforming loans,
loan loss reserves and chargeoffs.

At the same time, the increase in interest

rates in the early 1980s raised funding costs and, although rates have since
come down, the removal of various deposit rate ceilings has limited reductions in the cost of funds.

Nevertheless, banks on the whole have adjusted

remarkably well, owing in large part to the strong recovery, which by itself

- 5 -

tended to boost credit demands and bank profits.

Even so, earnings at many

banks remain depressed, particularly among those with a concentration of
energy and agricultural loans.

Also, certain banks with heavy foreign

exposure have experienced swings in investor confidence, at times causing
them to pay a premium over market rates for their funds.

The asset quality of

many banks has not improved significantly, even though the ability of some
borrowers to repay has been helped by lower interest rates and reschedulings.
Indeed, 48 commercial banks failed in 1983 and 65 have closed so far this
year, the largest number since the 1930s.

It will take some time for banks

to restore fully their financial health, and this process would be made
more difficult should the recovery stall or interest rates increase sharply.
Thrift institutions too were adversely affected during the transition to lower inflation.

During the 1970s, as home prices escalated, many

of these ins titutions acquired large volumes of fixed-rate mortgages and
funded such iong-term assets with short-dated deposit liabilities.

Some

institutions were particulary aggressive, and funded rapid growth with
substantial issuance of jumbo CDs and other purchased funds.

However, as

mortgage rates climbed in 1980 and 1981 and real estate values stagnated,
thrift asset quality declined.

Moreover, with the rise in market rates,

these lenders found their costs of funds rising faster than returns on
their mortgage assets and thrift earnings were severely depressed.
the industry as a whole registered sizeable losses in 1981 and 1982.

Indeed,
With

the decline in interest rates from their cyclical peaks, thrift earnings
have improved somewhat.

In addition, the increased popularity of adjust-

able rate mortgages has better positioned these institutions for weathering
future interest rate volatility, although unless appropriate standards are

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followed in extending such loans, this reduction in interest rate risk may
be traded off for more credit risk.

Additionally, with the long maturi-

ties of the mortgages still on the thrifts' books, any such balance sheet
restructuring will take time.

In the meantime, the substantial overhang of

low-rate mortgages in thrift portfolios will continue to depress earnings
in this industry.

And, the removal of many deposit-rate ceilings has made

thrift liabilities increasingly rate sensitive.
Nonfinancial corporations also*face certain imbalances in their
debt structure.

As credit demands strengthened with the recovery, these

firms relied principally on short-term borrowing or on term loans with
floating rates.

The spate of merger activity this year has created further

leveraging as a substantial volume of equity was retired.

Although gross

issuance of long-term bonds and equities has picked up in response to the
recent decline in long-term rates and the rally in the stock markets over
the summer, this period of balance sheet restructuring has been brief.
Without substantial further adjustments, businesses in general will remain
vulnerable to interest rate upswings.
All of these factors have reduced the capacity of our economy and
financial system to absorb further shocks.

Certainly the Federal Reserve

and other agencies have carefully considered the strains on our financial
institutions in determining appropriate financial supervisory and regulatory policies.

Increased attention has been paid to the capital adequacy

of banks and other depositories as well as to the credit quality of their
loan portfolios.

Assessing maturity imbalances of depository balance sheets

also has been emphasized.

While these regulatory and supervisory efforts

help assure the soundness of the financial system, these problems can best
be addressed over time by prudent management decisions on the part of the
institutions themselves.

Their task would be facilitated by a sustained
In my

period of growth in the economy and stability in financial markets.

view, such a period of stability can not be ensured without a continuation
of monetary policies designed to prevent a resurgence of inflation.
Unfortunately, there are no clear-cut rules that we can follow
in designing such policies.

Policy strategies that focus exclusively on a

single target depend for their success on a stable relationship between
that target and the policy goals.

In the case of the monetary aggregates,

the rapid pace of financial innovation and deregulation has made less
certain their relationship to economic activity and prices.
High inflation and accompanying high interest rates in the past
prompted some of the financial innovation and deregulation.

As interest

rates rose cbove deposit rate ceilings, the financial system brought forth
a wide array of financial assets free of these restrictions and with
different characteristics than traditional deposits.

Money market mutual

funds, for example, which combined investment and transaction capabilities,
grew rapidly in the 1970's as deposit rate ceilings became increasingly
restrictive.

In turn, as the new instruments attracted funds from those

deposit accounts included in the monetary aggregates, the relationship
between the aggregates and nominal economic activity deteriorated.

This

problem was addressed to a degree by redefining the aggregates to include
the new deposit substitutes.

However, the hybrid nature of many of the new

instruments suggests that any such redefined aggregate will take on n e w and
uncertain behavioral characteristics compared with the one it replaced.

In response to erosion of the competitive position of depository
institutions and to enable depositors to earn market rates on their funds,
deposit-rate ceilings were gradually lifted over time and new types of accounts were authorized.

This process is now nearly complete; as a result of

the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
all deposit-rate ceilings except for the statutory prohibition of interest
payments on demand deposits are scheduled to be eliminated by early 1986.
This deregulation has been largely beneficial by promoting a more
efficient allocation of funds, by allowing depository institutions to compete on an equal footing and by expanding the variety of market-rate instruments available to the public.

Even so, it has further complicated the

Federal Reserve's interpretation of the monetary aggregates.

The deregula-

tion of existing accounts and the introduction of new ceiling-free deposits
can cause sudden shifts of funds into these instruments.

If these funds are

attracted from outside the aggregate containing the new deposits, estimating
the amounts Involved and interpreting movements in that aggregate can be
difficult.

Two recent examples of this phenomenon are the introduction of

NOW accounts nationwide in early 1981 and the creation of money market
deposit accounts in December of 1982.

NOW accounts grew very rapidly

during 1981 and boosted Ml that year by an estimated 2-1/2 percent.

MMDAs

were phenomenally attractive and grew to over $320 billion by March of
1983.

The amount of these funds that came from outside M 2 is difficult to

estimate but there can be little doubt that MMDAs boosted this agggregate
substantially during this period.
The authorization of new accounts also can have more lasting
effects on the underlying behavior of the aggregates relative to economic

- 9 -

activity and interest rates.

These effects as well impair the usefulness of

the aggregates as guides to monetary policy.

For one thing, deposits such as

NOW accounts and the more recent Super NOW accounts and MMDAs can perform
both savings and transactions functions.

Including the fully transactional

NOW and Super NOW accounts in Ml and the more restricted MMDAs in M2 thus
tends to blur further the distinction between the narrow and broad aggregates.
In addition, as investment motives come to play a larger role in determining
the demand for narrow money, the relationship between Ml and income is likely
to change.

Finally, demands for money over time are likely to become less

responsive to movements in market interest rates as deposits increasingly
bear competitive rates of return.
The relationships among money, interest rates and economic activity may stabilize upon completion of the transition to the deregulated
environment.

But these linkages are likely to remain uncertain during the

period of adjustment.

Although Ml recently appears to be behaving more in

line with historical norms, it may well be some time before full confidence
in this aggregate can be restored.

Looking ahead, the removal of all rate

restrictions on regular NOWs by early 1986, not to mention the possible
elimination of the statutory prohibition against payment of interest on
demand deposits, will create new uncertainties.

Under these circumstances,

the conduct of monetary policy will continue to require analysis of a broad
range of economic developments and careful judgment.
Allowing depository institutions to compete for liabilities with
market rates has tended to raise their funding costs, of course, particularly for smaller depositories that previously relied most heavily on retail
deposits subject to rate ceilings.

And, as I mentioned earlier, this upward

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pressure on funding costs occurred during a period when earnings were already
squeezed.

To a degree, more efficient pricing of credit and deposit ser-

vices should liinit the impact of deregulation on bank profits over time, as
banks and other depositories increasingly compete through price rather than
nonprice means.

In the near-term, however, increased funding costs may

continue to reduce net earnings, particularly if public pressures develop
that constrain depositories from passing on costs through explicit pricing
of services or from eliminating unprofitable activities.

These factors,

along with the possibility that bank asset powers likewise will be further
expanded, point up the continuing importance of strong supervision to
ensure the safety and soundness of the depository system as deregulation
proceeds.

This need is heightened by the current strains affecting the

asset portfolios of many of these institutions.
Sizeable federal budget deficits now and in the foreseeable future
add to these concerns.

Although fiscal policy provided an important stim-

ulus during the recession, the continued large shortfall of receipts from
expenditures during the expansion raises certain risks.

At present, large

structural deficits are putting upward pressure on interest rates, as the
government competes with private borrowers for a limited savings pool and
as market participants fear that such federal deficits will ultimately
prove inflationary.

Such pressure further contributes to the strains I

spoke of e a r l i e r — o n borrowers, depository institutions, and firms in need
of balance sheet restructuring.

In addition, to the extent that real

interest rates are boosted, the dollar is strengthened and a correction to
our sizeable external deficit delayed.

The federal deficit also complicates

-li-

the implementation of monetary policy; to reduce the risks of a resurgence
of inflation, the Federal Reserve must avoid monetizing the substantial
federal debt issuance, even as it deals with the uncertainties currently
surrounding the monetary aggregates.
Over a longer horizon, prospective large federal deficits raise
the potential problem of reduced capital formation due to crowding out,
particularly if uncertainties caused by a burgeoning current account deficit
retard the willingness of foreign investors to hold U.S. debt.

Any lessening

in long-term capital formation also would jeopardize further improvements
in labor productivity and unit labor costs.

And if concerns by foreign

investors about potential debt monetization and long-run U.S. inflation
prospects were ever to induce a sharp erosion in the dollar's exchange
value, added price pressures would emerge in a self-fulfilling process.
I believe that the best way to forestall such outcomes would be
further and timely actions to reduce the imbalance between federal receipts
and expenditures.

I would not take it upon myself to make detailed recom-

mendations on fiscal policy matters to Congress or the Administration, of
course, but I would hope that in addressing this issue, ways can be found
to preserve and promote strong incentives to produce and invest.

Progress

in this area can only strengthen the foundations of our economy and financial system.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that many reasons for
optimism can be advanced.

Although attaining price stability has been

difficult, we have achieved great progress in the last few years.

I am

confident that sound public policies can promote the period of economic
and financial stability necessary to sustain and extend this progress.