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RESEARCH LI

•LEASE ON DELIVERY

11 CDT (8:00 p.m. EDT)
Federal ResenreftteHfe , July 30, 1985

of St. Louis

CHALLENGES OF CHANGE

Remarks by
Martha R. Seger
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

before the
BAI School for Dank Administration
Madison, Wisconsin
July 30, 1985

Introduction
It is a distinct pleasure to have the privilege of meeting with you today
to discuss the challenge of change in our banking and financial system. It is clear
that we are entering—indeed it is probably more accurate to say we are in—a
period of accelerating change and, therefore, a period of great challenge for both
bank managers and bank regulators. It seems that nearly every day a new financial
instrument is created, a new banking service introduced, a new technology
unveiled, or a new regulatory loophole discovered. Ours is a world of credit cards
one day, debit cards the next; automated teller machines one day, home banking
the following; interest rate futures one day, options on interest rate futures
another day; nonbank banks one day, nonthrift thrifts the next.

I need not

document all these changes to you, for you and your banks are the agents,
promoters, originators, and beneficiaries of many of the changes. My intention is
simply to illustrate the magnitude of the challenges and to point out the two-sided
nature of change—it presents both positive opportunities and new potential risks.
It is incumbent upon us, therefore, to promote change in a constructive, not a
bewildering, fashion.
These changes are of paramount importance because of the crucial role
played by banks and other depository institutions in our financial system.
Depository institutions perform a number of unique and critical functions with
national and global implications.

Among other things, depository institutions

administer the payments mechanism through the issuance of transaction accounts
to corporations and individuals, serve as key providers of credit to individuals and
businesses, and act as the vehicle through which the effects of monetary policy are
transmitted to the economy. Given the profound importance of each of these
functions, we have a special responsibility to act wisely in the face of change. All
of our decisions, good and bad, will be magnified.

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2-

The unprecedented pace and magnitude of change in the banking
industry require a flexible and responsive regulatory structure.

Recent history

suggests that the marketplace changes faster than the laws that attempt to
regulate it. (De facto interstate banking is just one outstanding example.) If this
lesson carries through to the future, it is imperative that regulators and depository
institution managers work together to shape laws and regulations that will make
sense in the face of the changes to come in the industry. If not, unnecessary
resources will be expended, as they are now, to find loopholes in archaic laws.
Before discussing some of the critical challenges we face, I would like
to share what I believe are the major objectives of our banking system. After all,
our approach to change should be guided by a clear vision of our objectives. As
regulators, we often express our objectives in terms of a banking system that is
competitive, innovative and efficient, and safe and sound. It seems to m e that
bankers also share the same objectives. What differences exist are likely to be
differences of approach, not substance.
As we face the challenges ahead, it is important for bankers and
regulators to understand each other's concerns and perspectives.

Bankers have

increasingly come to understand that market and technological changes, the
development of new products and services, and the rescission of obsolete or
unnecessary regulations can open new opportunities to better serve their customers
and communities and, thereby, enhance their opportunities for growth and
improved profitability. For this reason, bank managers have begun to seek greater
freedom to manage and respond to change in ways that maximize reliance on free
markets. Regulators, on the other hand, are sensitive to the possibility that along
with change, innovation and new opportunities can go new types and levels of risk
exposure for banking organizations.

-

3-

The critical test for both sides, bankers and regulators, is to strike the
proper balance among the sometimes competing objectives I outlined above.

In

general, I believe that the most effective means of achieving the objectives—
competition, innovation and efficiency, and safety and soundness—is to allow the
creative energies that abound in the marketplace to operate freely. That means
that, as regulators, our job is to facilitate change, not to hinder it. Likewise, our
responsibility is to administer a system of incentives and constraints designed to
promote prudence and discipline, not to decide on how individual banks respond to
the system o f incentives and constraints. That responsibility lies in the hands of
management and the directors themselves.
The regulator's ultimate concern, of course, is the safety and soundness
of the banking and payments system.

Only by understanding the dynamic

environment in which depository institutions operate—and the opportunities and
risks

that

can

accompany

change—can

regulators

carry

out

this

critical

responsibility in a way that benefits all sectors and participants in our complex and
growing economy.

Some Specific Challenges
I would now like to discuss some of the major changes and developments
over the last several years—and some possible prospective changes—that have
complicated and will, no doubt, continue to complicate the task of both managing
banking organizations as well as supervising them. The principal developments that
I would like to address may be subsumed under the following categories:

i)

economic/financial, ii) technological, iii) regulatory/competitive and iv) public
confidence.

-

4

-

Economic and Financial Environment
Economic and financial developments shape the environment in which
banking organizations operate, and have a major impact on the financial health and
stability of the banking system.

Since the early 1970s, the U.S. economy has

experienced two severe recessions and has, at various times, been subject to
significant financial pressures stemming from high and volatile interest rates.
Since the. early 1980s, these developments have led to an increase in business
failures and problem loans.

Particular sectors such as agriculture, energy,

commercial real estate, heavy equipment and manufacturing have been especially
hard hit. Moreover, many firms have taken on increasingly high levels of debt
which has weakened their ability to withstand unanticipated shocks. These
developments,

combined with overly

rapid growth and, in some cases, a

deterioration in credit standards and controls, have resulted in a significant
increase in bank failures which reached a post-depression high of 79 in 1984. In
addition to the increase in the number of bank failures, we have also seen serious
earnings and asset quality problems in some of our nation's larger institutions.
While I believe our economy has returned to a long-run path of sound,
sustainable growth, the volatility and uncertainty of the 1970s and early 80s have
left a legacy o f troubled loans in some depository institutions. This situation has
been exacerbated by the strains experienced by farmers and certain manufacturing
firms whose financial health has been further hurt in recent years by the continuing
high exchange value of the dollar.

Clearly, the events of the last several years

underscore the critical importance of asset quality and the need for senior
management and directors to establish sound lending standards and internal
controls for limiting bank exposure to credit risks. This is especially true during
economic recessions, but even in a dynamic and growing economy some sectors,

-

5-

such as is presently the case in the oil and gas industry,

will be experiencing

difficulties or adjustment problems that require vigilance on the part of both bank
managers and bank supervisors.
Events of the last several years also highlight the critical responsibility
of bank managers and senior financial officers to ensure that their institutions
maintain a strong financial profile in order to withstand unanticipated shocks and
strains. In this regard, adequate capital and liquidity, and a balance sheet that is
resistant, or, at least, not unduly exposed to interest rate risk, are of paramount
importance. We regulators have traditionally been extremely concerned about the
maintenance of adequate capital in banking organizations and, in particular, about
the decline in capital levels that characterized many of our larger institutions in
the 1970s and early 80s. As most of you know, the Federal banking agencies have
established capital guidelines or regulations specifying acceptable minimum capital
ratios. No one, of course, has yet devised a scientific method for determining what
is the right amount of capital for all organizations under all conditions, and some
of us~here I include myself—are not overly enthusiastic about fostering a
proliferation o f supervisory rules that tend to be somewhat arbitrary and, at times,
inflexible. However, as I have suggested, it is incumbent upon bank management to
ensure that strong capital positions are maintained over time, and the Federal
Reserve's capital guidelines program was, in part, a regulatory response to the
failure of some banking organizations to prevent the decline in their capital ratios
to very low levels.
Within recent years, the capital ratios of many banking organizations
have increased significantly.

In attempting to raise capital ratios and satisfy

supervisory capital requirements, however, it is, of course, essential that bank
managers avoid steps that may actually increase risk exposure, reduce liquidity, or

-

6-

undercut the intent of the banking agencies' capital adequacy programs.

For

example, a reduction of low-risk, money market assets in order to generate a
higher capital-to-total assets ratio may do little to reduce risks and may actually
weaken an institution's overall liquidity.

In a similar vein, the assumption of

excessive contingent liabilities and arrangements to move significant credit risks
o ff the balance sheet, while minimizing the adverse impact on capital-to-assets
ratios, likewise does little to strengthen an organization's capital adequacy or its
overall financial condition.

Indeed, the issue of the rapid growth of off-balance

sheet activities and risks is of concern to all regulators and represents an area in
which bank managers must sharpen their understanding of and control over risktaking. In the first instance, it is the responsibility of each bank to control its own
risk—this, in my view, is preferable to the imposition of restrictive and inflexible
rules which should only constitute a last resort for bank regulators.
While we have experienced a good deal of volatility and uncertainty in
recent years, one development, in particular, augurs extremely well for the growth
and overall stability of our economy. I am referring to the significant decline in
the rate of inflation from the double-digit levels of a few years back, which placed
the economy on a more firm footing for future growth. However, this favorable
development has placed considerable pressure on some borrowers who, during the
period of rapid inflation, incurred debt with the expectation that their loans could
readily be repaid with depreciated dollars. The transition from an inflationary to a
more stable economic environment can indeed place strains on certain borrowers
and, in turn, affect their ability to repay their debts.

However, the long-run

benefits to the economy of a more stable price level are immense, and I can assure
you that the Federal Reserve is committed to continuing the progress that has thus
far been achieved in reducing the rate of inflation.

-

7

-

Technological Change
Another major factor affecting the environment in which banks must
operate is the speed and nature of technological change.
traditional

banking

services

with

new

The combination of

telecommunications, electronic

data

processing, and funds transfer technologies has created new products and services,
and has diminished the importance of geographic barriers in the provision of
banking services.

It is, of course, impossible to say where this technological

revolution will lead. What is clear, however, is that these changes will create new
product opportunities, new ways for banks to serve their customers, new forums in
which depository institutions will have to compete, and continued pressure to
eliminate outmoded regulations that tend to inhibit constructive responses to
market forces.

Managers of depository institutions must understand the nature of

technological change, how this change will affect the evolving needs of their
customers, and the implications of the acquisition of new technologies for expense
control and overall profitability.

Regulatory/Competitive Environment
A hallmark of the last several years has been the growing trend toward
deregulation of our banking and financial system. We are indeed in the midst of a
rapidly changing regulatory and legislative environment that has already greatly
altered, and will continue to alter, many of the ground rules that have affected the
performance of depository institutions since the 1930s.

This, as I have already

suggested, has ushered in many new opportunities and challenges.
Deregulation means many things to many people, but generally the term
refers to the lifting o f interest rate ceilings, the expansion of asset powers and
other permissible activities, and the dismantling, however fitful and gradual, of

-

8-

geographic barriers to deposit-taking. In addition, I would point to another element
of deregulation that, while it has perhaps achieved less publicity, is in my view no
less important. That is, the commitment on the part of regulators to periodically
review their regulations and supervisory policies to eliminate any unnecessary or
obsolete restrictions that do not have a clear and demonstrable safety and
soundness rationale.
Interest

rate

deregulation gained impetus in the late

1970s as

inflationary expectations and financial uncertainties drove open market rates
above the deposit rate ceilings applicable to regulated depository institutions. As
you were no doubt painfully aware at the time, banks and other depository
institutions suffered significant deposit outflows resulting from the ability of
money market mutual funds to pay market rates and offer checking accounts,
unencumbered by rate ceilings and reserve requirements.

The phase-out of rate

ceilings begun in 1973, broadened and enacted into law in 1980 in the Monetary
Control Act, and, subsequently, administered by the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Committee, is now virtually complete. Depository institutions can
now compete more fairly among themselves and with other financial service
companies for the funds of depositors and savers. While this has raised the cost of
funds for some smaller institutions, it has also improved their access to consumer
deposits that were flowing to the money market funds or other financial
intermediaries.
By improving the competitive

fund-raising position of depository

institutions, rate deregulation has provided many benefits and has lessened the
likelihood that institutions will experience the liquidity pressures and deposit
outflows associated with disintermediation. However, there clearly are costs and
risks that have accompanied the lifting of rate ceilings.

Depository institutions'

-

9

-

liability structures have become more rate sensitive, and this can place severe
pressure

on spreads and margins when interest

rates

increase.

Moreover,

competitive pressures, combined with overly exuberant growth plans, have induced
some institutions to pay excessive rates for funds, and, in turn, to make high risk,
high yielding loans and investments in order to cover their costs.

Thus, the

competitive opportunities opened up by interest rate deregulation have also
exposed depository institutions to the potential risks associated with increased
funding costs, asset/liability mismatches and the tendency to seek higher yields
through the assumption of excessive risks. Bank managers, in such an environment,
must closely monitor the maturity, cost and rate sensitivity of their liabilities, and
ensure that the risk and reward relationship inherent in their loan and investment
portfolios is kept within reasonable and prudent limits.
The

phase-in

of

deposit

rate

deregulation

has

highlighted

the

importance of providing depository institutions with greater powers and freedom on
the asset side of the balance sheet. This has been particularly evident in the case
of

thrift

institutions

who

have experienced

the severe, and often

fatal,

consequences of funding relatively low-yielding, fixed-rate mortgages with deposits
carrying higher market rates of interest. Thrifts, of course, have had their asset
powers broadened considerably by the Monetary Control Act and the Garn-St.
Germain Act, and depository institutions in general have been given greater loan
pricing freedom by the repeal or liberalization of usury statutes.

Further,

depository institutions of all types have continually developed new products,
services and delivery systems to better meet the needs of their customers.
Despite the degree of deregulation that has already occurred, changing
market conditions, the advent of new technologies, intensifying competition among
various types of financial institutions, and the existence of loopholes in the present

-

10-

regulatory framework, continue to underscore the pressing need for a thorough
réévaluation and clarification of what powers banking and other depository
institutions should be allowed to exercise. Consistent with its safety and soundness
concerns and public policy as reflected in existing statutes, the Federal Reserve
Board has acted where appropriate to expand the "laundry list" of activities that
are permissible for bank holding companies.

For example, within the last few

years, the Board has allowed holding companies to provide discount brokerage
services, to act as futures commission merchants and to arrange equity financing
for commercial real estate.

The Board has also taken steps, consistent with

existing law, to streamline and reduce the burden associated with the process of
applying to make acquisitions and to conduct new activities.
Ultimately, of course, the Congress—not the regulators or the courts—
must determine what powers depository institutions may exercise and, therefore,
what is the proper line of demarcation between banking and other forms of
commercial activity.

In so doing, Congress will have to consider the changing

environment, and weigh the opportunities and benefits associated with new powers
for depository institutions against the potential risks involved.

The Federal

Reserve has supported an expansion of certain powers for depository institutions—
such as the underwriting of municipal revenue bonds and mortgage backed
securities, the sponsoring and distribution of mutual funds, and certain insurance
and real estate brokerage activities—while ensuring an adequate regulatory and
supervisory framework and maintaining the basic separation of banking and
commerce. I personally agree that depository institutions can be given additional
freedom and latitude to respond to market forces and customer needs, without
compromising our concerns over safety and soundness.

-11

-

The advent of interstate banking poses another challenge to bank
managers. As an economist, I see great benefits from the removal of restrictions
on entry into new markets. Enhanced competition will benefit bank borrowers and
other customers, and the greater diversification that depository institutions will be
able to achieve should, other things equal, help to lower banking risks. Both bank
managers and regulators, however, need to be sure that geographic expansion is
supported by adequate financial and managerial resources and strong capital
positions. There is, of course, already a considerable amount o f interstate banking
in the provision of most bank services, except for the taking of deposits, and even
in this latter area, funds transfer technologies and the activities of money brokers
have begun to diminish the importance of geographic restrictions.
A number of states have already enacted, or are in the process of
considering, statutes that allow the acquisition of in-state banks by out-of-state
institutions, although in many cases the potential acquirers are limited to
institutions located in specified geographic regions. While regional pacts may play
a role as a transitional mechanism to full interstate banking, such arrangements
should not be used to

protect the market positions of dominant regional

organizations or indefinitely restrict entry into regional banking markets.

In the

case of those states that have opted for regional arrangements, the Federal
Reserve supports a national trigger that would at some future point allow full
interstate banking, with appropriate safeguards to preclude undue concentration of
resources on a national basis and within individual states.
In my view, a national approach to interstate banking will maximize the
number of potential bidders and entrants, broaden the opportunities for those
organizations that wish to be acquired and strengthen competition in the banking
system. I do not believe that small banks will disappear or that the total number of

-

12-

banking organizations will decline to the extent predicted by some forecasters. It
is clear, however, that in such an environment bank managers will be forced to
sharpen their skills, better understand and respond to their customers' needs, and
adapt to change.

Indeed, the common thread running through all of the

developments I have mentioned is the prospect for intensified competition among
depository institutions and between depository institutions and other financial
services companies.

I believe this point is critical and must be stressed:

bank

managers must innovate and respond to change in a way that serves their
customers and assures their profitability, while avoiding unsafe and unsound
practices and undue risk-taking.

The job of managing and regulating financial

institutions is becoming increasingly complex, and both bankers and bank regulators
will be critically tested in the years ahead.

Public Confidence
I would like to mention one other challenge that I believe bank
managers face in light of recent developments in the banking industry. This relates
to the public's perception of and confidence in the banking system. The increase in
the number of bank and thrift institution failures, the notoriety associated with
certain well-publicized examples of insider abuse, mismanagement and excessive
risk-taking, and the extensive problems recently experienced by privately insured
depository institutions have raised questions in some people's minds about the
safety of financial institutions and the degree of prudence exercised by bank and
thrift managers.

The most egregious cases of mismanagement and insider abuse

have, I believe, been quite limited—by far the overwhelming preponderance of bank
managers are highly skilled and operate their institutions in full compliance with
banking laws and prudent banking practice.

Nonetheless, there is, I believe, a

-

13

-

degree of public concern that the managers o f some depository institutions may be
inclined to take excessive risks with depositors' funds.

This concern must be

addressed by bank managers in a straightforward manner.

The public must have

complete confidence in the banking system, and the actions o f bank managers must
truly justify and reinforce this trust. Depository institutions operate to a large
degree on public confidence, and bankers cannot hope to gamer the support needed
to continue the trend toward deregulation i f the wisdom, prudence or legality of
their actions is open to serious question.

Responsibilities of Management and Directors
The responsibility to meet the challenges I have outlined lies squarely
on bank management and boards of directors. As members of senior management,
you must have a firm grasp of the nature and type of risks your organization has
undertaken. This grasp must embrace not only the traditional risks associated with
lending and investing, but also the exposure arising from off-balance sheet banking
in the form, for example, of standby letters of credit, involvement in financial
futures and interest rate swaps. The nature of risks is changing just as rapidly as
the environment in which depository institutions are operating. In this connection,
the introduction o f any new product, service, or activity—whether or not it
involves conventional extensions of credit—ought to require an assessment of all
potential risks that could result from providing the service or engaging in the
activity.

Depository institutions must have systems and procedures in place to

monitor and control risk-taking and to report operating results in a timely and
clear manner to senior management.

And, equally as important, boards of

directors must play an active role in establishing policies and monitoring the
compliance of senior management with the policies.

-

Notwithstanding

14 -

the importance of

general economic

factors

in

affecting the health of financial institutions, the key determinants of a depository
institution's financial condition are, in most cases, the skill and competence of the
institution's management and the effectiveness of its directors. In my view, this is
becoming increasingly evident in this period of rapid change, and the principle of
management and director accountability will guide the actions of bank regulatory
officials as they carry out their responsibilities for ensuring the safety and
soundness of the banking system.

Regulatory Challenges
This discussion leads me to the point of considering the challenges that
face the depository institution regulators.

Clearly, given the changes that are

taking place, our jobs will be tougher too. On the one hand, as I have indicated, the
supervisory and regulatory framework must provide an appropriate degree of
freedom for bankers to innovate and compete.

Trivial and stifling regulations

should have no place in our complex banking and financial system.

On the other

hand, the pace of change and uncertainty that we are experiencing pose new risks
that, i f not properly controlled, can undermine the stability of our banking system
and the strength of our economy.
We are continually reminded that overly rapid growth and overly
aggressive or enthusiastic lending concentrated in certain

sectors—-such as

characterized the REIT industry in the early 1970s or the oil and gas industry more
recently—can seriously weaken loan portfolios and result in damage that requires
many years to repair. This serves to reemphasize the critical importance of such
fundamental principles of safety and soundness as proper credit evaluation,
adequate portfolio diversification, and effective oversight by management and

-

15 -

directors. The challenge to us as regulators, then, is to understand the nature of
the changes that are taking place and to accommodate these changes while
discharging our critical responsibilities for the safety and soundness of the banking
system. To put it another way, we must not try to impede change or turn the clock
back.

Instead, we must be sensitive to the environment in which depository

institutions must operate and provide freedom to innovate, while at the same time
holding management accountable for monitoring and controlling their risk-taking
activities.

And, when necessary, we must step in, employing formal or informal

enforcement actions, to prevent unsound practices, excessive risk-taking or
violations o f law.
The best way, in my view, to achieve a strong, competitive and
innovative financial system is to have a legislative and regulatory framework that
rests on three fundamental pillars or principles.

First, we need a set of clear,

rational laws establishing the types of activities that banking organizations may
conduct and the geographic scope in which they can be conducted.

This is the

responsibility of Congress and, as I have suggested, there is room to broaden the
permissible activities for depository institutions and provide more latitude to
respond to market forces while paying due regard to safety and soundness
considerations and the long-standing public policy of the separation of banking and
commerce.

Once the fundamental statutes and, prudential rules have been

established, trivial or niggling restrictions that have no real prudential rationale
should be discarded.
Second, greater freedom to innovate and compete and, therefore,
greater freedom to assume risks implies the need for an effective program of
prudential rules and supervisory oversight. As a quid pro quo for greater latitude,
depository institutions should be required to maintain strong capital positions—that

-

16-

is, capital positions generally above regulatory minimums—and be subject to
thorough

on-site

examinations

and,

when

necessary,

timely

and

effective

supervisory enforcement actions. We at the Federal Reserve are actively engaged
in exploring ways to strengthen the examination and enforcement processes. One
area of particular interest to me is the communication between bank regulators
and boards of directors.

It is incumbent upon us as regulators to present clearly

and candidly—without hedging and obfuscating—our assessment of your institution's
financial condition.
management

and

Only in this way, can we be justified in holding bank
directors

accountable

for

responding

adequately

to

our

supervisory criticisms and concerns.
In addition to capital adequacy guidelines and examination programs,
regulators must establish other prudential rules that clearly delimit what is
considered sound banking practice, without making these rules so detailed or
inflexible as to unduly burden or impede the management process.

Of course,

regulators should not intrude in management's prerogatives so long as an institution
is in sound condition and in compliance with the law; on the other hand, regulators
cannot hesitate to step in to prevent insider abuse, unsafe practices or legal
violations.
Given the rapidly changing environment we are in, regulators must
continually consider new ways to discharge our responsibilities and promote the
soundness of the banking system. One idea that warrants consideration is greater
financial disclosure and reliance on market discipline in lieu of, or to supplement,
regulatory fiat. Banks already disclose a good deal of information, and I know that
some of you may feel that disclosure has already gone too far, that disclosed
information may be misinterpreted and, therefore, that further disclosure could be
detrimental to the banking system.

On the other hand, to the extent that

-

17

-

disclosure encourages customers to deal with the overwhelming preponderance of
banks that are sound and well-managed, and to the extent that market forces can
substitute for the rigidity often inherent in government rules and regulations,
disclosure may hold out prospects for a more efficient and flexible regulatory
system.
Another idea that merits careful consideration is the peer review
concept put forward by Vice Chairman Preston Martin.

Under a system of self-

evaluation, bankers themselves could complement the supervisory efforts of the
government by establishing a peer review process, identifying questionable banking
practices, and encouraging management to take corrective action.

Peer group

review and evaluation could, of course, be a powerful tool to encourage sound
banking practices, and this approach, too, could foster a regulatory environment
that is more flexible and responsive to conditions in the banking system.
In addition, I believe that the supervisory process could benefit
considerably from increased cooperation and communication between in-house
auditors, external auditors and bank supervisors. Financial managers and in-house
auditors play an important role in safeguarding assets, identifying potential risks,
establishing financial and operating standards, developing internal systems and
controls, and monitoring and reporting on risk-bearing activities. These functions
are obviously of interest to the external auditors and are of critical concern to
bank regulators. We as regulators should make every effort to foster an increased
understanding of what constitutes appropriate standards in these areas and
encourage in-house and external auditors to see that such standards are continually
met.
The third major pillar of a sound banking system rests on the role
played by management and the boards of directors. When all is said and done, it is

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18-

clear that examiners cannot and should not oversee every action taken by bank
management, and no regulatory system of written rules or restrictions can
anticipate all of the adverse consequences or potential risks associated with new
activities. For this reason, directors must establish prudent policies within the law
and the guidelines established by the regulatory authorities. Moreover, directors,
working with senior management, must also ensure that the depository institution
at all times operates within the established policies.
In the end, greater management and director accountability must
accompany the greater freedom afforded in a deregulated environment. Clearly, in
light of the changes that are taking place, the days of protected markets, static
technology and easy profits in the banking industry—if they ever did exist—are
gone forever. Supervisors must identify problems and communicate their concerns
clearly, and directors must recognize and carry out their responsibility to ensure
that institutions are operated in full compliance with the law and sound banking
practices.

Despite the profound challenges we face, our financial system can

thrive and grow stronger so long as we recognize both the risks as well as the
opportunities inherent in a dynamic economy and a changing environment, and so
long as both bankers and regulators are committed to carrying out the full range of
their responsibilities.

While our perspectives may differ, both the managers of

depository institutions and the regulators share the common goal of an efficient,
competitive, responsive and safe banking system.