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Statement by
Mark H. Willes
President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
before the
Inflation Task Force of the House Budget Com m ittee
United States House of Representatives

Uune 27, 1979

Mr. Chairman and members of the Inflation Task Force, I am pleased to have
the opportunity to testify today on credit controls and inflation.

A ll o f us here today

would agree that reducing inflation and avoiding a serious recession are the major
objectives of economic policy today. The debate then is not about where we want to go
but rather about the best way to get there. I wish I could assure you that credit controls
would be a practical way to reach our objectives, or at least a step in the right direction.
Based on considerable research and analysis, however, I am convinced that credit controls
are counterproductive policy tools.
Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis have, since early in
this decade, been conducting research that has resulted in a serious challenge to the
traditional ways government conducts economic policy, including anti-inflation policy.
Among other things, we have investigated past inflationary periods in our country's history
and current stagflation.

We have also tested different theories o f how the economy works

and have developed new theories and new economic models that, we think, can better
explain both inflation and fluctuations in economic activity.
Obviously, we have not done this single-handedly.

We have made use of the

scholarship of some of the best economists from around the world. Together, we believe
we have made significant contributions toward understanding inflation and its causes and
have reached some conclusions that only a few years ago would have sounded like heresy
in almost any economics department in this country.
controversial, they are rapidly gaining acceptance.

Although our conclusions are still
More importantly, they are entirely

consistent with the facts and the basic assumptions that have been the foundation of
economics for 200 years, which is, surprisingly, more than can be said about many current
explanations of inflation.
The assumptions we make are straightforward

and fam iliar.

Our basic

assumption is that people act in their own best interests, that they try to get the most




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psychological or material benefit from the resources available to them.

A related

assumption is that people use available information to derive the maximum benefit or, in
other words, that they use information efficien tly.

When a large population is involved,

this means that people make random errors in predicting future trends in inflation but
that they are correct on average.

That is, they cannot be repeatedly and systematically

fooled about government policy unless they lack important information or do not act in
their own best interests.
Starting from these assumptions, our research has led to two main conclusions.
The first is that we don't have to create a recession in order to control inflation. That is,
the so-called trade-off between inflation and unemployment is not chiseled in stone.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the sustained inflation of the 1970s was accompanied by
higher, and not lower, rates of unemployment.
For the same reasons that we now have high inflation and high unemployment,
we could have lower inflation and lower unemployment.

With moderate, credible, and

well-understood monetary and fiscal policies, in other words, we can lower inflation
without causing more permanent unemployment.

O f course, a recession is still a danger

that must not be overlooked in setting economic policy, but it is not necessary or
desirable for restraining inflation.
The second main conclusion that our researchers have reached is that the
cause of inflation is not what most consumers and voters believe it to be.
aren't the main cause of inflation.

Labor unions

Big businesses aren't the main cause of inflation.

Greediness or live-for-today attitudes aren't the main cause of inflation.

Failures in

Presidential jawboning, wage and price controls, or the Energy Department aren't the
main cause of inflation.

Even OPEC is not the main cause of inflation.

Many countries,

such as Germany and Japan, import proportionately more oil than the United States and
still have much lower rates of inflation.




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While these things may aggravate inflation, particularly in the short run, there
is no doubt that government is the main cause of inflation.

That is, government policies

that let the money supply grow too quickly and too sporadically, and that let federal
deficits get too large for too long, are the underlying causes of inflation.
These two conclusions— that a recession isn't essential for fighting inflation
and that government causes inflation— have direct implications for credit controls.

They

indicate that more restrictive controls on private credit transactions are the wrong way
to fight inflation and could easily be counterproductive.

Credit controls can actually

make inflation worse.
Certainly, the proponents of credit controls would disagree with this.

They

usually argue that credit controls can help fight inflation by improving productivity and
reducing excess demand. But I fe el strongly that these controls couldn't really do the job.
Take, for example, the notion that credit controls, by prohibiting "unpro­
ductive"

loans and channeling

inflationary pressures.
impossible

without

the

funds to

more

productive

uses,

can help ease

The first problem is that defining a productive loan is all but

being arbitrary, subjective, or unfair.

For

instance, loans for

producing food, clothing, and shelter are certainly essential, but what about loans for
candy, disco pants, and home bars?

The regulators would have to distinguish between

essential foods and junk foods, between everyday clothing and glad rags, and between
necessary and frivolous construction.

August committees might debate whether a

breakfast cereal that is 40 percent sugar is a food or a candy, a productive or a
nonproductive good.

Even a basic crop like wheat could not clearly be categorized as

productive if there was a wheat surplus. No matter how competent the regulators might
be, defining a productive loan would be a futile exercise.
Defining a nonproductive loan would be just as hard.

It is common, for

example, to simply presume that loans for takeovers or mergers are not productive. But
new executives might be able to manage a company's resources more effic ie n tly than the




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old ones, thereby increasing productivity.

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In addition, sometimes the mere threat of a

takeover motivates the managers to operate more e ffe c tiv e ly . Besides, the money from a
takeover or merger doesn't disappear.

It is invested or spent and probably finds its way

into productive use, whatever that means. Defining a nonproductive or a productive loan
would be an overwhelming task.
In any case, restricting loans to any one category is hard, because money is so
fungible. If a given company wants to buy a "nonproductive" company yacht, for instance,
it can take out a loan for carrying inventories and thus free other funds for the yacht.
Putting barriers in the flow o f credit, therefore, is not likely to accomplish anything
useful.

Putting up barriers, however, does cost the government something.

around the barriers costs consumers and businesses something.
are not free.
inflation.

And getting

Credit controls, in short,

As they raise the price of credit-related transactions, they aggravate

The burden of the extra costs o f credit controls falls on low-income families

and small businesses, who have the fewest liquid assets and are least able to find
alternative financing.
There are similar problems in trying to use credit controls to moderate
inflation by restricting demand for goods and services.

Interest rate ceilings or other

restrictions on small consumer loans, for example, fail to lower interest rates or to
regulate aggregate demand. When the market rate for loans rises above the legal ceiling,
the loans become extinct, because creditors do not want to make unprofitable loans. But
creditors don't just sit on their money; they invest it in the markets where ceilings do not
exist.
Likewise, in most cases, usury ceilings on conventional mortgages fail to
reduce interest rates or aggregate demand significantly. Even though mortgages become
more difficult to find, mortgage borrowers are resourceful enough to turn to FHA
mortgages, to those guaranteed by the Veterans Administration, or to sources not
regulated by usury ceilings.




These modes of financing are generally less desirable than

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what they replace.

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For most people, when all costs are taken into account, the

alternative means o f financing turn out to be more expensive.

So once again, credit

controls of this type raise prices on average but do not significantly reduce demand.
Of course, some credit controls, if
aggregate demand.

sufficiently

Draconian, could reduce

Low ceilings on the interest rates financial institutions can pay their

depositors, in the past, have caused funds to leave savings institutions and made
mortgages more difficu lt and more expensive to get, ultimately putting the squeeze on
the housing industry.
Such a shock to the housing sector, to other sectors, and to the whole economy
can indeed precipitate a recession and temporarily restrain inflation. But two side e ffe c ts
make this an in e ffe ctiv e remedy for inflation.

First, periodically tearing down and then

rebuilding the housing industry is wasteful and inflationary over the long run. Uncertainty
about when and how much the low interest rate ceilings will a ffe c t the housing market
creates an added risk and hence an added cost that the industry must face.

It w ill

eventually lead to higher prices. A second side e ffe c t is that the recessions precipitated
by tearing down the housing industry virtually guarantee that the government will pursue
stimulative monetary and fiscal policies. These policies, after all, are the main causes of
inflation.

So for economic and political reasons, using credit controls to dismantle

housing, or any other sector, will be likely to cause higher, not lower, inflation.
As a means of fighting inflation, then, credit controls are generally unaccept­
able.

Happily, they are also unnecessary.

The best way to fight inflation— the least

expensive and the most enduring--is with well-designed monetary and fiscal policies.

If

such policies are well-publicized and well-understood, they do not need to disrupt the
economy to be e ffe c tiv e .
of work.




They can lower the rate of inflation without putting people out