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For release on delivery
10:30 a.m. Central Europe Summer Time
4:30 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time
April 14, 1989

Economic Developments in the United States:
An International Perspective

Remarks by

Manuel H. Johnson
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Annual Meeting
Swedish National Committee

of the International Chamber of Commerce

Stockholm,

Sweden

It is an honor to participate in your annual meeting,
such a distinguished audience,

including His Majesty the King of Sweden.

Looking over the list of previous

Howe,

which has

speakers,

I note that Sir Geoffrey

the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

the United Kingdom,

European Community.
developments

for

spoke last year about the experience of joining the

Although my talk will deal mainly with economic

in the United States,

to those of Secretary Howe.

my remarks

strike a certain parallel

We in the United States have come

increasingly to appreciate the extent to which our economic well-being

is closely linked to developments outside our borders.

If there was

ever a time when the United States could view itself as a closed

economy,

that time has passed.

The economies of all the major

and policies undertaken in one

industrial nations are interwoven,

country can have an important bearing on conditions

Thus,

my review today of challenges

faced by others.

facing policymakers in the United

States will have a distinctly international

flavor,

as it must if we are

to understand the economic events of recent years and their implications
for the future.

Economic developments in the U.S.

and other industrial nations:

1983-88

The U.S economy is now well into the seventh consecutive year
of expansion.

This has been the longest period of sustained peacetime

growth in recorded American economic history.

accompanied by relatively subdued inflation,
future,

Moreover,

it has been

at least up to now.

In the

when economic historians analyze the performance of the U.S.

economy in the middle and late years of the 1980s,

render a favorable

judgment.

I suspect they will

-

2

-

I say this with full knowledge that these years have not,

any sense,

been a golden age for economic growth.

been steady— at times surging,

in

The expansion has not

while at other times

flagging— and

certain sectors of the economy have languished despite the generally

rising tide of activity.

In addition,

as large as one would like to see.

productivity gains have not been

Imbalances have emerged in the mix

of fiscal and monetary policy that pose significant risks to the long­
term health of the U.S.
nations.

Nonetheless,

economy and have had consequences for other
overall,

it is likely that the period from 1983

to the present will be viewed as a positive chapter in American economic
history.

To provide some support for this view,

it may help to review

the major economic trends during the current expansion.

of 1982 and the end of 1988,

Between the end

GNP in the United States increased at an

average 4 percent pace per year,

And the

after adjusting for inflation.

economy has shown few signs of fatigue as this expansion has matured,

with output growth continuing to average about 4 percent annually over
the past two years.

As a result of this healthy rate of growth,

20 million new jobs have been created during this expansion.
unemployment rate,
cut about in half.

which stood at nearly 10 percent in 1982,
At the same time,

made in the fight against inflation.
picked up a bit recently,

almost

The

has been

considerable progress has been

Although price increases have

consumer price inflation has run at about a

4 percent rate throughout much of the current expansion— less than a

third of what it was when we entered the 1980s.

Thus,

much that is favorable in the performance of the U.S.
past several years.

overall,

I find

economy over the

-

In many respects,

3

­

the experience of other industrial countries

during this period has been broadly similar.

In particular,

inflation

rates throughout the industrialized world receded sharply in the early

and mid-1980s,
worldwide.

owing to increased discipline in monetary policy

Moreover,

after stagnating in 1981 and 1982,

economic

activity in most of these countries picked up considerably over the next

several years,

though not to the same degree,

on average,

as in the

United States.
There were,

however,

marked differences

in the pace of growth

As a generalization,

across the industrial countries.

Canada,

Japan,

and the United Kingdom posted growth similar to that in the United
States,

while continental Europe— including Sweden— has lagged somewhat.

This dichotomy is visible as well in the behavior of unemployment.

Canada and the United Kingdom,

unemployment rates now stand at levels

well below their peaks earlier in the decade,

and in Japan,

rate has remained generally in the range of 2 to 3 percent.

contrast,

the rates in Germany,

high by historical
performance,
group,

standards.

In

France,

Still,

the

jobless

In

and Italy have stayed relatively

despite these differences in

it is fair to say that the industrialized nations as a

and not

just the United States,

have posted impressive economic

gains since the early part of the decade.
has turned up in the past two years,

Moreover,

the pace of growth

moving closer to that of the United

States.
Unfortunately,
have emerged in the U.S.

countries.

we cannot ignore the fundamental imbalances that
economy,

some of which are mirrored in other

We have been contending with a large federal budget deficit

and a comparably sized deficit in our foreign transactions.

Both of

-

these deficits indicate that,

4

-

in a manner,

chosen to consume more than we produce.

we in the United States have

The federal budget deficit

implies that we have opted for ever-growing government services,

have been unwilling to pay for them through direct taxation.

but

Moreover,

we have borrowed heavily from abroad to finance our acquisition of both
public and private goods and services,

resulting in a large external

deficit.

One measure of this external imbalance is the deficit on
current account,

defined as the excess of U.S.

purchases of goods and

services from other nations over the sum of our sales to these countries

and the net earnings

from our international investment portfolio.

deficit rose to more than $150 billion in 1987,

nominal U.S.

GNP.

roughly 3-1/2 percent of

The current account deficit for 1988,

smaller at $135 billion,

though somewhat

remained a large share of GNP by historical

As the converse of our external deficit,

standards.

This

some of our major

trading partners have registered sizable current account surpluses.

1988,

In

both Japan and Germany had surpluses in the range of 3 to

4 percent of nominal GNP.

The concern with these imbalances,

of course,

is that any reduction in the willingness of foreigners to ship their
savings and production to the United States could result in wrenching
adjustments first in foreign exchange and domestic financial markets and
then in our economy.

some time,

Even if the capital inflows could be sustained for

the burden of servicing our growing foreign debt eventually

could diminish the living standard of future generations

of Americans,

especially if we are borrowing for nonproductive purposes.
Fortunately,

it appears that these imbalances have peaked and

that a corrective process is underway to reduce them to more manageable

-

proportions.

5-

This process involves changes in relative prices and

relative incomes among the major trading nations,
in part on movements in exchange rates.
and the end of 1987,

both of which depend

Between the early part of 1985

the value of the dollar fell sharply against the

currencies of our trading partners.

This depreciation had two primary

It led to strong growth in exports from the United States,

effects.

our producers again became competitive in world markets.
foreign goods less attractive to American consumers,

as

And it made

damping domestic

demand for imports.

Owing in large part to these effects,

the volume of U.S.

net

exports began to improve toward the end of 1986 and continued to
register substantial gains through the middle of last year.

noted a moment ago,

the U.S.

considerably in 1988,

1981.

And,

as I

deficit on current account narrowed

the first annual improvement in this deficit since

Some adjustment toward external balance also occurred in Japan

last year,

partly in response to earlier yen appreciation.

Moreover,

the German trade surplus with the United States narrowed in 1988,
though Germany's total current account surplus rose slightly,

even

owing to

offsetting changes with its other trading partners.
Recent developments

Amid these encouraging developments,
certain worrisome signals

we have begun to see

in the economic data for both the United

States and other industrial countries.

First,

inflation has started to

pick up from the subdued rates that prevailed throughout most of the

current expansion.

Second,

during the second half of 1988,

the pace of

external adjustment in the industrial world slowed rather abruptly.

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6

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Despite the global stock market crash in late 1987— which
appeared at the time to be a serious threat to economic expansion
worldwide— real GNP advanced 3-1/2 percent in the United States over
1988,

after adjusting for the effects of last summer's severe drought.

Industrial production increased even more rapidly,

stronger demand for U.S.

domestic demands.

to trend down,
month,

exports,

reflecting the

as well as the continued buoyancy of

At the same time,

the unemployment rate has continued

hitting 5.3 percent at yearend 1988 and 5 percent last

the lowest level in a decade and one-half.

Although there is

much uncertainty about the long-run growth potential of the U.S.

economy

and the level of the unemployment rate at which wage and price inflation

will begin to pick up,

there is now some risk of a reversal in the

disinflationary trend established earlier in the decade.
Indeed,

upward pressure has become apparent in measures of U.S.

wage and price inflation.

Broad indexes of price change indicate

inflation ran in the range of 4 to 4-1/2 percent last year,

of these indexes,

this represents

some acceleration from the

and for most
1987 pace.

The pickup in inflation is even more apparent if we abstract from food
and energy prices,

which— owing to their volatility— tend to obscure

underlying price trends.
Similarly,

the tightness in labor markets has led to some

acceleration of labor costs.

Along with the rise in wage inflation,

there has been a slowdown in the rate of productivity gains,

perhaps

reflecting the employment of less efficient labor and capital as the

pool of unused resources has become thinner.

Due to this combination of

accelerating labor costs and slower productivity growth,

unit labor

-7-

costs

for the entire nonfarm business economy rose more rapidly in 1988

than during any previous year of this expansion.

Let me take a moment to stress the importance of defusing the
inflationary pressures that have emerged.

Our experience in the 1970s

and early 1980s demonstrated all too well the adverse effect of
uncontrolled inflation on economic performance.

periods,

During inflationary

too much effort is spent attempting to shift the negative

effects of rising prices to others.

macroeconomy,

From the perspective of the

this is completely wasted effort.

Moreover,

decision­

making of all types is impaired by the increased level of uncertainty
that tends to accompany bouts of inflation.

planning made more difficult,
resources efficiently,

against which to
reasons,

Not only is long-range

it also becomes harder to allocate

owing to the absence of a stable benchmark

judge movements in relative prices.

inflation is an insidious process,

For all of these

and too much is at stake to

roll back the progress we have made in recent years in the fight against
inflation.

The inflationary pressures now apparent in the United States
also are evident in many of the other industrial nations.

Consumer and

wholesale price increases moved steadily higher over 1987 and 1988 for
the G-7 countries as a group.

Among these nations,

only Japan has

avoided much evidence of an uptick in inflation to date.

in Japan,

However,

even

there are some signs of increased pressure—mainly in the form

of tightening labor-market conditions— that have raised concerns about
higher inflation in the coming year.
As

I noted earlier,

the second worrisome development in recent

quarters has been the reduced pace of improvement in external positions.

-8-

In particular,

the growth of U.S.

exports has tapered off from the rapid

gains recorded between the middle of 1987 and the middle of 1988.

small part of this

A

slowdown reflects the reduced level of agricultural

exports after last summer's drought.

However,

most of the deceleration

has been due to less robust export growth for our nonagricultural

products.

Actually,

this

shift to more limited gains in U.S.

should not be viewed as much of a surprise.

dollar since the beginning of 1987,

Given the

firmness of the

it would have been unrealistic to

expect export growth to continue with such intensity.
be entering a period of slower,

exports

We appear now to

but probably more sustainable,

growth in

exports.
It also seems likely that the pace of external adjustment has

been limited by the continued strength of domestic demand in the United
States,

especially consumer spending.

about 3-3/4 percent in real terms,
income.

Over 1988,

consumer outlays rose

in line with the growth of after-tax

This robust pace of consumer demand contributed to fairly rapid

growth in imports,

underscoring the need to restrain domestic demand if

we are to check inflationary pressures in the United States while at the
same time continuing to make satisfactory progress toward balance in
trade.

Monetary policy developments
Acting against signs portending higher inflation,

monetary

authorities in the United States and elsewhere have tightened policy.

Moreover,

the cumulative degree of restraint that has been applied in

many cases would appear to be appreciable.

For example,

short-term

interest rates in the United States have increased more than

3-1/2 percentage points over the last two years,

with the bulk of this

occurring in the past year.
Given the lags between changes in monetary policy and their

effects on activity and inflation,

the effects already in train may be

sufficient to slow demand to a pace more in line with potential growth.
There are some hints that growth in the United States may have begun to
moderate,
nations,

though these signs remain tentative.

In the other industrial

there is also some evidence of a transition to slower growth.

Nonetheless,

no one has a precise fix on the current amount of momentum

in our economies or on the extent of slowing still to come

moves already undertaken,

some of them fairly recently.

from policy

Accordingly,

it

seems to me that monetary policy is now at a particularly difficult
juncture.

The ever-present problem for policymakers is the need to peer
into the future— to predict the effects of policy actions that will
occur only with a lag.

These lags,

all economic relationships,

together with the uncertainties

in

have led economists over the years to search

for variables that would give reliable indications of whether the stance

of policy is appropriate— that is,

whether the economy is likely to be

moving in a way consistent with broad economic goals.
the money supply has received special attention.

In this regard,

The association

between expansion of the money supply and subsequent inflation has been
studied extensively for various economies and various times.

These

studies typically have found a significant correlation between the rate
of growth of the money supply and the rate of inflation,

the long run.

at least over

-

In the United States,

for the last few years,

10

-

monetary growth has been relatively low

suggesting policy restraint.

reliability of the money-inflation relationship,

short and intermediate run,

Unfortunately,

the

particularly over the

recently has been weakened in the United

States and elsewhere by financial innovation and sweeping institutional

change.

In the United States,

we have come to appreciate that the

closely watched monetary aggregates Ml and M2 have a rather high degree

of interest sensitivity.

This characteristic greatly complicates the

use of these aggregates as indicators of monetary policy over shorter
periods of time,

although the relationship between money and prices

likely remains intact over the long run.

The level of interest rates traditionally has been used as
another indicator of the stance of monetary policy.

Over the years,

we

have learned some hard lessons about inferring the tightness of monetary
policy from the level of interest rates,

However,

especially nominal rates.

the theories of the prominent Swedish economist,

Knut Wicksell,

may provide a valuable framework for using interest rates to assess the
restrictiveness of monetary policy.

Nearly a century ago,

he pointed

out that the balance between aggregate demand and potential aggregate
supply in an economy— and hence the outlook for inflation— can be

observed in the difference between the market interest rate and the
long-run equilibrium or "natural” rate.

His message was that price

pressures will tend to increase as long as the prevailing market rate
lies below the natural rate and will decrease when the prevailing rate

exceeds the natural rate.

Today,

is,

we would view this in terms of real interest rates— that

interest rates adjusted for anticipated inflation.

In this

-

framework,

11

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real interest rates in the United States appear to have moved

up over the past year and may be in the neighborhood of the natural

rate— another indication that a considerable amount of restraint has

been put in place.

Nonetheless,

conceptual framework,

despite the value of Wicksell's

its application is difficult because the real

interest rate and the natural interest rate are both unobservable.
consequence,

I have searched for other variables

As a

that might serve as

useful indicators of the degree of policy restraint.

My own observations have suggested to me that commodity prices,
exchange rates,
measures,

and the yield curve,

when taken together with other

can be helpful in assessing the stance of monetary policy and

the degree of restraint on inflation.

prices are falling,

for example,

When,

commodity

the dollar exchange rate is increasing,

yield curve is flattening or becoming inverted,

and the

I tend to view U.S.

monetary policy as increasingly restrictive.

None of the indicators that I have mentioned— nominal and real

interest rates,
prices,

growth of the money supply,

exchange rates,

commodity

and the slope of the yield curve— captures all the complexities

of an evolving economic and financial system.

But taken together,

they

suggest that monetary policy in the United States has applied

appreciable and sustained restraint and that over time we are likely to
see an ebbing of inflationary pressures.

At the same time,

however,

we

in the United States stand prepared to apply more restraint should it
become evident that inflationary pressures have not receded.

Structural imbalance in mix of fiscal and monetary policy in the U.S.
One of the dominant features of the current expansion in the
United States has been the persistence of large deficits in the federal

-12-

budget.

The deficit for the current fiscal year has been projected by

most analysts to exceed $150 billion, which represents about

3-1/4 percent of nominal GNP.

The presence of such a large federal

deficit at a time when the economy is near full employment indicates a

serious structural problem with fiscal policy.

Compared to the situation several years ago, it is true that
some progress has been made to control federal spending, particularly in

the area of defense outlays.

But, while defense spending declined last

year in real terms, sizable increases continued for a wide range of
entitlement programs.

At the same time, greater burdens were placed on

the deposit insurance agencies mostly owing to the savings and loan

crisis, and interest payments on the national debt mounted further.
At the macroeconomic level, the basic problem with government

deficits is that they contribute to a shortfall of domestic saving
relative to domestic investment. To grasp the magnitude of the problem

in the United States, note that the deficit in fiscal year 1988 exceeded
total domestic personal saving during the same period.

Because our

total private saving—the sum of personal and business saving—is so
meager, and the federal deficit absorbs such a large proportion of it,
the United States has found itself borrowing heavily from abroad to

finance private domestic investment.
In addition to being responsible, in part, for the large U.S.
external imbalance, the federal deficit also has important effects on
the conduct of domestic monetary policy.

Because government spending

has continued to be too high, tighter monetary policy remains the only
tool available in the near term to restrain domestic demand and

inflationary pressure.

Unfortunately, this policy mix means that the

-

13

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sectors we least want to see squeezed— business investment and exports—

are among those that bear the brunt of the anti-inflation effort.
Capital spending is crimped directly by the higher real interest rates
that are the byproduct of such a policy mix.

These higher real rates

also place upward pressure on the dollar, limiting gains

Indeed,

in net exports.

it has been argued that the tighter stance of U.S.

monetary

policy has affected the domestic economy to a large extent through the

external sector.
Clearly,

it would be better to shift toward more restrictive

government spending,

monetary policy.

which over time would allow an adjustment to

In this way,

we could limit the contractionary impact

on domestic investment of an anti-inflation policy and finance more of
rather than with resources

that investment domestically,

from abroad.

Such a development should be welcomed by other countries,

too,

as more

of the saving of their residents would remain at home to finance
investment.

The United States must follow through on its commitment to

reduce the federal budget deficit.
taxation on incentives

Given the adverse effects of higher

for work and investment,

deficit reduction should

be accomplished as much as possible through spending cuts.

The Gramm-

Rudman targets provide for a phased reduction of the deficit to zero by

1993.

It is essential that the targets be met not only in the 1990

budget process now underway,

Equally important,
gimmickry,

but over the remaining years as well.

the targets

should be hit without budgetary

so that demands on scarce domestic saving really are reduced.

We must not use creative accounting to satisfy the target

year,

for the coming

only to have the actual deficit come in far above the target

-

14

-

Hard choices will have to be made to restrain federal spending,

level.

but these cannot be avoided any longer.

prospects

I am optimistic about the

for meaningful deficit reduction.

The public has come

increasingly to realize the importance of this endeavor,

and the

President and Congress seem to be approaching this challenge with new
vigor.

Exchange rates and international policy coordination
The United States,

acting alone,

can make changes in domestic

policy to bring us closer to global balance while at the same time

reducing inflationary pressure.

However, continued international

cooperation improves the odds that these goals will be achieved smoothly
and efficiently for both the United States and our trading partners.

it is particularly important that policymakers

this vein,

In

in the

industrial nations not work at cross purposes and that we seek to temper
excessive

swings in exchange rates.

For the same reasons that price

volatility associated with domestic inflation can impair economic

performance,

noisy and unnecessary movements in exchange rates also can

be detrimental.

Such movements complicate the efficient allocation of

resources not only within a single country but across nations as well.

As

I noted earlier,

the dollar depreciated substantially from

its peak in 1985 until the end of 1987.

Over the past year or so,

the

value of the dollar has fluctuated relative to the currencies of the
other industrial countries,

1987

level.

At that level,

but has not departed sharply from its lateU.S.

producers have cost structures that are

quite competitive with their foreign counterparts.

Owing to the

significant lags with which trade flows adjust to movements

rates,

in exchange

I suspect that a considerable part of the adjustment to the lower

-

15

-

exchange value of the dollar is yet to come.

Therefore,

I would counsel

patience to those who argue that the dollar must be driven below its

late-1987 level to achieve external balance.
Exchange rate stability is not a realistic,

desirable,
nations.

or even a

outcome without compatible policies among the major trading
This coordination requires

frequent and candid discussions on

ultimate objectives and the policies across countries to achieve those

objectives.

Such a process has been pursued in the Group of Seven and

in other international forums.

It is a challenging process,

one that

requires a sensitive balance between domestic and international policy

goals.
nations,

But,

in a world with economic influence dispersed among many

there is no substitute for this give and take,

for the

inevitable compromises that must be made to promote the common good.