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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
Friday, November 21, 1980
9:30 A.M.

Statement by

Lyle E. Gramley

Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Before the

Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs




November 21, 1980

I am pleased to present the views of the Board of
Governors on Amendment No. 1586 to the A. Phillip Randolph
Institute Bill (H.R. 5625).

This Amendment would modify

Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act to prohibit banking
organizations from acquiring a savings bank, a savings and loan
association, or a savings and loan holding company except where
necessary to prevent an insolvency or to restore solvency.

The issue of affiliations between commercial banks and
thrift institutions is an important one for the evolution of the
financial sector of the economy.

The Board has long believed

that this issue should be the focus of careful study and Con­
gressional consideration.

The need to do so is heightened by

the fact that the distinctions between banking organizations
ani thrifts are narrowing.

However, the Board believes that

an indefinite moratorium on such affiliations is not desirable.
What is needed is timely resolution by the Congress of the broad
public policy issues posed in this area, and we doubt that a
moratorium would contribute to that development.

Moreover,

depository institutions, and especially thrifts, have experienced
a significant decline in earnings recently, and pressures on
earnings may persist as these institutions adapt to changes in the
competitive environment created by recent legislative and regulatory
actions.




-2-

The Board feels that the public interest would be best
served by a flexible regulatory framework capable of responding
to special situations that may arise.

A moratorium would only

introduce additional rigidities into the regulatory system.

Let me begin by reviewing briefly the economic forces
that have been operating during recent years to reduce the dis­
tinctions among different financial institutions.

Changes in the U.S. financial system have been occurring
at a rapid pace over the past two decades.

An evolutionary

process is underway that is profoundly affecting the structure and
performance of the financial industry.

It has involved banks,

thrift institutions, nonfinancial businesses,

individuals, and

financial regulatory institutions--all interacting in response to
economic forces.

A major initiating source of this proce

been the dramatic increase in interest rates that has accompanied
accelerating inflation.

Each rise of interest rates has brought

with it new efforts to capitalize on the time value of money.
Repeatedly, banks and thrift institutions have faced usury ceilings
and other regulatory constraints that limit profit-making oppor­
tunities, and deposit rate ceilings that limit their ability to pay
market rates of return to business and individuals.

As a result,

depositors have shifted funds elsewhere in search of higher yields.




-3-

To avoid regulatory and statutory constraints, and protect their
sources of funding, financial institutions have responded by
creating new instruments--CD's, NOW accounts, money-market cer­
tificates, automatic transfers, and others;
such as EFT;

new technologies--

new concepts of funds management--such as remote

or controlled disbursement and reliance on short-term liabilities
as a source of liquidity;

and even new markets and institutional

forms.

These developments have had profound effects on the
structure and functioning of the U.S. financial system.

The

expanded array of services has resulted in a blurring of the
distinctions between banks and thrifts and even between depository
and nondepository institutions.

Regulations limiting the ability

of institutions to pay market rates of return have become increas­
ingly ineffective.

Barriers to the free flow of funds among

markets have been reduced, and geographical mobility of funds has
increased greatly.

The bank holding company form of organization,

besides enhancing leverage possibilities, has served as a vehicle
enabling intra-state expansion within states with restrictive
branching laws, and expansion beyond state boundaries, particularly
with respect to the lending activities of non-bank affiliates.
This inter-state expansion,

together with the growth and multi-state

presence of foreign banking organizations, has called attention to
the need for a careful review of the present restrictions on inter­
state banking.




-

4-

These changes in the financial system contributed to
passage of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980.

By providing for a phase-out of Regulation Q,

expanded asset powers for thrifts, and NOW accounts and automatic
transfers, the Act will encourage a further homogenization of
depository institutions, especially in the field of consumer services.
The Act also sought to provide for competitive equality between banks
and thrift institutions offering nearly identical services but subject
to different regulatory constraints.
however,

The Act would not result,

in complete equality in the regulatory treatment of financial

institutions even when fully in effect. Federal savings and loan
associations,

for example, have broader branching powers within

states and are subject only to regulatory, not statutory,
restrictions on interstate expansion.

As the distinctions between banks and thrifts diminish
further, it will become increasingly difficult to rationalize the
maintenance of barriers to consolidation between bank holding
companies and thrifts.
situation.

We are already faced with an anomalous

It is permissible for bank holding companies to acquire

other companies meeting the statutory criterion of providing
services that are "so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto," such as con­
sumer finance and mortgage banking firms.

But the Board has not

generally permitted bank holding companies to acquire thrifts,




which are more similar to banks in terms of the types of services
they offer than many of the nonbanking companies whose activities
are on the permissible list.

The issue of whether or not to include thrift institution
activities on the permissible list for bank holding company acqui­
sitions has come up on several occasions since the enactment of
the 1970 Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act.

Beginning in

May of 1971, with adoption of its initial list of permissible activi­
ties, and in each instance thereafter,

the Board has consistently

ruled in the negative on this general issue.

The Board noted that

Congress had created a separate statutory and regulatory framework
for savings and loan associations, reflecting its intent to
maintain savings and loans as specialized lenders to finance housing.
Because of that, the Board felt that affiliations between banks and
thrifts involved broad public policy matters that the Congress should
address.

The most recent case involving the general issue was in
1977, with the application of D. H. Baldwin to retain an S&L acquired
before the 1970 Amendments became effective.

The Board again con­

cluded that operating an S&L was impermissible for bank holding
companies, for several reasons.

The Board noted that there were

conflicts between the regulatory frameworks for bank holding




-6-

companies and thrifts, especially with respect to the nonbanking
activities that thrifts and bank holding companies are permitted
to engage in.

The Board felt that it could not resolve this con­

flict nor could it limit the activities of thrifts so as to fit
within the standards of the Bank Holding Company Act.

The Board

also stated that such acquisitions might erode the beneficial
institutional rivalry between thrifts and banks.

Finally,

the

Board recognized that as the powers of thrifts were expanded, and
they became more like banks, acquisitions of thrifts by out of
state bank holding companies would undercut the interstate
restrictions of section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act.

The only exceptions to the Board's general policy in this
regard have been cases in Rhode Island and New Hampshire, where such
affiliations have been permitted because of the unique banking
structures in those states.

In both states, state law permits

mutual associations to own commercial bank stock, and virtually
all thrifts, with the exception of credit unions, are affiliated
with commercial banks.

Moreover, in the most recent case,

involving New Hampshire institutions,

the Board indicated that the

exceptions made for New Hampshire and Rhode Island were not to be
viewed as signaling a departure from the principles set forth in
the D. H. Baldwin case.




-7-

In light of the changes in the financial system and
competitive environment presently underway,

the Board would urge

the Congress to address the issues in a purposeful way of whether,
when, and under what circumstances, thrift institutions and
commercial banks should be allowed to merge or join forces under
a holding company structure.

We feel it is particularly important

to investigate fully the legal, supervisory, competitive and other
implications of affiliations between banks and thrifts,

especially

at this crossroads in the evolution of the financial system.

We

would be pleased to prepare a timely study of the issues so as to
facilitate early consideration by Congress.

The Board believes

it would be appropriate also for the FDIC and the FHLBB to prepare
separate studies,

since they would bring to bear their unique

experiences as regulators of mutual savings banks and savings and
loan associations.

As I have already indicated,

there are important reasons

why the Board does not feel that this legislation is desirable.
In addition to these concerns,
type of negative laundry list.

this legislation would establish a
The Board has consistently

opposed such attempts because of the limits that would be placed
on the ability to adapt the regulatory structure to a changing
competitive and economic environment.
seems to us defective in several ways.




In any event, the legislation

-

First,

8-

thrift acquisitions in New Hampshire and Rhode

Island already approved by the Board would need to be explicitly
grandfathered;

otherwise, they might have to be divested.

Second, while the amendment would prohibit banks or
bank holding companies from acquiring thrifts, it does not prohibit
thrifts from acquiring banking organizations.

Third,

the language of the Act relating to acquisitions

in emergency situations does not provide the flexibility needed
for the Board to permit acquisitions before insolvency becomes
imminent.

Moreover,

the proposed legislation does not provide for

suspension of the notice requirements in emergency situations, as
is the case in emergency bank acquisitions under section 3 of the
Bank Holding Company Act.

The Board would not be able to act until

proper notice and opportunity for a hearing had been given.

This

might telegraph to the public that a particular thrift institution
was in financial difficulty.

Finally,

the Board believes that if a moratorium is imposed,

it should have a terminal date of no more than one year to encourage
the Congress to deal in a timely way with the broad issues involved.




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