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ON DELIVERY
MARCH 18, 1981
.S.T.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MONETARY POLICY

REMARKS BY

LYLE E. GRAMLEY

MEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM




BEFORE THE

BOSTON ECONOMIC CLUB

Boston, Massachusetts
March 18, 1981

My subject today is the outlook for economic activity
and prices during 1981 and the role that monetary policy will
play in the course of the economy.

Let me begin by discussing

economic developments since the middle of last year.

The typical economic forecast at mid-year 1980 was
for a continued decline in real output during the second half
and a weak recovery beginning early in 1981.

When it became

evident late last summer that economic recovery had already
begun, but that strong pressures on interest rates were develop­
ing, the consensus forecast switched to expectations of a second
economic downturn--beginning in the fourth quarter, or perhaps
early this year.

Instead,

the pace of activity picked up in

the fourth quarter, and has continued to be relatively brisk in
early 1981.

Why has the economy been so strong during the past
nine months?

One could point to the run-up of defense orders,

or the strength of energy-related investment spending, or the
creative financing devices that have helped to sustain housing
activity in the face of very high mortgage interest rates.
I suspect, however,




that the underlying reason is the powerful

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effect of inflationary expectations on individual and business
behavior.

Anticipations of inflation are virtually as strong

now as they were at their worst early last year.

The steep,

but short, recession of 1980 had relatively little effect either
on the underlying inflation rate or on the public's perception of
the outlook for prices.

During the past month or so, incoming economic
indicators have been somewhat more mixed.
still rising;

Retail sales are

capital investment plans are relatively strong,

and the output of defense goods is gaining momentum.

At the

same time, auto production has been cut back in response to the
earlier sluggishness of sales;

housing starts declined in

February, and industrial output fell for the first time since
last July.

A noticeable slowdown in real economic growth next

quarter therefore seems probable, but the consensus among
forecasters is that a serious recession this year is unlikely.
The general expectation is that, following a lull in the second
quarter,

the pace of economic growth will pick up again in the

second half in response to the tax cuts recommended by the new
Administration.




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The virtual disappearance of forecasts of a double-dip
recession is of more than passing interest.

Last fall, when

interest rates began to increase rapidly, worries began to spread
that the strategy of monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve
in October 1979 had doomed the economy to continuing violent
gyrations of interest rates and a corresponding process of boom
and bust in economic activity.

That policy change had freed up

interest rates to move promptly in response to market forces of
demand and supply.

The fear was that each time the economy popped

up out of recession, rising interest rates would bat it down again.

As I will argue later, restraint on money growth imposed
by the Federal Reserve will put a substantial damper on real
economic growth as long as inflation stays near its present rate.
However,

studies by Federal Reserve staff of developments since

October 1979 indicate that the Federal Reserve's efforts to limit
money growth, as implemented over the past year and a half, are
unlikely to be a source of serious cyclical instability in
interest rates and the economy.

Economic developments since

the middle of last year support that conclusion.

Those studies

also indicate that the pronounced variations in interest rates
and real output we saw during 1980 were not principally the
result of patterns of money growth but stemmed from other sources,
including the impact of credit controls in the second quarter.




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While it is true that most forecasters do not expect
a serious recession this year,
not so sure.

there are at least a few who are

Some of those who give a high weight to monetary

variables in assessing the economic outlook have begun to worry
about the recent sluggish growth of money balances.

Adjusted

for shifts into NOW accounts that became available nationwide on
January 1, the level of M-1B (the more comprehensive measure of
transactions balances) was about the same in February as it was
in December.

The worry is that the Federal Reserve has become

a bit too zealous in its pursuit of monetary restraint.

This concern is, in my judgment, unwarranted.

In

December 1980, the level of M-1B was 6-1/2 percent above a year
earlier--or at the upper end of the target range the Federal
Reserve had set a year earlier.
there.

All of that money is still out

Moreover, when growth in money slows for a brief period,

as it has recently, careful analysis is needed of the reasons for
the slowdown and what it means for the economy.

For example,

the slowdown may stem from inadequate reserve provision by the
Federal Reserve, or the effects on demands for money and credit
of a weakening economy.

But it may also result from a reduction

in the public's demand for money that reflects shifts in the form
in which the public chooses to hold its liquidity.




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In the present case, the last explanation seems the
most likely.

Economic activity apparently has advanced about

as strongly in the first quarter as it did in the final three
months of 1980.
remained robust.

On this ground, demands for money should have
Had the Federal Reserve been overly zealous

in its efforts to restrain money growth in the face of rising
demand, interest rates would have shot up--instead of falling
as they have since mid-December.

Quite possibly,

the nationwide

spread of NOW accounts on January 1 prompted individuals and
non-profit organizations to rethink their cash management
practices, and thereby encouraged shifts of demand deposits to
market securities, or other financial assets, as well as to NOW
accounts.

This explanation is suggested by the fact that a

similar brief slowdown in growth of transactions balances occurred
after the introduction of ATS deposits in late 1978.

I have discussed this recent slowdown of money growth
in some detail because it is important for the public to under­
stand why money growth often proceeds at an uneven pace.

The

Federal Reserve's objectives for monetary expansion are, as you
know, set forth each February for the calendar year in progress.
We in the Federal Reserve know, both from intensive study and
extensive experience,
very imprecise.




that short-run control of money growth is

We also know that there are times when shifts

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in the demand for money, reflecting a restructuring of the
public's financial asset holdings, mean that a consistent
monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation must permit
temporary deviations of money growth from our targets.

Since 1974, new forces have come along that have
affected powerfully the relation between money, economic
activity and prices.

These new forces have tended to decrease

the amount of money needed to finance a given volume of trans­
actions.

While they have done so at a very uneven pace, the

amounts of money involved have cumulated to huge magnitudes,
so that they cannot safely be ignored.

When a slowdown in money growth occurs, we in the
Federal Reserve can never be 100 percent sure why it is happening.
In light of the history of the past

seven or eight years,

however, we are acutely aware that if every weakening in money
growth for more than a month or two is taken as a signal to step
on the monetary accelerator, we could seriously aggravate our
nation's inflation problem.




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It is regrettable that a consistent,

steady,

monetary policy does not always mean a steady rate of growth
in the monetary aggregates from month to month and quarter to
quarter.

Our problems of credibility would be reduced if that

were the case.
on blind faith.

We do not ask the public to accept what we do
But we do believe that your understanding of

monetary policy would be improved if you recognized that short­
term variations in the pace of money growth are at some times
unavoidable, and at other times actually desirable.

Let me return now to a point that I made earlier-namely, that consistent restraint on the growth of money and
credit will, until inflation slows substantially, put a damper
on how much the economy can reasonably be expected to grow in
the second half of the year and on into 1982.

The Federal Reserve announced its targets for monetary
growth in 1981 in its report to Congress a few weeks ago.
M-1B,

For

the more comprehensive measure of transactions balances,

the target range is 3-1/2 to 6 percent (adjusted for shifts into
NOW accounts).

For M-2, which also includes savings and time

deposits of individuals at commercial banks and thrift institutions,
the range is 6 to 9 percent.

Our current intention is to reduce

these target ranges in the years ahead.




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The history of the past decade indicates that growth
of M-1B at less than 6 percent, or growth of M-2 at less than
9 percent, would not sustain an increase in the current dollar
value of the Gross National Product of much over 10 percent for
an extended period.

But if inflation were to continue at

roughly the 10 percent pace of the past year, this would mean
that little or no room would be left for real economic growth.
To put the matter a different way, a 6 percent rise in trans­
actions balances is roughly what is needed presently to finance
a 10 percent inflation at a constant level of real output.

The relations between money growth and GNP are by no
means fixed, as I have already noted.
indefinitely flexible.

But neither are they

Given our monetary targets, growth in

current dollar GNP at a pace significantly above 10 percent
tends to put strong upward pressures on interest rates so that
sooner or later economic growth begins to be choked off.

Monetary restraint does not, unfortunately, work
directly on prices.

On the contrary, its initial effects are

on real output and employment.
year and a half indicates,

As the experience of the past

the process of reducing inflation

through monetary restraint is an excruciating one, once




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inflationary expectations have become deeply embedded in
economic decisions and economic institutions.
restraint takes hold,

When monetary

it reduces employment and real incomes;

pushes interest rates to painfully high levels;
viability of thrift institutions;

threatens the

imposes enormous losses of

sales and profits on homebuilders, auto dealers and other small
businesses; results in a growing backlog of needs for housing,
and even affects adversely the growth of business capital invest­
ment that we so badly need for productivity improvement.
effects on inflation occur with agonizing slowness.

And its

The economic

distress occasioned by firm monetary restraint since the fall of
1979 has kept inflation from getting worse, but as yet there are
no clear signs that the hard-core rate of inflation has begun to
come dow n.

Over periods of several years or more, prices track
closely with costs.

In 1980, unit labor costs rose about as

fast as they had in 1979.

Productivity declined again, although

not so much as in 1979; hourly compensation of employees actually
rose a little faster than in 1979.

Higher unemployment and

weak markets has had some effect on wages.

Nonunion wages,

for

example, rose somewhat less in 1980 than in the previous year.
Moreover,




the UAW contract with Chrysler was reopened, and there

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is speculation that the contracts with Ford and GM may also
be modified.

Realistically, however,

there is little hope

for more than small progress this year in reducing the rise
of wage costs or the rate of advance of industrial and service
prices.

If you ask why the Federal Reserve persists in its
policy of restraint in light of these disappointing results,
the answer is that there is no real alternative.

Reducing the

rate of expansion in money and credit is an indispensable
ingredient of any anti-inflation program.

But there is no

reason why our country must, or should, fight inflation with
monetary policy alone.

We in the Federal Reserve are extremely encouraged
by the efforts presently underway by the new Administration
and the Congress to hammer out agreement on an effective antiinflationary budgetary policy.
I believe,

It is of fundamental importance,

that the budget deficit be brought down as rapidly

as possible.

The projected deficit of $45 billion for fiscal

1982 is worrisomely large.

If economic growth did not proceed

as rapidly as expected in the Administration's forecast,
interest rates did not decline as much as expected,

if

if agreement

were not reached on all the expenditure cuts recommended by the




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the deficit could easily be much larger.

If that

happened, conditions in financial markets would go from bad
to worse.

We would be well advised to remember that the surest

way to increase the aggregate amount of national saving avail­
able to finance investment through Federal budgetary policy is
to reduce the Federal deficit.

The President's new economic program seeks to reduce
inflation in a variety of ways:

by reducing the costs of

government regulations, by increasing productivity through tax
incentives for business investment, by expanding energy pro­
duction, by encouraging individual work effort through
reduction in marginal tax rates, by supporting continued monetary
restraint, and other means.
of fronts,

By moving massively on a variety

the Administration hopes to effect a dramatic turn­

around in inflationary expectations and thereby encourage
economic decisions that would bring inflation down rather quickly.

This approach to fighting inflation puts great weight
on the judgment that our present inflation problem is heavily
a consequence of inflationary expectations built up because the
rate of inflation has been rising for almost two decades.
judgment is, in my view, a valid one.

But no one can be sure

what it will take to convince the public that inflationary




That

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behavior will no longer be rewarded by economic developments,
or how soon visible results on the inflation front will be
achieved.

The President was therefore wise to counsel the

public, as he did recently, not to expect immediate results.

What we do know, however,

is that achieving a turn­

around in the public's views about the inevitability of
inflation will require a consistent anti-inflationary stance
in every area of economic policy--not just this year, but for
the foreseeable future.

Any major policy decision that appeared

to be at variance with a strong anti-inflationary stance--whether
it be Congressional unwillingness to make the hard decisions on
expenditure cuts, import restrictions on autos or other goods,
or a backing away from a firm commitment to monetary restraint-would have a severely damaging effect on public confidence.
I can assure you that the Federal Reserve,

in its area of

responsibility, will do all it can to ensure that our national
effort to end inflation is successful.




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