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For release on delivery
7:30 pm EST
March 12, 1992

The Case for Disinflation

Address by
Lawrence B. Lindsey
to
The Government Bond Club of New England
Boston, Massachusetts
March 12, 1992

THE CASE FOR DISINFLATION

Thank
frankly,

you.

this

It
time

is

a pleasure

every

four

anywhere but Washington D.C.

to be

years,

here

it's

tonight.

nice

to

Quite

be

almost

And, since you've just endured the

Super Tuesday limelight, I'm bet you all know what I mean.

The

Olympics are over and the baseball season has yet to begin.

And

life just wouldn't be the same without some contest to stir the
blood.

So I suppose we should be grateful for these Tuesday night

events.
My

aim

tonight

is

to

look beyond

tomorrow's

beyond next Tuesday, and even beyond November.

bond

market,

There is a major

unreported economic story occurring in America, the consequences of
which will have a profound impact on our Nation's economy for the
rest of this decade.
The story I'm speaking of is the continuing reduction in the
underlying rate of inflation.
the

Federal

stability.

Reserve

is

Let there be no mistake about it;

committed

to

the

attainment

of

price

Furthermore, largely due to actions which took place

before I joined the Fed, we have a good chance to achieve effective
price

stability

understood

and

in America by mid-decade.
certainly

not

appreciated

This
in

is not

financial

widely

markets.

But, it is one of the factors which makes me very optimistic about
America in the 1990s.
This commitment by the Fed reflects a revolution in monetary
policy

thinking

throughout

the

economics

profession.

The

underlying policy approach to inflation which is taught today just

down the river is radically different from what I learned as a
student.

This revolution in thinking might better be termed a

counter-revolution.

The

so-called

New

Macroeconomics

has

rediscovered the case for price stability that was largely taken
for granted in the pre-Keynesian era.

The experience of the last

two decades has taught that there really is no attractive long term
policy tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. At best, lower
unemployment can only be attained temporarily at the price of
permanently higher inflation.

Indeed, the case is now becoming

clear that low inflation may actually enhance economic performance.
Still, the case for price stability has not been widely
appreciated by the public at large.

I believe that one of the

reasons for this is the prevalence of three myths about inflation
which persist from an earlier period of economic policy.

Tonight,

I would like to address these myths.
The first myth is that inflation is good for investment and
therefore for economic growth.

In fact, the opposite is the case;

price stability will aid in the process of capital formation.

The

public finance profession has long pointed out the pernicious
effects of inflation on savings and capital formation in our tax
system.

The usual remedy suggested by the profession is effective

indexation, so that taxes are levied on real income and not nominal
income.

The legislative changes needed to accomplish this are not

in sight.

Achieving price stability will accomplish the same end

without legislative action.
Consider for example, the effect of taxation and inflation on
the real after-tax return to savers.

Imagine a world of 8 percent

bond yields, where 4 percent represents real interest and 4 percent:

a compensation for inflation.

A 25 percent nominal tax rate

translates into a 50 percent tax on the real interest.
absence of inflation,
income

is

the

same

In the

the effective tax rate on real interest
as

the

statutory

rate,

or

25

percent.

Disinflation, or I should say zero inflation, thus halves the real
tax rate in our example.
A similar story could be told about capital gains.

It is

clear from tax return data that a substantial portion of realized
capital gains represents the effect of inflation.

To this must be

added the effect of inflation on the basis of investments which end
up as capital losses.

The net effect of our tax system coupled

with current levels of inflation is to make the effective tax rate
on real capital gains well over 50 percent.

Disinflation would

mean a real cut in the effective tax rate on capital gains.

Zero

inflation would provide a real boost to after-tax returns to
savings

and

investment

by

reducing

our

currently

very

high

effective tax rates.
Disinflation

could

also

accelerate

capital

formation by

substantially improving the tax treatment of productive equipment
by

increasing

schedules.

the

present

value

of

depreciation

deduction

The effective tax rate on new corporate investment

depends on the present value of depreciation deduction schedules,
which in turn depend on the nominal discount rate.

Prevailing

nominal discount rates are likely to fall point for point with the
inflation rate, thus increasing the present value of the stream of
depreciation deductions on plant and equipment. Disinflation from
4 percent to zero would induce nearly the same reduction in the
after-tax cost of industrial equipment as a 3.5 percent investment

tax credit.
There is a widespread consensus in the economics profession
that

higher

beneficial

rates
to

of

the

saving

U.S.

and

capital

economy.

accumulation would be

Numerous

schemes

advanced to achieve this end through the tax system.

have

been

The point is

that disinflation would achieve much the same result.
Somehow a fallacy has developed in the thinking of many people
that easy money - - o r inflation -- is good for investment.
not.

It is

Consider both the post-War miracles of Japan and Germany and

our own history.

The German concern with inflation predates the

second world war and has been central to German economic policy.
Yet the German economic miracle of the 1950s and 1960s occurred in
the

midst

of

price

stability.

During

the

1980s

the

Japanese

inflation rate was less than half of the American inflation rate.
Here at home, the level of net private domestic investment in GNP
was greatest during the 1950s and early 1960s when inflation was at
its lowest.

The evidence suggests that low inflation is not only

consistent with rapid industrial growth, but may actually enhance
the process.
The second myth about inflation is that it is good for making
the income distribution more equal.
behind

this

consequent

myth

seems

compelling.

Money

creation

and

the

inflation provide funds for the state by eroding the

real value of financial wealth.
concentrated,

this

As financial wealth is relatively

represents

redistributive form of taxation.
real

At first glance, the logic

assets

from

creditors

to

a

highly

progressive

and

In addition, inflation transfers
debtors,

effecting

a

private

redistribution in addition to the one carried out directly by the

state.
Whatever the merits of this story in the short run, inflation
cannot

be

viewed

as

a

successful

long

term

instrument

of

redistribution. Financial markets adapt to policy changes and will
ultimately
returns.

equilibrate at prices

that preserve expected

real

Let us consider our recent experience.

Much has been made recently of the apparent rise in inequality
of the distribution of income over the past 20 years.

Contrary to

the myth about inflation and income distribution, this increase in
inequality has occurred in the midst of a sustained period of
inflation.

While many

factors affected

the

changes

in the

distribution of income over this period, a cursory look at the
statistics suggests that inflation may actually have had the
opposite effect than one would assume.
The statistic most often cited to highlight the rise in
inequality is the increased share of income received by the top
quintile of households.
percent of income.

In 1967, the top quintile received 43.8

In 199 0, this figure was 46.6 percent.

In

other words, an additional 2.8 percent of household income was
received by the top quintile.

By contrast, in 1967, interest

income represented 7.6 percent of personal income.

In 1990, this

figure was 15.4 percent. Furthermore, most of this interest income
went to households in the top quintile.

In other words, the rising

share of interest income in the economy, in large part due to a
market reaction to inflation, was three and one half times as big
as the rise in the share of income going to the top quintile.
While clearly not definitive, these statistics should make us
seriously question the efficacy of inflation as an instrument of

redistribution.
In fact, lower inflation should help to improve one of the
very important measures of economic opportunity in America: home
ownership.

The fact is: lower inflation and interest rates greatly

increase the affordabilitv of housing in America.

The National

Association of Realtors puts out a housing affordability index.
Today, by this measure, housing is more affordable to the typical
family than at any time since 1976.
complicated

statistic

that

If one uses a slightly more

adjusts

for

housing

quality,

the

favorable affordability comparison dates back to 1973.
Let us be clear on why this is the case.

Higher inflation and

interest rates impose a form of forced saving on homebuyers.

They

must pay an inflation premium in their mortgage payment which is
offset

by

a

rise

in the

nominal value

of

their home.

inflation lowers this forced saving component.

Lower

A lower cash flow

is needed to finance an identical house as a result.

While the

change may not lower the long term net benefits of homeownership,
it does allow more people to afford their own home.
that

this

is

the

surest

sign we

have

that

I would argue

disinflation

will

increase economic opportunity in America.
The

third myth about

inflation

is

that

America's international competitive position.
widely discredited.

it helps

improve

This myth is now

It is clear that in the long run, only changes

in real exchange rates affect trade flows, not simply changes in
nominal exchange rates.

This means that attempts to drive down the

value of the dollar through a conscious policy of inflation will
prove ineffective.
Contrary to the myth, a policy of price stability is doubly

beneficial

to America.

international

trade,

a

Not

only

policy

does price

from

which

stability

we

enhance

benefit,

it

also

increases the role that America, and our currency, plays in the
global economy.

Let us consider each link in turn.

A stable medium of exchange has long been recognized as a
prerequisite

for

efficient

markets.

Today,

we

have

devised

financial arrangements that allow for stability even in the midst
of unstable currency values.

Individuals engaging in international

trade may, to some extent, hedge their foreign exchange risks in
futures

markets.

While

this

achieves

stability, it is not a free lunch.
real resources.

the

benefits

of

price

The hedging process consumes

Clearly the more stable are currency values, the

lower these costs need be.
Complicating the instability in markets is the potential for
deliberate policy actions by governments and central banks to gain
temporary advantages by manipulating currency values.
these activities are avoided today.
the

risks,

and

therefore

the

In general

But, their potential increases

costs

of

international

trade.

Establishing the dollar as a stable currency, one not subject to
persistent inflationary pressures, will help lower these risks and
therefore enhance world trade.
Such a policy will also enhance the value and role of the
dollar in world markets.
developments in Europe.
have a single

To see this most easily, consider recent
If all goes according to plan, Europe will

currency by

1999.

For the

first

time since the

second world war, a currency zone of a size that rivals the dollar
will have emerged on the world scene.
- is managed

in a way that

If this currency -- the ECU-

conveys stability,

it may gradually

replace the dollar as the world's reserve currency.
not benefit from this occurrence.

America would

Thus, our need to achieve price

stability for international reasons involves both a threat and a
promise.

The promise is expanded world trade with the dollar as a

preeminent force in world markets.

The threat is being displaced

from this role.
In sum, I think the case for disinflation in the 1990s is a
strong one.
the

costs

While disinflation is not a costless process, most of
in

benefits are
vigilant.

reducing
ones we

inflation have
can reap

These benefits

already been borne.

in the years ahead

include

increased

if we

capital

The
remain

formation,

expanded economic opportunity particularly home ownership, and an
expanding role for our country in an expanding world economy.

If

true, then we will soon be enjoying the fruits of a revolution -or counterrevolution - - in economic thought.