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Remarks by Governor Laurence H. Meyer
At the National Association for Business Economics 40th Anniversary Annual
Meeting, Washington, D.C.
October 5, 1998
The Economic Outlook and the Challenges Facing Monetary Policy
It is always a pleasure to participate at the annual NABE meetings, especially at a session
chaired by my former partner and your in-coming president, Joel Prakken. Thank you for
inviting me. And congratulations on our 40th anniversary. I am confident that, under our
current leadership, NABE will continue to play an important national role in supporting the
work of economists and others in business, academics and government who focus on cutting
edge issues related to the performance of the U.S. economy.
As I stand here with Joel, I marvel at how we ended up here, from where we met about 25
years ago when I was a young assistant professor and you were a younger graduate student
at Washington University. And this is not an easy place to get to, on the program at the
opening session on the U.S. economic outlook at the annual NABE meeting. Joel got here
by virtue his exceptional service to NABE over many years and his prowess as an economic
forecaster. As for me, it took a Presidential appointment to get me here. But it's good to be
here, with Joel and with you.
I will begin by identifying the broad themes in the NABE consensus forecast and discussing
how the consensus forecast has changed over the last year. I focus on the change in the
consensus forecast because, in my judgment, it is the revision in the outlook for 1999 in
response to recent developments in the global economy and domestic financial markets that
justified the recent easing of monetary policy. Next I will offer some personal perspectives
on the outlook, highlighting the developments that I believe justified a downward revision to
the forecast for 1999. Then I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the
outlook for monetary policy. The key here is to explain the rapid change in the posture of
monetary policy--from a stance of asymmetric toward tightening just a few months ago, to
symmetric, and then to an easing.
Let me emphasize that the views on the economic outlook and monetary policy I present this
morning are my own. I am not speaking for the FOMC or for the Board of Governors.
Let me start with the conclusion and avoid the suspense. The bottom line is that you forecast
a benign slowdown that unwinds some of the tightness in labor markets, while sustaining
growth and maintaining modest inflation. Your forecast also presumes a flexible monetary
policy that responds to changing conditions and effectively promotes such an outcome. The
preemptive policy move last week can, in my view, be understood as the implementation of
such a flexible policy.
NABE Consensus Forecast
The NABE forecast is, of course, in line with other consensus forecasts. Because it closely
parallels the Blue Chip Consensus forecast, I used the Blue Chip forecast to assess the
changes in the consensus forecast over the last year.
The first point I would make about the consensus forecast with respect to the second half of
1998 and for 1999 is how little it has changed over the last year, despite quite dramatic
developments, including the global turmoil and the recent drop off in the stock market. This
is evident by comparing Blue Chip forecasts of July 1997, prior to the floating of the Thai
baht, and of September 1998, just after contagion from the Russian crisis put increased
pressure on Latin American economies, contributing to a correction in global equity
markets. The forecast for the second half of 1998 has been virtually unchanged, at about 2
¼% and the forecast for 1999, once it became available, has been relatively steady at about
2 ¼% also. Indeed, the generic forecast for much of the last three years has been one of an
imminent slowdown, to--you guessed it--about 2 ¼%--continually, I might note, frustrated
by the data. I share your pain.
There is one difference between the last Blue Chip forecast and the NABE survey that might
reflect the timing of the two surveys. Judging from the path of the Treasury bill rate, the
Blue Chip forecast assumed no change in monetary policy through 1999. The NABE survey,
on the other hand, assumed a single 25 basis point cut in the funds rate; about 65% of you
expected the move in the fourth quarter and about another 20% in the first quarter of next
year. So, the NABE forecast was slightly weaker, but just offset by its assumption of a
policy easing, leaving the forecasts for growth over 1999 identical in both cases. To be fair,
recent developments have been--well, recent; as a result, it is possible and indeed likely that
both surveys did not fully incorporate revisions in response to these developments.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, at least from July of 1997 through mid-August of 1998
there was so little change in the forecast.
Even if the forecasts have not changed or have changed very little over the past year, the
rationale and credibility of the slowdown scenario have evolved in rather significant ways.
Over time, there has been increased reliance on the spillover from the global turmoil and
more recently from the decline in global equity markets as explanations for a projected
deceleration. But why was there no or so little revision to the forecast in response to these
far-reaching developments? It might suggest that you believe very strongly in the resilience
of the U.S. economy, irrespective of shocks, or it might indicate that you are simply very
stubborn. More likely, it reflects the fact that during this period, there have also been
continuing upside surprises with respect to domestic demand. As a result, the upward
revisions to the forecast for domestic demand may have just offset downward revisions to
the forecast for net exports. More recently, it also appears to reflect your confidence in
monetary policy, a theme that I will return to later.
The second point I want to make about the consensus forecast is that its qualitative theme-for a very long time now--has been what I refer to as a "reverse soft landing," which is, as
this label suggests, a rather benign outcome. In a traditional soft landing, the economy
begins from a position below potential output, growing above trend. A soft landing is
achieved if growth slows to trend just as the economy converges to potential output. In a
reverse soft landing, the same convergence is the outcome, but the initial condition is an
economy operating beyond its productive capacity. In this case, growth has to slow to a
below-trend rate until actual output again converges to potential, at which point growth
returns to and remains at trend.
The characterization of the forecast as a reverse soft landing hinges on the interpretation that
the unemployment rate is initially below NAIRU and that growth slows below trend going
forward, allowing the transition back toward NAIRU. While this is consistent with your
estimates of NAIRU and trend growth, I was, nevertheless, surprised that your estimate of
NAURU was as low as it was, 4.9%, and that your estimate of trend growth, 2.7%, was as
high as it was. You gave nearly equal weights to temporary favorable supply shocks
("temporary bliss") and long-term structural change ("permanent bliss") in explaining the
recent exceptional performance. My view is that, while both factors are operative, there is
less structural change than you have incorporated into your forecast and therefore a greater
weight on temporary relative to permanent factors in explaining recent performance.
The qualitative features of the reverse soft landing scenario in your forecast are slowing
growth and rising inflation. There is a hint of stagflation in your forecast--below-trend
growth and rising unemployment, on the one hand, and rising inflation on the other. It
reflects, I expect, on the inflation side, both the contribution of demand pressures in the
labor market, as a consequence of the initial conditions, and dissipation or even reversal of
the favorable supply shocks that have been restraining inflation. Yet I am not sure I could
envision a more benign forecast, given the initial conditions. Of course, reverse soft
landings come in many forms, some more graceful than others. A version that had slower
growth and a sharper rise in the unemployment rate, but still well short of a recession, could
be consistent, for example, with stable inflation, even beginning from initial conditions of
very tight labor markets.
The third feature of interest in your forecast is the source of the slowdown. I focus here on
the contributions from net exports and private domestic demand. Slowdown scenarios of late
have often been motivated by the following logic. An external shock lowers net exports and
slows GDP growth; the resulting slowdown in GDP growth then weakens domestic demand.
This is not, however, what happened in the first half. Even though the decline in net exports
was much sharper than virtually anyone expected, subtracting more than 2 percentage points
from growth, the economy's average growth did not differ much from the pace over the
previous year. The growth in the first half was, to be sure, unbalanced between the first and
second quarters, but that was entirely due to the rise in inventory investment in the first
quarter and its decline in the second. The strength of domestic demand and the subtraction
via net exports were very similar in both quarters.
The explanation for the stability of GDP growth was the surprising surge of private
domestic demand that offset the sharper-than-expected decline in net exports. Private
domestic demand soared to an 8% annual rate in the first half, from the robust 4 ½% rate
over the previous two years.
This raises two questions: Why did private demand soar in the first half and why will the
economy slow going forward? Simply calling upon continued drag from net exports will not
suffice. Your forecast, and virtually all others I have seen, project diminished drag via net
exports going forward. To be sure, recent developments have reinforced the negative
outlook for the external sector and net exports will be subtracting from GDP growth going
forward. But in the consensus forecast, net exports subtract less than half as much from
GDP growth in the second half as in the first half and still less in 1999. Hence, the
slowdown scenario now depends critically on a slowing in domestic demand. So while all
eyes are focused on global turmoil and the spillover to U.S. net exports, I believe that you
are correct to focus the case for slowdown ahead on diminished strength in private domestic
demand.
Perspectives on the Outlook
The most important point I want to make is that the easing, from my perspective, was based
on a change in the outlook for 1999. It was driven by the forecast, not by initial conditions
and not by recent data on the pace of the expansion.
There are three key developments that, in my view, justify a downward revision for the
forecast for growth in 1999. First, the further pressure on emerging market economies,
especially Latin America, following the Russian default and devaluation merits a downward
revision in the forecast for foreign growth and hence in U.S. net exports. This is partially
offset by the recent depreciation of the dollar, but still leaves, in my judgment, net exports
lower than previously projected. Second, the correction in equity prices points to a
downward revision to consumer spending and to business fixed investment and residential
construction as well. The wealth effect, after all, works in both directions. Third, the
widening of risk spreads and generally reduced appetite for risk suggests that financing
conditions will be less favorable going forward. The effect of the latter is more difficult to
quantify, but it is likely to affect underwriting standards and loan terms, especially for
riskier borrowers. Because these developments occurred from mid-August through early
September, they might not have been reflected in forecasts on which you based your survey
responses.
Phase Two
These three developments combine to define what I will refer to as phase two of global
turmoil. During phase one, the shocks from Asian emerging economies and of the further
deterioration in Japan resulted in powerful but partially offsetting cross currents. Phase one
resulted in a powerful adverse shock to U.S. aggregate demand as a result of the decline in
net exports induced by the combination of recessions and sharp depreciations in the region.
But the same global turmoil that undermined net exports also brought a shift in portfolio
preferences toward dollar-denominated assets, resulting in lower interest rates and perhaps
adding to the resilience of U.S. equity markets. In addition, an important part of the decline
in oil prices could be directly attributable to the regional turmoil, taking into account both
the declines in income and the dramatic increase in the relative price of oil, priced in dollars,
to this region. The latter two developments buoyed U.S. private domestic demand,
contributing at least in part to its strengthening during the first half and partially offsetting
the restraint via net exports.
Phase two appears to have begun in about mid-July. Some companies reported disappointing
earnings. The stock market peaked in July and fell sharply in early August, and yield
spreads began to widen. All this accelerated with the spread of turmoil to Russia and with
the heightened concern about Latin America. Phase two will involve an incremental further
hit to net exports, though one that is likely to be relatively small compared to that in phase
one. But the key to phase two is that its effects on U.S. financial markets will likely
reinforce rather than offset the projected incremental restraint on net exports. There has been
a sharp correction of equity prices, in the United States and around the world, and rising risk
spreads offset and, for the riskier borrowers, more than offset the effect of further declines in
government bond rates. So phase two has added to the projected decline in net exports ahead
and broadened the impact of global turmoil on domestic demand by undermining the
favorable set of financial conditions that had been so important in promoting strong growth
over the last couple of years.
Gravity
The deterioration in financial conditions and incremental effect on net exports are two
important sources for a downward revision to the forecast for 1999. But I want to offer a
third reason for the slowdown I now expect, gravity. Let me explain.
Phase one failed to slow GDP growth, in part, because of offsets via lower interest rates and
a lower price of oil. But these offsets were only partial. They do not, I believe, fully explain
the surge in domestic demand in the first half. Part of this surge may have reflected the
lagged effects of the long period of rising equity prices and declining long-term rates. But
part may simply have been an unexplained and fortuitous positive demand surprise. This
would be reflected in correlated under-predictions across a range of spending equations-from consumer spending, to housing starts, to business fixed investment. In this case, the
slowdown going forward will be reinforced to the extent these positive demand shocks
dissipate.
I call this the gravity explanation. Growth is going to slow, in part, because it was
unexplainably high in the first half. It reminds me of the explanation of our forecast at
LHM&A for a sharp decline in long-term interest rates in 1993. When we were asked why
we expected such a sharp decline in long-term rates, we responded: Because they are too
high! Fundamentals were consistent with lower rates, and we were simply calling for actual
rates to converge to where we thought they already should be. The slowdown in 1999 will
be the cumulative effect of this spontaneous slowing as the high-flying economy succumbs
to the force of gravity and the induced slowing of the economy in response to weaker
foreign growth, the recent decline in equity values, and the widening of risk spreads and
generally reduced appetite for risk.
Central tendency and asymmetric risks
Ordinarily, the mean and mode of the forecast are identical, because the risks facing the
economy are typically quite symmetric. Indeed, when I am told that the risks associated with
a given forecast are asymmetrical, I usually suggest the forecaster revise the forecast until
the risks become symmetrical. But occasionally, and perhaps now, a true sense of
asymmetric risks enters the picture, introducing a meaningful gap between mean and mode.
This is perhaps most likely the case when there are possible discontinuities in the forecast.
A source of such discontinuity arises from possible devaluations in countries on a fixed or
pegged exchange rate. Whereas under floating rates, a gradual depreciation could take some
pressure off an economy subject to an adverse shock, a forced devaluation in a country that
can no longer defend its peg often reinforces rather than cushions the downward momentum
in the economy in response to an adverse shock and can, therefore, be instrumental in
abruptly moving an economy from slow growth to sharp recession. It is rare that we capture
such discontinuities in our forecasts. It is tough enough to forecast the consequences once
the discontinuity becomes apparent.
Forecasters have a choice. They can be aggressive with the central tendency forecast and
project a substantial slowing in growth, leaving us with about equal probabilities that growth
will be faster or slower than the central tendency. Or they can be somewhat more cautious
and be left with asymmetric downside risks. Both the central tendency and the perception of
the probability distribution around that central tendency are important features of the
"outlook" and are relevant to the setting of monetary policy.
The profit squeeze
Corporate profits have declined, on net, over the past three quarters. Interestingly, as I have
noted before, this is not a period over which there has been a slowdown in GDP growth.
Instead the squeeze has come from declining margins rather than from declining volume.
The margin squeeze reflects the effect of tight labor markets on wages and the deceleration
in product prices over the last several quarters. No doubt, some of the pressure on margin
reflects direct and indirect fallout from the global slowdown.
One of the most dramatic developments over the last year has been a halving in the inflation
rate for broad indices of domestically produced goods. For example, the chain price measure
for GDP has slowed from 2% over the four quarters ended in the second quarter of 1997 to
just 1% over the four quarters ended in the second quarter of 1998. A couple of tenths of this
slowdown can be attributed to developments in food and especially energy prices. But the
rest was widespread throughout the various components of GDP.
A key factor, I believe, was the increasingly rapid decline in import prices. Now, I assure
you I do not need to be reminded that GDP is the sum of spending on U.S. produced goods
and therefore does not include imports. I have not spent so much time focusing on
regulatory matters that I have forgotten the GDP identity! Nevertheless, I believe that the
effect of declining import prices might have been as large or even larger on the GDP price
measure than on the CPI or PCE price indices that directly include imports. How could that
be? One of the most important sources of restraint on inflation in this episode has been the
effect of declining import prices on the pricing leverage of domestic producers of competing
goods. The weight of imports is actually higher for capital goods than for consumer goods,
so this effect will be larger for capital goods included in GDP than for the domestically
produced consumer goods included in both the CPI and GDP.
Given the tightness of labor markets, it has been widely expected that profit margins would
narrow as the mark-up of prices over unit labor costs declined. This was expected to result
from a gradual acceleration of wages relative to prices and to be a precursor of higher price
inflation. The mark-up has indeed declined, but more from a deceleration of prices relative
to wages. Instead of pointing toward higher inflation, the decline in the mark-up is in fact
further evidence of forces restraining inflation. Going forward, slower growth is likely to
bring a cyclical slowing in productivity, reinforcing the effect of narrower margins on
profits. As a result, firms will be challenged by less accommodative internal cash flow in
addition to the less favorable external financing terms that I discussed earlier.
Confidence
Ordinarily I place little emphasis on an independent role for "confidence" in forecasting. For
example, I do not believe it is useful, in general, to use confidence variables directly in
spending equations. This is because, normally, economic fundamentals determine both
spending and confidence. As a result, confidence is little more than a summary of
fundamentals and provides little if any independent information.
Occasionally, confidence measures can change independently or at least disproportionately
to fundamentals. In this case, they may have incremental forecasting value. It will be worth
watching how consumer confidence measures respond to the global and equity market
turmoil.
The Challenge Facing Monetary Policy
Now I turn to the implications of the outlook for monetary policy.
Two-sided risks
The first challenge facing monetary policy is the degree of two-sided risk the economy
faces. The upside risk, the threat of higher inflation, arises from the initial conditions and
from the history of growth exceeding expectations over the past two years. The initial
conditions are an economy operating at a point beyond sustainable capacity and, in the first
half, still growing above trend. This set of initial conditions is clearly not one that supports,
much less compels an easing in monetary policy. Indeed, it is this set of initial conditions
that suggested that a slowdown could be benign, the route to the reverse soft landing.
The downside risk became noteworthy following the crises among Asian developing
economies and Japan slipping from stagnation into recession and, more recently was
exacerbated by the further contagion among emerging market economies, and the decline in
equity prices and increased risk spreads here at home.
As a result of these developments, the balance of risks has, in my view, been gradually
shifting over recent months. Earlier, I believed that the risks supported an asymmetric
posture toward tightening, reflecting the very tight labor markets. Later this balance shifted
to support a symmetric position with an unchanged funds rate. By late September, this
balance had shifted enough, in my view, to justify an easing of monetary policy.
Asymmetric risk and the "maximin" solution
The adjustment to the outlook that justified the policy change can be thought of as some
combination of a lower central tendency for growth next year and a widening of the risk
associated with downside possibilities relative to the baseline forecast. The role of
asymmetric risks in the forecast means that the probability distribution related to outcomes
is an important ingredient in the policy decision. Another way of explaining my thinking
about the recent policy action is as an attempt to avoid the worst possible errors in an
uncertain environment. I have called this approach the "maximin" solution to the policy
problem. It involves comparing the relative costs of two policy mistakes. In the current
environment that comparison was between holding policy constant when an easing would
have been justified and easing when no change would have been called for. The "maximin"
solution (patterned after the solution to the "prisoners' dilemma") is to select the option that
would yield the smaller cost if the policy turned out to be a mistake. For example, if there is
no change in policy, the worse case outcome would be a sharp slowing in growth to well
below the trend rate. Under an easing, the worse case outcome would be that the economy
turned out stronger than expected, so the easing was unwarranted, and inflation increased
more sharply than projected. These two outcomes have to be weighed. My judgment is that
the most worrisome possibility has become the former, justifying the easing of monetary
policy last week.
Preemptive policy
Because the easing was, for the most part, a response to the change in the forecast, it is an
example of preemptive policy. During the period when the stance of monetary policy was
asymmetric toward tightening, the focus was on whether or not a preemptive move toward
restraint was justified in light of the progressive tightening of the labor market. Because
inflation continued to decline, even as labor markets became tighter, and because the turmoil
in global markets held the possibility of some relief in U.S. labor markets, policy remained
on hold, with the exception of the single 25-basis point tightening in March of 1997. But
preemptive policy is a two-way street. The recent easing was, in my view, a preemptive
move to cushion the projected slowdown and help promote the graceful version of the
reverse soft landing scenario in your forecast.
The aggressiveness of such a preemptive policy move, specifically one based entirely on a
change in the forecast, is generally going to be smaller than would be the case if there was
also clear evidence of a slowing in the expansion in the most recent data. In addition, the
aggressiveness of the policy move will generally be affected by the initial conditions. If
labor markets initially are very tight, growth has been above trend, and there have been
consistent surprises on the up side, there will be more caution in easing than if the economy
were initially operating just at full employment and growing at trend. One has to be
confident in the former case that the slowing will be enough to cross the line from being
benign to becoming undesirable.
The Taylor Rule and balancing stabilization and inflation objectives I have talked on several
occasions about the usefulness of the Taylor Rule as a starting point for thinking about
monetary policy. The Taylor Rule specifies how the federal funds rate should be adjusted
over time in response to changing economic conditions, allowing attention to be paid to
monetary policy's stabilization role in the context of the Federal Reserve's long-run price
stability objective. There are a variety of versions of this basic approach, depending on
measures of utilization and inflation rates and depending on whether the adjustment is made
in response to past and current movements in utilization and inflation rates or in response to
forecasts of these variables. I believe the current move can be justified in a forward-looking
variant of the Taylor Rule, where today's policy depends on the forecast of future output
gaps and inflation. The policy is, therefore, well designed, in my judgment, to balance the
stabilization and inflation objectives.
Domestic policy and global risks
Another major challenge is to decide to what degree U.S. policy should take into account
global risks, above and beyond their direct effect on the U.S. forecast. The conventional
wisdom has always been that the best way for the United States to be an effective anchor in
the world economy would be for U.S. policy to maintain a disciplined focus on U.S.
domestic objectives. That is, a U.S. economy growing at its maximum sustainable rate, at its
maximum sustainable utilization rate, and maintaining price stability would offer the very
best support that we could possibly provide to the world economy. It is hard to argue with
this approach.
The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States, not the central bank for the
world. Our Congressional mandate is to achieve full employment and price stability in the
United States. On the other hand, we live in the world economy and, therefore, have a
powerful interest in its prosperity. The bottom line is that avoiding an excessively sharp
slowdown in the U.S. next year is both consistent with domestic policy objectives and with
supporting the global economy during a period of stress.
It should be appreciated, however, that U.S. monetary policy has a far greater ability to
shield the U.S. economy from global distress than to counter the powerful recessionary and
deflationary forces in the world economy. While the easing by the Federal Reserve may take
some pressure off global financial markets, this respite will be wasted if the countries in
crisis and those facing serious contagion risks do not take appropriate policy actions to
support their own economies.
The stock market and monetary policy
Just a short time ago, there was widespread concern that an overvalued stock market, an
erosion of credit standards and failure to adequately reflect risk in asset prices were both
contributing to the strength of the expansion and increasing the vulnerability of the
economy. The conventional wisdom for monetary policy, nevertheless, was not to assume
that policymakers had a better ability to assess stock market valuations than market
participants themselves. The stock market, in this view, should be taken into account in
monetary policy in the same way as myriad other considerations, only in so far as it affected
the balance between supply and demand in the economy and hence projected
macroeconomic performance. And this was, in my view, exactly how it was taken into
account. The simulative effect of soaring equity prices was one of the considerations that, in
my judgment, supported allowing the real federal funds rate to rise, as inflation declined
over recent quarters.
Now that stock prices have moved lower and there has been some reversal of the excessive
erosion in risk premiums, it would be wildly inconsistent to argue that these market
developments themselves are the basis for easier monetary policy. Once again, the issue is
the effect of recent market developments on the forecast for growth, utilization rates and
inflation and whether any such revision is sufficient to justify policy action.
Conclusion
The U.S. economy continues to operate at high utilization rates and with low inflation. But
the cumulative force of recent developments appears likely to yield a slowing in the pace of
growth next year. This is a rapidly changing environment. Fortunately, monetary policy is
capable of responding quickly to changing conditions. The role of monetary policy, in this
episode, is to cushion this slowdown, provide insurance against downside risks, and promote
the reverse soft landing you have been consistently forecasting.
Let me conclude by returning to a point I touched on in the introduction. Your forecast, in
particular, and consensus forecasts, in general, appear to appreciate both the ability and
willingness of monetary policy to adjust as necessary to changing developments. This
perception is, I believe, one reason why consensus forecasts have changed so little in the
face of recent developments that appeared to encourage downward revisions to the forecast
for growth. This observation is implicit in your survey, but did not immediately catch my
attention. Only when I saw the more recent consensus forecast in the October 5 issue of
Macroeconomic Advisors' Weekly Commentary did I get the message.
MA's consensus panel projected that GDP growth would be 2.1% over 1999, almost
identical to your forecast. This seems to further confirm that some things, like the growth
forecast for 1999, apparently never change. This was the first time the MA panel had been
asked for their forecast over 1999, so I do not know for sure whether or not their forecast
changed. But I am assuming, given that it is so close to yours and to where the consensus
forecast has been for the last year, that it did not. I was, I have to admit, a little surprised,
because I had expected the consensus forecast to be revised downward in response to recent
developments.
But there was an important difference between your forecast and that of MA's panel. MA's
consensus panel assumed a cumulative 100 basis point decline in the federal funds rate over
the coming year, compared to the 25 basis point decline in your forecast. I suspect you see
where I am going with this. Both your forecast and the MA panel's forecast offset any
downward revision to the forecast due to recent developments with perfect monetary policy,
leaving the growth forecast for 1999 unchanged. The larger the expected restraining
influences, the sharper the change in the policy response, not in the growth forecast. All I
can say is that I appreciate the confidence that you have in monetary policy and I know we
will try to live up to your expectations.
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